List of Cases (State Immunity)

1. Republic vs. Villasor, 54 SCRA 83

2. Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693

3. Republic vs. Feliciano, 148 SCRA 424

4. Del Mar vs. PVA, 51 SCRA 340

10

5. PNB vs. CIR, 81 SCRA 314

14

6. Lansang vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.No. 102667, February 23, 2000

17

7. Republic s. Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124

20

8. Meritt vs. Government of Philippine Islands, 34 Phil. 311

27

9. USA vs. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487

32

10. Amigable vs. Cuenca, G.R. No. L-26400, February 29, 1972

40

G.R. No. L-30671 November 28, 1973

1969, .... 10. On the strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution
dated June 26, 1969, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal (respondent herein)
served notices of garnishment dated June 28, 1969 with several Banks,
specially on the "monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form
of deposits sufficient to cover the amount mentioned in the said Writ of
Execution"; the Philippine Veterans Bank received the same notice of
garnishment on June 30, 1969 .... 11. The funds of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine
Veterans Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are
public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of
retirees, pay and allowances of military and civilian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as per
Certification dated July 3, 1969 by the AFP Controller,..." 2. The paragraph

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF RIZAL, THE
SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY, and THE SHERIFF OF THE CITY OF
MANILA, THE CLERK OF COURT, Court of First Instance of Cebu, P. J.
KIENER CO., LTD., GAVINO UNCHUAN, AND INTERNATIONAL
CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Bernardo P.
Pardo for petitioner.

immediately succeeding in such petition then alleged: "12. Respondent Judge,

Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, acted in excess of jurisdiction [or] with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of an alias writ of
execution against the properties of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, hence, the
Alias Writ of Execution and notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null
and void." 3 In the answer filed by respondents, through counsel Andres T. Velarde
and Marcelo B. Fernan, the facts set forth were admitted with the only qualification
being that the total award was in the amount of P2,372,331.40. 4

Andres T. Velarde and Marcelo B. Fernan for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines, as mentioned at the outset, did right in filing
this certiorari and prohibition proceeding. What was done by respondent
Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. .

The Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding

challenges the validity of an order issued by respondent Judge Guillermo P.
Villasor, then of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I, 1 declaring a
decision final and executory and of an alias writ of execution directed against the
funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines subsequently issued in pursuance
thereof, the alleged ground being excess of jurisdiction, or at the very least, grave
abuse of discretion. As thus simply and tersely put, with the facts being undisputed
and the principle of law that calls for application indisputable, the outcome is
predictable. The Republic of the Philippines is entitled to the writs prayed for.
Respondent Judge ought not to have acted thus. The order thus impugned and the
alias writ of execution must be nullified.

It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic

concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune
from suit unless it gives its consent. It is readily understandable why it must
be so. In the classic formulation of Holmes: "A sovereign is exempt from suit,
not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends." 5 Sociological jurisprudence
supplies an answer not dissimilar. So it was indicated in a recent decision, Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 6 with its affirmation that "a
continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as
against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the
availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well known propensity
on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and
energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle
that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined." 7

In the petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines on July 7, 1969, a

summary of facts was set forth thus: "7. On July 3, 1961, a decision was
rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P. J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., GavinoUnchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, and against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration
award in the amount of P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. 8.
On June 24, 1969, respondent Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an
Order declaring the aforestated decision of July 3, 1961 final and executory,
directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City [as well as] Manila to
execute the said decision. 9. Pursuant to the said Order dated June 24,
1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution [was issued] dated June 26,

This fundamental postulate underlying the 1935 Constitution is now made

explicit in the revised charter. It is therein expressly provided: "The State

may not be sued without its consent." 8 A corollary, both dictated by logic and
sound sense from a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a
garnishment proceeding even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted
and the state liability adjudged. Thus in the recent case of Commissioner of Public
Highways v. San Diego, 9 such a well-settled doctrine was restated in the opinion of
Justice Teehankee: "The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be
sued by private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action
'only up to the completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered, since government funds
and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy. Disbursements
of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriation as required by
law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and
specific objects, as appropriated by law." 10 Such a principle applies even to an
attempted garnishment of a salary that had accrued in favor of an employee. Director
of Commerce and Industry v. Concepcion, 11 speaks to that effect. Justice Malcolm as
ponente left no doubt on that score. Thus: "A rule which has never been seriously
questioned, is that money in the hands of public officers, although it may be due
government employees, is not liable to the creditors of these employees in the
process of garnishment. One reason is, that the State, by virtue of its sovereignty, may
not be sued in its own courts except by express authorization by the Legislature, and
to subject its officers to garnishment would be to permit indirectly what is prohibited
directly. Another reason is that moneys sought to be garnished, as long as they
remain in the hands of the disbursing officer of the Government, belong to the latter,
although the defendant in garnishment may be entitled to a specific portion thereof.
And still another reason which covers both of the foregoing is that every consideration
of public policy forbids it." 12

In the light of the above, it is made abundantly clear why the Republic of the
Philippines could rightfully allege a legitimate grievance.
WHEREFORE, the writs of certiorari and prohibition are granted, nullifying
and setting aside both the order of June 24, 1969 declaring executory the
decision of July 3, 1961 as well as the alias writ of execution issued
thereunder. The preliminary injunction issued by this Court on July 12, 1969
is hereby made permanent.

G.R. No. 104269 November 11, 1993

the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and
executory.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, petitioner,

vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., respondents.

On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5 commanding

the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the two
respondents. Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on execution the
motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota
Mini Cruiser, and one (1) unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody
of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner, pending their sale at public
auction or the final settlement of the case, whichever would come first.

Roy Lago Salcedo for private respondents.

A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for

preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the petitioner with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Cagayan de Oro, alleging, inter alia,
that the writ issued was effected without the Labor Arbiter having duly
acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner, and that, therefore, the decision of
the Labor Arbiter was null and void and all actions pursuant thereto should
be deemed equally invalid and of no legal, effect. The petitioner also pointed
out that the attachment or seizure of its property would hamper and
jeopardize petitioner's governmental functions to the prejudice of the public
good.

VITUG, J.:
For consideration are the incidents that flow from the familiar doctrine of
non-suability of the state.
In this petition for certiorari, the Department of Agriculture seeks to nullify the
Resolution, 1 dated 27 November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, denying the petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus that prays to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional
Arbitration Branch X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision 2 of
31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from attaching and executing on
petitioner's property.

On 27 November 1991, the NLRC promulgated its assailed resolution; viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the following orders
are issued:

The Department of Agriculture (herein petitioner) and Sultan Security

Agency entered into a contract 3 on 01 April 1989 for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Save for the increase in the
monthly rate of the guards, the same terms and conditions were also made to apply to
another contract, dated 01 May 1990, between the same parties. Pursuant to their
arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Agency in the various premises of the
petitioner.

1. The enforcement and execution of the judgments

against petitioner in NLRC RABX Cases Nos. 10-1000455-90; 10-10-0481-90 and 10-10-00519-90 are
temporarily suspended for a period of two (2) months,
more or less, but not extending beyond the last quarter of
calendar year 1991 to enable petitioner to source and
raise funds to satisfy the judgment awards against it;

On 13 September 1990, several guards of the Sultan Security Agency filed a

complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay and overtime
pay, as well as for damages, 4 before the Regional Arbitration Branch X of

2. Meantime, petitioner is ordered and directed to source

for funds within the period above-stated and to deposit the
sums of money equivalent to the aggregate amount. it has
been adjudged to pay jointly and severally with respondent
Sultan Security Agency with the Regional Arbitration
Branch X, Cagayan de Oro City within the same period for
proper dispositions;

Cagayan de Oro City, docketed as NLRC Case No. 10-09-00455-90 (or 10-10-0051990, its original docket number), against the Department of Agriculture and Sultan
Security Agency.

The Executive Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on 31 May finding herein

petitioner and jointly and severallyliable with Sultan Security Agency for the
payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of the complainant
security guards. The petitioner and Sultan Security Agency did not appeal

SO ORDERED.

3. In order to ensure compliance with this order, petitioner

is likewise directed to put up and post
sufficient surety and supersedeas bond equivalent to at
least to fifty (50%) percent of the total monetary award
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Supreme Court or by the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental to answer for the satisfaction of the
money claims in case of failure or default on the part of
petitioner to satisfy the money claims;

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner charges the NLRC with grave
abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner
faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the
Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC
has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has
impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with
Sultan Security Agency.

4. The City Sheriff is ordered to immediately release the

properties of petitioner levied on execution within ten (10)
days from notice of the posting of sufficient surety or
supersedeas bond as specified above. In the meanwhile,
petitioner is assessed to pay the costs and/or expenses
incurred by the City Sheriff, if any, in connection with the
execution of the judgments in the above-stated cases
upon presentation of the appropriate claims or vouchers
and receipts by the city Sheriff, subject to the conditions
specified in the NLRC Sheriff, subject to the conditions
specified in the NLRC Manual of Instructions for Sheriffs;

The basic postulate enshrined in the constitution that "(t)he State may not be
sued without its consent," 7 reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign
character of the State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively
insulating it from the jurisdiction of courts. 8 It is based on the very essence of
sovereignty. As has been aptly observed, by Justice Holmes, a sovereign is exempt
from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that
makes the law on which the right depends. 9 True, the doctrine, not too infrequently, is
derisively called "the royal prerogative of dishonesty" because it grants the state the
prerogative to defeat any legitimate claim against it by simply invoking its nonsuability. 10 We have had occasion, to explain in its defense, however, that a continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability cannot be deplored, for the loss of
governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious
functions would be far greater in severity than the inconvenience that may be caused
private parties, if such fundamental principle is to be abandoned and the availability of
judicial remedy is not to be accordingly restricted. 11

5. The right of any of the judgment debtors to claim

reimbursement against each other for any payments made
in connection with the satisfaction of the judgments herein
is hereby recognized pursuant to the ruling in the Eagle
Security case, (supra). In case of dispute between the
judgment debtors, the Executive Labor Arbiter of the
Branch of origin may upon proper petition by any of the
parties conduct arbitration proceedings for the purpose
and thereby render his decision after due notice and
hearings;

The rule, in any case, is not really absolute for it does not say that the state
may not be sued under any circumstances. On the contrary, as correctly
phrased, the doctrine only conveys, "the state may not be sued without its
consent;" its clear import then is that the State may at times be sued. 12 The
States' consent may be given expressly or impliedly. Express consent may be made
through a general law 13 or a special law. 14 In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving
the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government "consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil
action between private parties." 15 Implied consent, on the other hand, is conceded
when the State itself commences litigation, thus opening itself to a counterclaim 16 or
when it enters into a contract. 17 In this situation, the government is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and to have divested itself of its
sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by the NLRC and the private respondents,
is not, however, without qualification. Not all contracts entered into by the government
operate as a waiver of its non-suability; distinction must still be made between one

7. Finally, the petition for injunction is Dismissed for lack of

basis. The writ of preliminary injunction previously issued
is Lifted and Set Aside and in lieu thereof, a Temporary
Stay of Execution is issued for a period of two (2) months
but not extending beyond the last quarter of calendar year
1991, conditioned upon the posting of a surety or
supersedeas bond by petitioner within ten (10) days from
notice pursuant to paragraph 3 of this disposition. The
motion to admit the complaint in intervention isDenied for
lack of merit while the motion to dismiss the petition filed
by Duty Sheriff is Noted

which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign function and another which is done
in its proprietary capacity. 18

But, be that as it may, the claims of private respondents, i.e. for

underpayment of wages, holiday pay, overtime pay and similar other items,
arising from the Contract for Service, clearly constitute money claims. Act
No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be "sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, . .
. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act ("C.A.") No. 327, as amended
by Presidential Decree ("P.D.") No. 1145, the money claim first be brought to
the Commission on Audit. Thus, inCarabao, Inc., vs. Agricultural Productivity
Commission, 20 we ruled:

In the Unites States of America vs. Ruiz, 19 where the questioned transaction
dealt with improvements on the wharves in the naval installation at Subic Bay, we
held:

The traditional rule of immunity exempts a State from

being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence
of the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified;
they are constantly developing and evolving. And because
the activities of states have multiplied, it has been
necessary to distinguish them between sovereign and
governmental acts ( jureimperii) and private, commercial
and proprietary act ( jure gestionisis). The result is that
State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii. The
restrictive application of State immunity is now the rule in
the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
Western Europe.

(C)laimants have to prosecute their money claims against

the Government under Commonwealth Act 327, stating
that Act 3083 stands now merely as the general law
waiving the State's immunity from suit, subject to the
general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that "no
execution shall issue upon any judgment rendered by any
Court against the Government of the (Philippines), and
that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for
filing money claims against the Government must be
strictly observed."
We fail to see any substantial conflict or inconsistency between the
provisions of C.A. No. 327 and the Labor Code with respect to money claims
against the State. The Labor code, in relation to Act No. 3083, provides the
legal basis for the State liability but the prosecution, enforcement or
satisfaction thereof must still be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in C.A. No. 327, as amended by P.D. 1445.

xxxxxxxxx
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial
transactions of the foreign sovereign, its commercial
activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a state
may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can this be deemed to have actually given
its consent to be sued only when it enters into business
contracts. It does not apply where the contracts relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the
projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the
Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for not dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does thereby necessarily
consent to unrestrained execution against it. tersely put, when the State
waives its immunity, all it does, in effect, is to give the other party an
opportunity to prove, if it can, that the State has a liability. 21 In Republic vs.
Villasor 22 this Court, in nullifying the issuance of an alias writ of execution directed
against the funds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy a final and
executory judgment, has explained, thus

The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law,
it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the completion
of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution" and that
the power of the Courts ends when the judgment is
rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to
satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious

In the instant case, the Department of Agriculture has not pretended to have
assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmental entity when it
entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact,
performed any act proprietary in character.

considerations of public policy. Disbursements of public

funds must be covered by the correspondent appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services
rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed
or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law. 23
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolution, dated 27
November 1991, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of
execution directed against the property of the Department of Agriculture is
nullified, and the public respondents are hereby enjoined permanently from
doing, issuing and implementing any and all writs of execution issued
pursuant to the decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter against said
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70853 March 12, 1987

rightful and true owner of the property in question consisting of 1,364.4177

hectares; that his title of ownership based oninformacionposesoria of his
predecessor-in-interest be declared legal valid and subsisting and that
defendant be ordered to cancel and nullify all awards to the settlers.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
PABLO FELICIANO and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents-appellants.

The defendant, represented by the Land Authority, filed an answer, raising

by way of affirmative defenses lack of sufficient cause of action and
prescription.
On August 29, 1970, the trial court, through Judge Rafael S. Sison, rendered
a decision declaring Lot No. 1, with an area of 701.9064 hectares, to be the
private property of the plaintiff, "being covered by a possessory information
title in the name of his predecessor-in-interest" and declaring said lot
excluded from the NARRA settlement reservation. The court declared the
rest of the property claimed by plaintiff, i.e. Lots 2, 3 and 4, reverted to the
public domain.

YAP, J.:
Petitioner seeks the review of the decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court dated April 30, 1985 reversing the order of the Court of First Instance
of Camarines Sur, Branch VI, dated August 21, 1980, which dismissed the
complaint of respondent Pablo Feliciano for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land on the ground of non-suability of the State.

