Tile information given in this document 'is not to be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to the Press or to any person

not authorized to receive it.

,- ARMY CODE No. 70516 (Part 2)

A/26/GS Trg P!,bfirafiol1s/3028

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LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME III-COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS

PART 2-INTERNAL SECURITY

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By Command of the Defence Council

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE,

26th November. 1969

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CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

(Applicable to copies supplied with Ministry of Defence approval to Commonwealth and Foreign Governments)

1. This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to the

recipient Government for defence purposes only. .

2. This information must be accorded the same degree of security protection as that accorded thereto by the United Kingdom Government.

3. This information may be disclosed only within the Defence Department of the recipient Government, except as otherwise authorized by the Ministry of Defence,

4. This information may be subject to privately owned rights.

AMENDMENTS

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Amendment Number

By whom amended

Date amended

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DISTRIBUTION

(see Catalogue of A rmy Publications, Part /I) Regular Army (other than those mentioned below and Women's

Services) RAChD,RAPCRAVC,RAEC,RADC T &AVR

Staff College

Joint Services Staff' College RMCS

RMA

Arms Schools

Scale D Scale A Scale C

250 100 100 200 100

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LAND OPERATIONS

VOLUME III-COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 2-INTERNAL SECURITY

CONTENTS

Aim

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CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION

SECTION

1. General Introduction

Responsibility for Law and Order Legal Status

2. Principles on the Use of Force General

Application

3. Pattern of Operations General

Nature of Incidents Types of Operations Intelligence

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CHAPTER 2-PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

4. Impact of Military Presence on the People Possible Good Effects

Possible Adverse Effects

Co-operation with Civil Authorities

5. Command and Control and Joint Organization Command and Control ...

Outline Chain of Command

Joint Organization

Local Security Schemes

6. Protection of Military Personnel and Dependants General

Troops on Duty .

Troops off Duty .

Other Precautions against MT Ambush Action if Ambushed

Dependants

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1 1 1 2

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3 3 3 8 9

13 13 13 13

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15 15 15 16 16 19 19

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SECTION

7. Protection of Important Persons and Small Convoys General

Road Escorts

Other Measures ... Briefing

8. Guarding of Vulnerable Points General

Selection of VPs ...

Priority List and Types of VPs Tasks of a Key Point Guard Economy of Manpower Dispositions

Orders

Administration

9. Maintenance of Essential Services Use of Troops

Command

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23 23 23 24 24 24 24 25 26

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CHAPTER 3-SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES AND RIOTS

10. Introduction ...

General Planning

Military Responsibility The Crowd

Preliminary Military Action

Arrival of Military Forces at an Incident

11. Crowd Dispersal

Layout of Section Crowd Dispersal Drills

General Matters Affecting Crowd Dispersal Non-violent Crowd Dispersal

Opening Fire

Crowd Dispersal in a Confined Street Crowd Dispersal in an Open Space

12. Employment of Troops on Police Duties General

Military Standards

Action by Troops Employed in Police Role Training, Organization and Drills

13. Urban Anti-terrorist Operations General

Probable Background Situation

Difficulties Peculiar to Urban Anti-terrorist Operations Concept of Operations

Tactical Methods ...

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SECTION

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CHAPTER 4-CONTROL OF URBAN MOVEMENT

14. Introduction Aim Principles Planning

Methods of Control

15. Road Blocks ...

General Types Principles Methods Stores

43 43 43 44 44

44 44 45 45 47 49

49 49 49 49 50 50 50 51 51 51

51 51 51 52 52 53 53 53

53 53 53 56 56 56

56 56 57 57 57 58 58 58

16. Control Points Aim

Tasks Composition Layout Orders

Method of Operation Communications Stores

Police Assistance ...

17. Domination from Rooftops/Hilltops General

Tasks

Composition of Standing Patrols Orders

Reconnaissance and Siting

Method of Operation during Civil Disorder Helicopters

18. Urban Patrols Aim

Types

Use of Armoured Vehicles Communications

Police

19. Curfews

General

Imposition ...

Military Duties

Police Duties

Method of Operation Command and Control Administration

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SECTION

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CHAPTER 5-CORDON, SEARCH AND SNATCH OPERATIONS

20. General

Introduction Command and Control Tasks

Difficulties and Possible Disadvantages Organization

21. Cordon Techniques General

Approach ... Dispositions

Battle Procedure Action in Cordon Area

Isolating an Area from External Telephone Communications

22. Search Techniques ...

Announcements to the Public Search Parties

Searching of Women Methods

Cages

Screening Teams Escort Troops

23. Snatch Operations Aim

Composition of Snatch Parties Planning

Method

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ANNEXES

Annex

A The Law and Members of the Armed Forces 73

B Detection and Disposal of Enemy Booby Traps and Explosive Devices., . 81

C Communications 83

D Specimen Headings for a Military Local Security Scheme 87

E Vehicle Modifications 89

F Safety Precautions against Accidental Discharges 93

G Suggested Instructions on When to Open Fire ... 95

H Platoon Box Formation for Crowd Dispersal 96

I Platoon Extended Front Formation for Crowd Dispersal 97

J Standard Company Formation for Crowd Dispersal 98

K Company Formation for Crowd Dispersal in an Open Space-Pivoting 99

L The Platoon Acting in a Police Role-Crowd Dispersal Formation 100

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M The Platoon Acting in a Police Role-Sequence of Action and Scale of

.. Equipment 101

N Crowd Dispersal-Sequence of Events and Words of Command 103

o Specimen Headings for Incident Reports 107

P Riot and Crowd Dispersal Diary of Events 108

Q Use of Riot Control Agent 109

R Form to be Completed by an Officer who Ordered Fire to be Opened... 111

S Procedure for Searching Vehicles ... 112

T Control Points, Road Blocks, Gate Check Points-Suggested Scale of

Stores 114

• U Control Points-Specimen Headings for Orders 117

FIGURES
1. Booby Traps and Explosive Devices 5-7
2. A Terrorist Hide 10-11
3. An Arms Cache 12
4. Vehicles fitted for IS Operations 17-18
5. Immediate Action Drill when Ambushed 20
6. Diagrammatic Layout of a Road Escort 22
7. Troops in IS Box Formation 29
8. Troops Facing a Hostile Crowd . .. 35
9. A Police Riot Squad 38
10. Troops in IS Formation for Police Role 38
11. Diagrammatic Layout of a Road Block 46
12. A Kidnap Vehicle used in Palestine 48
13. A Rooftop/Hilltop Standing Patrol 52
14. A Foot Patrol in an Urban Area 54
15. A Vehicle Patrol in an Urban Area 55
16. A Cordon Moving into Position . .. 64
• 17. A Cordon in Position 65
18. Diagram of a Cage Layout for Screening 70 ..

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VOLUME III-COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY OPERATIONS PART 2-INTERNAL SECURITY

AIM

1. The aim of Part 2 is to give guidance on the tactics and techniques to be used by military forces when called upon by the civil authorities for support in dealing with:

a. Civil disobedience, unlawful assemblies and riots.

b. Armed terrorist activities in urban areas .

Scope

2. This Part confines itself to internal security operations in urban areas. As explained in Part 1 paragraph 6, internal security operations against insurgents in rural areas are dealt with in Part 3. However. when applying the tactics and techniques used in counter insurgency to an internal security situation, regard must be paid to the principle of minimum force described in this pamphlet.

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION SECTION I-GENERAL

Introduction

3. In internal security operations the threat, whether it be riots, terrorism by individuals or by small sabotage and killer groups, could well occur in the context of a revolutionary war. On the other hand there will be cases when the incidents, particularly civil disturbances, are locally inspired and unconnected with a wider struggle. The degree of force which it is appropriate to use will depend very much on the political climate. In civil disturbances which do not savour of revolt or rebellion, armed force will be essentially in support of the civil power and the principle of minimum force should be applied most conscientiously. In the case of the more violent threats with serious political undertones, some latitude may be allowed to the commander to ensure that he can produce sufficient force to deal with the situation. Although still aiding the civil power, there may, under these circumstances, be occasions when the police are placed under the direction of the military commander in a given area for a specific period of time.

Responsibility for Law and Order

4. The primary responsibility for maintaining law and order, and for safeguarding essential services, rests with the civil authorities. In British dependencies overseas British military forces must be prepared to support the civil authorities in preserving or restoring peace. This type of assistance may also be called for by the governments of independent states with whom we are bound by some form of treaty, although experience has shown that this is not particularly likely unless violence reaches serious proportions. In independent territories it is more appropriate, when civil disturbances do not savour of rebellion, to use indigenous forces. There may also be a requirement for British forces to maintain law and order under United Nations auspices, as part of a United Nations Force.

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Legal Status

5. When calling in the military the civil authorities must clearly define the nature of the unrest and the legal status under local law of the military forces; it is also essential that members of the British forces taking part are fully briefed beforehand on any differences between the local and English law, which might affect the degree of military force permitted and their powers of arrest. In this pamphlet English law is used as the basic guide and the main principles to be considered are set out in Annex A. It must also be made absolutely clear who has authority to ask for military assistance.

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SECTION 2-PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF FORCE

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General

6. In addition to those principles given in Part 1, Section 8, the following apply particularly to the use of force in aid of the civil authorities on internal security

duties:

a. Justification. There must be a justification at law for each separate act of force, and such an act should not be continued longer than is necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

h. Prevention. The only object of the use of force is to suppress actual disturbances. Force must never be applied with punitive intent nor as a reprisal.

c. Minimum Force. A commander must be firm and never flinch from using sufficient force, but he must not use more force than is absolutely necessary to achieve the immediate military aim. The military commander is ultimately responsible for deciding the nature and extent of the force to be used, and he must always act in a spirit of humanity.

d. Legal Obligations. Members of the armed forces must comply with the law and act calmly and impartially in doing so.

e. Safeguarding Loyal Citizens. Care must be taken not to endanger harmless civilians.

f. Maintenance of Public Confidence. Every effort must be made to win and foster public confidence and support, as by doing so this will depress the morale of the dissidents.

g. Evidence. It is the responsibility of the commander on the spot to record •

accurate evidence of any incident involving a civil disturbance.

Application

7. In applying these principles, it is important to recognize the distinction between civil disturbances which are not aimed at overthrowing the established government, and other incidents and acts of terrorism which savour of armed rebellion.

8. In circumstances which approach conditions of armed rebellion, there may be instances where rigid adherence to the principles of minimum force may result in

unnecessary casualties and a disproportionate escalation in the degree of the force ...

subsequently required. Under such circumstances it may be desirable to use a degree

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of force which is apparently greater than immediately necessary in order to show firmness of purpose to dissident elements. The decision to adopt this course is a difficult one but commanders must be prepared to exercise the latitude indicated in paragraph 3 to prevent the deterioration of a situation, and unnecessary casualties.

9. In addition, the principle of minimum force must not be confused with the number of troops deployed on the ground. A large concentration of troops deployed at the proper time may actually enable a commander either to use less force than he would otherwise have done or to avoid having to use it altogether.

10. It is impracticable to attempt to cater for every contingency, and to do so would tend to cramp initiative. When operating in aid of the civil authorities, commanders at all levels are likely to be confronted with unusual situations, in which they alone can make the decisions; they must therefore be trained and briefed so that they can be relied upon to act soundly and intelligently on their own responsibility.

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SECTION 3-PATTERN OF OPERATIONS

General' .

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11. Background Situation. The pattern of military operations will depend on the political situation and the reason for and nature of the disturbances. These may range from isolated incidents which have their origin in industrial or racial disputes and natural disasters, whose aftermath can lead to looting; to acts of terrorism which are part of a planned insurgency designed to overthrow the government. Whatever the precise circumstances, it is assumed in this Part that the responsible government has already established the necessary joint machinery, in conjunction with the military, on the lines set out in Part 1. It will then be the aim of the military, acting in concert with the civil authorities, to restore or maintain order and the authority of the legal government.

12. Timing of Military Operations. If the incidents are of a minor nature, the military will hold themselves in readiness for any call for assistance from the civil authorities, which is only likely to be made if the police are unable to deal with the situation or have exhausted their resources. If the information available indicates that the disturbances are likely to be on a large scale, or if there is some sinister undertone savouring of rebellion, troops are likely to be called out at an early stage to supplement police action by military force. A decision may even be taken for the military to assume control for specific periods, with the police under their direction or in support.

13. Integration of Security Forces. Once the decision has been taken to call the military into the disturbed area, and particularly when it has been decided that the military must be used to break up unlawful assemblies and riots, the military forces and police must be considered as one security force operating jointly to a previously rehearsed deployment plan.

Nature of Incidents

14. Disturbances. These include unlawful assemblies, strikes and picketing, civil disobedience, riots, arson and looting.

15. Terrorism in Urban Areas. This may manifest itself in any of the following forms:

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a. Murder Attacks by Killer Groups. High priority targets for the killer groups will be members of Special Branch, and the more important agents and informers on whom security forces rely for their covert information. Killer groups will also murder selected potential or actual political opponents, and local government or trade union officials to whom the local population may look for leadership. Less resolute terrorists may attack soft targets such as civilians in isolated houses, unwary and unarmed servicemen, and unguarded VIPs. As efforts by the security forces to counter terrorism increase, murder attacks will be preceded by lengthy surveillance, careful planning and rehearsal, to ensure the getaway of the killers. In towns, the weapon may only be in the hands of the killer for a very short time and will probably be hidden near the site chosen for the murder.

b. Ambushes. The enemy's main aim will often be to capture arms and

ammunition, and only to inflict casualties coincidentally. Detailed planning and •

lengthy surveillance are likely to precede all ambushes and little will be left to

chance, but it is unlikely that a resolute effort will be made to press home an advantage once the ambush has been sprung. A small incident may be manufactured to draw troops or police into an ambush. The characteristics of

ambushes can be summarized as follows: r '

(1) They are laid in places where profitable targets are likely to appear. The site chosen will normally be a place where vehicles have to slow down, halt or close up, and where troops after dismounting have little room to manoeuvre. A typical place in a town would be a narrow street where there is a good line of withdrawal for the attackers. Ambushes in urban areas are likely to be carried out by one or two persons only, who strike and then quickly make their getaway.

(2) Weapons used may include pistols, rifles, automatic weapons or grenades.

Vehicles, fallen trees and mines may be used to block a route, while grenades could be thrown from windows or rooftops, or from behind walls.

(3) The enemy's aim is to achieve success by surprise. He is likely to withdraw quickly if confronted by immediate and resolute offensive action.

c. Incidents Involving Mines, Booby Traps and Bombs. Incidents may involve the use of pressure or electrical1y detonated mines, booby traps or bombs, as they lessen the risk on the attacker. Their detection and disposal is considered in Annex B. In many cases ambushes may rely entirely on such devices without any fire from small arms:

(1) Pressure Mines. They will be buried under the surface and can be placed •

in position some time before use and armed in a matter of minutes. They

are ideal for trapping vehicles whose movements can be anticipated.

(2) Electrically Detonated Mines. These may be used in carefully sited positions, attached to the branches of trees hanging over the road or buried under road surfaces, in walls or in culverts. They will normal1y be detonated from an OP overlooking the road, or by trip wires.

(3) Booby Traps (see Fig. 1). The following are some examples of articles which have been used as booby traps-the list is not exhaustive and any attractive items might be used as booby traps and left lying about:

Thermos flasks Air travel bags

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BOOBY TRAPS AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

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Fig. lee)

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Cameras of all types Watches and pens Cigarette tins and packets OHMS envelopes.

(4) Simulated Explosive Devices. May be articles as outlined in the previous sub-paragraph but without an explosive charge. They have to be dealt with by qualified experts and consume much time and effort in their· disposal.

(5) Parcel Bombs. Bombs concealed in parcels have in the past been delivered

to important officials and servicemen, often wrapped in service stationery

or discarded wrapping from ordinary parcels. Control of service stationery and the destruction of old parcel wrapping is one method of • countering such tactics.

(6) Explosives in Vehicles and Planted Containers. These may be used for attacks on important security force centres such as HQ's and officers' living accommodation.

d. Sabotage. Attacks with bombs and explosives may be made against essential services, the transport system, unguarded public buildings, police stations and service installations. It is not easy to prevent sabotage because of the difficulty of screening and carefully searching all casual labour.

e. Impersonation. The terrorist may disguise himself as a priest, woman, policeman or soldier, in order to deceive the security forces.

f. Hides and Arms Caches. These may be located as follows:

(1) Hides. Hides for wanted terrorists may be found in houses, sheds or outbuildings. Likely places are in large cupboards, wardrobes with false bottoms, clothes containers, attics, food bins, water tanks or underground tunnels. Where the entrance to a hide is through the floor it will usually be covered by a large heavy piece of furniture (see Fig. 2a. and b.). False walls may also be used, and trapdoors constructed beneath tiled floors in such a way that no hollow sound will result from tapping.

