Subsea Dropped Object and Layout Study
Subsea Dropped Object and Layout Study
BRITANNIA PROJECT
SUBSEA DIVISION
DOCUMENT
TITLE:
NUMBER: BRT2-XSO-NR-S0-55-00011
PAGES:
1 OF 68
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ORIGIN
BY
DATE
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Eng.
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APPROVAL
As Appropriate
Introduction
1.1
1.2
1.3
2.0
Recommendations
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
3.0
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Overview of Methodology
3.1.1 Load Case Criteria
3.1.2 As Built Dropped Object and Impact Protection
Detailed Hazard Review
3.2.1 Review of Subsea Hazard Identification and Screening Study
3.2.2 Dropped Object and Impact Hazards Listing
Dropped Object and Impact Analysis
3.3.1 Dropped BOP
3.3.2 Dropped Tree
3.3.3 Dropped Tubulars
3.3.4 Dropped Containers
3.3.5 Dropped Tools, Equipment and Other Objects
3.3.6 Dropped Equipment for Wireline and Coiled Tubing Operations
3.3.7 Dropped Anchors and Related Impacts
3.3.8 Dropped Objects and Impacts during Intervention Operations
3.3.9 Impact from Other Major Accidents
3.3.10 Impacts from Fishing Activity
Hazard Classifications
Protection Criteria
Subsea Layout
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5.0
4.0
Purpose
Scope
Abbreviations
Rig Considerations
4.1.1 Proposed Mooring Pattern
4.1.2 Catenary Touch Down Points
4.1.3 Preferred Rig Heading
4.1.4 Overall Dimensions of Main Deck
4.1.5 Rig Side for Loading of Trees
4.1.6 Rig Side for Loading of Tubulars
Typical Rig Geometries
Seabed Layout Design Objectives
Layout of Subsea Facilities
References
Appendix 1
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1.0
INTRODUCTION
The seabed layout of the subsea facilities and the protective measures applied in design have a
significant effect on the potential for damage, hydrocarbon releases and remedial work. These
factors have a major influence on the inherent risks associated with the facilities and as such should
be optimised to ensure safety in design.
This study presents an assessment of the dropped object and impact hazards associated with the
Britannia subsea facilities. This assessment is used to generate design criteria for protective
requirements and develop the seabed layout of the subsea facilities.
Following design implementation, this document has been revised to reflect the residual risks
associated with dropped objects taking into consideration the dropped object protection incorporated
into the design of the subsea facilities.
This study is identified in the Project Safety Plan (Ref. 1) as a requirement for the preliminary
engineering phase of the project.
1.1
Purpose
The main purpose of this document is to provide a logical basis for the seabed layout of the subsea
facilities that meets the following objectives.
To identify all potential dropped object and impact hazards that can affect the subsea facilities
and to assess their potential to cause damage, hydrocarbon releases, impact on the
environment and subsequent remedial activities.
To develop a seabed layout for the subsea facilities that minimises the likelihood of these
hazards occurring.
To determine protective measures for the subsea facilities necessary to avoid damage, releases
and remedial activities where it is not possible to eliminate hazards by optimisation of the
seabed layout.
To identify procedural measures that can be adopted to minimise hazards where physical
protection is impractical or not cost effective based on the dropped object protection
incorporated into the design of the subsea facilities.
To provide an auditable trail of design decisions to help demonstrate that risk have been reduced
to a level that is as low as reasonably practical.
This work also satisfies two general recommendations made in the Subsea Hazard Identification and
Screening Report (Ref. 2), issued as Safety Action Records, as follows.
SS-010-013
SS-010-030
1.2
Scope
This study provides a thorough assessment of all dropped object and impact hazards on the subsea
facilities that could affect the seabed layout or procedural requirements.
The study considers dropped object and impact hazards for the following phases over the field life.
Initial batch setting and pre-drilling phase from semi submersible drilling rig (no subsea facilities
installed at this stage) during which 8 guide bases will be set with 36", 30" and 20" casing.
These wells will then be drilled and casing and liner set but not completed. These wells will
be plugged and left in a safe condition and the drilling rig demobilised.
Installation of flowlines and manifold and subsequent hook up and commissioning (not
considered in this study).
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Completion of the 8 pre-drilled wells by installation of tubing, trees and perforation from a semi
submersible drilling rig (simultaneous completion and production will not take place at this
stage because all wells will be completed and the rig demobilised prior to first gas).
Subsequent workover and well intervention activities from semi submersible drilling rig or a DSV
equipped with a subsea wireline system.
Intervention on subsea facilities by divers and/or ROV for inspection, maintenance and repair.
Drilling and completion of future 3 wells.
Drilling and completion of additional 3 wells if required and/or installation and hook up of satellite
wells.
Installation of mid-line template and subsequent hook up and commissioning (not considered in
this study).
Dropped object hazards during the initial construction and installation phase for the flowlines and
manifold and future phase for the mid-line template are not addressed in this study. Hazards
associated with these activities are considered as part of the risk assessment process during detail
design. The dropped object and impact criteria for these activities and facilities will be based on the
same criteria developed for the subsea facilities.
The study considers the subsea facilities by division into a number of areas, as follows.
In order to rationalise the number of project phases and facilities under consideration, the following
situations are assessed in this study.
1.3
Abbreviations
BOP
C/T
DSV
EDP
ESD
FB
LRP
OIM
PSU
QRA
ROV
SAR
SCSSV
SSIV
TH
THRT
THOAJ
W/L
Blowout Preventor
Coiled Tubing
Dive Support Vessel
Emergency Disconnect Package
Emergency Shut Down
Full Bore (rupture)
Lower Riser Package
Offshore Installation Manager
Power Supply Unit
Quantitative Risk Assessment
Remote Operated Vehicle
Safety Action Record
Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (alternatively referred to as a Down Hole
Safety Valve, DHSV)
Subsea Isolation Valve
Tubing Hanger
Tubing Hanger Running Tool
Tubing Hanger Orientation and Alignment Joint
Wireline
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2.0
RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations drawn from this study are shown below, each separated into major
development stages of the subsea facilities; batch setting and pre-drilling operations, completion and
future workover and intervention operations, future drilling operations and general recommendations
applicable to all stages of development. All recommendations have been issued as safety action
records, SAR SS-011-001 to SS-011-031 inclusive.
2.1
2.2
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2.3
2.4
2.5
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3.0
3.1
Overview of Methodology
The general methodology adopted for this study is; firstly to identify all potential dropped object and
impact hazards; secondly to assess their potential to cause releases or critical damage to the subsea
facilities; and thirdly to ensure that appropriate measures have been taken to provide physical
protection or procedural controls in order to reduce risks to as low as reasonably practical. The
general methodology is implemented as follows.
3.1.1
Review all dropped object and impact scenarios to ensure that all potential hazards have been
identified. This is based on the Subsea Hazard Identification and Screening Report (Ref. 2)
and a review of other documents that address dropped object and impact hazards for subsea
facilities (Ref. 3, 4, 5 and 6). Information on the shipping arrangements for Dril-Quip
supplied equipment has also been used to identify potential dropped object scenarios.
For each identified dropped object or impact hazard, determine the likely impact energy and
trajectory of dropped objects.
For the hazards that exceed the protection provided by the Load Case categories given in the
Subsea Facilities Basis of Design (Ref. 7) and the Load Cases for wellheads (see Section
3.1.1), determine suitable protective measures or mitigation to reduce risks to as low as
reasonably practical.
Review the hazards that exceed the dropped object protection incorporated into the design of the
subsea facilities.
Determine requirements for precautionary procedures and shutdown philosophy for simultaneous
drilling/intervention and production operations based on the dropped object protection
incorporated into the design of the subsea facilities to ensure that risks are reduced to as low
as reasonably practical.
Load Case Criteria
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The Load Case criteria defined in the Subsea Facilities Basis of Design are summarised below.
For a full definition refer to the Subsea Facilities Basis of Design (Ref. 7).
Load Case A
Snag loads on structures from fishing gear up to 500kN,
pullover loads on vertically sided pipelines and structures up to 310kN and
pullover loads on sloping sided pipelines and structures up to 230kN.
Load Case B
Impacts on pipelines and structures from 25kJ to 45kJ from
fishing gear subject to the relative stiffness under impact of the stationary and
moving bodies.
Load Case C
Impacts from non-deformable dropped objects where up to
2kJ is fully absorbed by the facilities on a maximum grid spacing of 0.15m
(where applicable) and up to 20kJ is fully absorbed by the facilities on a
maximum grid spacing of 2.5m (where applicable). If no protective grid is used,
the above energies shall be dissipated by the stationary body.
Load Case D
Impacts on structures from deformable dropped objects
where the energy distributed is governed by the relative stiffness between the
moving and stationary bodies under impact conditions. For impacts from
dropped tubulars this shall be taken as 30kJ with an equivalent linear stiffness for
the moving body of 14.7MN/m. For impacts from dropped containers a load of
50 tonnes is applied at the impact point, governed by local collapse of the
container, plus a further impact of 20kJ from the contents at the same location.
In addition to the Load Case criteria specified in the Subsea Facilities Basis of Design (Ref. 7),
further information on the impact resistance of the wellheads is required for to assess the predrilling operations. Work has been carried out by the platform template wellhead supplier, ABB
Vetco (Ref. 18) to determine the impact resistance of the Vetco SG5 wellhead assembly. This
work is also considered to be equally applicable to the Dril-Quip SS10 wellheads used for the
subsea wells which has led to the following additional Load Cases.
Load Case E
External Impacts up to 50kJ and snag loads up to 500kJ
which can be absorbed by the Dril-Quip SS10 wellheads (Ref. 18). Note that
critical sealing surfaces within the wellhead cannot withstand this impact energy
and are covered in Load Case F.
Load Case F
Impacts up to 2kJ which will not cause critical damage to
sealing surfaces within the wellheads (Ref. 18).
3.1.2
Objects dropped from drilling rigs, dive support vessels, supply boats and other vessels used for
inspection, maintenance and repair activities, and impact loads applied during normal
intervention activities. These hazards only occur when there are oilfield vessels working on
or near the subsea facilities.
Loads imposed by fishing gear dragging across or snagging on equipment, flowlines and
umbilicals and impacts from trawl boards. These hazards can feasibly occur at any time except
when there are oilfield vessels working directly over the subsea facilities.
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3.2.1
3.2.2
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3.3.1
Dropped BOP
The BOP can only realistically be dropped during running and retrieval operations whilst drilling a
well. The BOP will remain on the rig during the complete drilling or workover programme since it is
too heavy to be off loaded onto a supply boat using the rig cranes. If for any reason Refurbishment is
necessary during the drilling or workover programme, the rig will be demobilised to port.
The BOP is deployed on the end of the drilling riser and lowered to the seabed whilst additional riser
sections are added and made up on the drill floor of the rig. The deployment operation starts by
transferring the BOP under drill floor by skidding. The BOP is then picked up on the drilling riser and
lowered through the moonpool. The assembly is then held on the spider beams and the derrick hook
detached to allow another section of riser to be added. The assembly is then picked up and lowered
with the operation being repeated until sufficient riser has been added for the water depth. Retrieval
of the BOP is carried out in a reverse sequence of operations.
The BOP could potentially be dropped at any stage during this operation due to the BOP becoming
detached from the riser assembly (ie, by parting of a riser joint) or the whole assembly becoming
detached from the derrick or spider beams.
The typical weight of a BOP assembly is 140 tonnes and would reach a terminal velocity of
approximately 10.5 m/s with a resultant impact energy of 9.7MJ, as shown in Table 1.
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It is not practical to provide structural protection that can resist this magnitude of impact force so the
only practical means of controlling this hazard is either to avoid dropping the BOP or to ensure that if
it is dropped, it will not impact the subsea facilities. Although precautions to avoid dropping the BOP
will be made, it cannot be guaranteed that the BOP will not be dropped. Hence the solution adopted
for Britannia is to ensure that if the BOP is dropped, it will not impact the subsea facilities.
In order to achieve this objective, the BOP running and retrieval operations will be carried out over a
heavy goods handling area such that if it is dropped, it cannot impact the subsea facilities. In order
to determine the size and location of this heavy goods handling area, dropped object trajectory
analysis has been carried out for the BOP.
Two cases exist which may yield the largest extent of the drop out zone. The first case is where the
BOP is dropped from the surface and has the greatest potential to be carried by the current before it
impacts the seabed, and then topples over. The second case is where the BOP is dropped with a
number of riser sections attached and then topples over after impacting the seabed.
The largest extent of the drop out zone is where the BOP is dropped from the surface (and has the
greatest potential to be carried by the current before it impacts the seabed) and then topples over
after impact. If the BOP is dropped with riser sections attached to the BOP, then the riser is likely to
topple after impact. The toppling motion is likely to result in the riser buckling and parting at the
connections between riser sections. The behaviour of the riser sections for this scenario has not
been addressed specifically in this study but is assumed to have an impact energy less than that of
dropped tubulars addressed in Section 3.3.3, below.
The drop out zone for the first case gives a maximum radius of 11m for the initial impact with a
probability of between 1 x 10-5 and 1 x 10-6 per drop event, as shown in Figure 1. This is to say that
if a BOP is dropped, then the probability that it lands further than 11m from the drop axis is between 1
in 100,000 and 1 in 1,000,000.
After the BOP lands on the seabed, it may topple over and could topple away from the impact point,
thereby increasing the potential area of damage. This is a conservative assumption given the
seabed soil conditions at the Britannia location, a more likely scenario is that the BOP penetrates the
seabed to a depth where it cannot topple over. However, detailed analysis has not been carried out
and it is therefore assumed that the BOP can topple over.
The drop out zone assuming the BOP does topple over gives a maximum radius of 23m for an
impact probability of between 1 x 10-5 and 1 x 10-6 per drop event, as shown in Figure 1. This is to
say that provided the rig maintains a horizontal separation distance of 23m from the centre of the
moonpool to the nearest subsea facilities then the risk of damage to the subsea facilities in the event
of a BOP being dropped from the sea surface will be below 1 x 10 -5 per drop event. As the BOP is
run on the riser, the potential drop out zone will be reduced in size because the BOP will have a
lesser distance to fall and hence a smaller potential excursion due to current forces.
The results of the BOP trajectory analysis are shown in Figure 1 giving the probability of impact per
drop versus horizontal distance between the drop point and edge of target for both the initial impact
and toppling after impact.
