No. L-47745. April 15, 1988.

*
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA
JR., NORMA A. YLAYA, PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A.
AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA,
PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A.
AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners, vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSERECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH, SERGIO P. DAMASO, JR.,
CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON, thru
his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR
GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, ATTY.
FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents.
Civil Law; Torts; Article 2180 of the Civil Code should apply to all
schools, academic as well as non-academic.After an exhaustive
examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that
the provision in question should apply to all schools, academic as well
as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student
will attach to the teacher in charge of such student, following the first
part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of
establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he,
who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students
except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it is the
head thereof who shall be anBwerable. Following the canon of reddendo
singula singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupHs and
students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the word
apprentices.
Same; Same; Same; No substantial distinction between the academic
and the non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their
students are concerned.There is really no substantial distinction
between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is
expected from the teacher over the students under his control and
supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching, The
suggestion in the Sxconde and Mercado Cases is that the provision

would make the teacher or even the head of the school of arts and
trades liable for an injury caused by any student in its custody but if that
same tort were committed in an academic school, no liability would
attach to the teacher or the school head. All other circumstances being
the same, the teacher or the head of the academic school would be
absolved whereas the teacher and the head of the nonacademic school
would be held liable, and simply because the latter is a school of arts
and trades.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No plausible reason why different degrees
of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities.The Court
cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the
school authorities on the basis only of the nature of their respective
schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxLng
that vigilance simply because the school is academic in nature and for
increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the
injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school
itself nor it is a result of the operations of the school or its equipment.
The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless of
the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be
able to excuse himself by simply showing that he is teaching in an
academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held
liable if the school were non-academic.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reason for the disparity.The
reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and
secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such
a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the
academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.

Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer
ties with them, could be so blamed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction no longer obtains
at presentIt is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at
present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the
consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding
diminution of the direct and personal contact of their heads with the
students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present
state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its
clear and original mandate until the legislature, taking into account the
changes in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the
necessary amendment.
Same; Same; Custody requirement; Article 2180 of the Civil Code does
not mean that the student must be boarding with the school authorities
but the student should be within the control and under its influence at the
time of the occurrence of the injury.From a reading of the provision
under examination, it is clear that while the custody requirement, to
repeat Palisoc vs. Brillantes, does not mean that the student must be
boarding with the school authorities, it does signify that the student
should be within the control and under the influence of the school
authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not
necessarily mean that such custody be co-terminous with the semester,
beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof,
and excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of
registration, and in the case of graduating students, the period before
the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in
the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control
and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the
semester has not yet begun or has already ended.
Same; Same; Same; Extent ofresponsibility;As long as the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate purpose, the
responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.As
long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate

student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the

student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing
more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and
friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is
still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school
authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Teacher-in-charge must answer for his
students torts.During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacherincharge who must answer for his students torts, in practically the same
way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their
custody. The teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision over
the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned.
It is not necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically
present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence
exerted on the child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such
influence. Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and
not the parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within
the premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The school may be held to answer
for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general
principle of respondent superior but may exculpate itself from liability by
proof that it had exercised the diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.In
any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its
nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the
head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but then
it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias,
Same; Sarne; Same; Same; Same; Same; Such defense also available
to the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trade,Such
defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the
school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by

the student. As long as the defendant can show that he had taken the
necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can
exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Liability attaches to
the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer
was already of age.In this connection, it should be observed that the
teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for
the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age.
Unlike the parent, who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the
teacher is held answerable by the law for the act of the student under
him regardless of the students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability
attached to the teacher and the head of the technical school although
the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the
parent more favorably than the teacher.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

Jose S. Amadora & Associates for petitioners.
Padilla Law Office for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:

Like any prospective graduate, Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to

the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and in
the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma,
These ceremonies were scheduled on April 16, 1972. As it turned out,
though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes, a classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun
that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as welL
The victim was only seventeen years old.1
Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence.2
Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victims parents, Sled a civil

action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the
Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, its rector, the high school principal, the
dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and two
other students, through their respective parents, The complaint against
the students was later dropped. After trial, the Court of First Instance of
Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum of
P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning
capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.3 On appeal to the respondent
court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were
completely absolved.4
In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the respondent court found that
Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the
school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended,
that there was no clear identification of the fatal gun, and that in any
event the defendants had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury.5
The basic undisputed facts are that Alfredo Amadora went to the San
Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972, and while in its auditorium was shot to
death by Pablito Daffon, a classmate. On the implications and
consequences of these facts, the parties sharply disagree.
The petitioners contend that their son was in the school to finish his
physics experiment as a prerequisite to his graduation; hence, he was
then under the custody of the private respondents. The private
respondents submit that Alfredo Amadora had gone to the school only
for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no
longer in their custody because the semester had already ended.
There is also the question of the identity of the gun used which the
petitioners consider important because of an earlier incident which they
claim underscores the negligence of the school and at least one of the
private respondents. It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7,
1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from Jose

Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making

a report to the principal or taking any further action.6 As Gumban was
one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed
Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had
been confiscated from Gumban and that their son would not have been
killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say,
however, that there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that
killed Alfredo.
Resolution of all these disagreements will depend on the interpretation
of Article 2180 which, as it happens, is invoked by both parties in
support of their conflicting positions. The pertinent part of this article
reads as follows:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so
long as they remain in their custody.
Three cases have so far been decided by the Court in connection with
the above-quoted provision, to wit: Exconde v. Capuno,7 Mercado v.
Court of Appeals,8 and Palisoc v. Brillantes.9 These will be briefly
reviewed in this opinion for a better resolution of the case at bar.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak
Elementary School and a Boy Seout, attended a Rizal Day parade on
instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy
boarded a jeep, took over its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it
turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was
found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the
separate civil action filed against them, his father was held solidarily
liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the
Civil Code for the tort committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June
29,1957, exculpated the school in an obiter dictum (as it was not a party
to the case) on the ground that it was not a school of arts and trades.
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes
concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school authorities who
should be held liable. Liability under this rule, he said, was imposed on
(1) teachers in general; and (2) heads of schools of arts and trades in

particular. The modifying clause of establishments of arts and trades

should apply only to heads and not teachers.
Exconde was reiterated in the Mercado Case, and with an elaboration. A
student cut a classmate with a razor blade during recess time at the
Lourdes Catholic School in Quezon City, and the parents of the victim
sued the culprits parents for damages. Through Justice Labrador, the
Court declared in another obiter (as the school itself had also not been
sued) that the school was not liable because it was not an establishment
of arts and trades. Morever. the custody requirement had not been
proved as this contemplates a situation where the student lives and
boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influences
on the pupil supersede those of the parents. Justice J.B.L. Reyes did
not take part but the other members of the court concurred in this
decision promulgated on May 30,1960.
In Palisoc vs. Brillantes, decided on October 4, 1971, a 16year old
student was killed by a classmate with fist blows in the laboratory of the
Manila Technical Institute. Although the wrongdoer-who was already
of agewas not boarding in the school, the head thereof and the
teacher in charge were held solidarily liable with him. The Court declared
through Justice Teehankee:
The phrase used in the cited article'so long as (the students) remain
in their custody'means the protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students
for as long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess
time. There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to
attach, the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and
board in the school, as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta
in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied, must now be
deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.
This decision was concurred in by five other members,10 including
Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who stressed, in answer to the dissenting opinion,
that even students already of age were covered by the provision since
they were equally in the custody of the school and subject to its
discipline. Dissenting with three others,11 Justice Makalintal was for
retaining the custody interpretation in Mercado and submitted that the

rule should apply only to torts committed by students not yet of age as
the school would be acting only in loco parentis.
In a footnote, Justice Teehankee said he agreed with Justice Reyes
dissent in the Exconde Case but added that since the school involved at
bar is a non-academic school, the question as to the applicability of the
cited codal provision to academic institutions will have to await another
case wherein it may properly be raised.
This is the case.
Unlike in Exconde and Mercado, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos has
been directly impleaded and is sought to be held liable under Article
2180; and unlike in Palisoc, it is not a school of arts and trades but an
academic institution of learning. The parties herein have also directly
raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even
establishments which are technically not schools of arts and trades, and,
if so, when the offending student is supposed to be in its custody.
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to
the conclusion that the provision in question should apply to all schools,
academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic
rather than technical or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort
committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such
student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule.
In the case of establishments of arts and trades, it is the head thereof,
and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their
students except where the school is technical in nature, in which case it
is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of
reddendo singula singulis, teachers should apply to the words pupils
and students and heads of establishments of arts and trades to the
word apprentices.
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said in part:
I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to
teachers of arts and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial
difference is there between them insofar as concerns the proper

supervision and vigilance over their pupils? It cannot be seriously

contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching
that his pupils do not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so
long as they are in a position to exercise authority and supervision over
the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words arts and trades does not qualify teachers but only
Tieads of establishments. The phrase is only an updated version of the
equivalent terms preceptores x artesanos used in the Italian and
Prench Civil Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of the presumption of
negligence of Art. 1903 in some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their
authority, it would seem clear that where the parent places the child
under the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent,
should be the one answerable for the torts committed while under his
custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere
with the discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of
the teacher while the child is under instruction. And if there is no
authority, there can be no responsibility.
There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the
non-academic schools insofar as torts committed by their students are
concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the
students under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the
school where he is teaching. The suggestion in the Exconde and
Mercado Cases is that the provision would make the teacher or even the
head of the school of arts and trades liable for an injury caused by any
student in its custody but if that same tort were committed in an
academic school, no liability would attach to the teacher or the school
head. All other circumstances being the same, the teacher or the head
of the academic school would be absolved whereas the teacher and the
head of the non-academic school would be held liable, and simply
because the latter is a school of arts and trades.
The Court cannot see why different degrees of vigilance should be
exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature of
their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible

reason for relaxing that vigilance simply because the school is academic
in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is nonacademic. Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student
and not by the school itself nor is it a result of the operations of
the,school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by
any student regardless of the school where he is registered. The teacher
certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply showing that he
is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head
would be held liable if the school were non-academic.
These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic
school is to be held answerable for the torts committed by his students,
why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic
or non-technical school, why not apply the rule also to the head thereof
instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?
The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the
head of the school of arts and trades exercised a closer tutelage over his
pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their
master who personally and directly instructed them on the technique and
secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such
a master and so was personally involved in the task of teaching his
students, who usually even boarded with him and so came under his
constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the
academic school was not as involved with his students and exercised
only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had
then (as now) only a vicarious relationship with the students.
Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the
students, the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer
ties with them, could be so blamed.
It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of
the expansion of the schools of arts and trades, the consequent increase
in their enrollment, and the corre-sponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180,
however, remains unchanged. In its present state, the provision must be

interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until
the legislature, taking into account the changes in the situation subject to
be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary amendment.
The other matter to be resolved is the duration of the responsibility of the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades over the students. Is
such responsibility co-extensive with the period when the student is
actually undergoing studies during the school term, as contended by the
respondents and impliedly admitted by the petitioners themselves?
From a reading of the provision under examination, it is clear that while
the custody requirement, to repeat Palisoc v. Brillantes, does not mean
that the student must be boarding with the school authorities, it does
signify that the student should be within the control and under the
influence of the school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the
injury, This does not necessarily mean that such, custody be coterminous with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and
ending upon the close thereof, and excluding the time before or after
such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of
graduating students, the period before the commencement exercises. In
the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has
already ended.
It is too tenuous to argue that the student comes under the discipline of
the school only upon the start of classes notwithstanding that before that
day he has already registered and thus placed himself under its rules.
Neither should such discipline be deemed ended upon the last day of
classes notwithstanding that there may still be certain requisites to be
satisfied for completion of the course, such as submission of reports,
term papers, clearances and the like. During such periods, the student is
still subject to the disciplinary authority of the school and cannot
consider himself released altogether from observance of its rules.
As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in
pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a
legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate
student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege,

the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing
in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and
enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within
the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under
the provisions of Article 2180.
During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-incharge who must
answer for his students torts, in practically the same way that the
parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The
teacher-in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other
administrative superior to exercise supervision over the pupils in the
specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not
necessary that at the time of the injury, the teacher be physically present
and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote immediate and
actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the
child and the discipline instilled in him as a result of such influence.
Thus, for the injuries caused by the student, the teacher and not the
parent shall be held responsible if the tort was committed within the
premises of the school at any time when its authority could be validly
exercised over him.
In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is
supposed to fall directly on the teacher or the head of the school of arts
and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever its
nature, may be held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the
head thereof under the general principle of respondent superior, but then
it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the
diligence of a bonus paterfamilias.
Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of
the school of arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort
committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show that he
had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of,
he can exonerate himself from the liability imposed by Article 2180,
which also states that:

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damages.
In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held
liable not only when he is acting in loco parentis for the law does not
require that the offending student be of minority age. Unlike the parent,
who will be liable only if his child is still a minor, the teacher is held
answerable by the law for the act of the student under him regardless of
the students age. Thus, in the Palisoc Case, liability attached to the
teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer
was already of age. In this sense, Article 2180 treats the parent more
favorably than the teacher.
The Court is not unmindful of the apprehensions expressed by Justice
Makalintal in his dissenting opinion in Palisoc that the school may be
unduly exposed to liabUity under this article in view of the increasing
activism among the students that is likely to cause violence and resulting
injuries in the school premises. That is a valid fear, to be sure.
Nevertheless, it should be repeated that, under the present ruling, it is
not the school that will be held directly liable. Moreover, the defense of
due diligence is available to it in case it is sought to be held answerable
as principal for the acts or omission of its head or the teacher in its
employ.
The school can show that it exercised proper measures in selecting the
head or its teachers and the appropriate supervision over them in the
custody and instruction of the pupils pursuant to its rules and regulations
for the maintenance of discipline among them. In almost all cases now,
in fact, these measures are effected through the assistance of an
adequate security force to help the teacher physically enforce those
rules upon the students. This should bolster the claim of the school that
it has taken adequate steps to prevent any inj ury that may be committed
by its students.
A fortiori, the teacher himself may invoke this defense as it would
otherwise be unfair to hold him directly answerable for the damage
caused by his students as long as they are in the schooJ premises and
presumably under his influence, In this respect, the Court is disposed

not to expect from the teacher the same measure of responsibility

imposed on the parent for their influence over the child is not equal in
degree. Obviously, the parent can expect more obedience from the child
because the latters dependence on him is greater than on the teacher. It
need not be stressed that such dependence includes the childs support
and sustenance whereas submission to the teachers influence, besides
being co-terminous with the period of custody, is usually enforced only
because of the students desire to pass the course. The parent can instill
more lasting discipline on the child than the teacher and so should be
held to a greater accountability than the teacher for the tort committed by
the child.
And if it is also considered that under the article in question, the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice even if he is already of
ageand therefore less tractable than the minorthen there should all
the more be justification to require from the school authorities less
accountability as long as they can prove reasonable diligence in
preventing the injury. After all, if the parent himself is no longer liable for
the students acts because he has reached majority age and so is no
longer under the formers control, there is then all the more reason for
leniency in assessing the teachers responsibility for the acts of the
student.
Applying the foregoing considerations, the Court has arrived at the
following conclusions:
1, At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the
custody of the authorities of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was
immaterial if he was in the school auditorium to finish his physics
experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is important is
that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even
the mere savoring of the company of his friends in the premises of the
school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him in the
custody of the school authorities.
2. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-incharge as

previously defined. Each of them was exercising only a general authority

over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted by
the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus
immediately involved in its discipUne. The evidence of the parties does
not disclose who the teacher-in-charge of the offending student was.
The mere fact that Alfredo Amadora had gone to school that day in
connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics
teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredos
killer,
3. At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no
showing that Dicon was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or
that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school
or condoned their nonobservance. His absence when the tragedy
happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed or required to report to school on that day. And while it is true
that the offending student was still in the custody of the teacher-incharge even if the latter was physically absent when the tort was
committed, it has not been established that it was caused by his laxness
in enforcing discipline upon the student. On the contrary, the private
respondents have proved that they had exercised due diligence, through
the enforcement of the school regulations, in maintaining that discipline.
4. In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys
who should be held liable, especially in view of the unrefuted evidence
that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the
students and returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary
action or reporting the matter to higher authorities. While this was clearly
negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school,
it does not necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not
been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol was the gun that
killed the petitioners son.
5. Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos
cannot be held directly liable under the article because only the teacher
or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the
damage caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to
answer for the tort committed by any of the other private respondents for
none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of

the offending student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in
connection with such custody.
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in
the light of the principles herein announced that none of the respondents
is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Daffon on Alfredo Amadora that
resulted in the latters death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos on April 13,1972. While we deeply sympathize with the
petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief
they seek, as a balm to their grief, under the law they have invoked.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, without any pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
Yap, Narvasa, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts
and Grino-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, C.J., did not participate in deliberations.
Fernan and Padilla, JJ., no part, formerly counsel for Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur but please see additional statement.
Herrera, J., with separate concurring and dissenting opinion.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the term
teacher in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as teacherin-charge. This
would limit liability to occasions where there are classes under the
immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the
intendment of the law.
As I understand it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in
loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents
whenever in such a standing. Those persons are mandatorily held liable
for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in
their custody, meaning their protective and supervisory custody.

Thus, Article 349 of the Civil Code enumerates the persons who stand in
loco parentis and thereby exercise substitute parental authority:
Art 349,. The following persons shall exercise substitute parental
authority:
xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments, with regard to apprentices;
Article 352 of the Civil Code further provides:
Art. 352. The relationB between teacher and pupil, professor and
student, are fixed by government regulations and those of each school
or institution. x x x
But even such rules and regulations as may be fixed can not contravene
the concept of substitute parental authority. The rationale of liability of
school heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils was
explained in Palisoc vs. Brillantes (41 SCRA 548), thus:
The protective custody of the school heads and teachers is mandatorily
substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation
05 well as that of the school itself to provide proper supervision of the
students activities during the whole time that they are at attendance in
the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary
precautions to protect the students in their custody from dangers and
hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some students themselves may inflict wilfully or through negligence on
their fellow students. (Italics supplied)
Of course, as provided for in the same Article 2180, the responsibility
treated of shall cease when the persons mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
damage.
And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since Article 2180
speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same

provision, the school, as their employer, may be held liable for the failure
of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties
as substitute parents (Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts & Damages,
1978 ed., p. 201). Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by
proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family.
Art. 2180. x x x
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

Parenthetically, from the enumeration in Article 348 of the Civil Code,

supra, it is apparent that the Code Commission had already segregated
the classification of teachers and professors vis-a-vis their pupils, from
directors of trade establishments, with regard to their apprentices.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring opinion:

I concur in the Courts opinion so carefully analyzed and crafted by

Justice Isagani A. Cruz. However, H. would like to stress the need for a
major amendment to, if not a complete scrapping of, Article 2180 of the
Civil Code insofar as it refers to teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades in relation to pupils and students or apprentices. The
seventh paragraph of Art. 2180 is a relic of the past and contemplates a
situation long gone and out of date. In a Palisoc v. Brillantes (41 SCRA
548) situation, it is bound to result in mischief and injustice.
First, we no longer have masters and apprentices toiling in schools of
arts and trades. Students in technologicaT colleges and universities are
no different from students in liberal arts or professional schools.
Apprentices now work in regular shops and factories and their
relationship to the employer is covered by laws governing the
employment relationship and not by laws governing the teacher
student relationship.

Second, except for kindergarten, elementary, and perhaps early high

school students, teachers are often no longer objects of veneration who
are given the respect due to substitute parents. Many students in their
late teens or early adult years view some teachers as part of a bourgeois
or reactionary group whose advice on behaviour, deportment, and other
non-academic matters is not only resented but actively rejected. It
seems most unfair to hold teachers liable on a presumption juris tantum
of negligence for acts of students even under circumstances where
strictly speaking there could be no in loco parentis relationship, Why do
teachers have to prove the contrary of negligence to be freed from
solidary liabiUty for the acts of bomb-throwing or pistol packing students
who would just as soon hurt them as they would other members of the
so-called establishment.
The ordinary rules on quasi-delicts should apply to teachers and schools
of whatever nature insofar as grown up students are concerned. The
provision of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code involved in this case has outlived
its purpose. The Court cannot make law. It can only apply the law with its
imperfections. However, the Court can suggest that such a law should
be amended or repealed.
Petition denied.
Note.Trial is necessary for any final decision of the two cases on the
merits or on the issues as to the power of a school over its students, like
the case of re-enrollment of an expelled student. (University of the
Phttippines vs. Fernandez, 137 SCRA l.)