A motion to intervene and to set aside the decision of August 29, 1970 was
filed by eighty-six (86) settlers, together with the barrio council of Pag-asay,
alleging among other things that intervenors had been in possession of the
land in question for more than twenty (20) years under claim of ownership.

The background of the present controversy may be briefly summarized as

follows:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then
Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, for the recovery of ownership
and possession of a parcel of land, consisting of four (4) lots with an
aggregate area of 1,364.4177 hectares, situated in the Barrio of Salvacion,
Municipality of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Plaintiff alleged that he bought the
property in question from Victor Gardiola by virtue of a Contract of Sale
dated May 31, 1952, followed by a Deed of Absolute Sale on October 30,
1954; that Gardiola had acquired the property by purchase from the heirs of
Francisco Abrazado whose title to the said property was evidenced by
an informacionposesoria that upon plaintiff's purchase of the property, he
took actual possession of the same, introduced various improvements
therein and caused it to be surveyed in July 1952, which survey was
approved by the Director of Lands on October 24, 1954; that on November
1, 1954, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 90 reserving
for settlement purposes, under the administration of the National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), a tract of land
situated in the Municipalities of Tinambac and Siruma, Camarines Sur, after
which the NARRA and its successor agency, the Land Authority, started
sub-dividing and distributing the land to the settlers; that the property in
question, while located within the reservation established under
Proclamation No. 90, was the private property of plaintiff and should
therefore be excluded therefrom. Plaintiff prayed that he be declared the

On January 25, 1971, the court a quo reconsidered its decision, reopened
the case and directed the intervenors to file their corresponding pleadings
and present their evidence; all evidence already presented were to remain
but plaintiff, as well as the Republic of the Philippines, could present
additional evidence if they so desire. The plaintiff presented additional
evidence on July 30, 1971, and the case was set for hearing for the
reception of intervenors' evidence on August 30 and August 31, 1971.
On August 30, 1971, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for
intervenors, the latter did not appear but submitted a motion for
postponement and resetting of the hearing on the next day, August 31,
1971. The trial court denied the motion for postponement and allowed
plaintiff to offer his evidence "en ausencia," after which the case would be
deemed submitted for decision. On the following day, August 31, 1971,
Judge Sison rendered a decision reiterating his decision of August 29, 1970.
A motion for reconsideration was immediately filed by the intervenors. But
before this motion was acted upon, plaintiff filed a motion for execution,
dated November 18, 1971. On December 10, 1971, the lower court, this time
through Judge Miguel Navarro, issued an order denying the motion for
execution and setting aside the order denying intervenors' motion for

misinterpreted. 2 There is no such showing in the instant case. Worse, the complaint

postponement. The case was reopened to allow intervenors to present their

evidence. Unable to secure a reconsideration of Judge Navarro's order, the
plaintiff went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on a petition for certiorari.
Said petition was, however, denied by the Intermediate Appellate Court, and
petitioners brought the matter to this Court in G.R. No. 36163, which was
denied on May 3, 1973 Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings.

itself fails to allege the existence of such consent. This is a fatal defect, 3 and on this
basis alone, the complaint should have been dismissed.

The failure of the petitioner to assert the defense of immunity from suit when
the case was tried before the court a quo, as alleged by private respondent,
is not fatal. It is now settled that such defense "may be invoked by the
courts suasponte at any stage of the proceedings." 4

On August 31, 1970, intervenors filed a motion to dismiss, principally on the

ground that the Republic of the Philippines cannot be sued without its
consent and hence the action cannot prosper. The motion was opposed by
the plaintiff.

Private respondent contends that the consent of petitioner may be read from
the Proclamation itself, when it established the reservation " subject to
private rights, if any there be. " We do not agree. No such consent can be
drawn from the language of the Proclamation. The exclusion of existing
private rights from the reservation established by Proclamation No. 90 can
not be construed as a waiver of the immunity of the State from suit. Waiver
of immunity, being a derogation of sovereignty, will not be inferred lightly. but
must be construed instrictissimijuris. 5 Moreover, the Proclamation is not a

On August 21, 1980, the trial court, through Judge Esteban Lising, issued
the questioned order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent
moved for reconsideration, while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines filed its opposition thereto, maintaining that the
dismissal was proper on the ground of non-suability of the State and also on
the ground that the existence and/or authenticity of the purported
possessory information title of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest had
not been demonstrated and that at any rate, the same is not evidence of
title, or if it is, its efficacy has been lost by prescription and laches.

legislative act. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from statutory
authority. Waiver of State immunity can only be made by an act of the legislative body.

Neither is there merit in respondent's submission, which the respondent

appellate court sustained, on the basis of our decision in
the Begosa case, 6 that the present action is not a suit against the State within the
rule of State immunity from suit, because plaintiff does not seek to divest the
Government of any of its lands or its funds. It is contended that the complaint involves
land not owned by the State, but private land belonging to the plaintiff, hence the
Government is not being divested of any of its properties. There is some sophistry
involved in this argument, since the character of the land sought to be recovered still
remains to be established, and the plaintiff's action is directed against the State
precisely to compel the latter to litigate the ownership and possession of the property.
In other words, the plaintiff is out to establish that he is the owner of the land in
question based, incidentally, on an informacionposesoria of dubious value, and he
seeks to establish his claim of ownership by suing the Republic of the Philippines in an
action in personam.

Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, plaintiff again went to the
Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for certiorari. On April 30, 1985, the
respondent appellate court rendered its decision reversing the order of
Judge Lising and remanding the case to the court a quo for further
proceedings. Hence this petition.
We find the petition meritorious. The doctrine of non-suability of the State
has proper application in this case. The plaintiff has impleaded the Republic
of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of ownership and
possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any
private person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for
the recovery of property is not an action in rem, but an action in personam.1 It
is an action directed against a specific party or parties, and any judgment therein binds only such party or
parties. The complaint filed by plaintiff, the private respondent herein, is directed against the Republic of
the Philippines, represented by the Land Authority, a governmental agency created by Republic Act No.
3844.

The inscription in the property registry of an informacionposesoria under the

Spanish Mortgage Law was a means provided by the law then in force in the
Philippines prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United
States of America, to record a claimant's actual possession of a piece of
land, established through an ex parteproceeding conducted in accordance
with prescribed rules. 7 Such inscription merely furnishes, at best, prima

By its caption and its allegation and prayer, the complaint is clearly a suit
against the State, which under settled jurisprudence is not permitted, except
upon a showing that the State has consented to be sued, either expressly or
by implication through the use of statutory language too plain to be

facieevidence of the fact that at the time the proceeding was held, the claimant was in
possession of the land under a claim of right as set forth in his application. 8 The
possessory information could ripen into a record of ownership after the lapse of 20
years (later reduced to 10 years), upon the fulfillment of the requisites prescribed in
Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

There is no showing in the case at bar that the informacionposesoria held by

the respondent had been converted into a record of ownership. Such
possessory information, therefore, remained at best mere prima
facie evidence of possession. Using this possessory information, the
respondent could have applied for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
under the Public Land Act, which is an action in rem. However, having failed
to do so, it is rather late for him to pursue this avenue at this time.
Respondent must also contend, as the records disclose, with the fact
admitted by him and stated in the decision of the Court a quo that settlers
have been occupying and cultivating the land in question since even before
the outbreak of the war, which puts in grave doubt his own claim of
possession.
Worthy of note is the fact, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that
the informacionposesoria registered in the Office of the Register of Deed of
Camarines Sur on September 23, 1952 was a "reconstituted" possessory
information; it was "reconstituted from the duplicate presented to this office
(Register of Deeds) by Dr. Pablo Feliciano," without the submission of proof
that the alleged duplicate was authentic or that the original thereof was lost.
Reconstitution can be validly made only in case of loss of the original. 10 These
circumstances raise grave doubts as to the authenticity and validity of the "informacionposesoria" relied
upon by respondent Feliciano. Adding to the dubiousness of said document is the fact that "possessory
information calls for an area of only 100 hectares," 11 whereas the land claimed by respondent Feliciano
comprises 1,364.4177 hectares, later reduced to 701-9064 hectares. Courts should be wary in accepting
"possessory information documents, as well as other purportedly old Spanish titles, as proof of alleged
ownership of lands.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered reversing and setting aside the

appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated April 30, 1985,
and affirming the order of the court a quo, dated August 21, 1980, dismissing
the complaint filed by respondent Pablo Feliciano against the Republic of the
Philippines. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioner and appellee,

vs.
THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION, respondent and
appellant.

The PVA reiterated its contention that del Mar's receipt of a similar pension
from the United States Government effectively barred him from claiming and
receiving from the Philippine Government the monthly life pension granted
him as well as the monthly allowances he claimed for his five living
unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age. The PVA also
asserted that it is discretionary on its part to grant or discontinue the pension
sought by del Mar. In addition, it alleged that the action of del Mar was
premature because of his failure to exhaust administrative remedies before
invoking judicial intervention, and that the court a quo was without
jurisdiction to try the case as del Mar demand partakes of a money claim
against the PVA a mere agency of the Philippine Government and, in
effect, of a suit against the Government which is not suitable without its
consent. The PVA thus prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

Quirico del Mar in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, First Assistant Solicitor
General Esmeraldo Umali and Solicitor Eulogio Raquel Santos for
respondent appellant.

After due trial, the court a quo rendered judgment upholding del Mar claims.
In its decision dated February 27, 1965, the court (1) ordered the PVA to pay
to del Mar his monthly life pension corresponding to the period from April
1950 to May 1957 at the rate of P50 a month, adding up to P4,334.86, and
his monthly life pension corresponding to the period from June 22, 1957 to
February 1965 at the amount of P100 a month totalling P9,200, and
thereafter to continue to pay his monthly life pension at the rate of P100. a
month; (2) directed del Mar to file with the PVA the corresponding written
application for the payment to him of the monthly living allowance of P10 for
each of his five living unmarried minor children from June 22, 1957; and
ordered the PVA to give due course to the written application as soon as del
Mar shall have filed the same with it, and once approved, to make the
necessary payment of the accumulated unpaid living allowances due to each
of the said children from June 22, 1957 as well as the current ones until
each one of them ceases to be entitled to the same; and (3 directed the PVA
in the event of unavailability of funds to pay the claims aforementioned, to
set aside funds from such as intended to pay the veterans' living pensions,
or to cause the same to be appropriated in its budget in order to comply with
the judgment. For lack of basis, the court a quo omitted to pass judgment on
del Mar's claim for moral and exemplary damages.

CASTRO, J.:
On June 20, 1964, Quirico del Mar (hereinafter referred to del Mar) filed with
the Court of First Instance of Cebu petition for mandamus (civil case R8465) against the Philippine Veterans Administration (hereinafter referred to
the PVA to compel the latter to continue paying him monthly life pension of
P50 from the date of its cancellation in March 1950 to June 20, 1957, and
thereafter, or from June 22 1957 his monthly life pension, as increased by
Republic Act 1920, 1 of P100 and to pay to him as well the monthly living allowance
of P10 for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of
age, 2 pursuant to the said Republic Act 1920 which took effect on June 22, 1957. Del
Mar also asked for compensatory, moral and exemplary damages.

In his petition below, del Mar averred that he served during World War II as
chief judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command (a duly recognized
guerrilla organization) with the rank of major; that he subsequently obtained
an honorable discharge from the service on October 20, 1946 on a
certificate of permanent total physical disability; that upon proper claim
presented and after hearing and adjudication, the Philippine Veterans Board
(the PVA's predecessor granted him a monthly life pension of P50 effective
January 28, 1947; that in March 1950, the said Board discontinued payment
of his monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of a similar pension
from the United States Government, through the United States Veterans
Administration, by reason of military service rendered in the United States
Army in the Far East during World War II, precluded him from receiving any
further monthly life pension from the Philippine Government; that he wrote
the said Board twice demanding that it continue paying his monthly life
pension, impugning the cancellation thereof as illegal; and that his demands
went unheeded.

Hence, the present appeal by the PVA.

The PVA alleges that the court a quo erred (1) in not holding itself without
jurisdiction to try civil case R-8465; (2) in no finding as premature the petition
for mandamus filed by del Mar due to the failure of the latter to exhaust
available administrative remedies before seeking judicial intervention; (3) in
declaring null and void section 6 of PVA Regulation No. 2 relied upon by it in
discontinuing the monthly life pension of del Mar since March 1950; (4) in
not finding it discretionary on the part of the PVA to grant or discontinue the

10

said suspension; (5) in ordering it to pay to del Mar the amounts stated in the
judgment; and (6) in ordering it to give due course to and approve the
application which the said court directed del Mar to file for the payment to
the latter of the monthly living allowance for each of his living unmarried
minor children below eighteen years of age.

exemption from the filing of the appeal bond per section

16 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, not to the nature of
the claim sought to be enforced by the private respondent
therein (del Mar) against the said PVA. Thus, in the said
case, this Court made a lengthy disquisition on the history,
development and organization of the PVA to show
conclusively that the same is an entity or agency of the
Republic of the Philippines performing governmental
functions. True, this Court referred to the claim of the
private respondent therein as "a claim for a sum of money
against the Government, which claim, if adjudged finally to
be meritorious, would render the Republic of the
Philippines liable therefor," since the funds from which the
claim was to be satisfied were funds appropriated by
Congress for the PVA; but this Court properly and
advisedly omitted any study and consideration of the
question of suitability or non-suitability of the Government
in connection therewith.

This appeal raises several questions which will be discussed in seriatim.

1. The PVA argues that the court a quo was without jurisdiction to try civil
case R-8465 because it involves a money claim against the said PVA a
mere agency of the Government performing governmental functions with no
juridical personality of its own and, in reality, partakes of an action against
the Philippine Government which is immune from suit without its consent,
citing this Court's observation in Republic of the Philippine vs. Ramolete and
Del Mar, 3 to wit:
....a charge against the Government where the money
involved is part of the public funds, is a suit against the
Government, and the happenstance that the action is
directed against the PVA as an entity and not against the
Republic of the Philippines is of no moment. Perforce, the
Republic of the Philippines, on matters of administration of
all benefits due to the veterans of revolutions and wars,
and to their heirs and beneficiaries, acts and has to act
through its agency and instrumentality, the PVA. The suit
should therefore be regarded as one against the Republic
of the Philippines; the PVA is therefore exempt from the
filing of an appeal bond.

As a general proposition, the rule well-settled in this jurisdiction on the

immunity of the Government from suit without its consent holds true in all
actions resulting in "adverse consequences on the public treasury, whether
in the disbursements of funds or loss of property." 4 Needless to state, in such
actions, which, in effect, constitute suits against the Government, the court has no
option but to dismiss them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no
application where a claimant institutes an action against a functionary who fails to
comply with his statutory duty to release the amount claimed from the public funds
already appropriated by statute for the benefit of the said claimant. 5 As clearly
discernible from the circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.

2. The second question posed by the PVA relates to del Mar alleged failure
to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to court action. Suffice it
to state that where a case as in the present controversy involves a
question solely of a legal nature, there arises no need for the litigant to resort
to all administrative remedies available to him before seeking judicial relief. 6

The PVA labors under a muddled and mistaken appreciation of the

aforecited observation. This Court stated in precise language the sole issue
for resolution in that case, thus:
Is the PVA exempt from the filing of an appeal bond? To
resolve this issue, we must initially determine whether the
PVA is an agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, and, in the affirmative, whether it exercises
governmental functions.

