Domingo vs. Court of Appeals

57
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Domingo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993.*
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration
of such fact under the. Family Code even for purposes other than
remarriage.Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
_______________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
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VOL. 226, SEPTEMBER 17, 1993

573
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.
Same; Same.In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who,
believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With
the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Same; Same.That Article 40 as finally formulated included the
significant clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might
well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other
than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as
well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters presumptive legitimes. In such cases,
evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove
the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a
court declaring such previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a marriage which remains

subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an
absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto
a judgment for the liquidation of property, custody and support of
children, etc. There is no need of filing a separate civil action for such
purposes.Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondents
ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Thus, petitioners suggestion that in order for their
properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects
of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It
stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a
first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the
incidental questions regarding the couples properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible
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57
4

error in finding that the lower court committed no grave abuse of

discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
VITUG, J., Concurring:

Marriages; Certain effects of a valid marriage can flow out of a void
marriage.A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a
nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed in
the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the status or
the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific instances
where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow from the void
marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void marriages under
Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and Article 53, in relation to
Article 52 (due to failure of partition, delivery of presumptive legitimes
of children and recording thereof following the annulment or declaration
of nullity of a prior marriage), conceived or born before the judicial
declaration of nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as
legitimate (Article 54, Family Code).
PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent courts ruling
finding no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts order
denying petitioners motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo
filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig entitled
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property
against petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J alleged among others
that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth
Center Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No.
1277K-76 with Marriage License No. 4999036 issued at Carmona,
Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one
Emerlina dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and
still existing; she came to know of the prior marriage
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575
only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for
bigamy; from January 23, 1979 up to the present, she has been
working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the Philippines
only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave
granted by her foreign employer; since 1983 up to the present, he
has been unemployed and completely dependent upon her for
support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased
real and personal properties with a total amount of approximately
P350,000.00, which are under the possession and administration of
Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month vacation,
she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she
further discovered that he had been disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him
about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as
her attorney-in-fact to take care of her properties; he failed and
refused to turn over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to
administer and possess the same on account of the nullity of their

marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from
exercising any act of administration and ownership over said
properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of no force
and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive
owner of all properties acquired at the time of their void marriage
and such properties be placed under the proper management and
administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
petition stated no cause of action. The marriage being void ab initio,
the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property
which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an
Order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. She
explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage
by a man with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap
v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary
to establish the invalidity of a void marriage (citing the cases
576
57
6

of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845).

Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the second marriage
contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first marriage with
another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an
issue in said case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme
Court ruled in explicit terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the
second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of its
nullity. (37 SCRA 316, 326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous rulings of the
Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no property in his
possession is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous

application of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS2 and the absence of
justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On
September 11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for

reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days from receipt
within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special
civil action of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the
petition. It explained that the case of Yap v. CA4 cited by petitioner
and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not
have relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts
because these cases dealt with the successional rights of the second
wife while the instant case prays for separa_______________
Annex C, Rollo, pp. 28-29.
L-28093, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 315.
3 Annex J, Rollo, pp. 62-67, Justice Jorge S. Imperial, ponente and Justices Luis
A. Javellana and Serafin V.C. Guingona, concurring.
4 L-40003, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 229.
577
1
2

577
tion of property corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage.
It observed that the separation and subsequent distribution of the
properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper
determination of the status of the marital relationship between said
parties, whether or not the validity of the first marriage is denied by
petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and
multiplicity of suits, the declaration of nullity of marriage may be
invoked in this proceeding together with the partition and
distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52
of the Family Code, it held that private respondents prayer for
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation
of their properties. Lastly, it noted that since the Court has
jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to
dismiss is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would
have been to file an answer, proceed with the trial and in case of an
adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.

The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are
the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void
marriage is necessary. If in the affirmative, whether the same should
be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP N6. 1989-J is the proper remedy of
private respondent to recover certain real and personal properties
allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v.
Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No. 1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous.
Furthermore, under his own interpretation of Article 40 of the
Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since
the petition in SP No. 1989-J contains no
_______________
Annex M, Rollo, p. 80.
6 100 Phil. 1033 (1957).
7 95 Phil. 845 (1954).
5
578
57
8

allegation of private respondents intention to remarry, said petition
should, therefore, be dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage, not for purposes
of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private
respondent celebrated while the formers previous marriage with one
Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it is
void from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the
absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied
upon by petitioner are cases where the Court had earlier ruled that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex
Reyes, however, dissented on these occasions stating that:

Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void
there would be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge
whether that marriage was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the
courts. x x x10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in

subsequent cases involving the same issue. Thus, in Gomez v.
Lipana,11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in the Aragon and
Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower courts order forfeiting the
husbands share of the disputed property acquired during the second
marriage, the Court stated that if the nullity, or annulment of the
marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is
need for a judicial declaration thereof, which of course contemplates
an action for that purpose.
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System, that
_______________
CIVIL CODE, art. 80, par. 4; FAMILY CODE, arts. 35, par. 4 and 41.
Rollo, pp. 102 and 106.
10 See: Note 6 at p. 1036; Note 7 at p. 848.
11 L-23214, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 615, 620-621.
8
9
579

579
although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio
as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and
applied the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the
prayer of the first wife asking for a declaration as the lawful
surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her
deceased husband, it explained that (t)he second marriage that he
contracted with private respondent during the lifetime of his first
spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and
effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage.
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy13 the
Court reverted to the Consuegra case and held that there was no
need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial

declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she
contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel.
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense.14 Where the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code
Revision Committee16 which drafted what is now the Family
_______________
L-43905, May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 525.
13 G.R. No. 53703, August 19, 1986, 143 SCRA 499.
14 FAMILY CODE, art. 39.
15 Id., art. 40. See also: arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148.
16 The Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) prepared the draft of the revision of Book I of the
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12
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0

Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
This is borne out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint
Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees where the
present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39.
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not
only void but also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above
provision be modified as follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes),
however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only. . .
On the other hand. Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . . Justice Caguioa explained that
his idea is that one cannot determine for himself whether or not his marriage is valid
and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno accordingly proposed that the
provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a final judgment
annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice

Puno, however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment,
they still have to produce the judgment. Justice Caguioa suggested that
they say.
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the
_______________
Civil Code of the Philippines. After more than four years, the draft was turned over to the
Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center which reviewed and revised the same
for more than three years.
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581
basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in Article
41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid,

does it include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the
marriage is void? Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit
added that in some judgments, even if the marriage is annulled, it is
declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this matter be made clear in
the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to
require first a judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable
marriages, with which the other members concurred. Judge Diy added
that annullable marriages are presumed valid until a direct action is filed
to annul it, which the other members affirmed. Justice Puno remarked
that if this is so, then the phrase absolute nullity can stand since it might
result in confusion if they change the phrase to invalidity if what they
are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is
void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral
defense as well as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the
idea in the provision is that there should be a final judgment declaring the
marriage void and a party should not declare for himself whether or not
the marriage is void, which the other members affirmed. Justice Caguioa
added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral attack on that
point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on the
assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving
one of the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the
basis of the liability is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say
that there will be no judgment on the validity or invalidity of the marriage
because it will be taken up in the same proceeding. It will not be a
unilateral declaration that it is a void marriage. Justice Caguioa saw the
point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be invoked only on
the basis of final judgment . . . Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as
follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only on the basis of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent
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marriage, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the
basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and
will not solve the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if
one enters into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment
declaring the nullity of a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is
void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to
the original wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a

marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that
his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the
judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that
there is a necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a
prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent
case of Terre v. Terre.19 The Court, in turning down the defense of
respondent Terre who was charged with grossly immoral conduct

consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the
latter remained subsisting, said that for purposes of determining
whether a person is legally free to
_______________
August 23, 1986, pp. 4-7.
18 J. A.V. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK OF THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 46 (1988).
19 Adm. Case No. 2349, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 6, 11.
583
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583
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first
marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage, petitioner submits that the same can be
maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to
allege this purpose, according to petitioners theory, will warrant
dismissal of the same.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the

provision of the word solely. As it is placed, the same shows that
it is meant to qualify final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in
conveying the precise intent of the Committee members, the
provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for
purposes of remarriage . . ., in which case solely would clearly
qualify the phrase for purposes of remarriage. Had the
phraseology been such, the interpretation of petitioner would have
been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus
rendering irrelevant the clause on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.

Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party
might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an
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earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage
void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously
contracted a marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into
another marriage which is legally unassailable, he is required by law
to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other
words, for purposes of remarriage, why should the only legally
acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute
nullity be a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void?
Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as
such, it shall be protected by the State.20 In more explicit terms,
the Family Code characterizes it as a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.21 So crucial
are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation
that their nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation . . .,22 As a matter of policy, therefore,
the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another
cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of
both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void

ipso jure and with no legal effectand nothing more. Were this so,
this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and
would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and farranging as human
ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a socially significant
institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and
nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only
would such an open and public
_______________
CONST., art. XV, sec. 2.
FAMILY CODE, art. 1.
22 Id.
20
21
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585
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the
contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through
records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no
impediment to a second sought to be contracted by one of the parties
may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code
to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, If
previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved and annulled.23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioners interpretation of Art.
40 of the Family Code is, undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his
position that private respondents failure to state in the petition that
the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal
of SP No. 1989-J is untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40
resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term solely was in
fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented that the word only may be misconstrued to
refer to for purposes of remarriage. Judge Diy stated that only
refers to final judgment. Justice Puno suggested that they say on the
basis only of a final judgment. Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the
legal term solely instead of only, which the Committee approved.24
(Italics supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute

nullity of marriage is unnecessary, petitioner suggests that private
respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the

recovery of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their
union. In such an eventuality, the lower court would not be acting as
a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on
the issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out
that there is actually nothing to separate or partition as the petition
admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondents money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded
that the prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be raised together with the other incident of their
_______________
Id., art. 11.
24 See: Note 17, at p. 7.
23
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marriage such as the separation of their properties.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the
final judgment therein shall provide for the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and
support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings.25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. x x x
xxx
xxx
1. (2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the
net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership
property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if
there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
2. (3)Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if
the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations
made to said donee are revoked by operation of law;
3. (4)The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse
who acted in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy,
even if such designation be stipulated as irrevocable; and
4. (5)The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith
shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate

and intestate succession. (n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith,
said marriage shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of
marriage and testamentary disposition made by one in favor of the other
are revoked by operation of law. (n)26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondents ultimate

prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their
marriage. Thus, petitioners suggestion that in
_______________
Art. 50 (2).
26 In relation to Art. 50 (1)The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4)
and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper cases to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and
45.
587
25

587
order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has
to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has
clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage,
one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of
property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the lower
court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought
is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental
questions regarding the couples properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the
lower court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioners motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of respondent Court dated February 7, 1992 and the
Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bidin and Melo, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., On official leave.
Vitug, J., With concurring opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
I concur with the opinion so well expressed by Mme. Justice Flerida
Ruth P. Romero. I should like, however, to put in a modest

observation.
Void marriages are inexistent from the very beginning and, I
believe, no judicial decree is required to establish their nullity,
except in the following instances:
(a) For purposes of remarriage pursuant to the provision of
Article 40 of the Family Code; viz:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes
of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. (n)
(b) A marriage celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Fam588
58
8

ily Code in case a party thereto was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage (Article
36, Family Code), where an action or defense for the declaration of
nullity prescribes ten (10) years after the Family Code took effect
(Article 39, Family Code); otherwise, the marriage is deemed
unaffected by the Family Code.
A void marriage, even without its being judicially declared a
nullity, albeit the preferability for, and justiciability (fully discussed
in the majority opinion) of, such a declaration, will not give it the
status or the consequences of a valid marriage, saving only specific
instances where certain effects of a valid marriage can still flow
from the void marriage. Examples of these cases are children of void
marriages under Article 36 (due to psychological incapacity) and
Article 53, in relation to Article 52 (due to failure of partition,
delivery of presumptive legitimes of children and recording thereof
following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a prior
marriage), conceived or born before the judicial declaration of
nullity of such void marriages, who the law deems as legitimate
(Article 54, Family Code).
In most, if not in all, other cases, a void marriage is to be
considered extant per se. Neither the conjugal partnership of gain
under the old regime nor the absolute community of property under
the new Code (absent a marriage settlement), will apply; instead,
their property relations shall be governed by the co-ownership rules
under either Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. I must
hasten to add as a personal view, however, that the exceptional

effects on children of a void marriage because of the psychological
incapacity of a party thereto should have been extended to cover
even the personal and property relations of the spouses. Unlike the
other cases of void marriages where the grounds therefor may be
established by hard facts and with little uncertainty, the term
psychological incapacity is so relative and unsettling that until a
judicial declaration of nullity is made its interim effects can long and
literally hang on the balance not only insofar as the spouses
themselves are concerned but also as regards third persons with
whom the spouses deal.
Petition denied. Questioned decision affirmed.
Notes.Obligation to give or the right to ask for support does
589

589
Arambulo vs. Court of Appeals
not cease permanently. Right to support subsists throughout the
period that the marriage subsists (Canonizado vs. Benitez, 127
SCRA 610).
The best documentary evidence of a marriage is the marriage
contract itself (Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 472).
o0o
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57

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED