SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 72841. January 29, 1987.]

PROVINCE OF CEBU, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ATTY. PABLO P. GARCIA, respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J :
p

This is a petition to review the decision of the respondent Intermediate Appellate

Court in A.C. G.R. CV No. 66502 entitled "Governor Rene Espina, et al. v. Mayor
Sergio Osmea, Jr., et al., Atty. Pablo P. Garcia v. Province of Cebu" 1 arming with
modication the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch VII, granting
respondent Pablo P. Garcia's claim for compensation for services rendered as counsel
in behalf of the respondent Province of Cebu.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. On February 4, 1964, while then incumbent
Governor Rene Espina was on ocial business in Manila, the Vice-Governor,
Priscillano Almendras and three (3) members of the Provincial Board enacted
Resolution No. 188, donating to the City of Cebu 210 province-owned lots all
located in the City of Cebu, with an aggregate area of over 380 hectares, and
authorizing the Vice-Governor to sign the deed of donation on behalf of the
province. The deed of donation was immediately executed in behalf of the Province
of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in behalf of the City of Cebu by
Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. The document of donation was prepared and notarized by
a private lawyer. The donation was later approved by the Oce of the President
through Executive Secretary Juan Cancio.
cdasia

According to the questioned deed of donation the lots donated were to be sold by
the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to nance its public improvement
projects. The City of Cebu was given a period of one (1) year from August 15, 1964
within which to dispose of the donated lots.
Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina denounced as illegal and immoral the
action of his colleagues in donating practically all the patrimonial property of the
province of Cebu, considering that the latter's income was less than one-fourth
(1/4) of that of the City of Cebu.
To prevent the sale or disposition of the lots, the ocers and members of the Cebu
Mayor's League (in behalf of their respective municipalities) along with some
taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, led a case seeking to have the donation declared
illegal, null, and void. It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintis were ling it
for and in behalf of the Province of Cebu in the nature of a derivative suit. Named
defendants in the suit were the City of Cebu, City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. and the

Cebu provincial ocials responsible for the donation of the province-owned lots. The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-8669 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
and assigned to Branch VI thereof.
Defendants City of Cebu and City Mayor Osmea, Jr. led a motion to dismiss the
case on the ground that plaintiffs did not have the legal capacity to sue.
Subsequently, in an order, dated May, 1965, the court dismissed Case No. R-8669
on the ground that plaintis were not the real parties in interest in the case.
Plaintis led a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal. This motion
was denied by the Court.
Meanwhile, Cebu City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. announced that he would borrow
funds from the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and would use the donated lots as
collaterals. In July, 1965, the City of Cebu advertised the sale of all the lots
remaining unsold. Thereupon, Governor Espina, apprehensive that the lots would be
irretrievably lost by the Province of Cebu, decided to go to court. He engaged the
services of respondent Garcia in ling and prosecuting the case in his behalf and in
behalf of the Province of Cebu.
Garcia led the complaint for the annulment of the deed of donation with an
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, which application
was granted on the same day, August 6, 1965.
The complaint was later amended to implead Cebu City Mayor Carlos P. Cuizon as
additional defendant in view of Fiscal Numeriano Capangpangan's manifestation
stating that on September 9, 1965, Sergio Osmea, Jr. led his certicate of
candidacy for senator, his position/oce having been assumed by City Mayor Carlos
P. Cuizon.
Sometime in 1972, the Provincial Board passed a resolution authorizing the
Provincial Attorney, Alfredo G. Baguia, to enter his appearance for the Province of
Cebu and for the incumbent Governor, Vice-Governor and members of the Provincial
Board in this case.
llcd

On January 30, 1973, Alfredo G. Baguia, Provincial Attorney of the Province of Cebu,
entered his appearance as additional counsel for the Province of Cebu and as
counsel for Governor Osmundo Rama, Vice-Governor Salutario Fernandez and Board
Members Leonardo Enad, Guillermo Legazpi, and Rizalina Migallos.
On January 31, 1973, Atty. Baguia led a complaint in intervention stating that
intervenors Province of Cebu and Provincial Board of Cebu were joining or uniting
with original plainti, former Governor of Cebu, Rene Espina. They adopted his
causes of action, claims, and position stated in the original complaint filed before the
court on August 6, 1965.
On June 25, 1974, a compromise agreement was reached between the province of
Cebu and the city of Cebu. On July 15, 1974, the court approved the compromise
agreement and a decision was rendered on its basis.

