106 David Vs Macapagal

106 David vs Macapagal
G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,

171489 & 171424 May 6, 2006
TOPIC: threat to states existence as valid exercise of
AUTHOR: Arthur Archie Tiu

NOTES
restraint to ones liberty

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency and call
upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP),
to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country. The Office
of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the
20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and revoked the permits to hold
rallies issued earlier by the local governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.
The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the
University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion,
Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
In the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the
Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was made against representatives of
ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA whom suspected of inciting to sedition and
rebellion. On March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the
Supreme Court and three (3) of those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent
questioning the legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency
powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press,
of speech and assembly.
ISSUE(S): 1.) Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?
2.) Whether or not the warantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas and the dispersal of KMU and NAFLUKMU members during rallies were valid?
3.) Whether or not proper to implead President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as respondent in the petitions?
4.) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing in questioning the constitutionality of the proclamation?
5.) Whether or not the concurrence of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are
used?
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petitions are partly granted. The Court rules that
PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by President Gloria MacapagalArroyo on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, the provisions of PP
1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. In addition,
the provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Section 17, Article VII of
the Constitution is CONSTITUTIONAL, but such declaration does not authorize the
President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public
interest without prior legislation.
G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP
should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of
terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such
portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the
absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media
or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials,
are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
RATIO:
1.) The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a
call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence whenever
becomes necessary as prescribe under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.
However, there were extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power
(A) To issue decrees; (" Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that "[t]he legislative power shall be
vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.")
(B) To direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President[The absence of a law defining
"acts of terrorism" may result in abuse and oppression on the part of the police or
military]; and
(C) To impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra
vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the
Constitution, the President, in the absence of legislative legislation, cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
Therefore, the PP No. 1017 is only partly unconstitutional.
2.) The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and
warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies are illegal, in
the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts constituting lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media
or any form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the
Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of its articles for publication and other materials,
are declared unconstitutional because there was no clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent.
3.) It is not proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is the doctrine that
the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
4.) This Court adopted the direct injury test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held
that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as
a result. Therefore, the court ruled that the petitioners have a locus standi, for they
suffered direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by
police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
5.) Under Article XII Section 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, in times of national
emergency, when the public interest so requires, the President may temporarily take over
a privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest only if there is
congressional authority or approval. There must enactment of appropriate legislation
prescribing the terms and conditions under which the President may exercise the powers
that will serves as the best assurance that due process of law would be observed.
1.
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

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106 David vs Macapagal

G.R. No. 171396, 171409, 171485, 171483, 171400,

AUTHOR: Arthur Archie Tiu

restraint to ones liberty

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