Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) v.

Commission
on Elections [G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by
its Secretary General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
[G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
FACTS:
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of
registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions
under the party-list system through its resolution, denying also the latters
motion for reconsideration, in accordance with Section 6(8) of Republic Act
No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List System Act, which
provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC
may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove
or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following
grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain
at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in
the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in
2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its
opposition to the resolution citing among others the misapplication in the
ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of merit. Petitioner
elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate
Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law

(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.

(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA
7941; hence, it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the
party-list system. First, the law is in the plain, clear and unmistakable
language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of
Section 6(8) of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly
show. MINERO therefore simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not
violated for [it] was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a
reconsideration of [COMELEC resolution]. The essence of due process,
consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to
administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain ones
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and
hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that
PGBI was not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare
decisis. The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to
precedents and not to unsettle things which are established) is embodied in
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which provides, thus:

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ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution

shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in
a country to follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme
Court. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in
subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare decisis is
based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that
circumstances attendant in a particular case override the great benefits
derived by [SCs] judicial system from the doctrine of stare decisis, the Court
is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the
language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing
validity of an erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike
it out from [the] ruling case law.

Bayan Muna Vs. Romulo

Facts: Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list
group established to represent the marginalized sectors of
society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this
case. Respondent Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his
capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court . Having a key
determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the
power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes
of international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national
criminal jurisdictions. The serious crimes adverted to

cover those considered grave under international law, such as

genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of
aggression.
On
December
28,
2000,
the
RP,
through Charge
dAffaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which,
by its terms,is subject to ratification, acceptance or

approval by the signatory states. As of the filing of the

instant petition, only 92 out of the 139 signatory countries
appear to have completed the ratification, approval and
concurrence process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US Non Surrender Agreement is
void ab initio for contracting obligations that are either
immoral or otherwise at variance with universally recognized
principles of international law.
Held: No. Petitioner urges that the Agreement be struck down
as void ab initio for imposing immoral obligations and/or being
at variance with allegedly universally recognized principles of
international law. The immoral aspect proceeds from the fact
that the Agreement, as petitioner would put it, leaves criminals
immune from responsibility for unimaginable atrocities that
deeply shock the conscience of humanity; x x x it precludes
our country from delivering an American criminal to the [ICC]
x x x. The above argument is a kind of recycling of
petitioners earlier position, which, as already discussed,
contends that the RP, by entering into the Agreement, virtually
abdicated its sovereignty and in the process undermined its
treaty obligations under the Rome Statute, contrary to
international law principles.The Court is not persuaded.
Suffice it to state in this regard that the non-surrender
agreement, as aptly described by the Solicitor General, is an
assertion by the Philippines of its desire to try and punish
crimes under its national law. x x x . The agreement is a
recognition of the primacy and competence of the countrys
judiciary to try offenses under its national criminal laws and
dispense justice fairly and judiciously.
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression
that the Agreement would allow Filipinos and Americans
committing high crimes of international concern to escape
criminal
trial
and
punishment. This
is
manifestly
incorrect. Persons who may have committed acts penalized
under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in
the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or
the US, before the ICC, assuming, for the nonce, that all the
formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome
Statute
have
been
met. For
perspective,
what
the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender by either
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party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC,

without the consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the view we
take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of
assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both
Philippine laws and the Rome Statute.

Rubrico vs. Arroyo

February 18, 2010
FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3,
2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence
and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field
Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During
her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy
Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by
Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed
men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of
amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to
desist from performing any threatening act against the
security of the petitioners and for the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file an information for
kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of
gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and
for respondents to produce documents submitted to any of
them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ
specifically denying the material inculpatory averments
against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the
President may not be sued during her incumbency.
Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex
parte against the President, et al.
By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as
respondent in the case .

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in
dismissing [their] Petition and dropping President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under
our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in
the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his comembers in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his
or her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of
office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or
criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the
Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be
dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case
against other respondents for failure of the petition to allege
ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the
enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and
harassment that followed.
Caltex vs Palomar 18 SCRA 247
G.R. No. L-19650
Caltex Philippines, Inc., petitioner-appellee
Vs.
Enrico Palomar, in his capacity
General, respondent-appellant

as

The

Postmaster

FACTS:
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In the year 1960, Caltex Philippines conceived and

laid the ground work for a promotional scheme calculated to
drum up patronage for its oil products. The contest was
entitled Caltex Hooded Pump Contest, which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters as hooded
gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specific period.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as
amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also for the
transmission of communications, representations were made
by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be
cleared in advance for mailing. This was formalized in a letter
sent by Caltex to the Post master General, dated October 31,
1960, in which Caltex, thru its counsel, enclosed a copy of the
contest rules and endeavored to justify its position that the
contest does not violate the The Anti-Lottery Provisions of
the Postal Law.
Unfortunately, the Palomar, the acting Postmaster
General denied Caltexs request stating that the contest
scheme falls within the purview of the Anti-lottery Provision
and ultimately, declined Clatexs request for clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration, stressing that there
being no consideration involved in part of the contestant, the
contest was not commendable as a lottery. However, the
Postmaster General maintained his view that the contest
involves consideration, or even it does not involve any
consideration it still falls as Gift Enterprise, which was
equally banned by the Postal Law.
ISSUE:
Whether the petition states a sufficient cause of action for
declaratory relief?

Whether or not the scheme proposed by Caltex the appellee

is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the
Postal Law?
HELD:
I.
By express mandate of Section 1 of Rule 66 of the old Rules of
Court which deals with the applicability to invoke declaratory
relief which states: Declaratory relief is available to person
whose rights are affected by a statute, to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the statute
and for a declaration of rights thereunder.
In amplification, conformably established jurisprudence on
the matter, laid down certain conditions:
There must be a justiciable controversy.
The controversy must be between persons whose interests
are adverse.
The party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal
interest in the controversy.
The issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination.
With the appellees bent to hold the contest and the
appellants threat to issue a fraud order if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by an ominous shadow of
imminent and inevitable litigation unless their differences are
settled and stabilized by a declaration. And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can
rightly be said that merely the appellees desires are
thwarted by its own doubts, or by the fears of others
which admittedly does not confer a cause of action. Doubt, if
any there was, has ripened into a justiciable controversy
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when, as in the case at bar, it was translated into a positive

claim of right which is actually contested.
Construction

Is the art or process of discovering and expounding the

meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect
to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that
the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion
we have herein just reached is not without precedent. In
Liberty Calendar Co. vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487,
where a corporation engaged in promotional advertising was
advised by the county prosecutor that its proposed sales
promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery, and that if
such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation would
be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief
action against the county prosecutor to determine the legality
of its sales promotion plan.
II.
Is the Contest Scheme a Lottery?
Lottery

Prize
3. Chance
No, according to the Supreme Court, the contest
scheme is not a lottery but it appears to be more of a
gratuitous distribution since nowhere in the rules is any
requirements that any fee be paid, any merchandise be
bought, any services be rendered, or any value whatsoever
be given for the privilege to participate. Since, a prospective
contestant has to do is go to a Caltex Station, request for the
entry form which is available on demand and accomplish and
submit the same for the drawing of the winner. Because of
this, the contest fails to exhibit any discernible consideration
which would brand it as a lottery.
Moreover, the law does not condemn the gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, if no consideration is
derived directly or indirectly from the party receiving the
chance, but it does condemn as criminal scheme in which a
valuable consideration of some kind is paid directly or
indirectly for the chance to draw a prize.
Is the scheme, as sales promotion which would benefit the
sponsor in the way of increased patronage be considered as a
consideration and thus violates the Postal Law?

e.g. policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and

fairs as well as various forms of gambling.

No, the required element of consideration does not

consist of the benefit derived by the sponsors of the contest.
The true test lies on whether or not the participant pays a
valuable consideration for the chance of winning and not
whether or not those conducting the enterprise receiver
something of value for the distribution of the prize.

Three Essential Elements:

Is the Contest Scheme a Gift Enterprise?

Extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by

chance

Consideration
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Even if the term Gift Enterprise is not yet defined

explicitly, there appears to be a consensus among
lexicographers and standard authorities that the term is
common applied to a sporting artifice of under which goods
are sold for their market value but by way of inducement to
purchase the product, the purchaser is given a chance to win
a prize.
And thus, the term of gift enterprise cannot be
established in the case at bar since there is not sale of
anything to which the chance offered is attached as an
inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all
qualified contestant irrespective of whether or not they buy
the appellees products.
The lesson that we derive from this state of the pertinent
jurisprudence is that every case must be resolved upon the
particular phraseology of the applicable statutory provision. It
is only logical that the term under a construction should be
accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with
the nature of the word associated therewith.
In the end, the Supreme Court ruled out that under the
prohibitive provision of the Postal Law, gift enterprise and
similar schemes therein contemplated are condemnable only
if, like lotteries, they involve the element of consideration.
Finding non in the contest, it was ruled out that the appellee
may not be denied the use of the mails for the purpose
thereof.

Republic Flour Mills vs Commissioner of Customs39

SCRA 269

FACTS:
The personalities involved: (1) Republic Flour Mills (petitioner)
is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of
wheat flour and in the process of milling said product, produces
pollard (darak) and bran (ipa); (2) Respondents are the Commissioner
of
Customs
and
the
Court
of Tax
Appeals.T h e c o m p l a i n t : Pe t i t i o n e r q u e s t i o n s r e s p o n
dents decision to charge thecorporation P7,948 i
n wharfage dues on exported pollard and/or bran
. Petitioner paid this amount in protest. Petitioner sent the case to Court
of
Tax Appeals who decided in favour of respondent (sustained t
he actions of theCommissioner of Customs). Petitioner el
evated the matter to the SC andrequested that the decision
of
the Court
of
Tax
Appeals
be
reviewed.Pe t i t i o n e r c l a i m s : S e c t i o n 2 8 0 2 o f t h e Ta r i
ff C u s t o m C o d e ( w h i c h w a s respondents basis for the
collection of wharf age dues) is not applicable in the case at bar
because the bran and pollard are actually not
"products of the Philippines" because they came from
wheat grain which were imported from abroad.
ISSUES: Is respondent liable for wharf age dues on its exportation of
bran and pollard asthey are not "products of the Philippines?
HELD:
The SC denied the petition; It re-affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals
decision.
Rationale: The petitioner erred in its construction of the Act.
As per section2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code, "There shall be
levied, collected and paid on all articles imported or brought into the
Philippines, and on products of the Philippines exported from
the Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric
ton as a fee for wharf age. The meaning and intent of the Act is
precisely to collect tariffs on anything imported and exported to and
from the Philippines.

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National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma

GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)En Banc, Fernando
(p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts:
On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment(Labor Relations Division,
Zamboanga City), a petition for direct certification as the sole
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid
employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing plant of the Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982, such
employees charged the firm before the same office for
underpayment of monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the
union issued anotice of strike against the firm, alleging illegal
termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union;
unfair labor practice; non-payment of living allowances; and
employment of oppressive alien management personnel without
proper permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.On 9 July 1982,
Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the
officers and members of the union, for damages for obstruction of
private property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order. The union filed a motion for the dismissal and
for the dissolution of the restraining order, and opposition to
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, contending that
the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (LaborCode, Article
217) and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied.
Hence, the petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether construction of the law is required to determine
jurisdiction.

The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.

Construction and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes the court; and
it is given only by law. Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be
conferred bylaw in words that do not admit of doubt. Since the
jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is derived exclusively
from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved on the
basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the
original wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with
jurisdiction; since (2) Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the
jurisdiction with respect to money claims of workers or claims for
damages arising from employer-employee relations to the
labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such
jurisdiction to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa
130 made no change with respect to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with respect to money claims of
workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee
relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The
exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided
for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first
instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts
beyond the scope of the authority conferred on him by law when he
entertained the suit for damages, arising from picketing that
accompanied a strike. The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of
certiorari, and nullified and set aside the 20 July 1982 order issued
by the court a quo. It granted the writ of prohibition, and enjoined
the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf in the RTC to
which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on the
civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose
of dismissing it. It also made permanent there straining order
issued on 5 August 1982.

Held:

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