3. The validity of section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of the "Rules and Regulations

on Veterans' Benefits" adopted by the PVA constitutes the core of the
present controversy. The said section 6 reads as follows:
SEC. 6. Effect of receipt of USVA pension benefit
termination, reduction. An award of a similar disability
compensation from the US Veterans Administration shall
be a ground for the cancellation of a disability pension

Indeed, the decisive point in the aforementioned case

related to the status of the PVA as an agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines
exercising governmental functions as to be entitled to

11

amended, and argues that under section 20 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended,

granted under the Regulation: Provided, however, That if

and while the disability compensation awarded by the US
Veterans Administration is less than the pension granted
hereunder, the difference in amount shall be assumed and
paid by the PVA: Provided, further, That upon proper
application, the disability award previously cancelled may
be restored upon the termination of the US Veterans
Administration award if the cause of such termination is
due to negative military service report of the pensioner
certified by the US Department of the Army and not for
any other valid cause: Provided, finally, That the veteran is
medically determined to be still suffering from the disability
for which he was previously awarded a pension. Payment
of pension thus restored shall take effect or shall
commence only from the date of approval of restoration
and when funds become available.

the power suspend the payment of the monthly life pension awarded to disabled
veteran belongs exclusively to the President of the Philippines, not to the PVA which,
in the case at bar, illegally arrogated unto itself the said power. Furthermore, del Mar
states, the PVA "deliberately misinterprets" the phrase from other Government funds"
in extending its scope to include United States Government funds.

The principle recognizing the necessity of vesting administrative authorities

with the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given
statute and to effectual its policies, provided such rules and regulations
conform to the terms and standards prescribed by the statute as well purport
to carry into effect its general policies, constitutes well established doctrine
in this jurisdiction. 10 In Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration, suprea, this Court fittingly stated: .

... the Constitution limits the authority of the President, in

whom all executive power resides, to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative
executive office or agency then can, contrary to the
express language of the Constitution, assert for itself a
more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to
observe the constitutional mandate. There must be strict
compliance with the legislative enactment. Its terms must
be followed. The statute requires adherence to, not
departure from, its provisions. No deviation is allowable.

Pursuant to the foregoing, the PVA cancelled and discontinued the monthly
life pension of del Mar reasoning that the latter's receipt of a similar pension
from the United States Government precluded his enjoying any like benefit
from the Philippine Government. The PVA avers that it adopted the
aforequoted section 6 in order to carry out and implement section 9 of
Republic Act 65, as amended, 7 particularly its excepting clause. Said section 9
reads:

SEC. 9. The persons mentioned in sections one and two

hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work
owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained in line of
duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a
month, and ten pesos a month for each of his unmarried
minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they
are actually receiving a similar pension from other
Government funds, and shall receive, in addition, the
necessary hospitalization and medical care. 8

Section 11 of Republic Act 2665 11 empowers the PVA to adopt rules and
regulations, thus:

SEC. 11. Policies, rules and regulations. Subject to

existing laws, the Administration shall have the power to
promulgate and issue rules and regulations as may be
found necessary to govern its operations and to carry out
that aims and purposes of this Act and of all other laws to
be administered by the Administration.

The PVA reads the phrase "from other Government funds" in the excepting
clause of the aforecited provision as necessarily including funds of the
United States Government. And without question, the pension del Mar
receives from the United States Veterans Administration comes from the
funds of the United States Government.

Pursuant to this rule making authority, the PVA

allegedly' to implement section 9 of Republic Act 65, as
amended promulgated its "Rules and Regulations on
Veterans' Benefits," section 6 of Regulation No. 2 of which
cancels the disability pension granted if the beneficiary
receives a similar compensation from the United States
Veterans Administration. In effect, the PVA by adopting
section 6 of Regulation No. 2, suspended the operation of

On the other hand, del Mar avers that section 6 of Regulation No. 2 illegally
effects the suspension of the operation of section 9 of Republic Act 65, as

12

section 9' of Republic Act 65, as amended. This, Republic

Act 65, as amended, forbids the PVA to do for it expressly
authorizes only the President of the Philippines to suspend
the operation of any of its provisions "if and when the
Congress of the United States approves the pending GI
Bill of Rights applicable to the Philippines the provisions of
which are identical or similar to the provisions of this Act."
Clearly then, section 6 of Regulation No. 2 not only
negates the very spirit behind section 9 of Republic Act
65, as amended, but also contravenes the express
mandate of section 20 thereof.

weight but also respect and finality. "There is limit, however, to such a
deference paid to the actuations or such bodies, Clearly, where there has
been a failure to interpret and apply the statutory provisions in question,
judicial power should assert itself. Under the theory of separation of power it
is to the judiciary, and to the judiciary alone, that the final say on questions
of law in appropriate cases coming before it is vested." 12
All told, no roadblock stands in the way of del Mar's demand for the
continuance of his monthly life pension.
In view, however, of the further amendment by Congress of section 9 of
Republic Act 65, as amended, through Republic Act 5753 the provisions
of which took effect on June 21, 1969 there arises the need to modify the
judgment a quo in order to make it conform to the said statute as it now
stands. Republic Act 5753, in further amending section 9 of Republic Act 65,
as amended, grants every totally disabled veteran of World War II "a life
pension of two hundred pesos a month, and thirty pesos a month for his wife
and each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age."

The PVA's pretense that del Mar case falls under the clause of section 9 of
Republic Act 65, as amended, which excepts those who "are actually
receiving a similar pension from other Government funds" from the coverage
of said section 9 predicated upon its interpretation that the phrase other
Government funds" includes funds of the United States Government fails
to persuade this Court as a valid argument to justify its cancellation of del
Mar monthly life pens Section 9 of Republic Act 65, as amended, in
providing for the excepting clause, obviously intends to prevent the receipt
the same beneficiary of concurrent or multiple pensions benefits similar to
each other in nature and basis, although coursed through different
departments or agencies, but paid out of the funds of the same Government.
Any contrary interpretation resulting in the derogation of the interests of the
beneficiary who likewise receives a similar pension paid out funds of other
Governments, conflicts with the establish axiom ordaining the construction of
pension laws of war veterans in favor of those seeking their benefits.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court adjudges the appelleeQuirico del Mar entitled to

his life pension (1) at the rate of P50 a month effective as of April 1950 to
May 1957, per Republic Act 65; (2) at the rate of P100 a month effective as
of June 22, 1957 to May 1969, per Republic Act 65 as amended by Republic
Act 1920; and (3) at the rate of P200 a month effective as of June 21, 1969,
per Republic Act 65 as further amended by Republic Act 5753. This Court
directs the appellant Philippine Veterans Administration to compute and then
to pay to the appelleedel Mar his past and accumulated monthly life pension
at the aforementioned statutory rates.

The record of the case at bar being completely bereft of any indication to
show the suspension by the President of the Philippines pursuant to
section 20 of Republic Act 65, amended of the operation of any of the
provisions of the said statute, this Court perforce must uphold del Mar
claims.

Regarding the monthly living allowance the appellee del Mar asks for each
of his five "living unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age," it
appearing that he has not filed any proper application therefor with the
appellant PVA but simply included them in his claim for the restoration of his
discontinued monthly life pension, the appellee del Mar may, if he so
desires, comply with section 15 of Republic Act 65, as amended, which
requires that "[A]ny person who desires to take advantage of the rights and
privileges provided for in this Act should file his application" with the
Philippine Veterans Administration, and the latter is hereby ordered to
consider and pass upon the merits of such application, if filed, particular
reference to the entitlement qualifications of intended beneficiaries. No
pronouncement as to costs.

4. The rest of the assigned errors relate to the allege undue interference by
the court a quo with the purely discretionary functions of the PVA in the
matter of granting discontinuing the pension benefits.
The law concedes to administrative bodies like the PVA the authority
to act on and decide claims and applications in accordance with their
judgment, in the exercise of their adjudicatory capacity. Because of their
acquired expertise in specific matters within the purview of their respective
jurisdictions, the findings of these administrative bodies merit not only great

13

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, GABRIEL V. MANANSALA and
GILBERT P. LORENZO, in his official capacity as authorized Deputy
sheriff, respondents.

The order of August 26, 1970 of respondent Court denying the motion to
quash, subject of this certiorari proceeding, reads as follows: "The Philippine
National Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon its
branch in Quezon City by the authorized deputy sheriff of this Court. It
contends that the service of the notice by the authorized deputy sheriff of the
court contravenes Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended
which reads:" 'All writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served
and executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person
authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs and processes of
Courts of First Instance.' Following the law, the Bank argues that it is the
Sheriff of Quezon City, and not the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio
Sheriff, that has the authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the
actual service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in order. The
Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act No. 4201 has, since June
19, 1965, already repealed Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law,
it is now the Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio Sheriff.
As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has therefore the authority
to issue writs of execution and notices of garnishment in an area
encompassing the whole of the country, including Quezon City, since his
area of authority is coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national
in nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that the appeal to
the Supreme Court by individual employees of PHHC which questions the
award of attorney's fees to Atty. Gabriel V.

Conrado E. Medina for petitioner.

Gabriel V. Manansala in his own behalf.
Jose K. Manguiat, Jr. for respondent Court.

FERNANDO, J.:
The issue raised in this certiorari proceeding is whether or not an order of
the now defunct respondent Court of Industrial Relations denying for lack of
merit petitioner's motion to quash a notice of garnishment can be stigmatized
as a grave abuse of discretion. What was sought to be garnished was the
money of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited at
petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to satisfy a decision of respondent Court
which had become final and executory. 1 A writ of execution in favor of private

Manansala, has already been dismissed and that the same became final
and executory on August 9, 1970. There is no longer any reason, therefore,
for withholding action in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by
the Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said Bank is
therefore ordered to comply within five days from receipt with the 'notice of
Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970." 5 There was a motion for reconsideration filed

respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued. 2 He was the counsel
of the prevailing party, the United Homesite Employees and Laborers Association, in
the aforementioned case. The validity of the order assailed is challenged on two
grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized
deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds
subject of the garnishment "may be public in character." 3 In thus denying the motion
to quash, petitioner contended that there was on the part of respondent Court a failure
to abide by authoritative doctrines amounting to a grave abuse of discretion. After a
careful consideration of the matter, it is the conclusion of this Tribunal that while the
authorization of respondent Lorenzo to act as special deputy sheriff to serve the notice
of garnishment may be open to objection, the more basic ground that could have been
relied upon not even categorically raised, petitioner limiting itself to the assertion
that the funds "could be public" in character, thus giving rise to the applicability of the
fundamental concept of non-suability is hardly persuasive. The People's Homesite
and Housing Corporation had a juridical existence enabling it sue and be
sued. 4 Whatever defect could be attributed therefore to the order denying the motion
to quash could not be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, with the
lapse of time during which private respondent had been unable to execute a judgment
in his favor, the equities are on his side. Accordingly, this petition must be dismissed.

by petitioner, but in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied. Hence, this
certiorari petition.

As noted at the outset, the petition lacks merit.

1. The plea for setting aside the notice of garnishment was promised on the
funds of the People's homesite and Housing Corporation deposited with
petitioner being "public in character." There was not even a categorical
assertion to that effect. It is only the possibility of its being "public in
character." The tone was thus irresolute,the approach difficult The premise
that the funds could be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in
the sense that the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation was a
government-owned entity It does not follow though that they were exempt
from garnishment. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court of

14

Industrial Relations 6 is squarely in point. As was explicitly stated in the opinion of

not applicable. If properly understood they can easily be distinguished. As is clear in

the opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic v. Palacio, the Irrigation Service Unit
which was sued was an office and agency under the Department of Public Works and
Communications. The Republic of the Philippines, through the then Solicitor General,
moved for the dismissal of such complaint, alleging that it "has no juridical personality
to sue and be sued." 14 Such a motion to dismiss was denied. The case was tried and
plaintiff Ildefonso Ortiz, included as private respondent in the Supreme Court
proceeding, obtained a favorable money judgment. It became final and executory.
Thereafter, it appeared that the Solicitor General was served with a copy of the writ of
execution issued by the lower court followed by an order of garnishment 15 Again,
there was an urgent motion to lift such order, but it was denied. A certiorariand
prohibition proceeding was then filed with the Court of Appeals. The legality of the
issuance of such execution and punishment was upheld, and the matter was elevated
to this Tribunal The Republic was sustained. The infirmity of the decision reached by
the Court of Appeals, according to the opinion, could be traced to the belief that there
was a waiver of "governmental immunity and, by implication, consent to the
suit." 16 There was no such waiver. Even if there were, it was stressed by justice J.B.L.
Reyes: "It is apparent that this decision of the Court of Appeals suffers from the
erroneous assumption that because the State has waived its immunity, its property
and funds become liable to seizure under the legal process. This emphatically is not
the law. (Merritt v. Insular Government, 34 Phil 311)." 17 To levy the execution of such
funds, according to him, would thus "amount to a disbursement without any proper
appropriation as required by law " 18 InCommissioner of Public Highways v. San
Diego, the opening paragraph of Justice Teehankee was quite specific as to why there
could be neither execution nor garnishment of the money of petitioner Bureau of
Public Highways: "In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, the Court
declares null and void the two questioned orders of respondent Court levying upon
funds of petitioner Bureau of Public Highways on deposit with the Philippine National
Bank, by virtue of the fundamental precept that government funds are not subject to
execution or garnishment." 19 The funds appertained to a governmental office, not to a
government-owned or controlled corporation with a separate juridical personality. In
neither case therefore was there an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued, the
funds of which could thereafter be held liable to execution and garnishment in the
event of an adverse judgment.

the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the
funds of the NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same
may not be garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government
owned and controlled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been
established 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...'
Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court processes just like
any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as amended." 7 The similarities
between the aforesaid case and the present litigation are patent. Petitioner was
similarly a government-owned corporation. The principal respondent was the Court of
Industrial Relations. The prevailing parties were the employees of petitioner. There
was likewise a writ of execution and thereafter notices of garnishment served on
several banks. There was an objection to such a move and the ruling was adverse to
the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation. Hence the filing of a petition
for certiorari. To repeat, the ruling was quite categorical Garnishment was the
appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed against the funds of a
corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government. In a 1941
decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company, 8 this Court,
through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well settled that when the
government enters into commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and
is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United States v. Planters'
Bank, 9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a particular business thru the
instrumentality of a corporation, the governmnent divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to the rules of law
governing private corporations."

2. It is worth noting that the decision referred to, the Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank, 10 was promulgated by the American Supreme Court as
early as 1824, the opinion being penned by the great Chief Justice Marshall. As was
pointed out by him: "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private
citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it
descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted. Thus,
many states of this Union who have an interest in banks, are not suable even in their
own courts; yet they never exempt the corporation from being sued. The state of
Georgia, by giving to the bank the capacity to sue and be sued, voluntarily strips itself
of its sovereign character, so far as respects the transactions of the bank, and waives
an the privileges of that character. As a member of a corporation, a government never
exercises its sovereignty. It acts merely as a corporator, and exercises no other power
in the management of the affairs of the corporation, that are expressly given by the
incorporating act." 11 The National Shipyard and Steel Corporation case, therefore,
merely reaffirmed one of the oldest and soundest doctrines in this branch of the law.

