Director of lands vs iac

Our Constitution, whether the 1973 9 or 1987, 10 prohibits private corporations or

associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease.
Republication is required if the amendment is due to substantial change in the
boundaries or increase in the area of the land applied for.
Lands of the public domain are classified under three main categories, namely: Mineral,
Forest and Disposable or Alienable Lands.
under Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Secs. 6-7), which states that it is only the President,
upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral
lands.
Mineral and Timber or forest lands are not subject to private ownership unless they are
first reclassified as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.
This is in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Hence, a positive act of the government is needed to declassify a forest land into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
In any case tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess land when not supported by evidence.
The fact that the disputed property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the
names of the applicants or of their predecessors-in-interest way back in 1921 does not
necessarily prove ownership.
Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession
the applicant may have had and however long, cannot ripen into private ownership.
The conversion of subject property does not automatically render the property as
alienable and disposable.

Bagunu vs Spouses Francisco

Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45

In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue.
The courts jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving ownership of real property
extends only to private lands.
This issue of identity of the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of
Lands, as the administrative agency with direct control over the disposition and
management of lands of the public domain.
Courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the
DENR Secretary and the Director of Lands, unless grave abuse of discretion exists.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a
controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to its resolution by the latter, where the question demands the exercise of

sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and

services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact
Republic vs Lao

The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought
to be registered forms part of the public domain.
It bears stressing at this point that declassification of forest land and its conversion into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes requires an express and
positive act from the government. It cannot be presumed; but must be established by
convincing proof.

Heirs of Gregorio vs Republic

Under the Constitution, timberlands, which are part of the public domain, cannot be
alienated.
A certificate of title covering inalienable lands of the public domain is void and can be
cancelled in whosever hand said title may be found.
Thus, we have ruled that a certificate of title is void when it covers property of the public
domain classified as forest or timber and mineral lands.
And any title issued on non-disposable lands even if in the hands of alleged innocent
purchaser for value, shall be cancelled.

SENR vs Yap

Classification of lands of the public dominion: agricultural, national parks, forest or

timber.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been
the subject of the present system of classification for purposes of determining which are
needed for forest purposes and which are not]
There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under
CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
abona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how
long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first
element of possession.
Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.

Krivenko vs ROD

Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:

Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned
by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of
the inaguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no
licence, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which cases
beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
Under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public agricultural lands,
including residential lands

Halili vs CA

Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not
reviewable by this Court.
Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court.

Exceptions:

This admits of only a few exceptions, such as

o when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
o when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
o when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
o when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run
contrary to the admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain
relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
o when there is a misappreciation of facts;
o when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence
on which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or
o are contradicted by evidence on record.
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain, except only by way of legal succession.
Jurisprudence is consistent that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a
Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
The objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands -has been served.

Muller vs Muller

Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the
public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. The
primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national
patrimony.
Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary succession, respondents
disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership
in trust is allowed.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands. Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property
despite the constitutional prohibition.
To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a
property which he is not allowed to own.

Republic vs CA and Lapina

Private respondents stepped into the shoes of

their predecessors-in-interest and by virtue
thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary
to confirm what could otherwise be deemed as
an imperfect title.
(The weight of authority is) that open,
exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial

or other sanction, ceases to be public land and

becomes private property. . . .
The Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in
the concept above stated, must be either since
time immemorial or for the period prescribed in
the Public Land Act
In other words, the Torrens system was not
established as a means for the acquisition of
title to private land. It merely confirms, but
does not confer ownership.
In case the transferee already owns urban
or rural lands for residential purposes, he
shall still be entitled to be a transferee of
an additional urban or rural lands for
residential purposes which, when added
to those already owned by him, shall not
exceed the maximum areas herein
authorized.
An application for registration of title before a
land registration court should not be confused
with the issuance of a certificate of title by the
register of deeds. It is only when the judgment
of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final
that a decree of registration is issued. And

that is the time when the requirements of Sec.

6, BP 185, before the register of deeds should
be complied with by the applicants. This
decree of registration is the one that is
submitted to the office of the register of deeds
for issuance of the certificate of title in
favor of the applicant. Prior to the issuance of
the decree of registration, the register of deeds
has no participation in the approval of the
application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
Chavez vs Public Estates
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged
areas is rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State
owns all lands and waters of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act,
which authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of
the government to corporations and individuals.
Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores,
roadsteads, and that of a similar character;
That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of
general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the
development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and
other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until
granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by
the public.
In contrast, property devoted to public service referred to property
used for some specific public service and open only to those
authorized to use the property.

 Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted

to public use, but also to property not so used but employed to
develop the national wealth.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable
lands of the public domain classified as government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands shall be disposed of to private parties
by lease only and not otherwise.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy public lands for non-agricultural
purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for public
service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and
only allowed the lease, of these lands to private parties. The State
always reserved these lands for some future public service.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional
limitation on individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of
alienable lands of the public domain. Without the constitutional ban,
individuals who already acquired the maximum area of alienable
lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire
more alienable public lands. An individual could own as many
corporations as his means would allow him.
A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a
formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it
from being such.

Director vs IAC and ACME

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment
of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in
this instance.

Republic vs Candymaker

Who may apply: Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier

Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must,

therefore, prove the following:
o (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and
o (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of the same
under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time
immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the
claimant does not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of
ownership; such possession is not exclusive and notorious as
to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.