Conclusions for BOP running and retrieval operations
When determining practical safe handling zones for BOP running and retrieval operations
consideration should also be given to rig positioning accuracy and rig surge and sway motions which
will tend to increase the desired separation distance. This distance is conservatively estimated to be
5m. Therefore, during BOP running and retrieval operations it is recommended that a minimum
horizontal separation of 28m is maintained between the centre of the rig moonpool and the nearest
subsea facilities.
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The BOP drop out zone relative to the rig is shown in Figure 10. BOP handling zones for the predrilling operations and future workover and drilling activities are shown in Figure 9.
Once the BOP has been run and all riser sections are installed, the BOP and riser assembly will be
raised to provide adequate clearance between the top of the wellhead and the bottom of the BOP.
The rig will then be moved by tensioning the appropriate anchors to locate the BOP directly above
the well. Once the rig is in the correct position, the riser will be lowered and the BOP mated to the
wellhead.
During this operation, the BOP will not impact the tree because there is sufficient clearance but the
risk of dropping the BOP cannot be eliminated. However, because the riser system is fully
assembled at this stage, the risk of dropping the BOP is significantly reduced.
If the BOP is dropped during this operation, it is most likely to impact the well directly beneath the
BOP which is being drilled or worked over. During the pre-drilling phase, there will be no risk of
hydrocarbon releases from any wells because these wells will not have been perforated or
completed. However, in order to minimise the risk of damage, it is prudent to set the well spacing at
a suitable distance to prevent damage to adjacent wells for this scenario. Given the height of a
typical BOP assembly is 12m, the minimum distance between wells must be at least 12m to prevent
damage and possible release. Therefore it is recommended that the minimum centre to centre
spacing for the trees is 15m allowing for a 1m well positioning tolerance and the typical dimensions of
the trees. This well spacing has been adopted for the subsea layout as shown in Figure 9.
3.3.2
Dropped Tree
A tree can potentially either be dropped during loading operations from a supply boat or during
running and retrieval operations as the tree is installed. Loading operations will take place from a
supply boat using the rig crane to load the tree onto the rig prior to completion of the well. Tree
installation will be carried out by running the tree on the completion riser using the tree running tool
and the LRP/EDP assembly.
The all up weight of the completion riser assembly, lower riser package and tree is similar to that of
the BOP and riser assembly and therefore the dropped object impact forces and drop out zones for
this scenario are assumed to be the same. The control of these hazards during tree running and
retrieval operations are the same as those used for BOP deployment.
For assessment of a dropped tree during loading operations, it is assumed that the weight of a tree
alone is approximately 35 tonnes and would reach a terminal velocity of 7 m/s with a resultant impact
energy of 1.2MJ if dropped from the sea surface, as shown in Table 1.
It is not practical to provide structural protection that can resist this magnitude of impact force so the
only way the hazard can be controlled is either to avoid dropping the tree or to ensure that if it is
dropped, then it will not impact the subsea facilities. Although precautions to avoid dropping the tree
will be made, it cannot be guaranteed that the tree will not be dropped. Hence the solution adopted
for Britannia is to ensure that if the tree is dropped, then it will not impact the subsea facilities.
In order to achieve this objective, the tree loading, running and retrieval operations will be carried out
over a heavy goods handling area such that if it is dropped, then it cannot impact the subsea
facilities. In order to determine the size and location of this heavy goods handling area, dropped
object trajectory analysis has been carried out for the tree.
Since the tree is roughly cuboid, it is unlikely to topple over after the initial impact, unlike the BOP.
Therefore, trajectory analysis for the dropped tree only includes the initial impact. The drop out zone
for the first case gives a maximum radius of 20m which will ensure that if the tree is dropped from
the surface, then it will always land within this area. Provided the rig maintains this horizontal
distance from the centre of the moonpool to the nearest subsea facilities then there is no risk of
damage.
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The drop out zone for the tree gives a maximum radius of 20m for the initial impact with a probability
of between 1 x 10-5 and 1 x 10-6 per drop event, as shown in Figure 2. This is to say that if a tree is
dropped during loading, then the probability that it lands further than 20m from the drop axis is
between 1 in 100,000 and 1 in 1,000,000.
The results of the dropped tree trajectory analysis are shown in Figure 2, giving the probability of
impact per drop versus horizontal distance between the drop point and edge of target for the initial
impact.
Conclusions for tree loading operations
When determining practical safe handling zones for tree loading operations, consideration should
also be given to rig positioning accuracy and rig surge and sway motions which will tend to increase
the desired separation distance. This distance is estimated to be 5m. The position of the supply
boat, the position of the rig crane and the way in which the crane swings the load onto the rig will also
affect the separation distance between the safe handling areas and the subsea facilities. It is
recommended that a minimum horizontal separation of 25m is maintained between the path of the
tree during loading operations and the nearest subsea facilities.
In order to rationalise the requirement for heavy goods handling zones, the required separation
distance of 25m for tree loading operations has been combined with the required separation
distances for loading 10" drill collars (see Section 3.3.3) and general heavy equipment (see Section
3.3.5). This has resulted in a general purpose 28m dropped object boundary for loading operations,
as shown in Figure 9.
The use of a rig that loads trees at the rear of the vessel is undesirable for the well completion and
tree installation phase since this will require the rig to be moved further away from the seabed
facilities during tree loading operations. Therefore, it is recommended that rigs on which trees must
be loaded at the rear of the vessel are avoided for the well completion and tree installation
operations. Of the 26 rigs identified for Britannia (see Section 4.1), only 2 rigs, the Sonat John Shaw
and the Western Oceanic Western Pacesetter IV load trees exclusively at the rear of the
vessel (Ref. 11) and should be avoided for these activities. Note also that the subsea trees
are relatively heavy (35 tonnes) and consideration should be taken of the crane capacity when
selecting a rig for well intervention operations during which trees need to be loaded.
3.3.3
Dropped Tubulars
A wide range of tubulars can potentially be dropped during drilling and workover operations when
loading onto the rig or during running and retrieval operations. During loading (or off loading)
operations from a supply boat, the tubulars will be lifted in a horizontal attitude either as single tubes
or as bundles of tubes depending on their size and weight and could potentially be dropped into the
sea.
During running and retrieval operations, the tubulars will be handled vertically in the derrick and could
potentially be dropped through the moonpool, either as single joints or as multiple joints. Tubulars
that are commonly handled in multiple lengths in the derrick include riser, drill pipe, drill collars and
tubing. The likelihood of tubulars being dropped vertically from the derrick is less likely than during
loading operations. For tubulars to be dropped through the moonpool, there must be an open path
from the drill floor to the sea. This only realistically occurs when running riser or during riserless
drilling operations. Once the riser is in place, there is no open path from the drill floor to the sea and
the likelihood of this occurring is considerably reduced. If tubulars are dropped from the derrick when
a riser is in place, then the tubular could fall down the riser. This will not affect the subsea facilities
but may necessitate remedial drilling operations.
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In order to assess the potential trajectory and resulting impact energy from dropped tubulars, analysis
has been carried out for all tubular items identified in Section 3.2.2 using a commercial software
package, DELTA (Ref. 8, 9 and 10). DELTA simulates the trajectory of dropped objects in two
dimensions as they fall through the air, then impact the sea surface and then through the water until
they reach the seabed. The results provide information on the excursion of the dropped object, it's
velocity and orientation.
The simulations have been carried out assuming that tubulars are dropped from a height of 25m
above the sea surface at a range of orientations from horizontal to vertical in 10 increments. The
current velocity of the water column has been assumed to be 0.66 m/s which corresponds to a return
period in excess of 100 years. It is unlikely that drilling or handling operations would take place in
current conditions in excess of this since rig operations would be stopped due to the severe weather
conditions that are associated with high current velocities and is therefore the limiting case. Full
details of the input parameters for the simulations and corresponding results are given in Tables 4 to
6.
This analytical work carried out on the behaviour of dropped tubulars as they fall through the water
column indicates that it is extremely unlikely that the tubulars will arrive at the seabed in a vertical
orientation. In order to confirm this general finding, additional simulation work was carried out on 10"
drill collars to determine the range of initial conditions that would result in the tubular arriving at the
seabed vertically. Single lengths of drill collar will only arrive at the seabed vertically if the drill collar
is dropped vertically to within approximately 1 x 10 -6 degrees and the water column is perfectly still
(i.e., no current and no waves). These results are shown in Figure 3. These results confirm the
general conclusion that all single length tubulars will adopt a horizontal attitude as they fall through
the water column and the likelihood of vertical impacts is so low it can be ignored.
If multiple lengths of tubulars are dropped, then they will have to fall further through the water column
before adopting a horizontal attitude. The work carried out for multiple lengths of tubulars indicates
that when dropped vertically, the tubular string will not have reached a stable horizontal orientation
before reaching the seabed. This is not a significant cause for concern because it is assumed that
multiple lengths of tubulars can only be dropped through the moonpool during riser running and
retrieval operations or during riserless drilling, as discussed above.
In most cases, the tubulars assessed in this study adopt a horizontal attitude whilst falling through the
first 50m of the water depth and then continue in a horizontal attitude until they reach the seabed.
Results from the DELTA simulation work indicate that all tubulars under consideration dropped as
single lengths or in bundles arrive at the seabed within an angle of 2.15 to the horizontal.
Therefore, for the purpose of impact assessment, it is assumed that all impacts are from horizontal
tubulars.
The horizontal distance the tubulars travel as they fall through the water column is dependant on the
size of the tubulars and the current velocity. More slender, smaller diameter tubulars tend to travel
further whilst larger diameter tubulars tend to travel shorter distances. This phenomena occurs
because after motions of the dropped tubular stabilise to a horizontal orientation, the tubular is
accelerated up by the current so that the horizontal velocity is the same as the current velocity. The
horizontal distance travelled is then determined by the vertical velocity relative to the current velocity.
Since larger diameter, heavier tubulars tend to fall vertically through the water column faster than
smaller diameter, lighter tubulars they will not travel so far from the drop point.
Results from the DELTA simulation work for the maximum horizontal excursion distance at the
seabed are shown in Tables 4 to 6. These results indicate that the maximum excursion distance for
single lengths of 30" conductors is approximately 33m which increases up to approximately 75m for
4" tubing. Note that these results have been obtained from a range of 10 simulations at different
drop angles and therefore do not represent the maximum potential excursion that could occur which
may be greater at some intermediate angle or different wave conditions. However, the variability in
the results at the different drop angles indicates that the maximum horizontal excursions are unlikely
to be exceeded by more than 10% for the same current conditions.
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The DELTA simulation results summarised in Table 1 show the predicted horizontal excursion
distance, impact velocity, and impact energy for each of these tubulars. Where appropriate, results
are also given for bundles and multiple lengths of these tubulars. The effect and mitigation of each of
these hazards for impacts on unprotected and protected pipework is given in Tables 2 and 3
respectively.
Over the course of the drilling and intervention activities on the subsea facilities, different hazards will
occur over the different phases of the project. Some tubulars used are unique to specific phases
which limits the possible hazards over the different phases. These are summarised as follows.
Tubular
Description
36" Casing
30" Casing
20" Casing
13.375" Casing
10.75" Casing
9.625" Casing
7" Liner
5.5" Tubing
4.5" Tubing
6.625" Drill Pipe
5.5" Drill Pipe
5" Drill Pipe
3.5" Drill Pipe
10" Drill Collar
8" Drill Collar
6.5" Drill Collar
Drilling Riser
Completion Riser
Pre-Drilling
Operations
Completion &
Workover
Operations
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
For single lengths of tubulars dropped from the rig, the impact energies and horizontal excursion
distances are as follows.
Description
36" Casing (single)
30" Casing (single)
20" Casing (single)
10" Drill Collar (single)
Impact Energy
(kJ)
133
87.6
24.4
49.2
Horizontal Distance
Travelled (m)
33
33
44
22
For multiple lengths of tubulars dropped from the rig, the impact energies and horizontal excursion
distances are correspondingly higher, as follows.
Description
Drilling Riser (length x 2)
10" Drill Collar (length x 4)
8" Drill Collar (length x 4)
6.5" Drill Collar (length x 4)
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Impact Energy
(kJ)
51.4
299
183
78.4
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Horizontal Distance
Travelled (m)
68
50
60
70
Given the large potential drop out area for tubulars, it is not practical to control all tubular dropped
object hazards by performing all lifting operations over a heavy goods handling area. Therefore, it is
preferable to ensure that the physical protection of the subsea facilities is sufficient to resist the
resultant impact forces and prevent damage to equipment and subsequent hydrocarbon releases.
Conclusions for dropped tubular risks during batch setting and pre-drilling operations
For the pre-drilling operations, additional precautions need only be considered for dropped objects
which exceed the 50kJ impact energy for Load Case E. Load Case F is not considered applicable for
dropped tubulars since the internal wellhead seal surfaces will not be affected by horizontal impacts
from tubulars.
Single lengths of dropped 36" and 30" casing and multiple lengths of drill collars exceed Load Case E
and therefore a means of mitigating against these impacts should be considered.
The potential impact energy of 51.4kJ for dropped dual lengths of drilling riser only just exceeds the
allowable impact energy of 50kJ for load case E. The total energy of 51.4kJ will not be transferred to
the wellhead in practice because some energy will be dissipated by flexing of the riser on impact,
thereby reducing the impact energy transferred to less than 50kJ.
An obvious solution to minimising these dropped object risks during the pre-drilling phase would be to
complete all riserless drilling on all wells before drilling for the 13.375" casing is started. With this
strategy, all handling operations for the 36" and 30" casing and drill collars (which are most likely to
be dropped during riserless drilling) are completed before riser drilling starts. If a 36" casing, 30"
casing or drill collar is dropped during this phase then the maximum remedial cost is likely to be one
well being re-drilled and 36", 30" and 20" casing installed, say 10 days rig time. Conversely, if all
wells are drilled in strict sequence, the maximum remedial cost is likely to be a complete well at
approximately 75 days rig time.
The recommendations to minimise the risk of damage from dropped tubulars are therefore to carry
out all riserless drilling operations on all wells and install the 36", 30" and 20" casing. Following these
operations, the main drilling operations for each well should be completed in sequence. This strategy
will minimise the potential cost and duration of remedial work in the event of a dropped tubular
critically damaging a well.
During the initial batch setting operations of the pre-drilling phase, there is no risk of hydrocarbon
release since there are no wells drilled at this stage. However, loading of the 36" and 30" casing
could result in damage to the wellheads which have been batch set or drilled if casing is dropped
during loading operations. Although mitigation could be provided by moving the rig to a heavy goods
handling area during the loading operations, each rig move is likely to take at least 4 hours and it is
arguable that this strategy will provide any benefit.
