IMMUNITIES

McCulloch v. Maryland
Brief Fact Summary. The state of Maryland enacted a tax that would force the
United States Bank in Maryland to pay taxes to the state. McCulloch, a cashier for
the Baltimore, Maryland Bank, was sued for not complying with the Maryland state
tax.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Congress may enact laws that are necessary and proper
to carry out their enumerated powers. The United States Constitution (Constitution)
is the supreme law of the land and state laws cannot interfere with federal laws
enacted within the scope of the Constitution.
Facts. Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. Branches were
established in many states, including one in Baltimore, Maryland. In response, the
Maryland legislature adopted an Act imposing a tax on all banks in the state not
chartered by the state legislature. James McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore
branch of the United States Bank, was sued for violating this Act. McCulloch
admitted he was not complying with the Maryland law. McCulloch lost in the
Baltimore County Court and that courts decision was affirmed by the Maryland
Court of Appeals. The case was then taken by writ of error to the United States
Supreme Court (Supreme Court).
Issue. Does Congress have the authority to establish a Bank of the United States
under the Constitution?
Held. Yes. Judgment reversed.
Counsel for the state of Maryland claimed that because the Constitution was
enacted by the independent states, it should be exercised in subordination to the
states. However, the states ratified the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of their
citizens, not by a decision of the state legislature. Therefore, although limited in its
powers, the Constitution is supreme over the laws of the states.
There is no enumerated power within the Constitution allowing for the creation of a
bank. But, Congress is granted the power of making all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers. The
Supreme Court determines through Constitutional construction that necessary is
not a limitation, but rather applies to any means with a legitimate end within the
scope of the Constitution.
Because the Constitution is supreme over state laws, the states cannot apply taxes,
which would in effect destroy federal legislative law. Therefore, Marylands state tax
on the United States Bank is unconstitutional.

Discussion. This Supreme Court decision establishes the Constitution as the

supreme law of the land, taking precedent over any state law incongruent with it.

US vs Ruiz (136 SCRA 487)

Doctrine: implied consent
Date: May 22, 1985
Ponente: Justice Abad-Santos

Facts:
At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base in
Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military Bases
Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
US invited the submission of bids for Repair offender system and Repair typhoon
damages. Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation, submitted bids
and complied with the requests based on the letters received from the US.
In June 1972, a letter was received by the Eligio De Guzman & Co indicating that the
company did not qualify to receive an award for the projects because of its previous
unsatisfactory performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat
landings of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay.
The company sued the United States of America and Messrs. James E. Galloway,
William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all members of the Engineering Command of the
U.S. Navy. The complaint is to order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform
the work on the projects and, in the event that specific performance was no longer
possible, to order the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering
into contracts with third parties for work on the projects.
The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the complaint
and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of defendant United States of

America, a foreign sovereign which has not given her consent to this suit or any
other suit for the causes of action asserted in the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)
Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which included
an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The company
opposed the motion.
The trial court denied the motion and issued the writ. The defendants moved twice
to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

Issue/s:
WON the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity

Held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the respondent
judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs against the private
respondent.

Ratio:
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts
of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of
International Law are not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving.
And because the activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them-between sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and
private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State
immunity now extends only to acts jure imperil (sovereign & governmental acts)
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly
given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not

apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this
case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the
defense of both the United States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the
government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
correct test for the application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a contract
by a State but the legal nature of the act.

FACTS:
The USA had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided
in the military bases agreement between the Philippines and the US. Respondent
alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction of
wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a
suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.

ISSUE:
Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental
functions to be able to invoke state immunity.
HELD:
The traditional role of the state immunity exempts a state from being sued in the
courts of another state without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary
consequence of the principle of independence and equality of states. However, the
rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and evolving and
because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish
them between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and
proprietory acts. The result is that state immunity now extends only to sovereign
and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial
activities of economic affairs. A state may be descended to the level of an individual
and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Only when it
enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates the
exercise of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the
naval base which is devoted to the defense of both US and Philippines, indisputably,

a function of the government of highest order, they are not utilized for, nor
dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
115. Is the US Government also immune from suit in the Philippines in
connection with the exercise of its governmental functions?
Yes. This was the ruling in U.S. VS. RUIZ, 136 SCRA where it was held that even if
there is a contract entered into by the US Government but the same involves its
jusre imperii functions (governmental functions, it cannot be sued. It is only
when the contract involves its jus gestiones or business or proprietary functions
that it may be sued.