On December 4, 1974, the court issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the decision dated July 15, 1974, to wit:
"1.
Ordering the City of Cebu to return and deliver to the Province of
Cebu all the lots enumerated in the second paragraph hereof;
"2.
Ordering the Province of Cebu to pay the amount of One Million Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) to the City of Cebu for and in
consideration of the return by the latter to the former of the aforesaid lots;
"3.
Declaring the retention by the City of Cebu of the eleven (11) lots
mentioned in paragraph No. 1 of the compromise agreement, namely, Lot
Nos. 1141, 1261, 1268, 1269, 1272, 1273, 917, 646-A, 646-A-4-0 and
10107-C;
"4.
Ordering the City of Cebu or the City Treasurer to turn over to the
Province of Cebu the amount of P187,948.93 mentioned in Annex "A" of the
defendants manifestation dated October 21, 1974;
"5.
Declaring the City of Cebu and all its present and past ocers
completely free from liabilities to third persons in connection with the
aforementioned lots, which liabilities if any, shall be assumed by the Province
of Cebu;
"6.
Ordering the Register of Deeds of the City of Cebu to cancel the
certication of titles in the name of the City of Cebu covering the lots
enumerated in the second paragraph of this order and to issue new ones in
lieu thereof in the name of the Province of Cebu."

For services rendered in Civil Case no. 238-BC, CFI of Cebu, respondent Pablo P.
Garcia led through counsel a Notice of Attorney's Lien, dated April 14, 1975,
praying that his statement of claim of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon
the records thereof, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
To said notice, petitioner Province of Cebu led through counsel, its opposition dated
April 23, 1975, stating that the payment of attorney's fees and reimbursement of
incidental expenses are not allowed by law and settled jurisprudence to be paid by
the Province. A rejoinder to this opposition was filed by private respondent Garcia.
After hearing, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, then presided over by Judge
Alfredo Marigomen, rendered judgment dated May 30, 1979, in favor of private
respondent and against petitioner Province of Cebu, declaring that the former is
entitled to recover attorney's fees on the basis of quantum meruit and xing the
amount thereof at P30,000.00.
dctai

Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. In the case of
private respondent, however, he appealed only from that portion of the decision
which xed his attorney's fees at P30,000.00 instead of at 30% of the value of the
properties involved in the litigation as stated in his original claim.
On October 18, 1985, the Intermediate Appellate Court rendered a decision

arming the ndings and conclusions of the trial court that the private respondent
is entitled to recover attorney's fees but xing the amount of such fees at 5% of the
market value of the properties involved in the litigation as of the date of the filing of
the claim in 1975. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, except for the aforementioned modication that the
compensation for the services rendered by the Claimant Atty. Pablo P.
Garcia is xed at ve percent (5%) of the total fair market value of the lots in
question, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed in all other respects."

Both parties went to the Supreme Court with private respondent questioning the
xing of his attorney's fees at 5% instead of 30% of the value of the properties in
litigations as prayed for in his claims. However, the private respondent later
withdrew his petition in G.R. No. 72818 with the following explanation:
cdrep

"That after a long and serious reection and reassessment of his position
and intended course of action and, after seeking the views of his friends,
petitioner has come to the denite conclusion that prosecuting his appeal
would only result in further delay in the nal disposition of his claim (it has
been pending for the last 10 years - 4 in the CFI and 6 in the Court of
Appeals, later Intermediate Appellate Court) and that it would be more
prudent and practicable to accept in full the decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court."

Hence, only the petition of the Province of Cebu is pending before this Court.
The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has been
settled in Ramos v. Court of Appeals (108 SCRA 728). Collaboration of a private law
rm with the scal and the municipal attorney is not allowed. Section 1683 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:

"Section 1683.
Duty of scal to represent provinces and provincial
subdivisions in litigation. The provincial scal shall represent the province
and any municipality, or municipal district thereof in any court, except in
cases whereof original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases
where the municipality, or municipal district in question is a party adverse to
the provincial government or to some other municipality, or municipal district
in the same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of
any political division thereof are opposed, the provincial scal shall act on
behalf of the province.
LLpr

"When the provincial scal is disqualied to serve any municipality or other

political subdivision of a province, a special attorney may be employed by its
council."

The above provision, complemented by Section 3 of the Local Autonomy Law, is

clear in providing that only the provincial scal and the municipal attorney can
represent a province or municipality in its lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The

municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to

situations where the provincial scal is disqualied to represent it (De Guia v. The
Auditor General, 44 SCRA 169; Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok, 93 Phil.
173; Enriquez, Sr., v. Honorable Gimenez, 107 Phil. 932) as when he represents the
province against a municipality.
The lawmaker, in requiring that the local government should be represented in its
court cases by a government lawyer, like its municipal attorney and the provincial
scal, intended that the local government should not be burdened with the
expenses of hiring a private lawyer. The lawmaker also assumed that the interests
of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a government lawyer
handles its litigations. It is to be expected that the municipal attorney and the scal
would be faithful and dedicated to the corporation's interests, and that, as civil
service employees, they could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction
of duty (See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, supra).
However, every rule is not without an exception, Ibi quid generaliter conceditur;
inest haec exceptio, si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque (Where anything is granted
generally, this exception is implied; that nothing shall be contrary to law and right).
Indeed, equity, as well as the exceptional situation facing us in the case at bar,
require a departure from the established rule.
The petitioner anchors its opposition to private respondent's claim for compensation
on the grounds that the employment of claimant as counsel for the Province of
Cebu by then Governor Rene Espina was unauthorized and violative of Section
1681 to 1683 in relation to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code and
that the claim for attorney's fees is beyond the purview of Section 37, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.
LLjur