Given that the worst case scenario for a dropped length of 36" or 30" casing would result in a
severely damaged wellhead resulting in the well being abandoned, this would only incur 10 days
extra rig time to batch set a new well and install the 36", 30" and 20" casing. On this basis, moving
the rig to a safe loading area can only be justified if the probability of dropping a length of 36" or 30"
casing is greater than the risk adjusted cost of remedial work. This can be approximated as follows.
If
Pdrop Phit
Tload
Tdrill
Then move rig to heavy goods handling area to load 36" and 30"
=
=
=
=
casing.
Where Pdrop
Phit
Tload
Tdrill
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Historical data indicates that the probability of dropping a length of 36" or 30" casing during loading
operations (ie, Pdrop) is approximately 1 x 10 -3 per lift operation (Ref. 17). The probability of a well
being hit (ie, Phit) can be approximated to the cross sectional area of the tubular over the drop out
area which is approximately 1 x 10-2 per drop event assuming there is one well that can be hit.
Over the batch setting operations, the number of wells that can potentially be hit will increase from
zero (during the lifting operations for the first well) to 7 (during the lifting operations for the last well).
Therefore, the expression for Pdrop x Phit will increase from zero to 0.0007 over the course of the
batch setting operations. Over this period, the expression T load over Tdrill will remain constant at
0.01667. Since Tload over Tdrill is always greater than P drop x Phit, moving the rig to the heavy goods
handling area is not justified for loading the 36" and 30" casing.
The same argument can be applied to any dropped object precautions considered for multiple lengths
of drill collars. The probability of dropping a multiple length of drill collars (ie, P drop) will be lower than
that for 36" and 30" casing and the probability of a well being hit hitting (ie, P hit) will also be lower due
to the smaller cross sectional area and larger drop out zone for the drill collars. Therefore moving the
rig to a heavy goods handling area is not justified for drill string running operations.
Conclusions for completion and post installation workover and intervention operations
Although impact forces from dropped 36", 30" and 20" casing sections exceed Load Cases C and D,
these tubulars will not be handled during completion or post installation workover and intervention
operations. Therefore, these hazards need not be considered for these phases of the development.
During running and retrieval operations, tubulars will be handled vertically in the derrick and could
potentially be dropped through the moonpool, either as single joints or as multiple joints. Tubulars
that are commonly handled in multiple lengths in the derrick include drilling riser, completion riser,
drill pipe, drill collars and tubing. The likelihood of tubulars being dropped vertically from the derrick
is less likely than during loading operations. For tubulars to be dropped through the moonpool, there
must be an open path from the drill floor to the sea. This only realistically occurs when running riser
or during riserless drilling operations. Once the riser is in place, there is no open path from the drill
floor to the sea and the likelihood of this occurring is considerably reduced. If tubulars are dropped
from the derrick when a riser is in place, then the tubular could fall down the riser. This will not affect
the subsea facilities but may necessitate remedial drilling operations.
Of these tubulars, only dual lengths of drilling riser exceed Load Cases C and D which are only likely
to be dropped during BOP running and retrieval operations when the rig is located over the BOP
handling area. Although the 28m separation for the BOP handling zone is insufficient to eliminate the
risk of a dual length of drilling riser impacting the subsea facilities (drop out radius 68m), the risk of
impact will be reduced considerably. Increasing the separation distance from 28m to 68m will give a
reduction in risk, this is not considered significant and therefore no additional precautions are
considered necessary.
Conclusions for future drilling operations of subsea wells
When drilling the 3 future subsea wells that will have 36", 30" and 20" casing installed during the
initial batch setting operations, hazards from dropped tubulars will be the same as during the initial
pre-drilling phase. However, at this stage of the development, the initial 8 subsea wells, manifold and
flowlines will be installed and hence the consequences of dropped objects more severe. Ideally,
these drilling operations will be carried out simultaneously with production from the existing 8 subsea
wells. However, since these operations will be planned for the summer months, a production
shutdown may have no economic impact depending on the sales contract and the status of platform
production.
During simultaneous drilling/workover and production, the layout of the subsea facilities will have a
significant impact on the risk and potential consequences of a release due to a dropped tubular. If it
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is not feasible to protect all hydrocarbon systems by providing adequate separation, then it is
preferable to place those systems that contain the largest inventory as far from the drop point as
possible. Releases from trees and jumper hoses can be isolated by shutting in the well and manifold
valves, thereby limiting the release. Conversely, it will not be possible to isolate releases from the
flowlines and therefore greater emphasis should be placed on ensuring that the flowlines are well
outside possible drop out areas.
The same strategy used for pre-drilling activities of completing all batch setting operations prior to
drilling the wells should be followed for the future wells. This will minimise the dropped object risk
and remedial activities for the new wells. In addition to this, the 36", 30" and 20" casing and 10" drill
collars should be loaded over a heavy goods handling area such that if they are dropped, they cannot
impact the existing subsea wells, manifold and pipelines. This strategy will allow production from the
existing wells to continue during the drilling operations provided there are no other overriding safety
considerations.
During these loading operations, the rig should be located far enough from the existing subsea wells,
manifold and flowlines such that the drop out zones for the respective tubulars does not encroach
onto the subsea facilities. The drop out zones relative to the generic rig is shown in Figures 11 and
12.
3.3.4
Dropped Containers
During drilling and intervention operations on the subsea facilities, general supplies, equipment and
materials will be transferred to rigs and other surface support vessels in containers. 3 types of
container are generally used offshore, small mini containers (2.3m x 1.85m x 1.6m) weighing up to 6
tonnes fully loaded, 10' containers (3m x 1.8m x 1.8m) weighing up to 8 tonnes fully laden and large
20' containers (6.1m x 2.5m x 2.5m) weighing up to 18 tonnes fully laden.
Containers are generally transferred between supply boats and rigs (or large DSVs) using the vessel
cranes and could potentially be dropped during this transfer process. Once on the rig or vessel, they
are not generally moved and are secured to prevent them being swept overboard in severe weather.
In order to assess the potential trajectory and resulting impact energy from dropped containers,
analysis has been carried out on the three types of container both in the full (loaded) and empty
condition. For the full condition, two cases have been assessed, firstly where the weight of the
contents are evenly distributed (such that the centre of gravity is at the centre of the container); and
secondly where centre of gravity is displaced towards one end of the container. This second case is
based on the assumption that the contents of the container is a solid cube of steel of the required
weight and this falls to one end on impact with the water. This causes the container to fall through
the water in a vertical orientation which results in the maximum velocity through the water.
This case is not likely to occur in practice because the contents of the containers are often secured
and in practice, the bulk of the contents would not allow a sufficient shift in the centre of gravity to
make the container hydrodynamically stable in the vertical orientation. Also, it is common practice to
evenly load the containers and secure the contents if they are likely to shift in transit. Therefore, it
has been assumed that containers will fall in a horizontal attitude. However, results for vertical
orientations are given for information.
The simulations have been carried out assuming that containers are dropped from a height of 25m
above the sea surface at a range of orientations from horizontal to vertical in 10 increments. The
current velocity of the water column has been assumed to be 0.66 m/s which corresponds to a return
period in excess of 100 years. It is unlikely that container handling operations would take place in
these conditions and is therefore the limiting case. Full details of the input parameters for the
simulations and corresponding results are given in Table 4 to 6.
Results from the DELTA simulation work for dropped containers are shown in Table 1 and
summarised below. These results indicate that provided the load in the container is evenly
distributed, the container will adopt a horizontal attitude, irrespective of the angle which it is dropped
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from. Provided the centre of gravity of the containers is located along the longitudinal centre line of
the container, they will always arrive at the seabed within an angle of 0.67 to the horizontal.
Description
Mini Container Empty
Mini Container Full
10' Container Empty
10' Container Full
20' Container Empty
20' Container Full
Weight
in Air
(kg)
1,620
6,000
2,000
8,000
3,000
18,000
Horizontal
Distance
Travelled (m)
60
30
66
31
117
39
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
37.6
153
49.9
214
211
635
Note that these results have been obtained from a range of 10 simulations at different drop angles
and therefore do not represent the maximum potential excursion that could occur which may be
greater at some intermediate angle or different wave conditions. However, the variability in the
results at the different drop angles indicates that the maximum horizontal excursions are unlikely to
be exceeded by more than 10% for the same current conditions.
The horizontal excursion distances shown in the results above assume that the containers sink
immediately on entering the water. In practice, all the containers under consideration would float,
even when fully loaded. However, they would slowly sink as they became flooded with water through
the ventilation ports. It is not possible to predict the time that a container would remain afloat before
sinking, during which time currents could carry the container a considerable distance from the drop
point. Historical evidence suggests that containers have floated and been carried for up to 15km
before sinking. Historical evidence also suggests that the doors of the container could burst open on
impact with the sea surface, in which case the container would start sinking almost immediately. The
relationship between the distance the container drifts and the probability of impacting seabed
facilities quickly diminishes with distance. This relationship is shown in Figure 4. At a distance of
1,000m from the drop point, the probability of impact drops to between 1 x 10 -5 and 1 x 10-6.
20' containers may be used on the platform although they are used infrequently. Information
obtained from the Murchinson platform (Ref. 12) indicates that mini containers account for over 90%
of movements, 10' containers for less than 10% and 20' for less than 1%. It is not possible to
eliminate the use of 20' containers on platforms since they are needed for bulky spare parts and
equipment. However, at the platform, potential damage from dropped 20' containers can be
protected against by providing adequate separation. This is feasible for the platform because
separation distances are greater than at the subsea locations.
Conclusions for dropped container risks
The potential impact energy from a dropped container is significant and exceeds the basic Load Case
criteria (Ref. 7). However, in the event of an impact from a container, a considerable proportion of
the available energy would go into deforming the container, rather than damaging the seabed
facilities that are hit. It is recommended that impact analysis is carried out for 10' and mini containers
to determine the energy transferred to the subsea facilities under impact conditions.
Impact forces associated with 20' containers cannot be practically protected against. Given the
infrequent use of 20' containers on drilling rigs, it is recommended to avoid their use wherever
possible for the regular transport of equipment and materials and transfer all goods in smaller 10'
containers.
In order to minimise the risk of damage from dropped containers it is recommended that 20'
containers are not transferred between the rig and supply vessels when on location over the subsea
facilities and that all goods are transferred in mini and 10' containers. Given the infrequent use of 20'
containers for the regular transport of equipment and materials on drilling rigs, this recommendation
is unlikely to cause any significant operational constraints. Note that 20' containers may be used for
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'company stores' in which case they will be loaded onto the rig before mobilisation and will not be off
loaded until rig demobilisation.
3.3.5
Weight
in Air
(kg)
25,000
33,000
5
500
Horizontal
Distance
Travelled (m)
20
20
8
20
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
450
810
2
12
These results indicate that the potential impact energy from a large piece of equipment that is
dropped from the rig could cause major damage. These hazards will therefore have to be protected
against by procedural controls.
Conclusions for dropped tools, equipment and other objects
It is recommended that large items of equipment such as spare winches and mud pumps for the rig
or other vessels are loaded over heavy goods handling area at a safe distance from the subsea
facilities. When determining practical safe handling zones for these loading operations, consideration
should also be given to rig positioning accuracy and rig surge and sway motions which will tend to
increase the desired separation distance. This distance is conservatively estimated to be 5m.
Therefore, during loading operations for large items of equipment it is recommended that a minimum
horizontal separation of 28m is maintained between the path of the load and the nearest point on the
subsea facilities. The 28m dropped object boundary is shown in Figure 9.
For the pre-drilling operations, impact energies associated with dropped tools (sledge hammer) and
ancillary structures such as a section of hand rail or temporary walkway and other similar small
dropped objects generally exceed Load Case F. Given the small size of these objects, they could
easily damage wellhead sealing surfaces. The debris caps on the wellheads would provide adequate
protection against these dropped objects so risks can be minimised by ensuring that the debris caps
are installed on all wellheads except the well which is being drilled.
For other operations where the wellhead is not exposed, impact energies associated with dropped
tools (sledge hammer) and ancillary structures such as a section of hand rail or temporary walkway
are within the criteria for Load Case C (Ref. 7), therefore no additional protection is required.
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3.3.6
Weight
in Air
(kg)
5,000
1,000
900
5,500
6,950
11,500
5,400
1,000
900
Horizontal
Distance
Travelled (m)
64
22
54
61
56
44
52
N/A
N/A
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
90.6
13.8
5.7
101
132
161
157
13.8
5.7
Note that these results have been obtained from a range of 10 simulations at different drop angles
and therefore do not represent the maximum potential excursion that could occur which may be
greater at some intermediate angle or different wave conditions. However, the variability in the
results at the different drop angles indicates that the maximum horizontal excursions are unlikely to
be exceeded by more than 10% for the same current conditions.
The impact energies associated with the wireline and coiled tubing containers do not exceed that
given for a fully loaded 10' container (214kJ) in Section 3.3.4 and therefore this should be taken as
the worst case dropped container (maximum total impact energy). However, the relative stiffness of
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the wireline and coiled tubing containers will have to be taken into consideration when assessing the
total energy transferred to the subsea structure on impact. The horizontal excursion distances shown
in the results above assume that the containers sink immediately on entering the water. In practice,
all the containers under consideration would float, even when fully loaded. However, they would
slowly sink as they became flooded with water through the ventilation ports. It is not possible to
predict the time that a container would remain afloat before sinking, during which time currents could
carry the container a considerable distance from the drop point.
Impacts from dropped subsea wireline equipment are only likely to impact the well that is being
worked on since the subsea wireline BOP and subsea lubricator are run on guidewires. If they are
dropped during the subsea wireline intervention operation then it is only possible for the objects to fall
down the guidewires.
Conclusions for dropped wireline equipment
The potential impact energy from a dropped wireline control and reel container is significant and
exceeds the basic Load Case criteria (Ref. 7). However, in the event of an impact, a considerable
proportion of the available energy would go into deforming the container, rather than damaging the
seabed facilities that are hit. It is recommended that impact analysis is carried out for wireline
containers to determine the energy transferred to the subsea facilities under impact conditions.
The potential impact energy from a dropped wireline BOP or wireline lubricator are less than that
given for Load Case C and therefore adequate protection against these items is provided.
Conclusions for dropped coiled tubing equipment
The potential impact energy from dropped coiled tubing control and PSU containers is significant and
exceeds the basic Load Case criteria (Ref. 7). However, in the event of an impact, a considerable
proportion of the available energy would go into deforming the container, rather than damaging the
seabed facilities that are hit. It is recommended that impact analysis is carried out for coiled tubing
containers to determine the energy transferred to the subsea facilities under impact conditions.
Potential impact energies from a dropped coiled tubing reel and injector head exceed the basic Load
Case criteria (Ref. 7). It is recommended that these items are loaded over the heavy goods handling
area at a safe distance from the subsea facilities.
3.3.7
If a drilling rig or similar anchor is dropped during deployment or recovery, then the potential impact
energy will be approximately 90kJ. Although it is possible to provide protection for subsea facilities
against this magnitude of impact force, it would result in large protective structures. Pipelines could
not practically be protected against this magnitude of impact because the majority of the impact
energy will be absorbed by deformation of the seabed facilities that are hit.
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The solution adopted for this scenario is to ensure that all anchors are handled during running and
retrieval a safe distance away from the seabed facilities such that if an anchor is dropped, then it will
not impact the subsea facilities. The anchor handling vessel may have to carry anchors over
pipelines which may not be avoidable. The layout of seabed facilities discussed in Section 4.0
considers anchoring procedures and it is anticipated that the layout will allow all anchor transfer
operations to be carried out away from the subsea facilities.
It is anticipated that a precautionary process shutdown of the subsea facilities will not be necessary
during vessel anchoring operations. However, these issues will be addressed when detailed mooring
procedures are developed.
Whilst a rig is moored over the subsea facilities, it is possible that a failure may occur in the mooring
line which would result in the anchor chain (or cable) falling to the seabed. This is likely to occur
during severe weather when high anchor line tensions are experienced. The most likely point of
failure is at the fairleader on the rig since this is usually the point of maximum tension.
If an anchor chain should part in such circumstances, then the chain will drop to the seabed and
could potentially damage the subsea facilities. However, the impact mechanism in such an event will
be a series of small impacts as each link in the chain falls to the seabed, in a line defined by the
catenary shape of the chain at the instant before failure . The maximum impact energy will be
governed by the size and weight of the individual chain links and the velocity of the chain as it falls to
the seabed. It has been assumed that the maximum individual impact energy associated with this
event is within the criteria for Load Case C (Ref. 7). After impact, the dead weight of the chain will
apply a load at the resting point of the chain. This is assumed to be within allowable limits based on
the assumption that the chain will come to rest along a line and will not be concentrated at one point.
Whilst a rig is moored over the subsea facilities, the anchor chain will repeatedly impact the seabed
in the touch down zone as environmental forces on the rig are absorbed by the mooring system. The
touch down zone varies with the type of mooring system used on the rigs and anchor tensions
applied during rough weather. Although these impacts from the anchor chain are within the impact
criteria for Load Case C (Ref. 7), repeated impacts at the same point are likely to cause damage,
particularly to the carrier pipe of the heated flowlines.
This issue has been addressed by sending a questionnaire to rig owners to obtain further information
of mooring system characteristics (Ref. 11). The responses obtained on this subject varied
considerably due partly to the way in which the question was interpreted by the rig owners and the
level of detail available from the mooring analyses. Mooring analyses carried out by the rig owners
varied from standard static catenary tables to full dynamic analyses under storm survival conditions
and dynamic cases for broken anchor lines.
From the responses obtained, only those from Diamond and Saipem give full dynamic analyses in
sufficient detail to establish a realistic touch down radius under storm survival conditions. In order to
derive generic touch down zones for the Britannia development, this information has been further
assessed to take account of rig movements and differences in the co-ordinate systems used by
Diamond and Saipem. Results from this assessment (Ref. 11) indicate that under storm survival
conditions (when the rig will be located over the centre of the seabed facilities), the minimum touch
down distance occurs on the leeward anchors which can touch the seabed as close as 15m
horizontally from the fairleader.
During normal operations, the intention is to keep the rig precisely located over the subsea facilities
which is achieved by increasing anchor tensions. During rough weather (storm survival conditions),
the intention is to ride out the storm without exposing the anchors to excessive tensions by
slackening off the mooring system.
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When anchor tensions are reduced, more anchor chain is placed on the seabed which is lifted to
absorb rig motions due to wind and wave action. This gives the worst case condition that results in
the touch down zones which occurs on the leeward anchors which can touch the seabed as close as
15m from the fairleader. The typical rig locations under storm survival conditions is shown in Figure
13.
Further correspondence with rig owners (Ref. 13 to 16) recommends that the rig be positioned
relative to the subsea facilities in storm conditions such that the touchdown zone of the leeward
anchors is clear of the subsea facilities. Rig owners also recommend that the rig be positioned
symmetrically across the pipelines to avoid anchor chain impacts on the pipelines under storm
survival conditions. Following further clarification with rig owners (Ref. 13 to 16), it is assumed that
there is no problem maintaining a 250m touch down radius under normal operating conditions for all
rigs under consideration.
Snag loads from dragged anchors are only limited by the breaking strength of the anchor chains or
cable. These loads can reach 3.75MN which cannot be tolerated by the design. If such an incident
occurred then it would result in hydrocarbon releases and severe damage to the subsea facilities if
they were hit by the dragging anchor. However, there would be no immediate impact to personnel on
the rig from the hydrocarbon release because the incident would only likely occur in severe weather if
the rig is blown off station. The rig would be over 1km downwind of the dragging anchor and the
rupture point. The severity of damage could be minimised by appropriate marine and emergency
response procedures to avoid the dragged anchor impacting the subsea facilities by releasing the
anchor chain before impact.
Conclusions for dropped anchors and related impacts
To avoid potential damage from dropped anchors during running and retrieval operations, it is
recommended that anchors are handled a safe distance from the subsea facilities and where possible
anchor handling boats do not traverse subsea facilities whilst running anchors. Rig mooring
procedures should be developed to ensure that appropriate precautions are followed.
Load Case C criteria (Ref. 7) provides adequate protection against damage from a broken anchor
chain.
It is recommended that rig operating procedures are developed to ensure that potential touch down
zones do not encroach on the subsea facilities. Responses from rig owners (Ref. 13 to 16) indicate
that use of such procedures is feasible but a thorough set of procedures for all operating conditions
will have to be developed to ensure protection of the subsea facilities under all conditions.
It is recommended that emergency response procedures are developed to cope with a dragging
anchor to ensure that the mooring chain is released before the dragging anchor impacts subsea
facilities.
3.3.8
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A number of potential dropped object and impact hazards are associated with intervention operations,
as follows.
Impact from dropped DSV taught wire clump weight (small and large)
Impact from a diving bell collision
Impact from diving bell clump weight
Impact from diving bell drop weight
Impact from a ROV collision
Dropped control pod
The potential trajectory and resulting impact energy for this equipment if it is dropped has been
assessed for most items using the DELTA software package (Ref. 8, 9 and 10). The simulations have
been carried out assuming that items are dropped from a height of 25m above the sea surface at a
range of orientations from horizontal to vertical in 10 increments. The current velocity of the water
column has been assumed to be 0.66 m/s which corresponds to a return period in excess of 100
years. Results from the DELTA simulation work are shown in Table 1 and summarised below.
Description
DSV Clump Weight (small)
DSV Clump Weight (large)
Impact from Diving Bell Collision
Diving Bell Clump Weight
Diving Bell Drop Weight
Impact from ROV Collision
Dropped Control Pod
Weight
in Air
(kg)
500
1,000
N/A
3,000
500
N/A
1,000
Horizontal
Distance
Travelled (m)
57
54
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
52
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
4.4
11.0
Negligible
18.0
12.6
Negligible
12.0
These results indicate that all potential dropped objects under consideration for subsea intervention
operations have impact energies within the criteria for Load Case C (Ref. 7).
Note that in the North Sea, diving bell clump weights (a circular ring located on the underside of the
bell to provide a means of bringing the bell to the surface by jettisoning the clump weight) are
generally welded up. The reason for this is that adequate rescue facilities are available to recover
divers in a bell that has a severed lift line. Inadvertent release of the clump weight would be a
serious risk to divers since this would result in rapid decompression unless the diving bell hatch were
securely closed at the time of jettisoning. Therefore, the risk of damage from a dropped diving bell
clump weight can be ignored since it is assumed that the clump weight cannot be inadvertently
dropped.
Conclusions for dropped objects and impacts during intervention operations
All potential dropped object and impact hazards during intervention operations are within Load Case
C (Ref. 7). Therefore no additional precautions are necessary.
3.3.9
Impact from a sinking supply boat following a collision or dropped object onto the supply boat.
Impact from a sinking drilling rig due to collision damage, extreme weather, mooring failure or
loss of buoyancy in the event of a subsea blowout.
Impact from a sinking helicopter following a collision during landing or take off from the drilling
rig or DSV.
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All these accident scenarios could involve significant loss of life and assets in their own right and also
cause damage to the subsea facilities.
A supply boat could be sunk due to a collision with the drilling rig or as a result of an object being
dropped onto the vessel during transfer operations which had sufficient energy to penetrate the hull.
If such an event occurred and the supply boat sunk onto the subsea facilities, this would result in
serious damage and probably hydrocarbon releases. It is estimated that the impact energy from such
an incident would be in the order of 64MJ. It is obviously not feasible to protect the subsea facilities
against such impact forces so the only way in which the event can be mitigated against is to prevent
the incident occurring or avoid impact if a vessel should be holed.
A supply boat could collide with the drilling rig for a number of reasons, either failure of propulsion or
thrusters, severe weather, or human error. The likelihood of propulsion failure could be minimised by
ensuring that only serviceable, well maintained supply boats are used. Collisions due to extreme
weather could be minimised by setting weather limits for supply boat transfer operations. The
potential for human error could be minimised by ensuring that only experienced vessel crews are
used, by briefing the crews and providing good communications between the supply boat and drilling
rig. Many of these factors could be incorporated in a simple procedure for supply boats which would
give the vessel crew clear instructions to minimise the likelihood of human error.
During transfer operations, items such as containers, tubulars and other goods could be dropped and
may land either in the sea or on the supply boat. If an object is dropped onto the supply boat there is
a risk that it will puncture the hull, thereby flooding the vessel. However, crane operations avoid
lifting loads directly over the supply boat by swinging the load away from the vessel after the initial
lift. If a vessel is holed then it is unlikely that it will sink immediately. Depending on the severity of
the damage, it may be some time before the vessel actually sinks. During this time, the supply boat
could be steered away from the subsea facilities to a safe location before the vessel is abandoned.
A drilling rig could possibly sink for a number of reasons, including ship impact, catastrophic
structural failure, severe weather or loss of buoyancy in a blowout or flowline rupture. Such an event
would undoubtedly result in a significant loss of life and severe damage to the subsea facilities if hit
by the sinking rig. It is obviously not feasible to protect the subsea facilities against such impact
forces so the only way in which the event can be mitigated against is to prevent the incident
occurring.
The regime of marine regulations and certification for semi submersible drilling rigs cover structural
integrity, impact resistance (and loss of buoyancy) and the adequacy of mooring systems. The
design of the subsea facilities does not affect these hazards to any considerable degree. However,
the risk and consequences of ship collisions can be minimised by appropriate procedural controls.
These controls include weather limits for loading operations, surveillance and monitoring of passing
shipping and emergency response procedures to be used in the event of an impending collision from
a passing vessel. These issues should be addressed as part of the operating and emergency
response procedures for the drilling rig.
The rig could possibly be sunk due to loss of buoyancy in the event of a blowout or rupture of a
flowline or process pipework. Such an event is unlikely given the precautions that will be taken to
minimise the risk of damage from dropped objects. However, the risk of blowout cannot be
eliminated entirely so this scenario will have to be considered. This scenario has already been raised
(Ref. 2 and SAR SS-010-002) and will be addressed during detail design.
Dropped object and impact analysis for a sinking helicopter has not been assessed in this study. If a
helicopter crashed into the sea during take off or landing then it is possible that the helicopter could
hit the subsea facilities. However, the stiffness of a helicopter is likely to be significantly less than
that of the subsea facilities and a large proportion of the impact energy is likely to be absorbed by the
helicopter.
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Dropped object and impact hazards associated with other major accidents obviously cannot be
protected against by physical means. For the 3 major accidents under consideration, procedural
controls can help reduce the likelihood of occurrence but risks cannot be eliminated. Therefore, it is
appropriate to consider emergency response plans that could be used to help mitigate against the
consequences of these events.
The consequences of a supply boat sinking could be reduced by steering the boat away from the
facilities prior to sinking so that the risk of the boat sinking onto the subsea facilities is minimised.
Precautionary measures could also be taken by the rig (or DSV) to initiate a full subsea ESD to
minimise the potential for hydrocarbon releases if a supply boat is in imminent danger of sinking.
These actions should be incorporated into the emergency response procedures.
The consequences of a rig sinking could also be mitigated against in a similar way by attempting to
move the rig away from the subsea facilities before it sinks and by initiating a full subsea ESD.
Again, these actions should be incorporated into the emergency response procedures.
The consequences of impact from a sinking helicopter could be mitigated against by initiating a full
subsea ESD which would minimise the potential for hydrocarbon releases if a helicopter crashes into
the sea adjacent to the rig or DSV. This action should be incorporated into the emergency response
procedures.
3.3.10 Impacts from Fishing Activity
A number of impact and snag load scenarios have been identified for the subsea facilities (Ref. 3 and
17). These scenarios are as follows.
The work carried out on impacts and snag loads from fishing gear in Ref. 3 and 17 determines the
maximum anticipated forces associated with fishing activity. These loads have been used to define
Load Cases A and B (Ref. 7). Since all subsea facilities will be designed to meet these Load Case
criteria, adequate protection against fishing activity is provided.
Conclusions for impacts from fishing activity
Load Cases A and B (Ref. 7) provide adequate protection against all potential impact and snag load
hazards associated with fishing operations.
3.4
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In order to provide practical emergency response guidelines on actions to be taken in the event of a
dropped object, a simple approach is needed based on the information readily available to the crew
on the vessel at the time of the incident. If a dropped object incident occurs, the deck crew will be
able to relay what was dropped (and the approximate weight) and where it was dropped to the rig
OIM or vessel master with a reasonable degree of confidence. The rig OIM or vessel master will
know the position of the vessel relative to the subsea facilities and will have to make a decision to
initiate a subsea shutdown on this information alone as fast as possible.
Ideally, the guidelines should lead to a subsea shutdown being initiated for all dropped objects that
could cause a release. Where the dropped object has insufficient impact energy to cause a release
or if the dropped object cannot reach the subsea facilities because it has been dropped over the
heavy goods handling area, then a subsea shutdown should not be initiated.