(2) Arms Caches. The enemy will be short of arms and ammunition and will take particular care of them. The location of arms caches may be known only to a small group. Arms may be hidden anywhere, possibly in an oil-drum built into a wall, or an earthenware jar covered with

rubber and buried out of range of mine detectors, or even merely buried • in the middle of a vegetable patch (see Fig. 3). Reserve weapons may be

kept in less accessible hides on the outskirts of urban areas.

Types of Operations

16. The tasks which will face the military forces operating under the above circumstances call for some special tactics and techniques, which are considered in this Part under the following headings:

a. Chapter2. Precautionary Measures. These are for the protection of military personnel and dependants, the guarding of important persons and vulnerable points and the maintenance of essential services.

b. Chapter 3. Suppression of Unlawful Assemblies and Riots.

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c. Chapter 4. Control of Urban Movement.

d. Chapter 5. Cordon, Search and Snatch Operations.

e. Annex C. Communications.

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17. More extensive operations beyond those listed above, to deal with terrorism outside urban areas and insurgency, are dealt with in Part 3.

Intelligence

18. The importance of intelligence in internal security operations cannot be over-estimated. It is the key to successful operations. The subject is dealt with in detail in Part 1, Chapter 5, and is therefore not repeated in this Part .

19-20. Reserved .

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A TERRORIST HIDE

CONCEALED Fig.2(a)

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REVEALED Fig.2(b)

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CHAPTER 2 PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

SECTION 4-IMPACT OF MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE PEOPLE

Possible Good Effects

21. The arrival or presence of an efficient armed military force will often do much to restore confidence and peace in an area involved in civil disturbances; this will apply particularly if the troops are well disciplined, smartly turned out, and perform their duties impartially, with patience and politeness. Furthermore, the presence of a strong military force available to assist the civil authorities will undoubtedly help to raise the morale of the local police and armed forces. It will also enable police and military action thereafter to be joint.

Possible Adverse Effects

22. There may, however, be occasions when the premature and ostentatious display of British forces could antagonize local opinion, heighten tension, increase the likelihood of disturbances, and even lower police morale; this could apply particularly in an area where our treaty arrangements were in themselves a political issue. A commander must use his judgment, after taking advice from the civil authorities, as to whether an open display of force is likely to do harm or good.

Co-operation with Civil Authorities

23. Whatever the circumstances under which military assistance has been requested, it must be made abundantly clear to the local population that the British forces are operating in full co-operation with, and at the request of the civil authorities.

SECTION 5-COMMAND AND CONtROL AND JOINT ORGANIZATION

Command and Control

24. The form of command and control to deal with an emergency will depend on the type of constitution that exists in the country, the extent of the emergency and the size and composition of the security forces.

25. Since every function of government is affected by an emergency, a special system for the control and direction of operations must be developed. The detailed application and the general principles of government action are fully covered in Part 1, Chapter 3, Sections 8 and 9 and at Annex D to Part 1.

26. The chain of command and control must be by joint civil/military/police

committees at various levels; this ensures that:

a. There is always complete integration of effort.

b. The security forces are always acting in support of the civil authorities.

c. Plans are agreed by joint decisions. Orders are then passed through service channels.

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Outline Chain of Command

27. It is impossible to lay down a chain of command to meet all circumstances and in any case it is frequently difficult to achieve a neatly dove-tailing joint command organization.

28. A possible outline chain of command at the lower levels might be as follows, although additional members will be appointed to the committee dependent on the circumstances:

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REGIONAL OPERATION COMMITTEES
, ASSISTANT
REGIONAL BRIGADE COMMISSIONER
GOVERNOR COMMANDER OF POLICE

DISTRICT OPERATION COMMITTEES
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POLICE
GOVERNMENT BATTALION DISTRICT OR
DISTRICT COMMANDER DIVISIONAL
OFFICER COMMANDER •

COMPANY COMMANDER

OC POLICE DIVISION OR STATION

Joint Organization

29. As stressed in Chapter 1 paragraph 13, the military forces and the police •

must be considered as one security force operating jointly to a previously rehearsed deployment plan. This can be achieved by the following precautionary measures:

a. Practising the establishment of joint police/military HQ. Although military HQ must be mobile it will be normal for the military HQ during disturbances to move into the appropriate police HQ, where the civil and police communications exist and the joint intelligence organization can be integrated. The police have the local knowledge and experience and their advice should always be sought.

b. Establishing and rehearsing the procedure for calling in the military to assist the police.

c. Rehearsing drills for joint police/military action at the scene of disturbances, ..

as described in Chapter 3.

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d. Rehearsing joint police/military action for control measures (Chapter 4) and for cordon and search operations (Chapter 5).

30. During internal security disturbances and insurgency the police force may be penetrated at lower levels by subversive organizations and information must always be passed on a "need to know" basis. It may therefore be necessary for final details of actual operations involving low level police deployment to be passed to them as late as possible. Lack of mutual trust between the military and the police can be disastrous; however the current state and morale of the police force must be assessed.

Local Security Scheme

31. Commanders overseas will be responsible for the production of local security schemes. Specimen headings are given in Annex D and it is particularly important that states of readiness listed in paragraph 13a of Annex D are clearly defined, together with the action required at each stage.

SECTION 6-PROTECTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND DEPENDANTS

General

32. When it is possible that the enemy wil1 attack dependants and troops whether or not engaged on operations, certain precautionary measures must be taken.

Troops on Duty

33. Organized bodies of troops must be prepared to move tactically at all times.

When travelling in vehicles, the packet system may have to be introduced and in that case vehicles should move in groups of not less than two, with sufficient troops on board to provide local protection. The commander of a vehicle group should not travel in the leading vehicle. Also:

a. Care and planning is needed to control the movement of routine administrative vehicles, such as those taking officers and troops to and from their place of duty, post and ration vehicles and school children's buses. To obviate ambush, precautions should include the use of escorts, alternative routes and staggered timings.

b. If there is a danger of military personnel being attacked it may be necessary to ensure that all vehicles travelling outside secure areas carry one or more armed sentries, whilst at night a vehicle may have to be accompanied by an armed escort in a separate vehicle. Such measures cannot be laid down arbitrarily but must be altered to suit the particular circumstances in the area of operations.

34. Organized bodies of troops and vehicles should always move in the form of an advance patrol, with a main body in the centre and a reserve/strike group in the rear. Groups should be sufficiently close together to help each other, but not so close that an ambush can catch several groups at the same time. Each group must have its own sentries.

35. During movement through a possible danger area all ranks must be alert.

An effective plan is to have two degrees of alertness, which can be described as scales 1 and 2; scale 1 should be ordered when a commander considers an attack is likely and every man must be ready for instant action; scale 2 may be ordered when

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moving through a less dangerous area, and when it is only necessary to have the commander and sentries fully alert for instant action. The different scales can be ordered verbally for marching troops, and by flags, radio or light signals for vehicle convoys.

36. When troops are travelling in vehicles all packs and stores should be stacked centrally and men must sit facing the sides and rear holding their weapons. Sentries

should have smoke grenades immediately at hand to throw. To enable troops to It

debus quickly:

a. Not more than 15 troops should be carried in the back of a 4 ton vehicle.

b. Vehicle canopies should be removed.

c. Tail boards should be down.

d. Wire mesh if fitted must be so constructed that men can debus from the rear •

or over the sides. Use of wire mesh depends on the role of the unit and usually

only applies to operations in urban areas. Wire mesh can be a severe handicap in anti-ambush drills.

e. Mesh if fitted must be angled so that bombs or grenades cannot be caught on top.

37. Details of vehicle modifications (see Fig. 4) are given in Annex E, and consideration must be given to the use of sandbags and metal or plastic armour to protect troops in the vehicles.

Troops off Duty

38. Movement will often have to be restricted by placing certain clearly defined areas or establishments out of bounds at specified times. It may become necessary to impose a military curfew to restrict and control the movement of troops, dependants and service sponsored civilians; also to guard places of recreation and to transport personnel to and from recreational areas in escorted vehicles.

39. If the threat is sufficiently serious arms may have to be carried by all troops outside barracks, but this measure has certain obvious disadvantages as well as providing a degree of provocation. Troops carrying arms should never move singly. Safety precautions to be taken against accidental discharges are given in Annex F.

Other Precautions against MT Ambush

40. Armoured Vehicles. Although they are more vulnerable in built-up areas than in open country, the inclusion of armoured vehicles in convoys has three important effects on anti-ambush action:

a. They act as a deterrent to hostile action.

b. They give good covering fire for a counter attack.

c. They can support anyone ambushed, by driving into the ambush area and engaging the enemy at point blank range.

41. Precautions against Mines. Ambushes may be based on the mining of roads with either electrically detonated explosives or pressure mines. To reduce the risk in such circumstances, the following rules should be observed:

a. Vehicle movement should be controlled and carried out at irregular times and intervals.

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VEHICLES FITTED FOR IS OPERATIONS LANDROVER FITTED WITH WIRE MESH

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LANDROVER FITTED WITH WIRE CUTTER

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VEHICLE FITTED WITH WIRE MESH CARRYING TROOPS

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LANDROVER FITTED WITH ANTI-MINE PLATING, ROLL BARS AND SAFETY HARNESS

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b. Dust roads should be avoided if possible.

c. Vehicles should if possible be armoured, or escorted by armoured vehicles.

d. In addition to the vehicle modifications given in Annex E, sandbags should be placed on the vehicle floor.

e. Mudguards may be removed from such vehicles as Ferrets, where they tend to trap the blast from a mine .

Action if Ambushed

42. General. If an organized body of troops is deliberately ambushed in an urban area, the action to be taken should be governed by an immediate action drill, which has been practised repeatedly and can be applied automatically.

43. Basic Rule. The basic rule is to avoid remaining in or entering the killing area of the ambush itself.

44. Immediate Action Drill (see Fig. 5). When troops in vehicles are caught and forced to stop inside the danger area of an ambush, the immediate action drill will be as follows:

a. Sentries throw smoke grenades and engage the enemy, while the remainder debus and move to a rallying point in the direction ordered, followed finally by the sentries.

b. Simultaneously the commander orders "muster right" or "muster left" to indicate the direction in which troops are to move at once.

c. As soon as the troops have assembled, any wounded brought under cover and the commander has located the enemy, an immediate counter attack should be launched with the aim of cutting off the enemy's retreat and destroying him.

d. All troops must be trained to act according to the circumstances, but they must be briefed to avoid wild and indiscriminate firing.

45. Minor Ambushes and Sniping. On occasions, troops and vehicles may be subjected to a minor ambush in the form of long distance sniping. In such circumstances it is generally advisable to keep moving. Fire should be returned towards the general area of the sniper.

Dependants

46. The term dependants covers British service families and service sponsored civilians, all of whom may be terrorist targets. The following precautionary measures must be taken for the protection of dependants if the situation warrants it:

a. The restriction of movement to certain areas at specified times for business, shopping, recreation, etc, and restrictions on large social gatherings.

b. Movement in pairs, avoiding any regular pattern of movement.

c. The organization of a family warden system to protect dependants in their homes. This takes the form of armed vigilante patrols composed of off-duty servicemen, supplemented by security force patrols if necessary.

d. In a really grave situation, dependants may have to be concentrated in one or more security areas under guard, and their movement outside these areas prohibited.

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e. Establishment of family information centres where dependants can be briefed on the general situation and the latest security regulations. This will help to counter alarmist rumours.

47. Specific instructions on the protection and movement of dependants will be set out in local security schemes.

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SECTION 7-PROTECTION OF IMPORTANl' PERSONS AND SMAI.·L CONVOYS

General

48. In many instances, and particularly in the case of VIP travel, the safest and quickest method will usually be by helicopter. When helicopters are used security measures must include the protection at, and the clearance of any mines/booby traps from, terminal landing points.

49. The staff officer responsible for the arrangements for the movement of the VIP or small convoy, must agree with the district security committees concerned the measures the committees are taking to protect the VIP or small convoy through their area. The points to be covered include the means of travel, the route, timings and the size of escort.

50. A regular pattern of movement must be avoided.

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Road Escorts (see Fig. 6)

51. The Escort. A full escort is divided into:

a. Advanced patrol.

b. Close protection group.

c. Reserve/strike group.

52. Advanced Patrol. This should be made up of armoured cars and infantry mounted in armoured or soft vehicles. The task of the advanced patrol is to clear the route of any obstruction and give warning to the close protection group of any danger. It must travel sufficiently far ahead to enable small obstructions to be cleared withcut getting the close protection group involved.

53. The Close Protection Group. This should be composed of armoured cars, the convoy/Vl P car, and infantry in armoured or soft vehicles. This party should move at a steady speed, estimated to conform to the convoy/Vf Ps programme and well within the capability of the armoured vehicles.

In certain circumstances it will be advisable for the VIP to travelin an armoured vehicle. If there is more than one VIP, additional vehicles for their use and additional mounted infantry may be required. A typical order of march is as follows:

a. Armoured car .

b. Convoy/VIP car.

c. Armoured car containing the escort commander.

d. Mounted infantry.

e. Armoured car.

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DIAGRAMATIC LAYOUT OF ROAD ESCORT

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Saladin - Escort commanderj • Troop leader

Notes:

1. Escort based on a troop/platoon

2. If an assault section had been allocatea it would replace the leading infantry section and the strength of the reserve/strike group would be increased.

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54. The Reserve/Strike Group. This should be composed of armoured cars to provide firepower, and mounted infantry; it must move sufficiently far behind the close protection group to allow freedom of action if the latter is ambushed.

55. Command and Control. The escort commander commands the escort from his position behind the convoy/VtP. Good radio communications throughout the column are therefore essential together with a link to the local commander in case the column requires help.

Other Measures

56. The following additional measures should be considered:

a. If the VIP agrees, he should be encouraged to travel in a less conspicuous vehicle than an official flag car.

b. In the event of an attack, it is the duty of the close protection group to protect the convoy/Vl.P and to get them and their vehicles out of the danger area as quickly as possible.

c. In some circumstances it may be advisable to establish. rooftop/hilltop patrols on all or part of the route to be covered by the convoy/Vl P,

d. Light aircraft and helicopters, in radio touch with the escort commander, will in some circumstances provide valuable warning of danger ahead, and discourage ambushers.

e. Secrecy about details of the move must be maintained for as long as possible.

f. The immediate action drill to be taken in the event of a vehicle breakdown must be planned and rehearsed.

Briefing

57. Before starting the move, the escort commander should brief the convoy or VIP on what action to take in the event of an incident. Command will be exercised by. the escort commander. Whatever the size of the convoy, everyone in it must know what to do if an incident occurs.

SECTION 8-GUARDING OF VULNERABLE POINTS

General

58. Guards on vulnerable points (VPs) must be kept to the minimum. They are normally a police responsibility and commanders must strike a balance between the military need to retain mobile forces for offensive tasks and the civilian requirement for security. A satisfactory and sound solution will only be found by close cooperation and discussion with the police. A policeman should be present with any military guard.

Selection of VPs

59. In order to free as many troops as possible for offensive tasks, the following

action must be taken:

a. All VPs inust be reconnoitred and classified as key or otherwise.

b. Military guards should only be provided for those classified as key points.

c. Some VPs may only be classified as key for a limited period, eg a railway station during the unloading of security forces and their equipment. For this reason the classification of VPs should be frequently reviewed.

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Priority List and Types of VPs

60. A list of key points and other VPs should if possible be drawn up by the local government officer and military and police commanders before trouble breaks out:

a. Key points may include:

(1) Communications centres such as telephone and teleprinter exchanges

and radio transmitters. ' ..

(2) Joint HQs. These are normally located at a police station.

(3) Public utilities such as power stations, water pumping stations and

pipelines.

(4) Those bridges essential to the security forces. (5) VIP houses and offices.

(6) Civilian stores of industrial explosives.

b. Other VPs may include: (1) Government offices.

(2) Industrial concerns such as oil storage tanks, refineries. (3) Jails.

(4) Cantonments, especially during racial or religious disturbances.

Tasks of a Key Point Guard

61. The task of a key point guard is to prevent damage, arson or looting and ensure the maintenance of essential services. The guard must. remain until relieved at the key point and should not be called upon to answer requests for help elsewhere. Mobile patrols must be readily available to support key point guards, either in the

defence of a key point or to deal with incidents reported by them. .

Economy of Manpower

62. Economy of manpower is essential, but adequate guards must be provided.

Many key points have to be guarded mainly by providing sentries on the ground, but the use of rooftop sentries by day, if suitable vantage points exist, combined with a good alarm system will reduce the number of troops required. Detection devices of the TOBIAS or IRIS type are now available and may save manpower. Guard dogs can provide protection of large key points or areas such as depots and installations, although a determined saboteur will not be deterred solely by a guard dog.

63. A key point guard should not normally be of less than a section but its

strength will be determined by:

a. The size of the key point.

b. The threat.

c. The distance from the nearest reserve.