It is argued that Governor Espina was not authorized by the Provincial Board,
through a board resolution, to employ Atty. Pablo P. Garcia as counsel of the
Province of Cebu.
Admittedly, this is so.
However, the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar are such that the rule
cannot be applied. The Provincial Board would never have given such authorization.
The decision of the respondent court elucidates the matter thus:
". . . The provisions of Sections 1681 to 1683 of the Revised Administrative
Code contemplate a normal situation where the adverse party of the
province is a third person as in the case of Enriquez v. Auditor General, 107
Phil. 932. In the present case, the controversy involved an intramural ght
between the Provincial Governor on one hand and the members of the
Provincial Board on the other hand. Obviously it is unthinkable for the
Provincial Board to adopt a resolution authorizing the Governor to employ
Atty. Garcia to act as counsel for the Province of Cebu for the purpose of
ling and prosecuting a case against the members to the same Provincial
Board. According to the claimant Atty. Garcia, how can Governor Espina be

expected to secure authority from the Provincial Board to employ claimant

as counsel for the Province of Cebu when the very ocials from whom
authority is to be sought are the same ocials to be sued. It is simply
impossible that the Vice-Governor and the members of the Provincial Board
would pass a resolution authorizing Governor Espina to hire a lawyer to le a
suit against themselves.
xxx xxx xxx
"Under Section 2102 of the Revised Administrative Code it is the Provincial
Board upon whom is vested the authority `to direct, in its discretion, the
bringing or defense of civil suits on behalf of the Provincial Governor ____.'
Considering that the members of the Provincial Board are the very ones
involved in this case, they cannot be expected to directed the Provincial
Fiscal the ling of the suit on behalf of the provincial government against
themselves. Moreover, as argued by the claimant, even if the Provincial
Fiscal should side with the Governor in the bringing of this suit, the Provincial
Board whose members are made defendants in this case, can simply
frustrate his eorts by directing him to dismiss the case or by refusing to
appropriate funds for the expenses of the litigation.
". . . Consequently, there could have been no occasion for the exercise
by the Provincial Fiscal of his powers and duties since the members of
the Provincial Board would not have directed him to le a suit against
them."

A situation obtains, therefore, where the Provincial Governor, in behalf of the

Province of Cebu, seeks redress against the very members of the body, that is, the
Provincial Board, which, under the law, is to provide it with legal assistance. A strict
application of the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code on the matter
would deprive the plaintis in the court below of redress for a valid grievance. The
provincial board authorization required by law to secure the services of special
counsel becomes an impossibility. The decision of the respondent court is grounded
in equity a correction applied to law, where on account of the general
comprehensiveness of the law, particular exceptions not being provided against,
something is wanting to render it perfect.
It is also argued that the employment of claimant was violative of sections 1681 to
1683 of the Revised Administrative Code because the Provincial Fiscal who was the
only competent ocial to le this case was not disqualied to act for the Province of
Cebu.
dctai

Respondent counsel's representation of the Province of Cebu became necessary

because of the Provincial Board's failure or refusal to direct the bringing of the
action to recover the properties it had donated to the City of Cebu. The Board more
eectively disqualied the Provincial Fiscal from representing the Province of Cebu
when it directed the Fiscal to appear for its members in Civil Case No. R-8669 led
by Atty. Garcia, and others, to defend its actuation in passing and approving
Provincial Board Resolution No. 186. The answer of the Provincial Fiscal on behalf of
the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Board members led in Civil Case No. R-8669;