In order to determine an appropriate threshold for the weight of an object which if dropped could
cause a release from unprotected pipework on the subsea facilities, the results of the dropped object
analysis have been further analysed. This has been carried out by plotting the weight of the dropped
object versus the resulting impact energy for the potential dropped objects identified in Table 2, as
shown in Figure 5. These results have been plotted by category depending on the potential of the
dropped object to rupture different size unprotected pipework.
This approach allows the potential for hydrocarbon releases due to damage from dropped objects to
be assessed based on the weight of the dropped object alone. This will allow simplified emergency
response guidelines and allow the potential impact of dropped objects which have not been
considered to date in the dropped object analysis to be reasonably estimated.
From Figure 5, it can be seen that the minimum weight of a dropped object scenario considered in
Table 2 which could rupture a 5 flowline between a well and the manifold is 10 tonnes. Note that
smaller diameter pipework (1, 2 and 3) does not generally contain produced hydrocarbons under
pressure with the exception of the 1 annulus bleed line which is normally at test flowline pressure.
Note also that all pipework in the subsea facilities is protected against impact damage by either
protective covers, rock dump or by the structural elements of the manifold or bundle trail head. This
protection is ignored in the analysis of potential ruptures discussed above and therefore, it is
conservative to assume that the minimum dropped object weight which could cause a hydrocarbon
release is 10 tonnes.
Since the position of the heavy goods handling areas relative to the subsea facilities have been
determined from the dropped object trajectory analysis (Ref. 6), it can be assumed that any object
dropped within the heavy goods handling area assigned for the object is unlikely to impact the subsea
facilities and therefore unlikely to cause a release. However, this analysis is based on mathematical
predictions of dropped object trajectories through the water and hence should be treated with caution.
Therefore, even if an object is dropped in the heavy goods handling area assigned for the object,
emergency response actions should be still taken to ensure that the object has not hit the subsea
facilities.
For dropped objects greater than 10 tonnes which are dropped onto the subsea facilities, the
probability of a release will increase as the weight of the dropped object increases. Therefore, it is
appropriate to take more positive emergency response actions on the basis that a release is more
likely with heavier dropped objects.
Likewise, a dropped object greater that approximately 20 tonnes will threaten the 8 and possibly 14
pipework leading to more severe consequences from the potential release rate from the production
and test headers and flowlines.
The potential gas dispersion and fire scenarios can thus be linked to the dropped objects weight and
the point at which it is dropped relative to the subsea facilities. This information is used as the basis
of the emergency response guidelines presented in Section 5.
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3.5
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4.0
SUBSEA LAYOUT
This section addresses the layout of the subsea facilities where the primary objective is to develop a
layout which meets the design objectives described in Section 4.2, below. The layout is developed in
part from the results of the dropped object analysis which identifies dropped object and impact
hazards that exceed the Load Case criteria (Ref. 7) which must be protected against by procedures.
Where possible, protection against these dropped object hazards (see Section 3.4) is provided by
sufficient horizontal separation between the point from which objects can be dropped and the subsea
facilities.
4.1
Rig Considerations
A total of 26 semi submersible drilling rigs have been identified for potential use on the Britannia
development for drilling of subsea and template wells. These drilling rigs are as follows.
1. Diamond Offshore
2.
3.
4. Global Marine
5.
6. Lauritzen Offshore
7. Maersk Drilling
8. Neddrill
9. Ross Offshore
10. Saipem
11. Santa Fe
12.
13. Sedco Forex
14.
15.
16.
17.
18. Smedvig
19.
20.
21. Sonat
22.
23.
24. Stena
25. Transocean
26. Western Oceanic
Ocean Alliance
Ocean Guardian
Ocean Valiant
Glomar Arctic 1
Glomar Arctic 3
Dan Princess
Maersk Vinlander
Neddrill 6
Vildkat Explorer
Scarabeo 5
Santa Fe Rig 135
Santa Fe Rig 140
Sovereign Explorer
Drillstar
Sedco 711
Sedco 712
Sedco 714
West Alpha
West Delta
West Vanguard
Sonat Arcade Frontier
Sonat Rather
John Shaw
Dyvi Stena
Transocean 8
Western Pacesetter IV
A thorough assessment of the design features that could affect the subsea layout for these rigs has
been made (Ref. 11) which addressed the following topics.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
The findings from this assessment for these 6 topics are summarised in Sections 4.1.1 to 4.1.6.
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4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
4.1.4
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4.1.5
4.1.6
4.2
4.3
When loading trees, heavy equipment and 10" drill collars, the drop out zone does not encroach
over the centre of the rig which will allow the rig to remain on a well during the loading
operations without risk of damage if the equipment is dropped, provided the drop out zone
does not encroach over other seabed facilities. Simultaneous BOP running and retrieval
operations and loading of trees, heavy equipment and 10" drill collars will also be
permissible because these objects could not hit the BOP if dropped.
When loading 36", 30" and 20" casing, the drop out zones encroach over the centre of the rig
and therefore the rig cannot load these tubulars whilst drilling a well without risk of damage if
the equipment is dropped. This implies that these tubulars will have to be loaded during rig
moves between wells. However, it may be possible to carry out loading operations whilst
batch setting the initial wells because the only facilities installed at this point in time are the
subsea wellheads which may be capable of resisting the impact energies for these dropped
objects, as given in Section 3.3.3.
When loading coiled tubing equipment, the potential drop out zone encroaches well over the
centre of the rig and therefore it will not be possible to load this equipment whilst remaining on a
well without risk of damage if the equipment is dropped.
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Allow rig loading away from seabed facilities when running BOP
No anchor touch down zones across pipelines
Minimise length of flowline spools
Minimise length of well jumper spools
Provide adequate thermal expansion
Allow a rig that gives acceptable mooring design and minimises weather downtime
Pipelines are well away from dropped object zones
Avoid requirement for excessive additional protection
Adequate clearance for pipeline laying
Clear routes for satellite well flowlines
ROV access to all sides of manifold when drilling
Adequate space for installation of temporary pig launching facilities
Provide 28m horizontal clearance for BOP running and retrieval operations
Provide 28m horizontal clearance for tree running and retrieval operations
Provide 25m horizontal clearance for tree loading operations
Provide 39m horizontal clearance for 36" and 30" casing loading operations
Provide 28m horizontal clearance for 10" drill collar loading operations
Provide 25m horizontal clearance for heavy equipment (winches, mud pumps, etc.) loading
operations
Provide 47m horizontal clearance for coiled tubing reel loading operations
Provide 55m horizontal clearance for coiled tubing injector head loading operations
Ideally, the seabed layout of the subsea centre should satisfy all these design objectives. However, it
may not be possible to satisfy all objectives in which case additional procedures may be necessary.
In developing the optimum configuration, consideration will be given to general safety issues, costs
associated with drilling, intervention and maintenance and the general operability of the facilities.
4.4
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Under storm survival conditions, the rig will have to move off the well that is being worked on to a
safe location where the anchor chains straddle the pipelines. This is necessary to ensure that the
anchor chain touch down points (which may be as close as 15m to the rig) do not impact the subsea
facilities. This rig position is shown in Figure 13.
A potential problem with this layout is anchor chain interference with the pipelines on anchor No 3.
When working on well 8 or during BOP running and retrieval operations, the distance between the rig
fairleader and the point where the anchor chain crosses the pipelines is approximately 260m. In
order to prevent anchor chain No 3 impacting the pipelines, sufficient anchor tension will have to be
maintained to ensure that the touch down point is further than 260m from the rig. It is assumed that
this will be possible from the responses received from rig owners (Ref. 13 to 16). However, the
behaviour of mooring systems is rig specific and no further work on this subject is possible until the
rig is selected. If there is a problem with anchor chain impacts a number of solutions are possible.
These include moving anchor No 3 or changing the rig heading to reduce the distance between the
rig fairleader and the point where the anchor chain crosses the pipelines. Alternatively, the anchor
chain could be buoyed to prevent touch down or a section of wire could be inserted to extend the
catenary. These solutions will only be considered following mooring analysis for the selected rig.
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5.0
REFERENCES
1. Project Safety Plan, BRT0-XO0-NO-O0-00-01003, Rev B2.
2. Subsea Hazard Identification and Screening Report, BRT0-XS0-XR-S0-55-00010, Rev B1.
3. Trawlgear and Dropped Object Accidental Loads on Coaxial and Bundled Flowlines, BRT0-XS0QR-S0-55-10002, Rev B1.
4. Conoco (U.K.) Ltd, Hazard Protection Study Subsea Installations, Cameron Atkins Technology,
Final Report, August 1988.
5. Dropped Objects on Subsea Installations, SINTEF, STF75 A89039, ISBN 82-595-5768-1.
6. An Initial Appraisal of the Threat of Damage to Subsea Installations, UEG Technical Note 27,
November 1982.
7. Subsea Facilities Basis of Design, BRT2-XS0-XB-S0-55-00001, Rev B1.
8. DELTA User Guide, Noble Denton, January 1992.
9. Motion Simulation and Hazard Assessment of Dropped Objects, Y Luo and J Davies, Noble
Denton.
10. Reliability Analysis of the Behaviour of Dropped Objects, R Colwill and R Ahilan, Noble Denton,
OTC 1992.
11. Rig Considerations for Subsea Layout, Britannia Subsea Technical Note 013.
12. Murchinson Platform loading operations, April 1994, Conoco Materials and Logistics, Dept,
Aberdeen. Fax communication, 2/8/94.