Dispositions

64. General. Guardrooms, living areas and sentry postsshould be established where they cannot be rushed. Sandbags and barbed wire should be used to provide adequate protection against small arms, grenades and rocket launcher type weapons, and to create an atmosphere of military alertness and strength. Dispersion of posts should be avoided, otherwise the relief of sentries and quick support in an emergency will be difficult.

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65. Daytime Guards. The minimum requirement will normally be:

a. Sentry at the main entrance to support those checking the right of entry.

b. Sentry in tower or on rooftop, and/or armed prowler(s), paying particular .. attention to the perimeter fence.

c. Reserve that can be called out immediately.

66. Night Guards. At night, isolated and patrolling sentries must be doubled.

Patrolling should be done in an irregular pattern with one man covering the other. Sentries should report to the guardroom at timed intervals. Dogs may be of use.

67. Support of Key Points. Key point guards must be able to call for assistance by such means as radio, telephone or very lights. A degree of protection can be provided for secondary VPs by regular visits from mobile patrols. Commanders of such patrols must be given specific tasks to perform and on return be correctly de-briefed so that all information is recorded. Routes and timings must be changed constantly, otherwise they will become known to the. enemy.

Orders

68. Guard Commanders. Every key point guard commander must be given clear and explicit orders, which should be put in writing as soon as possible. They should

include: .

a. Description of the key point.

b. Tasks including:

(1) Entrances, installations to be guarded and posts to be manned. (2) Number of sentries required at anyone time.

(3) Duration of sentries' duties and degrees of standby for remainder.

(4) Action to be taken if the key point is approached by an unauthorized person.

(5) Action to be taken if the key point is in danger of damage, looting or arson.

c. Concise instructions on the circumstances in which fire may be opened.

d. Liaison with police, including instructions regarding searching of vehicles

and persons entering or leaving the key point.

e. List of authorized employees or visitors, together with specimen passes.

f. Availability of reinforcements.

g. Communications, and the times at which reports must be made by radio

and telephone .

h. Action on receipt of any code word.

i. Safety precautions-charging of weapons.

j. Security of weapons. k. Administration.

69. Sentries. Sentries' written orders are to be read out by the guard commander or by the NCO in charge of reliefs, and should include the:

a. Dress and equipment.

b. Scale of ammunition to be carried, charging of magazines, loading, position of safety catch/change lever.

c. Area and arc of responsibility.

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d. Position of post on patrol route.

e. Checking of passes, specimens of which should be issued.

f. Challenging and identification of authorized employees/visitors, and ,.

instructions regarding searching persons and vehicles. The necessary commands

in the local language must be known.

g. Action to be taken when approached by unauthorized persons.

h. Action when the key point is in danger of damage, looting or arson.

i. Orders on opening fire.

j. Method of calling for assistance.

70. Opening Fire. Suggested instructions on when to open fire are at Annex G.

These must be adapted to meet local conditions and the circumstances.

Administration •

71. Small detachments guarding key points must be correctly administered and

visited frequently, otherwise morale and efficiency wi11 suffer.

SECTION 9-MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES

72. The maintenance of essential services is one of the most obvious forms of effective government. The insurgent, particularly in urban areas, has the ability to disrupt the life of the community by intimidating the people into withdrawing their labour. This not only causes widespread administrative problems, but also brings the existing government into disrepute.

73. To forestall such insurgent activity it will be necessary to prepare contingency plans at an early stage for the manning of essential services should a withdrawal of local civil labour occur. These contingency plans may include the provision of specialists from the UK.

Use of Troops

74. Troops should not normally be employed to maintain essential services unless the local governor or his equivalent has specially authorized their employment on such duties, in order to:

a. Protect the health of the community.

b. Protect the local administration of the security forces.

c. Maintain the commercial life of the community.

d. Maintain a service for the community on humanitarian grounds.

Command

75. Military forces employed on maintaining essential services are to be used solely as organized labour under their own commanders, who will arrange with the civil authorities how the troops can best be employed. Troops may be withdrawn at any time if a prior military claim arises. In some circumstances it may be necessary to form combined civil/military committees to co-ordinate measures for maintaining public services such as ports, electricity, water, sewage, fuel, food, post and telephones. Troops employed on the maintenance of essential services may themselves need protection.

76-80. Reserved.

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CHAPTER 3

SUPPRESSION OF UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLIES AND RIOTS SECTION lO-INTRODUCTION

General

81. This Chapter explains the tactics and techniques which should be employed by military forces in the suppression of unlawful assemblies and riots. Italsa covers the use of troops in a police role. Instructions given in this Chapter are based on English law and if overseas may have to be adapted to meet the requirements of the local law. An aide memoire, Army Code No. 70014 is in issue .

Planning

82. If disturbances are expected, military intervention should be planned and rehearsed with the civil police. Outline plans should cover the following:

a. An assessment of the different types of disturbances likely to develop, their probable locations and the strengths and action needed to control or suppress them.

b. An assessment of what troops will be required for each localityand the earmarking of troops for each task. In some circumstances it may be necessary to plan to use troops in a police role. This is covered in detail in Section 12.

c. The arrangements for magistrates or representatives of the civil government (who may be police officers) to join the troops.

d. Joint, and discreet reconnaissance, if possible down to platoon/riot squad

level.

e. The channels through which requests for military help should be made.

f. The establishment of joint police/military operational HQs.

g. An assessment of critical areas and centres of communication which must be securely held.

h. The provision of evidence by photographic means or by taped eye-witness accounts at the time of the incident.

i. The preparation of any special stores likely to be needed, eg, public address equipment, warning banners, dannert wire and emergency lighting.

j. The reception, accommodation and administration of troops and reinforcements .

k. The rehearsal of procedures and the testing of communications. In all areas where internal security operations are likely there should be specific military frequency allocations so that forces can use radio immediately on arrival.

I. Stockpiling of internal security equipment, riot control agents and maps for reinforcing units.

m. Maintenance of up-to-date briefs to hand to commanders of reinforcing units on arrival.

Militaty Responsibility

83. Troops will normally be positioned at strategic points when disturbances are imminent, but it will be exceptional for them to be called to the actual scene of a

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disturbance unless a high level decision has already been taken to employ military forces for the dispersal of unlawful assemblies or riots. Once the troops have been called, it is still the military commander's responsibility to decide what action is necessary, and it will be his responsibility not to use more force than is necessary. Whether or not he takes action is likely to depend largely on the information and the advice of the civil police or authorities. He will be guided by these authorities unless he has good reasons for not doing so.

84. The military commander should not use force if:

a. The civil authorities are still in control and have not asked for help in the particular incident in question.

b. Other effective but less severe methods of dispersing the crowd will suffice .

The Crowd

85. Generally, the size of the crowd is no indication of its attitude. It may consist of nearly as many peaceful citizens and sightseers as unruly elements, and women

and children may be present in large numbers. Troops should appreciate that a

crowd which hitherto has confined itself to shouting slogans and creating noise may,

in a brief space, be joined by other more violent elements or may spontaneously

turn to more violent methods. There have been occasions in the past when ring-

leaders have tried to induce troops to open fire on a crowd, to use the incident for propaganda purposes.

Preliminary Military Action

86. Before trouble breaks out the military commander must decide, in conjunction with the police, whether and where his troops should be concentrated, where they should move to if disturbances occur, and whether or not they should be seen to be available. It will be'desirable of course to dominate an area before trouble breaks out by the measures described in Chapter 4. The commander must not allow his forces to be scattered, and he shouldkeep a reserve under his own control. Military and police HQs must wherever possible be together and the two commanders at the appropriate level must always be in personal or radio contact with each other. There must also be good communications to any detachments.

Arrival of Military Forces at an Incident

87. The decision to move troops openly or unobtrusively will depend on the cause and degree of the disturbance. When it is of a minor and local nature, and

particularly when violence has not yet occurred, the appearance of troops may have •

a calming effect, but if the disturbance is more serious and widespread, it may be

wise to move troops in unobtrusively. If a situation is serious and the police are

losing or have lost control, troops must be moved in by the most direct open route. Detailed reconnaissance should have been made of all likely routes, and police

action planned to speed the movement of troops in urban areas.

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88. It is essential that movement should be carried out in an orderly, decisive and deliberate manner because, when feeling is running high, this will have a steadying effect. Police guides and traffic escorts should be provided if available. Troops must move in formed bodies. Officers or experienced NCOs will command all small parties or detachments, particularly when AFVs are used. Neither men nor vehicles must be employed singly and sentries or lookouts must be posted in pairs.

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89. Armed forces should not confront, nor be used to marshal the crowd until necessary, as this may cause provocation. Moreover the crowd may become accustomed to the presence of armed troops and be encouraged to think that stronger measures will not be used. On the other hand, to keep too far away may make it difficult to use troops at the right moment, and their commanders may be out of touch with the situation. It is p~rticular1y important that AFVs should not make a premature appearance, which may rob a commander of the advantage he would gain later from the effect of their sudden intervention.

90. Troops should be ready to intervene the moment they arrive at the scene of the disturbance, so that the situation may not be allowed to deteriorate through unnecessary delay. They must therefore have a well rehearsed deployment drill. Commanders must lay down states of readiness for reserves in accordance with the situation .

TROOPS IN IS BOX FORMATION

Fig. 7

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SECTION It-CROWD DISPERSAL

Layout of Section

91. This Section describes particular steps which must be taken when dispersing

a crowd in an urban area under the following headings: .

a. General matters affecting most forms of crowd dispersal.

b. Crowd dispersal by non-violent persuasion.

c. Opening fire.

d. Crowd dispersal in an open space.

e. Crowd dispersal ina confined street.

Crowd Dispersal Drills

92. The drills described in this Section must not be followed rigidly on all occasions, as circumstances will vary according to the place, size and type of crowd and number of police present. Each occasion will require a special plan made jointly with the police. Crowd dispersal formations are shown in Fig. 7 and in Annexes H to L. A sequence of events and words of command for crowd dispersal are given in Annex N.

General Matters Affecting Crowd Dispersal

93. Factors and Principles. The key factor in the military commander's plan will, probably be to assess the direction in which to disperse the crowd. He. will be influenced by the mood and intentions of the crowd, alternative dispersal routes, the location of other crowds in the area, the location of attractive targets, and the degree of urgency, particularly if another threat is likely to develop. The principles governing crowd dispersal are:

a. Early warning of crowd assembly from police, rooftop standing patrols,

helicopters and other sources.

b. Speed of arrival once called for. c.: Co-operation with the police.

d. All-round protection to prevent rioters encircling security forces.

e. Warning, eg, non-violent persuasion.

f. Intelligent anticipation of the crowd's intention, including: (1) Keeping factions apart.

(2) Protecting attractive targets from the whim of the crowd.

g. Intelligent handling of the crowd, which must never be bottled up but must be given time and room in which to disperse.

h. Use of minimum force.

i. !Subsequent domination of the area.

94. Command and Control. The terms military commander and police commander mean the senior military/police representative present at the riot. Although the senior police officer present will not normally be commanding the police riot squad, it Is with him that the senior military commander should make the joint plan. The physical command of troops must always be exercised by their own officers.

95. Use of aircraft. Aircraft, particularly helicopters, may be employed on the foIlowing tasks:

a. Reconnaissance to give advance warning of crowd assembly.

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b. Shadowing a crowd.

c. Dominating a crowd by flying low overhead, thereby drowning cheer leaders and generally causing confusion among the crowd. These tactics may be sufficient to persuade the crowd to disperse.

d. Dropping riot control agent on or near the crowd.

e. Acting as an airborne command post or to relay radio messages between ground stations.

f. Troop carrying.

g. Voice aircraft.

96. Records. Military action in support of the civil authorities is often a subject of inquiry. Therefore it is essential to be able to establish the facts, and a complete record must be kept of all events as they occur. Commanders at all levels must arrange for a diary to be kept in which is recorded such things as:

a. Important events in a chronological order.

b. Brief details of any orders received and issued, either in writing or orally.

c. Factual information, such as the names of civil representatives or police officers with whom the commander has consulted.

d. Brief details of any requests, proposals, and advice given by the civil authorities.

e. Reasons for decisions, subsequent action taken and results.

97. Photographs. Photographs form a valuable record of the situation. A military photographer should be included in a riot platoon organization to photograph important events such as the activities of a crowd, the capture of offenders and the opening and cessation of fire.

98. Proforma. A proforma for use by a commander when giving evidence or when writing his report of an incident is at Annex 0 and a specimen format for use as a diary of events is at Annex P.

Non-violent Crowd Dispersal

99. If possible a commander should try to disperse a crowd by non-violent means before resorting to force, eg:

a. Verbal and visual persuasion using loud hailers, banners, bugles, and/or powerful public address equipment mounted in a vehicle or aircraft. A policeman or interpreter may be required to make announcements .

b. The ostentatious assembly of a large concentration of armed troops who are alert and clearly ready for anything.

c. Ringleaders, agitators and others should be photographed so that they can be identified later as disturbers of the peace. This may cause ringleaders to have second thoughts.

d. In some circumstances water hosing from fire engines may be used to dis;perse crowds. If so, adequate traffic control arrangements are necessary to get the fire engines to the scene, and they must be protected while carrying out their task.

e. Irrespective of previous police action, the military commander should always consider the use of riot control agent before resorting to opening fire. Annex Q gives a guide to the use of riot control agent.

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f. The steady advance of a line of soldiers with fixed bayonets can have an unnerving effect on a crowd. This form of action must be taken only if the commander is quite certain in his own mind that there will be no danger of troops coming into close contact with the crowd. Otherwise it will inevitably lead to hand-to-hand fighting, dispersion, loss of control and perhaps the use of more than minimum force by individual soldiers.

Opening Fire

100. Responsibility and Timing. Responsibility for deciding to open fire is solely that of the military commander on the spot. If possible, he should consult with any representatives of the civil authorities present before ordering fire to be opened, but he cannot ask them to take or share the responsibility for his action. In no circumstances will anyone but the commander himself order fire to be opened, and he will not do so unless he is absolutely satisfied that no other means at his disposal would be effective. Every effort must be made to prevent troops from being overrun by a crowd; when this is about to happen, opening fire is usually the only way of restoring the situation.

10l. Sequence of Action. When the military commander decides that fire must be opened he will, as far as possible, take the following action:

a. Warn the crowd by all available means that effective fire will be opened unless the crowd disperses at once. This can be done by a call on a bugle, followed by the display of banners showing the necessary warning in the vernacular, and an announcement over a loud hailer, megaphone, or public address equipment.

b. Give the order personally to the fire unit (platoon or section) commander concerned, indicating the target and the number of rounds to be fired. He will ensure that the number of rounds is the minimum to achieve the immediate aim.

102. Additional Points Connected with Opening Fire. The following should be

noted:

a. Troops may have to suffer much provocation and even casualties before a decision is made to open fire.

b. Marksmen should be used to provide fire. Steps must be taken to conceal the identity of the firer so that reprisals cannot later be taken against him. A possible way is for a whole section to cock their weapons, apply their safety catches and come into the aim. A firer is then indicated-but NEVER by nameand ordered to fire.

c. When used, fire must be effective.

d. Fire will only be deliberately directed at persons who can be seen to be taking an active part in the disturbance. Aiming low may in many cases be an effective way of keeping casualties to a minimum but, where there is a tarmac road or other hard surface, it may be unwise as innocent people behind the crowd may be killed or injured by ricochets.

e. The SLR is the best weapon to use against a crowd because its fire is easily controlled and can be directed accurately against individuals. Rapid fire from SLRs or bursts from automatic weapons must be used only in the gravest emergency and after single shots have failed.

f. In a really serious riot the threat of fire from the machine gun of an armoured vehicle is a powerful deterrent to a hostile crowd, and will also be ideal for dealing

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with any terrorists supplementing the threat by sniping from buildings. An armoured vehicle used in this role must be provided with close infantry protection and must not open fire unless the threat justifies it.

, g. Ammunition must be strictly controlled and accounted for. This ensures that troops do not possess unofficial ammunition and prevents ammunition falling into the hands of the terrorists. The control of ammunition is particularly ,important as it provides a check on the number of rounds expended and acts as "a deterrent to careless handling or unauthorized firing by our own troops.

103. Action after Firing. The effect of fire must be judged by the reaction of the crowd and not by the number of casualties. As soon as it is considered that the desired effect has been achieved, the following action will be taken:

a. Firing must be stopped at once. Empty cartridge cases will be collected and counted.

b. Immediate help must be given to any wounded.

c. Any necessary steps must be taken to help to clear the area, but in so doing it is important that the exits are not blocked, and that no action involving violence is taken against the people who are trying to disperse.

d.Any dead bodies must be collected and held until they can be handed over to the police. They must not be removed by relatives or friends.

e. Efforts must be made to arrest the ringleaders. Where possible this must be done by the police.

f. Any persons arrested by the military must be handed over to the police as soon as possible. However care must be taken to maintain the chain of evidence, see paragraphs 29 and 30 of Annex A.

g. Finally, the armed forces, with representatives of the civil authorities and police, must remain at the scene of the disturbance until it is clear that the situation has been restored.

h. After an officer has ordered fire to be used he will as soon as possible render a written report to his superior officer. The proforma to be used is at Annex R.