4. Both the Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions,

insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries of the
fundamental concept of non-suability is that governmental funds are immune
from garnishment, refer to Merritt v. Insular Government, a 1916
decision 20 Since then such a principle has been followed with undeviating rigidity, the
latest case in point being Republic v. Villasor, 21 promulgated in 1973. It is an entirely
different matter if, according to Justice Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 22 the office or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate
existence." 23 Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds may be levied upon or
garnished. That is what happened in this case.

5. With the crucial issue thus resolved in favor of the correctness of the order
assailed, the other objection raised, namely that respondent Court acted

3. The invocation of Republic v. Palacio, 12 as well as Commissioner of Public

Highways v. San Diego,

13

did not help the cause of petitioner at all The decisions are

15

erroneously in having a special sheriff serve to the writ of execution, hardly

needs any extensive decision. It is true that in the aforesaid Commissioner
of Public Highways opinion, this Court held that there is no authorization in
law for the appointment of special sheriffs for the service of writs of
execution.24 In the order sought to be nullified, the then Judge Joaquin M. Salvador
of respondent Court pointed out that under a later Act, 25 the Court of Industrial
Relations Act was amended with the proviso that its Clerk of Court was the exoficio sheriff. The point raised in the petition that it should be the sheriff of Quezon City
that ought to have served the writ of execution would thus clearly appear to be
inconclusive. There is to be sure no thought of deviating from the principle announced
in the Commissioner of Public Highways case. That is as it ought to be. Even if,
however, there is sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed to respondent Court
by virtue of such a ruling, still considering all the circumstances of this case, it clearly
does not call for the nullification of the order in question. What cannot be denied is that
the writ of execution was issued as far back as May 5, 1970 by the then Clerk of Court
of respondent Tribunal as the authorized sheriff. It would be, to say the least, unfair
and unequitable if, on the assumption that such Clerk of Court lacked such
competence, a new writ of execution had to be issued by the proper official At any
rate, what is important is that the judgment be executed. That is to achieve justice
according to law. It would be to carry technicality, therefore, to an absurd length if just
because of such a mistake, assuming that it is, but undoubtedly one committed in
good faith, further delay would get be imposed on private respondent by
characterizing the order sought to be nullified amounting to a grave abuse of
discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. No costs.

16

AMADO J. LANSANG, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE BLIND, INC., and
JOSE IGLESIAS, respondents.

totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing the notice. He was
allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that he
was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as
president was knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business.

QUISUMBING, J.:

On the day of the supposed eviction, GABI filed an action for damages and
injunction in the Regional Trial Court against petitioner, Villanueva, and "all
persons acting on their behalf".5 The trial court issued a temporary
restraining order on the same day.6

Before us is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.

G.R. CV No. 27244, which set aside the ruling of the Regional Trial Court,
Manila, Branch 8, in Civil Case No. 88-43887, and ordered petitioner Amado
J. Lansang to pay private respondent Jose Iglesias P50,000.00 in moral
damages, P10,000.00 in exemplary damages and P5,000.00 in attorney's
fees.

The TRO expired on March 28, 1988. The following day, GABI was finally
evicted by NPDC.
GABI's action for damages and injunction was subsequently dismissed by
the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually directed against the State
which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial court ruled
that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement
since GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could
only recover damages upon proof of the profits it could realize from the
conclusion. The trial court noted that no such proof was presented.

Like public streets, public parks are beyond the commerce of man. However,
private respondents were allegedly awarded a "verbal contract of lease" in
1970 by the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), a government
initiated civic body engaged in the development of national parks, including
Rizal Park,1 but actually administered by high profile civic leaders and
journalists. Whoever in NPDC gave such "verbal" accommodation to private
respondents was unclear, for indeed no document or instrument appears on
record to show the grantor of the verbal license to private respondents to
occupy a portion of the government park dedicated to the national hero's
memory.

1wphi 1.nt

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government
official is being sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such
official from liability for acts done without or in excess of his
authority.7 Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal
Park, "the abusive and capricious manner in which that authority was
exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which he must now be held liable
for damages"8 according to the Court of Appeals.

Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as
kiosks area selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M.
Kalaw St., in front of the Army and Navy Club. Private respondent General
Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to NPDC, 40 percent of the
profits derived from operating the kiosks,2 without again anything shown in
the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or
spent.

The Court of Appeals noted that, as the trial court observed, the eviction of
GABI came at the heels of two significant incidents. First, after private
respondent Iglesias extended monetary support to striking workers of the
NPDC, and second, after Iglesias sent the Tanodbayan, a letter on
November 26, 1987, denouncing alleged graft and corruption in the
NPDC.9 These, according to the Court of Appeals, should not have been
taken against GABI, which had been occupying Rizal Park for nearly 20
years. GABI was evicted purportedly for violating its verbal agreement with
NPDC.10 However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that NPDC failed to
present proof of such violation.11

With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new
Chairman of the NPDC, herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a
written notice dated February 23, 1988 and received by private respondents
on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the so-called verbal agreement
with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and the kiosks
it ran privately within the public park.3 In another notice dated March 5, 1988,
respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate.4
The latter notice was signed by private respondent Iglesias, GABI president,
allegedly to indicate his conformity to its contents. However, Iglesias, who is

17

The Court of Appeals found petitioner liable for damages under Articles 19,
21, and 24 of the Civil Code.12

According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals' observation that the eviction

was prompted by Iglesias' support for striking NPDC workers and the lettercomplaint sent to the Tanodbayan is merely conjectural.

The Court of Appeals absolved from liability all other persons impleaded in
GABI's complaint since it appeared that they were merely acting under the
orders of petitioner. The new officers of NPDC, additionally impleaded by
GABI, were likewise absolved from liability, absent any showing that they
participated in the acts complained of. Petitioner was ordered to pay private
respondent Iglesias moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Finally, petitioner avers that the move to evict GABI and award the spaces it
occupied to another group was an executive policy decision within the
discretion of NPDC. GABI's possession of the kiosks as concessionaire was
by mere tolerance of NPDC and, thus, such possession may be withdrawn
at any time, with or without cause.

Hence, this petition, in which petitioner raises the following issues:

On the other hand, private respondents aver that petitioner acted beyond the
scope of his authority when he showed malice and bad faith in ordering
GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Quoting from the decision of the Court of
Appeals, private respondents argue that petitioner is liable for damages for
performing acts "to injure an individual rather than to discharge a public
duty."14

I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' COMPLAINT
AGAINST PETITIONER, AS CHAIRMAN OF NPDC, AND HIS CODEFENDANTS IN CIVIL CASE NO. 88-43887, IS IN EFFECT A
SUIT AGAINST THE STATE WHICH CANNOT BE SUED
WITHOUT ITS CONSENT.

While private respondents recognize the authority of petitioner to terminate

the agreement with GABI "if [the contract] is prejudicial to the interest of the
NPDC,"15 they maintain that petitioner's personal interest, and not that of the
NPDC, was the root cause of GABI's ejecment.

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT PETITIONER'S ACT OF TERMINATING
RESPONDENT GABI'S CONCESSION IS VALID AND DONE IN
THE LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL DUTY.13

The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against
public officials for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is
that the suit must be regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of
the judgment against the public official concerned will require the state itself
to perform a positive act, such as appropriation of the amount necessary to
pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff.16

Petitioner insists that the complaint filed against him is in reality a complaint
against the State, which could not prosper without the latter's consent. He
anchors his argument on the fact that NPDC is a government agency, and
that when he ordered the eviction of GABI, he was acting in his capacity as
chairman of NPDC. Petitioner avers that the mere allegation that he was
being sued in his personal capacity did not remove the case from the
coverage of the law of public officers and the doctrine of state immunity.

The rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others.17 Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from
liability arising from acts committed in bad faith.18

Petitioner points out that Iglesias signed the notice of eviction to indicate his
conformity thereto. He contends that as evidence of private respondents'
bad faith, they sued petitioner instead of complying with their undertaking to
vacate their library and kiosk at Rizal Park.

Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his
official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of
may have been committed while he occupied a public position.

Petitioner adds that during the actual eviction, no untoward incident

occurred. GABI's properties were properly inventoried and stored.

We are convinced that petitioner is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC
chairman but in his personal capacity. The complaint filed by private
respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of the
NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that

18

capacity.19 Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that

petitioner was sued allegedly for having personal motives in ordering the
ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 27244 is hereby SET ASIDE, and the
DISMISSAL of the complaint for damages by the trial court for want of merit
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

4. Defendant AMADO J. LANSANG, JR., the Chairman of the

National Parks Development Committee, acting under the spirit of
revenge, ill-will, evil motive and personal resentment against
plaintiff JOSE IGLESIAS, served on the plaintiff corporation a letter,
dated February 23, 1988 terminating plaintiffs lease agreement with
a demand for the plaintiff corporation to vacate its office premises. .
.20 (Emphasis supplied.)

SO ORDERED.

The parties do not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of
GABI from their office and kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute that
petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which was the agency tasked to
administer Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the agreement with
GABI21 and order the organization's ejectment. The question now is whether
or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the ejectment of private
respondents.
We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority on record. As
earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could
not be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written
contract. That private respondents were allowed to occupy office and kiosk
spaces in the park was only a matter of accommodation by the previous
administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may validly
discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may
be ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and
does not claim a vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
The Court of Appeals awarded private respondent Iglesias moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees. However, we find no evidence on
record to support Iglesias' claim that he suffered moral injury as a result of
GABI's ejectment from Rizal Park. Absent any satisfactory proof upon which
the Court may base the amount of damages suffered, the award of moral
damages cannot be sustained.22
Neither can we sustain the award of exemplary damages, which may only be
awarded in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory
damages.23 We also disallow the award for attorney's fees, which can only
be recovered per stipulation of the parties, which is absent in this case.
There is no showing that any of the exceptions justifying the award of
attorney's fees absent a stipulation is present in this case.24

19

1w phi1.nt

G.R. No. 84607 March 19, 1993

SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO,

BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO
MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, and ROSELLA
ROBALE, respondents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GEN. RAMON MONTANO, GEN.

ALFREDO LIM, GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. EDGAR DULA
TORRES, COL. CEZAR NAZARENO, MAJ. FILEMON GASMEN, PAT.
NICANOR ABANDO, PFC SERAFIN CEBU, JR., GEN. BRIGIDO
PAREDES, COL. ROGELIO MONFORTE, PFC ANTONIO LUCERO, PAT.
JOSE MENDIOLA, PAT. NELSON TUASON, POLICE CORPORAL
PANFILO ROGOS, POLICE LT. JUAN B. BELTRAN, PAT. NOEL
MANAGBAO, MARINE THIRD CLASS TRAINEE (3CT) NOLITO NOGATO,
3CT ALEJANDRO B. NAGUIO, JR., EFREN ARCILLAS, 3CT AGERICO
LUNA, 3CT BASILIO BORJA, 3CT MANOLITO LUSPO, 3CT CRISTITUTO
GERVACIO, 3CT MANUEL DELA CRUZ, JR., MARINE (CDC) BN., (CIVIL
DISTURBANCE CONTROL), MOBILE DISPERSAL TEAM (MDT), LT.
ROMEO PAQUINTO, LT. LAONGLAANG GOCE, MAJ. DEMETRIO DE LA
CRUZ, POLICE CAPTAIN RODOLFO NAVAL, JOHN DOE, RICHARD
DOE, ROBERTO DOE AND OTHER DOES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch IX, ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ,
MYRNA BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA
GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL
ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND
CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO
DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C.
CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO BAUTISTA, DANTE
EVANGELIO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE
CAMPOMANES, RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of
sixty-two injured victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA,
NAPOLEON BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT
PITALBO, VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO
LABAMBA, JR., EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO
DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE,
GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE
PERRAS, TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS,
FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER,
RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORIANO QUIJANO, JOEY
ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA,
MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN
CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN
DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES,
ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO

G.R. No. 84645 March 19, 1993

ERLINDA C. CAYLAO, ANATALIA ANGELES PEREZ, MYRNA
BAUTISTA, CIPRIANA EVANGELIO, ELMA GRAMPA, AMELIA
GUTIERREZ, NEMESIO LAKINDANUM, PURITA YUMUL, MIGUEL
ARABE, TERESITA ARJONA, RONALDO CAMPOMANES AND
CARMENCITA ARDONI VDA. DE CAMPOMANES, ROGELIO
DOMUNICO, in their capacity as heirs of the deceased (ROBERTO C.
CAYLAO, SONNY "BOY" PEREZ, DIONESIO GRAMPA, ANGELITO
GUTIERREZ, BERNABE LAKINDANUM, ROBERTO YUMUL, LEOPOLDO
ALONZO, ADELFA ARIBE, DANILO ARJONA, VICENTE CAMPOMANES,
RONILO DOMUNICO) respectively; and (names of sixty-two injured
victims) EDDIE AGUINALDO, FELICISIMO ALBASIA, NAPOLEON
BAUTISTA, DANILO CRUZ, EDDIE MENSOLA, ALBERT PITALBO,
VICENTE ROSEL, RUBEN CARRIEDO, JOY CRUZ, HONORIO
LABAMBA, JR. EFREN MACARAIG, SOLOMON MANALOTO, ROMEO
DURAN, NILO TAGUBAT, JUN CARSELLAR, JOEY CLEMENTE,
GERARDO COYOCA, LUISITO DACO, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
ARTHUR FONTANILLA, WILSON GARCIA, CARLOS SIRAY, JOSE
PERRAS TOMAS VALLOS, ARNOLD ENAJE, MARIANITA DIMAPILIS,
FRANCISCO ANGELES, MARCELO ESGUERRA, JOSE FERRER,
RODEL DE GUIA, ELVIS MENDOZA, VICTORINO QUIJANO, JOEY
ADIME, RESIENO ADUL, ALBERTO TARSONA, CARLOS ALCANTARA,
MAMERTO ALIAS, EMELITO ALMONTE, BENILDA ALONUEVO, EMMA
ABADILLO, REYNALDO CABALLES, JR., JAIME CALDETO, FABIAN
CANTELEJO, RODRIGO CARABARA, ENRIQUE DELGADO, JUN
DELOS SANTOS, MARIO DEMASACA, FRANCISCO GONZALES,
ERNESTO GONZALES, RAMIRO JAMIL, JUAN LUCENA, PERLITO
SALAYSAY, JOHNNY SANTOS, MARCELO SANTOS, EMIL SAYAO,
BAYANI UMALI, REMIGIO MAHALIN, BONG MANLULO, ARMANDO
MATIENZO, CARLO MEDINA, LITO NOVENARIO, ROSELLA ROBALE,
petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HONORABLE EDILBERTO G.
SANDOVAL, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the Republic of the Philippines.

20

Structural Alternative Legal Assistance for Grassroots for petitioners

in 84645 & private respondents in 84607.

receipt of this order within which to file their respective

pleadings.
On the other hand, the Order 3, dated August 8, 1988, denied the motions filed by
both parties, for a reconsideration of the abovecited Order, respondent Judge finding
no cogent reason to disturb the said order.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

The massacre was the culmination of eight days and seven nights of
encampment by members of the militant KilusangMagbubukidsaPilipinas
(KMP) at the then Ministry (now Department) of Agrarian Reform (MAR) at
the Philippine Tobacco Administration Building along Elliptical Road in
Diliman, Quezon City.

People may have already forgotten the tragedy that transpired on January
22, 1987. It is quite ironic that then, some journalists called it a Black
Thursday, as a grim reminder to the nation of the misfortune that befell
twelve (12) rallyists. But for most Filipinos now, the Mendiola massacre may
now just as well be a chapter in our history books. For those however, who
have become widows and orphans, certainly they would not settle for just
that. They seek retribution for the lives taken that will never be brought back
to life again.

The farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they
called "genuine agrarian reform". The KMP, led by its national president,
Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems and demands, among which were:
(a) giving lands for free to farmers; (b) zero retention of lands by landlords;
and (c) stop amortizations of land payments.

Hence, the heirs of the deceased, together with those injured (Caylao
group), instituted this petition, docketed as G.R. No. 84645, under Section 1
of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal and setting aside of
the Orders of respondent Judge Sandoval, 1 dated May 31 and August 8, 1988,

The dialogue between the farmers and the MAR officials began on January
15, 1987. The two days that followed saw a marked increase in people at the
encampment. It was only on January 19, 1987 that Jaime Tadeo arrived to
meet with then Minister Heherson Alvarez, only to be informed that the
Minister can only meet with him the following day. On January 20, 1987, the
meeting was held at the MAR conference room. Tadeo demanded that the
minimum comprehensive land reform program be granted immediately.
Minister Alvarez, for his part, can only promise to do his best to bring the
matter to the attention of then President Aquino, during the cabinet meeting
on January 21, 1987.

dismissing the complaint for damages of herein petitioners against the Republic of the
Philippines in Civil Case No. 88-43351.

Petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines, through a similar remedy,

docketed as G.R. No. 84607, seeks to set aside the Order of respondent
Judge dated May 31, 1988, in Civil Case No. 88-43351 entitled
"ErlindaCaylao, et al. vs. Republic of the Philippines, et al."
The pertinent portion of the questioned Order 2 dated May 31, 1988, reads as
follows:

Tension mounted the following day. The farmers, now on their seventh day
of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the
employees from going inside their offices. They hoisted the KMP flag
together with the Philippine flag.

With respect however to the other defendants, the

impleaded Military Officers, since they are being charged
in their personal and official capacity, and holding them
liable, if at all, would not result in financial responsibility of
the government, the principle of immunity from suit can not
conveniently and correspondingly be applied to them.

At around 6:30 p.m. of the same day, Minister Alvarez, in a meeting with
Tadeo and his leaders, advised the latter to instead wait for the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution and just allow the government to implement its
comprehensive land reform program. Tadeo, however, countered by saying
that he did not believe in the Constitution and that a genuine land reform
cannot be realized under a landlord-controlled Congress. A heated
discussion ensued between Tadeo and Minister Alvarez. This

WHEREFORE, the case as against the defendant

Republic of the Philippines is hereby dismissed. As
against the rest of the defendants the motion to dismiss is
denied. They are given a period of ten (10) days from

21

notwithstanding, Minister Alvarez suggested a negotiating panel from each

side to meet again the following day.

stated that the government anti-riot forces were assembled at Mendiola in a

formation of three phalanges, in the following manner:

On January 22, 1987, Tadeo's group instead decided to march to

Malacaang to air their demands. Before the march started, Tadeo talked to
the press and TV media. He uttered fiery words, the most telling of which
were:
". . . inalisnaminangbarikadabilangkahilinganngatingPresidente,
perokinakailanganalisin din niyaangbarikadasaMendiolasapagkatbubutasin
din naminiyon at dadanakangdugo . . . ." 4

(1) The first line was composed of policemen from police

stations Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 and the Chinatown
detachment of the Western Police District. Police Colonel
Edgar Dula Torres, Deputy Superintendent of the Western
Police District, was designated as ground commander of
the CDC first line of defense. The WPD CDC elements
were positioned at the intersection of Mendiola and
Legarda Streets after they were ordered to move forward
from the top of Mendiolabridge. The WPD forces were in
khaki uniform and carried the standard CDC equipment
aluminum shields, truncheons and gas masks.

The farmers then proceeded to march to Malacaang, from Quezon

Memorial Circle, at 10:00 a.m. They were later joined by members of other
sectoral organizations such as the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
BagongAlyansangMakabayan (BAYAN), League of Filipino Students (LFS)
and KongresongPagkakaisangMaralitangLungsod (KPML).

(2) At the second line of defense about ten (10) yards

behind the WPD policemen were the elements of the
Integrated National Police (INP) Field Force stationed at
Fort Bonifacio from the 61st and 62nd INP Field Force,
who carried also the standard CDC equipment
truncheons, shields and gas masks. The INP Field Force
was under the command of Police Major Demetrio dela
Cruz.

At around 1:00 p.m., the marchers reached LiwasangBonifacio where they

held a brief program. It was at this point that some of the marchers entered
the eastern side of the Post Office Building, and removed the steel bars
surrounding the garden. Thereafter, they joined the march to Malacaang. At
about 4:30 p.m., they reached C.M. Recto Avenue.
In anticipation of a civil disturbance, and acting upon reports received by the
Capital Regional Command (CAPCOM) that the rallyists would proceed to
Mendiola to break through the police lines and rush towards Malacaang,
CAPCOM Commander General Ramon E. Montao inspected the
preparations and adequacy of the government forces to quell impending
attacks.

(3) Forming the third line was the Marine Civil Disturbance
Control Battalion composed of the first and second
companies of the Philippine Marines stationed at Fort
Bonifacio. The marines were all equipped with shields,
truncheons and M-16 rifles (armalites) slung at their
backs, under the command of Major Felimon B. Gasmin.
The Marine CDC Battalion was positioned in line formation
ten (10) yards farther behind the INP Field Force.

OPLAN YELLOW (Revised) was put into effect. Task Force Nazareno under
the command of Col. Cesar Nazareno was deployed at the vicinity of
Malacaang. The civil disturbance control units of the Western Police District
under Police Brigadier General Alfredo S. Lim were also activated.
Intelligence reports were also received that the KMP was heavily infiltrated
by CPP/NPA elements and that an insurrection was impending. The threat
seemed grave as there were also reports that San Beda College and Centro
Escolar University would be forcibly occupied.

At the back of the marines were four (4) 6 x 6 army trucks,

occupying the entire width of Mendiolastreet, followed
immediately by two water cannons, one on each side of
the street and eight fire trucks, four trucks on each side of
the street. The eight fire trucks from Fire District I of
Manila under Fire Superintendent Mario C. Tanchanco,
were to supply water to the two water cannons.

In its report, the Citizens' Mendiola Commission (a body specifically tasked

to investigate the facts surrounding the incident, Commission for short)

Stationed farther behind the CDC forces were the two

Mobile Dispersal Teams (MDT) each composed of two

22

tear gas grenadiers, two spotters, an assistant grenadier,

a driver and the team leader.

WPD, attired in civilian clothes with white head bands,

who were armed with long firearms.6 (Emphasis ours)

In front of the College of the Holy Spirit near Gate 4 of

Malacaang stood the VOLVO Mobile Communications
Van of the Commanding General of CAPCOM/INP,
General Ramon E. Montao. At this command post, after
General Montao had conferred with TF Nazareno
Commander, Colonel CezarNazareno, about the
adequacy and readiness of his forces, it was agreed
that Police General Alfredo S. Lim would designate Police
Colonel Edgar DulaTorresand Police Major Conrado
Francisco as negotiators with the marchers. Police
General Lim then proceeded to the WPD CDC elements
already positioned at the foot of Mendiolabridge to relay to
Police Colonel Torres and Police Major Francisco the
instructions that the latter would negotiate with the
marchers. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

After the clash, twelve (12) marchers were officially confirmed dead,
although according to Tadeo, there were thirteen (13) dead, but he was not
able to give the name and address of said victim. Thirty-nine (39) were
wounded by gunshots and twelve (12) sustained minor injuries, all belonging
to the group of the marchers.
Of the police and military personnel, three (3) sustained gunshot wounds
and twenty (20) suffered minor physical injuries such as abrasions,
contusions and the like.
In the aftermath of the confrontation, then President Corazon C. Aquino
issued Administrative Order No. 11, 7 (A.O. 11, for brevity) dated January 22,
1987, which created the Citizens' Mendiola Commission. The body was composed of
retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente Abad Santos as Chairman, retired Supreme
Court Justice Jose Y. Feria and Mr. Antonio U. Miranda, both as members. A.O. 11
stated that the Commission was created precisely for the "purpose of conducting an
investigation of the disorder, deaths, and casualties that took place in the vicinity of
Mendiola Bridge and Mendiola Street and Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the
afternoon of January 22, 1987". The Commission was expected to have submitted its
findings not later than February 6, 1987. But it failed to do so. Consequently, the
deadline was moved to February 16, 1987 by Administrative Order No. 13. Again, the
Commission was unable to meet this deadline. Finally, on February 27, 1987, it
submitted its report, in accordance with Administrative Order No. 17, issued on
February 11, 1987.

The marchers, at around 4:30 p.m., numbered about 10,000 to 15,000. From
C.M. Recto Avenue, they proceeded toward the police lines. No dialogue
took place between the marchers and the anti-riot squad. It was at this
moment that a clash occurred and, borrowing the words of the Commission
"pandemonium broke loose". The Commission stated in its findings, to wit:
. . . There was an explosion followed by throwing of
pillboxes, stones and bottles. Steel bars, wooden clubs
and lead pipes were used against the police. The police
fought back with their shields and truncheons. The police
line was breached. Suddenly shots were heard. The
demonstrators disengaged from the government forces
and retreated towards C.M. Recto Avenue. But sporadic
firing continued from the government forces.

In its report, the Commission recapitulated its findings, to wit:

(1) The march to Mendiola of the KMP led by Jaime
Tadeo, together with the other sectoral groups, was not
covered by any permit as required under Batas
PambansaBlg. 880, the Public Assembly Act of 1985, in
violation of paragraph (a) Section 13, punishable under
paragraph (a), Section 14 of said law.

After the firing ceased, two MDTs headed by Lt. Romeo

Paquinto and Lt. LaonglaanGocesped towards Legarda
Street and lobbed tear gas at the remaining rallyist still
grouped in the vicinity of Mendiola. After dispersing the
crowd, the two MDTs, together with the two WPD MDTs,
proceeded to LiwasangBonifacio upon order of General
Montao to disperse the rallyists assembled thereat.
Assisting the MDTs were a number of policemen from the

(2) The crowd dispersal control units of the police and the
military were armed with .38 and .45 caliber handguns,
and M-16 armalites, which is a prohibited act under
paragraph 4(g), Section 13, and punishable under
paragraph (b), Section 14 of Batas PambansaBlg. 880.

23

(3) The security men assigned to protect the WPD, INP

Field Force, the Marines and supporting military units, as
well as the security officers of the police and military
commanders were in civilian attire in violation of
paragraph (a), Section 10, Batas Pambansa 880.

(10) The water cannons and fire trucks were not put into
operation because (a) there was no order to use them; (b)
they were incorrectly prepositioned; and (c) they were out
of range of the marchers.
(11) Tear gas was not used at the start of the disturbance
to disperse the rioters. After the crowd had dispersed and
the wounded and dead were being carried away, the
MDTs of the police and the military with their tear gas
equipment and components conducted dispersal
operations in the Mendiola area and proceeded to
LiwasangBonifacio to disperse the remnants of the
marchers.

(4) There was unnecessary firing by the police and military

crowd dispersal control units in dispersing the marchers, a
prohibited act under paragraph (e), Section 13, and
punishable under paragraph (b), Section 14, Batas
PambansaBlg. 880.
(5) The carrying and use of steel bars, pillboxes, darts,
lead pipe, wooden clubs with spikes, and guns by the
marchers as offensive weapons are prohibited acts
punishable under paragraph (g), Section 13, and
punishable under paragraph (e), Section 14 of Batas
PambansaBlg. 880.

(12) No barbed wire barricade was used in Mendiola but

no official reason was given for its absence. 8
From the results of the probe, the Commission recommended 9 the criminal
prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed individuals, shown either on tape or in
pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. In connection with this, it was the
Commission's recommendation that the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) be
tasked to undertake investigations regarding the identities of those who actually fired
their guns that resulted in the death of or injury to the victims of the incident. The
Commission also suggested that all the commissioned officers of both the Western
Police District and the INP Field Force, who were armed during the incident, be
prosecuted for violation of paragraph 4(g) of Section 13, Batas PambansaBlg. 880, the
Public Assembly Act of 1985. The Commission's recommendation also included the
prosecution of the marchers, for carrying deadly or offensive weapons, but whose
identities have yet to be established. As for Jaime Tadeo, the Commission said that he
should be prosecuted both for violation of paragraph (a), Section 13, Batas
PambansaBlg. 880 for holding the rally without a permit and for violation of Article 142,
as amended, of the Revised Penal Code for inciting to sedition. As for the following
officers, namely: (1) Gen. Ramon E. Montao; (2) Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim; (3)
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres; (4) Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz; (5) Col.
CezarNazareno; and (5) Maj. FelimonGasmin, for their failure to make effective use of
their skill and experience in directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola,
administrative sanctions were recommended to be imposed.

(6) The KMP farmers broke off further negotiations with

the MAR officials and were determined to march to
Malacaang, emboldened as they are, by the
inflammatory and incendiary utterances of their leader,
Jaime Tadeo "bubutasinnaminangbarikada . . Dadanak
and dugo . . . Angnagugutomnamagsasaka ay
gagawangsarilingbutas. . .
(7) There was no dialogue between the rallyists and the
government forces. Upon approaching the intersections of
Legarda and Mendiola, the marchers began pushing the
police lines and penetrated and broke through the first line
of the CDC contingent.
(8) The police fought back with their truncheons and
shields. They stood their ground but the CDC line was
breached. There ensued gunfire from both sides. It is not
clear who started the firing.

The last and the most significant recommendation of the Commission was
for the deceased and wounded victims of the Mendiola incident to be
compensated by the government. It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao
group) invoke in their claim for damages from the government.

(9) At the onset of the disturbance and violence, the water

cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to
disperse the rioting crowd.

Notwithstanding such recommendation, no concrete form of compensation

was received by the victims. Thus, on July 27, 1987, herein petitioners,

24

(Caylao group) filed a formal letter of demand for compensation from the
Government. 10 This formal demand was indorsed by the office of the Executive

Under our Constitution the principle of immunity of the government from suit
is expressly provided in Article XVI, Section 3. The principle is based on the
very essence of sovereignty, and on the practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends. 12 It also rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be

Secretary to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) on August 13, 1987.
The House Committee on Human Rights, on February 10, 1988, recommended the
expeditious payment of compensation to the Mendiola victims. 11

hindered, and the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to
law suits at the instance of every citizen and consequently controlled in the uses and
dispositions of the means required for the proper administration of the government. 13

After almost a year, on January 20, 1988, petitioners (Caylao group) were
constrained to institute an action for damages against the Republic of the
Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in the
Mendiola incident, before the trial court. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 88-43351.

This is not a suit against the State with its consent.

