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    Pelaez V Auditor General - Lasam

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    Pilyang Sweet
    The petitioner challenged executive orders issued by the President creating 33 new municipalities. The petitioner argued this was an undue delegation of legislative power, as the authority to create municipal corporations is an essentially legislative function. The respondent claimed the President had this power under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court held that Section 68 did not constitute a valid delegation of legislative power, as it did not sufficiently define the policy to be implemented or set standards for the delegate to conform to. As the executive orders lacked statutory authority, they were deemed null and void.

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    Pelaez V Auditor General - Lasam

    Uploaded by

    Pilyang Sweet
    84 views2 pages
    The petitioner challenged executive orders issued by the President creating 33 new municipalities. The petitioner argued this was an undue delegation of legislative power, as the authority to create municipal corporations is an essentially legislative function. The respondent claimed the President had this power under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court held that Section 68 did not constitute a valid delegation of legislative power, as it did not sufficiently define the policy to be implemented or set standards for the delegate to conform to. As the executive orders lacked statutory authority, they were deemed null and void.

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    9. Pelaez v Auditor General_lasam

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    The petitioner challenged executive orders issued by the President creating 33 new municipalities. The petitioner argued this was an undue delegation of legislative power, as the authority to create municipal corporations is an essentially legislative function. The respondent claimed the President had this power under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court held that Section 68 did not constitute a valid delegation of legislative power, as it did not sufficiently define the policy to be implemented or set standards for the delegate to conform to. As the executive orders lacked statutory authority, they were deemed null and void.

    Copyright:

    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    84 views2 pages

    Pelaez V Auditor General - Lasam

    Uploaded by

    Pilyang Sweet
    The petitioner challenged executive orders issued by the President creating 33 new municipalities. The petitioner argued this was an undue delegation of legislative power, as the authority to create municipal corporations is an essentially legislative function. The respondent claimed the President had this power under Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. The Court held that Section 68 did not constitute a valid delegation of legislative power, as it did not sufficiently define the policy to be implemented or set standards for the delegate to conform to. As the executive orders lacked statutory authority, they were deemed null and void.

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    © All Rights Reserved
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 2

    PELAEZ V.

    AUDITOR GENERAL
    No. L-23825
    December 24, 1965
    Petitioner:

    Hon. Emmanuel Pelaez, Vice President of the Philippines

    Respondent:

    Auditor General

    This case is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary
    injunction against the Auditor General to restrain him as well as his representatives and
    agents from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the
    executive orders issued by the President in October 4, 1965 creating 33 municipalities
    and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
    Facts:
    The President issued Executive Orders No. 93 to 121, 124, and 126 to 129
    creating 33 municipalities purporting to have acted pursuant to Sec. 68 of the revised
    Administrative Code. Said section provides that the (General Governor) President may
    by executive order define the boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality,
    (township) district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
    comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more sub-provinces, separate
    any political division other than a province, into such portion as may be required, merge
    any of such subdivision or portions with one another, name any new subdivision so
    created, may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place
    therein as the public welfare may require. Provided: that the authorization of the
    (Philippine Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the
    boundary of any province or sub-province is to be defined or any province is to be
    divided into one or more sub-provinces.
    The petitioner averred that the law relied upon by the President constitute an undue
    delegation of legislative power hence the executive orders are null and void. Sec. 3 of
    RA 2370 provides that barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their
    names changed. Except thru the following:
    1. By act of Congress,
    2. Petition of a majority of voters in the areas affected (for creation of new barrios),
    and
    3. Upon the action of the provincial board of the province acting on the
    recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the
    barrio whose name to be changed is situated.
    The petitioner further argued that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to
    create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities.

    Belmar S. Lasam Jr. Page 1 of 2

    The respondent on the other hand claimed that the power to create municipalities
    under Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not amount to an undue
    delegation of legislative power, relying upon the settled case of Municipality of Cardona
    v. Municipality of Binangonan which involves the transfer of territory from the former to
    the latter. And that the President under said law can create a new municipality without
    creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
    municipality.
    Issue:

    Whether or not the President has the power as provided by Section 68 of


    the Revised Administrative Code to create new municipalities?

    Held:
    None. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in
    nature. It is solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power. To be exercised by
    an administrative officer or body would nullify the principle of separation of powers.
    Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill
    in the detail in the execution of, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential
    that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
    executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fix a standard the limits
    of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must
    conform in the performance of his functions. Without a statutory declaration of policy,
    the delegate would in effect make or formulate such policy which is the essence of
    every law. And without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to
    determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond
    the scope of his authority. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
    these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
    the enforcement of a law, hence, the executive orders in question are null and void.

    Belmar S. Lasam Jr. Page 2 of 2

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