Crowd Dispersal in a Confined Street

104. Speed. Street crowds are almost invariably intent on looting, committing arson or threatening life and property. Quick arrival at the incident is therefore vitaL For this purpose mobile reserves should be maintained in each unit area as well as each control point.

105. Information Required/rom the Police. When the senior police representative at the scene of the disturbance decides that he is unable to deal with the crowd, he willcall for reinforcements. If the reinforcements are military, he must give the following information which should be based on an aide-memo ire common to police and military:

a. The RV with the police near to the scene of the incident.

h. The best route to the RV, to ensure arrival from the right direction without interference.

c. The size of the crowd.

d. The crowd's intention and temper.

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e. Any relevant topographical details including lighting problems at night.

f. The direction in which he wishes the crowd to disperse.

106. Calling for Military Reinforcements. The senior police officer present should personally call for reinforcements if his radio vehicle is with him at the scene of the disturbance. If the radio is some distance away, he may send a deputy briefed with the information listed in paragraph 105 above. In normal circumstances, the police commander should meet the military commander at the R V, but there may be occasions when his deputy will be sent. It is not possible, or indeed desirable, to be dogmatic about the action of the police commander as much will depend on his assessment of the situation.

107. Routes. To help the two commanders to meet, the police commander should if possible keep open the route from the RV to the scene of the incident.

lOS. Communications. In every situation where troops are called to aid the police, it is the military commander's responsibility to communicate with the police commander.

109. Reconnaissance and Plan. The RV should be well clear of the crowd, so that the two commanders can make their plan without interference, but the crowd and rioters must be visible from nearby. If the police commander cannot meet the military commander at the RV, the latter must act according to the circumstances,

as follows: .

a. Make a plan with the police commander over a police radio at the R V.

b. Base his plan on information given him by a police deputy.

c. Advance with his force to make physical contact with the police engaged.

Fire must not be opened if there is any danger to policemen.

110. Role of Police. When the military commander takes over, the police are withdrawn into reserve, but a police representative must remain with the military commander. The police can then be used to:

a. Follow up quickly with a baton charge after the troops have opened fire.

This is effective only if the crowd shows signs of wavering.

b. Cover the troops' rear, by blocking side streets.

c. Make arrests.

Ill. Deployment. The following is the normal sequence of action:

a. Approach. If the military force moves to the scene of the disturbance in transport, it should debus well clear of the crowd. Troops must debus quickly • to a practised drill with all their equipment, and at once form up in the correct formation. If necessary, the force may then be given the order to load and fix bayonets. Those in the centre of the box formation and the wiremen do not fix

bayonets. .

b. Transport. With the exception of one vehicle, transport should be left under guard well clear of the incident, as it is an encumbrance in the streets. The one vehicle can carry a small party including a policeman, which can move quickly to deal with specific diversions such as a splinter crowd setting fire to property, looting, or attacking an individual. This vehicle can also carry wire to block off side streets, entrances to buildings etc., and is useful for dominating the area afterwards.

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c. Action. After taking action as described in sub-para. a. above, the force should advance in formation and take action in one of the following ways, depending upon the action of the crowd (see Fig. 8):

(1) If the crowd is advancing, or is likely to advance down the road, the force will if possible halt 60 to 70 metres from the crowd. The men on the flanks and in the rear ranks will then turn to face their arc of responsibility as shown in the diagram in Annex H. The force is thus covered from all directions and will be able to watch the ground, upper windows and rooftops on both sides of the streets. If there is time the tape/wiremen will then double out and put the tape across the road up to 50 metres in front of the force, and return. If considered practicable wire may be stretched across the road instead of tape. The banner men facing the crowd will then hold up their banner, inscribed in the vernacular "Anyone crossing this line is liable to be shot". Once the force is in position any police in contact with the crowd should withdraw behind the military.

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The military commander should then take action, first employing the non-violent measures outlined in paragraph 99, before resorting to the opening of fire, should this prove necessary.

(2) If the crowd is stationary the initial action is the same as described above, except that the tape need not be put down in front of the force. A banner inscribed "disperse or we fire" will be held up towards the crowd. If the crowd later decides to move towards the troops, the commander can order the tape to be put out and the banner described in (1) above displayed. It is normal to have two banners with "Disperse or we fire" on one and "Anyone crossing this line is liable to be shot" on the other in the local language.

112. Handling of a Dispersing Crowd. Once a crowd has started to disperse, it may occasionally be necessary for troops to advance to keep it on the move in the right direction. Troops advancing and pushing a crowd before them should remember that the pace will be that of those furthest away. A crowd on the move in the right direction should not be hurried. Those able to see the troops will no doubt be going as fast as they can and not nearly as fast as they would wish. On no account should the crowd be hemmed in so that it is unable to disperse.

113. Subsequent Domination of the Area. The following action will normally take place after a crowd has dispersed:

a. Patrolling. An operation does not end with the dispersal of a crowd, which must not be given an opportunity to re-assemble. A joint plan must therefore be made by military and police for patrolling the area after dispersal of the crowd, and removing any barricades erected by the crowd. Only when the military and police commanders are satisfied that the crowd is not re-assembling, or that the police alone can carry out the patrolling, should the military force withdraw.

b. Size of Patrol. If possible the military force should not be split when following up a crowd, but if detachments are used they must be commanded by someone sufficiently senior to be authorized under local instructions to order fire to be opened. Control will be quickly lost if soldiers start chasing a crowd from side streets and houses, the only exception to this being the use of a vehicle as described in paragraph 111 b.

c. Follow-up Action. The crowd should be followed up at a reasonable distance and the military force must remain poised ready to take over from the police again if necessary. When a crowd splits up into side streets all round protection is particularly important.

Crowd Dispersal in an Open Space

114. General. The dispersal of a crowd in an open space is often a more difficult operation than in a confined street because:

a. The crowd is likely to be larger and to build up more rapidly.

b. It will be less easy to canalize the crowd's movement, so a larger force may be necessary to deal with it.

c. It will be less easy to anticipate the direction in which the crowd is moving, and to take the necessary counter measures.

d. The crowd will be more likely to envelop and encircle the security force opposing it.

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e. It will be less easy to establish a clear-cut demarcation line, across which the crowd cannot penetrate without knowingly incurring a heavy penalty.

f. Riot control agent is less effective when used in open spaces (see Annex Q).

115. Adjustments to Tactics and Techniques. Due to the factors listed above, the following adjustments to confined street techniques should be considered when dispersing a crowd in an open space:

a. Initial Action. Before taking dispersal action it is usually advisable to:

(1) Decide where the crowd must not be allowed to go, and deploy accordingly.

(2) Observe the crowd by all available means, to establish its objective and mood.

(3) Give the crowd every opportunity to disperse of its own accord .

b. Strength. Due to the necessity for all round protection, a force of at least company strength is likely to be used when dealing with a crowd in an open space. The use of armour with infantry protection should also be considered, as the threat of fire from an armoured vehicle is a powerful deterrent to a hostile crowd.

c. Formations and Tactics. The basic platoon formation will again be the box formation as shown in Annex H and the company formation as shown in Annex J. Considerable flexibility is however essential, and platoons must be trained to extend their front as indicated in Annex I. Particular care must be taken to prevent troops being surrounded by the crowd and it may be necessary to use several platoons acting together, eg two platoons remaining firm while the third pivots in an attempt to disperse the crowd in the required direction, as in Annex K. The importance of basing one flank of the company on secure ground like a fence or ditch, so that it cannot be turned, must not be overlooked. Police riot squads can also be very effective in helping to cover the flank and rear of a company.

d. Transport. Company transport must be left in a firm base clear of the disturbance, and should be protected by wire to save manpower.

SECTION 12-EMPLOYMENT OF TROOPS ON POLICE DUTIES General

116. The likely organization of a police force is described in Part 1 Chapter 4.

In certain circumstances, eg when the police are unreliable, under strength, or insufficient to deal with the scale of disturbances, the civil authorities may authorize troops to perform certain duties normally carried out by the police, such as crowd dispersal using batons and shields (see Fig. 10), and dismounted patrols. Troops may also be enrolled as special constables, where an authority exists for this.

117. Troops will not be used for these duties unless direct orders have been given by the local governor or his equivalent and the necessary legislation has been passed.

118. Normally troops should only be used in a police role as a last resort, and the use of mixed police and military parties in such a role as dispersing a riot, should be avoided if possible for the following reasons:

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a. The way in which orders are given to their men by military and police commanders differ.

h. Troops and police may use a different language. c. Drills may vary.

Military Standards

119. When soldiers are used for duties which are normally carried out by the police, they will use police techniques but must retain the normal military standards of bearing, dress and discipline.

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Action by Troops Employed in Police Role

120. Tasks. The tasks are to:

a. Disperse unlawful assemblies and riots.

b. Deter demonstrators from taking further action.

c. Arrest law breakers, so that they can be brought before civil courts.

121. Main Force. On arrival at the scene of action, the force must deploy rapidly in accordance with a simple rehearsed drill, which wi1l vary according to conditions. If it is necessary to detach part of the force to deal with trouble on a flank, 'a balanced sub-unit should be sent. It is inadvisable to detach a military baton section on its own, except as a blocking party.

122. Other Detachments. A small military party should be held in reserve to spot and arrest ringleaders at the appropriate moment. Riflemen, who are good shots, should be posted to watch higher places such as roofs and windows to deal with snipers or bomb throwers. Rooftop patrols may be established to observe the area.

123. Transport. Sub-units of the riot force should be carried tactically, each in their own vehicles, which should if possible be t ton/i ton trucks, as larger vehicles are difficult to manoeuvre in narrow streets. Vehicles should be left under guard well clear of the incident, once the riot force has debussed.

Training, Organization and Drills

124. When it is likely that military forces may be used for police duties, training and rehearsal of all possible drills must be practised and carried out in close cooperation with the police. The take-over by a military riot force from the police at the scene of an incident is a very difficult and delicate operation. Details of the organization, formation, sequence of action and equipment of a platoon acting in a police role are given in Annexes Land M.

SECTION 13-URBAN ANTI-TERRORIST OPERATIONS

General

125. The maintenance of law and order when the urban terrorist is prepared to use rifles, light automatic weapons and grenades against the security forces requires a different approach to the use of force, although the principle of minimum force

still obtains. .

126. Urban terrorism may occur during any phase of revolutionary warfare.

Here it is considered however as an aspect of internal security .

Probable Background Situation

127. A typical situation could include the following: ,

a. The population will have been intimidated, subjected to virulent propaganda and be under severe political pressure.

b. A law should have been passed prohibiting the assembly of more than five persons, and therefore any crowd will be a deliberate defiance of authority.

c. The police and indigenous para-military forces are likely to be relatively ineffective and to be heavily infiltrated by agents, informers and sympathizers.

d. The system of command and control differs little from less severe internal security situations. The civil authority should remain in overall control; in

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extreme situations however the military may be given control during specific operations of the police and any para-military forces.

e. The armed insurgents normally mount operations against the security forces by:

(1) Ordering crowds to assemble and then creating incidents to draw in the security forces. When the security forces are in contact grenadiers placed in the crowd throw grenades and snipers engage the deployed troops from rooftops.

(2) Sniping at rooftop/hilltop standing patrols, and sentries.

(3) Firing at helicopters and security force patrols in the urban area.

Difficulties Peculiar to Urban Anti-terrorist Operations

128. a. Identification. A terrorist in a town can be anyone. He wears no uniform and can merge easily into the crowd. The only positive identification is to catch the terrorist committing an act of terrorism, or in actual possession of offensive armaments such as grenades or fire-arms.

b. Cover. An urban terrorist has only to step into a shop, cinema or house to achieve perfect cover, not only from identification but also from the view of those seeking him.

c. Security. Whenever any soldier is deployed anywhere in an urban area he has to be constantly inquisitive and alert to prevent exposing himself as a target and to provide security for those with him. Sentries, observers in OPs, foot and mobile patrols, even parked vehicles, can present targets for the armed. insurgents. All soldiers in static posts must be covered by fire and the post itself should be protected with sandbags and have overhead cover. All movement must be carried out with fire support available.

d. Intelligence. It is probable that the police and Special Branch will be ineffective. However military intelligence must be integrated with whatever remains. It also becomes doubly important that the military make every effort to gain intelligence by good observation, constant patrolling and the quick passage of information. It is also essential that less overt methods are employed.

e. Press. There are normally adequate hotels in the area and therefore reporters and photographers can get extremely quickly by car or foot to the scene of any incident. They can be a liability because they are prepared to take great personal risks to scoop a story or picture.

Concept of Operations

129. Contain or Control. A decision must be made whether the urban terrorists are to be contained or controlled. On this will result the deployment and the use of minimum force. To contain is the more passive policy whilst to control will require more positive action. The aim of maintaining complete law and order can probably only be achieved by capturing or killing those insurgents engaging the security forces or those elements fighting each other, to the danger of the rest of the population.

130. Deployment. There are-two methods of deployment in these conditions: either for the troops to be based outside the periphery of the urban area and to operate from a secure and firm base, or to establish sub-unit and unit bases within the urban area:

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a. Bases Outside the Urban Area.

(1) Advantages.

(a) Security of the base.

(b) Troops have better amenities and rest is more assured. (c) Fewer sentries and guards are required.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Reserves, if required, take longer to get to the scene of an incident. (b) Speed of reaction suffers.

(c) Increased transport to ferry reliefs, meals and normal administrative traffic within the urban area, can create additional targets for insurgent activity.

b. Bases in the Urban Area.

(1) Advantages .

(a) Ensures speedy reaction and deployment of reserves.

(b) Troops become more familiar with. the layout of the urban area. (c) Domination can be achieved.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Extra guards and sentries are required to provide security for the

bases.

(b) More troops are constantly exposed to danger and attack. (c) Troops probably have less rest.

(d) Administration over a long period becomes progressively more difficult.

131. Degree of Force. The principle of minimum force still applies but must be related to the aim. When the aim is to control the urban insurgents a greater degree of force will need to be used if casualties to the security forces are to be kept to the minimum. However the mounting of counter offensive action in an urban area, without inflicting large casualties on the civilian population, is a difficult operation.

Tactical Methods

132. Planning. The main requirements in any plan whether to contain or control an urban area in these conditions are good observation, sound communications and quick reaction. Rooftop/hilltop standing patrols may prove essential to achieve these requirements.

133. Allocation of Area. It is normal to split the urban area into unit and sub-unit areas of responsibility .

134. Patrolling. Constant patrolling both by day and night, by vehicle and foot are essential if terrorist activity is to be curbed.

135. Reserves. These must be held by commanders at sub-unit and unit level, they must be so positioned asto be able to deploy speedily.

136. Tactical Formations. The platoon box formation shown in Annex H is not suitable for use in this situation. It presents too great a target, is ponderous, and prohibits quick retaliation with mutual fire support and cover. All movement must be carried out tactically so that at any moment, if troops are engaged with fire by the terrorists, they are in a position to obtain the maximum cover and protection and are able to retaliate.

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137. Additional Aspects. Aspects which need special emphasis in urban antiterrorist operations although little different from those necessary in less violent forms of internal security are:

a. Sealing Off the Urban Area. Further arms and explosives must be prevented

entering the area by sealing off likely routes by such means as:

(1) Road blocks and control points.

(2) Waterborne patrols if there is access by river or sea.

(3) Constant patrolling and ambushing of footpaths or foot routes into the urban area.

b. Carriage of Arms. Consideration must be given to prohibiting the carriage of arms. In some parts of the world however this may cause resentment. In the Middle East a rifle can be the symbol of manhood.

c. Prevention of Large Crowds Forming. Once a large crowd has been allowed to form it presents a major security problem. The crowd may have been ordered to form to draw the security forces into the area. Only by good observation and constant patrolling together with a quick reaction by the security forces, can

this be prevented. In fact surprise against the terrorists can be achieved by anticipating the assembly of a crowd as a result of intelligent observation.

138. Night Operations. The measures that have to be taken must depend on the particular situation. Some factors that should be considered are:

a. Curfews. Curfews stop all movement and inhibit terrorist activity. They require, however, the authority of the civil power, who may be unwilling to impose or prolong them, due to the disruption caused. The factors to be taken into consideration and the methods of imposing curfews are considered in Section 19.

b. Lighting. The decision as to whether street lighting is to be turned off depends on the situation. Town dwellers are usually afraid of the dark, but this must be balanced against the cover that darkness provides for evil-doers. Conversely street lighting exposes security force patrols to added dangers at night.

c. Patrolling. At night, patrolling should mainly be done on foot. Vehicle noise and lights provide good targets and the land rover in particular is easily identified by-its headlamp configuration,

139. Helicopters. Apart from their normal functions helicopters are particularly useful in urban areas as command posts to direct the deployment of the security forces and to plot the movement of crowds; as re-broadcast stations; for casualty evacuation and for the re-supply of rooftop/hilltop standing patrols. However they

are vulnerable in these conditions and will normally have a minimum operating •

height imposed. They are unable to land indiscriminately in the urban area, and

landing points must be selected that are secure and free from possible sniper fire.

140. Individual Protection. Troops engaged on certain duties can at times wear armoured vests. Not only do these prevent serious chest injury, they also raise morale.

141-146. Reserved.

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CHAPTER 4

CONTROL OF URBAN MOVEMENT

SECTION 14-INTRODUCTION

Aim

147. In general terms, the aim of controlling the movement of vehicles and people in urban areas is to assist in the maintenance of law and order. The particular aims may be summarized as:

a. To dominate an area or areas before trouble breaks out, as a deterrent to hostile action and to hinder the gathering of unlawful assemblies and riots.

b. To prevent crowds that have already assembled being reinforced and to

canalize their movement into areas chosen by the police .

c. To deny contact between the people and terrorist groups.

d. To apprehend wanted persons.

e. To prevent the smuggling of arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies to terrorists.

f. To increase public confidence in the local government, and encourage those who are willing to divulge information.

g. To facilitate operations by the security forces.

Principles

148. Imposition. The civil authorities are responsible for imposing collective measures of control in accordance with local law. The police/military commanders are responsible for enforcing these collective measures.

149. Control of Measures. Prohibitions and restrictions are distasteful to the people and affect the life of the whole community. Unless such measures are closely controlled they may cause the collapse of such things as public utility services, postal facilities and food distribution, and may engender widespread discontent. The exact purpose and value of each new restriction should be carefully considered before it is imposed; those responsible must:

a. Appreciate the criticism which such measures may engender.

b. Be sure that the advantages to be secured outweigh the objections.

c. Satisfy themselves that a measure will be effective in producing the advantages claimed .

d. Recognize that, once imposed, a measure must be continued only until it produces the desired results or it is proved to have failed.

e. Appreciate that measures which are ineffective may do untold damage.

150. Manner of Imposition. Control measures should be applied with firmness but not with harshness. It must be made clear to the population that the inconvenience and hardship is not being inflicted with punitive intent, but in order to root out bad elements and to provide the law-abiding with security and protection.

151. Lifting of Restrictions. Controls must not be continued for longer than is absolutely necessary. The lifting of controls in one area may well act as an incentive to the population in another area to drive out terrorists and trouble-makers:

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152. Co-operation. Control measures must be planned and directed from a joint police/military HQ; full co-operation with the police is essential at all levels, as is co-ordination with heads of public services such as medical, ambulance, fire, etc.

Planning

153. The joint police/military plan for enforcing control measures should normally include:

a. The division of large areas into sub-areas, if possible to coincide with police divisions, and the allocation of troops to sub-areas.

b. The establishment of joint police/military HQs in sub-areas, and liaison with Special Branch for early warning.

c. The positioning of central and local reserves.

d. Establishing the channels through which requests for military help should be made.

e. The siting and control of ground surveillance radars, detection devices, searchlights and other aids.

f. The planning and rehearsal of control measures, including the testing of communications and the allocation of police to accompany and assist the military.

g. Arrangements to keep the public informed of the situation.

h. The preparation of any special stores likely to be needed, eg, photographs and descriptions of wanted persons and vehicles.

i. The reception, accommodation and maintenance of troops.

154. The planning of control measures will invariably take place concurrently with the planning of the other types of operation considered in this pamphlet. Plans must be flexible, so that military forces are always ready to switch wholly or partly from one type of operation to another; the availability of central and local reserves should help to meet this requirement.

Methods of Control

155. The methods of control are considered in succeeding sections:

a. Section IS-Road blocks.

b. Section 16-Control points.

c. Section 17-Domination from rooftops/hilltops.

d. Section I8-Urban patrols.

e. Section I9-Curfews.

SECTION IS-ROAD BLOCKS

General

156. Road blocks may be established with one or all of the following aims in view:

a. To maintain a continuous check on road movement.

b. To apprehend wanted persons and couriers.

c. To prevent the smuggling of arms, ammunition and supplies.

d. To assist the local authorities in enforcing food control.

157. Road blocks may be expanded into control points, which are described in Section 16.

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Types

158. Broadly, there are two types of road blocks:

a. Deliberate. These may be placed on a main road and act as a useful deterrent to unlawful movement, but they are unlikely to produce spectacular results.

b. Snap. These are used for spot checks, and their actual location is often related to some item of intelligence. Quick planning and execution is required. Initially they may achieve surprise and success, but once their position is generally known they become deliberate road blocks. This type of road block can be of a simple design based on two vehicles set diagonally across the road with a search area in between them. However, the principles and methods described below still apply .

Principles

159. When a road block has to be established, the following principles should be observed:

a. Concealment, It should be sited tactically where it is difficult for a guilty person to turn back or reverse a vehicle without being noticed. Sharp bends or dips in the road provide good positions.

b. Security. There must be sufficient troops to provide security throughout the duration of the road block, and particularly during the initial occupation. To make a road block truly effective, sentries should be sited as back stops on both sides and well clear of the search area, to watch appropriate traffic and prevent persons or vehicles from evading the block. The space available and the number of roads leading into the site, are relevant factors to be consid.ered.

c. Construction. It is best established by placing two parallel lines of knife rests (each with a gap) across the road, approximately 50 metres apart. The enclosure formed can then be used as a search area.

d. Layout. The number of troops required will depend upon the number of roads to be covered and the expected volume of traffic. Wherever possible, there should always be a policeman and an interpreter at each military road block, particularly in the early stages of disturbances. If persons are to be searched, women searchers and special accommodation must be provid.ed. The military commander should where possible be of the rank of sergeant or above. The search and administrative area should contain a cage, a male and female search area, and a vehicle waiting check and search area .

e. Early Warning Devices. The provision, if available, of early warning devices, detection devices or radars to give warning of an approaching vehicle may be of value.

f. Communications. It must be provided with external communications, preferably radio in addition to telephone, in order that revised instructions may be given, information about wanted persons passed quickly and incidents at the road blocks reported. Internal communications within a large road block can speed reaction time.

g. Administration. All troops may have to be self-contained for administration.

h. Diagrammatic Layout. A suggested layout for a road block is shown at Fig. 11.

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DIAGRAMMATIC LAYOUT OF A ROAD BLOCK

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Methods

160. General. All those manning a road block must know their jobs thoroughly, and act quickly and methodically. To prevent delay to all legitimate traffic, identification should be checked before searching starts, this avoids friction with civilians employed by government, etc. Politeness and consideration must be shown at all times and wanton damage to vehicles and property must be forbidden. Any suspects arrested must be handed over to the police as soon as possible.

161. Searching Vehicles. The following procedures should be followed:

a. General. Each vehicle must be dealt with separately. It is generally better to select a few vehicles for complete examination in a separate bay, including stripping by mechanics, than to attempt to do so to all vehicles. Vehicles awaiting either a cursory or complete examination must be held under guard in a waiting area, with passengers confined to their vehicles.

b. Number of Searchers. An armed sentry and one unarmed searcher should be used to search cars. Two armed sentries and two unarmed searchers are required for large vehicles and buses.

c. Conduct of Search. Vehicle occupants must be made to get out and stand well clear. The owner or driver of the vehicle must watch the whcle search.

d. Frisking Passengers. The road block commander will arrange for all vehicle occupants to be frisked and checked while the vehicle search proceeds. Drivers will not be questioned about their identity or requested to produce documents until they have been frisked. Women may not be frisked except by women searchers but their handbags, parcels or shopping baskets must be searched.

e. Completion of Search. When the search is completed the vehicle will be allowed to proceed, unless any suspicion remains that there is still something hidden. In such circumstances the vehicle and driver should be handed over to the police. In order to refute subsequent accusations of theft by soldiers, it may be necessary to get vehicle owners to sign an indemnity certificate stating that they ha ve suffered no damage or loss during the search.

f. Detailed Procedure for Searching Vehicles. More details of the procedure for searching cars, buses, goods vehicles and motor cycles are given in Annex S. The photograph at Fig. 12 illustrates the need for inquisitiveness and thoroughness in vehicle searching. The vehicle shown was successfully used by terrorists in Palestine.

162. Searching Persons. The following procedure should be followed:

a. Searching must include under the arms, the stomach, inside the thighs and the crotch.

b. Clothing should not be patted, as this might result in a small flat object like a knife being overlooked, but should be rolled between the fingers.

c. Women will only be searched by a woman searcher; particular attention should be paid to their hair.

d. After a person has been searched, he will be asked to produce his identity card and, if applicable, his driving licence, or any other official document he might possess. These documents should be carefully checked against each other, and against any photographs or descriptions of wanted persons.

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A KIDNAP VEHICLE USED IN PALESTINE

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e. Occupants of a vehicle should be requested to stand facing the vehicle with their hands resting on the roof orside of the vehicle as the case may be. The searcher should then quickly but thoroughly run his hands over their bodies from head to foot.

163. Identity Documents. The following points should be noted when checking identity documents:

a. Photograph. Compare the photograph on the card with the individual.

When making such a comparison try to create conditions under which the photograph was originally taken, eg, if a photograph was taken hatless than ask the person being searched to remove his or her hat. Similarly a woman, having had her photograph taken two or three years ago with straight hair may now look very different after a permanent wave-a good tip is to place a finger across the photograph to hide the hair and compare only the features. A check of age will also assist in making the comparison.

b. Stamp. Careful examination of the stamp across the corner of the photograph will show whether the original photograph has been removed and another substituted. The authenticity of the stamp itself should also be checked.

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c. Questioning. When questioning a person about the particulars of his or her identity documents, leading questions should be avoided. Questions should be framed in a direct manner, eg, "What is your name?", "Where do you live?", "How old are you T",

d. Finger Prints. Positive identification can only be made by experts; for this reason a mark indicating a thumb print must in the normal course of events be accepted. However, if for any reason suspicion has been aroused, a suspect can be held for further questioning and a finger print check can be carried out by the police.

Stores

164. A suggested scale of stores for a road block is given in Annex T .

SECTION 16-{:ONTROL POINTS

Aim

165. As soon as armed forces are called in to help the civil authorities, the first step will normally be to establish control points throughout the populated area of a town or city, to control the movement of vehicles and pedestrians and to help maintain law and order. Crowds can be canalized into areas chosen by the police with control points established as stops. By intelligent planning, disturbances can be confined to unimportant areas where arrests can easily be effected.

Tasks

166. The tasks of a control point are:

a. To control all vehicles and pedestrian traffic so that large crowds cannot assemble, known offenders can be arrested and curfews can be enforced.

b. To dominate the area of responsibility around the control point. This includes maintaining law and order by local patrolling with a view to preventing damage to property or injury to persons, and dispersing groups of people before they have time to assemble into a crowd.

Composition

167. A control point should normally be manned by at least a platoon, but the minimum strength required will vary according to the number of roads to be controlled and the number of traffic lanes in each road. The minimum scale should be:

a. Control Point HQ. Commander, signaller and runner.

b. Barrier Sentries. One NCO for each road or lane of traffic blocked and one sentry for each barrier.

c. Covering Party. Two men covering the barrier sentries.

d. Standing Patrol. Where possible two men in an OP or on a nearby rooftop should watch adjacent buildings and roofs for bomb and acid. throwers, and. the whole area for approaching crowds.

e. Reliefs. Reliefs are required for all the above. Reliefs will also be required. to carry out patrolling and crowd dispersal when necessary.

f. Civil Police. One civilian policeman, if available, for each lane of traffic.

Interpreters and women searchers are also required.

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Layout

168. Barriers. Each road or traffic lane should have two barriers, one at the beginning and one at the end of the control point. The barriers should be made of knife rests and dannert wire, and should cover the width of the road or traffic lane so that a vehicle has to do an'S' turn to pass. Red hurricane lamps should be hung on the end of knife rests nearest the centre of the road at night. STOP signs should be placed ahead of all barriers, and must at night either be luminous or lit by hurricane lamps.

169. Control Point HQ. The HQ and covering party should be sited centrally where they can see and effectively control the barrier sentries. The HQ should be constructed of sandbags and other materials up to at least four feet from the ground to give protection against missiles. If possible, the HQ should also be protected from sun and rain. A reserve of riot control agent should be held.

170. Standing Patrol. A control point is vulnerable to attack by a crowd which may suddenly appear near to it, or to acid and bomb throwing from roofs, or from tip-and-run attacks with bazookas and small arms. It must therefore be covered by a standing patrol, ideally on a nearby flat roofed building, armed with riot control agent and an automatic weapon. The latter should of course only be used if the threat justifies if.

171. Rest and Administrative Area. This should be as close as possible to the control point and should be reasonably secure and out of public view. The latter is important because in order to instil confidence in law abiding citizens and. fear into would be law breakers, it is essential that soldiers appear smart and alert whenever they are seen by the public.

172. Transport: Each control point in a residential or relatively open area should have a suitable vehicle for use by patrols, and for moving troops quickly to deal with incidents.

Orders

173. General. The commander should be issued with written orders, giving the layout of his control point, a list of stores and equipment required and details of his area of responsibility. Specimen headings for control point orders are given at Annex U.

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Method of Operation

174. Control points should be operated in the fol1owing manner:

a. The commander or his second-in-command must be present at all times. •

b. All vehicles and pedestrians will be channelled through the barriers, and checked in accordance with current orders. Checking will be carried out within the barriers by the civil police if available, otherwise by barrier sentries or NCOs.

c. The control point commander should ensure that the area around his

control point is patrolled. The exact area of responsibility will depend on the type of area and the men he has available.

d. The commander must remember that the manning of his control point is his primary task, and if an incident occurs in his area with which he cannot deal effectively without seriously depleting the strength of his control point, he must call for reinforcements.

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e. The control point commander must maintain a log of all important events and incidents.

f. The control point commander in a densely populated area must carefully assess the effect of imposing a degree of control on both traffic and pedestrians. For instance during the rush hour period, however efficient the control point, a crowd of impatient civilians or a jam of cars and lorries can quickly build up and precipitate the very situation that the control point commander is trying to avoid .

Communications

175. Whenever possible alternative means of communication should be provided.

Communications are required from control point HQ to:

a. Company or equivalent HQ, or direct to unit HQ.

b. Rest and administrative area .

c. Standing patrol.

Stores

176. A suggested scale of stores required for a control point is shown at Annex T.

Police Assistance

177: The closest liaison must be maintained between the control point com-

mander and the senior policeman. Policemen at control points are employed:

a. For checking and searching vehicles and persons.

b. As interpreters.

c. To make arrests when necessary.

d.On the scale of one policeman for each lane of traffic, but if sufficient police are not available most of the duties will have to be carried out by the barrier sentries.

SECTION 17-DOMINATION FROM ROOFTOPS/HILLTOPS

General

178. Standing patrols or sentries on rooftops or hilltops are an important means of acquiring information and dominating trouble areas (see Fig. 13). They can be used in particular areas or, given suitable buildings, can cover the whole of a city. They can operate by day and by night depending on the situation .

Tasks

179. The tasks of rooftop/hilltop patrols are:

a. To obtain general information of civilian activity in the area, eg, signs of intimidation, distribution of leaflets etc.

b. To observe the movement or activities of terrorists, curfew breakers or crowds and to direct patrolling troops, police or helicopters to them.

c. To give covering fire to vehicle or foot patrols if these are attacked.

d. To assist in the dispersal of unlawful assemblies by observation and by using riot control agent. They will require the authority of the commander on the ground before using CS.

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ROOFTOP/HILLTOP STANDING PATROL

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Fig. 13

Photograph by Associated Press, Ltd,

Composition of Standing Patrols

180. Rooftop/hilltop standing patrols should consist of an officer or NCO, two to four soldiers and if possible a civil policeman, The patrol should be equipped with radio, aircraft recognition panels, binoculars, riot control agent, town plan/map and aids to night vision.

181. The introduction of night observation devices and ground surveillance •

radars should greatly assist in detecting the movement of men and vehicles around

the area being observed at night.

Orders

182. The following must be known: a. The area to be covered.

h. The locations and movements of our own troops and police patrols.

c. The location of mobile reserves and control points.

d. The method of reporting and other action to be taken in the event of an

incident. •

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Reconnaissance and Siting

183. Reconnaissance should be carried out by the unit or sub-unit commander providing the patrols, in conjunction with the police. Patrols should be sited within visual distance of each other or of a central control point. A rooftop/hilltop position is vulnerable to attack, particularly sniping. Buildings should therefore be chosen which cannot easily be burned down, and the position itself should be protected by sandbags. A reserve must be available to reinforce a rooftop/hilltop patrol quickly.

Method of Operation During Civil Disorder

184. Rooftop/hilltop standing patrols might be operated as follows:

a. In the case of a building, the policeman accompanying the patrol will obtain access to the roof.

b. If an unlawful assembly is observed, the patrol commander should instruct it to disperse. If this fails, and provided he has the authority to take such action, he should attempt to disperse the assembly with riot control agent. If unable to do either he should:

. (1) Direct troops/police on the ground to the scene, or

(4) Radio or signal by flag to a patrolling helicopter and indicate the position of the crowd. The helicopter can then disperse the crowd with riot control agent, call up reserves or take any other action necessary.

185. Experience has proved that in the right circumstances well sited posts manned by an officer can spot crowds assembling and identify the ringleaders. This information can then be passed by radio to mobile patrols, who can arrive on the scene quickly and immediately arrest those ringleaders, even if by this time they have withdrawn into the crowd. This apparent second sight can have a very salutary effect.

Helicopters

186. If helicopters are available, they should patrol over the area where rooftop/ hilltop standing patrols are operating and should where possible be in radio communication with the patrols.

187. Reserved.

SECTION 18-URBAN PATROLS

Aim

188. In general, the aims of urban patrols should be to dominate the area in which they are operating, maintain curfews when these have been imposed, and provide protection for dependants.

Types

189. Foot Patrols (see Fig. 14). These should normally be of section strength and should patrol in open formation to avoid being ambushed. Their task is to dominate an area, to instil confidence in the civil community particularly during working hours, to carry out snap searches and to deal with minor incidents.

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A FOOT PATROL IN AN URBAN AREA

Fig. 14

190. Vehicle Patrols (see Fig. 15). Police/military patrols mounted in vehicles and equipped with radio are the quickest means of covering a wide area with a limited number of troops. Tasks include:

a. Reconnaissance.

b. Moving to the scene of an incident quickly and dealing with it.

c. Reinforcing foot patrols.

d. Supporting control points, rooftop/hilltop standing patrols and road blocks.

e. Escort duties.

f. Establishing a cordon rapidly in a cordon and search operation.

g. Snap road blocks.

191. Helicopter Patrols. Police/military helicopter patrols can be very effective in urban operations but their vulnerability must be taken into account. Main tasks are:

a. Reconnaissance, both visual and photographic.

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A VEHICLE PATROL IN AN URBAN AREA

Fig. 15

Photograph by SOLDIER Magazine

b. The reporting of incidents quickly.

c. The rapid reinforcement of foot and vehicle patrols in certain open areas, and casualty evacuation .

d. To take action under certain circumstances against rioting crowds by dropping riot control agent. This must be co-ordinated with the commander on the ground.

e. Supporting rooftop/hilltop patrols.

192. Clandestine Patrols. Co-ordinated with the overall patrol scheme, small clandestine patrols on foot can be effectively employed. Their activities should be based on stealth, guile and doing the unexpected. By lying up concealed, moving through back alleys and over waste ground and garden walls, they will be able to impose sudden checks, intercept couriers and bomb carriers, and thus maintain a measure of initiative over the terrorists. War dogs can be used effectively with such patrols.

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Use of Armoured Vehicles

193. Armoured cars and scout cars have a deterrent effect on crowds and insurgents. They can be employed to support troops in other vehicles or on foot. They can be used to shield infantry from a crowd which has opened fire, can help to illuminate darkened streets and dazzle snipers at night, and their excellent communications should prove invaluable. Armoured vehicles should not be used as patrols by themselves, but should always be supported by infantry. They are vulnerable in built-up areas and their armament is not usually compatible with the principle of minimum force. The use of tracked vehicles, and particularly tanks, is generally inadvisable as their presence may cause public ill-feeling. The same does not normally apply to armoured personnel carriers when used in their troop carrying role, nor to light AFVs such as the combat vehicle reconnaissance series.

Communications •

194. All patrols operating in urban areas should be in radio contact with their HQ. Where this is not possible due to shortage of equipment or bad reception, arrangements should be made for the patrol to report to its HQ periodically, or in the event of an incident, by some other means, eg, by public telephone or by vehicle. Poor communications can usually be overcome by the use of properly sited VHF rebroadcast stations in a secure location.

Police

195. Whenever possible patrols should be accompanied by a policeman. He can act as an interpreter and a link between the military forces and the civil population. A policeman should always be present when any building is searched by troops, to prevent accusations of looting by soldiers. A building may be searched without a policeman only when troops are in hot pursuit of a suspected terrorist. Entry to certain buildings such as mosques may be forbidden to British forces. The search of such buildings will have to be carried out by police or local military forces.

SECTION 19-CURFEWS

General

196,. The following matters should be taken into consideration when planning a curfew:

a, It is an effective measure for maintaining control, and is normally imposed forone or all of the following reasons:

(1) To prevent movement in a selected area while a search or the investigation •

of an incident is carried out.

(2) To prevent movement for a period of time following serious incidents. (3) To allow tempers to cool after riots.

(4) To prevent the movement of terrorists between areas, and disrupt their courier routes.

(5) To allow the security forces greater freedom of movement.

b. It may be applied as a total measure over a large town, to a particular area, or to a particular part of the community. By varying its form and timing, the insurgent will be kept guessing and his plans may be disrupted. Security of planning is therefore important.

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c. It should not normally be imposed on punitive grounds, nor should it be applied to impress on the population the inconvenience and hardships which their behaviour warrants .

d. To be effective, a curfew must be complete and there must be sufficient troops and police to enforce it.

e. It requires careful timing especially in large towns. If timings are wrong the curfew will soon become unworkable. The following factors must therefore be considered:

(1) The time that the inhabitants normally get up, go to and return from work.

(2) The time that shops are normally opened and closed.

(3) The time taken to implement the curfew after the public announcement has been made.

f. In general, the population will obey the curfew, but shortage of food, boredom and a natural desire to go out may eventually cause the curfew to be broken and incidents will then result.

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Imposition

197. The likely sequence of events is as follows:

a. The decision to impose a curfew is made by the civil authorities in consultation with the police and military commanders.

b. Plans are made to cover timings, areas, boundaries, troops required and administrative arrangements.

c. A joint police and military curfew control HQ is established, or an existing joint HQ is nominated for the task.

d. Local representatives of the police and military make detailed plans, although overt reconnaissance of the area should be avoided.

e. Cordon parties, road and static patrols move rapidly into position.

f. The curfew and subsequent control instructions are announced by the appropriate means, eg, press, radio, siren and police announcements by loud hailer. Helicopters and light aircraft can also be used as voice aircraft to make public announcements.

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Military Duties

198. The military commander will provide troops for the following purposes:

a. Cordons.

b. Road blocks if required.

c. Static posts and mobile patrols to supplement the police.

d. Administrative help required by the civil authorities to maintain essential and public services.

Police Duties

199. The police are responsible for:

a. Announcing the curfew to the general public.

b. The issue of curfew passes.

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c. Carrying out normal police duties.

d. Providing police patrols, to enforce the curfew in conjunction with the military.

e. The disposal of all curfew breakers, including any that may be arrested by troops.

Method of Operation

200. Area of Curfew. The area must be clearly defined. Where practicable in urban areas, care must be taken to ensure that both sides of the street on the perimeter are included in the area, ie, houses outside the curfew area should not be overlooked by the perimeter. The curfew areas must if possible be planned and agreed with the civil and police authorities beforehand.

201. Patrols. Mobile patrols and static posts may be required initially to establish •

the curfew. If on the other hand authority can be established quickly, or if the

curfew is solely to prevent movement of cars and/or cycles, then the number of

static posts can be reduced and the curfew maintained mainly by mobile patrols. In

towns, static posts on rooftops/hilltops are necessary in order to watch for any

illegal movement between houses and to help cover street patrols. The employment

of rooftop/hilltop standing patrols was considered in Section 17.

202. Electronic Aids. Troops may be assisted in enforcing the curfew at night by the use of night observation devices and ground surveillance radars.

Command and Control

203. Control HQ. Normally, the existing joint police/military HQ will maintain and control a curfew throughout the whole period it is in force. The main function of the joint HQ is the co-ordination of any aspect affecting both the military and the police.

204. Control of Visiting Vehicles. When a curfew is imposed over a large area, a number of visiting vehicles will often be checked. A planned system of screening and clearing such traffic must be worked out with the civil police. It must be explained to drivers what restrictions are imposed on their movement within the curfew areas, and that no re-entry to the area will be permitted during the curfew.

20$. Curfew Passes. This is a major problem for the civil administration and for the police, who will normally be responsible for the issue of passes. From the time that a curfew is imposed a number of persons such as doctors, nurses and essential

workers must be free to move about. A system of passes which can be easily under- •

stood by troops, must be devised well in advance by the civil authorities.

206. Curfew Breakers. The action to be taken by troops against curfew breakers must be laid down. Offenders will normally be frisked and handed over to the civil police, care being taken to log evidence, if a policeman is not present, for production in court when the offender is committed to trial.

Administration

207. The civil authorities are responsible for introducing measures to meet administrative difficulties which will arise if a curfew is imposed for a long period, but military help may be required in this respect. The administrative problems which could arise are:

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a. Lack of water in houses.

b. Shortage of food in shops.

c. The need to purchase essential food daily.

d. Essential food deliveries in areas with no shops.

e. Clearance of refuse from houses and streets.

f. Fuel supplies for lighting, cooking and heating houses.

g. Treatment of the sick and maternity cases.

h. Care of animals.

i. Care of crops.

[, Lack of indoor sanitation.

k, Local administrative support for isolated police detachments not in police stations.

1. Pavement sleepers.

208-211. Reserved .

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CHAPTER 5

CORDON, SEARCH AND SNATCH OPERATIONS

SECTION 20-GENERAL

Introduction

212. Cordon and search is normally a joint police and military operation, which has as its aim the capture of wanted persons, arms, ammunition, supplies, explosives or documents. Everyone taking part in the search must be quite clear about the aim, which will determine the methods used.

213. Cordon and search operations should be based on good intelligence and should be planned in detail. Everything possible must be done to maintain secrecy and achieve surprise. Reconnaissance in uniform must be avoided and the plan should be simple and capable of rapid execution.

Command and Control

214. The size of the area, the relative strength of police and troops and an estimate of whether violent resistance may be encountered, will determine whether a search should be controlled by the police or the military. A search involving a company or more is best controlled by the military, while it may be preferable for a smaller search to be controlled by the police. Where troops are confined to the cordon and all searching is done by the police, both forces will operate under their own command, but a joint HQ will be established.

Tasks

215. Searching. The actual searching will normally be carried out by the police with troops in support.

216. Military. The military forces are normally responsible for:

a. Providing the cordon.

b. Escorting the poli ce searchers.

c. Setting up cages.

d. Guarding detained suspects.

e. Providing helicopters if required and available, to spot movement within the cordon area .

f. Providing technical assistance for searchers, eg, mine detectors, dogs or small parties trained in the use of explosives.

217. Police. The police are normally responsible for:

a. Deciding on the area to be searched.

b. Carrying out plain clothes reconnaissance.

c. Provision of Special Branch representatives to evaluate intelligence on the spot.

d. Providing any guides required for the cordon troops.

e. Warning the inhabitants of the search and curfew imposition, after the cordon is in position.

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f. Searching the area and arresting suspects.

g. Screening suspects.

h. Traffic control.

Difficulties and Possible Disadvantages

218. The difficulties and disadvantages of a large scale cordon and search

operation are:

a. It is difficult to preserve security.

b. It is expensive in manpower.

c. The search, if thorough and prolonged, may irritate the population and so win further support for the insurgents.

Organization

219. If sufficient troops and police are available, the force should be organized into:

a. Inner Cordon Troops. These surround the area to be searched to prevent anyone inside from getting out. In large scale searches it may be necessary to deploy troops within the search area to divide the area into manageable sections and to prevent movement between those sections.

b. Outer Cordon Troops. If required, these are deployed some distance from the inner cordon, at road blocks and positions covering routes leading into the area, to prevent any attack or interference from outside.

c. Search Parties. These usually consist of the police with an escort of troops, who search houses and inhabitants in the selected area.

d. Cage Troops. These erect and guard cages for holding persons awaiting interrogation.

e. Screening Teams. These consist of police and informers who identify suspects and wanted persons.

f. Escort Troops. These escort wanted persons to a place of detention after interrogation.

g. Reserve. A reserve of troops should be kept at all levels to deal with the unexpected. It may be necessary to use reserves to:

(1) Maintain rooftop/hilltop standing patrols.

(2) Deal with any disturbances or unlawful assemblies which occur in the

cordon area.

(3) Enforce a curfew.

(4) Operate and protect public address equipment touring the district.

(5) Reinforce the cordons and/or pursue any persons making away from the search area.

(6) Provide reliefs.

SECTION 21-CORDON TECHNIQUES

General

220. Normally one cordon only is necessary to achieve the aim in a cordon and search operation. However, as indicated in paragraph 219, it may on occasions be

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necessary to deploy an outer cordon in the form of road blocks some distance from the inner cordon, to prevent interference with the latter and to prevent people joining the inhabitants of the area being searched.

221. The outer cordon can move into position by helicopter, in vehicles or on foot, and can be assisted in its task by light aircraft and helicopters giving warning of any large scale movement towards the isolated area. The outer cordon could be found from an armoured unit.

222. The remainder of this Section is concerned with the deployment and operation of the inner cordon, referred to hereafter as the cordon (see Figs. 16 and 17).

Approach

223. General. The aim is to surround an area before the inhabitants realize what is happening. It is sometimes best to move into position direct in helicopters (eg on to rooftops) or in vehicles, while on other occasions it may be advisable to deplane or deb us some distance away. The decision will depend on the available approaches and exits, and on the local situation. Normally, the quickest way is the best, the approach being by as many different routes as the maintenance of simplicity permits.

224. Timing. Exact timing is the most important factor affecting the success of a cordon, and the most difficult to achieve. As far as is possible, the area must be surrounded simultaneously: if this does not happen and some troops are late, an alert suspect will be given an open exit through which he can escape.

225. Movement. The following points should be considered:

a. Forward R V. When the approach is made in vehicles there should if possible be a forward RV, so that the commander can retain control for as long as possible. The forward RV is not a debussing point, and dispersal may take place later, but it ensures up to the last possible moment that the convoy remains under control, and that it is not split up by other traffic. The forward RV should be close to, but out of sight and sound of the target area.

b. Traffic Control. Civil police will be required at the forward R V to control traffic so that the convoy achieves a clear run to the target area. The following points should be noted:

(1) Just before the convoy is due to move from the forward RV, traffic must be held up at the rear-the rear vehicle will normally be a police vehicle carrying traffic policemen .

(2) If a number of side roads lead into the route selected between the forward R V and the target area, they must be sealed off to prevent civilian vehicles infiltrating into the convoy. A traffic police vehicle should travel immediately behind the leading company commander's vehicle. At each intersection police should drop off this vehicle and prevent traffic entering the convoy. These policemen are picked up by the police vehicle at the rear of the convoy.

c. Routes. It is normally best to move to the forward R V by one route, as this is the simplest way in which to co-ordinate the simultaneous arrival of the whole convoy. From the forward RV to the objective sufficient routes should be used to ensure that the cordon is established simultaneously. The sub-unit with the

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furthest distance to travel should move first; subsequent departures from the forward RV can be on a timed basis. Vehicles should not, however, remain in the forward R V for more than two or three minutes, otherwise the advantage of surprise may be lost.

d. Security. Surprise will be lost if anyone connected with the operation arrives in the target area before the cordon is in position. Detectives, police searchers, etc., should move at the rear of the military convoy, and this must be made clear during the joint planning.

Dispositions

226. General. A cordon established in darkness must be unbroken, with every man in sight of his neighbour. After daylight, a cordon can be thinned out and

maintained by a chain of observation posts of one or two men, with gaps covered •

by patrols. Normally, it will be impossible to maintain a continuous cordon for

any length of time, owing to the large number of troops required. If possible troops

should use wire to help maintain their line, and under some circumstances it may

be advisable to dig in and take advantage of natural cover.

227. Estimate a/Troops Required. A cordon of 100 metres in a built-up area will require nearly 30 men, or approximately one platoon. Men of company HQ may also be required to guard any captured suspects and company transport. The following may be used as a guide:

a. Cordon facing inwards, 15 men per 100 metres.

b. Facing outwards and watching opposite rooftops/windows, an additional five men per 100 metres.

c. Facing inwards and watching rooftops/windows above the cordon, an additional five men per 100 metres.

d. To cover any side roads or alleys leading into the area, an additional one or two men per 100 metres.

e. Numbers may be reduced in an area with large modern buildings.

228. Siting 0/ Cordon. A cordon should not be on the inner kerb of the road, but as far back as possible to gain a field of view. If strengths permit, two man patrols should move behind the cordon in each sector to act as pursuit parties should anyone break through.

229. Thinning the Cordon. The cordon may have to remain in position for long • periods, the length of time depending on the number of buildings, size of the area,

the strength of the police available for searching and the density of the community.

To thin out the cordon the following action should be taken:

a. Once escape routes have been wired off, sentries should be sited tactically, on rooftops, etc. if available.

b. Sentries should be sited in pairs and in depth, and where possible should be in shade by day. They require good all round observation to get warning of any attempt at break out. They should be found from one sub-unit where possible.

c. When thinning out the cordon, sections should be removed complete; they can then be rested close at hand and form a tactical reserve (see paragraph 237).

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Battle Procedure

230. General. Practice and rehearsal of cordon techniques is essential. A suggested form of battle procedure for a planned battalion operation is outlined in paragraphs 231 ~233. Whatever the size of the operation every man must know his task. As in all other similar operations, smartness and alertness, coupled with a determined attitude in every individual will go a long way to ensuring success.

231. Maps and Enlargements. For the briefing the intelligence officer should produce an enlargement showing measurements and distances marked on each side of the perimeter, and a blackboard diagram of the area, plus air photographs if available. Company commanders, and later even platoon commanders, can study the blackboard diagram and air photographs while waiting for their orders.

232. Orders. Orders must include details about:

a. Roads or open spaces forming the perimeter of the target.

b. Location and time of R V for military/police commanders. This is quite separate from the forward R V and is normally at a pol ice station.

c. Assembly area for company main bodies, normally near to the police station

where the briefing takes place.

d. Routes to the assembly area and from the assembly area to the forward RV.

e. Order of march.

f. Time cordon to be in position.

g. Orders for the apprehension of cordon breakers.

h. Search party organization and details.

i. Company areas of responsibility on the perimeter.

j. Battalion/company cages. k. Deception measures.

233. Company and Platoon Commanders' Orders. The following points should be noted:

a. After the battalion "0" group, company commanders will give out their orders to their platoon commanders who should by now have studied the diagram and air photographs of the area.

b. The platoon commanders then give their orders in the form of a briefing to the whole platoon including their drivers. Platoon commanders can enlarge their diagram on either a blackboard, pavement, road, or canopy of a vehicle.

c. Every soldier must understand the outline plan and his part in the operation before he embusses. There is no time, even for last minute orders, on arrival at the debussing points, nor is it advisable to try to give them out en route.

Action in Cordon Area

234. Debussing] Deplaning and Deployment. As soon as troops leave the forward RV surprise is lost. Speed in identifying the target area and in deployment is therefore essential. To achieve this the following sequence of action should take place:

a. In the case of a vehicle approach, each company commander should travel about 30 metres in front of his column with a police guide if one is available. The company commander then has time to confirm the correct spot for all to debus,

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cription of hides and arms caches is given in Chapter 1 paragraph 15f. When carrying out a search imagination is needed, but every effort must be made to avoid unnecessary damage. Mine detectors are invaluable for arms detection.

(3) When a house has been searched it must be marked accordingly. It may be necessary to get house owners to sign a certificate stating that they have suffered no loss or damage during the search.

(4) Persons awaiting search must not be allowed to move into a building which has already been searched. This can be prevented by the inner cordon closing in to exclude from the isolated area the houses that have been searched.

Cages

243. The military are responsible for erecting and guarding any cages- requiredbuildings may be used as part of the cage complex. If in the open, cages should be sited in the shade and on ground free from stones. If no shade is available, tents should be erected for women and young children, and if the search is to be prolonged arrangements must be made for food and water. Adequate latrines must be provided for males and females and the latrines should be searched at the end of the operation. A suggested cage layout is shown in Fig. 18.

DIAGRAM OF A CAGE LAYOUT FOR SCREENING

Tent for Screening team

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NB: The cage staff should include a doctor and an interpreter. Children must not be regarded automatically as being innocent, since they may have been trained to be hostile by parents and teachers-if under 12 years of age they should be kept with the women. If suitable buildings which will provide the above facilities are available, they can be used.

Screening Teams

244. The two types of screening are:

a. Low Level. This is done at the cage in the search area and aims to eliminate persons of good character and to pick out suspects for higher level screening at the central cage. This screening should be done by local police or representatives of Special Branch.

b. High Level. This is done by police at the central cage. Their task is to interrogate all suspected persons picked out during the search. and to decide who should be detained. Although this screening is the responsibility of the police, troops will have to escort suspected persons to the central cage and keep them under observation while they wait their turn for interrogation. During this period it is important that the suspected persons are prevented from communicating with other persons or disposing of incriminating papers. The collection of documents and issue of detention certificates for suspected persons are the tasks of the police.

Escort Troops

245. Wanted persons must be evacuated as soon as possible after screening has been completed. Troops may be required to do this and if so escort parties with transport must be detailed in advance. Vehicles used to carry wanted persons should have a wired off compartment to make it impossible for them to jump out, and to segregate them from their guards.

SECTION 23-SNATCH OPERATIONS

Aim

246. When accurate information is gained on a wanted individual's whereabouts, his capture should be carried out by an organized snatch party.

Composition of Snatch Parties

247. Snatch parties consist of special1y selected and trained groups with a high officer and NCO content. They should be trained in "coup de main" operations, and may require a special allocation of vehicles and other equipment, eg, ladders, sledgehammers, etc. At least one officer or NCO should be able to speak the local language. Each major unit should train a number of these groups to ensure that at least one is available at all times.

Planning

248. A snatch needs most careful planning and rehearsal to ensure that the approach is undetected. Several methods can be used to obtain surprise, such as the employment of civilian vehicles or helicopters. Detailed arrangements are required for follow-up action should the operation prove successful, and for the immediate interrogation and handling of the captured person.

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Method

249. Two parties should be organized for an operation. The first consists of a Special Branch representative to recognize the subject, and a few selected soldiers to provide firepower and carry out the snatch. The other party forms a close cordon to prevent escape, and to make the area of the snatch secure from outside interference. A subsequent search of the area may also be necessary.

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Annex A

THE LAW AND MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES (See Chapter 1 Section 1)

INTRODUCTION

Aim

1. The aim of this Annex is to help a member of the armed forces to understand his responsibilities when he has to assist civil authorities. It explains in outline the basic principles of English law, a knowledge of which will help a member of the armed forces to understand local law in overseas territories .

Knowledge of Local Law

2. Overseas, a member of the armed forces may have rights and duties which differ from those which he has in England. He must be fully briefed on any differences between local law and English law and the effect of these differences on such subjects as the legal procedure for dealing with unlawful assemblies and riots, the degree of force permitted and powers of arrest. Military commanders overseas will, with the assistance of the local authorities and the Army Legal Services, frame written instructions regarding the duties of military personnel when helping the civil authorities. Both service and civil authorities must know who has authority to ask for help from the armed forces.

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF ENGLISH LAW

Duties of Members of the Armed Forces as Citizens

3. A member of the armed forces has the same rights and duties as an ordinary citizen, when dealing with crime or helping the civil authorities.

Responsibility of Civil Authorities

4. The primary responsibility for preserving and restoring law and order rests with the civil authorities who may call upon any citizen, includ.ing a member of the armed forces, to help them .

Service Responsibilities

5. A member of the armed forces must:

a. Respond. to a request for help by the civil authorities.

b. Use the minimum force necessary to achieve the immediate arm when enforcing law and order.

6. A commander who has been asked to help the civil authorities must do so, unless he knows of facts which make him consider that intervention by the armed forces is unnecessary. Even if he has not been asked to help, it will be his duty to intervene if it is clear that such intervention is necessary to prevent disorder and the commission of offences. It follows, that if he does not know all the circumstances, he must arrange for forces to be moved close to the scene, but these forces should

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not take any action until ordered by him to do so. If there is time he should go, or send a representative, to find out what is happening, and if he considers that the civil authorities are mistaken in thinking that it is necessary for the armed forces to intervene, he will be justified in refusing their request for help; indeed, it is his duty to refuse in such circumstances.

7. A request for help from the civil authorities to the military may be made orally or in writing. It is, however, desirable that such a request should be made in writing, as this will nuke it easier for a military commander subsequently to prove that the civil authorities asked for his help.

A written request might take the following form:

"To OC troops .

I have come to the conclusion that the civil authorities are unable to control the situation and that the assistance of the military has become necessary.

I accordingly request such assistance.

Place .

Date .

Time ,~ .

Signature ..

Appointment "

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Use of Force-Commander's Responsibility

8. A commander, irrespective of his rank, is solely responsible for deciding what action the armed forces under his command are to take, eg, what degree of force if any they are to use in the circumstances. In making his appreciation and deciding upon his plan to help the civil authorities, he will be guided by the principles referred to in Chapter 1, Section 2.

9. The civil authorities are assumed to have no knowledge of weapons and their effects, and are not the best judges of the degree of force which the armed forces must use to achieve their immediate aim.

to. A commander must carefully consider whether to order his force to fire without a request from the civil authorities, and whether to refuse to fire if asked by them to do so. It is his judgement of the immediate circumstances which alone will determine whether fire should or should not be opened.

IF A COMMANDER ACTS WITHIN THE LAW, IN GOOD FAITH AND THE ACTION WHICH HE TAKES IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE HIS IMMEDIATE AIM, OR THERE ARE REASONABLE GROUNDS FOR BELIEVING IT TO BE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THAT AIM, HE NEED NOT FEAR THE RESULT OF ANY INQUIRY INTO HIS CONDUCT.

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11. Depending on the circumstances, the minimum force necessary to restore law and order can vary from the mere appearance of troops, to the use of all the force at a commander's disposal.

12. A commander must not exceed his duty in one instance, or at one place, because it is his personal opinion that his action will have a good effect in another instance or at another place.

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13. Disorders and offences which are clearly not of a serious nature should never be suppressed or prevented by the use of fire-arms. Where, however, serious disorders or offences can be suppressed or prevented only by the extreme measure of resorting to the use of fire-arms special care must be taken to restrict the use of such fire-arms to the minimum necessary to achieve the immediate aim. For example, if automatic weapons capable of firing single shots are being used and single shots only are necessary to restore law and order, the firing of bursts will not be justified. Where a commander decides that he has no alternative except to resort to the use of fire-arms he must, wherever possible, give warning of this .intention, since the warning may of itself prove sufficient to restore order and the use of fire-arms may then be avoided.

Prevention of Crime

14. Any person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances to prevent the commission of a crime. Only in the case of crimes of violence involving an immed iate threat to life, such as murder or arson,could actually killing the wrongdoer be considered "reasonable force" and then only if there was no other way of preventing the wrongdoer carrying out his design.

15. Forces engaged in protective or defensive duties, eg a sentry, guard, picquet or patrol may if it is essential to do so use force and even in the last resort lethal force, in the execution of their specific duty to protect or defend, in particular as follows:

a. In Preventive Action. To prevent:

(1) Other bodies of the armed forces from being attacked.

(2) The capture of or damage to buildings, vehicles, aircraft or equipment in charge of the armed forces.

(3) Damage to or interference with VPs such as communications centres, railways and canals which they are protecting.

b. In Self Defence.

16. In accordance with the general rule, however, no more force must be used than is necessary to achieve the immediate aim.

Self Defence

17. A member of the armed forces, like an ordinary citizen, may use force in self defence providing he makes every effort to avoid its use and in any event he must not use more force than is necessary. Fire-arms may be used in self defence by a person only if there is no other way of avoiding an immediate risk of losing his life or receiving serious bodily injuries. A person who uses fire-arms in self defence must be prepared to justify his action strictly on the above basis.

Unlawful Assembly

18. An unlawful assembly consists of three or more persons who are assembled together and intend to commit a crime by open force or, to carry out a common purpose, whether lawful or unlawful, in such a way that firm and courageous persons near the assembly have reasonable ground for thinking that a breach of the peace may resul t. The commission of an act of violence by one or more of the

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assembly is not necessary to make the assembly unlawful. It will be unlawful if its character and the circumstances are calculated to alarm a person of reasonable firmness and courage.

19. An unlawful assembly may be dispersed although it has committed no act of violence. The civil authorities have power to command the persons forming the assembly to go away, to arrest them if they do not go and to stop others from joining them. If the civil authorities are resisted they may use such force as will compel obedience, but it would be very unwise of them to use force which would maim or injure a person who was resisting, unless that person himself makes an attack inflicting or calculated to inflict grievous personal injury.

Riot

20. A riot is a tumultuous disturbance of the peace by three or more persons who

are assembled together without lawful authority and with the intention of mutually •

helping one another, by force if necessary, against anyone opposing them in carrying

out an enterprise of a private nature, and who actually begin to carry out that enter-

prise in a violent and turbulent manner which terrifies other people. It is immaterial

whether the act done is unlawful or not, but there must be an act. The doing of an

act which is calculated to terrify people is punishable whether the act is lawful or not.

When the aim of an assembly is lawful, the evidence that terror was caused must

be stronger than would otherwise be the case.

21. Civil authorities are required by law to do all they can to suppress a riot. If a mob is committing, or is obviously about to commit some outrage calculated to endanger life or property, the authorities may at once use such force as is necessary to disperse the mob. Fire-arms, however, ought not to be employed against the rioters unless they are armed and in a position to inflict grievous injury on the person trying to disperse them, or are committing or are about to commit some outrage which can only be stopped by the use of fire-arms.

22. It will sometimes be impossible to arrest individuals without using fire-arms, but opening fire on a mob can be justified only by the need of self protection or because the forces at the disposal of the authorities are so small that some violent outrage such as burning a building, breaking open a prison or attacking a barracks, cannot otherwise be prevented.

23. Details of the methods of suppressing unlawful assemblies and riots are given in Chapter 3.

Insurrection

24. An insurrection savours of high treason and consists of some enterprise of a general and public nature which is being carried out in defiance of the government of the country.

25. The existence of an armed insurrection or rebellion will justify the use of any degree of force necessary to suppress it. What is said in paragraph 21 above about the duty of suppressing riots applies still more strongly to insurrections or riots which border on rebellion. Fire-arms may be used as soon as the intention of the insurgents to carry out their purpose by force of arms is shown by open acts of violence, and it is apparent that the immediate use of fire-arms is essential.

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Application of Basic Principles

26. The answer to the question, "For what purpose has the mob come together?" will help the civil authorities and a commander to decide what force, if any, is necessary to maintain law and order and when to use it. Some examples are given

bclow: .

a. A mob assembles to remove an obstacle across a footpath which has been obstructed illegally or with doubtful legality. Their proceedings may be disorderly but their purpose may be legal. They will probably disperse after moving the obstacle, and normally it is better not to use force to disperse such a mob. Participants should however be identified in case they are later charged.

b. A meeting or procession assembles in order to further a parliamentary reform or some other political aim which involves neither rebellion against established authority nor any intention to enforce its aims by violence. Excitement may prompt the meeting or procession to some outrage, but, so long as it commits no act of violence, it should be interfered with as little as possible and no exhibition of force should be made until some violent crime has been or is about to be committed.

c. Where a mob shows clearly that it intends to destroy a factory or other property of an unpopular owner, and arms itself with weapons to break down doors and shows a settled intention to carry out its aim, its intent is criminal and it should be warned of the danger it will incur if it attempts to carry out its aim. The necessary measures should be taken to prevent the mob carrying out its aim. These may include the arrest of ringleaders. If the civil authorities are in danger of being overpowered, forces should stand by but should not be committed unless there is an immediate need to protect life and property by armed force. Although it may be wise to have forces standing by within easy distance, an actual display of armed force may, in.certain circumstances, provoke a mob and do more harm than good. Armed forces (at any rate when unmounted) can in practice seldom intervene effectively without using firearms and running the risk of killing and wounding a number of innocent or comparatively innocent persons. However, a mob which declares openly that it proposes to attack the constituted authorities and which consists wholly or partly of armed persons, or which attempts to seize an arsenal for the purpose of getting arms, cannot be dealt with too quickly.

References in the Manual of Military Law

27. The account of the law given in this chapter is sufficient for all practical purposes. However, all officers should read the following extracts from the Manual of Military Law, 1965:

a. Part II, Section V-Employment of Troops in Aid of the Civil Power.

b. Part I (lIth Edition) Chapter VI.

Para 11 (Responsibility for the use of Force). Para 13 (Arrest).

Para 16 (Self-defence).

Para 17 (Prevention of Crime).

c. Part I (11 th Edition) Chapter I.

Paras 9-12 (Martial Law and Emergency Legislation) .

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Legislation

28. When an emergency arises which cannot be dealt with by the civil authorities under the ordinary law, even with the aid of the armed forces, emergency legislation may be passed or brought into force giving the authorities special powers. Restrictions are permitted which, in the absence of such legislation, would be considered unjustified infringements on the liberty of the individual, and punishment for offences is often increased. For example, the death penalty may be imposed for carrying arms. Such legislation is introduced for limited purposes and is subject to review. Examples of increased powers which may be conferred on the civil authorities are as follows:

a. To impose a curfew.

b. To search without a warrant.

c. To detain a person without trial.

d. To declare special and prohibited areas.