13. Internal memo, Saipem Scarabeo 5, Cesare Calef, 418/94-70.BRI, 8 March 1994.
14 Letter, Neddrill, Cees Van Diemen, CVD/wm.007, 24 February 1994.
15. Letter, Western Oceanic, Peter Ramsey, PR/0458/94, 7 March 1994.
16. Letter, Stena Offshore, John Davies, LTR/SDR/JDA/440, 4 March 1994.
17. Tree Protection and Elevation Philosophy, BRT3-XS0-QR-S1-56-00001, Rev D1.
18. Dropped Object Study for Pre-Drilling Activities at Platform Template, BRT2-XS0-NR-S0-5500033, Rev D1.
19. Manifold Structural Design Calculations, BRT2-XS0-QC-S2-56-00007.
20. Manifold Trailhead Protection Cover Structural Design Calculations, BRT2-XS0-QC-S3-5600005.
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Appendix 1
Tables and Figures
Table 1
Table 2
Table 3
Table 4
Table 5
Table 6
Table 7
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4
Figure 5
Figure 6
Figure 7
Figure 8
Figure 9
Figure 10
Figure 11
Figure 12
Figure 13
Figure 14
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Total
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
Effective
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
Source
(see
report)
10.5
9,730
9,730
[2]
11
10.5
9,730
9,730
[2]
50,000
20
7.0
1,225
1,225
[2]
Weight
in Air
(kg)
Total
Mass
(kg) [1]
140,600
176,500
11
140,600
176,500
Subsea Tree
35,000
Distance Impact
Travelled Velocity
(m)
(m/s)
36" Casing
Single
10,051
25,154
33
3.3
133
133
[3]
30" Casing
Single
5,633
16,296
33
3.3
87.6
87.6
[3]
20" Casing
Single
2,352
7,111
44
2.6
24.4
24.4
[3]
13.375" Casing
Single
1,207
3,315
52
2.3
9.0
9.0
[3]
13.375" Casing
Bundle x 3
3,620
11,400
41
2.8
43.4
28.9
[3]
10.75" Casing
Single
900
2,246
54
2.3
5.7
5.7
[3]
10.75" Casing
Bundle x 4
3,601
11,919
44
2.6
40.5
20.3
[3]
9.625" Casing
Single
9.625" Casing
Bundle x 4
7" Liner
Single
7" Liner
Bundle x 7
5.5" Tubing
Single
5.5" Tubing
Bundle x 7
Length x 3
4.5" Tubing
Single
4.5" Tubing
4.5" Tubing [8]
840
1,904
53
2.3
5.0
5.0
[3]
3,360
9,966
43
2.7
36.0
18.0
[3]
522
1,075
59
2.1
2.4
2.4
[3]
3,657
8,144
36
3.2
40.4
17.3
[3]
307
650
70
1.9
1.1
1.1
[3]
2,148
4,932
43
2.7
18.4
18.4
[3]
920
1,950
107
2.8
7.6
7.6
[3]
223
450
75
1.8
0.7
0.7
[3]
Bundle x 7
1,558
3,407
46
2.6
11.3
4.8
[3]
Length x 3
668
1,350
110
2.7
4.9
4.9
[3]
Single
461
832
52
2.3
2.2
2.2
[3]
Length x 4
1,844
3,327
93
3.5
20.1
20.1
[3]
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
339
540
53
2.3
1.4
1.4
[3]
1,355
2,160
95
3.5
13.1
13.1
[3]
376
624
52
2.3
1.7
1.7
[3]
1,505
2,497
94
3.5
15.2
15.2
[3]
3,479
4,006
22
5.0
49.2
49.2
[3]
13,914
16,026
50
6.1
299
299
[3]
2,218
2,557
25
4.4
25.2
25.2
[3]
Length x 4
8,872
10,227
60
6.0
183
183
[3]
Single
1,101
1,254
29
3.8
9.0
9.0
[3]
Length x 4
4,403
5,016
70
5.6
78.4
78.4
[3]
Drilling Riser
Single
2,503
9,158
51
2.4
25.7
25.7
[3]
Length x 2
5,006
18,316
68
2.4
51.4
51.4
[3]
Completion Riser
Single
1,001
1,782
50
2.6
5.8
5.8
[3]
Length x 2
2,002
3,565
77
3.3
19.1
19.1
[3]
Horizontal
1,620
19,473
60
2.0
37.6
37.6
[3]
Horizontal
6,000
23,282
30
3.6
153
153
[3]
Vertical
6,000
22,623
42
4.4
222
222
[3]
Table 1
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Weight
in Air
(kg)
Total
Mass
(kg) [1]
Distance Impact
Travelled Velocity
(m)
(m/s)
Total
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
Effective
Impact
Energy
(kJ)
Source
(see
report)
Horizontal
2,000
28,261
66
1.9
49.9
49.9
[3]
Horizontal
8,000
33,478
31
3.6
214
214
[3]
Vertical
8,000
31,964
44
4.6
344
344
[3]
Horizontal
3,000
111,402
117
1.9
211
211
[3]
Horizontal
18,000
124,446
39
3.2
635
635
[3]
Vertical
18,000
113,739
11
4.9
1,384
1,384
[3]
Rig Winch
25,000
25,000
20
6.0
450
450
[4]
33,000
33,000
20
7.0
810
810
[4]
24.6
2.1
2.1
[4]
500
500
20
5.0
6.3
6.3
[7]
5,000
55,638
64
1.8
90.6
90.6
[3]
5,000
53,075
48
2.1
113
113
[3]
1,000
1,297
22
4.6
13.8
13.8
[3]
900
2,246
54
2.3
5.7
5.7
[6]
Sledge Hammer
Failure of ancillary structure on rig or vessel
Vertical
W/L BOP
W/L Lubricator Joints
C/T Control Container [10] [12]
Horizontal
5,500
57,046
61
1.9
101
101
[3]
Vertical
5,500
53,941
45
2.3
142
142
[3]
Horizontal
6,954
64,043
56
2.0
132
132
[3]
Vertical
6,954
58,074
40
2.5
185
185
[3]
11,500
113,554
44
2.7
407
407
[3]
5,400
78,825
52
2.0
157
157
[3]
7,900
10,000
24
4.3
90.0
90.0
[5]
50 kg/link
N/A
N/A
N/A
2.0
2.0
[7]
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
5.0
5.0
[7]
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
3,750 kN
3,750 kN
[2]
Large
1,000
1,403
54
4.0
11.0
11.0
[3]
Small
500
702
57
3.6
4.4
4.4
[3]
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.1
3,000
4,000
N/A
3.0
18.0
18.0
[7]
500
702
N/A
6.0
12.6
12.6
[7]
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.1
Control Pod
1,000
3,250
52
2.8
12.0
12.0
[4]
1,000
1,297
22
14
13.8
[3]
900
2,246
54
5.7
[6]
5,000 T
20,000 T
N/A
8.0
64,000
64,000
[7]
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
45.0
45.0
[5]
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
500 kN
500 kN
[2]
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
230 kN
230 kN
[5]
Negligible Negligible
Negligible Negligible
[7]
[7]
Table 1 (continued)
Dropped Objects and Impact Scenarios
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Single
Single
Single
Single
Bundle x 3
Single
Bundle x 4
Single
Bundle x 4
Single
Bundle x 7
Single
Bundle x 7
Length x 3
Single
Bundle x 7
Length x 3
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 2
Single
Length x 2
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Weight
in Air
(kg)
140,600
140,600
25,000
10,051
5,633
2,352
1,207
3,620
900
3,601
840
3,360
522
3,657
307
2,148
920
223
1,558
668
461
1,844
339
1,355
376
1,505
3,479
13,914
2,218
8,872
1,101
4,403
2,503
5,006
1,001
2,002
1,620
6,000
6,000
Impact On
Unprotected 14" dia x
20.0mm wt
Effective
Rupture
Effect
Impact
Energy
Energy (kJ)
(kJ)
9,730
2,194
FB Rupture
9,730
2,194
FB Rupture
1,225
2,194
30mm Hole
133
2,194
Intact
87.6
2,194
Intact
24.4
2,194
Intact
9.0
2,098
Intact
28.9
2,098
Intact
5.7
1,685
Intact
20.3
1,685
Intact
5.0
1,506
Intact
18.0
1,506
Intact
2.4
1,097
Intact
17.3
1,097
Intact
1.1
862
Intact
18.4
862
Intact
7.6
862
Intact
0.7
705
Intact
4.8
705
Intact
4.9
705
Intact
2.2
1,038
Intact
20.1
1,038
Intact
1.4
784
Intact
13.1
784
Intact
1.7
862
Intact
15.2
862
Intact
49.2
1,567
Intact
299
1,567
Intact
25.2
1,254
Intact
183
1,254
Intact
9.0
862
Intact
78.4
862
Intact
25.7
2,194
Intact
51.4
2,194
Intact
5.8
1,254
Intact
19.1
1,254
Intact
37.6
2,194
Intact
153
2,194
Intact
222
2,194
Intact
Impact On
Unprotected 8" dia x
15.2mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
666
FB Rupture
666
FB Rupture
666
FB Rupture
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
540
Intact
540
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
347
Intact
347
Intact
347
Intact
511
Intact
511
Intact
386
Intact
386
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
666
Intact
666
10mm Hole
617
Intact
617
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
617
Intact
617
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
Impact On
Unprotected 5" dia x
15.9mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
372
FB Rupture
372
FB Rupture
372
FB Rupture
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
368
Intact
368
Intact
368
Intact
301
Intact
301
Intact
301
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
334
Intact
334
Intact
368
Intact
368
Intact
372
Intact
372
30mm Hole
372
Intact
372
10mm Hole
368
Intact
368
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
Intact
372
10mm Hole
372
30mm Hole
Impact On
Unprotected 3" dia x
8.7mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
10mm Hole
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
30mm Hole
67
FB Rupture
67
Intact
67
FB Rupture
67
Intact
67
FB Rupture
67
Intact
67
30mm Hole
67
Intact
67
Intact
67
30mm Hole
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
Impact On
Unprotected 2" dia x
6.3mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
10mm Hole
22
FB Rupture
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
Intact
22
Intact
22
Intact
22
Intact
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
10mm Hole
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
Intact
22
30mm Hole
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
Impact On
Unprotected 1" dia x
4.5mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
10mm Hole
5
FB Rupture
5
Intact
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
Intact
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
10mm Hole
5
FB Rupture
5
Intact
5
FB Rupture
5
Intact
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
5
FB Rupture
Worst Case
Release
Scenario
Case 10
Case 10
Case 3
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 1
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
Case 1
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Table 2
Potential for Rupture of Unprotected Subsea Pipework from Dropped Objects and Impact Scenarios
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 40 of 68
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Weight
in Air
(kg)
2,000
8,000
8,000
3,000
18,000
Impact On
Unprotected 14" dia x
20.0mm wt
Effective
Rupture
Effect
Impact
Energy
Energy (kJ)
(kJ)
49.9
2,194
Intact
214
2,194
Intact
344
2,194
Intact
211
2,194
Intact
635
2,194
Intact
Impact On
Unprotected 8" dia x
15.2mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
10mm Hole
666
Intact
666
30mm Hole
18,000
25,000
1,384
450
2,194
2,194
30mm Hole
Intact
666
666
FB Rupture
30mm Hole
33,000
810
2,194
Intact
666
Sledge Hammer
Failure of ancillary structure on rig/vessel
W/L Control & Reel Container
W/L Control & Reel Container
W/L BOP
W/L Lubricator Joints
C/T Control Container
C/T Control Container
C/T PSU Container
C/T PSU Container
C/T Tubing Reel
5
500
5,000
5,000
1,000
900
5,500
5,500
6,954
6,954
11,500
2.0
12.0
90.6
114
13.8
5.7
101
142
132
204
407
31
1,543
2,194
2,194
987
100
2,194
2,194
2,194
2,194
2,194
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
15
666
666
666
486
49
666
666
666
666
666
100mm
Hole
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
30mm Hole
5,400
7,900
50 kg/link
N/A
N/A
1,000
500
N/A
3,000
500
N/A
1,000
1,000
900
5,000 T
N/A
N/A
N/A
157
90.0
2.0
5.0
3,750 kN
11.0
4.4
Negligible
18.0
12.6
Negligible
12.0
13.8
5.7
64,000
45.0
500 kN
230 kN
2,194
1,234
617
617
N/A
2,194
617
N/A
2,194
926
N/A
2,194
2,194
2,194
N/A
1,234
N/A
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
666
608
304
304
N/A
666
304
N/A
666
456
N/A
666
666
666
N/A
608
N/A
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Vertical
Large
Small
Impact On
Unprotected 5" dia x
15.9mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
372
Intact
372
30mm Hole
372
30mm Hole
372
30mm Hole
372
100mm
Hole
372
FB Rupture
372
100mm
Hole
372
FB Rupture
13
372
372
372
372
42
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
263
263
N/A
372
263
N/A
372
372
N/A
372
372
372
N/A
372
N/A
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
10mm Hole
100mm
Hole
10mm Hole
Intact
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
Impact On
Unprotected 3" dia x
8.7mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
67
30mm Hole
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
Impact On
Unprotected 2" dia x
6.3mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
Impact On
Unprotected 1" dia x
4.5mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Worst Case
Energy
Release
(kJ)
Scenario
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 3
67
67
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
22
22
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
5
5
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Case 6
Case 3
67
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Case 3
4
67
67
67
67
12
67
67
67
67
67
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
2
22
22
22
22
6
22
22
22
22
22
Intact
30mm Hole
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
30mm Hole
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
1
5
5
5
5
2
5
5
5
5
5
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 3
67
67
67
67
N/A
67
67
N/A
67
67
N/A
67
67
67
N/A
67
N/A
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
22
22
22
22
N/A
22
22
N/A
22
22
N/A
22
22
22
N/A
22
N/A
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
N/A
10mm Hole
Intact
Intact
30mm Hole
30mm Hole
Intact
30mm Hole
30mm Hole
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
5
5
5
5
N/A
5
5
N/A
5
5
N/A
5
5
5
N/A
5
N/A
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
Case 10
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
Case 2
Case 10
No Release
No Release
No Release
Table 2 (continued)
Potential for Rupture of Unprotected Subsea Pipework from Dropped Objects and Impact Scenarios
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 41 of 68
Single
Single
Single
Single
Bundle x 3
Single
Bundle x 4
Single
Bundle x 4
Single
Bundle x 7
Single
Bundle x 7
Length x 3
Single
Bundle x 7
Length x 3
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 4
Single
Length x 2
Single
Length x 2
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Weight
in Air
(kg)
140,600
140,600
25,000
Effective
Impact
Energy (kJ)
9,730
9,730
1,225
10,051
5,633
2,352
1,207
3,620
900
3,601
840
3,360
522
3,657
307
2,148
920
223
1,558
668
461
1,844
339
1,355
376
1,505
3,479
13,914
2,218
8,872
1,101
4,403
2,503
5,006
1,001
2,002
1,620
6,000
6,000
133
87.6
24.4
9.0
28.9
5.7
20.3
5.0
18.0
2.4
17.3
1.1
18.4
7.6
0.7
4.8
4.9
2.2
20.1
1.4
13.1
1.7
15.2
49.2
299
25.2
183
9.0
78.4
25.7
51.4
5.8
19.1
37.6
153
222
Impact On Protected
14" dia x 20.0mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
2,194
FB Rupture
2,194
FB Rupture
2,194
30mm Hole
2,194
2,194
2,194
2,098
2,098
1,685
1,685
1,506
1,506
1,097
1,097
862
862
862
705
705
705
1,038
1,038
784
784
862
862
1,567
1,567
1,254
1,254
862
862
2,194
2,194
1,254
1,254
2,194
2,194
2,194
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Impact On Protected
8" dia x 15.2mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
666
FB Rupture
666
FB Rupture
666
100mm
Hole
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
540
Intact
540
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
347
Intact
347
Intact
347
Intact
511
Intact
511
Intact
386
Intact
386
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
666
Intact
666
10mm Hole
617
Intact
617
Intact
424
Intact
424
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
617
Intact
617
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
Intact
Impact On Protected
