VOL.

150, MAY 28, 1987

259

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

*

No. L-72873. May 28, 1987.

CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners,

vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA
PADUA, respondents.
Statutes; We test a law by its results. A law should not be
interpreted so as to cause an injustice.But as has also been aptly
observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by
its

_______________
*

EN BANC.

260

260

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonzo us. Intermediate Appellate Court

purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the

law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law
should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the
legislature, is to render justice.
Same; Law and justice are inseparable. Laws must be applied
in consonance with justice.Thus, we interpret and apply the law
not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there

are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In
such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word
and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
Same; Judges must not unfeelingly yield like robots to the literal
command of the law.As judges, we are not automatons. We do not
and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the
words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them." While we
admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to
interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the
legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is
not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason
for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that
killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the
lawmaker's will.
Same; Property; Prescription; Succession; Redemption; Where
co-heirs filed action for redemption of co-heir's sold share only after
thirteen years had elapsed from the sale, they are deemed to have
been actually informed thereof sometime during those years
although no written notice of sale was given to them.While we do
not here declare that this period started from the dates of such
sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those
years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed,
the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that
thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately
expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of
thirteen years, when none of
261

VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987

261

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in
other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of
redemption had already been extinguished because the period for
its exercise had alr eady expired.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; The Court's

deviation from the strict letters of Art. 1088 NCC on giving of
written notice to co-heirs of the sale of an heir's share is not being
abandoned. The ruling here should be deemed an exception due to
peculiar circumstances of this case.We realize that in arriving at
our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the
law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant
to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no
competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the
above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we
ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines.
What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general
rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

PETITION to review the decision of the Intermediate

Appellate Court.
The f acts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners.
Luis R. Reyes for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in
curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court
of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we
administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we
do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither
because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply
the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in
the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration.
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso
shares a parcel of land registered in the name of their
deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of
1
Deeds of Tarlac.
_______________
1

Rollo, p. 5.
262

262

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua,

transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners
2
for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. One year
later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold
her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument
denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of
3
P440.00.
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied,
after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of
the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In
1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his
wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed
4
area.
On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five
coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses
Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared
5
that he was an American citizen. On May 27, 1977,
however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own
complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed
6
by her brother.
**
The trial court also dismiss this complaint, now on the
ground that the right had lapsed, not having been
exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963
and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was
held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs
7
satisfied the requirement of the law.
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs
cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including
Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only
604 square meters, including the portions sold to the
8
petitioners. Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion,
was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who
later claimed redemp_______________
2

Ibid., p. 6.

Id., p. 64.

Id

Id., p. 21.

Id., p. 21.

**

Presided by Judge Cezar D. Francisco.

Id., p. 65.

Id., p. 5.

263

VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987

263

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

9

tion. Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents

were close friends
and neighbors whose children went to
10
school together.
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were
unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they
alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had
merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the
circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not
to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially
significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semiconcrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done
without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the
correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law
as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners
and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the
Civil Code, providing as follows:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a
stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be
subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for
the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the
vendor."
***

In reversing the trial court, the respondent court declared

that the notice required by the said article was written
notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a
substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of
11
Appeals applied by the trial court, the respondent court
held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article
1623, stressed the need for written notice although no
particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the
_______________
9

Id., p. 64.

10

Id, p. 26.

***
11

Gaviola, Jr., P.J., ponente, Caguioa, Quetulio-Losa & Luciano, JJ.

16 SCRA 775.
264

264

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-heirs with a copy of

the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would
satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long,
therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed
in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he
declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running."
12
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy, the Court,
speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that
the written notice should be given by the vendor and not
the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under
Article 1623, reading as follows:
" Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not
be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by
the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The
deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written
notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the
adjoining owners."

As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in

Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of
giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive,"
the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the
vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of
the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the
petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that
there was really no written notice given by the vendors to
their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088
can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30day period for redemption had not begun
to run, much less expired in 1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the

first concern of the judge should be to discover in its

provisions the in_______________
12

4 SCRA 527.
265

VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987

265

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is
never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part
of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of
the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently
of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem
arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its
peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language.
What we do instead is find a balance between the word and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must
not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like
robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too
closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice
Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes
13
beyond them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we
nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a
way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may
not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we
nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for
its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that
killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the
lawmaker's will.'
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its
construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or
intent. For what is within the spirit is within the statute although

it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter
but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently,
a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much
within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is
within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless
within the intent of
_______________
13

Dissenting in Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438.

266

266

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

the law makers."

14

In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure

that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to
indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the
30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of
the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to
pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate
any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only
a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the
right of redemption was invoked not days but years after
the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was
filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first
sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay
invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade,
assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled
the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires
the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in
this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it
was not in writing, would there be any question that the
30-day period for redemption had expired long before the
complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the
private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of
the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and
1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would
be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their
palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of

the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to

make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are
satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters
were actually informed, although not in writing, of the
sales made in 1963 and 1964,
_______________
14

Statutory Construction, Ruben E. Agpalo, pp. 64-65, 1986, citing

Manila Race Horse Trainers' Assn. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60; Go Chi v.

Go Cho, 96 Phil. 622; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 105; Roa v. Collector
of Customs, 23 Phil. 315; Villanueva v. City of Iloilo, 26 SCRA 578; People
v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542; US v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128.
267

VOL. 150, MAY 28, 1987

267

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

and that such notice was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started
from the dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say
that sometime between those years and 1976, when the
first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs
were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the
30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This
could have happened any time during the interval of
thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to
redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when
Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption
had already been extinguished because the period f or its
exercise had already expired.
The f ollowing doctrine is also worth noting:
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the
assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have
knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the
circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the
means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry,
but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches,
15
the same as if he had known the facts. "

It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder

why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should
enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a

house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of

a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly
looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least
inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily
available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them
chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was
already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we
are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the
respondent court understandably applied pursuant to
existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it
had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by
this Court in the
_______________
15

Ater v. Smith 245 111. 57, 19 Am. Cases 105.

268

268

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly

stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero
and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting
an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of
the sales although no notice in writing was given them.
And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began
and ended during the 14 years between the sales in
question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in
1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of
redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined
justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every
16
one his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court
when it assesses the facts and the law in every case
brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice,
presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we

have done in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of
the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial
court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento
and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Fernan and Feliciano, JJ., on leave.
Petition granted.
o0o
_______________
16

Institutes 1, 1, pr. as cited in Handbook for Roman Law, Miravite,

Lorenzo F., p. 39, 1981.

269

Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.