(Exhibit "K") upholds the validity and legality of the donation. How then could the
Provincial Fiscal represent the Province of Cebu in the suit to recover the properties
in question? How could Governor Espina be represented by the Provincial Fiscal or
seek authorization from the Provincial Board to employ special counsel? Nemo
tenetur ad impossibile (The law obliges no one to perform an impossibility). Neither
could a prosecutor be designated by the Department of Justice. Malacaang had
already approved the questioned donation.
Anent the question of liability for respondent counsel's services, the general rule
that an attorney cannot recover his fees from one who did not employ him or
authorize his employment, is subject to its own exception.
Until the contrary is clearly shown, an attorney is presumed to be acting under
authority of the litigant whom he purports to represent (Azotes v. Blanco, 78 Phil,
739) His authority to appear for and represent petitioner in litigation, not having
been questioned in the lower court, it will be presumed on appeal that counsel was
properly authorized to le the complaint and appear for his client. (Republic v.
Philippine Resources Development Corporation, 102 Phil. 960) Even where an
attorney is employed by an unauthorized person to represent a client, the latter will
be bound where it has knowledge of the fact that it is being represented by an
attorney in a particular litigation and takes no prompt measure to repudiate the
assumed authority. Such acquiescence in the employment of an attorney as
occurred in this case is tantamount to ratication (Tan Lua v. O'Brien, 55 Phil. 53).
The act of the successor provincial board and provincial ocials in allowing
respondent Atty. Pablo P. Garcia to continue as counsel and in joining him in the suit
led the counsel to believe his services were still necessary.
LLjur

We apply a rule in the law of municipal corporations: "that a municipality may

become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the
benets accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to
contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all
cases where money or other property of a party is received under such
circumstances that the general law, independent of express contract implies an
obligation upon the municipality to do justice with respect to the same." (38 Am.
Jur. Sec. 515, p. 193):
"The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied
contract does not connote an enforceable obligation. Some specic principle
or situation of which equity takes cognizance must be the foundation of the
claim. The principle of liability rests upon the theory that the obligation
implied by law to pay does not originate in the unlawful contract, but arises
from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benet
received by the municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of
the property or services, or the compensation specied in the contract, is
not the measure. If the price named in the invalid contract is shown to be
entirely fair and reasonable not only in view of the labor done, but also in
reference to the benets conferred, it may be taken as the true measure of
recovery."

The petitioner can not set up the plea that the contract was ultra vires and still
retain benets thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of
reaping some benets, the petitioner is estopped to question its validity for the
purposes of denying answerability.
The trial court discussed the services of respondent Garcia as follows:
". . . Thus because of his eort in the ling of this case and in securing
the issuance of the injunction preventing the City of Cebu and Sergio
Osmea, Jr., from selling or disposing the lots to third parties, on the
part of the members of the Provincial Board from extending the date of
the automatic reversion beyond August 15, 1965, on the part of the
Register of Deeds - from eecting the transfer of title of any of the
donated lots to any vendee or transferee, the disposition of these lots
by the City of Cebu to third parties was frustrated and thus: saved
these lots for their eventual recovery by the province of Cebu."

Actually it was Governor Espina who led the case against Cebu City and Mayor
Osmea. Garcia just happened to be the lawyer. Still Atty. Garcia is entitled to
compensation. To deny private respondent compensation for his professional
services would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law
(Cristobal v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 103 SCRA 329).
The petitioner alleges that although they do not deny Atty. Garcia's services for
Governor Espina (who ceased to be such Governor of Cebu on September 13, 1969)
and the original plaintis in the case, "it cannot be said with candor and fairness
that were it not for his services the lots would have already been lost to the
province forever, because the donation itself he was trying to enjoin and annul in
said case was subject to a reversion clause under which lots remaining undisposed
of by the City as of August 15, 1965 automatically reverted to the province and only
about 17 lots were disposed of by August 15, 1965." We quote respondent counsel's
comment with approval:
Cdpr

xxx xxx xxx

"While it is true that the donation was subject to a reversion clause, the
same clause gave the Provincial Board the discretion to extend the period of
reversion beyond August 15, 1965 (see paragraph 3 of donation).
"With the known predisposition of the majority of the members of the
Provincial Board, there would have been no impediment to the extension of
the reversion date to beyond August 15, 1965. Once the date of reversion is
extended, the disposition of all the donated lots would be only a matter of
course."

We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and conclude that 30% or even
5% of properties already worth (P120,000,000.00 in 1979 as compensation for the
private respondent's services is simply out of the question. The case handled by
Atty. Garcia was decided on the basis of a compromise agreement where he no

longer participated. The decision was rendered after pre-trial and without any
hearing on the merits.
LLphil

The factual ndings and applicable law in this petition are accurately discussed in
the exhaustive and well-written Order of then Trial Judge, now Court of Appeals
Justice Alfredo Marigomen. We agree with his determination of reasonable fees for
the private lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit. The trial court xed the
compensation at P30,000.00 and ordered reimbursement of actual expenses in the
amount of P289.43.
WHEREFORE, the questioned October 18, 1985 decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court is set aside. The Order of the Trial Court dated May 30, 1979 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Fernan, Alampay, Paras and Padilla, JJ ., concur.

Bidin J ., took no part.
Footnotes
1.

The decision was penned by Justice Marcelino R. Veloso with Justices Porrio V.
Sison Abdulwahid Bidin, and Ramon B. Britanico concurring.