5" dia x 15.9mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
372
FB Rupture
372
FB Rupture
372
FB Rupture
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
368
368
368
301
301
301
372
372
334
334
368
368
372
372
372
372
368
368
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
30mm Hole
Intact
10mm Hole
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
30mm Hole
Impact On Protected
3" dia x 8.7mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
67
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
30mm Hole
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
30mm Hole
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
Impact On Protected
2" dia x 6.3mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
22
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
Impact On Protected
1" dia x 4.5mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Worst Case
Energy
Release
(kJ)
Scenario
5
FB Rupture
Case 10
5
FB Rupture
Case 10
5
FB Rupture
Case 3
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
No Release
Case 2
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
Case 2
Table 3
Potential for Rupture of Protected Subsea Pipework from Dropped Objects and Impact Scenarios
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 42 of 68
Impact On Protected
14" dia x 20.0mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
2,194
Intact
2,194
Intact
2,194
Intact
2,194
Intact
2,194
Intact
Impact On Protected
8" dia x 15.2mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
666
Intact
666
Intact
666
10mm Hole
666
Intact
666
30mm Hole
Weight
in Air
(kg)
2,000
8,000
8,000
3,000
18,000
Effective
Impact
Energy (kJ)
49.9
214
344
211
635
18,000
25,000
1,384
450
2,194
2,194
30mm Hole
Intact
666
666
FB Rupture
30mm Hole
33,000
810
2,194
Intact
666
Sledge Hammer
Failure of ancillary structure on rig/vessel
W/L Control & Reel Container
W/L Control & Reel Container
W/L BOP
W/L Lubricator Joints
C/T Control Container
C/T Control Container
C/T PSU Container
C/T PSU Container
C/T Tubing Reel
5
500
5,000
5,000
1,000
900
5,500
5,500
6,954
6,954
11,500
2.0
12.0
90.6
114
13.8
5.7
101
142
132
204
407
31
1,543
2,194
2,194
987
100
2,194
2,194
2,194
2,194
2,194
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
15
666
666
666
486
49
666
666
666
666
666
100mm
Hole
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
30mm Hole
5,400
7,900
50 kg/link
N/A
N/A
1,000
500
N/A
3,000
500
N/A
1,000
1,000
900
5,000 T
N/A
N/A
N/A
157
90.0
2.0
5.0
3,750 kN
11.0
4.4
Negligible
18.0
12.6
Negligible
12.0
13.8
5.7
64,000
45.0
500 kN
230 kN
2,194
1,234
617
617
N/A
2,194
617
N/A
2,194
926
N/A
2,194
2,194
2,194
N/A
1,234
N/A
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
666
608
304
304
N/A
666
304
N/A
666
456
N/A
666
666
666
N/A
608
N/A
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Vertical
Horizontal
Vertical
Large
Small
Impact On Protected
5" dia x 15.9mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
372
Intact
372
30mm Hole
372
30mm Hole
372
30mm Hole
372
100mm
Hole
372
FB Rupture
372
100mm
Hole
372
FB Rupture
13
372
372
372
372
42
372
372
372
372
372
372
372
263
263
N/A
372
263
N/A
372
372
N/A
372
372
372
N/A
372
N/A
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
10mm Hole
100mm
Hole
10mm Hole
Intact
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
Impact On Protected
3" dia x 8.7mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
67
30mm Hole
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
67
FB Rupture
Impact On Protected
2" dia x 6.3mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Energy
(kJ)
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
Impact On Protected
1" dia x 4.5mm wt
Rupture
Effect
Worst Case
Energy
Release
(kJ)
Scenario
5
FB Rupture No Release
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 2
5
FB Rupture
Case 3
67
67
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
22
22
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
5
5
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Case 6
Case 3
67
FB Rupture
22
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Case 3
4
67
67
67
67
12
67
67
67
67
67
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
2
22
22
22
22
6
22
22
22
22
22
Intact
30mm Hole
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
30mm Hole
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
1
5
5
5
5
2
5
5
5
5
5
Intact
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
No Release
No Release
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
Case 2
Case 3
67
67
67
67
N/A
67
67
N/A
67
67
N/A
67
67
67
N/A
67
N/A
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
22
22
22
22
N/A
22
22
N/A
22
22
N/A
22
22
22
N/A
22
N/A
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
5
5
5
5
N/A
5
5
N/A
5
5
N/A
5
5
5
N/A
5
N/A
N/A
FB Rupture
FB Rupture
Intact
Intact
N/A
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
Intact
FB Rupture
N/A
N/A
N/A
Case 2
Case 2
No Release
No Release
Case 10
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
No Release
Case 10
No Release
No Release
No Release
Table 3 (continued)
Potential for Rupture of Protected Subsea Pipework from Dropped Objects and Impact Scenarios
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 43 of 68
Units
Input
36" Casing
30" Casing
20" Casing
none
m
mm
ft
none
none
m
m
m
m
m
kg
kg/m
m3
m3
m3
kg m2
kg/m3
kg/m3
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
none
none
none
none
none
m2
m2
none
none
m
degrees
m/s
m/s
degree/s
kJ
kJ
kJ
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Single
0.914
38.1
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.838
0.914
10051
824.42
1.279
6.73
8.01
124507
7860
1025
1311
8741
6896
8207
23843
25154
2.503
0.136
2.503
1.000
0.167
11.148
35.024
13.33
1.00
32.59
2.15
0.61
3.20
1.89
4.68
128.79
133.47
Single
0.762
25.4
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.711
0.762
5633
462.00
0.717
4.84
5.56
69772
7860
1025
735
4898
4964
5699
15562
16296
2.893
0.136
2.893
1.000
0.167
9.290
29.186
16.00
1.00
33.25
1.18
0.80
3.18
1.06
5.21
82.40
87.61
Single
0.508
15.9
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.476
0.508
2352
192.91
0.299
2.17
2.47
29134
7860
1025
307
2045
2226
2533
6804
7111
3.023
0.136
3.023
1.000
0.167
6.194
19.458
24.00
1.00
44.09
0.29
0.75
2.51
0.49
2.00
22.40
24.40
13.375"
Casing
Single
0.340
12.2
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.315
0.340
1207
98.98
0.154
0.95
1.11
14948
7860
1025
157
1049
975
1133
3158
3315
2.747
0.136
2.747
1.000
0.167
4.142
13.012
35.89
1.00
51.75
0.52
0.77
2.20
0.39
0.98
8.02
9.00
13.375"
Casing
Bundle x 3
0.340
12.2
40
3
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.315
0.703
3620
296.94
0.461
2.85
4.74
44845
7860
1025
472
3148
2926
4854
10928
11400
3.149
0.136
3.149
1.000
0.167
8.574
26.935
17.34
1.00
41.36
0.72
0.77
2.65
0.65
3.38
40.03
43.41
10.75"
Casing
Single
0.273
11.4
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.250
0.273
900
73.84
0.115
0.60
0.71
11151
7860
1025
117
783
614
732
2129
2246
2.495
0.136
2.495
1.000
0.167
3.329
10.458
44.65
1.00
54.18
0.46
0.76
2.12
0.29
0.65
5.05
5.70
10.75"
Casing
Bundle x 4
0.273
11.4
40
4
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.250
0.773
3601
295.36
0.458
2.40
5.72
44606
7860
1025
470
3131
2457
5861
11450
11919
3.310
0.136
3.310
1.000
0.167
9.421
29.597
15.78
1.00
43.57
0.75
0.67
2.52
0.34
2.68
37.85
40.52
9.625"
Casing
Single
0.244
12.0
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.220
0.244
840
68.89
0.107
0.47
0.57
10405
7860
1025
110
730
477
587
1794
1904
2.266
0.136
2.266
1.000
0.167
2.981
9.364
49.87
1.00
53.31
0.42
0.75
2.17
0.26
0.54
4.48
5.02
9.625"
Casing
Bundle x 4
0.244
12.0
40
4
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.220
0.692
3360
275.58
0.427
1.86
4.58
41618
7860
1025
438
2922
1908
4698
9528
9966
2.966
0.136
2.966
1.000
0.167
8.435
26.500
17.62
1.00
42.88
0.31
0.76
2.58
0.51
2.88
33.17
36.05
7" Liner
7" Liner
Single
0.178
10.4
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.157
0.178
522
42.85
0.066
0.24
0.30
6471
7860
1025
68
454
242
310
1007
1075
2.058
0.136
2.058
1.000
0.167
2.168
6.810
68.57
1.00
59.34
0.17
0.69
2.00
0.07
0.26
2.15
2.41
Bundle x 7
0.178
10.4
40
7
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.157
0.533
3657
299.93
0.465
1.65
2.72
45296
7860
1025
477
3180
1695
2793
7667
8144
2.227
0.136
2.227
1.000
0.167
6.503
20.430
22.86
1.00
36.26
0.54
0.75
3.06
0.50
2.29
38.13
40.42
Table 4
Summary Calculations for Tubular Dropped Object and Impact Analysis
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 44 of 68
Units
Input
5.5" Tubing
5.5" Tubing
5.5" Tubing
4.5" Tubing
4.5" Tubing
4.5" Tubing
none
m
mm
ft
none
none
m
m
m
m
m
kg
kg/m
m3
m3
m3
kg m2
kg/m3
kg/m3
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
none
none
none
none
none
m2
m2
none
none
m
degrees
m/s
m/s
degree/s
kJ
kJ
kJ
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Single
0.140
7.7
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.124
0.140
307
25.16
0.039
0.15
0.19
3800
7860
1025
40
267
152
192
610
650
2.118
0.136
2.118
1.000
0.167
1.703
5.351
87.27
1.00
69.73
0.08
0.67
1.73
0.02
0.15
0.97
1.12
Bundle x 7
0.140
7.7
40
7
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.124
0.419
2148
176.15
0.273
1.03
1.68
26603
7860
1025
280
1868
1061
1724
4652
4932
2.297
0.136
2.297
1.000
0.167
5.110
16.052
29.09
1.00
43.02
0.68
0.67
2.65
0.23
1.11
17.32
18.43
Length x 3
0.140
7.7
40
1
3
36.58
18.288
18.288
0.124
0.140
920
25.16
0.117
0.44
0.56
102610
7860
1025
120
800
455
575
1830
1950
2.118
0.136
2.118
1.000
0.167
5.110
16.052
261.82
1.00
107.29
43.54
1.39
2.43
0.35
1.88
5.76
7.64
Single
0.114
6.9
40
1
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.101
0.114
223
18.26
0.028
0.10
0.13
2757
7860
1025
29
194
99
128
421
450
2.022
0.136
2.022
1.000
0.167
1.394
4.378
106.67
1.00
75.31
0.07
0.67
1.63
0.02
0.10
0.60
0.70
Bundle x 7
0.114
6.9
40
7
1
12.19
6.096
6.096
0.101
0.343
1558
127.80
0.198
0.68
1.13
19301
7860
1025
203
1355
694
1154
3203
3407
2.186
0.136
2.186
1.000
0.167
4.181
13.134
35.56
1.00
46.38
0.67
0.65
2.49
0.39
0.72
10.56
11.28
Length x 3
0.114
6.9
40
1
3
36.58
18.288
18.288
0.101
0.114
668
18.26
0.085
0.29
0.38
74448
7860
1025
87
581
298
385
1263
1350
2.022
0.136
2.022
1.000
0.167
4.181
13.134
320.00
1.00
109.99
45.88
1.35
2.32
0.30
1.23
3.63
4.86
6.625" Drill
Pipe
Single
0.168
12.7
31
1
1
9.45
4.724
4.724
0.143
0.168
461
48.79
0.059
0.15
0.21
3430
7860
1025
60
401
155
215
772
832
1.804
0.136
1.804
1.000
0.167
1.590
4.995
56.15
1.00
51.73
0.47
0.71
2.20
0.19
0.21
2.01
2.22
6.625" Drill
Pipe
Length x 4
0.168
12.7
31
1
4
37.80
18.898
18.898
0.143
0.168
1844
48.79
0.235
0.61
0.84
219505
7860
1025
240
1603
621
862
3086
3327
1.804
0.136
1.804
1.000
0.167
6.360
19.980
224.60
1.00
93.16
43.72
1.60
3.09
0.57
4.26
15.88
20.14
5.5" Drill
Pipe
Single
0.127
12.7
31
1
1
9.45
4.724
4.724
0.102
0.127
339
35.84
0.043
0.08
0.12
2520
7860
1025
44
295
79
123
496
540
1.594
0.136
1.594
1.000
0.167
1.200
3.770
74.40
1.00
52.65
0.45
0.75
2.17
0.28
0.15
1.27
1.42
5.5" Drill
Pipe
Length x 4
0.127
12.7
31
1
4
37.80
18.898
18.898
0.102
0.127
1355
35.84
0.172
0.31
0.48
161269
7860
1025
177
1178
314
491
1983
2160
1.594
0.136
1.594
1.000
0.167
4.800
15.080
297.60
1.00
94.94
47.86
1.59
3.10
0.49
2.73
10.38
13.11
Length x 4
0.140
12.7
31
1
4
37.80
18.898
18.898
0.114
0.140
1505
39.83
0.192
0.39
0.58
179188
7860
1025
196
1309
398
594
2300
2497
1.659
0.136
1.659
1.000
0.167
5.280
16.588
270.55
1.00
94.42
46.51
1.59
3.10
0.52
3.16
12.00
15.15
Table 4 (continued)
Summary Calculations for Tubular Dropped Object and Impact Analysis
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 45 of 68
Units
Input
none
m
mm
ft
none
none
m
m
m
m
m
kg
kg/m
m3
m3
m3
kg m2
kg/m3
kg/m3
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
none
none
none
none
none
m2
m2
none
none
m
degrees
m/s
m/s
degree/s
kJ
kJ
kJ
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
10" Drill
Collar
Single
0.254
92.1
31
1
1
9.45
4.724
4.724
0.070
0.254
3479
368.15
0.443
0.04
0.48
25881
7860
1025
454
3025
37
491
3553
4006
1.152
0.136
1.152
1.000
0.167
2.400
7.540
37.20
1.00
21.89
0.33
0.67
4.91
0.38
0.90
48.29
49.19
10" Drill
Collar
Length x 4
0.254
92.1
31
1
4
37.80
18.898
18.898
0.070
0.254
13914
368.15
1.770
0.14
1.92
1656368
7860
1025
1815
12100
148
1963
14211
16026
1.152
0.136
1.152
1.000
0.167
9.600
30.159
148.80
1.00
50.35
11.65
2.75
5.45
2.27
60.60
238.00
298.60
8" Drill
Collar
Single
0.203
73.0
31
1
1
9.45
4.724
4.724
0.057
0.203
2218
234.73
0.282
0.02
0.31
16501
7860
1025
289
1929
25
314
2268
2557
1.153
0.136
1.153
1.000
0.167
1.920
6.032
46.50
1.00
24.68
0.34
0.67
4.39
0.24
0.57
24.64
25.21
8" Drill
Collar
Length x 4
0.203
73.0
31
1
4
37.80
18.898
18.898
0.057
0.203
8872
234.73
1.129
0.10
1.23
1056088
7860
1025
1157
7715
99
1256
9070
10227
1.153
0.136
1.153
1.000
0.167
7.680
24.127
186.00
1.00
59.50
24.16
2.47
5.45
2.18
31.20
151.89
183.09
6.5" Drill
Collar
Single
0.140
57.2
31
1
1
9.45
4.724
4.724
0.025
0.140
1101
116.49
0.140
0.00
0.14
8189
7860
1025
144
957
5
148
1111
1254
1.139
0.136
1.139
1.000
0.167
1.320
4.147
67.64
1.00
29.38
0.36
0.65
3.73
0.29
0.26
8.72
8.99
6.5" Drill
Collar
Length x 4
0.140
57.2
31
1
4
37.80
18.898
18.898
0.025
0.140
4403
116.49
0.560
0.02
0.58
524124
7860
1025
574
3829
20
594
4442
5016
1.139
0.136
1.139
1.000
0.167
5.280
16.588
270.55
1.00
70.37
38.78
2.25
5.12
1.61
12.70
65.75
78.45
Drilling
Riser
Single
0.533
12.8
50
1
1
15.24
7.620
7.620
0.508
0.533
2503
164.23
0.318
3.09
3.41
48443
7860
1025
326
2177
3164
3491
8831
9158
3.659
0.136
3.659
1.000
0.167
8.129
25.538
28.57
1.00
50.53
0.69
0.71
2.26
0.22
2.31
23.39
25.70
Drilling
Riser
Length x 2
0.533
12.8
50
1
2
30.48
15.240
15.240
0.508
0.533
5006
164.23
0.637
6.17
6.81
387545
7860
1025
653
4353
6328
6981
17663
18316
3.659
0.136
3.659
1.000
0.167
16.258
51.076
57.14
1.00
67.74
0.32
0.71
2.26
0.13
4.62
46.77
51.39
Completion
Riser
Single
0.203
15.8
45
1
1
13.72
6.858
6.858
0.172
0.203
1001
72.99
0.127
0.32
0.44
15694
7860
1025
131
871
325
456
1652
1782
1.780
0.136
1.780
1.000
0.167
2.787
8.756
67.50
1.00
50.08
0.27
0.71
2.45
0.12
0.45
5.35
5.80
Completion
Riser
Length x 2
0.203
15.8
45
1
2
27.43
13.716
13.716
0.172
0.203
2002
72.99
0.255
0.63
0.89
125555
7860
1025
261
1741
651
912
3304
3565
1.780
0.136
1.780
1.000
0.167
5.574
17.512
135.00
1.00
76.54
15.45
1.71
2.79
0.93
5.21
13.87
19.09
Table 4 (continued)
Summary Calculations for Tubular Dropped Object and Impact Analysis