116. Are local governments also entitled to invoke immunity from

suit?
Yes.

Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance, G.R. No. L-31635, August 31, 1971
FACTS:
Petitioners as plaintiffs in a complaint filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
dated April 13, 1966, sought the payment of just compensation for a registeredlot,
containing an area of 1045 square meters, alleging that in 1927 the National
Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material
possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road,
Cebu City, without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either
written or verbal. There was an allegation of repeated demands for the payment of
its price or return of its possession, but defendants Public Highway Commissioner
and the Auditor General refused to restore its possession. It was further alleged that
on August 25, 1965, the appraisal committee of the City of Cebu approved
Resolution No. 90, appraising the reasonable and just price of Lot No. 647-B at
P50.00 per square meter or a total price of P52,250.00. Thereafter, the complaint
was amended on June 30, 1966 in the sense that the remedy prayed for was in

the alternative, either the restoration of possession or the payment of the just
compensation.
In
the
answer
filed
by defendants,
now
respondents,
through
the
then Solicitor General, now Associate Justice, Antonio P. Barredo, the principal
defense relied upon was that the suit in reality was one against the government and
therefore should be dismissed, no consent having been shown. Then on July 11,
1969, the parties submitted a stipulation of facts to this effect: "That the plaintiffs
are the registered owners of Lot 647-B of the Banilad estate described in the
Survey plan RS-600 GLRO Record No. 5988 and more particularly described in
Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-5963 containing an area of 1,045 square meters;
That the National Government in 1927 took possession of Lot 647-B Banilad estate,
and used the same for the widening of Gorordo Avenue; That the Appraisal
Committee of Cebu City approved Resolution No. 90, Series of 1965 fixing the price
of Lot No. 647-B at P50.00 per square meter; That Lot No. 647-B is still in the
possession of the National Government the same being utilized as part of the
Gorordo Avenue, Cebu City, and that the National Government has not as yet paid
thevalue of the land which is being utilized for public use."
The lower court dismissed the complaint on January 30, 1969 stating that the case
is undoubtedly against the National Government and there is now showing that the
Government has not consented to be sued in this case. The petitioners appealed by
certiorari to review the decision and contended that they are entitled for just
compensation under the Art III, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the decision of the CFI of Cebu to dismiss the complaint by reason
Government immunity from suit correct?
HELD:
NO. The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot be an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. If there were an observance of procedural
regularity, petitioners would not be in sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then
that precisely there was a failure on what the law requires and the petitioners has
the right to demand from the Government what is due to them. The Supreme Court
decided that the lower courts decision of dismissing the complaint is reversed and
the case remanded to the lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
114. May the government be sued in the exercise of its governmental
functions?
Yes if the government agency has a charter which allows it to be sued. (RAYO VS.
CFI OF BULACAN, 110 SCRA 456). Also, the government is not allowed to invoke its
immunity from suit if by doing so, it will be causing an injustice to its citizens.
(MINISTERIO VS. CFI of Cebu, 40 SCRA and SANTIAGO VS. REPUBLIC, 87 SCRA 294)

Yamashita vs. Styer

G.R. L-129 December 19, 1945
Ponente: Moran, C.J.
Facts:
Tomoyuki Yamashita was an erstwhile commanding general of the 14th army group
of the Japanese Imperial Army in the Philippines. He was charged before an
American Military Commission with the most monstrous crimes ever committed
against the American and Filipino peoples.
Filed before the Court were petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Lt.
Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer, Commanding General of the United States Army Forces,
Western Pacific.
It was alleged that General Yamashita, after his surrender, became a prisoner of war
of the US but was later removed from such status and placed in confinement as an
accused charged for war crimes before an American Military Commission
constituted by respondent Lieutenant General Styer.
Petitioner wanted to be reinstated to his former status as prisoner of war, and that
the Military Commission be prohibited from further trying him.
Issues:
(1) That the Military Commission was not duly constituted, and, therefore, it is
without jurisdiction;
(2) That the Philippines cannot be considered as an occupied territory, and the
Military Commission cannot exercise jurisdiction therein;
(3) That Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given notice of the
implementing trial against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva
Convention of July 27, 1892, and therefore, the Military Commission has no
jurisdiction to try the petitioner;
(4) That there is against the petitioner no charge of an offense against the laws of
war; and
(5) That the rules of procedure and evidence under which the Military Commission
purports to be acting denied the petitioner a fair trial.
Held:

The Court deemed that petition for habeas corpus is untenable.

