Slam and Democracy in Indonesia: Michael Buehler
Slam and Democracy in Indonesia: Michael Buehler
Slam and Democracy in Indonesia: Michael Buehler
Indonesia
MICHAEL BUEHLER*
ABSTRACT
Islam and democracy are said
to be in a relationship fraught
with problems as the former,
allegedly, does not allow secular
law to be put above divine law or
accept the legitimacy of worldly
authorities. This relationship is
less problematic in Indonesia,
a democratic Muslim-majority
country, the argument goes, due
to the syncretic forms of Islam
practiced in the archipelago state
that are less dogmatic, and hence
more conducive to democratic
principles. While this is a valuable
point, various factors extraneous
to moderate Indonesian Islam,
such as a fragmented Islamic
authority in civil society, a weakly
institutionalized party system
as well as dynamics triggered
by recent institutional reforms
all play a role in the continuing
insignificance of political Islam in
the country.
* Postdoctoral Fellow in Modern Southeast Asian Studies, Weatherhead East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York City,
USA, mb3120@columbia.edu
Insight Turkey Vol. 11 / No. 4 / 2009
pp. 51-63
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MICHAEL BUEHLER
sive regulatory framework that directs both executive and legislative elections. In
April 2009 Indonesia conducted the third legislative election of the post-Suharto
era. As in 1999 and 2004, the recent election featured a nationwide legislative
election for the national parliament, the senate-like Regional Representatives Assembly, and for the parliaments at the provincial, district and municipal level.
Furthermore, direct elections for regents and mayors were held in 486 out of 510
regencies and municipalities and governor elections in 15 out of 33 provinces
throughout the last few years. By the end of 2008, all the leaders of sub-national
executive governments had been directly elected by the Indonesian people.4 Finally, presidential election took place in 1999, 2004, and 2009.
In addition to the introduction of elections, which were all regarded as reasonably free and fair, the independence of the media was restored while various
Table 1. Political and Electoral Rights for at Least Three Consecutive Years between
1972-2006 in Non-Arab Muslim-Majority Countries by per Capita GDP
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MICHAEL BUEHLER
Notwithstanding the fact that many such analyses ignore the radical and sectarian tendencies that have become increasingly visible in Indonesian Islam in
recent years,14 the overall argument that it is the syncretist nature of Indonesian
Islam, and the moderation and tolerance that stems from it, which allows democracy to flourish in the archipelago remains popular.15
The dispersion of power and the fragility of the social structure23 become
especially visible during elections. In the gubernatorial elections in the South Kalimantan province in 2005, for example, the influence of religious figures, the tuan
guru, was marginal, mainly due to the excessive proliferation of Islamic authority
figures in the province. It is hard to know whether the voters chose particular
candidates because [the voters] followed their tuan guru or for other reasons...[T]
he candidates...applied other strategies, including financial inducement by distributing money directly to the voters or television sets to local village heads, and
by financing small infrastructure construction projects, such as...roads,mosques
and schools. Apparently, [the candidates] realized that support from tuan guru
per se would not be enough to attract the voters, especially when every team had
a tuan guru, Ahmad Muhajir writes.24 At the same time, Indonesian voters have
frequently abandoned religious figures in past years if they disagreed with their
political affiliation.
MICHAEL BUEHLER
CHAN
The ease with which democracy is thriving in Muslim-majority Indonesia is usually ascribed to the
moderate forms of Islam Indonesians have adopted.
MICHAEL BUEHLER
MICHAEL BUEHLER
Conclusion
Various developments exogenous to Indonesian Islam have allowed this Muslim majority country to steer a democratic course in recent years. The absence of
a monopoly over Islamic authority has led to a proliferation of Islamic notables,
thereby weakening the importance and influence of such figures. If everyone is
using Islam in her election campaign, then no one is using Islam in her election
campaign.
Likewise, the weak cohesion of political parties and the new pressures such
organizations have become exposed to in recent years, have made it difficult to engage in programmatic politics. Both Islamic and Islamist parties (as well as secular
parties) depend on clientelistic strategies to mobilize the electorate. This greatly
undermines their Islamic message and credibility.
Finally, the preference vote system recently adopted introduced a strong element of personalism into a political system that was already characterized by centrifugal forces, pushing away from faith- or issue-based campaigns. Both Islamic
and Islamist parties have been weakened by fierce intra-party competition triggered by the most-open party list system introduced last year.
Consequently, both Islamic and Islamist parties in the regions will likely come
and go, their fates determined primarily by the individuals and families to whom
they hook their carts. Party organizations will remain weak, as power holders have
no incentive to develop a competing locus of authority. Consequently, votes will
show high levels of volatility from election to election, as parties remain unconnected to the electorate.
Even if an Islamist party should acquire a significant amount of votes (i.e. 15%
to 20%), the proportional representation system in Indonesia makes it also very
unlikely that a party with a minority of votes can form a government. This is
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Endnotes
1. Anna M. Gade, Perfection Makes Practice: Learning, Emotion, and the Recited Quran in Indonesia, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), p. 1.
2. Martin van Bruinessen, Saints, politicians and Sufi bureaucrats: mysticism and politics in
Indonesias New Order, Martin van Bruinessen and Julia Day Howell (eds.), Sufism and the modern
in Islam, (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), pp. 92-112.
3. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
4. The Asia Foundation, Elections and good governance in Indonesia, retrieved September 28,
2009 from http://asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/IDelectionseng.pdf.
5. Michael Buehler, Countries at the Crossroads: Indonesia (Freedomhouse, Washington D.C.,
forthcoming).
6. Freedomhouse, Combined Average Ratings: Independent Countries in 2009, retrieved September 26, 2009 from http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=475&year=2009; Polity
IV, Polity IV Country Report 2007, Indonesia, retrieved September 26, 2009 from http://www.
systemicpeace.org/polity/Indonesia2007.pdf.
7. Modernization theories state that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will
sustain democracy. In other words, as a countrys wealth increases so does the degree of electoral
contestation. It is therefore important to control for GDP when comparing cross-nationally. Against
the backdrop of its relatively modest GDP, Indonesia is an electoral overachiever. See Stepan and
Graeme B. Robertson, An Arab More than Muslim Electoral Gap, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14,
No. 3, p. 33.
8. Islamism usually denotes the mobilization of contention to support Muslim causes and is often understood as being anti-democratic in its worldview. Islamization, however, simply means the
strengthening of conservative Islam, not necessarily of Islamist elements. It is therefore compatible
with democracy. See Andreas Ufen, Mobilising Political Islam: Indonesia and Malaysia compared,
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 47, No. 3, p. 309.
9. Alfred Stepan and Graeme B. Robertson, An Arab More than Muslim Electoral Gap, pp.
31-44.
10. Greg Fealy and Sally White, Introduction. In Greg Feally and Sally White. (eds.), Expressing
Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia (Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008),
p. 1.
11. Reuters, Poll: Indonesian Muslims More Secular In Politics; Support For Sharia Declined,
retrieved September 28, 2009 from http://66.114.70.144/cgi-bin/terjem.rex?Poll__Indonesian_Muslims_More_ Secular_In_Politics__ Support_For_Sharia_-71005001.
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MICHAEL BUEHLER
12. Mujani, Saiful and William R. Liddle, Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 109-123.
13. Pancasila comprises five principles held to be inseparable and interrelated, namely belief in
the one and only God; just and civilized humanity; the unity of Indonesia; and democracy guided by
the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives and social
justice for the whole of the people of Indonesia.
14. In a recent report, the Wahid Institute in Jakarta identified 232 instances in 2008 alone where
individuals or groups, generally of the radical Islamic variety, tried to force their beliefs on others
through legislation or violence. This marked an increase compared to 2007 that reported 197 such
cases. See Wall Street Journal Asia, Radicalizing Indonesia, retrieved September 27, 2009 from
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122937199710107957.html. Various discriminatory sharia by-laws
have been passed in recent years. Most recently, in September 2009, the parliament of Aceh province
issued a by-law that endorses the stoning to death for adultery and caning of up to 100 lashes for
homosexuality. Amnesty International, Indonesia must repeal cruel new stoning and caning law,
retrieved September 28, 2009 from http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/indonesiamust-repeal-cruel-new-stoning-caning-law-20090917.
15. Mark R. Woodward, Indonesia, Islam, and the Prospect for Democracy, SAIS Review, Vol.
XXI, No. 2, pp. 29-37. See also Bernhard Platzdasch, Outlook bleak for Islamist parties, retrieved
August 20, 2009 from http://www.iseas.edu.sg/viewpoint/bp11apr08.pdf.