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 46 of 68
Units
Input
none
m
m
kg
kg
kg
none
kg/m3
none
kg/m3
m
m
m
m3
m
none
m3
m3
m3
kg m2
kg/m3
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
none
none
none
none
none
m2
m2
m
degrees
m/s
m/s
deg/s
kJ
kJ
kJ
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
Container
Mini Empty
Horizontal
1.15
1.15
1620
0
1620
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
2.30
1.85
1.59
6.77
1.72
0.75
0.21
0.00
0.21
714
1025
211
1409
6723
11130
10471
19262
19473
18815
1.61
1.51
1.61
2.00
2.00
3.94
2.94
60.19
0.06
0.66
1.85
0.01
4.24
33.32
37.57
Container
Mini Full
Horizontal
1.15
1.15
1620
4380
6000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
2.30
1.85
1.59
6.77
1.72
0.75
0.21
0.56
0.76
2645
1025
782
5218
6152
11130
10471
22500
23282
22623
1.61
1.51
1.61
2.00
2.00
3.94
2.94
29.70
0.08
0.66
3.56
0.01
5.07
147.53
152.61
Container
Mini Full
Vertical
1.69
0.61
1620
4380
6000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
2.30
1.85
1.59
6.77
1.72
0.75
0.21
0.56
0.76
2645
1025
782
5218
6152
11130
10471
22500
23282
22623
1.61
1.51
1.61
2.00
2.00
3.94
2.94
42.00
84.18
1.37
4.21
0.02
21.23
200.49
221.72
Container
10' Empty
Horizontal
1.52
1.52
2000
0
2000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
3.00
1.80
1.80
9.72
1.80
0.60
0.25
0.00
0.25
1500
1025
261
1739
9702
16559
15044
28000
28261
26746
1.66
1.51
1.66
2.00
2.00
5.40
3.24
65.65
0.06
0.66
1.76
0.05
6.16
43.77
49.93
Container
10' Full
Horizontal
1.52
1.52
2000
6000
8000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
3.00
1.80
1.80
9.72
1.80
0.60
0.25
0.76
1.02
6000
1025
1043
6957
8920
16559
15044
32435
33478
31964
1.66
1.51
1.66
2.00
2.00
5.40
3.24
30.98
0.21
0.66
3.51
0.05
7.29
206.23
213.52
Container
10' Full
Vertical
2.28
0.72
2000
6000
8000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
3.00
1.80
1.80
9.72
1.80
0.60
0.25
0.76
1.02
6000
1025
1043
6957
8920
16559
15044
32435
33478
31964
1.66
1.51
1.66
2.00
2.00
5.40
3.24
3.76
82.71
-0.01
4.64
0.01
0.00
344.08
344.09
Container
20' Empty
Horizontal
3.05
3.05
3000
0
3000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
6.10
2.50
2.50
38.13
2.50
0.41
0.38
0.00
0.38
9303
1025
391
2609
38687
69715
59008
111011
111402
100695
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
15.25
6.25
117.03
36.33
0.63
1.84
0.74
22.11
188.58
210.69
Container
20' Full
Horizontal
3.05
3.05
3000
15000
18000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
6.10
2.50
2.50
38.13
2.50
0.41
0.38
1.91
2.29
55815
1025
2347
15653
36731
69715
59008
122099
124446
113739
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
15.25
6.25
39.06
0.67
0.64
3.13
0.27
25.49
609.59
635.08
Container
20' Full
Vertical
5.07
1.03
3000
15000
18000
Steel
7860
Steel
7860
6.10
2.50
2.50
38.13
2.50
0.41
0.38
1.91
2.29
55815
1025
2347
15653
36731
69715
59008
122099
124446
113739
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
15.25
6.25
11.29
86.65
0.19
4.93
0.05
2.05
1382.20
1384.26
Table 5
Summary Calculations for Container Dropped Object and Impact Analysis
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 47 of 68
Units
Input
none
m
m
kg
kg/m3
m
m
m
m3
m
m3
m3
kg m2
kg/m3
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
kg
none
none
none
none
none
m2
m2
m
degrees
m/s
m/s
deg/s
kJ
kJ
kJ
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
N
N
N
W/L BOP
N/A
0.50
0.50
1000
7860
1.00
0.40
0.40
0.16
0.40
0.127
0.03
83
1025
130
870
34
263
248
1166
1297
1281
1.61
1.51
1.61
2.00
2.00
0.400
0.160
21.70
0.03
0.66
4.56
0.00
0.28
13.48
13.77
W/L
Lubricator
Sections
N/A
5.50
5.50
600
7860
11.00
0.13
0.13
0.18
0.13
0.076
0.10
6050
1025
78
522
104
302
275
928
1006
978
1.66
1.51
1.66
2.00
2.00
1.397
0.016
231.60
-2.03
-2.09
1.99
0.34
2.20
1.99
4.19
C/T Control
Container
C/T Control
Container
C/T PSU
Container
C/T PSU
Container
C/T Reel
C/T Injector
Head
Horizontal
1.71
1.71
5500
2000
3.43
2.46
2.36
19.92
2.41
2.750
17.17
5389
1025
2819
2681
17604
33942
30838
54227
57046
53941
1.66
1.51
1.66
2.00
2.00
8.266
5.811
61.19
0.01
0.66
1.76
0.01
12.42
88.35
100.78
Vertical
2.74
0.69
5500
2000
3.43
2.46
2.36
19.92
2.41
2.750
17.17
5389
1025
2819
2681
17604
33942
30838
54227
57046
53941
1.66
1.51
1.66
2.00
2.00
8.266
5.811
45.27
-90.41
0.90
2.11
-3.07
21.85
120.08
141.92
Horizontal
1.83
1.83
6954
2000
3.66
2.46
2.36
21.25
2.41
3.477
17.78
7754
1025
3564
3390
18222
38867
32897
60479
64043
58074
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
8.818
5.811
55.92
0.07
0.66
1.92
0.00
13.95
118.04
131.99
Vertical
2.93
0.73
6954
2000
3.66
2.46
2.36
21.25
2.41
3.477
17.78
7754
1025
3564
3390
18222
38867
32897
60479
64043
58074
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
8.818
5.811
39.73
-86.42
0.84
2.38
-1.47
22.59
181.38
203.98
N/A
2.31
2.31
11500
5000
4.62
3.35
2.36
18.29
1.99
2.300
15.99
20455
1025
2358
9143
16395
33454
28316
58991
61348
56210
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
9.194
3.960
44.25
-0.13
0.68
2.19
-0.03
14.18
147.12
161.30
N/A
3.04
3.04
5364
7860
6.07
2.07
2.07
25.99
2.07
0.682
25.31
16475
1025
700
4664
25939
47523
40224
78126
78825
71526
1.78
1.51
1.78
2.00
2.00
12.561
4.281
51.58
0.07
0.65
1.89
0.00
16.65
140.79
157.44
Table 6
Summary Calculations for Wireline & Coiled Tubing Dropped Object and Impact Analysis
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 48 of 68
Approximate
Weight
28 m
140 Tonnes
Subsea tree and LRP / EDP running and retrieval on workover riser
28 m
120 Tonnes
28 m
90 Tonnes
Subsea tree / shipping skid over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
35 Tonnes
LRP / EDP / EDP lift & test cap / test & shipping skid over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
31 Tonnes
Tree cap / shipping skid over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
5 Tonnes
Tree cap running tool / test or shipping skid over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
11 Tonnes
Surface tree / adaptor joint / riser spiders and miscellaneous tools in surface tree half height shipping basket over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
23 Tonnes
Completion riser sections (7 off) and surface joint in riser joints shipping basket over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
23 Tonnes
THRT / THOAJ / check tool in THOAJ shipping basket over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
13 Tonnes
TH / etc in TH shipping basket over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
6 Tonnes
Riser pup joints in riser pup joints shipping basket over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
6 Tonnes
Completion riser stress joint / tension joint shipped in stress joint / tension joint shipping skid over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
9 Tonnes
4 tools shipping and storage skid complete with tools over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
5 Tonnes
Subsea tree / BOP test stand over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
6 Tonnes
Subsea tree debris cap over the side crane loading and handling
No Precautions Required
2.5 Tonnes
Workover control panel over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
6.5 Tonnes
Workover umbilical reel over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
10.5 Tonnes
Tubing hanger umbilical reel over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
5 Tonnes
Workover control system storage container over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
3.5 Tonnes
No Precautions Required
1.6 Tonnes
No Precautions Required
2.2 Tonnes
Coiled tubing reel over the side crane loading and handling
42 m
11.5 Tonnes
Coiled tubing injector head over the side crane loading and handling
42 m
5.5 Tonnes
Drum of electric line cable over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
20 Tonnes
Table 7
Dropped Objects and Impacts to be Protected Against by Procedural Controls
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 49 of 68
Approximate
Weight
Mud logging unit over the side crane loading and handling
42 m
18 Tonnes
42 m
8 Tonnes
42 m
18 Tonnes
200 m
10 Tonnes
Piggy back anchor over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
10 Tonnes
Single length 6" drill collars over the side crane loading and handling
No Precautions Required
1.1 Tonnes
Bundle of 3 drill pipe over the side crane loading and handling
No Precautions Required
1.5 Tonnes
28 m
25 Tonnes
28 m
33 Tonnes
28 m
11 Tonnes
Pressure control skid over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
8 Tonnes
Completion basket (54 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
10 Tonnes
Steam exchanger (20 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
10.5 Tonnes
Pressure skid (12 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
6 Tonnes
Heat exchanger (24 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
10 Tonnes
Pressurised laboratory (16 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
10 Tonnes
Monitoring cabin (10 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
5 Tonnes
Air compressors (14 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
6 Tonnes
Mega-Flow separator (part 1) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
11.7 Tonnes
Mega-Flow separator (part 2) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
3.6 Tonnes
Mega-Flow separator (part 3) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
4.5 Tonnes
Mega-Flow separator (part 4) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
11.3 Tonnes
Mega-Flow separator (part 5) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
2.6 Tonnes
Gun basket (30 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
7 Tonnes
Tool house (12 ft) over the side crane loading and handling
28 m
5 Tonnes
Table 7
Dropped Objects and Impacts to be Protected Against by Procedural Controls
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 50 of 68
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
Direct Impacts
Toppling Impacts
0.0
0.0
0
10
15
20
25
Figure 1
Probability of Impact for Dropped BOP
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 51 of 68
0.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0
10
15
20
25
Figure 2
Probability of Impact for Dropped Tree
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 52 of 68
60
70
80
Impact Angle from Horizontal (degrees)
60
50
20
10
20
10
1.0E-10
1.0E-09
1.0E-08
1.0E-07
1.0E-06
1.0E-05
1.0E-10
1.0E-09
1.0E-08
1.0E-07
1.0E-06
1.0E-05
1.0E-04
1.0E-03
1.0E-01
1.0E-02
1.0E-04
-10
1.0E+00
1.0E-10
1.0E-09
1.0E-08
1.0E-07
1.0E-06
1.0E-05
1.0E-04
1.0E-03
1.0E-02
1.0E-01
30
0
1.0E+00
40
1.0E-03
10
50
1.0E-02
20
30
60
1.0E-01
30
40
70
1.0E+00
40
Impact Energy (kJ)
50
Figure 3
Behaviour of 9.625 Casing when Dropped at Near Vertical Angles through Still Water
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 53 of 68
Impact Probability versus Distance From Drop Point for Floating Containers
10,000
1,000
100
20' Large Container
10' Small Container
Mini Container
10
1E-02
1E-03
1E-04
1E-05
1E-06
1E-07
Probability of Im pact
Figure 4
Impact Probability versus Distance from Drop Point for Floating Containers
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 54 of 68
1000
100
Rupture of all pipework 2" & less
10
(20' Container)
Approximate w orst
case correlation of
dropped object w eight
versus impact energy
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
Figure 5
Correlation of Dropped Object Weight versus Impact Energy
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 55 of 68
Anchor No 8
337 5
Anchor No 7
292 5
Rig Heading
0 (relative)
Anchor No 1
22 5
Anchor No 2
67 5
Schematic Layout of
Generic Drilling Rig
10m
20m
30m
40m
50m
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Moonpool
Anchor No 6
247 5
Anchor No 3
112 5
Non typical33.33%
crane
loading area
Anchor No 5
202 5
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Anchor No 4
157 5
Page 56 of 68
Figure 6
Schematic Layout of Generic Drilling Rig
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 57 of 68
Anchor No 8
337 5
Anchor No 1
22 5
Rig Heading
0 (relative)
Anchor No 7
292 5
Anchor No 2
67 5
Schematic Layout of
Sedco Sovreign Explorer
Drilling Rig used for
Pre-Drilling Operations
C
10m
20m
30m
40m
50m
15T
33.33%
30T 33.33%
33.33%
30T
33.33%
15T
Moonpool
Anchor No 6
247 5
Anchor No 3
112 5
Anchor No 5
202 5
Anchor No 4
157 5
Figure 7
Schematic Layout of Sedco Sovereign Explorer Drilling Rig used for Pre-Drilling Operations
g:\subsea\secret\reports\017.doc
Page 58 of 68
Anchor No 8
337 5
Rig Heading
0 (relative)
Anchor No 1
22 5
Anchor No 7
292 5
Anchor No 2
67 5
Schematic Layout of
Sedco Drillstar Drilling
Rig used for Initial Well
Completion Operations
10m
20m
30m
40m
50m
15T
33.33%
30T 33.33%
33.33%
30T
33.33%
15T
Moonpool
Anchor No 6
247 5
Anchor No 3
112 5
33.33%
60T
33.33%
18T
Anchor No 5
202 5
Anchor No 4
157 5
Figure 8
Schematic Layout of Sedco Drillstar Drilling Rig used for Initial Well Completion Operations
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INSERT FIGURE 9
Figure 9
Subsea Centre Seabed Layout Showing Dropped Object Boundaries
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20m
30m
40m
50m
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
28m
Moonpool
Non typical33.33%
crane
loading area
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Figure 10
Typical 28m Dropped Object Drop Out Zone from Moonpool on Generic Drilling Rig
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20m
30m
40m
50m
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Moonpool
Non typical33.33%
crane
loading area
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Figure 11
Typical 28m Dropped Object Drop Out Zones from Port and Starboard Cranes on Generic Drilling Rig
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20m
30m
40m
50m
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Typical crane
33.33%
loading area
Moonpool
Non typical33.33%
crane
loading area
Figure 12
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Typical 42m Dropped Object Drop Out Zones from Port and Starboard Cranes on Generic Drilling Rig
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INSERT FIGURE 13
Figure 13
Subsea Centre Seabed Layout Showing Typical Severe Weather Stand Off Positions for Sedco Drillstar
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INSERT FIGURE 14
Figure 14
Subsea Centre Seabed Layout Showing Typical Emergency Stand Off Positions for Sedco Drillstar
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