The relative difference as to the degree of confinement in such cases is a matter of
military measure, disciplinary in character, beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts.
Neither may the petition for prohibition prosper against Lt. Gen. Wilhelm D. Styer.
The military Commission is not made party respondent in this case, and although it
may be acting, as alleged, without jurisdiction, no order may be issued in these case
proceedings requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.
Constitutionality of the Military Commission
The Commission has been validly constituted by Lieutenant General Styer duly
issued by General Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Army
Force Pacific, in accordance in authority vested in him and with radio
communication from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Under paragraph 356 of the Rules of the Land Welfare a Military Commission for the
trial and punishment of the war criminals must be designated by the belligerent.
And the belligerent's representative in the present case is none other than the
Commander in Chief of the United States Army in the Pacific.
The Military Commission thus duly constituted has jurisdiction both over the person
of the petitioner and over the offenses with which he is charged. It has jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by reason of his having fallen into the hands of the
United States Army Forces. Under paragraph 347 of the Rules of the Land Warfare,
"the commanders ordering the commission of such acts, or under whose authority
they are committed by their troops, may be punished by the belligerent into whose
hands they may fall."
As to the jurisdiction of the Military Commission over war crimes, the Supreme Court
of the United States said:
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law
of war as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct
of war, the status rights and duties and of enemy nations as well as of enemy
individuals. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have
jurisdiction to try offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.
Congress, in addition to making rules for the government of our Armed Forces, has
thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations
by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military
commissions to try persons and offenses which, according to the rules and precepts
of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such

tribunals. (Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28; 63 Sup. Ct., 2.)
Philippine jurisdiction to the case
Petitioner is charged before the Military Commission sitting at Manila with having
permitted members of his command "to commit brutal atrocities and other high
crimes against the people of the United States and of its allies and dependencies,
particularly the Philippines," crimes and atrocities which in the bills of particulars,
are described as massacre and extermination of thousand and thousands of
unarmed noncombatant civilians by cruel and brutal means, including bayoneting of
children and raping of young girls, as well as devastation and destruction of public,
or private, and religious property for no other motive than pillage and hatred. These
are offenses against the laws of the war as described in paragraph 347 of the Rules
of Land Warfare.
It is maintained, however, that, according to the Regulations Governing the Trial of
War Criminals in the Pacific. "the Military Commission . . . shall have jurisdiction over
all of Japan and other areas occupied by the armed forces commanded by the
Commander in Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific" (emphasis supplied), and
the Philippines is not an occupied territory. The American Forces have occupied the
Philippines for the purpose of liberating the Filipino people from the shackles of
Japanese tyranny, and the creation of a Military Commission for the trial and
punishment of Japanese war criminals is an incident of such war of liberation.
Third Issue Spain as protecting power of Japan
It is maintained that Spain, the "protecting power" of Japan, has not been given
notice before trial was begun against petitioner, contrary to the provisions of the
Geneva Convention of July 27, 1929. But there is nothing in that Convention
showing that notice is a prerequisite to the jurisdiction of Military Commissions
appointed by victorious belligerent. Upon the other hand, the unconditional
surrender of Japan and her acceptance of the terms of the Potsdam Ultimatum are a
clear waiver of such a notice. It may be stated, furthermore, that Spain has severed
her diplomatic relation of Japan because of atrocities committed by the Japanese
troops against Spaniards in the Philippines. Apparently, therefore, Spain has ceased
to be the protecting power of Japan.
Dismissal of the petition
And, lastly, it is alleged that the rules of procedure and evidence being followed by
the Military Commission in the admission of allegedly immaterial or hearsay
evidence, cannot divest the commission of its jurisdiction and cannot be reviewed in
a petition for the habeas corpus. (25 Am. Jur., 218; Collins vs. McDonald, 258 U. S.
416; 66 Law. ed., 692; 42 Sup. Ct., 326).

For all foregoing, petition is hereby dismissed without costs.