16. John T. Sidel. Indonesia: Islamist forces reach limits of expansion, retrieved September 26,
2009 from http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB151084
17. John T. Sidel, The Changing Politics of Religious Knowledge in Asia: The Case of Indonesia
in Saw Swee-Hock and Danny Quah (eds), The Politics of Knowledge (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 156-157.
18. Robin Bush, One step forward Inside Indonesia, retrieved September 26, 2009 from
http://www.insideindonesia.org/content/view/12/29/.
19. Julia Day Howell. 2008. Modulations of Active Piety: Professors and Teleevangelists as promoters of Indonesian Sufisme. In Greg Feally and Sally White, (eds.) Expressing Islam: Religious Life
and Politics in Indonesia, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp. 40-62.
20. Sidel. The Changing Politics of Religious Knowledge in Asia: The Case of Indonesia pp.
156-192; See also John T. Sidel The New Trinity: Religion, Knowledge and Power, The Straits
Times, 24 October 2007.
21. Religious notables were said to have great political influence in mobilizing the population
in times of elections throughout the New Order. The capacity of such figures to establish power
bases independent from the New Order state, however, was greatly exaggerated, as is shown in a
thesis by Endang Turmudi, 2003, Struggling for the Umma: Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in
Jombang, East Java, Canberra: Australian National University, online,retrieved 27 September 2009
from http://epress.anu.edu.au/islamic/umma/mobile_devices/index.html. See especially chapter 7,
Kiais Political Influence: Post-Back to Khittah.
22. Ahmad Muhajir, Tuan Guru and Politics in South Kalimantan: Islam in the 2005 Gubernatorial Elections, unpublished MA Thesis, (Canberra: Australian National University, 2009 ).
23. Endang Turmudi, Struggling for the Umma: Changing Leadership Roles of Kiai in Jombang, East Java, retrieved September 27, 2009 from http://epress.anu.edu.au/islamic/umma/mobile_devices/index.html, Chp 9.
24. Muhajir, Tuan Guru and Politics in South Kalimantan: Islam in the 2005 Gubernatorial
Elections, p. 77.
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25. Dirk Tomsa, The Defeat of Centralized Paternalism: Factionalism, Assertive Regional Cadres, and the Long Fall of Golkar Chairman, Akbar Tandjung, Indonesia, Vol. 81, (2006), pp. 1-22.
26. Marcus Mietzner, Party Financing in Post-Soeharto Indonesia: Between State Subsidies and
Political Corruption Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs,
Vol. 29, No. 2, (2006), pp. 238-263.
27. Michael Buehler and Paige Tan, Party-Candidate Relationships in Indonesian Local Politics: A Case Study of the 2005 Regional Elections in Gowa, South Sulawesi Province, Indonesia, Vol.
84, (2007), pp. 41-69.
28. Michael Buehler, The rising importance of personal networks in Indonesian local politics:
An analysis of district government head elections in South Sulawesi in 2005, in Maribeth Erb and
Priyambudi Sulistiyan (eds.) Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders
(Pilkada) (Singapore: Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), pp. 101-124.
29. Andreas Ufen, From aliran to dealignement: political parties in post-Suharto Indonesia,
Southeast Asia Research, Vol. 16, No. 1, (2008), pp. 5-37.
30. Stephen Sherlock, The 2004 Indonesian Elections: How the system works and what parties
stand for, retrieved July 10, 2009 from http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/asia/ID/Sherlock.pdf/
view.
31. The divisor is calculated by dividing the total number of votes in a district by its number of
seats. Therefore, it varies between districts.
32. Kompas, Partai Politik Islam dan Pemilihan Umum 2004, January 16, 2004, p. 8.
33. Kompas, Jawa Timur: Tembok Pembatas Mulai Terbelah, 22 June, 2009, p. 8.
34. PKS victories in local elections in West Java and North Sumatra throughout 2008 prompted
PKS President Titaful Sembiring to announce a party target of winning 20% of the national vote in
April 2008. Party patron Hidayat Nur Wahid considered this a realistic target, while many political
analysts considered 15% of the votes possible (Jakarta Post, 18 April 2008, 1).
35. In 1999 PKS was running under the name PK, Partai Keadilan.
36. In 1999, PPNUI was running under the name PNU-, Partai Nahdlatul Ummat.
37. Election results can be obtained through the Indonesian Election Commissions website
which is available at http://www.kpu.go.id/.
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