Firstly, the recommendation made by the Commission regarding
indemnification of the heirs of the deceased and the victims of the incident
by the government does not in any way mean that liability automatically
attaches to the State. It is important to note that A.O. 11 expressly states
that the purpose of creating the Commission was to have a body that will
conduct an "investigation of the disorder, deaths and casualties that took
place." 14 In the exercise of its functions, A.O. 11 provides guidelines, and what is

On February 23, 1988, the Solicitor General filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners
opposed said motion on March 16, 1988, maintaining that the State has
waived its immunity from suit and that the dismissal of the instant action is
contrary to both the Constitution and the International Law on Human Rights.

relevant to Our discussion reads:

Respondent Judge Sandoval, in his first questioned Order, dismissed the

complaint as against the Republic of the Philippines on the ground that there
was no waiver by the State. Petitioners (Caylao group) filed a Motion for
Reconsideration therefrom, but the same was denied by respondent judge in
his Order dated August 8, 1988. Consequently, Caylao and her copetitioners filed the instant petition.

1 Its conclusions regarding the existence of probable

cause for the commission of any offense and of the
persons probably guilty of the same shall be sufficient
compliance with the rules on preliminary investigation and
the charges arising therefrom may be filed directly with the
proper court. 15

On the other hand, the Republic of the Philippines, together with the military
officers and personnel impleaded as defendants in the court below, filed its
petition for certiorari.

In effect, whatever may be the findings of the Commission, the same shall
only serve as the cause of action in the event that any party decides to
litigate his/her claim. Therefore, the Commission is merely a preliminary
venue. The Commission is not the end in itself. Whatever recommendation it
makes cannot in any way bind the State immediately, such recommendation
not having become final and, executory. This is precisely the essence of it
being a fact-finding body.

Having arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically
identical issues, the two (2) petitions were consolidated and will therefore be
jointly dealt with and resolved in this Decision.
The resolution of both petitions revolves around the main issue of whether or
not the State has waived its immunity from suit.

Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President Aquino may have
done or said, the same are not tantamount to the State having waived its
immunity from suit. The President's act of joining the marchers, days after
the incident, does not mean that there was an admission by the State of any
liability. In fact to borrow the words of petitioners (Caylao group), "it was an
act of solidarity by the government with the people". Moreover, petitioners
rely on President Aquino's speech promising that the government would
address the grievances of the rallyists. By this alone, it cannot be inferred

Petitioners (Caylao group) advance the argument that the State has
impliedly waived its sovereign immunity from suit. It is their considered view
that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the government to
indemnify the heirs and victims of the Mendiola incident and by the public
addresses made by then President Aquino in the aftermath of the killings,
the State has consented to be sued.

25

that the State has admitted any liability, much less can it be inferred that it
has consented to the suit.

victims to demand indemnification from the government. The principle of

state immunity from suit does not apply, as in this case, when the relief
demanded by the suit requires no affirmative official action on the part of the
State nor the affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the
State in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents who are
made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of a title of the state and
as its agents and servants. 22 This Court has made it quite clear that even a "high

Although consent to be sued may be given impliedly, still it cannot be

maintained that such consent was given considering the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case.

position in the government does not confer a license to persecute or recklessly injure
another." 23

Thirdly, the case does not qualify as a suit against the State.
Some instances when a suit against the State is proper are:

16

The inescapable conclusion is that the State cannot be held civilly liable for
the deaths that followed the incident. Instead, the liability should fall on the
named defendants in the lower court. In line with the ruling of this court
in Shauf vs. Court of Appeals, 24 herein public officials, having been found to have

(1) When the Republic is sued by name;

acted beyond the scope of their authority, may be held liable for damages.

(2) When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency;

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error and no grave abuse of discretion

committed by respondent Judge in issuing the questioned orders, the instant
petitions are hereby DISMISSED.

(3) When the, suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the government.
While the Republic in this case is sued by name, the ultimate liability does
not pertain to the government. Although the military officers and personnel,
then party defendants, were discharging their official functions when the
incident occurred, their functions ceased to be official the moment they
exceeded their authority. Based on the Commission findings, there was lack
of justification by the government forces in the use of firearms. 17 Moreover,

SO ORDERED.

the members of the police and military crowd dispersal units committed a prohibited
act under B.P. Blg. 880 18 as there was unnecessary firing by them in dispersing the
marchers. 19

As early as 1954, this Court has pronounced that an officer cannot shelter
himself by the plea that he is a public agent acting under the color of his
office when his acts are wholly without authority. 20 Until recently in 1991, 21 this
doctrine still found application, this Court saying that immunity from suit cannot
institutionalize irresponsibility and non-accountability nor grant a privileged status not
claimed by any other official of the Republic. The military and police forces were
deployed to ensure that the rally would be peaceful and orderly as well as to
guarantee the safety of the very people that they are duty-bound to protect. However,
the facts as found by the trial court showed that they fired at the unruly crowd to
disperse the latter.

While it is true that nothing is better settled than the general rule that a
sovereign state and its political subdivisions cannot be sued in the courts
except when it has given its consent, it cannot be invoked by both the
military officers to release them from any liability, and by the heirs and

26

G.R. No. L-11154

March 21, 1916

suddenly and unexpectedly and long before reaching the center of

the street, into the right side of Taft Avenue, without having
sounded any whistle or horn, by which movement it struck the
plaintiff, who was already six feet from the southwestern point or
from the post place there.

E. MERRITT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, defendant-appellant.

By reason of the resulting collision, the plaintiff was so severely

injured that, according to Dr.Saleeby, who examined him on the
very same day that he was taken to the General Hospital, he was
suffering from a depression in the left parietal region, a would in the
same place and in the back part of his head, while blood issued
from his nose and he was entirely unconscious.

Crossfield and O'Brien for plaintiff.

Attorney-General Avancea for defendant..
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal by both parties from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of P14,741,
together with the costs of the cause.

The marks revealed that he had one or more fractures of the skull
and that the grey matter and brain was had suffered material injury.
At ten o'clock of the night in question, which was the time set for
performing the operation, his pulse was so weak and so irregular
that, in his opinion, there was little hope that he would live. His right
leg was broken in such a way that the fracture extended to the
outer skin in such manner that it might be regarded as double and
the would be exposed to infection, for which reason it was of the
most serious nature.

Counsel for the plaintiff insist that the trial court erred (1) "in limiting the
general damages which the plaintiff suffered to P5,000, instead of P25,000
as claimed in the complaint," and (2) "in limiting the time when plaintiff was
entirely disabled to two months and twenty-one days and fixing the damage
accordingly in the sum of P2,666, instead of P6,000 as claimed by plaintiff in
his complaint."

At another examination six days before the day of the trial,

Dr.Saleeby noticed that the plaintiff's leg showed a contraction of
an inch and a half and a curvature that made his leg very weak and
painful at the point of the fracture. Examination of his head revealed
a notable readjustment of the functions of the brain and nerves.
The patient apparently was slightly deaf, had a light weakness in
his eyes and in his mental condition. This latter weakness was
always noticed when the plaintiff had to do any difficult mental
labor, especially when he attempted to use his money for
mathematical calculations.

The Attorney-General on behalf of the defendant urges that the trial court
erred: (a) in finding that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and
the ambulance of the General Hospital was due to the negligence of the
chauffeur; (b) in holding that the Government of the Philippine Islands is
liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the collision,
even if it be true that the collision was due to the negligence of the chauffeur;
and (c) in rendering judgment against the defendant for the sum of P14,741.
The trial court's findings of fact, which are fully supported by the record, are
as follows:

According to the various merchants who testified as witnesses, the

plaintiff's mental and physical condition prior to the accident was
excellent, and that after having received the injuries that have been
discussed, his physical condition had undergone a noticeable
depreciation, for he had lost the agility, energy, and ability that he
had constantly displayed before the accident as one of the best
constructors of wooden buildings and he could not now earn even a
half of the income that he had secured for his work because he had
lost 50 per cent of his efficiency. As a contractor, he could no

It is a fact not disputed by counsel for the defendant that when the
plaintiff, riding on a motorcycle, was going toward the western part
of Calle Padre Faura, passing along the west side thereof at a
speed of ten to twelve miles an hour, upon crossing Taft Avenue
and when he was ten feet from the southwestern intersection of
said streets, the General Hospital ambulance, upon reaching said
avenue, instead of turning toward the south, after passing the
center thereof, so that it would be on the left side of said avenue, as
is prescribed by the ordinance and the Motor Vehicle Act, turned

27

longer, as he had before done, climb up ladders and scaffoldings to

reach the highest parts of the building.

Whereas a claim has been filed against the Government of the

Philippine Islands by Mr. E. Merritt, of Manila, for damages resulting
from a collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital on March twenty-fifth, nineteen hundred and
thirteen;

As a consequence of the loss the plaintiff suffered in the efficiency

of his work as a contractor, he had to dissolved the partnership he
had formed with the engineer. Wilson, because he was
incapacitated from making mathematical calculations on account of
the condition of his leg and of his mental faculties, and he had to
give up a contract he had for the construction of the Uy Chaco
building."

Whereas it is not known who is responsible for the accident nor is it

possible to determine the amount of damages, if any, to which the
claimant is entitled; and
Whereas the Director of Public Works and the Attorney-General
recommended that an Act be passed by the Legislature authorizing
Mr. E. Merritt to bring suit in the courts against the Government, in
order that said questions may be decided: Now, therefore,

We may say at the outset that we are in full accord with the trial court to the
effect that the collision between the plaintiff's motorcycle and the ambulance
of the General Hospital was due solely to the negligence of the chauffeur.
The two items which constitute a part of the P14,741 and which are drawn in
question by the plaintiff are (a) P5,000, the award awarded for permanent
injuries, and (b) the P2,666, the amount allowed for the loss of wages during
the time the plaintiff was incapacitated from pursuing his occupation. We find
nothing in the record which would justify us in increasing the amount of the
first. As to the second, the record shows, and the trial court so found, that
the plaintiff's services as a contractor were worth P1,000 per month. The
court, however, limited the time to two months and twenty-one days, which
the plaintiff was actually confined in the hospital. In this we think there was
error, because it was clearly established that the plaintiff was wholly
incapacitated for a period of six months. The mere fact that he remained in
the hospital only two months and twenty-one days while the remainder of the
six months was spent in his home, would not prevent recovery for the whole
time. We, therefore, find that the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff, without any fault on his part, is P18,075.

By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine

Legislature, that:

As the negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an agent

or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once arises whether the
Government is legally-liable for the damages resulting therefrom.

Enacted, February 3, 1915.

SECTION 1. E. Merritt is hereby authorized to bring suit in the

Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the Government
of the Philippine Islands in order to fix the responsibility for the
collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General
Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to
which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said collision, and the
Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and
directed to appear at the trial on the behalf of the Government of
said Islands, to defendant said Government at the same.
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect on its passage.

Did the defendant, in enacting the above quoted Act, simply waive its
immunity from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff? If only the
former, then it cannot be held that the Act created any new cause of action
in favor of the plaintiff or extended the defendant's liability to any case not
previously recognized.

Act No. 2457, effective February 3, 1915, reads:

An Act authorizing E. Merritt to bring suit against the Government of
the Philippine Islands and authorizing the Attorney-General of said
Islands to appear in said suit.

All admit that the Insular Government (the defendant) cannot be sued by an
individual without its consent. It is also admitted that the instant case is one
against the Government. As the consent of the Government to be sued by

28

the plaintiff was entirely voluntary on its part, it is our duty to look carefully
into the terms of the consent, and render judgment accordingly.

powers by its officers or agents. (Citing Gibbons vs. U. S., 8 Wall.,

269; Clodfelter vs. State, 86 N. C., 51, 53; 41 Am. Rep., 440;
Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep., 158; Green vs.
State, 73 Cal., 29; Bourn vs. Hart, 93 Cal., 321; 27 Am. St. Rep.,
203; Story on Agency, sec. 319.)

The plaintiff was authorized to bring this action against the Government "in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the
ambulance of the General Hospital and to determine the amount of the
damages, if any, to which Mr. E. Merritt is entitled on account of said
collision, . . . ." These were the two questions submitted to the court for
determination. The Act was passed "in order that said questions may be
decided." We have "decided" that the accident was due solely to the
negligence of the chauffeur, who was at the time an employee of the
defendant, and we have also fixed the amount of damages sustained by the
plaintiff as a result of the collision. Does the Act authorize us to hold that the
Government is legally liable for that amount? If not, we must look elsewhere
for such authority, if it exists.

As to the scope of legislative enactments permitting individuals to sue the

state where the cause of action arises out of either fort or contract, the rule is
stated in 36 Cyc., 915, thus:
By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from
suit. It does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any
cause of action in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not
previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to enforce a
preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court,
subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippine Islands having been "modeled after the
Federal and State Governments in the United States," we may look to the
decisions of the high courts of that country for aid in determining the purpose
and scope of Act No. 2457.

In Apfelbacher vs. State (152 N. W., 144, advanced sheets), decided April
16, 1915, the Act of 1913, which authorized the bringing of this suit, read:
SECTION 1. Authority is hereby given to George Apfelbacher, of
the town of Summit, Waukesha County, Wisconsin, to bring suit in
such court or courts and in such form or forms as he may be
advised for the purpose of settling and determining all controversies
which he may now have with the State of Wisconsin, or its duly
authorized officers and agents, relative to the mill property of said
George Apfelbacher, the fish hatchery of the State of Wisconsin on
the Bark River, and the mill property of Evan Humphrey at the lower
end of Nagawicka Lake, and relative to the use of the waters of
said Bark River and Nagawicka Lake, all in the county of
Waukesha, Wisconsin.

In the United States the rule that the state is not liable for the torts committed
by its officers or agents whom it employs, except when expressly made so
by legislative enactment, is well settled. "The Government," says Justice
Story, "does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of the
officers or agents whom it employs, since that would involve it in all its
operations in endless embarrassments, difficulties and losses, which would
be subversive of the public interest." (Claussen vs. City of Luverne, 103
Minn., 491, citing U. S. vs. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat, 720; 6 L. Ed., 199; and
Beers vs. States, 20 How., 527; 15 L. Ed., 991.)
In the case of Melvin vs. State (121 Cal., 16), the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from the state for personal injuries received on account of the
negligence of the state officers at the state fair, a state institution created by
the legislature for the purpose of improving agricultural and kindred
industries; to disseminate information calculated to educate and benefit the
industrial classes; and to advance by such means the material interests of
the state, being objects similar to those sought by the public school system.
In passing upon the question of the state's liability for the negligent acts of its
officers or agents, the court said:

In determining the scope of this act, the court said:

Plaintiff claims that by the enactment of this law the legislature
admitted liability on the part of the state for the acts of its officers,
and that the suit now stands just as it would stand between private
parties. It is difficult to see how the act does, or was intended to do,
more than remove the state's immunity from suit. It simply gives
authority to commence suit for the purpose of settling plaintiff's
controversies with the estate. Nowhere in the act is there a whisper
or suggestion that the court or courts in the disposition of the suit
shall depart from well established principles of law, or that the

No claim arises against any government is favor of an individual, by

reason of the misfeasance, laches, or unauthorized exercise of

29

In Sipple vs. State (99 N. Y., 284), where the board of the canal claims had,
by the terms of the statute of New York, jurisdiction of claims for damages
for injuries in the management of the canals such as the plaintiff had
sustained, Chief Justice Ruger remarks: "It must be conceded that the state
can be made liable for injuries arising from the negligence of its agents or
servants, only by force of some positive statute assuming such liability."

amount of damages is the only question to be settled. The act

opened the door of the court to the plaintiff. It did not pass upon the
question of liability, but left the suit just where it would be in the
absence of the state's immunity from suit. If the Legislature had
intended to change the rule that obtained in this state so long and
to declare liability on the part of the state, it would not have left so
important a matter to mere inference, but would have done so in
express terms. (Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth, 152 Mass.,
28; 24 N.E., 854; 8 L. R. A., 399.)

It being quite clear that Act No. 2457 does not operate to extend the
Government's liability to any cause not previously recognized, we will now
examine the substantive law touching the defendant's liability for the
negligent acts of its officers, agents, and employees. Paragraph 5 of article
1903 of the Civil Code reads:

In Denning vs. State (123 Cal., 316), the provisions of the Act of 1893, relied
upon and considered, are as follows:
All persons who have, or shall hereafter have, claims on contract or
for negligence against the state not allowed by the state board of
examiners, are hereby authorized, on the terms and conditions
herein contained, to bring suit thereon against the state in any of
the courts of this state of competent jurisdiction, and prosecute the
same to final judgment. The rules of practice in civil cases shall
apply to such suits, except as herein otherwise provided.

The state is liable in this sense when it acts through a special

agent, but not when the damage should have been caused by the
official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable.
The supreme court of Spain in defining the scope of this paragraph said:

And the court said:

That the obligation to indemnify for damages which a third person

causes to another by his fault or negligence is based, as is
evidenced by the same Law 3, Title 15, Partida 7, on that the
person obligated, by his own fault or negligence, takes part in the
act or omission of the third party who caused the damage. It follows
therefrom that the state, by virtue of such provisions of law, is not
responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in
consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge
of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor
even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the
organization of branches of public service and in the appointment of
its agents; on the contrary, we must presuppose all foresight
humanly possible on its part in order that each branch of service
serves the general weal an that of private persons interested in its
operation. Between these latter and the state, therefore, no
relations of a private nature governed by the civil law can arise
except in a case where the state acts as a judicial person capable
of acquiring rights and contracting obligations. (Supreme Court of
Spain, January 7, 1898; 83 Jur. Civ., 24.)

This statute has been considered by this court in at least two cases,
arising under different facts, and in both it was held that said statute
did not create any liability or cause of action against the state
where none existed before, but merely gave an additional remedy
to enforce such liability as would have existed if the statute had not
been enacted. (Chapman vs. State, 104 Cal., 690; 43 Am. St. Rep.,
158; Melvin vs. State, 121 Cal., 16.)
A statute of Massachusetts enacted in 1887 gave to the superior court
"jurisdiction of all claims against the commonwealth, whether at law or in
equity," with an exception not necessary to be here mentioned. In construing
this statute the court, in Murdock Grate Co. vs. Commonwealth (152 Mass.,
28), said:
The statute we are discussing disclose no intention to create
against the state a new and heretofore unrecognized class of
liabilities, but only an intention to provide a judicial tribunal where
well recognized existing liabilities can be adjudicated.

That the Civil Code in chapter 2, title 16, book 4, regulates the
obligations which arise out of fault or negligence; and whereas in

30

the first article thereof. No. 1902, where the general principle is laid
down that where a person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another through fault or negligence, shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done, reference is made to acts or omissions
of the persons who directly or indirectly cause the damage, the
following articles refers to this persons and imposes an identical
obligation upon those who maintain fixed relations of authority and
superiority over the authors of the damage, because the law
presumes that in consequence of such relations the evil caused by
their own fault or negligence is imputable to them. This legal
presumption gives way to proof, however, because, as held in the
last paragraph of article 1903, responsibility for acts of third
persons ceases when the persons mentioned in said article prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage, and among these persons, called upon to
answer in a direct and not a subsidiary manner, are found, in
addition to the mother or the father in a proper case, guardians and
owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise, the state, but
not always, except when it acts through the agency of a special
agent, doubtless because and only in this case, the fault or
negligence, which is the original basis of this kind of objections,
must be presumed to lie with the state.

administration and who on his own responsibility performs the

functions which are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office
and which are regulated by law and the regulations." (Supreme
Court of Spain, May 18, 1904; 98 Jur. Civ., 389, 390.)
That according to paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code and
the principle laid down in a decision, among others, of the 18th of
May, 1904, in a damage case, the responsibility of the state is
limited to that which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform some act
or charged with some definite purpose which gives rise to the claim,
and not where the claim is based on acts or omissions imputable to
a public official charged with some administrative or technical office
who can be held to the proper responsibility in the manner laid
down by the law of civil responsibility. Consequently, the trial court
in not so deciding and in sentencing the said entity to the payment
of damages, caused by an official of the second class referred to,
has by erroneous interpretation infringed the provisions of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. (Supreme Court of Spain, July 30,
1911; 122 Jur. Civ., 146.)
It is, therefore, evidence that the State (the Government of the Philippine
Islands) is only liable, according to the above quoted decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, for the acts of its agents, officers and employees
when they act as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.

That although in some cases the state might by virtue of the

general principle set forth in article 1902 respond for all the damage
that is occasioned to private parties by orders or resolutions which
by fault or negligence are made by branches of the central
administration acting in the name and representation of the state
itself and as an external expression of its sovereignty in the
exercise of its executive powers, yet said article is not applicable in
the case of damages said to have been occasioned to the
petitioners by an executive official, acting in the exercise of his
powers, in proceedings to enforce the collections of certain property
taxes owing by the owner of the property which they hold in
sublease.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
without costs in this instance. Whether the Government intends to make
itself legally liable for the amount of damages above set forth, which the
plaintiff has sustained by reason of the negligent acts of one of its
employees, by legislative enactment and by appropriating sufficient funds
therefor, we are not called upon to determine. This matter rests solely with
the Legislature and not with the courts.

That the responsibility of the state is limited by article 1903 to the

case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent,
in the sense in which these words are employed, is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the
exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in
representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent
thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This concept does
not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the acting

31

G.R. No. L-35645 May 22, 1985

complaint, the company alleges that the United States had accepted its bids
because "A request to confirm a price proposal confirms the acceptance of a
bid pursuant to defendant United States' bidding practices." (Rollo, p. 30.)
The truth of this allegation has not been tested because the case has not
reached the trial stage.]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CAPT. JAMES E. GALLOWAY, WILLIAM

I. COLLINS and ROBERT GOHIER,petitioners,
vs.
HON. V. M. RUIZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XV, Court of First Instance
of Rizal and ELIGIO DE GUZMAN & CO., INC., respondents.

In June, 1972, the company received a letter which was signed by Wilham I.
Collins, Director, Contracts Division, Naval Facilities Engineering Command,
Southwest Pacific, Department of the Navy of the United States, who is one
of the petitioners herein. The letter said that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory
performance rating on a repair contract for the sea wall at the boat landings
of the U.S. Naval Station in Subic Bay. The letter further said that the
projects had been awarded to third parties. In the abovementioned Civil
Case No. 779-M, the company sued the United States of America and
Messrs. James E. Galloway, William I. Collins and Robert Gohier all
members of the Engineering Command of the U.S. Navy. The complaint is to
order the defendants to allow the plaintiff to perform the work on the projects
and, in the event that specific performance was no longer possible, to order
the defendants to pay damages. The company also asked for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from entering into
contracts with third parties for work on the projects.

Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Manalo & Feliciano Law for petitioners.
Albert, Vergara, Benares, Perias& Dominguez Law Office for respondents.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

This is a petition to review, set aside certain orders and restrain the
respondent judge from trying Civil Case No. 779M of the defunct Court of
First Instance of Rizal.
The factual background is as follows:

The defendants entered their special appearance for the purpose only of
questioning the jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter of the
complaint and the persons of defendants, the subject matter of the complaint
being acts and omissions of the individual defendants as agents of
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which has not given
her consent to this suit or any other suit for the causes of action asserted in
the complaint." (Rollo, p. 50.)

At times material to this case, the United States of America had a naval base
in Subic, Zambales. The base was one of those provided in the Military
Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the United States.
Sometime in May, 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for
the following projects

Subsequently the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint which

included an opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
The company opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion and
issued the writ. The defendants moved twice to reconsider but to no avail.
Hence the instant petition which seeks to restrain perpetually the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 779-M for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
trial court.

1. Repair offender system, Alava Wharf at the U.S. Naval Station Subic Bay,
Philippines.
2. Repair typhoon damage to NAS Cubi shoreline; repair typhoon damage to
shoreline revetment, NAVBASE Subic; and repair to Leyte Wharf approach,
NAVBASE Subic Bay, Philippines.
Eligio de Guzman & Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids.
Subsequent thereto, the company received from the United States two
telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for the name of its
bonding company. The company complied with the requests. [In its

The petition is highly impressed with merit.

The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the
courts of another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a

32

In Harry Lyons, Inc. vs. The United States of America, supra, plaintiff
brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila to collect several sums of
money on account of a contract between plaintiff and defendant. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over defendant and over the subject matter of the action. The
court granted the motion on the grounds that: (a) it had no jurisdiction over
the defendant who did not give its consent to the suit; and (b) plaintiff failed
to exhaust the administrative remedies provided in the contract. The order of
dismissal was elevated to this Court for review.

necessary consequence of the principles of independence and equality of

States. However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they are
constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish them-between
sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and
proprietary acts (jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now
extends only to acts jure imperil The restrictive application of State immunity
is now the rule in the United States, the United Kingdom and other states in
western Europe. (See Coquia and Defensor Santiago, Public International
Law, pp. 207-209 [1984].)

In sustaining the action of the lower court, this Court said:

The respondent judge recognized the restrictive doctrine of State immunity
when he said in his Order denying the defendants' (now petitioners) motion:
" A distinction should be made between a strictly governmental function of
the sovereign state from its private, proprietary or non- governmental acts
(Rollo, p. 20.) However, the respondent judge also said: "It is the Court's
considered opinion that entering into a contract for the repair of wharves or
shoreline is certainly not a governmental function altho it may partake of a
public nature or character. As aptly pointed out by plaintiff's counsel in his
reply citing the ruling in the case of Lyons, Inc., [104 Phil. 594 (1958)], and
which this Court quotes with approval, viz.:

It appearing in the complaint that appellant has not

complied with the procedure laid down in Article XXI of the
contract regarding the prosecution of its claim against the
United States Government, or, stated differently, it has
failed to first exhaust its administrative remedies against
said Government, the lower court acted properly in
dismissing this case.(At p. 598.)
It can thus be seen that the statement in respect of the waiver of State
immunity from suit was purely gratuitous and, therefore, obiter so that it has
no value as an imperative authority.

It is however contended that when a sovereign state

enters into a contract with a private person, the state can
be sued upon the theory that it has descended to the level
of an individual from which it can be implied that it has
given its consent to be sued under the contract. ...

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the

proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign sovereign,
its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may
be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into
business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the
exercise of its sovereign functions. In this case the projects are an integral
part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the United
States and the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of the
highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or
business purposes.

xxxxxxxxx
We agree to the above contention, and considering that
the United States government, through its agency at Subic
Bay, entered into a contract with appellant for stevedoring
and miscellaneous labor services within the Subic Bay
Area, a U.S. Naval Reservation, it is evident that it can
bring an action before our courts for any contractual
liability that that political entity may assume under the
contract. The trial court, therefore, has jurisdiction to
entertain this case ... (Rollo, pp. 20-21.)

That the correct test for the application of State immunity is not the
conclusion of a contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown
in Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the plaintiffs leased
three apartment buildings to the United States of America for the use of its
military officials. The plaintiffs sued to recover possession of the premises on
the ground that the term of the leases had expired. They also asked for
increased rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.

The reliance placed on Lyons by the respondent judge is misplaced for the
following reasons:

33

Fernando, C.J., took no part.

The defendants who were armed forces officers of the United States moved
to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction in the part of the court. The
Municipal Court of Manila granted the motion to dismiss; sustained by the
Court of First Instance, the plaintiffs went to this Court for review on
certiorari. In denying the petition, this Court said:
On the basis of the foregoing considerations we are of the
belief and we hold that the real party defendant in interest
is the Government of the United States of America; that
any judgment for back or Increased rentals or damages
will have to be paid not by defendants Moore and Tillman
and their 64 co-defendants but by the said U.S.
Government. On the basis of the ruling in the case of Land
vs. Dollar already cited, and on what we have already
stated, the present action must be considered as one
against the U.S. Government. It is clear hat the courts of
the Philippines including the Municipal Court of Manila
have no jurisdiction over the present case for unlawful
detainer. The question of lack of jurisdiction was raised
and interposed at the very beginning of the action. The
U.S. Government has not , given its consent to the filing of
this suit which is essentially against her, though not in
name. Moreover, this is not only a case of a citizen filing a
suit against his own Government without the latter's
consent but it is of a citizen filing an action against a
foreign government without said government's consent,
which renders more obvious the lack of jurisdiction of the
courts of his country. The principles of law behind this rule
are so elementary and of such general acceptance that we
deem it unnecessary to cite authorities in support thereof.
(At p. 323.)

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.
In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where
the contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the
defendant (U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within
the Subic Bay area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the
United States Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services
within the Subic Bay area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can
bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political
entity may assume under the contract."
When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or
shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract
and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended
to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is
implied from its act of entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 284).

In Syquia,the United States concluded contracts with private individuals but

the contracts notwithstanding the States was not deemed to have given or
waived its consent to be sued for the reason that the contracts were
forjureimperii and not for jure gestionis.

Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach
of its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of
the award for the project by the United States government, through its
agency at Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a
party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind
the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as
in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his own country for
violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government
professing to act in its name.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the questioned orders of the

respondent judge are set aside and Civil Case No. is dismissed. Costs
against the private respondent.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, * Escolin, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

34

Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion

in Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:

The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties

cannot be over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private
individuals, it is to be reasonably assumed and expected that the
undertakings in the contract will be complied with in good faith.

Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the

jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government
enters into private contracts with the citizens of the court's
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all
principles of decency and violative of all tenets of morals.

One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation,
like the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak
nations. The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states
are equal and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big
nations wielding economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate
to small nations, subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus,
more often than not, when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small
nations, the American governmental agencies or its citizens invoke
principles of international law for their own benefit.

Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and

applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with
regard to governments either domestic or foreign. Once a
foreign government enters into a private contract with the
private citizens of another country, such foreign
government cannot shield its non-performance or
contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak
of non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government
beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give
approval to the execution of unilateral contracts,
graphically described in Spanish as 'contratosleoninos',
because one party gets the lion's share to the detriment of
the other. To give validity to such contract is to sanctify
bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis
that all parties in a private contract, including governments
and the most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and
that such contracts are enforceable through the help of the
courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any
violation of such contracts if the same had been entered
into only by private individuals.

In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval
authorities at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the
other, was honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion
of the majority will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of
contractual obligations. American authorities or any foreign government in
the Philippines for that matter, dealing with the citizens of this country, can
conveniently seek protective cover under the majority opinion. The result is
disastrous to the Philippines.
This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It fosters
economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our Republic.
The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs.
Cuenca, L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of
First Instance, L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).

Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State

immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and
dignity as a nation. Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or
domestic contractors from transacting business and entering into contracts
with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air
or ground forces-because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a
validly executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own courts
for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United
States government, always, looms large, thereby hampering the growth of
Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country by
United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the
various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines.

Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States
government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be held
amenable to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.
The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord
with paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the
above-mentioned rights, powers and authority, the United States agrees that
the powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis
supplied).

35

bargain collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines" (Emphasis supplied)

Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment
dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement,
which recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment
practices which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and
continuing favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that
an agreement will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic
institutions cherished by both Governments, ... the United States
Government agrees to accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in
the Bases, thus (1) the U.S. Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for
civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the
Amendment of May 27, 1968).

The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint
statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United
States dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine
sovereignty extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the
command of a Philippine Base Commander, " which is supposed to
underscore the joint Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President
Ford of December 7, 1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality,
territorial integrity and political independence of all States are fundamental
principles which both countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm
that mutual respect for the dignity of each nation shall characterize their
friendship as well as the alliance between their two countries. "

Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit

express fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of
May 2 7, 1968 which directs that " contractors and concessionaires
performing work for the U.S. Armed Forces shall be required by their
contract or concession agreements to comply with all applicable Philippine
labor laws and regulations, " even though paragraph 2 thereof affirms that
"nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver by either of the two
Governments of such immunity under international law."

The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base
Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base
Commander and the American Base Commander shall be guided by full
respect for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of
unhampered U.S. military operations on the other hand and that "they shall
promote cooperation understanding and harmonious relations within the
Base and with the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 &
par. 3 of the Annex covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979,
between Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis supplied).

Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States Government

before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III on respect for Philippine
law of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also
amending RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the
duty of members of the United States Forces, the civilian component and
their dependents, to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases
Agreement and, in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines.
The United States shag take all measures within its authority to insure that
they adhere to them (Emphasis supplied).

Separate Opinions

The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further

emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas
surrounding the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States
Forces shall procure goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum
extent feasible" (Emphasis supplied).

MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:

The petition should be dismissed and the proceedings in Civil Case No. 779M in the defunct CFI (now RTC) of Rizal be allowed to continue therein.

Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6,

1979 in connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations
of the Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on
the basis of the principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and

In the case of Lyons vs. the United States of America (104 Phil. 593), where
the contract entered into between the plaintiff (Harry Lyons, Inc.) and the
defendant (U.S. Government) involved stevedoring and labor services within
the Subic Bay area, this Court further stated that inasmuch as ". . . the

36

United States Government. through its agency at Subic Bay, entered into a
contract with appellant for stevedoring and miscellaneous labor services
within the Subic Bay area, a U.S. Navy Reservation, it is evident that it can
bring an action before our courts for any contractual liability that that political
entity may assume under the contract."

approval to the execution of unilateral contracts,

graphically described in Spanish as 'contratosleoninos',
because one party gets the lion's share to the detriment of
the other. To give validity to such contract is to sanctify
bad faith, deceit, fraud. We prefer to adhere to the thesis
that all parties in a private contract, including governments
and the most powerful of them, are amenable to law, and
that such contracts are enforceable through the help of the
courts of justice with jurisdiction to take cognizance of any
violation of such contracts if the same had been entered
into only by private individuals.

When the U.S. Government, through its agency at Subic Bay, confirmed the
acceptance of a bid of a private company for the repair of wharves or
shoreline in the Subic Bay area, it is deemed to have entered into a contract
and thus waived the mantle of sovereign immunity from suit and descended
to the level of the ordinary citizen. Its consent to be sued, therefore, is
implied from its act of entering into a contract (Santos vs. Santos, 92 Phil.
281, 284).

Constant resort by a foreign state or its agents to the doctrine of State

immunity in this jurisdiction impinges unduly upon our sovereignty and
dignity as a nation. Its application will particularly discourage Filipino or
domestic contractors from transacting business and entering into contracts
with United States authorities or facilities in the Philippines whether naval, air
or ground forces-because the difficulty, if not impossibility, of enforcing a
validly executed contract and of seeking judicial remedy in our own courts
for breaches of contractual obligation committed by agents of the United
States government, always, looms large, thereby hampering the growth of
Filipino enterprises and creating a virtual monopoly in our own country by
United States contractors of contracts for services or supplies with the
various U.S. offices and agencies operating in the Philippines.

Justice and fairness dictate that a foreign government that commits a breach
of its contractual obligation in the case at bar by the unilateral cancellation of
the award for the project by the United States government, through its
agency at Subic Bay should not be allowed to take undue advantage of a
party who may have legitimate claims against it by seeking refuge behind
the shield of non-suability. A contrary view would render a Filipino citizen, as
in the instant case, helpless and without redress in his own country for
violation of his rights committed by the agents of the foreign government
professing to act in its name.
Appropriate are the words of Justice Perfecto in his dissenting opinion
in Syquia vs. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312, 325:

The sanctity of upholding agreements freely entered into by the parties

cannot be over emphasized. Whether the parties are nations or private
individuals, it is to be reasonably assumed and expected that the
undertakings in the contract will be complied with in good faith.

Although, generally, foreign governments are beyond the

jurisdiction of domestic courts of justice, such rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the foreign government
enters into private contracts with the citizens of the court's
jurisdiction. A contrary view would simply run against all
principles of decency and violative of all tenets of morals.

One glaring fact of modern day civilization is that a big and powerful nation,
like the United States of America, can always overwhelm small and weak
nations. The declaration in the United Nations Charter that its member states
are equal and sovereign, becomes hollow and meaningless because big
nations wielding economic and military superiority impose upon and dictate
to small nations, subverting their sovereignty and dignity as nations. Thus,
more often than not, when U.S. interest clashes with the interest of small
nations, the American governmental agencies or its citizens invoke
principles of international law for their own benefit.

Moral principles and principles of justice are as valid and

applicable as well with regard to private individuals as with
regard to governments either domestic or foreign. Once a
foreign government enters into a private contract with the
private citizens of another country, such foreign
government cannot shield its non-performance or
contravention of the terms of the contract under the cloak
of non-jurisdiction. To place such foreign government
beyond the jurisdiction of the domestic courts is to give

In the case at bar, the efficacy of the contract between the U.S. Naval
authorities at Subic Bay on one hand, and herein private respondent on the
other, was honored more in the breach than in the compliance The opinion

37

of the majority will certainly open the floodgates of more violations of

contractual obligations. American authorities or any foreign government in
the Philippines for that matter, dealing with the citizens of this country, can
conveniently seek protective cover under the majority opinion. The result is
disastrous to the Philippines.

"nothing in this Agreement shall imply any waiver by either of the two
Governments of such immunity under international law."
Reliance by petitioners on the non-suability of the United States Government
before the local courts, actually clashes with No. III on respect for Philippine
law of the Memorandum of Agreement signed on January 7, 1979, also
amending RP-US Military Bases Agreement, which stresses that "it is the
duty of members of the United States Forces, the civilian component and
their dependents, to respect the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and
to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the Military Bases
Agreement and, in particular, from any political activity in the Philippines.
The United States shag take all measures within its authority to insure that
they adhere to them (Emphasis supplied).

This opinion of the majority manifests a neo-colonial mentality. It fosters

economic imperialism and foreign political ascendancy in our Republic.
The doctrine of government immunity from suit cannot and should not serve
as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen (Amigable vs.
Cuenca, L-26400, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 360; Ministerio vs. Court of
First Instance, L-31635, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA 464).

The foregoing duty imposed by the amendment to the Agreement is further

emphasized by No. IV on the economic and social improvement of areas
surrounding the bases, which directs that "moreover, the United States
Forces shall procure goods and services in the Philippines to the maximum
extent feasible" (Emphasis supplied).

Under the doctrine of implied waiver of its non-suability, the United States
government, through its naval authorities at Subic Bay, should be held
amenable to lawsuits in our country like any other juristic person.
The invocation by the petitioner United States of America is not in accord
with paragraph 3 of Article III of the original RP-US Military Bases
Agreement of March 14, 1947, which states that "in the exercise of the
above-mentioned rights, powers and authority, the United States agrees that
the powers granted to it will not be used unreasonably. . ." (Emphasis
supplied).

Under No. VI on labor and taxation of the said amendment of January 6,

1979 in connection with the discussions on possible revisions or alterations
of the Agreement of May 27, 1968, "the discussions shall be conducted on
the basis of the principles of equality of treatment, the right to organize, and
bargain collectively, and respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of the
Philippines" (Emphasis supplied)

Nor is such posture of the petitioners herein in harmony with the amendment
dated May 27, 1968 to the aforesaid RP-US Military Bases Agreement,
which recognizes "the need to promote and maintain sound employment
practices which will assure equality of treatment of all employees ... and
continuing favorable employer-employee relations ..." and "(B)elieving that
an agreement will be mutually beneficial and will strengthen the democratic
institutions cherished by both Governments, ... the United States
Government agrees to accord preferential employment of Filipino citizens in
the Bases, thus (1) the U.S. Forces in the Philippines shall fill the needs for
civilian employment by employing Filipino citizens, etc." (Par. 1, Art. I of the
Amendment of May 27, 1968).

The majority opinion seems to mock the provision of paragraph 1 of the joint
statement of President Marcos and Vice-President Mondale of the United
States dated May 4, 1978 that "the United States re-affirms that Philippine
sovereignty extends over the bases and that Its base shall be under the
command of a Philippine Base Commander, " which is supposed to
underscore the joint Communique of President Marcos and U.S. President
Ford of December 7, 1975, under which "they affirm that sovereign equality,
territorial integrity and political independence of all States are fundamental
principles which both countries scrupulously respect; and that "they confirm
that mutual respect for the dignity of each nation shall characterize their
friendship as well as the alliance between their two countries. "

Neither does the invocation by petitioners of state immunity from suit

express fidelity to paragraph 1 of Article IV of the aforesaid amendment of
May 2 7, 1968 which directs that " contractors and concessionaires
performing work for the U.S. Armed Forces shall be required by their
contract or concession agreements to comply with all applicable Philippine
labor laws and regulations, " even though paragraph 2 thereof affirms that

The majority opinion negates the statement on the delineation of the powers,
duties and responsibilities of both the Philippine and American Base
Commanders that "in the performance of their duties, the Philippine Base
Commander and the American Base Commander shall be guided by full

38

respect for Philippine sovereignty on the one hand and the assurance of
unhampered U.S. military operations on the other hand and that "they shall
promote cooperation understanding and harmonious relations within the
Base and with the general public in the proximate vicinity thereof" (par. 2 &
par. 3 of the Annex covered by the exchange of notes, January 7, 1979,
between Ambassador Richard W. Murphy and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Romulo, Emphasis supplied).

39

G.R. No. L-26400 February 29, 1972

Gorordo Avenues. She also sought the payment of compensatory damages

in the sum of P50,000.00 for the illegal occupation of her land, moral
damages in the sum of P25,000.00, attorney's fees in the sum of P5,000.00
and the costs of the suit.

VICTORIA AMIGABLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
NICOLAS CUENCA, as Commissioner of Public Highways and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, defendants-appellees.

Within the reglementary period the defendants filed a joint answer denying
the material allegations of the complaint and interposing the following
affirmative defenses, to wit: (1) that the action was premature, the claim not
having been filed first with the Office of the Auditor General; (2) that the right
of action for the recovery of any amount which might be due the plaintiff, if
any, had already prescribed; (3) that the action being a suit against the
Government, the claim for moral damages, attorney's fees and costs had no
valid basis since as to these items the Government had not given its consent
to be sued; and (4) that inasmuch as it was the province of Cebu that
appropriated and used the area involved in the construction of Mango
Avenue, plaintiff had no cause of action against the defendants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:p
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu in
its Civil Case No. R-5977, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint.
Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No.
639 of the Banilad Estate in Cebu City as shown by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-18060, which superseded Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT3272 (T-3435) issued to her by the Register of Deeds of Cebu on February
1, 1924. No annotation in favor of the government of any right or interest in
the property appears at the back of the certificate. Without prior
expropriation or negotiated sale, the government used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for the construction of the Mango and
Gorordo Avenues.

During the scheduled hearings nobody appeared for the defendants

notwithstanding due notice, so the trial court proceeded to receive the
plaintiff's evidence ex parte. On July 29, 1959 said court rendered its
decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff's cause of action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot in
question on the ground that the government cannot be sued without its
consent; that it had neither original nor appellate jurisdiction to hear, try and
decide plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages in the sum of P50,000.00,
the same being a money claim against the government; and that the claim
for moral damages had long prescribed, nor did it have jurisdiction over said
claim because the government had not given its consent to be sued.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a
reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
subsequently certified the case to Us, there being no question of fact
involved.

It appears that said avenues were already existing in 1921 although "they
were in bad condition and very narrow, unlike the wide and beautiful
avenues that they are now," and "that the tracing of said roads was begun in
1924, and the formal construction in
1925." *
On March 27, 1958 Amigable's counsel wrote the President of the
Philippines, requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been
appropriated by the government. The claim was indorsed to the Auditor
General, who disallowed it in his 9th Indorsement dated December 9, 1958.
A copy of said indorsement was transmitted to Amigable's counsel by the
Office of the President on January 7, 1959.

The issue here is whether or not the appellant may properly sue the
government under the facts of the case.
In the case of Ministerio vs. Court of First Instance of Cebu, 1 involving a claim
for payment of the value of a portion of land used for the widening of the Gorordo
Avenue in Cebu City, this Court, through Mr. Justice Enrique M. Fernando, held that
where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use
without going through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the
aggrieved party may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby
violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit without its consent. We there
said: .

On February 6, 1959 Amigable filed in the court a quo a complaint, which

was later amended on April 17, 1959 upon motion of the defendants, against
the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Public Highways for the recovery of ownership and
possession of the 6,167 square meters of land traversed by the Mango and

40

should pay for attorney's fees, the amount of which should be fixed by the trial court
after hearing.

... . If the constitutional mandate that the owner be

compensated for property taken for public use were to be
respected, as it should, then a suit of this character should
not be summarily dismissed. The doctrine of governmental
immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen. Had the government
followed the procedure indicated by the governing law at
the time, a complaint would have been filed by it, and only
upon payment of the compensation fixed by the judgment,
or after tender to the party entitled to such payment of the
amount fixed, may it "have the right to enter in and upon
the land so condemned, to appropriate the same to the
public use defined in the judgment." If there were an
observance of procedural regularity, petitioners would not
be in the sad plaint they are now. It is unthinkable then
that precisely because there was a failure to abide by what
the law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It
is just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law
were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when
the government takes any property for public use, which is
conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to be
judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits to
the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that the
doctrine of immunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside and the case
remanded to the court a quo for the determination of compensation,
including attorney's fees, to which the appellant is entitled as above
indicated. No pronouncement as to costs.

Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the

back of her certificate of title and that she has not executed any deed of
conveyance of any portion of her lot to the government, the appellant
remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, she could bring an
action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime
because possession is one of the attributes of ownership. However, since
restoration of possession of said portion by the government is neither
convenient nor feasible at this time because it is now and has been used for
road purposes, the only relief available is for the government to make due
compensation which it could and should have done years ago. To determine
the due compensation for the land, the basis should be the price or value
thereof at the time of the taking. 2
As regards the claim for damages, the plaintiff is entitled thereto in the form
of legal interest on the price of the land from the time it was taken up to the
time that payment is made by the government. 3 In addition, the government

41