In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
In Re Adoption of Stephanie Garcia
148311
Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests
Tags: Adoption, Illegitimate Child
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ADOPTION; ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
Facts: Honorato B. Catindig filed a petition to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Astorga Garcia.
He averred that Stephanie was born on June 26,
1994; that Stephanie had been using her mothers
middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He
prayed that Stephanies middle name be changed to
Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her surname
Garcia be changed to Catindig his surname.
The RTC granted the petition for adoption, and
ordered that pursuant to article 189 of the Family
Code, the minor shall be known as Stephanie Nathy
Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for classification and/or
reconsideration praying that Stephanie be allowed to
use the surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her
middle name. The lower court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
Issue: Whether or not an illegitimate child may use
the surname of her mother as her middle name when
she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Held:
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is
deemed to be a legitimate child of the adapter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the
Family Code and Section 17 of Article V of RA 8557.
Being a legitimate by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights
provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear
the surname of her father and her mother. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the
Civil Code and Family Law Committees. In fact, it is
a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of
the father.
ISSUE:
WON Juan E. Locsin Jr is an interested party and is
qualified to be granted letters of administration
(Which of the two documents is genuine)
HELD:
Juan E. Locsin, Jr is not an
Interested person
within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules
of Court entitled to the issuance of letters of administ
ration since he failed to prove his filiation with the
late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. (Certificate of Live Birth
No.477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious)
Reasoning:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays
down the persons preferred who are entitled to the
issuance of letters of administration, thus: Section 6.
When and to whom letters of administration granted
. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail
togive bond, or a person dies intestate, administration
shall be granted:(a) To the surviving husband or wife,
as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to
have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
XXX Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79
provides that a petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus: Sec. 2
Contents of petition for letters of administration
. A petition for letters of administration must be filed
by an interested person and must show, so far as
known to the petitioner:(a) The jurisdictional facts; x
x x" An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is
one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such
as a creditor. The deceased, Juan C. Locsin, was not
survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance
of letters of administration, respondent alleged that
he is an acknowledged natural son of the deceased,
implying that he is an
interested person
in the estate and is considered as next of kin
. But has respondent established that he is an
acknowledged natural son of the deceased? On this
point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
Residence Certificate were not filled up.There is no explanation why out of so manycertificat
es, this vital document, Exhibit "D", wasmerely
pasted with the
volume. The records of the instant case adequately
support afinding that Exhibit "8" for the petitioners,
not respondent's Exhibit "D", should have been given
more faith and credence by the courts below.-The
Civil Registry Law requires,
inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar to send copies of
registrable certificates and documents presented to
them for entry to the Civil Registrar General. A copy
of the document sent by the Local Civil
Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the
copy being kept by the latter. In the instant case,
Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil Registrar
General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing
in the records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. Such circumstance should have aroused
the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals and should have impelled them to declare
Exhibit "D" a spurious document. Exhibit "8" shows
that respondent's record of birth was made by
his mother. In
the same Exhibit "8", thesignature and name of Juan
C. Locsin listed asrespondent's father and the entry
that he and Amparo Escamilla were married in Oton,
Iloilo on November 28,1954 do not appear.-In