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EVIDENCE

General

29. The investigation and prosecution of offences is a police responsibility. Commanders can, however, help by ensuring that the chain of evidence is maintained in any action involving the military. Adequate evidence against offenders must be correctly presented.

30. The following are examples of the type of evidence required by police:

a. Dead Bodies. It is not sufficient merely to deliver the dead body to the police.

They must be told of the circumstances of death including time, place and cause, and given means of identification (if possible) and names of independent witnesses.

b. Prisoners. When handing over prisoners, statements must indicate where they were arrested, the reason for their arrest and give the full circumstances surrounding the case. The evidence of the person actually making the arrest is vital and he must be able subsequently to identify the accused. If possible, therefore a photograph should be taken of the captor and his prisoner which will support any evidence which may be given later in court. Independent witnesses to the activities of the accused should be obtained where possible.

c. Use of Dye. This is a useful method of identification when making largescale arrests. Considerable preparation is involved in the use of these different dyes. Records must be made of their composition, samples lodged with the government chemist and records kept of to whom they were issued and where and when they were used. This is essential to rebut the defence that discolouration was caused by any other means.

d. Conduct of Searches. Although a search is primarily a police responsibility, there may be occasions when soldiers conduct one. In such a case, householders should be present and occupants should be in their rooms when the search is carried out. If the objects which are being looked for are found, it is necessary to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the occupant was aware that the articles were there, and that there had been no possibility of other persons putting them

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there in his or her absence. When conducting a search, therefore, the reason for it should always be made known to the occupant and his or her reply recorded. If he or she denies the presence of persons or things subsequently found, this may help to establish his or her guilty knowledge.

e. Identification of Exhibits. A chain of identification must be maintained for exhibits required as evidence at a trial. The best example is a weapon found during a search or raid, and the chain of identification should be as follows:

(1) The actual finder should hand in the weapon to the receiving station, care being taken not to erase fingerprints.

(2) The weapon should then be labelled and signed for both by the finder and the receiver.

(3) The receiving station, which is normally organized by the police, must' then hand over the weapon direct to the police investigating officer .

(4) In the subsequent proceedings, the finder must be able to identify the exhibit, state exactly where he found it and in what circumstances, and also identify the person to whom he handed it over .

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Annex B

DETECTION AND DISPOSAL OF ENEMY BOOBY TRAPS AND EXPLOSIVE DEVICES

(See Chapter 1 Section 3)

Clearance

1. In internal security operations, booby traps or explosive devices may often be used to hinder the security forces, or to endanger the general community.

2. When such devices are discovered, they must be reported immediately to unit or formation HQ and to the police.

3. Clearance must be by the fastest means, with the object of allowing operations to proceed with the minimum delay. If the immediate operational situation makes it necessary these devices should be cleared, but only by qualified personnel, eg, infantry assault pioneers or engineers.

4. In cases where the presence of a device is not impeding operations, it is desirable that clearance should be carried out by RAOC ammunition technicians, in order to:

a. Obtain information on how the device is operated, with a view to disseminating this information to all security forces engaged on operations.

b. Obtain evidence of construction of the device, which may later be required to support police prosecutions.

5. If large numbers of devices are discovered, even though they are not impeding operations, it may be necessary for clearance to be carried out by qualified personnel of any arm or service. A decision on this matter must be taken by the local commander at the time.

Capabilities

6. In deciding who should carry out clearance and disarming of devices, commanders should bear in mind the capabilities of the various arms and services which are summarized below:

a. Royal Engineers and infantry assault pioneers are trained in the clearance and disarming of mines and booby traps, and in the use of explosives .

b. RAOC ammunition technical officers and ammunition technicians are experts in all matters concerning ammunition and explosives, including disarming and dismantling of explosive devices.

c. All arms are responsible for maintaining, in each unit, detachments trained in the detection and clearance of booby traps, for the immediate protection of the unit.

d. In the Royal Navy specialists will normally be found in the larger ships who are competent to deal with the clearance of explosive devices. The assault engineer troop in a Royal Marine Commando is trained in clearance and disarming of mines and booby traps, and in the use of explosives.

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e. The RAF employ specialist teams for bomb disposal both in the UK and overseas.

Co-operation

7. All military forces must co-operate closely with the police, local authorities and intelligence services. The speedy dissemination of information will reduce the risk of death or injury when similar booby traps or devices are subsequently discovered. In prolonged operations a joint cell may be necessary in joint police/ military HQ to co-ordinate action and disseminate information speedily.

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Annex C

COMMUNICATIONS (See Chapter 1 Section 3)

General

1. A joint communication system is required so that formations, units and the police can keep in touch. Operational communications must be duplicated by using radio and line whenever possible.

2. In certain overseas dependencies the Army has installed civilian pattern VHF radios in static locations and in vehicles specifically for disaster and/or internal security operations. These radios provide an alternative means to existing line communications and are often interoperable with those of the civilian police . Where military and police radios are not interoperable it will usually be necessary for the Army to station liaison detachments with the police, or to loan equipment for the police to operate on a joint net.

Liaison

3. Close liaison between the military, police and civil authorities must be maintained at all levels. The Royal Navy and Royal Air Force may require assistance from the Army in the provision of communications. An efficient system of passing signal traffic between Army and police radio stations is essential, eg, a joint message form must be used.

4. The senior signal officer must liaise with the senior telecommunications official, and Special Branch advice must be obtained, concerning the reliability of civil employees before the latter are consu1ted on internal security matters. A joint civil/military communications committee may be necessary.

5. If the civil postal service is slow, uncertain or insecure, the Army should offer its own facilities for the carriage of important civil documents.

Means of Communication 6. Radio.

a. When radios that are interoperable with those of the police have not been installed for internal security operations, an increased scale of military .' sets may be required together with an adequate reserve of operators, radios and spares.

b. Commanders should be aware of the limitations of VHF radio when in built-up areas. It may be necessary to deploy rebroadcast stations at high points so that communications may be maintained to all areas. These rebroadcast sites may need a guard and special resupply arrangements.

c. When ajoint military/police net is working, a mutually acceptable procedure must be agreed.

d. It should be remembered that the police will not normally have access to codes, whereas the Army may find SLIDEX essential when dealing with plans for future operations.

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7. Line. The following points must be noted:

a. Linemen will seldom be available in sufficient numbers to supply their own protection. Escorts are essential, particularly for repair parties working in remote areas and liable to ambush.

b. An alternative means of communication, normally radio, must be immediately available and must therefore either be tested regularly, say hourly, or remain on continuous listening watch.

c. Royal Signals officers should familiarize themselves with the exchanges and telephone system in readiness for any withdrawal of civil labour.

8. Despatch Riders. These should not normally be used as they are easily ambushed. When used they must operate in pairs and be mounted in vehicles and

not on motor cycles. Regular routes and timings must be avoided. The use of •

helicopters and light aircraft for SDS will often be the only acceptable method. Maximum use must be made of all visitors and liaison officers to lighten the burden

on SDS.

9. Maintenance of Equipment. The increased use of radio will heavily load the repair and maintenance facilities and reinforcement may be necessary. Mobile generating sets should be duplicated at every site and regularly maintained. Mains rectifiers should, where possible, be issued to all units, but a generator will always be required as an alternative to any civil mains power source.

Ground/ Air Communications

10. There is a specific need for formations and units, down to platoon or even section level and on occasions police, to be able to communicate with any aircraft supporting ground forces in internal security operations in urban areas. There will also be occasions when one aircraft may be used either as an airborne command post or to relay messages from one ground station to another, or to act temporarily as a radio rebroadcast station. It is therefore important for the senior signal officer to bear in mind the radio fit of all aircraft likely to be used in support of internal security operations.

Security

11. The following aspects of security are important:

a. Rules for voice procedure must be strictly adhered to at all times. Only •

authorized voice codes and appointment titles must be used. Past experience has

shown that in internal security operations the enemy is fully capable of monitoring

voice radio nets; in fact he would be stupid not to do so.

b. Telephone systems with radio relay back-up, and with channels allotted to teleprinters, offer some security, provided exchanges are inaccessible to saboteurs. Ciphers provide a high degree of security if the delay is acceptable.

c. The senior signal officer should be informed when clandestine methods, such as the tapping of telephones, are required to obtain information about the enemy.

d. The method of isolating an area from external telephone communication is described in Chapter 5, in connection with cordon and search operations. The "wrap" method of disconnecting overhead telephone lines is as illustrated:

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1. A wrap

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THE "WRAP" METHOD OF DISCONNECTING OVERHEAD TELEPHONE LINES

(see paragraph 238)

'0' class cable

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-----~

-.---- earth pins

2. Application of a wrap

3. Lines wrapped

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, .. \ A_.)~· _.\.- P ......... _.4._, __ ,_L __ 10 • .\1

(ii) throw over again

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wrap pulled tight and both earth pins in ground.

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-'-~ -~_, __ ,,-- .. _/r~ __ ..J'4-~-"''' _,

Civilian Radio

12. The senior signal officer must ensure that civilian radio transmissions do not interfere with the security forces radio nets.

13. The main transmitting station of the local radio service will always be a vulnerable point, and it may be necessary for a Royal Signals officer, covertly, to

, familiarize himself with the equipment in readiness for any withdrawal of civil labour.

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Annex D

SPECIMEN HEADINGS FOR A MILITARY LOCAL SECURITY SCHEME (See Chapter 2 Section 5)

Note: The headings given below are a guide to be adapted to meet the local situation.

Situation

1. Political Situation. An outline summary from intelligence reports and newspapers.

2. Areas Likely to be Affected by Disturbances. An up-to-date appreciation of the situation in each area.

3. Civil Administration and Police.

a. Outline organization of civil administration and police at appropriate level.

b. Brief details of civilian and police emergency plans.

c. Civil officials authorized to call on the military for assistance.

4. Ordinances Relating to Internal Disturbances.

5. Security Zones. Sub-division of area of responsibility into zones, to coincide if possible with civil/police sub-divisions.

Mission

6. (For example "To maintain law and order in ").

Execution

7. General Outline. Including outline dispositions.

8. Military Forces.

a. Grouping.

b. Tasks.

c. Reserves.

9. Local Military Forces. (May be included in paragraph 8) .

10. Naval Forces.

11. Air Forces.

12. Civil Police.

13. Co-ordination.

a. States of Readiness. Action to be taken at each stage to be defined under:

(I) Preparatory I

(2) Precautionary ~ The types and number of stages will depend on

(3) Emergency j the local situation.

b. Use of Force. Including use of riot control agents.

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c. Vulnerable Points.

(1) List of civilian and military VPs.

(2) List of key points which must be guarded.

(3) Responsibility of the civil/police/military for guarding key points. (4) Reconnaissance.

d.Movement between Zones.

e. Curfew Passes.

f. Announcements to the Public.

g. Precautionary Measures for Service Families, Dependents and MOD Civilians. This may be included in sub-para. a. above.

h. Preparation of Local Security Schemes.

Service Support •

14. Supplies. Including details of reserves to be held by units and sub-units. ..

15. POL. Including details of reserves to be carried by vehicles.

16. Water.

17. Transport. Including plans for requisitioning transport should such a measure become necessary.

18. Accommodation.

a. Plans for accommodating service families in an emergency.

h. Plans for accommodating troops on protracted operations away from their barracks.

19. Medical.

a. Military.

b. Civilian.

20. Reinforcements. Plans for reception and accommodation.

Command and Signal 21. Signal.

a. Detailed signal instruction, as an annex, to cover radio, line and civilian communications, call signs, security, codes, SDS, etc.

h. Duplication of civil/military lines of communication by the military.

22. Code Words and Nicknames. Comprehensive list to indicate each state of •

readiness, varying degrees of tension, place names, etc.

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Annex E

VEHICLE MODIFICATIONS (See Chapters 2 and 3)

GENERAL

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A Vehicles

1. Wire Bound Poles. Wooden poles 12 to 20 feet long, at least 6 inches in diameter and wound copiously with barbed wire, can be mounted on the front of light tracked or wheeled A vehicles for the clearing of large crowds in open spaces. Vehicles should be used in echelon, but where this is impracticable the sides and rear of the vehicle can be protected by barbed wire or by electrification.

2. Bullet-proof Skirt for Wheeled A Vehicles. Wheeled A Vehicles can be fitted with a bullet-proof skirt at the rear to protect troops sheltering behind them from a crowd which has opened fire. The skirt prevents ricochets from the metalled surface of the road.

3. Electrified Vehicle'}. Wheeled A vehicles can be electrified as described in paragraphs 9 to 12 below, and metal dozer bars similarly electrified can be fitted to the front and rear of the vehicle.

B Vehicles

4. Mine Plates. Where mines are liable to be encourtered, B vehicles may be fitted with mine plates kits. The principle in design is to afford protection to the crew rather than to the vehicle. When such kits are fitted, a reduction in the effective payload may have to be accepted (see Fig. 4d).

5. Internal Security Kits. These consist of sturdy wire-mesh guards and can be fitted to B vehicles. They are intended to give protection to passengers and crew from missiles, bombs and grenades (see Figs. 4a and 4c).

6. Wire Cutters. This consists of a long angle-iron picket mounted vertically on the front of a vehicle. It is designed to cut wires stretched across the road (see Fig. 4b).

7. Details. Detailed information of the above aids may be obtained through GS technical channels.

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Use of Fire Fighting Equipment

8. Use can be made of fire pumps and tenders for crows dispersal, and certain fire extingushers can be converted for spraying dye or irritant fluids.

ELECTRIFICATION OF WHEELED A VEHICLES

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Method

9. The framework or pushing bar of a vehicle, with a 24-volt DC LT system, is charged to a high voltage above ground potential, thus giving a strong electric shock to any person standing on the ground and in contact with the vehicle or bar. The current must be limited to a safe value, so that it will neither prove fatal, nor cause serious or permanent injury.

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ELECTRIFICATION OF WHEELED A VEHICLES WIRING DIAGRAM

Switch Vehicle batteries

......-----O~-----IIIIIII ~-------l

Low tension output

. Low tension input

Insulated metal bar

Chain insulated from vehicle

(With chain up man gets reduced electric shock)

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Water sets

(With in down man

gets full shock from vehicle)

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Description

10. The modification consists of a Centurion booster coil, wire earthing chain, and a 2-pint water can with tap and rubber tubing. The booster coil is mounted by means of a bracket next to the switch. The existing cable harness clips are used to carry the high tension lead and tubing to the rear of the vehicle, where they are passed through the rear drain hole in the hull. The high tension lead and earthing chain are insulated from the vehicle at this point. A switch which can be left permanently "on" is required. The wiring diagram is shown opposite.

Operation

11. To obtain a good electrical shock in the summer on dry stony ground, the following procedure should be adopted:

a. Open the water tap for approximately 15 seconds .

b. Switch on.

12. An even greater effect can be produced, if a small amount of the paint on the vehicle is scraped off at any point at which a person is likely to grasp the vehicle or pushing bar. The force of the shock will be much reduced if a crowd is pressing round the vehicle. The device is not, therefore, suitable for crowd control vehicles. It should be used to deter the individual from climbing on to a vehicle.

The Prodder

13. An alternative device is to carry the HT output to a radio aerial fitted with an insulated handle. The vehicle commander can prod anyone impeding his progress, particularly people lying down in his path .

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Annex F

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Stage Action

I a. Breech empty, working parts

forward.

b. Safety catch applied.

(Not applicable to GPMG).

c. Full magazine in pouch/ pocket.

As for Stage I but full magazine on weapon.

a. Action cocked.

b. Safety catch applied.

c. Full magazine on weapon.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS AGAINST ACCIDENTAL DISCHARGES (See Chapter 2 Section 6)

1. It is the duty of every officer and NCO to ensure that unnecessary waste of life does not occur through the accidental discharge of weapons; safe handling of weapons is an important part of training, and a matter which requires constant attention when troops are engaged on internal security operations. The following safety stages, applicable to all men engaged on such operations who are armed with SLR's, GPMGs and SMGs, are set out as a guide:

II

Where Applicable

In unit lines or in an area where incidents are unlikely to occur.

Travelling in vehicles in an area where incidents are likely to occur. (Nominated sentries should adopt Stage III).

III

-- -----------_.------ ----------------

IV

As for Stage III but safety catch off.

On entering an area on foot where incidents are likely to occur.

This stage also applies to nominated vehicle sentries.

When preparing to engage the enemy.

2. Weapons must be cleared before men return to unit lines, and then inspected by an officer or NCO. Weapons are normally returned to armouries when troops are in camp, but there may be occasions when all troops, or a proportion of troops on immediate stand by, are required to be armed at all times.

3. Many accidents, occur when reverting from Stage III to II and from II to I, re, when embussing, travelling, or debussing on return from an operation in transport. It is important that as a drill, weapons are cleared and inspected by an officer or NCO before embussing. If it is necessary then to change to Stage II or III this must be done as a drill from Stage I, when embussed.

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