Facts:
1. Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Japanese army in the Philippines
during World War 2. He was charged before the American military commission for
war crimes.
2. He filed a petition for habeas corpus and prohibition against Gen. Styer to
reinstate his status as prisoner of war from being accused as a war
criminal. Petitioner also questioned the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.
Issue: Whether or not the military tribunal has jurisdiction
Held:
YES.
1. The military commission was lawfully created in conformity with an act of
Congress sanctioning the creation of such tribunals.
2. The laws of war imposes upon a commander the duty to take any appropriate
measures within his powers to control the troops under his command to prevent
acts which constitute violation of the laws of war. Hence, petitioner could be
legitimately charged with personal responsibility arising from his failure to take
such measure. In this regard the SC invoked Art. 1 of the Hague Convention No. IV
of 1907, as well as Art. 19 of Hague Convention No. X, Art. 26 of 1929 Geneva
Convention among others.
3. Habeas corpus is untenable since the petitioner merely sought for restoration to
his former status as prisoner of war and not a discharge from confinement. This is a
matter of military measure and not within the jurisdiction of the courts.
4. The petition for prohibition against the respondent will also not life since the
military commission is not made a party respondent in the case. As such, no order
may be issued requiring it to refrain from trying the petitioner.

THE RULE OF LAW

VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 [Habeas Corpus]
Facts:

Mayor Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number
of years in the city of Manila, closed. The city authorities quietly perfected
arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao,
as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the person be actually confined for writ of Habeas Corpus to issue.
RULING:
No, there is no need for actual confinement. Any restraint which precludes freedom
of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of women of ill-repute fromManila to be
brought to Davao, deprived them of their freedom of locomotion just as effectively
as if they were imprisoned.

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs Santiago

58 SCRA 493
1974
The Public Service Commission (PSC) imposed a fine on a radio company for failure
to render service expected of a radio operator.
FACTS
The PSC, acting on complaints by dissatisfied RCPI customers, penalized it with a
fine. RCPI alleged that the Commission was devoid of such competence since
the Public Service Act (C.A. No. 146) expressly exempted radio companies from
the jurisdiction, supervision, and control of such body over their franchises,
equipment, and other properties (Sec. 13[a] thereof) except with respect to the
fixing of rates. (Sec. 14 thereof)
The first paragraph of Sec.21 of the Act reads:
Every public service violating or failing to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or regulations of the

Commission shall be subject to a fine of not exceeding P200 per day for
every day during which such default or violation continues; and the
Commission is hereby authorized and empowered to impose such fine,
after due notice and hearing.
ISSUE
Is there anything in Sec.21 of the Act which empowers the PSC to impose a fine?
HELD
None. The power is neither expressly nor impliedly granted.
In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public Service
Commission lacked the required power to proceed against petitioner.x x x a public
official must locate in the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can
exercise it. It need not be express. It may be implied from the wording of the law.
Absent such requisite, however, no warrant exists for the assumption of authority.
The act performed, if properly challenged, cannot meet the test of validity. It must
be set aside.

PREAMBLE
MITRA versus COMELEC (G.R. No. 191938)
Facts:
When his COC for the position of Governor of Palawan was declared cancelled, Mitra
was the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan. This district
then included, among other territories,
the Municipality of Aborlan and Puerto Princesa City. He was elected Representative
as a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa City, and represented the legislative district for
three (3) terms immediately before the elections of 2010.
On March 26, 2007 (or before the end of Mitras second term as
Representative), Puerto PrincesaCity was reclassified as a "highly urbanized city"
and thus ceased to be a component city of theProvince of Palawan. The direct legal

consequence of this new status was the ineligibility of PuertoPrincesa City residents
from voting for candidates for elective provincial officials.
On March 20, 2009, with the intention of running for the position of Governor, Mitra
applied for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Precinct No. 03720
of Brgy. Sta. Monica, PuertoPrincesa City, to Sitio Maligaya,Brgy.
Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan, Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC
for the position of Governor of Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr. (the
respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC.

Issue:
Whether or not Mitra is qualified to run for Governor of Palawan.
Held:
YES. Mitra is qualified to rum for the position as Governor of Palawan. The Supreme
Court ruled that Mitra did not misrepresent himself and that he met the residency
requirement as mandated by the Constitution.
The election of Abraham Kahlil Mitra as governor of Palawan in the May 10, 2010
elections was upheld in a vote of 11-3. The respondents were not able to present a
convincing case sufficient to overcome Mitras evidence of effective transfer to and
residence in Aborlan and the validity of his representation on this point in his COC.
Likewise, the "COMELEC could not present any legally acceptable basis to conclude
that Mitras statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation."