Building For Peace, Corps of Engineers 1945-91

IN THE
U.S. ARMY
COLD WAR
BUILDING FOR PEACE

U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS IN EUROPE
19451991
Robert P. Grathwol
Donita M. Moorhus
Donita M. Moorhus
United States Army
and
Center of
Military History
PIN : 081031000
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softcover_Final.indd 1
Robert P. Grathwol
U.S. Army in the Cold War
BUILDING FOR PEACE

U.S. ARMY ENGINEERS IN EUROPE
19451991
by
Robert P. Grathwol
Donita M. Moorhus
Center of Military History

and
Corps of Engineers
United States Army
Washington, D.C., 2005
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Grathwol, Robert P., 1939
Building for peace : U.S. Army engineers in Europe, 19451991 / Robert P.
Grathwol, Donita M. Moorhus.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. United States. Army. Corps of EngineersHistory. 2. Reconstruction (1939
1951)Europe. I. Moorhus, Donita M., 1942 II. Title.
UG23.G73 2005
358.4730973dc2
CMH Pub 4511
01Front page ii_soft cover withoi i
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Contents
U.S. Army in the Cold War Series

Jeffrey J. Clarke, General Editor
Advisory Committee
(As of October 2005)
Jon T. Sumida
University of Maryland
Col. Lance Betros
U.S. Military Academy
Col. Robert Dalessandro
U.S. Army War College
Adrian R. Lewis
University of North Texas
Brian M. Linn
Texas A&M University
John H. Morrow, Jr.
The University of Georgia
Sean D. Naylor
Army Times
Reina Pennington
Norwich University
Steven A. Raho
Records Management and
Declassification Agency
Col. Timothy R. Reese
U.S. Army Command and General
Staff College
Ronald H. Spector
The George Washington University
James T. Stensvaag
U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command
Brig. Gen. Volney Warner
Staff College
James H. Willbanks
Staff College
U.S. Army Center of Military History

Brig. Gen. (Ret.) John S. Brown, Chief of Military History
Chief Historian
Chief, Histories Division
Editor in Chief
Jeffrey J. Clarke
Richard W. Stewart
Keith R. Tidman
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Contents
FOREWORD
ost of the large wars between the end of World War II in 1945
and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were fought in
Asia and the Middle East. Europe, where no war was fought,
ironically was the epicenter of the Cold War. The stakes were
highest there for both sides as two fundamentally opposed ideologies and
political systems confronted each other across the so-called Iron Curtain.
Both sides saw war in Europe as an Armageddon that could bring total
victory or catastrophic defeat, and both sides focused and shaped their
strategies and military forces to fight that war. By the time the Cold War
ended in 1989 with the destruction of the Berlin Wallthe Iron Curtain
incarnateboth sides had spent huge sums of money and devoted vast
human resources to preparing for a war that never came.
A major fraction of the resources expended during the Cold War were
devoted to the physical infrastructure that housed, trained, fed, armed,
protected, and diverted the soldiers of the United States and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for almost half a century. The U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers played a central role in building and maintaining that infrastructure. This history examines the engineers work in
detail, chronicling their design and construction activities in support of
the U.S. and NATO forces that stood on the front lines of the Cold War.
Building for Peace tells the story of the often unglamorous but nevertheless critical missions of engineer officers and civilians and private contractors. It reflects the twists and turns of the Cold Wars history and the
effect these had on the engineering itself. Engineers, like their counterparts in other branches and services, worked tirelessly and often against
great odds to defend the West.
CARL A. STROCK
Lieutenant General, USA
Chief of Engineers
JOHN S. BROWN
Brigadier General, USA (Ret.)
Chief of Military History
Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991
THE AUTHORS
n 1988 Robert P. Grathwol, Ph.D., and Donita Moorhus formed a partnership to conduct historical research and provide services in organizational development. They are coauthors of Berlin and the American
Military, A Cold War Chronicle (1999); American Forces in Berlin, Outpost
of the Cold War, 19451994 (1994); and Oral History and Postwar GermanAmerican Relations: Resources in the United States (1997, with Douglas J.
Wilson). They are also are coauthors of Bricks, Sand, and Marble: U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers Military Construction in the Mediterranean and
Middle East, 19471991.
Grathwol has more than thirty years of experience as a professional
historian and publishing scholar. He has worked extensively with archival documents in Europe, as well as in the National Archives, federal
records centers, and the Library of Congress. He taught twentieth century
European history at Washington State University, Johns Hopkins School
of Advanced International Studies, Virginia Polytechnic Institute, and the
University of Arkansas. Academic publications include Stresemann and the
DNVP and numerous scholarly articles and book reviews in both English
and German. Grathwol studied in France on a Fulbright Scholarship and
spent two years as an Alexander von Humboldt Foundation Research
Fellow in Germany. He holds a Diplme Suprieur from the Centre des
Hautes tudes Europennes, Universit de Strasbourg, and a Ph.D. from
the University of Chicago.
Donita Moorhus is an oral historian, researcher, and writer. In addition to managing several historical research projects, she has written
historical reports on the activities in Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 19881992 and 19921996. For the U.S. Army Criminal
Investigation Command (USACIDC), she was coauthor of the Annual
Historical Review, Fiscal Years 19911992, the Annual Historical Review,
Fiscal Years 1992 through 1995, and sole author of a Historical Report
of the Investigations of Sexual Misconduct in the Army, September 1996
through July 1997. Ms. Moorhus has interviewed senior officers of the
U.S. military, civilians in government service, members of Congress,
business leaders, foreign nationals, and journalists. She has an M.S. from
Fordham University.
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PREFACE
his book traces the activities of the American military engineers

in Europe from the construction that began immediately after the
end of the war in 1945, through the increase in construction necessitated by the buildup of American troops during the Cold War,
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The book would not exist
if not for the forethought of Maj. Gen. James W. Bill Ray, commander
of the Europe Division of the Army Corps of Engineers in the mid-1980s,
who set aside funds for a history of the division.
We began our research in 1988, and the timing could not have been
more propitious. In that year the Europe Division expected to award
between $650 and $700 million in contracts for design and construction.
Before we completed the project, the Cold War had ended; two-thirds
of U.S. forces had left Europe, some for the war to liberate Kuwait, some
to return permanently to the United States; and American military construction in the region had shrunk to a small fraction of what it had been.
Within a few short years the personnel, documents, and photographs
that could tell the story of American military engineering in Europe
were widely dispersed and the Europe Division had given way to a much
smaller Europe District.
The story of the years between 1945 and 1991 has a straightforward
outline. By mid-1945 the U.S. Army that had fought Nazism occupied the
defeated German nation in cooperation with the three wartime Allies
that had led the victorious coalition. The occupying army required engineering support to reconstruct even the minimum essential elements of
the civic and economic structures necessary to conduct its business. The
German government financed this construction as a part of reparation
payments, providing for American military projects under American
direction built by Germans and financed with German marks. Engineer
activity was administered under the command structure of the U.S. Army
of Occupation.
Within a few years, the occupying armys role changed. The Berlin
Blockade of 19481949, the Korean War of 19501953, and the intensification of the Cold War between the Western allies and the Soviet Union
turned the American military from occupier of a defeated Germany into a
protective force contributing to a common European defense. By the mid1950s the newly created Federal Republic of Germany became a valued
ally in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).
Military construction expanded with this changing role, and new
engineering organizations were created to manage it. The Department
of Defense formed the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) in 1953 to hanvii

dle military building in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa for
the Army, Air Force, and Navy. The U.S. Army Construction Agency,
Germany (USACAG), took on a similar role starting in 1956 with U.S.financed construction in the Federal Republic of Germany. Within a year,
an organization similar to USACAG, the U.S. Army Construction Agency,
France (USACAF), succeeded JCA to supervise U.S. military construction in France. In 1964 the Engineer Element replaced both USACAF and
USACAG.
By 1966 the role of the U.S. military had evolved further and construction activities were consolidated in the Engineer Command under
the commander in chief of the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). For the
first time in Europe, a single engineer officer commanded all the Armys
European construction elements: troop construction, contract construction, and support to the military communities known as facilities engineering.
It was only in 1974 that engineering construction activities in Europe
came directly under the Chief of Engineers in Washington, D.C. In July
1974 USAREUR disestablished the Engineer Command and redistributed
its responsibilities. The contract construction function transferred to the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which established the European Division
(EUD). With only a minor change of name, from European to Europe
Division, this organization lasted until the end of the Cold War.
Over four years we pieced this story together from documents at the
National Archives in Washington, D.C.; the Research Collections of the
Corps of Engineers at the Humphreys Engineer Center in Alexandria,
Virginia; the records-holding area of the Europe Division/District
in Frankfurt, Germany; the U.S. Army Center of Military History in
Washington, D.C.; the Europe Divisions area offices in Germany and in
Turkey; and other locations. We interviewed more than 125 active and
retired military personnel, American civilians, and German and thirdcountry nationals. The interviews, of which more than 100 were recorded
and transcribed, were a particularly valuable source. They are located at
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Office of History Research Collections,
Alexandria, Virginia.
We gratefully acknowledge that many peoplecivilian and military,
in Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria, Turkey, and the
United Statescontributed to bringing the story of the Army engineers
service in Europe to these pages. We thank all the individuals who took
the time to talk with us candidly about their experiences. Their memories
and insights make this study more accurate and more interesting. We
received professional support from dozens of librarians, archivists, and
staff in offices and agencies in the United States and Europe. Our research
in Europe was particularly aided by Anita Morsman, Linda Tompkins,
Elaine Lawson, and Paul Nelson; but countless others helped us locate
documents, schedule interviews, and arrange site visits. Elizabeth Miller
and Douglas J. Wilson contributed intelligence and insight during the
research and writing phases; Dougs assistance with photographs and
viii
Preface
maps was invaluable. At a very early stage of the project, David Goldman
helped with research at the National Archives. The initial drafts of
the manuscript benefited from review by members of the Historical
Committee of the Europe Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Several people in the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, provided assistance and support. We are especially
grateful to Dr. William C. Baldwin, who administered the contract. From
our first day of research, he gave us encouragement laced with good
advice and tempered by good humor. Dr. Martin Gordon facilitated our
search for documents both in the Research Collections at the Humphreys
Engineer Center and at the Washington National Records Center. Drs.
Martin Reuss, Frank N. Schubert, and John Greenwood read versions of
the manuscript and offered criticism. Patricia Taylor helped us reshape
and improve the manuscript. The late Marilyn Hunter, as well as Jean
Diaz, offered editorial guidance and suggestions.
Staff at the U.S. Army Center of Military History under the leadership of Keith R. Tidman and Beth MacKenzie guided the manuscript
to publication. Diane M. Donovan carefully reviewed the text to assure
consistency of style; she worked closely with Teresa Jameson, who
designed the layout of the text, maps, and illustrations. S. L. Dowdy prepared the maps, and Glenn Schwegmann and Susan Carroll contributed
their editorial talents.
We give special recognition and appreciation to General Ray, who
made the decision to fund the initial contract for this study. Like General
Ray, we hope the information we have gathered will allow others to
appreciate the role that the Army engineers, civilian and military, played
in Europe after World War II.
29 September 2005
ROBERT P. GRATHWOL
DONITA M. MOORHUS
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Contents
CONTENTS
Part One
Postwar Reconstruction, 19451949
Chapter
Page
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. Combat to Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organizing the Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Army Engineers in the U.S. Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Office of the Theater Chief Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Construction Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Priorities and Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Redeployment of Troops and Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Securing a New Line of Communications and Supply . . . .
Rebuilding the Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7
9
14
16
17
19
20
21
23
2. From Occupation to Mutual Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Engineer Activities in Occupied Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supporting the U.S. Army in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supporting the Air Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Juggling Competing Demands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Construction Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dealing with Excess Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Hanau Depot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Repair and Rebuild Program. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reasserting Order and Discipline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Engineer Management Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tactical Readiness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Administration Reorganization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The First Berlin Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Blockade and U.S. Forces in Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Standardizing Engineer Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
27
28
28
30
31
33
33
34
37
38
39
42
43
44
47
51
Part Two
For a Common Defense, 19501973
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
xi

Chapter
Page
3. Defending the West, 19501953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Troop Base in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The American Zone in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Troop Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bachelor Officers Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Troop Training Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dependent Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Helping Hand Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Building West of the Rhine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Air Force Infrastructure in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Lines of Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
64
65
67
71
72
73
76
78
83
84
4. Construction in the Mid-1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Deutschmark Construction in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bachelor Officers Quarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Community Support Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Troop Training Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Construction Agency in France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Administrative Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personnel Recruitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Securing the Line of Communications across France . . . . .
Joint Construction Agency outside France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Phaseout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95
95
96
98
98
101
101
102
107
108
110
114
116
5. Managing Construction in Germany, 19561966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The German Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USACAG Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
USACAG Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Berlin Crisis of 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
From USACAG to Engineer Element . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
121
121
123
128
133
135
6. Engineer Command, 19661974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Structure and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Military, Civilian, and German Personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Engineer Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Facilities Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Changing Environment in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FRELOC Mission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rethinking the Commitment to Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Workload and Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Boiler Conversion Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stem to Stern Renovations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
139
141
144
146
147
148
148
152
153
155
155
158
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Contents
Chapter
Page
6. Engineer Command, 19661974 (Continued)

TAB VEE Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ENGCOM Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ammunition Storage Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Challenges in the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Modernizing U.S. Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upgrading Remote Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Phaseout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
160
161
162
163
165
167
168
Part Three
The Europe Division, 19741991
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
177
7. The Transition Period, 19741978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

New Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Area Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Staff Continuity and Morale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adjustments in the Comptrollers Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In-House Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Support for Facilities Engineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Assessing the First Two Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Change of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Projects Board . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addressing Personnel Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Visiting TUSEG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
181
181
183
188
191
192
193
195
196
197
199
202
8. Decade of Consolidation and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Balancing Manpower and Workload, 19781980 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Personnel Manipulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Managing Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Addressing EUD Customers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Persistent Manpower Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Developing the Engineering Division . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Managing the Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Construction in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tightening Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Shifts in Emphasis and Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Air Force as Customer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EUD Wartime Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Assessing EUD Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Change of Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
205
206
207
209
211
211
215
216
218
220
223
224
225
226
227
228
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Chapter
Page
8. Decade of Consolidation and Growth (Continued)

Organizational Structure and Data Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stability Achieved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organizational Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intergovernmental Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Focus on Customers and Quality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
229
232
233
237
237
9. Managing Design and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Methods of Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contracting in Turkey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contracting in West Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Projects and the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Value Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Projects and Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Host-Nation Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NATO Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Construction Workload . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Projects and Area Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Volume of Work in the 1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Projects in the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Concerns in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
241
243
244
245
247
247
248
249
251
253
253
255
256
257
258
261
262
266
10. Programs and Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Holdover Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Modernizing U.S. Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Air Force Aircraft Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Naval Facilities in Sigonella, Sicily . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ammunition Storage Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pre-positioned Materiel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
271
271
271
275
280
281
282
293
11. Supporting the Combat Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Redeploying U.S. Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garrison in Garlstedt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Forward Stationing in Vilseck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Supporting New Weapons Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upgrading the Ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels . . . . . . . .
Modernizing Operational Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Patriot Missile Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cruise and Pershing Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
299
299
300
307
309
310
313
315
319
321
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Contents
12. Improving the Community Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Family Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Existing Housing Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Factory-Built Housing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attic Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schools and Child Care Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Medical Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Community Support Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Commissaries and Post Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sports and Recreational Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
329
330
331
334
339
341
343
349
354
356
357
360
13. Europe Transformed, 19881991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Prelude to Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Emphasizing Affirmative Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Currents of Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Political Revolution in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
EUD and the European Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Manpower Reduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reorganization Approved . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Seeking Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Steps toward Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Changes in the Field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Impact on Morale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Europe District . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
363
364
366
368
370
372
374
376
379
381
384
385
388
Epilogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Appreciating Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recognizing Cultural Differences. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An Absence of Scandal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Continuity amid Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Legacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
389
389
390
390
391
391
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
395
Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
453
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
455
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
467
Tables
No.
1. Personnel Receiving European Command Support,

1950 and 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Page
65
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No.
Page
2. Workload of the U.S. Engineer Group, Turkey, 1955 and 1956 . . .

3. Military Construction for the Army, June 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Engineer Command Construction Placement and Staffing,
19651972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Engineering Division Staffing, Europe Division, Fiscal Years
19761988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Military Construction, Army, Annual Allotments, Fiscal
Years 19751986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Annual Allotments,
Fiscal Years 19751981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Europe Division Construction Execution,
May 1976August 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Europe Division Construction Execution, 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10. Construction Placement by Area Office, Fiscal Years
1979 and 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
11. Long Range Security Program, 19761982 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12. Europe Division Design Accomplishments, Fiscal Years
1980 and 1984 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
116
154
164
219
254
257
258
259
262
286
355
Charts
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, 1953 . . . . . . . . . .
Joint Construction Agency Construction Procedure in France . .
Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, September
1955, Depicting the New Eastern and Southern Districts . . . . .
Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe,
30 June 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany
(USACAG), ca. 1961, Depicting the New Legal Branch
and Eleven Resident Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1963, Just
before the Dissolution of USACAG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th
Army, 1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe,
1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of the Europe Division, 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of the Europe Division, July 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indirect Construction Process in the Federal Republic
of Germany. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Indirect Method of Contracting and Project Milestones . . . . . . . .
Organization of the Europe Division, February 1989 . . . . . . . . . .
Organization of the Europe Division, May 1990 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
59
103
105
117
125
129
136
142
143
183
235
251
252
365
377
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Contents
Figures
No.
Page
1. Converted Apartment in the Bindermichl Complex . . . . . . . . . . .

2. Annual Construction Placement of the U.S. Army Construction
Agency, Germany, and the Engineer Element, 19571966 . . . . .
3. New Masthead of the Europe Division Newsletter . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Drawing of a Proposed Ammunition Storage Site, 1981 . . . . . . . .
5. Site Plan of the Garrison in Garlstedt, 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
49
137
197
283
301
Maps
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
Zones of Occupation: Germany, August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Berlin Occupation Sectors, August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zones of Occupation: Austria, June 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Zone of Occupation, Military Districts and Posts:
West Germany, 1 August 1947 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
European Signatories, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
April 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe: West Germany, 1 December 1952 . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe, Family Housing: West Germany,
30 June 1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The U.S. Army Engineer Group (TUSEG): Turkey, 1950s . . . . . . .
Lines of Communication: France, 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Military Housing Construction: France, 19571963 . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe, Engineer Command: West Germany, Late
1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe, Theater Army Support Command:
West Germany, 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe, Engineer Command: West Germany, 1970 . .
U.S. Army, Europe: West Germany, 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Field Organization,
1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Northern Europe:
Field Organization, 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, January 1983. . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Military Construction,
1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Military Construction:
Mediterranean Area, Mid-1970s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Nuremberg Area,
1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Turkey, 1980s . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe: West Germany, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe: Italy, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
12
13
40
58
60
77
85
86
110
144
169
170
185
187
210
214
242
260
264
267
288
289
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No.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
Page
U.S. Army, Europe: Greece, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Army, Europe: Turkey, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army, Europe: Netherlands, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: POMSS Locations,
1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Upper Weser Region, West Germany, 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe: Netherlands, 1986 . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Field Organization:
Northern Europe, 1989 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, Field Organization:
Northern Europe, 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
289
290
291
296
304
325
373
386
Illustrations
War Destruction in Munich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Destroyed Bridge over the Rhine River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Power Station in Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mess Hall under Construction in Frankfurt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Constructing a Railway Bridge between Germany and Belgium . . . .
Training in Grafenwhr in Early 1956 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Engineer School Activities in Murnau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Refurbished Reinhardt Caserne, Neu Ulm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Enlisted Mens Club in Pirmasens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mock Village for Training near Hohenfels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Family Apartments and a Theater in Bremerhaven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ribbed-Concrete Floor Construction for Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warehouse Construction near Kaiserslautern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Family Housing Complex in Vogelweh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Medical Facility Construction in Landstuhl . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tent Life in Trois Fontaines. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Railroad Locomotives for Heating an Apartment Complex . . . . . . . .
High School in Furth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chapel at Downs Barracks in Fulda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Utilities Construction for Camp Roeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
William Camblor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Col. Robert P. Young . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
School in Heidelberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Depot in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lt. Gens. Kenneth W. Kennedy and William F. Cassidy . . . . . . . . . . .
Coal-fired Boiler in Bamberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. Carroll N. LeTellier and Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
General Prentiss and John Tambornino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
9
22
23
25
42
53
69
70
72
74
75
80
81
82
90
97
99
100
115
124
140
146
149
155
157
163
171
182
189
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Contents
Page
Brig. Gen. Norman G. Delbridge, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Build-to-Lease Family Housing in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Phillips Building in the Mid-1980s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. George K. Withers, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Army Engineer Projects in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. Scott B. Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. James W. Ray . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Recreational Facilities in Garmisch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prison in Mannheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warehouse Construction near Ankara, Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Construction Project Meeting in Sinop . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Operations Building Construction in Incirlik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pinden Barracks, Nuremberg, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Headquarters Building at an Air Base in Florennes, Belgium . . . . . . .
Europe Division Construction Site in Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Europe Division Airplane for Transport between Offices . . . . . . . . . .
Enlisted Mens Barracks under Renovation in Bremerhaven . . . . . . . .
Atomic-Resistant Aircraft Shelter in Jever, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atomic-Resistant Aircraft Shelter in the Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guard Tower for Ammunition Storage Site in Germany . . . . . . . . . . .
Heavy Door Protecting Ammunition at an LRSP Site . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vehicle Shelter in Mnchengladbach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Family Housing in Osterholz-Scharmbeck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Newly Constructed Facilities in Vilseck, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Helicopters in a Maintenance Hangar in Crailsheim . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pop-up Target at the Grafenwhr Training Range . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MOUT Village in Hohenfels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Washrack for Tanks, Trucks, and Other Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hardstand Construction in Kitzingen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Patriot Missile Facility in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GLCM Site in Florennes, Belgium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Housing Unit in Germany with Signs of Structural Cracking . . . . . .
Renovated Housing in Nuremberg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prefabricated Housing for Wildflecken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Prototype of Prefabricated Housing on Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Family Housing in Soesterberg, Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attic in Extant Building Being Converted into an Apartment . . . . . .
Exterior of Housing Unit with Attic Apartments Added . . . . . . . . . . .
Two-Person Barracks Room in Kaiserslautern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Elementary and High School in Stuttgart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contractor in Asbestos Protection Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Child Development Center in Bad Kreuznach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Youth Activity Center in Wiesbaden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
197
206
207
212
213
222
224
229
234
236
243
244
250
256
263
265
266
268
275
278
279
290
292
295
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xix
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Page
Addition to Army Hospital under Construction in Wrzburg . . . . . .

Front Lobby of Hospital in Bremerhaven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NCO Club in Gppingen under Construction in 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Exchange Mall in Nuremberg Completed in 1988. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gymnasium in Stuttgart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bowling Facility in Hanau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Custom-Built Chapel in Cakmakli, Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
352
353
354
357
358
359
361
366
Illustrations courtesy of the following: 81, Ingenieur- U Architekturbro

Robert Lffert; 97, H. Jace Greene; 158, U.S. Army, Europe; 189, Louis
Brettschneider; 224, Defense Visual Information Center. With the exception of p. 224, these and all other illustrations can be found in U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers Office of History Research Collections, Alexandria,
Va.
xx
PART ONE
POSTWAR RECONSTRUCTION
19451949
02A_PartI Intro_Final.indd 1
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INTRODUCTION
orld War II changed world politics in ways that few people

fully understood in 1945. By the end of that war, for the first
time since the sixteenth century, European states were no
longer the arbiters of the worlds balance of power. Indeed,
the destruction of German military and economic might created a vacuum
of power in the center of Europe. Although Germany was occupied and
governed by a coalition of powers that included Great Britain and France,
its ultimate fate would be in the hands of the two extra-European powers
that emerged from the war wielding unprecedented military forcethe
United States and the Soviet Union.
Over the course of the half-decade between 1945 and 1949, these two
superpowers became locked in a struggle for world supremacy that dominated the next forty years. Europe was a theater of conflict and tension in that
strugglethe West European states on one side as participants by assent in
an alliance led by the United States and the East European states on the other,
coerced into satellite status in a system dominated by the Soviet Union.
Between 1945 and 1948 the Grand Alliance that linked the United
States and the Soviet Union during World War II came apart. In a speech
in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March 1946, former British Prime Minister
Winston Churchill used the metaphor of an iron curtain descending
across Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic, behind which reigned
oppression and disregard for individual freedom. In a book published
late in 1947, the American journalist Walter Lippmann applied an equally
memorable labelCold Warto the struggle between the United States
and the Soviet Union.
The United States assumed its new role as a world leader in this struggle only gradually. At the end of the war the country expected to demobilize its military and return to a normal, peacetime existence. By degrees,
however, it took the initiative in overcoming the impasse concerning
German economic recovery. In the eastern Mediterranean, where Western
policymakers saw Communist insurrection threatening the government
of Greece and Soviet pressure threatening the government of Turkey, the
United States assumed responsibilities historically exercised by Britain. In
March 1947 President Harry S. Truman asked Congress for $400 million in
military and economic aid to help Greece and Turkey resist internal and
external threats and remain free peoples. In his address to Congress
presenting the policy that became known as the Truman Doctrine, the
president expressed a willingness to extend similar assistance to any
nation that faced a comparable threat.
2/3/06 11:08:01 AM

The Marshall Plan of 1947 represented another step on the United
States path to leadership. Outlined by Secretary of State George C.
Marshall in June 1947, the plan offered American economic aid to
European countries willing to cooperate in the economic reconstruction of
Europe as a whole. The proposal represented an invitation to create a new
alignment based on shared economic principles.
In Eastern Europe, Communist parties began as minority partners
in putatively pluralistic coalitions but progressively took dictatorial
control of governmentsPoland in January 1947, Hungary in June, and
Czechoslovakia in February and March 1948. Soviet intentions seemed
increasingly more threatening. On 17 March 1948, France, Britain, and
the three small countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
signed the Brussels Pact, an agreement for their mutual defense. On
the same day across the Atlantic in Washington, District of Columbia,
President Truman sent a special message to Congress asking for authorization to reinstitute peacetime conscription for military service. The
two events, taken together, marked the starting point for a regional security system linking Western Europe and North America. The Vandenberg
Resolution, adopted in the U.S. Senate on 11 June 1948, affirmed American
participation with West European states in a common military defense. It
reinforced Trumans decision earlier in the spring to commit the American
public to bear the burden of a standing army in peacetime. These individual steps confirmed a new direction in American foreign policyresistance to and containment of the extension of Soviet power in Europe and
around the globe.
The new policy received an immediate test in defeated Germanys
historic capital city, Berlin. When the four powers divided Germany, the
city of Berlin lay completely within the Soviet zone of occupation. Each
of the four powers received a sector of occupation within the city and
established a military presence. To gain access to the city from the rest
of Germany, the Western allies had to cross territory controlled by the
Soviets. The Soviets occasionally obstructed traffic over highways and rail
routes through their zone into Berlin, but they agreed with the Western
Powers for reasons of safety to establish unobstructed air passage through
three designated air corridors. As tensions increased among the occupying powers over how to deal with defeated Germanyand with one
anotherthe Soviet ability to isolate Berlin from overland communications became crucial. In 1948 the Soviet Union put Western resolve to the
test when it blockaded land access to Berlin from the three Western sectors of Germany. Only through the air could the West gain access to Berlin
without directly confronting the Red Army.
The clashes between the Western allies and the Soviet Union emerged
slowly, and it was not the framework that conditioned military planning for the occupation of Germany in 1945 and for the reconstruction
of Europe. The devastation of war and the collapse of society in Europe,
rather than ideological conflict, drove the U.S. military to develop pragmatic solutions to immediate problems.
4
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Introduction
The war itself had challenged the technical ingenuity of the American
military, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been an integral element in meeting the wartime challenges. The Army engineers had provided technical expertise to sustain the campaign to defeat Germany. The
Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) in Washington provided knowledge, equipment, and supplies to the combat engineer units. Engineer
troop units participated in the Allied invasions of North Africa, Italy,
and northern France at the Normandy beaches, and in the occupation
of a defeated Germany. Technical experts attached to OCE devised new
solutions, plans, techniques, and equipment for the massive problems of
logistics and combat in the war. When the war ended, the U.S. Army had
323,677 engineer troops on active military duty in the European Theater,
almost 11 percent of total troop strength in Europe.1
In 1945 the retiring chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Eugene Reybold,
observed that American engineering capacity was the one factor of
American strength which our enemies most consistently underestimated.
Without American construction talent we could not have won the war.
Recognizing that the challenges of peacetime reconstruction would be
equally great, General Reybold added, it is doubtful that without all of
Americas construction talent we can win the peace.2
Reybolds remarks were both a fitting tribute to the past and a prophetic comment on the future. In May and June 1945 the engineers had
to address the immediate needs of the U.S. Army as it changed its mission from combat to peacetime occupation. In addition, they had to help
reconstruct civil society, especially in defeated Germany, so that the
army could function as an occupying force. The Army engineers undertook these tasks in an environment as challenging as the war. Indeed,
the theater chief engineer in Europe at the end of the war, Maj. Gen.
Cecil R. Moore, reflected two decades later that his engineers had faced
circumstances after May 1945 that were far more trying than those arising during combat.3
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1
COMBAT TO OCCUPATION
he Army engineers attached to U.S. forces in Europe faced gargantuan tasks in 1945, and their work was rendered dramatically
more complex by the extent of the destruction that Europe had
suffered. During the last months of the war, retreating Germans
had devastated northern France and Belgium from the coast of Normandy
to the German border. In Holland, broken dikes allowed major sections of
the land to flood. In Italy, traditional centers of the countrys economic
strength, Milan and Turin, lay paralyzed. In Central Europe, business
and residential communities had given way to barren landscapes, piles
of debris, craters from bombs, stinking heaps of rubble, and ruins.
Throughout Germany, a large portion of civilian housing was uninhabitable. Eighty-one percent of all lodging units in the U.S. zone were either
destroyed or severely damaged. In Frankfurt, the city that the Americans
chose for the headquarters of their postwar military command, only
44,000 of 177,000 residences remained standing.1
Famine was a stark reality throughout Europe. The war had eroded
the farm economy and had destroyed machinery, fertilizers, and seed;
breeding livestock had been killed. After 1945 production of food grain in
France was less than half what it had been before the war. Food rationing
was absolutely necessary throughout Europe. An estimated 100 million
Europeans existed at a level of 1,500 or fewer calories a day, a diet inadequate to support heavy work or sustain growing children. Even that level
of nutrition proved impossible to maintain. In 1946 authorities in both the
British and American zones of occupation in Germany had to cut rations
to 1,000 calories a day, a level of consumption that the British commander
in chief, Field Marshal Bernard Viscount Montgomery, described as equivalent to slow starvation.2 Clothing and shoes were as scarce as food; tools
and domestic amenities were nonexistent.
Throughout much of Europe, the transportation system had ceased
to operate. Frances stock of locomotives was at 35 percent of prewar
numbers. In the American and British zones of Germany, 740 out of 958
important bridges had been destroyed. The debris of war clogged inland
waterways and ports, making them unusable.
03B_Chap01_Final.indd 1
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War Destruction in Munich
The theater chief engineer in Europe, Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore, exercised staff responsibility for advising the American theater commander,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, on all engineering matters and for establishing the basic plans and policies for the Army engineers. In practice,
Moore served as a part of the staff of Lt. Gen. John C. H. Lee, commander
of the Communications Zone (COMZ), the European Theaters rear area
command.3 Headquartered first in England and then in Paris after its liberation, COMZ managed the flow of supplies and support services to the
combat forces at the front and, after hostilities ended, to the occupation
forces in the American sector of Germany.4
As it advanced, the U.S. Army set up ad hoc civil affairs units of
military government in the German communities. Their main task was to
ensure the security of the armed forces on the move. Without any viable
indigenous government in place, the conquering troops assumed powers
far beyond the conventional responsibility to maintain law and order. The
Army inherited by default the responsibility to house and feed the population and to rebuild the German economic, social, and political structures
needed to sustain civilized life in the postwar era.
During the final phase of the war, Moores office provided technical
support to combat forces. Command of engineer unitsofficers and men
remained in the hands of the field commanders in the combat zone, where
the action was, or with COMZ section commanders in charge of the liberated areas. These commanders exercised considerable freedom in the field
in the use of their engineer troops and resources.5 When the war ended, the
8
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Combat to Occupation
Destroyed Railway and Highway Bridge over the Rhine River in Cologne, 18 May 1945
Army engineer organization at COMZ headquarters continued to provide

technical support for all military operations within the European Theater.
Command of engineer troops remained with the field commanders.
Organizing the Occupation

In the summer of 1945 the U.S. Army settled in Germany in the role of
occupying power. On 5 June the commanders in chief of coalition forces
in the European Theater met in Berlin and issued a joint statement on
Arrangements for Control of Germany. The Soviet Union, Great Britain,
the United States, and France declared that German centralized government had ceased to exist and that all governing authority rested with
them. They divided Germany into four zones of occupation (see Map 1)
and established the Allied Control Council in which the commanders of
the four occupying armies acted for Germany as a whole. Decisions of the
Allied Control Council had to be reached by unanimous consent. Within
his own zone each commander exercised complete authority. Berlin was
similarly divided into four sectors (see Map 2), with its own citywide
administration, the Kommandatura, composed of the four sector commanders. Under the terms of the surrender, the Germans were to bear the total
costs of the occupation.
The U.S. zone of occupation in Germany encompassed the southwestern states (Lnder) of Bavaria, Wrttemberg-Baden, and Hesse; the northern ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven; and the southwestern sector of
9
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ZONES OF OCCUPATION
GERMANY
August 1945
Zone Boundary
150 Miles
150 Kilometers
JOINT
AMERICAN-BRITISH
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
UNITED
KINGDOM
C
FOUR-
AMSTERDAM
The Hague
Hannover
N E T H E R L A N D S
Rh
in
eR
O
L
Kassel
BRUSSELS
Cologne
Erfurt
B E L G I U M
e
Meus
se
LUXEMBOURG
lR
Frankfurt
M
Mar
Kaiserslautern
Metz
Stuttgart
Danube R
e R
S e in
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
ne R
PARIS
Lo
Luxembourg
ire
Munich
Mulhouse
Dijon
S W I T Z E R L A N D
Map 1
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L I T H U A N I A
S W E D E N
A
E
S O V I E T
E A S T
P R U S S I A
Stettin
UNDER
POLISH
ADMINISTRATION
FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION
WARSAW
BERLIN
E lbe R
Leipzig
Breslau
Od
Dresden
er
PRAGUE
Pilsen
VIENNA
Munich
Da
nu
be
BUDAPEST
A
H
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BERLIN
OCCUPATION SECTORS
August 1945
F R E N C H
HQ
B R I T I S H
S O V I E T
HQ
SOVIET
HQ
HQ
A M E R I C A N
Potsdam
5
Miles
The area on the western edge of Berlin was transferred to

Soviet Occupation in 1945 in exchange for a part of the
Gatow Airport transferred to British Occupation.
Map 2
Berlin. The U.S. zone covered about 47,000 square miles, roughly the size
of the state of Mississippi; it contained few industrial resources and only
two major citiesFrankfurt and Munich. One-fourth of the land was arable, one-fourth was mountains and forest, and the remainder was pasture
or swamp land. In July 1945 the zone contained about 19 million people,
including many refugees from Eastern Europe.6
Austria presented an anomaly for the occupying powers. Annexed by
the German Reich in 1938, it had fought the war as part of Nazi Germany.
Upon defeat it was occupied and, like Germany, divided into four zones.
Arguably, Austria was not a defeated enemy state but a victim of Nazi
aggression. On the other hand, it was not a liberated state either. Its peculiar situation marked it for special treatment. After Germanys surrender,
the four occupying powers quickly turned political and economic authority over to the Austrians, who formed an indigenous central government
in Vienna. All four powers retained a military presence both in Vienna
wholly within the Soviet zone and divided like Berlinand in their four
zones. (Map 3) In June 1946, when the occupying powers recognized the
Austrian government, the Allied military governmentbut not the fourpower occupationended.
12
2/3/06 11:09:55 AM
Map 3
Bolzano
F R E N C H
Munich
75 Miles
Innsbruck
75 Kilometers
Augsburg
Landeck
SWITZERLAND
LIECHTENSTEIN
Zone Boundary
June 1945
AUSTRIA
ZONES OF OCCUPATION
Kitzbhel
Regensburg
Dan
ub
eR
Linz
Salzburg
Villach
Bad Ischl
Klagenfurt
Mur
A M E R I C A N
Dan
ube
Waidhofen
VIENNA
FOUR-POWER OCCUPATION
Bruck
Krems
Y
R
A
G
N
U
H
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Army Engineers in the U.S. Zone

On 1 July 1945, Eisenhower reorganized his forces in Europe and
established a new command, United States Forces, European Theater
(USFET), with its headquarters in the I. G. Farben Company building in
Frankfurt.7 For a brief time Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary
Force (SHAEF), the headquarters of the retiring wartime command,
the European Theater of Operations, United States Army (ETOUSA),
and its subordinate command, COMZ, all coexisted with USFET; by 1
August SHAEF and ETOUSA had been inactivated. General Eisenhower
left Europe on 11 November 1945; on 26 November General Joseph T.
McNarney took command of USFET and the military government of
Germany. The Army had begun to move support services provided by
COMZ from France into occupied Germany. It redesignated the support
command as the Theater Services Forces, European Theater (TSFET), with
a main headquarters in Frankfurt and a rear headquarters in Paris. In
Germany, American military personnel were dispersed over the entire
U.S. zone, often in small, isolated units.8
As the U.S. Army shifted its headquarters staff to Frankfurt, a new
center of engineer activities developed there. Over the summer General
Lee, the commander of COMZ and its successor, TSFET, assigned key
personnel to Frankfurt while maintaining logistical and redeployment
activities at Headquarters (Rear) in Paris.9 Lee decided to divide his staff.
He retained General Moore in Paris as theater chief engineer; but he sent
Moores deputy, Col. John R. Hardin, and Moores chief of construction,
Col. Paul D. Berrigan, to Frankfurt, where they worked under Lees chief
of staff, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder.10 The new structure perpetuated
Moores dual role as technical adviser to both the theater commander and
the commanding general of the Theater Services Forces; this duality existed until TSFET was inactivated in February 1946. By March 1946 all engineer planning and coordination functions were consolidated in Frankfurt
as a part of Headquarters, USFET.11
In Germany and Austria, the U.S. Army engineers had a wide range
of tasks. The occupying army units needed liquid fuels and petroleum
products, so Army engineers continued to operate the pipelines, pumping stations, and storage facilities that they had constructed to support
the conquest of Germany.12 To support the soldiers who remained in
Europe, the Army engineers had to build and maintain barracks, hospitals, airfields, and the attendant infrastructure. For the Army to exercise its control over the population, transportation lines choked by the
destruction of war had to be cleared. Roads, railways, canals, bridges,
rivers, and ports all demanded attention from the engineers, as did mine
fields and obstructions.13
In accomplishing their many tasks, the Army engineers operated
under two related but separate command structures. Engineer troops
remained under Army field commands and operated in support of the
occupying army units dispersed throughout the American zones in both
14
2/3/06 11:09:55 AM
Germany and Austria. The theater chief engineer, who served on the
USFET general staff, supervised area engineer officers assigned to the
military districts and subdivisions of the U.S. zones. These area engineers
acted as field agents to execute operations prescribed by the theater chief
engineer but remained under the authority of the local commander of the
military district in which they served. The structure resembled the division and district structure maintained by the Corps of Engineers in the
United States, except that it existed in what had been a combat theater
where Army field commanders retained overriding authority. The Army
engineers in the theater were commanded neither by the chief of engineers in Washington nor by the theater chief engineer. The theater chief
engineer served under the authority of the commander of USFET, not the
chief of engineers in Washington. The traditional primacy of combat field
commanders carried over into the period of occupation in ways that complicated the theater chief engineers mission.14
The dual structure of command under which the engineers operated
had a parallel in the two interdependent but separate missions faced by
the occupying armycivil administration of Germany and military command of the occupying troops. As a means of separating civil administration from issues of troop command and other military concerns, the U.S.
Army transferred administration of its occupied territory from the hands
of the tactical commanders, who had directed the invasion, to the Office of
Military Government United States (OMGUS). On 1 October 1945, OMGUS
became the official executive authority for American military government
in Germany. Headquartered in Berlin, OMGUS created local offices in the
three German states in the U.S. zone. Essentially in place by the end of 1945,
OMGUS retained its authority in Germany until 1949.15 OMGUS handled
civil administration, whereas USFET and its successors exercised command
authority over military affairs and over the troops organized into military
districts and military posts throughout the U.S. zone.16
United States Forces, Austria (USFA), established headquarters for the
American zone in Salzburg on 10 August 1945 but remained dependent
upon USFET headquarters in Frankfurt for supply and administration.
For matters concerning civil governance and political issues, USFAs commander operated directly under the command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in Washington.17 Once the postwar division of Austria was in place in
1945, the U.S. Army planned to reduce its presence to a minimum within
ninety days and to provide a military government that could support
and encourage Austrian political and economic recovery. In keeping with
these objectives, the USFA engineers tasks in 19451946 were to reduce
and reorganize personnel, to dispose of excess property, and to conduct
necessary rehabilitation and very limited construction using troop labor.18
By July 1947 USFA abandoned the practice of charging costs to Austria
as a burden of the occupation. The USFA staff engineers office had contracting experience, so the commander designated the engineers to convert all real estate occupied by the Army to lease arrangements; to close
rail service contracts; and to institute new systems for procurement, cost
15
2/3/06 11:09:55 AM

accounting, and budget preparation. During a single month of transition
in 1947, the engineers managed a team of personnel from all services that
transferred 2,000 properties being used by American personnel from requisition status to lease arrangements.19
The Office of the Theater Chief Engineer

As administration of the occupation became the dominant mission for
the U.S. Army, the need for coordination and overall planning superseded
the need for immediate decision and quick execution that had prevailed
in the immediate aftermath of Germanys surrender. To meet this change,
the Army reorganized engineer resources. Throughout the balance of the
1940s, the chief engineer in Europe and his staff acted as the headquarters
instrument, if not always the master, of activity for the engineers.
Throughout 1945 and early 1946 the Office of the Chief Engineer,
USFET, contained seven divisions: control, administration, intelligence,
troops, supply, construction, and real estate.20 The theater chief engineer
continued to support the Armys military mission in Europe, including support to the Army Air Forces. He advised the theater commander
concerning engineering needs, established basic engineer plans and policies, and supervised the engineer activities in the European Theater. His
authority was limited in practice, however, by the structure of command
in the theater. In 1945 USFET had nine subordinate commands: Third
Army; Seventh Army; the Bremen Port Command; United States Forces,
Austria; the Western and Continental Base Sections; the Berlin District;
U.S. Air Forces in Europe; and the Office of Military Government United
States. A general officer headed each of these commands, and an engineer
officer served on each of the general staffs. This decentralized structure,
coupled with the recent combat experiences in which field commanders
operated with a great deal of autonomy, created difficulties for General
Moore as he sought to plan, coordinate, and supervise overall engineer
activities throughout the theater.21
By the end of 1945 OMGUS had taken over authority for construction
related to waterways, railways, highways, and bridges. OMGUS turned to
the Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, only when it needed to supplement its own resources.22 Still, as the headquarters engineer for USFET, the
theater chief engineer retained a full agenda. His office supervised acquisition of real estate, construction and maintenance of all military structures not otherwise assigned, establishment of building standards, and
allocation of building materials among major commands. He reviewed all
building projects. He was also in charge of maintaining the water supply
and other utilities, as well as surveying and mapping. He ran the procurement system for the theater and was in charge of the disposition, storage,
and security of supplies within the theater, including captured enemy
materiel. Finally, he was responsible for fire fighting, camouflage, and
the training of U.S. forces in Europe.23 This profile of activities remained
essentially the same through the decade.24
16
2/3/06 11:09:55 AM
Most of the responsibilities of the Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET,
involved planning, administration, and supervision. The office played
a managerial and professional role in preparing architectural and engineering plans and in supervising their preparation by architect-engineer
firms. Contractors, generally hired by subordinate levels of command
under USFET, frequently executed construction and other tasks involving
physical labor.25
To supplement the cadre of officers and professional specialists on the
staffs of the Army engineers, the chief engineers office sought to train
military personnel in engineering skills. After the liberation of France the
Army established the Engineer Training Center (later called the Engineer
School) in Epernay. In 1946 the Army moved the school to Butzbach,
Germany (north of Frankfurt), and then in early 1947 to Murnau, near
Oberammergau in southern Bavaria. The training suffered markedly
from the demobilization of skilled personnel; the school needed qualified instructors, but requests for occupational specialists in engineering
from the United States yielded disappointing results. The chief engineer
described the new instructors arriving in 1946 as 18-, 19- and 20-year old
boys with no instructional ability and practically no technical background
other than that obtained during a six-week course in a given subject.26
As the occupation lengthened, Moore and his successor sought to
recover authority from the field and to consolidate it in the Office of the
Chief Engineer at theater headquarters. They argued that a centralized
staff could balance the competition between local, more parochial interests and the overall needs and responsibilities of the occupation forces.
The change they sought came slowly. For most of the four-year period,
central planning and coordination looked no more than one year ahead.27
Construction Personnel
Since the earliest days after the cross-Channel invasion, U.S. Army
engineers faced labor shortages for any construction they undertook. The
pool of civilian labor fell far short of the estimates made during planning
for the rehabilitation of liberated and occupied areas. While still in France,
General Moores office received War Department authorization to recruit
civilian laborers and set up an organization to supervise them as separate mobile units, using engineer labor procurement offices to recruit the
needed personnel. As local governments in France stabilized, they provided both the recruitment and payment of some civilian labor. In addition
to the civilians, 2,228 French engineer troops were organized in May and
June 1945 into construction companies to assist the U.S. Army construction units.28
Employing prisoners of war (PW) helped alleviate the labor shortage
in liberated areas and in the zones of occupation. In May 1945 prisoners of
war working for the U.S. military numbered 54,223, many of them supervised by engineer troops.29 Organized as 250-man companies, PW units
relieved the shortage of troops for construction, depot operation, equip17
2/3/06 11:09:55 AM

ment maintenance, and lumbering operations. These workers proved
highly competent and eager to perform. Displaced persons also supplemented the labor pool that served the Army in 1945.30
The shortage of labor for the rehabilitation and construction programs
remained a significant problem during the early years of the occupation.31
In July 1945 the U.S. Army employed about 625,000 prisoners of war, displaced persons, civilians from Allied and neutral countries, and German
civilians (local nationals in the Armys vocabulary), many of them supervised by engineer personnel.32 By the first quarter of 1946 these sources of
labor were declining because Army policy within the theater mandated the
rapid reduction of the use of prisoners of war and displaced persons were
repatriating. For the first quarter of 1946 the average number of German
prisoners of war working on construction or rehabilitation for the U.S.
Army remained about 60,000, although the engineers released more than
42,000 prisoners from labor service during this period. The German civilian
labor force exceeded 25,000. By the third quarter of 1946 the PW labor force
fell below 20,000; by February 1947 all PW labor had been eliminated.33
At the end of the war the military employed very few American civilians in Europe in either supervisory or professional positions; but as PW
labor declined and military personnel left, the Army had to recruit civilians to supplement its workforce.34 Restrictions on employment of Germans
made it extremely difficult to attract qualified personnel. To overcome
that, and to encourage stability in the workforce, the chief engineers office
recommended during the first year of the occupation that USFET provide
more liberal allowances in clothing, food, and housing for German civilian
employees working for the U.S. forces. While the number of prisoners of
war dropped under 20,000 by the third quarter of 1946, the German civilian labor force rose to over 35,000, in part because the Army immediately
rehired as many as 55 percent of the released prisoners as civilian workers.
The turnover of military personnel brought particularly negative consequences to financial record keeping where attention to detail and vigorous accuracy were crucial. Employees did not stay long enough to benefit
from any training, and accurate record keeping suffered as a result. The
Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, promulgated training guidelines, but
these had little prospect of bringing about improved accuracy until the
employment situation stabilized.35
Professional personnel were hardest to find. Occasionally, an engineer officer leaving military service chose to stay in Europe as a civilian
employee. But the chief engineers office could not depend for staffing
only on military officers mustering out. To identify the positions where
it needed civilian specialists and administrators, the office solicited personnel requests from the engineer offices of USFETs subordinate commands. It then forwarded the list to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in
Washington, which recruited personnel in the United States. The recruitment program began in 1946, and by late that year 156 American civilians
had signed on to serve with the engineers in the European Theater. By the
first quarter of 1947 the number had increased to 380.36
18
2/3/06 11:09:56 AM
On 1 July 1946, the civilian personnel serving the Army in Germany
had numbered 375,466; one year later the figure had dropped to 278,479.
By 1 July 1947, of all civilian employees of the U.S. Army in Europe, 71
percent were Germans, 17.3 percent were displaced persons, 4.3 percent
were Austrians, and 3.6 percent were U.S. citizens.
The share of this civilian workforce employed by the Office of the
Chief Engineer, USFET, was small. By late 1947 the chief engineers office
employed about 5,000 civilians of all nationalitiesor under 2 percent of
the 1 July totalworking in its headquarters office and all its field agencies in the American zones in Germany and Austria.37
During this same period the availability of soldiers for engineer work
continued to decline precipitously. In early 1946 the engineers could still
muster over 45,000 troops for construction assignments, but by the final
quarter of 1946 that number had fallen to 16,000. In the first quarter of
1947 troops available averaged 6,700; only 2,200 were available in the last
quarter. Germans still contributed the greatest numbers to the Army engineer workforce, but their numbers dropped from 33,764 (excluding prisoners of war) to 15,500 over the same period.38 To compensate for the losses,
the Army organized displaced personsthird-country nationalsinto
labor service units, provided uniforms and equipment, and paid them in
much the same manner as U.S. troops. The special labor service units continued to serve the American forces for decades.39
Priorities and Problems

After the German defeat the U.S. Army had to change the focus of
its activities. For three years, Eisenhower observed in retrospect, the
nation had mobilized all its energies to push men and supply forward
into the heart of Germany. Suddenly, in May 1945, the entire machinery had to be thrown into reverse.40 Troops had to be pulled out of
Europe and redeployed to the war against Japan or returned home to
the United States. Units remaining in Europe had to shift their mission from combat to control and governance, to occupying and administering conquered enemy land. The troops needed to maintain law
and order, disarm and demilitarize a population whom they feared
might be belligerent, and organize the U.S. military government in the
defeated states.41
In these circumstances the Army engineers faced three military
imperatives. First, they had to handle redeployment of troops. Second,
they had to open German ports on the North Sea to move supplies to
the U.S. forces concentrated in southern Germany. A third mission arose
out of necessity. Massive material destruction had brought civil society
in Europe to near total collapse by the end of the war, and the U.S. Army
engineers needed to marshal their personnel and equipment to revitalize
national civilian infrastructures in both liberated and occupied countries.
As theater chief engineer, General Moore in Frankfurt remained responsible for coordinating these engineering tasks.
19
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Redeployment of Troops and Materiel

The greatest engineer effort in the first months after the war ended
in Europe involved redeploymentreducing troop strength in Europe,
shipping men and materiel to the Pacific, and readjusting the total combat
force to allow the soldiers with the longest service in combat and with
dependent children to return to the United States. Rotation home depended upon an elaborate point system that took into account length and
nature of service. The War Departments plan called for reducing troops
in Europe from 3,071,000 in May 1945 to about 405,000 by June 1946. This
meant shipping out more men each month than the maximum number
that had arrived in any one month during the war. Fifteen percent of
the troops to be redeployed, with their equipment, were destined for the
Asiatic-Pacific Theater.42
Relocating 2.6 million men in one yearthe War Departments target
numberwas equivalent to moving the entire population of a city the size
of Baltimore halfway around the globe. To accommodate transient troops,
the engineers constructed holding camps near ports of embarkation to
handle 250,000 people at a time. They also had to package and crate all the
goods and equipment that accompanied the troops. Army engineers constructed camps at Rheims; near the French ports of Marseille, Le Havre,
and Cherbourg; and near the Belgian port of Antwerp. Accommodations
in these camps ranged from tents that provided a rudimentary bivouac
level of shelter to more solid, wooden-sided tents designed for the winters
of northern Europe.43
Constructing the camps and the packing crates necessary to move
belongings and equipment required enormous quantities of lumber. In the
spring of 1945 General Moores staff calculated an immediate and imperative need for about 95 million board feet. Much of this was available as
sawn lumber in the U.S. zone in Germany. In June Moores engineers in
Frankfurt began to set monthly production targets for the German forestry organizations that handled the logging and milling of lumber. Moore
estimated that by July the Germans could produce about 35 million board
feet a month. To move that much lumber by rail required about 350 railroad cars a day, straining the capacity of a rail system already worn down
by the war. Moving anything by truck meant seeking help from field
armies that had the very few trucks available; field commanders were disinclined to part with any of them.44
The availability of lumber for crating and packaging remained a major
concern throughout the summer of 1945. Although the Army turned to
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Russia to supplement supplies, most of the lumber came from Germany. The German lumber that
reached the engineers arrived unsorted and unclassified, making delivery of the proper stock to the appropriate locations much more difficult.
When ordering boxes and crates, the engineers had to spread the contracts
among small producers. The wide dispersion of these producers caused
serious problems in the distribution of lumber, nails (also in short sup20
2/3/06 11:09:56 AM
ply), and hardware and complicated getting the finished products where
needed. Despite the myriad of problems, supplies had become sufficiently
regular by early autumn 1945 to keep up with the demand for shipping
crates and boxes.45
The engineers had orders to prepare redeployment camp facilities for
294,000 troops in the assembly area for debarkation. By 1 July, just seven
weeks after the end of the war, they had constructed space for 287,125.
By December 1945, as the flow of redeployment passed its peak, the engineers began to dismantle the camps, starting in France. This task continued until it was completed in October 1946.46
All this work had to be coordinated and accomplished even though
the most experienced engineer personnel were simultaneously being
redeployed. Within a week of the German surrender, General Moore
began to see the severe impact on engineer units of the loss of key people.
He complained that he would lose 75 percent of our [engineer] troops in
the Communications Zone within the first four months. Years later he
recalled, [I] reorganized my units every damn week because my units
were decimated as the best men got their points to go home.47 Moore
wanted authority to determine which engineer officers and units would
be demobilized, but the command structure gave that authority to the
field commanders in Europe, who implemented the rotation system.48
Securing a New Line of Communications and Supply

Ensuring a secure supply line to transport materiel to the troops figured prominently among the tasks facing the occupying forces. After the
successful breakout from Normandy in 1944, most of the supplies needed
by the U.S. Army had flowed across France. After liberation, Frances sensitivity concerning foreign military authority within its sovereign territory made this route unsuitable. The port of Bremerhaven became the port
of entry and the northern end of a new line to bring supplies to the U.S.
occupation forces in southern Germany.
To construct the new line of communications and supply, Army
engineers had to clear the seaports and establish rail connections to the
south. Clearing the Bremerhaven seaway began in April 1945, before the
end of the war. The work included removing underwater mines from a
point upstream (south) of Bremerhaven to the river port in Bremen, about
thirty-five miles away. There the waterway also needed mine clearing and
dredging. Fortunately, the rail yards in both port cities had suffered only
light damage. On 28 June 1945, both Bremerhaven and Bremen opened
and the first four American supply ships were unloaded. Preparations
continued to ready the ports to receive forty ships within the next
month.49
Theoretically, the militarys formal responsibility toward the civilian
population was limited to only what was necessary to attain its military
objectives and to prevent widespread disease.50 In reality, the devastation and paralysis in Germany made the Army totally responsible for the
21
2/3/06 11:09:56 AM
Power Station in Germany
civilian population. When the war ended, the Army faced the prospect
of housing and at least partially feeding 8 million people in Europe: U.S.
troops and civilian personnel, recovered Allied military personnel, displaced persons in camps, and prisoners of war. More than 5 million of
them were in the U.S. zones of occupation in Germany and Austria; U.S.
troops made up 3 million.51 In addition, the Army commanded the only
structure capable of providing general relief, with goods drawn largely
from theater stocks, to the rest of the civilian population in need.52
The occupying armies had no choice but to address the pervasive
chaos and despair of civilian society. Normal economic activity had
totally broken down in the last days of the war. Most shops were empty.
In postwar Germany, it was impossible to find such commodities as fabric, soap, electric light bulbs, or window glass on the open market. Only
the black market functioned, and on it the common medium of exchange
was American cigarettes, which soldiers had in abundant supply. About a
third of the meager production in Germany found its way onto the black
market. Trading in the black market was a court-martial offense, but few
soldiers could resist it. A lieutenant who made his entire cigarette allowance available on the black market could pocket $12,000 in four months,
the equivalent of well over $100,000 in current values.53
The Army engineers encountered situations in which only the black
market offered the goods necessary to carry out military assignments.
Because the domestic economy in the United States strained to meet the
shift to peacetime production, the engineers faced severe restrictions on
22
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Mess Hall under Construction in Frankfurt, Germany, ca. 1945
what they could requisition from home. On occasion Col. Robert Fleming,
who served in the Construction Division in General Moores office from
1945 to 1947, received calls from Col. Howard A. Morris, the district engineer in Frankfurt, saying that he had exhausted all possibilities for supply.
Only the black market had the supplies that he needed to complete his
mission. Fleming recalled that he would reply, Okay, Ill donate a carton
of cigarettes. Neither man faced a court-martial; indeed, both retired as
general officers.54
Rebuilding the Infrastructure

Many of the underlying problems presented engineering challenges.
Transportation had to be restored; industry had to be restarted; and basic
utilities such as water, sewers, and electricity had to be made operational
again.
In Le Havre, Cherbourg, Marseille, and other French cities and villages,
the Army engineers repaired the mains that distributed water within the
cities. In Le Mans, Cherbourg, Saint Quentin, Rheims, and the Belgian cities
of Lige and Namur, they chlorinated the water systems as well as cleansing them. They restored 155 miles of power lines in the Normandy peninsula and another 21 miles of lines west of Aachen, Germany. Military personnel completed 65 to 85 percent of construction tasks in the first months after
the Normandy landing, but prisoners of war and civilians also provided
labor as the armies moved across France and into Germany.55
23
2/3/06 11:09:58 AM

Coal, the principal fuel for heating and power in Europe, was one
of the resources essential for recovery. Even before hostilities ended, the
engineers of the Advance Section (ADSEC) of COMZ received orders to
take over the coalmines in the captured parts of Germany and to restore
them to operation under U.S. military control to alleviate the critical shortage of coal. ADSEC engineers secured control of 177 mines in the RuhrCologne-Aachen area between 1 April and 15 May 1945 and immediately
began to mine and ship coal.56
Restoration of the German mines by the ADSEC engineers illustrates
the wide range of interlocking engineering problems created by the
destruction of war. First, the coalmines needed electrical power to operate.
To meet this need, the ADSEC engineers restored an 110,000-volt power
grid for the Ruhr and a generating plant near Cologne. These systems
provided more than adequate power for the mines, leaving a surplus for
transmission elsewhere, including into Frankfurt.57
Second, the Army engineers had to find a labor force to work the
coalmines. The Nazi regime had used slave labor to provide about 40
percent of the wartime workforce in the mines. This labor source disappeared with the wars end. To recruit mine workers, the engineers had to
provide food, clothing, and shelter, all elements in markedly short supply
in the spring of 1945. In the absence of a diet that would support strenuous labor, the mines were chronically understaffed and worker productivity was low. ADSEC engineers described the problem clearly: In order
to obtain large-scale production, working and living conditions must be
made attractive to the miner. The Army engineers wanted a diet of 3,500
calories a day for miners to sustain production.58 If it had been approved
(it was not), this diet would have given the miners three times the calories
afforded to millions of other Europeans.
Third, the restoration of production and distribution of coal was hampered by the near paralysis of the rail, truck, and barge network. Had
transportation been available to deliver essential supplies, such as timbers
to shore up the mineshafts and galleries, effective production from the
mines could have quadrupled in June 1945. In the Ruhr, where the level
of production was about 5 percent of prewar quantities, that increase
would have been dramatic! Even when newly reconstructed railroad lines
became available, ADSEC engineers faced an exceedingly acute shortage
of coal cars, which meant that coal could not move to the markets where it
was needed.59
The Allies had to rebuild the transportation system that the war had
disrupted and destroyed. Even as the troops advanced through Europe,
engineers began to reconstruct railroad lines just behind the front. The
Army repaired or rebuilt the equivalent of about 10,000 miles of singletrack lines between June 1944 and May 1945. Nearly all of these had been
turned back to civilian control by the time Germany surrendered. In occupied areas, the military retained control of railways, and reconstruction
continued in the U.S. zone after the surrender. In the Stuttgart-AugsburgMunich area, engineers started rebuilding the local electric rail system on
24
2/3/06 11:09:59 AM
In April 1945 engineers worked on an important railway bridge that linked

Germany and Belgium.
17 May, nine days after the German surrender. In less than two months
trains were operating on the entire line. By January 1946, 96 percent of the
rail lines in the American zone were operating again. German workers
supplied most of the physical labor to rebuild and operate the railways.
During the period immediately after American forces crossed the Rhine,
the Germans were neither paid nor given food, but later the military government provided food for the laborers.60
Waterways constituted a vital part of the German transportation network. After the surrender, Army engineers assumed the tasks of clearing the Rhine for navigation and replacing the temporary bridges with
more permanent structures.61 River clearing began in May 1945 under the
direction of the Construction Section of the Office of the Theater Chief
Engineer.62 Lt. Col. John Connally commanded the 1057th Engineer Port
Construction and Repair Group that handled the actual work. To remove
obstructions, engineers fabricated a floating crane mounted on a barge,
providing a lift capacity of over 250 tons. By the end of June Connallys
crews had completely removed only one of the twenty-six major obstructions between Koblenz and Karlsruhe and had begun work on thirteen
others. A month later they opened a navigational channel through seven
of the fourteen demolished bridges; by September the task was completed.63 Connallys unit also worked to reconstruct bridges on the Rhine and
the Main Rivers with the same barge and crane, using German prisoners as laborers. As of 1 January 1946, responsibility for inland waterways
25
2/3/06 11:09:59 AM

in Germany passed from the Office of the Theater Chief Engineer to
OMGUS. Army engineers completed work on the bridges across the Rhine
and the Main in Mainz shortly thereafter.64
In the early months of the postwar era the Army engineers began the
process of rebuilding Western Europe, especially defeated and devastated
Germany. In the face of the pervasive destruction, economic collapse, hunger, and paralyzing despair that prevailed in 19451946, each engineering
problem solved, each building rehabilitated, each roadway reconstructed
or river cleared represented a major triumph. Beyond these discrete triumphs lay the larger task of supporting the U.S. Army in southwestern
Germany for a duration that remained undefined.
The Soviets blockaded Berlin in 1948, which marked a significant
change in the role of the U.S. forces in Germany. The supposedly provisional division of German territory took on a new character, one that
reflected the tension growing between West and East in the Cold War
conflict. The U.S. Army engineers stationed in Germany and throughout
Europe adjusted their tasks and priorities accordingly.
26
2/3/06 11:10:00 AM
2
FROM OCCUPATION TO
MUTUAL DEFENSE
mid the dislocation of the immediate postwar period, the theater chief engineer, Maj. Gen. Cecil R. Moore, organized Army
engineer services to meet the needs and priorities of the army of
occupation in Germany. As he adjusted his engineer resources
to support and sustain the civilian administration of German communities, Moore also had to remain responsive to the challenges that developed as the wartime alliance gave way to the tensions of the Cold War.
The army of occupation in Germany and Austria needed shelter for
men and equipment; and the engineers had to locateand then relocate, as new exigencies emergedheadquarters, housing, and real estate
for both ground troops and aviation units, the latter organized in the
Army Air Forces. After April 1946 an ever-increasing number of military
dependents required a different kind of housing and support facilities.
The German infrastructure and economy were in shambles. Competing
demands for both material goods and labor, combined with the widespread physical destruction and social dislocation, created scarcities that
disrupted normal markets and caused persistent problems for the chief
engineers office in managing work and setting priorities. The engineers
faced only one area of oversupply: Vast quantities of equipment and materiel shipped into the European Theater to support the war remained on
hand. Disposing of this excess materiel became a major concern for the
chief engineers office through the end of the decade.
Over the three years following Germanys defeat, the entire atmosphere in Europe changed. In 19481949 the engineers had to cope with
the possibility of an armed conflict when the Soviet Union cut off free
access to Berlin. This confrontation over Berlin between the Soviet Union
and the three Western occupying powers posed incredible challenges to
the engineering ingenuity of the U.S. Army.
All these responsibilities coincided with the tasks that carried over
from immediate postwar imperatives. At the same time they accentuated
a new range of engineer activities that marked a transition from concern
04C_Chap02_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 11:10:17 AM

with occupying a defeated nation to developing a community of interest
with a potential ally.
Engineer Activities in Occupied Germany

During the early years of the occupation the engineers pursued
projects to secure and provide adequate housing, office, and operational facilities for the U.S. militaryheadquarters buildings, command
schools, hospitals, depots, shops, special installations, bridges, railways,
highways, utilities, and ports.1 The United States Forces, European
Theater (USFET) Office of the Chief Engineer coordinated planning for
these projects. When the occupation began, the U.S. military already
held more than 50,000 real properties in occupied territory in Germany,
Czechoslovakia, and Austria, including private houses, apartment buildings, hotels, schools, office buildings, factory buildings, warehouses and
depots, retail stores, and barracks.2 The largest part of the engineers
work went into rehabilitating buildings that the Army had confiscated
or requisitioned. New construction accounted for only 1 percent of the
work in the summer of 1946 and less than 5 percent in the next several
years.3
Supporting the U.S. Army in Europe

After the war with Japan ended in August 1945, many soldiers
frequently officers but also the small number of enlisted troops that
were marriedwanted to bring their families to the European Theater.
Housing in Germany was in a deplorable state. Overcrowding in the U.S.
zone created continued pressure to requisition more facilities, and the
military governments list of requisitioned properties grew during the
first year of occupation. In Wrttemberg-Baden, for example, U.S. troops
occupied 29,394 rooms in November 1945, 42,002 in December, and 43,361
in January 1946.4
In spring 1946, Headquarters, USFET, decided to allow dependents
into the theater. The Army began active planning for the change in
September 1945, when USFET created a board to define standards for
accommodations in military communities. In early October the planning board sent proposed standards to the theaters major commands
for review by the commanding generals, who were responsible for housing in their areas. In early December the major commands were directed
to prepare plans for establishing and maintaining military communities. At the same time, the commanding general of the Theater Service
Forces, European Theater, was directed to submit technical standards
to Headquarters, USFET, for all types of housing and installations,
including recreational facilities.5 General Moore proposed setting up
an Engineer Planning Office with German engineers, architects and
draftsmen somewhere outside the Frankfurt enclave.6 An office such
as he described evolved within the chief engineers office in Frankfurt,
28
2/3/06 11:10:18 AM
From Occupation to Mutual Defense

where staff officers devised standards for housing and prepared a guide,
translated into French and German, that both military communities and
contractors could consult.7
Because inflation had disrupted normal pricing mechanisms, for several years after 1945 the Army measured the value of all work in hours
of labor. During January 1946 the chief engineers office formulated a
set of general estimates of the amount of work necessary in the theater
over the next two years. The January 1946 projection called for 92 million
worker-hours. Seventy-seven percent of the labor and almost 74 percent of
the spendingbut only 24 percent of the supplieswere allocated to the
establishment of military communities. By late 1946 USFET had selected
permanent locations for the military communities, which would include
soldiers, dependents, and an array of service buildings to house commissaries, post exchanges, chapels, and administrative offices. As work on
the facilities progressed, it accounted for 60 percent of the construction
program and 47 percent of supplies, almost double the quantity projected
earlier.8
During the first winter of the occupation the chief engineers office set
out relatively simple rehabilitation plans to prepare facilities for soldiers.
The American zone contained requisitioned and confiscated barracks
or casernes that needed only minimal work to bring them to standards
acceptable to the occupying army.9 Many of these casernes had been built
before the First World War, and most had been damaged during the recent
fighting. Still, even with no repair at all, these buildings offered more
comfort than tents.
The engineers were allowed to rehabilitate barracks only to austere
standards. The chief engineers office planned a first phase to repair facilities so that they would be somewhat better than the wartime scales of
accommodations.10 As work progressed, the plan for rehabilitation foresaw improving accommodations to a level somewhat less than is allowed
in comparable posts within the continental United States.11 No one at
the time imagined that U.S. military personnel would use many of these
facilities for more than forty years.
Accommodating dependents was more complicated than housing
troops. Virtually all the apartments and private homes available for confiscation or requisition were in terrible condition as a result of neglect
and damage during the war. Most facilities required extensive repair
to be considered livable.12 The program for rehabilitating quarters for
dependents ran into a delay when the War Department ruled that neither permanent nor temporary construction funds could be devoted to
housing dependents. In the face of protests from the theater, the War
Department reconsidered and subsequently ruled that only appropriated
funds could not be used for dependent housing. Surplus materials and
money from reparations could be used to repair or to construct housing
for dependents. Further, in contrast to earlier regulations, materials absolutely essential but not obtainable in the theater could be purchased in the
United States. The reinterpretation made it possible to proceed. German
29
2/3/06 11:10:18 AM

construction firms performed the work; German civilians, displaced persons, and prisoners of war supplied the labor; and costs and materials
were charged to the Germans under the occupation budget.
Supporting the Air Forces

The U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) enjoyed the same measure of support
from the theater chief engineers office as the field armies in Germany.
The AAF had played a significant part in the war and needed appropriate facilities in occupied Germany. It chose as its command center the
German airfield at Rhine-Main, seven miles southwest of Frankfurt. The
U.S. troops had captured the field in April 1945 and put it at the disposal
of an American fighter squadron for the last month of the war. Engineer
battalions began rebuilding facilities at the airfield almost immediately.
By midsummer the engineers had completed nearly all of the initial
work, and by autumn Rhine-Main began operating as a major AAF base.
Expansion of facilities continued over the next several years.13
The AAF formulated no construction plan for 1946, although U.S. forces retained control of over forty former German air bases and a few active
bases in France and Britain. Even without major plans, the Office of the
Chief Engineer, USFET, allocated over 12 million worker-hours of labor to
AAF projects for the year13 percent of its total two-year allocation. Fifty
percent of the work scheduled for the AAF went into facilities at RhineMain, in part because it also opened for limited commercial use in May
1946. Seven months later a large passenger terminal opened for general
commercial traffic. The remaining 50 percent of the engineer workload
for the AAF for 1946 went into projects for housing, facilities, and routine
maintenance.14
Berlins main airport, Tempelhof, also became a locus of Army engineer activity immediately after the war ended. The airports design had
been avant-garde when planned in the mid-1930s, and 80 percent of its
facilities had been completed by the time construction was suspended in
1943. Bombing and systematic destruction by the invading forces had left
it nearly useless. When U.S. forces took control of Tempelhof in July 1945,
the terminal and field were in shambles and needed immediate attention.
The 473d Air Service Group assessed the damage at Tempelhof and
immediately set about reconstruction.15 Troops cleared away debris and
restored utilities. The airfields one runway was sod, so the 862d Engineer
Aviation Battalion began work on a new 6,000-foot runway. Over a base
of crushed brick taken from the rubble of Berlin, the engineers poured a
two-inch layer of concrete and then topped the concrete with pierced steel
planks. When the airfield opened for military use, planes landed on the
pierced plank runway and took off from the sod strip.16
By 1947 the Army engineers had begun work on other airfields
in Frankfurt, Giebelstadt, and Munich and on AAF depots in Erding,
Oberpfoffenhofen, and Roth. Work at Rhine-Main accounted for one-third
of an estimated 51 million worker-hours that the engineers provided for
30
2/3/06 11:10:19 AM

the AAF in 1947.17 When the U.S. Air Force emerged in September 1947
as an independent military service, decisions in Washington ordained
that the Army engineers, not its own engineer component, provide support. The Army engineer units detailed to the Air Force were designated
Special Category Army with Air Force units.18
Juggling Competing Demands

During the first three years of the occupation, construction supplies
were never adequate and certain materials were always lacking, particularly electrical fixtures and switches, plumbing supplies, paint, and
plaster.19 Because the engineers could not supply all essential projects,
the chief engineers office contrived a special category of hot projects that
received preferential distribution of supplies. The offices list of hot projects, based on the staffs judgment of relative importance and on information from construction officers in the field, changed from month to month.
The definition of hot was, to be sure, unofficial, and frequently at variance
with the judgment of the using services, each of which tended to consider
its own projects the most important.20
One of the earliest hot projects was the creation of facilities at RhineMain Air Base for the USFETs Air Transport Command (ATC) and the
European Air Transport Service. The ATC began limited service from
Rhine-Main in May 1946, but construction became more urgent later
that year when the ATC received orders to relocate from Orly Field
near Paris to Rhine-Main. The move had a ripple effect, pushing work
at the neighboring Wiesbaden military community into the hot project
category, because Wiesbaden became the new headquarters of the ATC.
The only way to liberate space for the ATC at Wiesbaden was to move
other units out of that city; each such move provoked another hot project. Similarly, construction in the Frankfurt area became a hot project by
late 1946 when authorities chose the city as the administrative center for
the merged British and American zones of occupation, renamed Bizonia.
The overwhelming wartime devastation in Frankfurt put the city behind
all other areas in the U.S. zone in providing dependent housing. As
administrative services expanded, drawing ever more people to the city,
securing adequate facilities for U.S. military personnel became increasingly difficult.
As a step toward resolving the situation, the chief engineers office
created a liaison team to work with the citys mayor to adjust space, labor,
and supplies. Army engineers made supplies available from their stocks
to speed the rehabilitation. The engineers concentrated labor in Frankfurt
by transferring labor service companiesthird-country nationals paid
by the Armyfrom Stuttgart and Nuremberg and German workers from
projects at Rhine-Main and in Griesheim.21 By 1 January 1947, military
housing in Frankfurt had first demand on materials. In the first three
months of 1947 work crews completed 106 housing unitsfar short of the
7,000 additional units needed for civilians and officers.22
31
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The designations of hot projects by the chief engineers office illustrate
that even in late 1946 decisions concerning engineer issues were based on
immediate need and amid shortages. Expedient solutions displaced coordination. With both operations and project approval decentralized, execution of a coherent construction program remained beyond the reach of the
chief engineers office. As with nearly all construction, the real responsibility for the housing projects lay with the major subordinate commands;
and they operated more or less independent of the efforts of the chief
engineer to coordinate planning, procurement, and supply.
Examples abound of uncoordinated solutions to urgent problems. In
the American military community in Bad Nauheim, north of Frankfurt,
getting power to the residents superseded concerns about standardization. Direct current and alternating current served the same block of residence units, so the purchasing of appliances could not be standardized.
Similarly, in the Hchst compound west of Frankfurt, some houses had
110-volt circuits installed in one room and 220-volt circuits in another.
When a power failure hit the compound in October 1946, some houses lost
power while others did not. Some houses lost power on only one floor.
Col. Robert Fleming, chief of construction in the chief engineers office,
commented in a staff briefing that he tried to explain to a friend of mine
why only his second floor lights were out, but I dont think he yet believes
me.23
The tension between the chief engineers vast responsibility and his
very limited authorityhe operated through only technical and not
command channelsconstituted a vexing administrative issue. U.S.
military construction and procurement proceeded on an ad hoc basis,
command by command, with disturbingly little attention to overall
theater needs. 24 For example, the Third Armys plans to construct an
ice rink with a roll-back roof in Garmisch received approval by the
commander over the objections of the chief engineers staff, particularly Cols. Robert Fleming and Louis W. Prentiss, Sr., the deputy chief
engineer in 1946. The engineer colonels in Third Army gloated publicly
that they had humiliated their counterparts in Frankfurt. Their arrogance thoroughly angered Fleming. Five years later, he settled some
scores. Fleming had become assistant chief of engineers for military
operations, and Prentiss headed the Personnel Branch in the Office
of the Chief of Engineers in Washington. As Fleming remembered, I
got General Prentiss to go alongand two careers got ended because
the two men involved [had been] too stupid to realize that cooperation
was an asset.25
Fleming, too, had had problems with unreasonable projects. He had
hit the ceiling upon learning that the engineers had received orders
to provide the wife of the USFET commander in chief, General Joseph T.
McNarney, with a cow barn so that she could have fresh milk daily. When
he calmed down, he reasoned that a cow barn was a small price to pay
for the good will of the four-star theater commander and let the project
proceed. 26
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Construction Costs
As the occupation continued, money to support the U.S. military presence in Germany became ever scarcer. After four years of war Americans
were ill disposed to invest in any military needs at all, much less in new
facilities to house the U.S. Army in Germany. At the end of the war in
1945, military spending garnered 39.1 percent of the U.S. gross national
product; by 1948 military spending had fallen to 3.7 percent.27 Politically
imposed budget constraints meant that troop strength in Germany
dropped steadily from 342,000 in July 1946, to 135,000 in July 1947, to just
over 100,000 by the end of 1948. In this climate, resources available to the
military, and to the Army engineers, declined drastically. In the first quarter of 1947 major and minor construction, already down sharply from wartime levels, required 10 million worker-hours; by the same quarter of 1948
that figure was down to just under 6 million worker-hours. The reduced
engineer budget for 1948 imposed a drastic curtailment of expenditures
on both construction and other activities for the year.28
Budgetary concerns led commanders to make penny-wise but poundfoolish decisions. In mid-1946 the theater chief engineers office warned
that the effort to hold down expenses in rehabilitating troop facilities was
false economy. Commanders were incorporating less desirable buildings requiring more labor and materials per unit into their inventory.29
In late 1947 the engineers observed repeatedly that maintenance costs
had increased because of the serious deterioration of the facilities constructed during the last two years.30 Indeed, funds saved from the budget through sparse rehabilitation went increasingly toward maintenance
and repair. By 1 January 1948, maintenance consumed 90 percent of the
total engineer labor, supplies, and funds. The early decisions during the
occupation to build cheaply and for the short term haunted the Army for
decades.31
Another factor increased the European Commands (EUCOM) expenditures for maintenance: the decision to shift an ever-greater burden
away from the German government. Because of the escalation of tensions
between the United States and the Soviet Union, German public opinion
became more important to American strategists. Accordingly, in 1947 the
U.S. military began to reduce as much as possible the financial, manpower, and production burden of the occupation upon the indigenous
economy.32 This policy reflected the changing relations between the U.S.
Army and the German polity developing with the active encouragement
of the Western Powers in their zones of occupation. As the military sought
to detach itself from dependence on German payments, it had to assume
more of the costs of maintenance and repair directly.
Dealing with Excess Materiel

The eminent nineteenth century British historian Thomas Macaulay
described the essence of war as violence, but in modern times the essence
33
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of war has become logistics. In World War II the industrial and logistical
system developed by the United States created the conditions for victory
by pumping the materiel of war into the European Theater at a prodigious
rate. By May 1945 over 5 million tons of war supplies were on hand in
Europe. Solving the quandary presented by the volume of war materiel no
longer needed became one of the most difficult and persistent problems
that the Army engineers faced. Resolving the problem involved four years
of intense effort.
Immediately after the victory, General Moores Office of the Theater
Chief Engineer received the assignment to clear the liberated countries as
rapidly as possible of the thousands of tons of war supplies that remained in
depots behind the advancing combat troops. About 90 percent of the materiel was in depots in rear or intermediate areas (France and Belgium) rather
than forward in Germany. Moores orders were to concentrate these supplies
in Germany, where the army of occupation could draw upon them.33
The Army engineers began consolidating war supplies by constructing
new depots and transferring materials to them. Before hostilities ended,
the Army had established its forward engineer depot in an encampment
formerly used by German military engineers near the town of Hanau in
the Frankfurt area. Within months the engineers had added major supply depots in Frth, Bremen, Mannheim, and Berlin in the U.S. zone in
Germany and in Linz in Austria. Thirteen supply depots (1 in Britain, 5 in
Belgium, and 7 in France) remained active throughout the Western Base
Section.34 As American military involvement in the liberated countries of
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands decreased, these supplies could be
transferred to Germany.
The Hanau Depot

To prepare for the influx of materiel from the Western Base Section,
particularly from France and Belgium in 1946, the chief engineers office
began a substantial program to expand the depot in Hanau. The goalto
establish stabilized open storage, closed storage, shops, access roads, utilities, and railroad facilitiescreated a long catalog of projects: improve
drainage; provide new latrines, a heating plant, a water system, and a
supply of potable water for the depot; pave motor pool areas; and build
rail spurs and related railroad facilities. The engineers also needed to
build an electrical distribution system and additional warehouse space,
winterize lubrication racks, put a fire prevention system in place, stabilize
streets and open areas, and create hardstands for processing and parking vehicles. Cols. Paul D. Berrigan and Robert Fleming, successive heads
of the Construction Division in the Office of the Theater Chief Engineer,
supervised the Hanau project from Frankfurt.35
Not only did construction of new facilities fail to keep pace with the
influx of goods from areas outside Germany, but the arrival of materiel often got in the way of construction. As an additional complication,
requirements changed in the summer of 1946. Anticipating an increase
34
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in the number of displaced persons in the U.S. zone in Germany, officials
ordered the materials to construct prefabricated huts for 40,000 persons
from storage areas in Belgium and France. The officials set 1 September
1946 as the target date for completing the transfer, without realizing that
facilities for unloading and storage at the existing depots in Germany
were inadequate to handle the volume of material involved.36
Management of the movement of excess war supplies broke down in
part because redeployment removed trained engineer personnel. Lack of
proper controls contributed to pilferage. The engineers did not have personnel in France or Belgium with sufficient experience to select the materials most adaptable to salvage and reuse. When a shipment of 20,000 tons
of miscellaneous parts for prefabricated huts arrived in Hanau unlabeled
and unsorted, Colonel Fleming observed that it would have taken a battalion a year to sort them out and build the huts.37
By 1 July 1946, inadequate facilities in Hanau left 1,800 railcars waiting to be unloaded. By late summer several hundred barges lined the
Main River because the depot had insufficient personnel to unload them
and insufficient facilities to store their cargo. To alleviate the backlog, the
engineers office established temporary construction supply dumps in
each of the seven major commands and opened a new engineer supply
depot in Gelnhausen.38 By late 1946 the Hanau depot had become not only
the storage point for all supplies from the Western Base Section but also
the main depot for the U.S. zone of occupation in Germany.39 In March
1947 all engineer supply depots in Germany were officially redesignated
as subdepots of Hanau.40
Harsh weather during the winter of 19461947 brought more difficulties for the overburdened operators of the Hanau depot. To husband limited supplies in the face of the severe cold, they rationed electrical power
and gasoline, substantially disrupting construction to expand the depots
storage facilities. Pressure on the depot increased when the Mediterranean
Theater was inactivated in early 1947 and 9,800 long tons of supplies
moved from Italy to the U.S. zone in Germany. In April, May, and June an
additional 6,940 long tons of suppliescement, lumber, and materials for
electrical and plumbing workarrived from the Mediterranean Theater.41
Although the Army engineers employed German contractors, construction throughout 1947 at the depot in Hanau remained inadequate
to accommodate the incoming supplies. In Giessen, the Army built
500,000 square feet of new covered storage for a quartermaster depot. In
Griesheim contractors rehabilitated and added to an I. G. Farben Company
plant and buildings to adapt them as an ordnance depot. Projects at these
sites included hardstands and rail, road, and other service connections, as
well as warehouses. In spite of additional facilities, the depots still could
not absorb all of the materiel arriving in Germany. By the summer of 1947
the target date for gathering all engineer supplies at the depot in Hanau
had been pushed back well into 1948.42
Although its facilities and its personnel were both overtaxed, the
Hanau depot provided a central point of distribution for the amassed
35
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materiel. Designating a central distribution point enabled the chief engineer in Frankfurt to manage construction materials more effectively
throughout the U.S. zone. In early 1947 the chief engineers office began
issuing lists that specified the quantities of each item of reserve stocks
in Hanau so that engineers and commanders in the communities would
know what was available in the theater.43 At the same time, depots closed
in the Western Base Section and supplies left France and Belgium for
Hanau. Within Germany, as the movement of goods passed its peak, the
engineer construction dumps in Kassel and Landsberg no longer had
to provide overflow space; their stocks could be transferred to Hanau.
By June stocks from Illesheim and Schwandorf were moved to Hanau
and the facilities at Illesheim passed to the Ordnance Corps for use as a
vehicle reserve park.44 By September the supply point in Stuttgart was
empty and supplies from Berlin had also been transferred to Hanau. The
last shipment from the Mediterranean Theater3,000 tonswas en route
from Italy. By March 1948 about 3,190 tons of engineer supplies remained
to be moved from subdepots to Hanau. Six months later all command
stocks had been removed from the other subdepots, which were then
closed, leaving Hanau as the only engineer service depot in the U.S. zone
in Germany.45
Construction of storage space continued in Hanau. The depot gained
usable space when in 1948 the Army turned over tens of thousands of tons
of supplies to a new semipublic German corporation under the program
called Bulk Transfer of U.S. Army Property.46 As consolidation of supplies
progressed and the inflow of goods lessened, the command of the Hanau
depot began to gain control of the materiel in the warehouses. In the final
quarter of 1948 the Hanau depot undertook an inventory of its entire stock
of general engineer and spare parts. The chief engineers office considered
this the biggest step forward that has been made since the depot was
activated.47 In January 1949 the Hanau depot passed inspection with a
rating of excellent, in sharp contrast to its unsatisfactory rating just eleven
months earlier.48
Fleming remembered the situation at the Hanau depot as the
biggest single problem that the engineers faced in the years immediately after the war. The evolution of the Hanau depot illustrates several aspects of the immediate postwar years. The engineers had to fulfill
assignments with limited resources and insufficient time to plan. To
some degree, these limitations led to mistakes, inefficiencies, waste, and
confusion. In retrospect, Fleming called the hasty consolidation of supplies in Hanau one of the best examples in our Army of wand-waving
and wishful thinking. Despite the problems, a substantial quantity of
materiel was actually gathered and warehoused in Hanau, and a good
percentage of it was salvaged and used. By early 1949 the engineers
could claim some success in Hanau. That success came at personal cost.
Fleming considered the whole process a tragedy because several very
fine officers trying to do a job were harassed to the point that their
careers were ended.49
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Repair and Rebuild Program
The Repair and Rebuild program at the Hanau depot offers another
example of engineer success. In 1947 the 485th Engineer Heavy Shop
Company (later designated the 507th Engineer Shop Company) was
attached to the depot. This units mission was to repair and maintain
mechanical equipment for the Army. Because the quantity of equipment
needing work was more than the company could handle, the engineers
turned to the German economy.
In 1947 the Hanau command awarded contracts to eleven German
firms to repair U.S. military equipment. Arranging the contracts was
not easy. German industrialists were reluctant to invest their capital,
and German workers were reluctant to take payment for their labor
in the worthless German Reichsmark. To overcome these obstacles,
the depot put up the basic materials required for production out of its
stocks and made special arrangements with Army agencies to provide
the workers with one hot meal a day. With these inducements in place,
three plants opened during the spring of 1947: a Daimler-Benz plant in
Uhingen-Gppingen, where heavy cranes were rebuilt; the Kaeble plant
in Backnang, which rebuilt tractors, rollers, and graders; and the FMA
Porkorny plant in Frankfurt, which rebuilt air compressors. By July 1947
eight more firms had joined the list of contractors for the Hanau depots
rebuild program: Beinhorne Electrical Shop in Hanau, Sabel & Scheurer
in Oberursel, Vulcan Diesel in Bremen, Karl Wolfe in Gppingen, another
Daimler-Benz plant in Stuttgart, Alfred Teves in Frankfurt, Karl Schmitt
in Fulda, and Fritz Leitz Machine Works in Oberkochen.
For almost a year these eleven plants could not keep up with the
demand from U.S. military units for rebuilt equipment. By late 1948 the
Repair and Rebuild program moved ahead of demand, and in the first
quarter of 1949 it had made so much progress that a Heavy Equipment
Storage Section had to be opened in Hanau to house and maintain the
reconditioned equipment until it was requisitioned.50
H. Jace Greene, one of the civilian engineers recruited from the United
States, became involved in the Repair and Rebuild program early in
1947. He had arrived in Germany in October 1946 and had first served as
the operations officer of the 333d Engineers in Rsselsheim, outside of
Frankfurt. The following February Greene was reassigned to Stuttgart to
carry on the work of the 555th Engineers. This new assignment, to supervise reconstruction of five German factories as Army shops to recondition
jeeps, trucks, and tractors, began what became a thirty-year career for
Greene with the Army engineers in Germany.51
Over the winter of 19481949 the Army reduced the number of service contractors involved in the rebuild program. By that time tremendous quantities of heavy engineering equipment had been salvaged and
repaired. In 1950 the rebuild plants produced an average of 200 major and
150 minor items of equipment a day, from rebuilt earthmovers to chainsaws and water pumps for engines. By 1952 the program had produced
37
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substantial quantities of such items as tanks, trucks, weapons, jeeps, tractors, cranes, radio equipment, light and heavy construction machinery,
smoke generators, flamethrowers, and household furniture. The cost of
the program represented about 30 percent of the replacement value of
the equipment reconditioned. The German economy benefited through
increased employment and expanded industrial capacity, important factors in the early phases of Germanys recovery.52
Reasserting Order and Discipline

A year after the occupation began it was clear that the rapid demobilization of the U.S. Army in Europe, coupled with difficult living conditions and frequent changes in command, had led to a decline in morale
and discipline among the troops. The U.S. forces in Germany had degenerated into what one of the engineers called almost an unruly mob
and had ceased to exist as an effective tactical fighting force.53 The U.S.
Constabulary, formed early in 1946 to act as a mobile military police force
for the U.S. zone, rated only 65 percent on a measure of combat readiness.
The 1st Infantry Division, the other unit available in event of combat,
rated just 20 percent.54
In August 1946 Lt. Gen. Clarence R. Huebner, commander of the 1st
Infantry Division during the war, became chief of staff, USFET, with the
assignment to reassert discipline and to restore the Armys tactical readiness.55 By the time Huebner assumed his position in Frankfurt, the sense
of urgency associated with combat had long since disappeared. The occupation force had assumed a supervisory rather than operational role,
and the challenge had shifted to meeting the duties of the occupation
with an ever-shrinking troop base and budget.56
At the center of military planning in Washington, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommended and the president approved a reorganization that
had two objectives. One goal was to reconfigure U.S. forces overseas to a
structure attuned to peacetime and to the mission of the occupation, with
a single commander responsible for the operations of all military services
in each overseas command. A second goal was to unify the armed forces
under a new Department of Defense (successor to the War and Navy
Departments) that would command four separate services: the Army, a
newly independent Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps.57
In Europe, these reforms led to the elimination of the wartime designation theater and the reorganization of U.S. forces under the new
European Command (EUCOM), established in Frankfurt on 15 March
1947. On 15 November a separate Army command, the U.S. Ground and
Service Forces, was created and then redesignated as the United States
Army, Europe (USAREUR).58 General Lucius D. Clay assumed command
of EUCOM while retaining his position as U.S. military governor in
Berlin. Huebner remained in Frankfurt as deputy commander in chief for
Europe and EUCOMs chief of staff. In early 1948 EUCOM moved its headquarters from Frankfurt to Heidelberg. Clay operated from Berlin until
38
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15 May 1949, when he returned to the United States and retired. All of
Clays successors as EUCOM commander in chief resided in Heidelberg.59
As a part of the reorganization in early 1947, the occupied areas of
Germany and Austria were reorganized. The military districts were divided into military posts and subposts, which became logistical and administrative commands. Post commanders assumed responsibility for training
and discipline. They also took over from the engineers the responsibility
for supply. This became a more manageable task after the 1948 economic
reforms in West Germany, which made procurement from the German
economy more feasible. Within a year the military districts were eliminated and the sixteen military postsnine in the German state (Land) of
Bavaria and seven in the states of Wrttemberg-Baden and Hessebecame
major subordinate commands under EUCOM.60 (See Map 4.)
Huebner quickly made his presence known to the engineers in
Frankfurt. In an attempt to boost morale, someone had ordered the
Frankfurt district engineer, Col. Howard A. Morris, to convert the rotunda of the I. G. Farben buildinga beautifully balanced architectural
blend of interior and exterior space separated by tremendous two-story
curved glass windowsinto a fully furnished Main Streetstyle soda
fountain. The new attraction opened about two weeks before Huebner
took command. When Huebner arrived, he closed it down immediately
and began looking for those responsible. Fingers pointed to the engineers,
so Huebner called in the chief of construction from the chief engineers
office, Colonel Fleming. In truth, Fleming also found the project outrageous, and both he and Morris had unsuccessfully opposed the project as
frivolous. At his meeting with Huebner, Fleming presented all the memoranda that he had written objecting to the project and orally protested
against the soda fountain and similar projects, including the skating
rink and the cow barn. After listening for a few minutes, Huebner asked
Fleming whether he had other examples of such unreasonable demands.
When Fleming said that he did, Huebner replied, I want to see them.
From that day onward, the extravagant projects stopped.61
On 19 November 1946, Brig. Gen. Don. G. Shingler succeeded General
Moore as theater chief engineer in Frankfurt. When EUCOM superseded
USFET the following March, the label theater ceased to exist, and
Shinglers title was shortened to chief engineer. Over the next three
years, as the changes Huebner initiated modified the character of the U.S.
forces in Germany, Shingler led a similar effort to increase efficiency and
discipline among the engineers.62
Engineer Management Efficiency

Huebner backed Shingler in asserting the authority of his office in
all engineer matters. In late 1946 Shinglers staff submitted to the USFET
general staff a plan to concentrate all construction activities under the
operational control of the theater chief engineer.63 The proposal became
the basis for reforms in the management of engineer assets.
39
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U.S. ARMY ZONE OF OCCUPATION

MILITARY DISTRICTS AND POSTS
WEST GERMANY
1 August 1947
District Boundary (approximate)
Berlin
Post Boundary (approximate)
Hannover
Post Headquarters
0
50
100 Miles
100 Kilometers
50
El
Leipzig
be
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
Dresden
Erfurt
S E C O N D M I L I TA RY
DISTRICT
Wetzlar
Fulda
Wiesbaden
Frankfurt
C Z E C H O S L O VA K I A
Bamberg
Wrzburg
Darmstadt
Pilsen
Grafenwhr
Kaiserslautern
Nuremberg
Rhi
ne R
Heidelberg
FRANCE
Regensburg
Stuttgart
F I R S T M I L I TA RY D I S T R I C T
Augsburg
Munich
Bad Tlz
Garmisch
A U S T R I A
L I E CHTE NS TE I N
Innsbruck
Map 4
2/3/06 11:10:21 AM

After the reorganization in March 1947, EUCOM had seven major commands: the First and Second Military Districts; U.S. Air Forces, Europe;
U.S. Forces, Austria; the Berlin Command (Office of Military Government
United States); the Continental Base Section; and headquarters command
(Frankfurt). EUCOM issued directives affirming that the commanding
general of each major command retained responsibility for construction in
his area. Simultaneously, these directives reemphasized the pivotal role of
the chief engineer as the central planner for all construction, with authority to approve all major projects, that is, those involving more than 10,000
worker-hours of labor and supervision.64
As a result of this mandate the chief engineers office reviewed 266
projects in the first quarter of 1947. Of these, the office approved 200 but
rejected 66, leading to a substantial decrease in the construction program,
in some areas a drop of as much as 50 percent. In the following quarter
the major commands seemed to get the message. The chief engineers
office received only 84 projects to review; of these, they approved 54,
rejected 2 outright, and returned 28 for further study. By the third quarter of 1947 the commands submitted only 79 projects, less than one-third
of the number proposed at the beginning of the year. Of these, the chief
engineers office turned back or deferred 40 percent. Many years later
Col. Alan J. McCutchen, who succeeded Fleming as chief of construction,
referred to this as the prevention-of-construction phase of engineering
activity in Europe.65
The chief engineers office continued to strengthen its role. By the
last quarter of 1948 the engineers at military posts within the major
commands no longer had the discretion to budget for projects requiring
5,000 or more worker-hours. Only projects approved by Headquarters,
EUCOM received funding through the chief engineers office. In other
words, the chief engineers office had the final word.66
Under Shinglers leadership the chief engineers office developed other
ways to manage engineer projects more efficiently. In the summer of 1947
the staff set up a post engineer training team made up of people from the
central office trained in real estate, solid fuels, construction and utilities,
cost accounting, engineer supply, repair and maintenance of engineer
equipment, and fire prevention. The First and Second Military Districts,
under which the military posts were organized, each formed a district
team that was trained by the team in the chief engineers office. The three
teams worked simultaneously and completed visits to all sixteen military
posts by the end of September.67
The renewed emphasis throughout EUCOM in 19471948 on military readiness, efficiency, and the elimination of unnecessary staff positions created a new activity for the engineers. The office began to engage
German and third-country personnel to substitute for soldiers in nonmilitary duties. The Engineer School in Murnau assumed the task of preparing these local workers for new responsibilities; in May 1947 the school
admitted the first German students to its training courses. Seven Germans
graduated from training courses in June, and by September another 146
41
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German engineer specialists graduated. The school trained increasing
numbers of local nationals in technical specialties through the 1940s.68
Tactical Readiness
General Huebners efforts to bring order and discipline to U.S. military forces in Europe stimulated other projects for the Army engineers.
To address tactical readiness and troop training, Huebner made field
exercises mandatory. He ordered elements of the 1st Infantry Division,
still scattered in early 1947 throughout the entire U.S. zone, to assemble
at a training area formerly used by the German army near Grafenwhr,
about twenty miles southeast of Bayreuth. Here he put company-size
units through combat training. During 1947 and 1948 a total of about 1.5
million worker-hours went into renovation and construction of training facilities at the Grafenwhr summer training camp. Although tents
served the troops as shelter in the field, engineers constructed more
durable wooden huts for kitchen, sanitary, recreational, and administrative facilities. During late spring 1948, eight separate camps were constructed at Grafenwhr, with access roads, latrines, water systems, lights,
mess and headquarters facilities, and floors for the tents. Headquarters,
26th Infantry, oversaw the preparations; and the Construction Branch of
the chief engineers office provided materials and trained engineers as
supervisors.69
The U.S. military has used training facilities in Grafenwhr since their construction
in the late 1940s. Members of the 43d Antiaircraft Battalion are training with the
.30-caliber M2 carbine in Grafenwhr in early 1956.
42
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Huebner also ordered extensive rehabilitation for Vilseck Caserne,
where the U.S. Constabulary was slated for special combat training under
the plan to revitalize American ground forces. The caserne consisted of
about 120 buildings damaged by war and three years of occupancy by
displaced persons. Because Vilseck was isolated from other U.S. military
installations, recreational facilities for soldiers received special attention.70
Other than Grafenwhr and Vilseck, the U.S. zone contained very
limited areas for military exercises. The U.S. Army had permission to use
training facilities in the British and French zones, but this involved greater
travel for the troops, so EUCOM sought more training space within its
own zone. In 1949 the command obtained another small training area for
regiment-size units in Wildflecken in northern Bavaria. Like Grafenwhr,
it lay very close to the German-Czech border.71
Administrative Reorganization
In the summer of 1946 the United States invited the three other occupying powers to merge economic administration of the zones of occupation
in Germany. The French and the Soviet Union declined the invitation, but
the British accepted. The new administrative authority, Bizonia, took formal shape on 1 January 1947. Later that year the two powers decided to
consolidate the administrative offices of their combined zones in Frankfurt.
To make room, the EUCOM headquarters staff and the staff of the chief
engineers office moved to Heidelberg, a city spared from bombing during the war because of the historic and cultural associations it held for the
British and Americans. To accommodate EUCOM, the U.S. Constabulary
moved from Heidelberg to Stuttgart. EUCOM located its headquarters in
Grossdeutschland Caserne, which in August 1948 was renamed Campbell
Barracks. This sequence of moves began in February 1948 but was not completed until early 1949.72 Beginning in 1948 the Army engineers supervised
military engineer activity in Europe from Heidelberg.
The movement of headquarters to Heidelberg demanded a major commitment of labor. The construction program to prepare the area involved
widening roads, providing office space and a new command post, preparing hardstands for parking military vehicles and five new parking lots for
passenger cars, and building a new quartermaster gas station and a new
engineer supply point.73
Although largely undamaged by air attacks, Heidelberg had not
escaped the effects of the shortages prevalent throughout Germany before
and during the war. Many of the citys buildings and homes suffered from
years of neglect and the absence of such basics as paint, heating fuel, and
utilities. The Army engineers had to carry out substantial rehabilitation on
requisitioned property, which included over a thousand German homes
and every hotel in Heidelberg, as well as military installations. Patton and
Campbell Barracks were completely renovated, but the most intricate and
delicate work went into the private homes that housed the general officers
at EUCOM headquarters.
43
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One of these facilities was the 72-room mansion of the Robert Bosch
family on Schlowolfsbrunnenweg. Sgt. Stanley Sikirica of the 252d
Engineer Combat Battalion received orders to coordinate and supervise
the carpentry, masonry, painting, and related work to repair the deterioration attributable to the lack of materials going back to the 1930s. The
wallpaper was terrible. Everything was falling down. The fresco work was
breaking off the ceilings and deteriorating to the point [that] there was no
adhesive, and everything was just mildewing and the floorsthe parquet floorswere warped. The heating systems were out; there was no
coal or coke to burn for years to heat these large mansions.74
To restore the quarters as faithfully as possible to their original state
of artistic beauty, the engineers engaged local people, including a fresco
craftsman in Heidelberg. The parquet floors provided the greatest challenge. Finding wood to match the three tones in the original was difficult
in an economy that had faced wood shortages for several years. But the
engineers succeeded, and Sikirica recalled the work with pride. During
the 1950s the Army returned the homes in Heidelberg to their German
owners.75
The First Berlin Crisis

The work in Heidelberg took place as political tensions reached a
public crescendo over Berlin. Shortly after the end of the war the United
States and Britain moved to create autonomous German economic and
political administrations within their zones. In January 1947 the two allies
merged their zones and created Bizonia. The Marshall Plan followed in
June. By 1948 France added its zone, and the Western allies prepared to
introduce reforms for their unified zonespolitical autonomy for the
German inhabitants, an economic reform program, and a revaluation of
the German currency. All four powers recognized that economic fusion of
the three Western zones would ultimately lead to a politically united West
Germany.
For the Soviet Union, such a development seemed to contradict the
results of its victory in battle. Economic recovery under an American-led
capitalistic system threatened Soviet ideological and political control of
both East Germany and Eastern Europe. In diplomatic meetings in early
1948, the four powers failed to agree on how to deal with Germany. The
Western Powers continued to prepare for the introduction of the new
German currency, and the Soviet Union prepared to do what it could
to make the West Germans pay dearly for their acceptance of Western
patronage. Soviet leaders chose to squeeze Berlin.
On 20 June 1948, the Western Powers introduced the new Deutschmark
(DM). Four days later the Soviet Union closed all access to Berlin by rail.
Within six weeks Soviet military officials stopped all road and canal traffic and shut off electricity to the Western sectors. The 2.5 million inhabitants of West Berlinformed from the sectors occupied by the United
States, Britain, and Francewere thereby cut off from the supplies they
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needed to survive. The Western allies viewed saving Berlin from slow
starvation or from being swallowed up within the Soviet system as a test
of their willingness to defend freedom. President Harry S. Truman was
determined to see that Berlin survived.
General Clay favored confronting the Soviet armies on the ground by
trying to force a convoy across the land routes to Berlin. Clay estimated
that the citys civilian population would need a minimum of 4,000 tons of
supplies per day and that the allied military forces would need another
500 tons a day. Without a convoy, all these supplies would have to reach
the city by air. Clay expressed doubts that such a logistical feat could be
sustained. Rather than force a confrontation on the ground, President
Truman chose to order the supply of Berlin by air.
The Berlin Airlift began in late June 1948 as a short-term expedient to
supply the allied forces. Within weeks it expanded into Operation VITTLES,
an unprecedented and much more demanding operation to supply the
citys entire civilian population. The airlift involved split-second timing
as planes formed an air bridge between West Germany and Berlin,
taking off and landing at all hours of the day in all kinds of weather. By
December 1948 the airlift was delivering more than Clays projected minimum of 4,000 tons per day. During January and February average daily
tonnage climbed to 5,500. At its peak in the spring of 1949, the air bridge
to the city delivered 8,000 tons of supplies per day.76
The moorings of the allied air bridge lay firmly on the groundon
the airfields from which the planes took off and on which they landed.
Maintaining airfields in Berlin and in the U.S. zone was the responsibility
of the Army engineers. Engineer work for the Air Force had declined late
in 1947 and in the first half of 1948, but it jumped sharply with the airlift.
Between 1 July and 30 September the chief engineers office recorded 1.5
million hours of work for the Air Force, of which 80 percent went into airfield construction in Berlin. Much of the remainder went into the air base
at Rhine-Maindubbed Rhine-Mud by those who worked therethe
starting point for airlift flights.77
Work on the airfields in Berlin involved keeping the limited runways
open despite the heavy pounding by a steady succession of planes packed
to the maximum. It also meant increasing the number of runways available. When the blockade began, Tempelhof Airfield in the U.S. sector had
only one runway suitable for landing cargo planes. It was evident within
days that this runway could not stand up to repeated use by heavily loaded C47 and C54 class aircraft. The weak base constructed in 1945 from
Berlin rubble gave way, the layer of concrete broke, and the hooks of the
pierced-steel landing mats tore off, causing the metal mats to warp and
bend. In response, teams of workers took up positions along the runway.
Wherever a fault appeared, a team would rush onto the runway, lift the
plank surface, fill the cavities with a sand-bitumen mixture, bend back the
planks to their correct positions, and weld steel straps between them. The
crews had only a few minutes between landings, so they used a lookout
to call out to workers as the next plane began its approach. The emergency
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repairs on the runway went on around the clock and made continuous
landings possible. The teams worked unceasingly until the first of the
new runways was completed.78
In the first week of July 1948, Col. Reginald Whitaker, engineer officer at the Berlin Military Post, received orders to build a new runway in
Tempelhof. On 8 July work began on an airstrip that was to be 5,500 feet
long and 140 feet wide. Two months later, on 8 September, planes began
landing on the new runway. A third runway in Tempelhof, started on
23 August, opened in November.79
Even with the additional runways, the facilities in Tempelhof were
not adequate to sustain the airlift. The airfields location among tall buildings made landings difficult and dangerous. The recommended approach
angle for landing aircraft was one vertical unit for every forty horizontal
units. The best angle that could be achieved in Tempelhof was one to sixteen! The glide angle was so sharp that as a safety measure engineers dug
a trench at the end of the principal runway so that planes overshooting it
would sheer off their landing gear and thus slow down enough to prevent
them from crashing into the administrative buildings.80
In addition to the liability of the glide angle, the facilities could not
accommodate the high volume of air traffic. Because Gatow Airfield in
the British sector could not be expanded, the pressures of the blockade
made a completely new airfield necessary. An engineer team identified an appropriate site in the Tegel area of the French sector, near rail
facilities and unobstructed by tall structures. The French agreed to let the
Americans build, staff, and maintain a field for the duration of the Berlin
Blockade. General Clay approved the construction of the new airport on
31 July 1948. Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, commander of the U.S. Air Force
in Germany, set in motion plans to complete the new field by February
1949. When Clay learned of LeMays projected date of completion, he sent
a terse message: I dont accept the February 1949 estimate for Tegel. It is
much too long.81 LeMay pushed the opening date to December 1948.
Very little heavy machinery was available in the city, so the engineers
applied labor-intensive methods. Clay, who had observed the value of
hand labor during a visit to China in 1943, put out an appeal for civilian workers in Berlin. Thousands of Berliners, men and women in almost
equal numbers, responded by volunteering to work on the runways for a
nominal wage plus one hot meal a day. At the peak of the activity some
17,000 people worked three shifts a day around the clock. Rather than laying a concrete base, because concrete was in short supply, the workers laid
the equivalent of ten city blocks of crushed rubble and bricks left from
the wartime destruction of Berlin. Between the start of work and the end
of the year, German civilians put in almost 3 million worker-hours. The
U.S. military managed this labor with 15 officers and 150 men assigned to
Tegel.82
Even with the multitude that volunteered to work on the airfields, the
engineers still needed heavy equipment for construction and to keep up
with runway maintenance. The appropriate equipment was available in
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Germany, but it was scattered. A call went out to the U.S. zone to send
available tractors, graders, rollers, scrapers, asphalt distributors, crushing and screening plants, and generators to the engineer supply depot in
Hanau. The engineers in Hanau disassembled the equipment to prepare it
for transport. To fit larger items into the aircraft, the engineers sometimes
had to cut the frames, so thirty engineers flew to Berlin, set up a reassembly shop, and welded the equipment together again as it arrived.83
One of the men who learned to operate that equipment was Lt.
Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., a twenty-year-old from Michigan who had
enlisted in the Army in 1946 after one year of university engineering
studies. Fresh out of Officer Candidate School, Delbridge commanded
a shift of workers in Tempelhof. Sgt. Joe Debco, a crusty World War II
veteran engineer on the crew, taught Delbridge how to operate each
type of equipment that arrived in Berlin. In 1949 Delbridge left the city
to accept an appointment to West Point, where he graduated in 1953. In
1976 he returned as a brigadier general and commander of the U.S. Army
Engineer Division, Europe.84
The heavy equipmentabout forty pieces in allarrived only after
work began, but its impact on the pace of construction was dramatic.
The second runway in Tegel, begun in March 1949 and completed after
the blockade had been lifted, required fewer than 400 civilian workers to
complete, in contrast to the 17,000 who worked round the clock on the first
runways in Tempelhof.85
The engineers also shipped fire extinguishers, generators to light
night operations, and tons of coal to Berlin during the blockade. Coal was
sacked at the Rheinau Coal Storage Point, shipped by rail to Rhine-Main
or to Wiesbaden air base, and then flown to Berlin. In late November 1948
a shortage of sacks temporarily slowed delivery to 100 tons a day; but
beginning on 1 December, when more coal sacks became available, the
engineers managed to load and ship 254 tons of coal a day, seven days a
week.86
In mid-May 1949 the Soviets abandoned the blockade and reopened
Berlin to land traffic, but the allies continued the airlift until September
1949 to build up stocks of goods. In fifteen months allied pilots made a
total of 279,114 flights into the city carrying 2,323,257 tons of supplies, an
average of one flight every two minutes and over 5,000 tons of supplies a
day. Keeping West Berlin free cost the lives of 39 British and 31 American
military personnel as well as 9 civilians.87
The Blockade and U.S. Forces in Austria

American military planners were acutely aware that Vienna, located
within the Soviet zone of Austria, was as vulnerable to a blockade as
Berlin. 88 Under the circumstances, the commander of United States
Forces, Austria (USFA), Lt. Gen. Geoffrey Keyes, concluded that he had to
reduce the number of personnel in Vienna and relocate them in the area
of Austria occupied by U.S. forces, specifically in Linz and Salzburg.89
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Pulling people back from the exposed position would reduce the number
of people that could be held hostage in Vienna.
General Keyes tapped the engineers of USFA to execute the relocation
from Vienna. In January 1949 the Army recalled Col. Hubert S. Miller,
USFA engineer from 1946 to 1948, and assigned him to administer the
emergency program to create housing for troops and dependents. The
engineer organization under Miller consisted of area engineers in Vienna,
Linz, and Salzburg who reported directly to him. This centralized structure served until the creation of post engineers under post commanders
in July 1951.90
Near Salzburg and Linz, USFA found old garrisons for the troops to
renovate and occupy.91 Housing for dependents was much more difficult
to find, but the Army identified the Bindermichl apartment complex
just outside of Linz as one possibility. Its rehabilitation became an early
example of the expanding role of the Army engineers in the changing
atmosphere of Europe.
The Bindermichl complex had been built in 1941 by the Nazi steel
conglomerate Reichswerke Hermann Gring to house the plants workers. Originally it consisted of sixty-five connected blocks, rather like a
series of row houses. Each block formed a three-story unit with six small
apartments, one on each side of the stairwell at every level. After the war
the U.S. Army took over the sixty-one blocks that had survived intact
and passed them to the International Refugee Organization for housing
displaced persons. The complex quickly became a lively center for blackmarket trade. When tensions began to mount during the Cold War, the
apartments were put at the disposal of the Army.92
In early 1949 Colonel Miller created a special position and appointed
Maj. William L. Starnes of his engineer staff as administrator for the
Bindermichl properties. Starnes hired an Austrian firm to design the renovations and to advise on technical details once the project got under way.
Colonel Miller persuaded the chief of engineers in Washington, Lt. Gen.
Lewis A. Pick, to send several experienced Corps of Engineers civilian
employees to Austria. The men were flown to Austria early in the project
and contributed substantially to its ultimate success.93
Austrian contractors, selected on the basis of sealed bids, were to do
the renovation and construction. Because the buildings had been German
property, they were under the trusteeship of the Austrian government
as a German external asset. USFA removed them from trusteeship and
established a German external asset fund of 9.72 million Austrian schillings (ATS) (about $971,899 at the official rate of exchange) to rehabilitate
the apartments for American families. USFA also arranged to evacuate
the displaced persons in phases, and Starnes put together a construction
schedule to follow the pace at which apartments were vacated. The standard plan called for workers to break through the dividing wall behind
the stairwell landing, thus joining the two apartments on each floor.
(Figure 1) The resulting five-room apartment contained a living room/dining room combination, a large bedroom, a small bedroom, a kitchen, a
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Figure 1: Converted Apartment in the Bindermichl Complex
storage room, a maids room, and two bathrooms. Six apartments were
specially modified for senior officers to provide more space and central
heating.
The apartments and grounds were in a deplorable condition when
vacated by the displaced persons. Black marketers had removed plumbing
fixtures, stoves, and anything sellable; floors had been ruined; doors and
windows, including frames, were often missing; over half the windows
that remained were without glass; and trash, dirt, broken bottles, feathers,
old clothes, shoes, and spoiled food soiled many apartments. Courtyards
and common areas were even more depressing. Drainage had broken
down completely, so that rain and snow produced a sea of mud. Wooden
shacks, variously used by the inhabitants as small stores, workshops, supply huts, churches, and night clubs, littered the once-open courtyards. All
of this debris had to be removed before renovation could begin.
The bids for renovating of the first block, which consisted of four
apartment units, were opened on 10 February 1949, and work began
within days. From that point to the completion of the project, Starnes and
a staff of five supervised a steady cycle of contracting and construction.
Each week contracts were signed for another group of buildings and work
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was begun on them. The engineers applied experience gained in the first
round of contract negotiations to subsequent rounds of bidding. The later
contracts included interior parking areas, lawns, exterior sidewalks, fumigating the buildings before actual construction, built-in storage units for
bedrooms and kitchens, andthrough the USFA quartermasterfurniture for the finished apartments. The four apartments begun in February
were completed two months later, and the first section of sixty-five apartments was finished in May.
By the middle of May 1949 all refugee residents had moved out and
renovation of the rest of the apartments began at an intense pace. Indeed,
the period from mid-May to early September became the busiest phase
of the project. Cost-saving measures, combined with declining costs in
the Austrian economy, meant that money stretched far enough to complete the project within budget. At one point, renovation was under way
simultaneously in twenty-four blocks of apartments and two courtyards.
The work involved about forty separate contractors. The American engineer supervisors relied heavily on Austrian engineers for inspections.
Funds were dispensed at the rate of ATS 45,000 ($4,500 at the official rate
of exchange) a day on construction and ATS 25,000 ($2,500 at the official
rate) a day on furniture.
By the middle of July American families began moving into the available apartments at a rate of ten to fifteen a week, a pace that kept up with
the construction crews progress. The arrival of families meant contending with children and pets that found construction sites irresistible attractions. Apartment managers organized a Repair and Maintenance Section
for the complex consisting of seven men and one foreman. The janitorial
staff, which had begun with just a few men as the initial apartments were
completed and furnished, grew to fifty men under one superintendent.
By the end of the construction phase the Army engineers had renovated and furnished 182 apartments and created a post exchange. Most of the
apartments were occupied immediately. The bulk of the work was over
by 15 November 1949; another twenty-four apartments were renovated
in subsequent months. The work in the complex included parking spaces
for 150 automobiles, landscaping for 3 lawn areas in courtyards, 5,500
square yards of sidewalk, and 10,000 square yards of concrete or asphalt
road. The cost of the project by mid-November was just over ATS 10 million (about $1 million), with 90 percent coming from the German external
asset account and the remainder from rent paid by families living in the
complex. About 60 percent of the total spent was for rehabilitation and
construction, with close to 30 percent devoted to apartment furnishings.
The remaining money paid for landscaping and operating costs.
Even after the end of the Soviet blockade of Berlin, housing remained
critically short for the U.S. Army in Austria. During 1949 and 1950
Colonel Miller arranged to house troops in the Salzburg province in facilities taken over from the International Refugee Organization. On three
sitesSaalfelden, Sankt Johann, and Riedenburg ATS 12.5 million was
expended from a special account set up for the purpose. In March 1950
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Miller arranged a program with the Austrian government that established
the Housing Administration Trust account, a fund of ATS 130 million
made available by the Austrian government and administered by Miller
to construct new apartment houses. Over the next two years, contractors completed new apartments in Linz (68), Wels (38), Salzburg (272),
Saalfelden (72), and Sankt Johann (16). The Austrian government put up
the land and the money for these buildings but insisted that Austrian
building codes be observed. The arrangement was a marked change
from the era of occupation when the U.S. Army had been able to insist on
American standards. Still, it was practical because, in return for its contributions, the Austrian federal government received title to the apartment
units once the Americans no longer needed them.94
Standardizing Engineer Operations

The positive support in American public opinion for the airlift to preserve West Berlin did not prompt a reversal of the declining troop levels
in Germany. Nor did the blockade change the mission and underlying
activities of the engineers. Still, after four years of struggling to draw
management of engineering activity into a central agency, the chief engineers office had developed a set of procedures to standardize its operations. One sign of the change was how they calculated work. Until the
stabilization of the German currency, paying an hourly wage in the vastly
devalued German Reichsmark or in occupation marks had been impossible. After the introduction of the Deutschmark in June 1948, projects
had to budget in worker-hours rather than in the money value for labor.
In April 1949, for the first time since the occupation began, the Army
engineers drew up their budget and projected their contracts for maintenance and construction in Deutschmarks using the cost per hour of labor.
The establishment of an efficient German domestic market for goods also
allowed the engineers to abandon their practice of furnishing to the contractor much of the material necessary for a job and to discontinue providing hot meals as an inducement to attract labor. By 1949 the marketplace
had begun to take over some of these functions, and the conduct of business within the German economy by the chief engineers office took on a
semblance of standard practice.95
The German economy was by no means fully reconstructed, but recovery was clearly under way. In the German fiscal year beginning 1 April
1949 (fiscal year 1950), all projects contracted out by the Army engineers
could be approved on a total-cost basis. Competitive bidding by German
contractors became the norm; and in establishing guidelines for contracts,
the chief engineers office introduced such features as bonus-and-penalty
clauses, leading to economies in construction and to earlier occupancy for
the user.96
The chief engineers office also made its technical authority felt in
other ways. Drawing on the talents of its professional staff of engineers,
the office assisted the post engineers in the most effective use of money,
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labor, and supplies. For example, to enable post engineers to stretch the
limited funds available for rehabilitation, the chief engineers office developed standard plans for several types of dependent housing units, a measure to help reduce unit costs.97
The European Command used the experience of the chief engineers
office with techniques of financial management to enhance the engineer
staffs central role. In 1948 Shinglers staff instituted cost-accounting procedures in engineer operations. In 1949 EUCOM extended the financial
management system that Shinglers staff had implemented to the entire
command, allowing commanders to match expenses to accomplishment,
whether funding came from appropriated dollars or from the German
government as part of the occupation obligations. The chief engineer also
sent out accountants from his office to audit the records maintained by
the post engineers.98
The chief engineers office also extended its influence by providing
assistance for facilities engineering. In the early years of the occupation,
routine maintenance involving repair and utilities had been managed
locally and executed by engineer units assigned to field commands (subsequently by the engineers of military districts). With the establishment
and evolution of military posts in 1947 and 1948, post engineers took
over the tasks related to maintenance, repair, and utilities.99 By 1949 the
chief engineers office had refined its training program to help the local
engineers establish a comprehensive maintenance program and allocated
sufficient funds from their own budgets for regular maintenance and
repair.100 The new program for 1949 emphasized preventive maintenance
to reduce repair costs. The teams trained by the chief engineers office
consisted of a carpenter, a plumber, and an electrician to inspect and
repair each building on a three-to-four-month cycle. The program allowed
the EUCOM Engineer Division to budget maintenance on a unit-cost
basisDM 0.186 per square foot per year for 1949.101 For the German fiscal
year 1949, the total budget for engineer costs of the occupation amounted
to about DM 430 million. Of this, about 50 percent went to repairs and
utilities. Most of the remaining budget went to real estate activities, major
rehabilitation, and custodial services.102
Other activities took a small percentage of the budget, but they illustrate the areas in which the chief engineers office established its position
as manager and supporter of engineer activity throughout the European
Command. For instance, starting in July 1948 the Office of the Chief
Engineer in Heidelberg supported teams in each of the military posts
to maintain the 5,500 pieces of engineer equipment in use throughout
the command. These field maintenance teams, which included a master
mechanic certified by EUCOMs chief engineer, could turn to the chief
engineers office for technical assistance. In addition, during 1949 the
EUCOM Engineer School, supervised and staffed by the chief engineers
office, trained 561 Americans and 502 Germans as operators, construction
equipment mechanics, diesel mechanics, welders, and utility repairmen.
This training gave necessary personnel resources to the local command52
2/3/06 11:10:24 AM
German and U.S. military personnel at the Engineer School in Murnau, Germany,
learned engineering skills such as surveying and building bridges with ferries.
ers, who were responsible for the maintenance of engineer equipment.

To supplement the local maintenance installations, the Office of the Chief
Engineer prepared and issued a manual on field maintenance of engineer
equipment and provided a maintenance assistance team, composed of
personnel from the Hanau Engineer Depot, that visited each military post
to assist and advise.103
The chief engineers office found that from a strictly mechanical point
of view, problems related to the maintenance of engineer equipment were
minimal but other aspects of maintenance created difficulties. There
was a critical shortage of spare parts, making timely repair difficult. The
language barrier that divided American soldiers from the Germans and
displaced Europeans who actually operated and repaired the equipment
created misunderstandings and mistakes. German translations of instructions and schedules for maintenance services provided by the chief engineers office were only a partial solution. More equipment was available
in the field than could be effectively maintained by the people at hand.
Lastly, field shops often attempted repairs beyond their capabilities.104
The engineer staff attached to the headquarters of the U.S. armed forces in Europe had moved from England to France to Germany in 1945 and
from Frankfurt to Heidelberg in 1948. The name changed slightly with the
reorganization of command in Europe, but the offices function remained
the same. After 1945 the army of occupation progressively reduced its
troop strength. Not even the blockade of Berlin interrupted the decline in
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the number of American troops in Germany. In December 1949 the number of U.S. military personnel in Europe reached its lowest point83,400
soldierssince the war. Few people realized as events unfolded that the
commitment symbolized by the Berlin Airlift would become the dominant determinant of policy and would override in succeeding decades the
American inclination toward military disengagement from Europe.
By the end of 1949 the mission of the U.S. Army in Europe had shifted
dramatically. In early 1945 combat had driven all American military decisions. After Germany was defeated, military leaders concentrated on the
peacetime occupation and the need to maintain order. As the decade
ended, combat readiness and rapid response to outside challenges supplanted static occupation duties. With its West European allies, the United
States prepared to meet possible aggression against Western Europe by
the Soviet Union.105
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PART TWO
FOR A COMMON DEFENSE
19501973
05D_PartII Intro_Final.indd 1
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INTRODUCTION
n the summer of 1948, encouraged by the Truman Doctrine, the

Marshall Plan, and President Trumans initiatives to reinstitute conscription, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg
entered discussions with the United States that led to the signing in
April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty and the establishment of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In addition to the United States
and the five countries that had initiated the discussions, Italy, Norway,
Denmark, Iceland, Portugal, and Canada also signed the treaty. (See Map
5.) The key provision of the pact was that each signatory agreed to treat
an attack on any member state as the equivalent of an attack on its own
soil and to render military assistance accordingly.
The establishment of NATO marked the recognition by West European
statesmen, and the acceptance by American policymakers, that only the
United States could counterbalance the power of the Soviet Union in
Europe. The Europeans also realized that an alliance led by the United
States would be based on consensus among independent, sovereign, and
free states, whereas one dominated by the Soviet Union would involve
coerced agreement.
NATO applied to Western Europe, but the next crisis of the Cold
War occurred in Asia. In June 1950 the Soviet client state of North Korea
attacked South Korea across the political line of demarcation that had
divided the Korean peninsula since the end of World War II. Only
American armed intervention saved South Korea from being overrun.
In the face of what they saw as open Communist aggression, the
signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty underlined their determination
to defend Western interests by creating a military command for NATO.
In December 1950 the United States proposed and the North Atlantic
partners accepted General Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe. Over the next several months Eisenhower established the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) near
Paris. Its mission was to defend the territory from the North Cape in the
Arctic Ocean north of Norway to northern Africa and from the Atlantic
coast of Western Europe to the eastern borders of Turkey.
Because SHAPE initially had no international funding, U.S. funds
and support were channeled through the European Command in
Heidelberg, which furnished budgeting, funding, and accounting for all
of the national military elements. As units were assigned to NATO, the
United States reorganized its own military headquarters in Europe to
clarify lines of authority. In August 1952 the Joint Chiefs of Staff activated a new command, U.S. European Command, to coordinate American
2/3/06 11:10:42 AM
I C E L A N D
N o r t h
DENMARK
S e a
U NI TE D
KI N G D OM
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
LUXEMBOURG
F R A N C E
I T A LY
PO
Corsica
Sardinia
M
Sicily
EUROPEAN SIGNATORIES
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
n
e
April 1949
European Signatories
Postwar Germany
Future Boundary between East and West Germany

0
0
500 Miles
500 Kilometers
Map 5
2/3/06 11:10:43 AM
Introduction
Chart 1: Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953
Headquarters,
United states Army Europe (USAREUR)
Major
Seventh Army
Commands
USAREUR
Communications Zone
Subordinate Commands
32d Antiaircraft
Artillery
Brigade
88th Counter
Intelligence
Group
Headquarters
Area Command
Special Troops
Headquarters
USAREUR
Berlin
Command
Northern
Area
Command
Bremerhaven
Port of
Embarkation
Units
Dependents
Education
Group
USAREUR
Audit
Agency
Southern
Area
Command
513th
Military
Intelligence
Group
U.S. Military
Liaison Mission to
Commander in Chief,
Soviet Occupied Zone
of Germany
Western
Area
Command
* Technical and
Administrative
Divisions
Military
Assistance
Advisory
Group, Spain
* Office, U.S.
Commander
Berlin
*Staff Divisions of Headquarters USAREUR having certain assigned and attached units under the
command of the respective heads of divisions: Adjutant General, Provost Marshall, Special Activities,
Armed Forces Information and Education, Finance, Chemical, Engineer, Medical, Ordnance,
Quartermaster, Signal, and Transportation.
support for SHAPE-NATO and to serve as the joint command for U.S.
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force personnel and activities in
Europe.1 What had been the European Command was redesignated
on 1 August 1952 as United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), responsible for all functions related to the Army. (See Map 6.) Headquartered
in Heidelberg, USAREUR took command of a small NATO planning
unit, the Central Army Group, and operated through the Northern,
Southern, Western, and Headquarters (Heidelberg area) Commands in
Germany and the Communications Zone in France. (Chart 1) The Europe
Command and its successor USAREUR also provided logistical support
to other agencies, including the American elements of NATO forces, the
United States Air Forces in Europe, and Military Assistance Advisory
Groups in Europe and the Middle East.2
Implementing a policy of common defense for the signatories of the
North Atlantic Treaty stimulated military construction on a scale that
Army engineers had not known since World War II. Whether in Greece,
59
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U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

WEST GERMANY
1 December 1952
Hamburg
Area Command Boundary (approximate)
Bremerhaven
NETHERLANDS

Area Command Headquarters
0
50
100 Miles
100 Kilometers
50
BERLIN
BERLIN
Hannover
Elbe R
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
Leipzig
Kassel
Dresden
Rh
Erfurt
in
e
FRANKFURT DIS T RICT
WIESBADEN
M ILITARY POST
Wiesbaden
NORTHERN AREA
Frankfurt
W RZ BURG D IST RICT

Bamberg
Wrzburg
WESTERN
AREA
Pilsen
NURE M BE RG D IST RICT

Kaiserslautern
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
F R A N C E
Karlsruhe
HEA D QUA RT E RS
A RE A
Regensburg
STUT T GA RT
DIST RICT
Stuttgart
SOUTHERN AREA
M UNICH D IST RICT
Augsburg
A UGSBURG
D IST RICT
Munich
GA RM ISCH
D IST RICT
Garmisch
A U S T R I A
Map 6
2/3/06 11:10:43 AM
Introduction
Turkey, Austria, Germany, or France, the fundamental responsibility of
the Army engineers remained to expand the tactical and the support
facilities necessary to meet the new American role.
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2/3/06 11:10:44 AM
3
DEFENDING THE WEST
19501953
he contest taking shape between the United States and the Soviet
Union was a global struggle that involved Europe as one arena
of conflicting interests. The United States policy of containing
Soviet expansion reached beyond traditional European boundaries to the eastern Mediterranean and Turkey. President Harry S. Truman
included Turkey in his speech of March 1947 and made the country one
focus of Western defense against communism. The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) included Turkey and Greece in its area of mutual
defense and admitted them into the alliance in 1952.
The Berlin Blockade focused attention on Germany as the land in
contention. In great measure the blockade had been the Soviet reply to
an initiative to establish local government on a liberal democratic basis in
the three zones in western Germany. The United States, Great Britain, and
France had encouraged the Germans to draw up a constitution, hold elections, and create a representative government. The process culminated
in September 1949 with the formation of the new Federal Republic of
Germany. The Soviet Union responded with the declaration of a competing state, the German Democratic Republic, officially established just a
month later.
All these events created a political framework for the presence of the
U.S. military in Europe that was vastly different in 1950 than it had been
in 1945. Beginning in 1950 the Army engineers had to develop airfields in
Turkey and the support facilities to make flights from these bases possible. In Germany, they scrambled to find and construct facilities to accommodate the dramatic increase in troops stationed in there, an influx that
also increased the need for dependent housing and support facilities. At
the same time, the Army engineers had to adjust to the end of the occupation regime and to West Germanys gradual assertions of autonomy,
factors that influenced both the financing and the execution of military
construction. The new relations translated into projects whereby the engineers contributed to the improvement of German communities in which
06E_Chap03_Final.indd 1
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the soldiers lived and worked. To protect against possible Soviet aggression from Eastern Europe, the European Command (EUCOM) also had
to reconsider its lines of communication and logistical support. Adjusting
the lines of communication stimulated more military construction for the
Army engineers.
The Troop Base in Germany

The outbreak of the Korean War in late June 1950 profoundly shocked
Europeans. They were acutely aware of the similarity between divided
Germany and divided Korea. In September 1950, with the North Korean
attack fresh in their minds, representatives of the NATO states met in
New York and announced that they would consider any attack on the
new West German state or on West Berlin as an attack upon themselves.
They unanimously adopted a resolution that called for an integrated
military force under a unified allied command to defend Europe. They
also announced that they would increase the number of allied and U.S.
military forces in Germany and position them without regard to zonal
lines.1 This declarationthat the Western Powers in the coalition to defeat
Germany just five years earlier would now defend the fledgling West
German stateillustrated the dramatic changes in political conditions in
Europe between 1945 and 1950. To accommodate the new strategic situation, the three Western Powers agreed to relinquish their military rights
under the occupation regime and accorded the year-old Federal Republic
of Germany the right to maintain their troops in Germany by invitation.
The new situation required the Western alliance to convert its military
presence in Germany into a credible defensive force capable of repulsing
an attack from the east. To achieve this status, the number of troops in
EUCOMby 1949 reduced to around 80,000 combat soldiershad to be
increased. Early in 1950 the Department of the Army authorized increases
for Europe to take place late in the year and throughout 1951. The command anticipated a troop basis of 164,000 in four divisions plus support
units, a figure that was surpassed in the first year. Troop strength almost
tripled during 1950 and 1951; total military strength in EUCOM increased
from 106,610 to 255,721.2 The personnel receiving support from EUCOM
or United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), during 19501953 rapidly
increased as the U.S. military expanded its presence and assumed its
NATO responsibilities. Only among European civilian employees of the
U.S. forces did the numbers decline substantially. (Table 1)
In September 1950 the commander in chief of EUCOM, General
Thomas T. Handy, asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to mobilize a field army
to command the additional troops. The Seventh Army, activated early
in the autumn of 1950 as part of the overall plan to establish an effective NATO fighting force in Europe, set up headquarters in StuttgartVaihingen.3 By 1 December 1950, the Seventh Army, headed by Lt. Gen.
Manton S. Eddy, became the first fully operational American field army to
exist in Germany since February 1947. General Eddy assumed the opera64
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Defending the West, 19501953

Table 1
Personnel Receiving European Command Support
1950 and 1953
1 Jan 50
83,394
30 Jun 53
215,242
Change
131,848
Percent
change
158
19,244
37,453
18,209
95
400
1,115
715
179
U.S. civilian employees
6,681
6,257
424
European civilian employees
1,405
269
1,136
81
Labor service troops
22,664
26,449
3,785
17
Dependents
40,616
78,709
38,093
94
174,404
365,494
191,190
210
Personnel
U.S. Army
U.S. Air Force
U.S. Navy
Total
Source: Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, The U.S. Army Construction Program in Germany,
19501953, prepared by George Tays, p. 12.
tional authority of USAREUR over all Army units within the European
Command. By the end of 1951 the Seventh Army contained two active
corpsV Corps and VII Corpswith a total of five divisions. Between
late 1950 and 1952 USAREUR continued to exist as the Armys administrative command under EUCOM. Unlike the Seventh Army, the Twelfth
Air Force remained independent of EUCOM, answering directly to the
Department of the Air Force in the Department of Defense.4
Within the new command structure the engineers continued to operate as an element of the EUCOM general staff, but in a reduced status.
When Brig. Gen. Don G. Shingler left his position as chief engineer in
November 1949, troop levels in EUCOM had fallen below 100,000 and the
position was downgraded. Shinglers successor was Col. Willis E. Teale,
who served as EUCOM staff engineer from 1949 to 1952. Only in the mid1950s, after the substantial buildup of troop strength to around 250,000,
did EUCOM again designate the position for a one-star general officer.5
The American Zone in Germany

No command-wide construction program of any significant volume
existed in EUCOM before the augmentation of troops began in late 1950.
For several years the Engineer Division of EUCOM headquarters had
engaged primarily in rehabilitating buildings and executing routine maintenance and repair. It had begun a modest program to construct family
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housing in 1949. By the beginning of 1950 the need to expand construction
to accommodate the changing requirements of the occupying forces clearly called for changes in the management of engineer activity.6 American
military supplies stored in vulnerable positions near the borders of East
Germany and Czechoslovakia had to be shifted to more tenable locations
west of the Rhine to make them more secure and to shorten lines of supply. Both the repositioning of supplies and the increase in troop strength
involved the Army engineers of the European Command in planning and
executing major building programs.
In April 1950 EUCOM set up a planning board to oversee the construction projected to accommodate the imperative to return requisitioned
property to the Germans. Representatives from the relevant EUCOM
headquarters divisionsSeventh Army, Twelfth Air Force, and Naval
Forces Germanyserved on the board and set general guidelines for
the construction program. In May the EUCOM Engineer Division took
construction out of its Operations Branch and established a Construction
Branch. The Operations Branch retained the responsibility to draw up,
review, keep current, and approve specifications for construction and to
establish policies, procedures, and standard specifications for the types of
buildings under consideration.7
Once the Operations Branch had processed guidelines formulated by
the planning board and approved by the EUCOM chief of staff, the plans
moved to the Construction Branch. Projects then passed to the appropriate post engineers, who let the contracts and managed the construction.
The Construction Branch supervised the execution of the contracts and set
up inspection teams to aid post engineers in obtaining satisfactory work
from contractors in the field.8
For several months after the reorganization in 1950, one person
commanded both the Operations and the Construction Branches; but
construction activity intensified with the outbreak of the Korean War
and the anticipated augmentation of troop strength in Germany. As
a result, EUCOM assigned Col. David H. Tulley to take charge of the
Construction Branch in August 1950, a post he held for nearly two years.
Contemporaneously, the Department of the Army assigned twelve engineer specialists to Tulley on temporary duty to equip EUCOMs engineer
staff to deal with the increase in construction. The department also authorized him to hire fifteen civilian engineers.9
The occupation statutes stipulated that Germany pay all costs of
maintaining the U.S. forces, but the new partnership between the United
States and West Germany made new arrangements imperative. During
the early years of occupation, the Army had requisitioned private homes
and state properties. American officials proposed that the German government now pay instead the costs of constructing new facilities. EUCOM
formulated a five-year budget for construction that the U.S. high commissioner, John J. McCloy, presented to the German Ministry of Finance. The
Federal Republic agreed to fund the construction as a long-term capital
investment in real property that would revert to German use when the
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Americans vacated it. EUCOM agreed to submit budgets yearly through
the high commission to the West German government.10
As the building program got under way, German federal and state
construction agencies raised objections. U.S. Army engineers, they complained, were cutting them out of the planning and bidding processes and
dealing directly and exclusively with private German contractors. During
the summer of 1951, American military leaders, West German government
authorities, and the U.S. high commissioner held talks to work out procedures to include the German Government Construction Agency (Deutsche
Bundesbauverwaltung, or DBBV) in the solicitation of bids and in negotiating with German firms for design and construction. Over the next several years the practice of including the DBBV in the contracting process
formed the basis of the contracting system, dubbed indirect contracting,
that evolved after the Federal Republic attained full sovereignty in May
1955. In the early 1950s a series of bilateral agreements between EUCOM
and the new West German government left the major part of U.S. military
construction under Deutschmark (DM) funding.11
Including German government agencies in the process of design and
in construction programs represented a precedent-setting step in adjusting relations between the United States and the new Federal Republic.
Equally as innovative, the Germans began formally to propose alternatives when the Army requested use of a facility. As early as 1949 associations of citizens and communities had offered to finance and build
housing for American military families in exchange for the return of requisitioned homes to their German owners.12 The practice continued on an
informal basis throughout the 1950s, and it eventually grew into a major
program labeled alternate construction.
Troop Housing
The impending influx of Army officers and soldiers posed the most
immediate concern for EUCOMs commander, General Handy, in 1950.
Handy proposed a four-part program to alleviate the prospective housing
crisis. He wanted an increase in the density of troops in existing casernes,
the immediate rehabilitation of all available casernes, an accelerated turnover of casernes still held by the International Refugee Organization, and
the rapid construction of semipermanent barracks facilities.13 To ensure
space for the arriving soldiers, McCloy directed the West German government to make available eleven casernes in the U.S. zone by 1 November
and another twenty-five by 1 December. McCloys directive hastened
the German governments plan to move the displaced persons out of the
casernes. Speeding up the process gave the construction crews more time
to repair and rehabilitate the facilities before troops began to arrive in
1951.14
Handy charged three separate elements to cooperate on planning,
setting priorities, and executing the construction needed to accommodate the augmentation of forces. The three elements included the director
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of logistics (G4), the Construction Branch of the EUCOM/USAREUR
Engineer Division, and the Logistics Division planning board that Handy
had established in early 1950. The director of logistics was responsible for
the overall plan of construction for the command. The planning board
prepared forecasts, reviewed requirements for projects submitted by the
military posts, settled priorities and locations for construction, and prepared the yearly construction budget submitted to the high commissioner
for transmittal to the Federal Republic.
The EUCOM/USAREUR staff engineer, Colonel Teale, was responsible for establishing work procedures and specifications for projects. The
Engineer Division approved projects, construction contracts, and construction budgets coming from the military posts. It provided detailed technical and administrative procedures for construction activities and prepared a master plan.15 Teale was the nominal superior to Colonel Tulley,
who commanded the Construction Branch of the Engineer Division, but
Teale was ineffective. The newly arrived Communications Zone (COMZ)
commander in France described him as a sad-sack [who] has slipped
immeasurably. Under the circumstances, EUCOMs chief of staff, Maj.
Gen. Daniel Noce, an engineer officer, instructed Tulley to take charge
of the construction program and to report directly to him while keeping
Teale informed.16
With Noces active encouragement and support, Tulley visited every
military post commander to explain the intensified construction mission
and to get authority to deal directly with the post engineer on construction matters. Tulley also instituted emergency construction procedures.
These emergency procedures specified that the bidding process include
a minimum of three contractors and that the post engineer give contractors a tour of the project site, provide a written description of the project,
and solicit a lump-sum proposal from each contractor. Provided that a
post engineer observed these steps, the emergency procedures gave him
authority to initiate contract negotiations and award the contract to the
lowest bidder. By reducing paperwork and levels of approval, the procedure increased the tempo of activity and shortened the time it took to
rehabilitate a caserne from six to four months.17
To facilitate coordination, troop units deploying from the United States
sent advance parties to Germany to consult with the Construction Branch
concerning their anticipated requirements. This practice established sound
relations between the engineer staff and the eventual users of facilities,
which persisted once the units arrived on site.18 Post engineers organized
their staffs into branches for real estate, repairs and utilities, construction,
and troop supply and field maintenance. The post engineer offices drafted
their requirements and submitted plans to the Construction Branch of the
EUCOM Engineer Division, which incorporated individual post projects
into a master plan. Each project was identified as either new construction or
rehabilitation, but projects from both categories progressed simultaneously.19
When Handy issued his guidelines in September 1950, U.S. forces
held about 100 former German army casernes. In addition to the facili68
2/3/06 10:29:57 AM
In the early 1950s, U.S. troops moved into the refurbished Reinhardt Caserne
in Neu Ulm, near Augsburg.
ties provided by the German government, EUCOM received facilities

from French occupation forces in their zone west of the Rhine, from the
International Refugee Organization, and from the U.S. high commissioner
for Germany.20
In February 1951 EUCOM headquarters requested through the Office
of the High Commissioner that the German government make available for incoming troops fifty-two additional casernes located in the U.S.
military posts of Augsburg, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Garmisch, Munich,
Nuremberg, Stuttgart, and Wrzburg. In March and April EUCOM
requested still more casernes. Simultaneously, EUCOM engineers proceeded to rehabilitate the casernes already under American control. Of
the 158 casernes and other installations under reconstruction in 1951, 80
were completed and occupied by the end of the year. During 1951 and
1952 EUCOM obtained 169 additional casernes from the Germans, all of
which the command engineers rehabilitated and repaired using German
contractors. The contractors qualified through a standardized bidding
process managed at the local level by the post engineers with the participation of the Engineer Division in EUCOM headquarters.
Concurrently with rehabilitation of casernes, the engineers managed construction of tent camps and cantonments designed to accommodate troops while more permanent facilities were being completed.
Wildflecken, thirty miles north of Schweinfurt, received one of the first
tent camps, constructed between 8 January and 10 April 1951 at a cost of
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Despite austere guidelines for housing construction in 1952, Army engineers did
build some amenities, including this enlisted mens club in Pirmasens.
more than DM 5 million. A camp for 20,000 men served as a staging area
for arriving troops after it was constructed at Sandhofen near Mannheim
in the summer of 1951. Similar camps were put up near Mainz, Fulda,
Giessen, and Baumholder in the French zone.21
In Grafenwhr, the training area thirty-seven miles northeast of
Nuremberg, an 8,000-man winterized tent camp constructed during
1951 remained in use well into 1952. In Bremerhaven, construction on a
5,000-man temporary tent camp used as a staging area for arriving and
departing troops began 9 June 1952 and was completed on 1 December.
All together the engineers supervised construction of nine tent camps in
Germany between 1950 and 1953.22
The engineers also experimented in Grafenwhr with another type
of construction to house a division for year-round training. They used
pumice stone for exterior walls and corrugated iron for roofs. Conceived
as semipermanent and designed for rapid, inexpensive construction, the
experimental buildings proved more economical than tents, because they
cost less to maintain and could be upgraded for longer-term use. The
buildings also improved sanitation. By June 1953 the engineers had used
concrete or pumice block construction on twenty-three cantonments.23
The engineers installed the utilities and services necessary to support
these developments. In Grafenwhr, for instance, where the Armys building program erected 250 structures in 1950, the engineers also constructed
a reservoir and ten miles of sewer and water lines, installed water heat70
2/3/06 10:29:58 AM

ing units to furnish hot water on demand, and provided a system of new
hard-surface roads. The cost of rehabilitation, cantonments, and tentcamps came to DM 832,683,600, the equivalent of $198.3 million, which
represented 35.2 percent of the total spent on all types of construction in
Germany between 1951 and 1953.24
None of this construction was luxurious by any measure. Standard
allowances under emergency regulations permitted about 100 square feet
per person in barracks, one showerhead per 20 men, one toilet for each
15 to 20 men, and one 2-foot urinal trough per 20 men. Post surgeons recommended that window and door screens, largely unknown in German
buildings, be installed to keep insects out of medical dispensaries, kitchens, mess halls, and other selected facilities.25 Army austerity occasionally proved penny-wise and pound-foolish. Despite warnings from the
Germans, the Army engineers decided to save money by not applying
stucco to troop barracks in Baumholder, relying instead on a cement
slurry. When wind-blown rain arrived with gale force and penetrated
the walls, it gave the appearance of a shower bath to interior rooms.
Embarrassed, the engineers applied stucco.26
As of September 1953, USAREUR controlled 282 Army and 16 Air
Force installations in Germany with a total capacity of about 406,000 beds.
At that time the facilities housed only about 329,000, including labor service troops and other nonmilitary personnel. To use all of the available
spaces, commands would have had to split military units, undermining
their tactical integrity. The apparent surplus of spaces also included unusable facilities and hundreds of requisitioned facilities scheduled to be
returned to the Germans.27
Bachelor Officers Quarters

Although a less pressing priority, building bachelor officers quarters (BOQ) proceeded at the same time as the barracks. The command
received approval for construction of the first 6 BOQ buildings on
13 December 1950; more were authorized in February. Construction
began in April on 12 buildings of 68 rooms each: 4 in the Heidelberg
region; 2 each in Heilbronn, Kaiserslautern, and Stuttgart; and 1 each in
Mannheim and Ansbach. By July construction was under way at another 5 buildings, and the list of cities extended to Nuremberg. Six BOQs
were completed by the end of 1951, providing 408 spaces. In March
1952 the director of EUCOMs Logistics Division proposed constructing
an additional 52 BOQ buildings with 2,448 spaces, half of them for the
Air Force; a month later he recommended that 8 buildings be added to
the plan. Sites were added in Munich, in the Western Area Command
west of the Rhine, and in Schwbisch Gmnd, Wrzburg, Schweinfurt,
Bamberg, and Amberg.28
In the period from 1 April 1950 to the end of June 1953, the Army
engineers supervised completion of 4,914 BOQ spaces at a cost of DM 53.9
million (the equivalent of $12.8 million). USAREUR still needed 12,300
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more spaces. Moreover, many of the facilities in use as bachelors quarters
were in family structures or located at a great distance from duty stations.
Thousands more spaces were earmarked for derequisitioning once West
Germany achieved full sovereignty, factors that increased the overall need.
The task of providing BOQ housing became more complicated when a
problem arose with the existing standard designs. The four-story design
used during 19501953 exceeded USEUCOMs new regulations for floor
space per occupant. The two-story structures, while meeting the revised
regulations, took from two to two-and-a-half times as much land area per
person as the four-story structure. Moreover, German authorities objected
to constructing them in urban areas because they considered the semipermanent cantonment design and corrugated roofs aesthetic eyesores.29
Troop Training Facilities

The augmentation of U.S. forces also imposed new requirements
for troop training facilities. Even with the acquisition of Wildflecken in
1949 to supplement Grafenwhr, the terrain limited action to regimentsize units. The Seventh Army needed space to train division-size units.
In October 1951, after long negotiations with the Federal Republic, the
Army secured the use of an area near Hohenfels, southeast of Nuremberg.
Initially about thirty-eight square miles, this area could eventually be
expanded to seventy-three square miles. Further removed from the
Czechoslovakian border than Wildflecken and Grafenwhr, Hohenfels
Facilities constructed near Hohenfels in 1951 included this mock village

for special training.
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was less vulnerable to sudden attack from the east and a less provocative
location for large-unit training maneuvers.30
EUCOM had also entered discussions with the French to use jointly a large training area in Baumholder in the French zone west of
Kaiserslautern. In March 1951 the two powers reached an agreement that
allowed U.S. tanks and artillery to exercise in the area during specified
periods. A part of the agreement provided that the Americans would
build semipermanent camp facilities and permanent facilities for about
500 soldiers, in addition to training facilities for use by soldiers from both
nations.31
During 1952 EUCOM had major projects for construction or modification of training facilities active at five sites and smaller projects at
over eighty locations in fifty different terrains in the French, British, and
American zones.32 In Grafenwhr, construction involved firing ranges for
weapons from pistols to antiaircraft artillery, roads, hardstands for trucks
and tracked vehicles, permanent quarters for 15,000 men, and concretefloored tents for another 7,000 soldiers. In Hohenfels, the construction
plan provided for thirty-two ranges of various types; accommodations
for 17,000 men (10,000 in semipermanent quarters and another 7,000 in a
tent camp); a railroad terminal at Parsberg, about eight miles away; and
surfaced roads from the terminal to the training area. By 30 June 1953,
EUCOM had put over DM 35 million ($8.3 million) into the construction
in Hohenfels.
More building went on in Wildflecken. Army engineers oversaw rehabilitation of facilities for 5,000 soldiers, upgrading of a 90-mm. stationary tank
firing range, and construction of 30,000 square feet of hardstand. During
1951 and 1952 in Baumholder, EUCOM constructed permanent housing for
10,500 troops; semipermanent quarters for another 3,000; and firing ranges,
roads, and courses for rocket launchers, rifle grenades, hand grenades, and
close combat training. By 30 June 1953, EUCOM had spent about DM 17 million ($4 million) on construction in the Baumholder training area.
Late in 1952, by agreement with the British, EUCOM acquired the
use of Todendorf, located in the British zone about 125 miles northeast
of Bremerhaven. At this site, the Army engineers built firing ranges for
tanks, a firing range and training area for antiaircraft units, and a semipermanent camp.33
These major areas dedicated to troop training, plus the eighty-two
other small ranges and lesser facilities, cost about DM 93.3 million ($22.2
million) between 1 January 1950 and 31 January 1953. This type of construction was particularly amenable to troop labor, and engineer troop
units participated extensively, giving them training, speeding construction, and reducing the cost in Deutschmarks.34
Dependent Housing
During the early years of the occupation, American military construction in Germany, financed by the Germans as part of the cost of occupa73
2/3/06 10:29:59 AM

tion, emphasized facilities for combat troops. Although dependents were
permitted into the theater after April 1946, construction to accommodate
them had been largely limited to rehabilitation and maintenance of existing facilities. Before 1950 only 324 new family units were built for military
personnel; most military families lived in requisitioned or confiscated
facilitiesthat is, private residences, including both houses and apartments. In 1950 American families, single officers, and civilians remained
in possession of 20,000 units of housing scheduled for return to their
German owners. The dramatic augmentation of troops in Germany and
the concomitant increase in the number of dependents created an urgent
problem for EUCOM. As requisitioned facilities were returned, housing
needs became even more acute.35
By late 1950 the modest building program begun a few months before
the outbreak of the Korean War had been overwhelmed by the changes
in military planning, and EUCOM faced a critical shortage of housing.
EUCOM was responsible for a long list of American civilians, including
employees of Stars and Stripes, the Armed Forces Network, the dependent
schools, EUCOM Central Welfare Fund, the American Red Cross, Douglas
Aircraft Corporation, International Business Machines, the Esso Export
Corporation, American Express, and other organizations that had some
official service-related role.36 To accommodate the large number of eligible persons, the command placed arriving families in transient hotels
or recreation centers in Bad Morgentheim and Bad Kissingen, both in the
Wrzburg area, and in Chiemsee near Munich.37 During 1951 and 1952
By the early 1950s, facilities in Bremerhaven for troops, dependents, and supplies
included family apartments and a theater.
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Engineers used ribbed-concrete floor construction for housing in

Mannheim, Germany.
dependent housing took 25 percent of the construction budget in Europe.

This was substantially less than the 56.5 percent that went into troop
housing and training facilities in the same period, but almost three times
more than the next-largest category, which included shops, technical service facilities, and depots (9.1 percent).38
At the outset of the new construction program, EUCOM had no
standard plans or criteria for family housing units, so the commands
Engineer Division drew up plans. Because the United States agreed to
turn the new buildings over to the Germans when no longer needed to
support U.S. military personnel, officials insisted that twelve-unit buildings be designed for easy conversion into eighteen apartments.39 Later
designs had four stories rather than three, included sixteen to twenty-four
family units rather than twelve, and offered somewhat smaller quarters
(1,215 square feet as opposed to 1,371 square feet). The later designs incorporated a different roof and a different arrangement of kitchens, bathrooms, and quarters for domestic help, making them more economical to
build. All building types were designed as permanent construction, with
basements of reinforced concrete, exterior walls of hollow pumice blocks,
and interior walls of brick. The floors were concrete with a parquet hardwood overlay.40
Although the command scheduled slightly more than 4,000 apartment
units for construction during April 1950March 1951 (corresponding to the
German fiscal year), by September 1950 it became clear that EUCOM would
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need another 4,000 units. In early 1952 another 5,000 units were added
to the plans. The engineers hastened to capitalize on the availability of
Deutschmark funding before West Germanys pending sovereignty ended
the countrys obligation to pay reparation costs, including construction.
Translating the resolve into action meant that the building plan for dependent housing was revised several times during 1952 and the first half of
1953 to include as many projects as possible. By 30 June 1953, EUCOM engineers had supervised the construction of just over 17,000 family housing
units. (Map 7) In addition, between July and October 1953, Army engineers
built about 2,000 units for Air Force and Navy personnel.41
The Helping Hand Program

Not all the engineer activity during the augmentation of U.S. forces
benefited only the military. The soldiers themselves worked in a program
labeled Helping Handpart training, part community relations. In 1953
alone Helping Hand involved an estimated $500,000 of work that was in
effect donated to German communities.42
Wilhelmsfeld, a small community near Heidelberg, profited from a
Helping Hand project. The community wanted a sports field and playground for its young people. The community had land available, but clearing and leveling the terrain with traditional German hand labor would
have taken more time and money than the local government could afford.
Through a U.S.-German advisory council set up at the military post to
improve relations, the town requested the help of the Army engineers.43 In
March 1951 personnel of the 77th Engineer Construction Battalion and the
Engineer Field Service Center took heavy earthmoving equipment into the
forest at the edge of the town. The soldiers moved thousands of tree stumps
and tons of earth, working through Good Friday to the surprise (and probably the chagrin) of the Germans. On Saturday evening, with the work completed, the townspeople held a festival-celebration for the Americans. The
local choral society sang, children performed, and town leaders bestowed
honors on the men who had helped make their sports field a reality.
A more ambitious and far-reaching project took place in 1952 and
1953 in Weingarten, a small community east of Karlsruhe and south of
Heidelberg. The local government asked a unit of the 39th Engineer Group
stationed in nearby Ettlingen to resculpt the farmland near the town. For
generations the land had been subdivided among family heirs successively; small plots divided by hedges and shrubs severely limited the tillable area. Regional planners wanted to consolidate the strips into more
efficient fields and settle new farmers on plots large enough to permit the
use of farm machinery. A key to the plan was the use of the earthmoving
equipment available to the Army engineers.
The project anticipated that the troops would survey the land, remove
the topsoil, level the hedgerows and terraces, and then replace the topsoil.
The community of Weingarten agreed to feed the soldiers during their
workdays. The town mayor selected a local inn to provide food and drink
76
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D E N M A R K
U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

FAMILY HOUSING
WEST GERMANY
30 June 1953
Area Command Boundary (approximate)
Family Housing Project Site
Other Project Site
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
50
100 Miles
100 Kilometers
50
Bremen
BERLIN
Berlin
Hannover
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
hi
be
El
ne
Leipzig
Fritzlar
LUXEMBOURG
BELGIUM
Cologne
Hersfeld
Dresden
Erfurt
NORTHERN AREA
WIESBADEN
M I L I TA RY P O S T
Giessen
Wetzlar
Bad Nauheim
Bdingen
Frankfurt
WESTERN AREA
Bad Kreuznach
Kirchheimbolander
Babenhausen
Gelnhausen
Hanau
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Bamberg
Aschaffenburg
Wrzburg
Darmstadt
Oppenheim
Worms Wertheim
Kitzingen
Neubrcke
Herzogenaurach
Kaiserslautern
Mannheim
Baumholder
Frth
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
Landstuhl
Vogelweh
Schwabach
H
Q
Zweibrcken
Schwbisch Hall
Ansbach
Hohenfels
AREA
Metz
Mnchweiler
Regensburg
Pirmasens
Crailsheim
Heilbronn
Vaihingen
Ludwigsburg
Karlsruhe
Ellwangen
Bad Cannstatt
Straubing
Stuttgart
Schwbisch Gmnd
Mhringen
Bblingen
Nellingen Gppingen
Gablingen
Landshut
Scheyern
F R A N C E
Neu Ulm
Augsburg
Leipheim
Mainz
Idar-Oberstein
Pilsen
Munich
SOUTHERN AREA
Mulhouse
Bad Tlz
Garmisch
A U S T R I A
Innsbruck
Map 7
2/3/06 10:30:01 AM

for the soldiers. The innkeepers daughter, who spoke good English, acted
as an interpreter for the enlisted man supervising the surveying, Robert
Rodehaver. Town officials communicated with Rodehaver through the
interpreter, and he informed the engineer troops of the jobs covered by
the plan. The troops moved equipment and earth over several hundred
acres, transforming the farmland in a revolutionary way. After his tour in
Germany, Rodehaver went home to Wisconsin accompanied by the innkeepers daughter, whom he married. In 1959 they returned to Germany,
where he built a long career as a civilian engineer for the Army.44
Not all Helping Hand projects ended as happily as Rodehavers story.
In the small town of Busenbach, also near Karlsruhe, the 291st Engineer
Company from nearby Ettlingen began work on 12 September 1954 to
help widen a footpath from the railroad station into town. A year earlier
this group had built a soccer field for the town.45 This time, four days after
the work began, an Army bulldozer hit a tank mine left from the war; the
explosion killed the operator, Pvt. Roy L. Mattson. To honor the young
soldiers memory, the town erected a monument. Contributions from
people in fifteen communities that had been assisted by the Army engineers helped finance the memorial, and the leaders of Busenbach invited
Mattsons parents to Germany. Neither the Mattsons, who worked a dairy
farm in Minnesota, nor the communities that funded the memorial could
afford the cost of a transatlantic flight, but the Minnesota congressional
delegation persuaded the Pentagon to arrange a flight for the family.
On 13 February 1955, Private Mattsons parents attended the dedication ceremony in Busenbach. The German county commissioner characterized the memorial as a symbol for the peaceful and benevolent cooperation and understanding between peoples, [a symbol] that will serve to
exhort us all to work together in peace, understanding, and freedom for
the well-being and happiness of all peoples.46
Peace seemed elusive in the early 1950s. The West Germans feared
an invasion, and East German propaganda played upon their fear. After
the fall of Seoul, the South Korean capital, East German leaders spoke of
the impending collapse of the Bonn puppet government and evoked
the prospect of trial in a peoples court for the pro-Western leaders.47
The construction managed by the Army engineers in Germany between
1950 and 1953 gave tangible expression to the formation of a common
defense for Europe and West Germany. More than bricks and mortar, the
construction helped transform U.S.-German relations. The dollars spent
on military construction provided a visible sign that U.S. forces would be
present in Germany as long as a threat of invasion existed.
Building West of the Rhine

As more troops arrived in 1951 and 1952, construction of new installations proceeded at a frenetic tempo. Creating an entirely new base of
operations in the Rhenish Palatinate (Rheinpfalz) typified the intensity of
effort that accompanied the expansion of U.S. forces.
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More remote from a potential attack and more defensible because it
lay west of the Rhine River, the Rhenish Palatinate had become the French
zone at the end of the war. By 1950 the cooperation among Western states
had made such distinctions unnecessary, and diplomatic representatives
worked out agreements to shift U.S. forces, depots, and installations into
the area around the principal city of Kaiserslautern.48 The Army transferred tons of supplies into this area from the exposed depots east of the
Rhine. Along with the movement of materiel came scores of service and
headquarters units.49
To accommodate the shift, the Army established its biggest supply
base outside the continental United States.50 Beginning in March 1951 and
spending more than $1.19 million a month, the post engineer of the new
post, Col. George E. Pickett, managed work on an unprecedented scale.
This work included construction and rehabilitation of troop housing,
training, support, and recreational facilities; nine major technical service
depots with related tactical supply points; radio sending and receiving
stations; landing fields for light aircraft; medical facilities; and a host of
other military installations.51 The program also provided 4,800 family
apartments for the Army and Air Force, shopping centers, gasoline stations, motor-repair shops, schools, chapels, theaters, and clubs for both
enlisted men and officers. The Army engineers oversaw all this construction between the summer of 1951 and the summer of 1953.52
When Lt. Col. A. M. Eschbach arrived in June 1951 as chief of construction in the post engineers office, very little planning had been done
for the pending construction in Rhineland. Men, supplies, and equipment
were arriving; and he had no facilities in place to accommodate them.53
Because no established U.S. military headquarters existed in the Rhenish
Palatinate, Franco-American procedures for cooperation had to be worked
out on the spot. To further complicate Eschbachs task, the area was
sparsely populated, its towns and small cities had been badly damaged
during the war, and it remained a distressed and depressed area even in
1951. Kaiserslautern supported a population of almost 60,000 in structures
with evident war damage.54
The size of the undertaking, the need for speed, and the expansion of
demands as the program progressed all made the buildup in the Rhenish
Palatinate a challenge. Troops of the 2d Armored Division, who arrived
during the summer of 1951, found the facilities they were to occupy still
under construction. Some troops had to spend the 19511952 winter in tents,
but many more were housed in hastily constructed semipermanent barracks. The engineers also rushed construction of depot facilities for medical supplies. Contractors rehabilitated a commissary to serve about 200 in
September 1951. In July 1952 a new building opened to serve almost four
times as many troops. In January 1954 a commissary opened with eleven
times the capacity of the original.55 Such was the pace of expansion.
Throughout Germany, local workers and managers had difficulty
dealing with American imperatives in fast-paced construction programs.
Eschbach explained that German craftsmen and professionals well
79
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Construction of a Shipping and Receiving Warehouse near Kaiserslautern,

March 1952
understood what was meant by the word rush, but not by [the concept
of] expediency.56 The Germans wanted to build carefully, solidly, and for
the long term, but the Americans were under pressure to get the job done
rapidly, economically, and with only semipermanent construction.
A lack of qualified personnel plagued the building program in the
Rhenish Palatinate from the outset. Engineer officers were in short supply in 1951 because of a general shortage throughout the Army and the
demands of the Korean War. As in Austria and elsewhere in Germany, the
Army recruited civilians in the United States, but many were reluctant to
take up residence in Europe, especially in the depressed Palatinate. Low
unemployment in the United States made it difficult for the Army to offer
salaries equivalent to those obtainable in industry and government. In
October 1951 the building program west of the Rhine employed only 15
percent of the American personnel deemed necessary for a project of its
size. Only 20 percent of the requisite German personnel were on hand.
Most of the laborers employed by German contractors came from outside
the Rhenish Palatinate.57
To compensate for the chronically short supply of labor, Eschbach
obtained permission to use troop labor. Most of the soldiers had no
construction experience, but they proved willing workers. Teams were
assigned on a ninety-day basis, but Eschbach requested several teams to
remain for six months. The engineers also used the labor service units
made up of former displaced persons from East European countries.58
80
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The infrastructure of the Rhenish Palatinate could not support the U.S.
military construction. The electrical network was barely adequate to serve
rural villages and some small factories in larger communities. To upgrade
the Mangin Caserne, an old facility in Mainz, the engineers increased the
expected electrical utilization from 400 to 2,000 kilowatts and increased
the water system by 400 percent. The family housing project in Vogelweh
on the edge of Kaiserslautern used an average of 870,000 gallons of water
a day and produced 609,000 gallons of sewage. In Vogelweh, they created
a separate water supply system and paid subsidies to Kaiserslautern to
enlarge its existing sewage disposal plant. The increased demand on the
electrical grid that served the area necessitated expanding the generating
capacity throughout the region and increasing the transmitting capacity
of the main and feeder lines. Similar problems existed for the road network. The rail network provided adequate lines, but the Army engineers
had to build special freight yards and access lines.59
The plan to relocate U.S. troops to the Rhenish Palatinate called
for developing medical facilities west of the Rhine, to the rear of any
expected attack. The engineers built 1,000-bed hospitals in Mnchweiler,
Neubrcke, and Landstuhl and a series of large dispensaries. They also
rehabilitated a former German military hospital and increased its capacity
from 150 to 500 beds.60
As usual, hospital construction imposed a myriad of special demands.
Each facility occupied a large area. Crews grading the terrain had to
ensure that the slope for ramps would not exceed the maximum of five
New facilities west of the Rhine included this family housing complex in
Vogelweh, near Kaiserslautern.
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Medical Facility under Construction in Landstuhl
degrees. The hospital structurea central building with wings projecting

out from each siderequired a specially designed heating plant. Medical
Corps personnel insisted that wards be oriented to achieve the most
favorable conditions of light and air. Because hospitals operated with both
German and American equipment, they had to be wired for both 110- and
220-volt electrical circuitry. The air, gas, and oxygen supply lines required
copper tubing. The terrazzo floors in surgery rooms had to be equipped
with special copper screens grounded to prevent static charges from causing a spark that could ignite ether or other volatile substances. Cork flooring was installed in some therapy rooms to absorb and dampen sound,
but the cork created maintenance problems. It could be cleaned only with
a cold wet mop; the customary cleaning agent, hot soapy water, dissolved
the glue binding the cork particles.61
At the beginning of the construction program in the spring of 1951,
only a few hundred American military personnel served in the Rhenish
Palatinate. By the end of 1953 more than 40,000 soldiers crowded the province, and more than 70 percent of the buildings used by the U.S. military
had been built from scratch in less than three years. The building program
cost approximately $250 millionhalf of it new constructionand at its
peak employed an estimated 40,000 Germans. The construction program
succeeded in creating the largest Army installation outside the continental
United States. It provided apartments for 6,000 families, schools for 4,000
dependent children, and facilities for the supplies that would flow from
France in support of a force totaling more than 60,000 in the area.62
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Air Force Infrastructure in Turkey

In 1947 the U.S. government sought to implement the Truman Doctrine
by sending military advisers to Turkey. Under the assistance program, the
Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT) coordinated the work of several service groupsThe United States Army Group
(TUSAG), The United States Air Force Group (TUSAFG), and The United
States Navy Group (TUSNG). Each group pursued its own particular
activity in support of the Turkish military.63
In 1948 the U.S. Air Force began an ambitious program to develop
facilities and upgrade existing bases in Turkey and to train the Turkish
air force. After a year of effort the progress on the construction was
unacceptable. Moreover, the inclusion of Turkey in the Mutual Defense
Assistance Program of 1949 meant additional construction would be
planned for the Air Force. To execute the Air Forces construction program, one of the officers of the American Military Mission in Turkey,
Col. Thomas H. Lipscomb, recommended creating an Army engineer
organization comparable to an engineer district in the United States.
JAMMAT adopted his suggestion and on 10 May 1950 established The
United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) with headquarters in Ankara,
Turkeys capital. (See Map 8.)
TUSEG began working directly under the chief of engineers in
Washington, D.C., but quickly passed to other Corps of Engineer commands: North Atlantic Division in December 1950, East Ocean Division
in November 1951, and Mediterranean Division in February 1952. In May
1954 the Joint Construction Agency under the commander in chief of U.S.
forces in Europe took over responsibility for construction in Turkey and
Greece. Through all its changes in chain of command, TUSEGs character
and mission remained essentially the same: construction and engineer
support of U.S. Air Force personnel, bases, and electronic listening posts
in Turkey.
TUSEG began with a small number of dedicated personnel. In part
because the customs, religion, and mores of the local population created
a living situation vastly different from either Europe or the United States,
Americans assigned to work in Turkey developed a strong esprit de corps.
TUSEGs Central Office in Ankara never had more than fifty people, and
the number of the staff in the field waxed and waned as projects came
into the program. From the outset TUSEG faced a vexing problem of
communications. The group always had project sites scattered around
Turkey; it also had nonengineer agencies in its chain of command. Mail
and telegraph services within Turkey were rudimentary and unreliable.
Telephone communications, both within and outside the country, were
discouraging at best, so contact with the supervisory office in the United
States was rare. Radio equipment for inland communications had the
potential to solve one aspect of the problem, but the Turkish government
was reluctant to concede radio channels to the group. Air Force airplanes
acted only intermittently as couriers.
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2/3/06 10:30:04 AM

TUSEGs problems extended beyond difficulties of communications. JAMMAT had established a general supply depot near Ismir in
Cumaovasi, to which construction equipment, much of it left over from
World War II, was shipped in the late 1940s. When TUSEGs engineers
tried to draw construction equipment from the depot to begin their jobs
in the early 1950s, they found that the American ambassador to Turkey
had loaned essential pieces to the Turkish governments Department of
Public Works. The Turks resisted returning the equipment to the U.S.
military engineers, and the chief of TUSEG had to struggle with Turkish
authorities to recover the equipment essential to his mission. Other equipment had been assigned to the Turkish Air Force for projects unrelated to
TUSEGs priority tasks. When the engineers finally recovered it, much of
the equipment had been destroyed by misuse. In one instance, the Turks
had replaced brake fluid in a consignment of thirty trucks with normal
engine oil, which had dissolved all the rubber parts in the brake system,
making the vehicles useless.
The plan that governed TUSEGs work during the 1950s projected construction or reconstruction at eight locations across Turkey: Diyarbakir,
Eskisehir, Kayseri, Bandirma, Erzincan, Balikesir, Afyon, and Merzifon.
The projects in Erzincan and Afyon were never built; the project in
Kayseri, although begun, was quickly suspended and only completed
much later. Other construction was added to the original program, notably in Batman and in Incirlik near Adana. By the summer of 1952, TUSEGs
work involved about $30 million in new construction. Subsequent additions brought the total for this phase to about $45 million.
From Trumans speech in March 1947 through Turkeys inclusion in
the NATO defensive perimeter for Europe in the early 1950s, the country
assumed a special place in the Western military and diplomatic planning.
It lay on Russias border, and building bases there put U.S. military might
within striking distance of the Soviet Union in the event of hostilities.
Still, Europe constituted the primary focus of conflict between the United
States and the Soviet Union during the early Cold War years, and the
Soviet blockade of Berlin demonstrated how vulnerable Germany was to
both military and political-psychological pressure.
New Lines of Communications

When Cold War tensions increased after the Soviet blockade of Berlin
in the summer of 1948, the supply line for the U.S. Army of occupation in
Germany and Austria became strategically untenable. The line stretched
from Bremerhaven in northern Germany through Frankfurt into southern
Germany and to Austria. It paralleled the frontier with the Soviet zone in
Germany and the Czechoslovak border for its entire length at a distance
of only about fifty miles. This location made it hard to defend even with
large numbers of troops; reductions in U.S. troop strength made it impossible to defend the line of communications against any serious Soviet
aggression.64
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Izmir
Map 8
Cumaovasi
Ortaky
GREECE
Burgas
Denizli
Balkesir
Afyon
Eskisehir
Izmit
Kseky
Istanbul
akmakl
Bandrma
orlu
B U L G A R I A
BUCHAREST
R O M A N I A
Konya
CYPRUS
ANKARA
Sevastopol'
Sinop
Karatas
Adana
Incirlik
Kayseri
Merzifon
Eup
Diyarbakr
S Y R I A
t
ra
Erzincan
100
Trabzon
100
200
Batman
Mus
Erzurum
gr
is
300 Miles
I R A Q
IRAN
UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
Lake
Van
300 Kilometers
200
General Supply Depots
Construction Sites
1950s
TURKEY
THE U.S. ENGINEER GROUP (TUSEG)
es
Ti
2/3/06 10:30:05 AM

Military logic dictated a change in the lines of communications and
supply. The first relocation came in relation to Austria, where since 1945
U.S. forces had been supplied from Bremerhaven through Germany.
EUCOM shifted the line of supply by making the port of Livorno, Italy, its
starting point. From Livorno, the line ran through Verona and the Brenner
Pass into Austria. Italy and the United States signed an agreement in June
1951 to establish facilities to service this new line of supply.65
Similar concerns about the vulnerability of supply along the northsouth line prompted the commander in chief for Europe, General Lucius
D. Clay, to seek authority in October 1948 to relocate his line of supply. He
proposed a line across France and instructed his staff, including his chief
engineer, General Shingler, to gather the information needed to begin constructing such a new line.66 In early 1949 staff began studying a route from
Bordeaux east through France into Germany. (Map 9) Although the route
was 650 miles long and would involve extensive construction, it had the
advantage of being perpendicular to the projected front of battle in case of
any attack and thus less vulnerable.
In October 1949, when the Western allies met in Washington to discuss
military requirements to implement the North Atlantic Treaty, they formally endorsed a new line of communications and supply across France.
In the spirit of cooperation that underlay the development of NATO, the
French were willing to approve the relocation of the major supply lines
through their country. Late in the year the State Department began diplomatic negotiations with France; a year later the two countries reached an
agreement to establish and operate U.S. military installations in France.
In the negotiations the French government expressed special sensitivity to potential domestic political protests against the introduction
of foreign military bases. German occupation during the war and criticism from the French Communist Party made any military presence a
touchy issue. As a result, both parties agreed to use line of communications when referring to the buildup rather than Communications
Zone, the label used during the war. By the summer of 1951 the ploy had
served its purpose and the command in France was redesignated as the
Communications Zone under the European Command.67 By mid-1952
COMZ was a major command under USAREUR in charge of administering construction in France for the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy.68
From the beginning of the discussions, the French government insisted on sovereign control of activities on its soil. French contractors were to
execute all construction on the network of rail lines, waterways, airways,
highways, and pipelines necessary to supply the U.S. forces in Germany
from ports in western France. The French government agreed to furnish
supplies, services, and facilities at cost. All installations would pass to
French ownership once the U.S. military no longer needed them. The
Army would supervise constructionthat is, establish specifications,
approve plans, let contracts, and conduct technical inspectionsbut
it could neither use American contractors nor deal directly with local
French contractors. It had to deal with French contractors through French
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Map 9
Brest
B
o
s
a
f
c
Nantes
Ingrandes
Captieux
Bordeaux
Bussac
ei
ne
Limoges
Orlans
Chartres
Dreux
Rouen
Prigueux
Angoulme
Braconne
Poitiers
Tours
Le Mans
Saumur
Chinon
Angers
Fontenet
Mrignac
Rochefort
La Rochelle
Le Croisic
St. Nazaire
Donges
Caen
Le Havre
Lo
ire
R
Fontainebleau
Melun
PARIS
Troyes
Toul
Dijon
Trois-Fontaines
Strasbourg
Pirmasens
Kaiserslautern
BERN
I T A L Y
50
50
Turin
100
Railroad
150 Kilometers
100
150 Miles
POL (Petroleum, Oil, Lubricant) Pipeline
1950s
FRANCE
WEST
GERMANY
Geneva
Nancy
Metz
Saarbrcken
LUXEMBOURG
LINES OF COMMUNICATION
Lyon
BELGIUM
Verdun
Chlons
Vitry-le-Franois
Ma r n e R
Reims
eR
ne R
Cherbourg
in
Rh
e R
in
Rh
Se
2/3/06 10:30:05 AM

military and civilian agencies.69 This indirect contracting system anticipated the similar arrangement that emerged in West Germany after 1955.
The establishment of sovereign control by the host nation became an issue
wherever the U.S. forces built during the Cold War.
The extensive work in France required the establishment of a new
American military unit. On 1 December 1949, in anticipation of the successful completion of negotiations then under way between France and
the United States, the European Command established the 7966th EUCOM
Detachment. With headquarters in Paris, the detachment succeeded the
Graves Registration Command that had been active in France since the
end of the war. The detachments initial mission was to prepare, develop,
and operate the line of communications across France.70 Because the Air
Force would be involved in developing facilities in France, Air Force officers were added to the staff of the 7966th EUCOM Detachment in January
1950, making it almost from the start an interservice unit.71
Brig. Gen. Howard L. Peckham commanded the detachment initially,
with Col. Mason J. Young as his engineer. They organized the staff to handle and convey 100,000 tons of supplies arriving each month in Bordeaux
and La Rochelle to Germany by rail or to depots in France. The detachment
had to construct supply depots and other installations to receive these supplies. By the end of January 1950, U.S. military engineers working with
French counterparts had selected sites in Bordeaux, Rochefort, La Rochelle,
Fontainebleau, Verdun, and Metz. Eventually, the line of communications
included installations in Orleans, Toul, Chinon, Angoulme, Ingrandes,
Saumur, and other locations. In April, Young became commander of the
7966th, and he was promoted to brigadier general shortly thereafter.72
From the start the detachment operated shorthanded. Although established with 1,000 military positions, it suffered personnel losses almost
immediately because of existing policies aimed at reducing military
positions in Europe. The detachment did not reach full strength until
late 1950. At years end, the 7966th moved its headquarters from Paris to
Orleans and received the additional mandate to provide logistical support
for the American contingent at the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, just being organized in Paris.73
American military strategists were eager to start storing supplies in
France. They quickly ordered an ordnance company and a quartermaster
truck company from Bamberg and Mannheim, respectively, to form a
300-vehicle convoy to pick up rations and several hundred tons of ammunition from dumps in exposed positions in Germany and move them to
Bordeaux. The convoy arrived on 11 November 1950. Later that month, just
days after the agreement with the French had been signed, the Americans
rerouted to Bordeaux three ammunition ships headed for Korea through
the Panama Canal. Unfortunately, neither the port of Bordeaux nor a storage site for the supplies was prepared to receive the materiel or the 1,000
men from the convoy.74
The location chosen for the first ordnance depot was Captieux, about
sixty miles south of Bordeaux. The site in Captieux had the political
88
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advantage for the French government of being government-owned land.
It had been a military base since World War I and therefore no local landowners had to be displaced. On the negative side, the terrain in Captieux
was a huge bog. Because of the composition of the soil and a water table
just two feet below the surface, ground water could not drain away.
Access roads and rail lines were not yet in place, and the heavy rains of
November 1950 threatened to wash out the roads that did exist. The buildings left from earlier military use were no more than stone shells. The
roofs and interior appointments had been stripped off and sold by the
Germans during their occupation of France in World War II.75
The rains continued through February, turning the area into a gigantic
mud bowl. Despite water everywhere, drinking water for the men in the
camp had to be brought in from twenty-four miles away. Although the
site was inappropriate and preparations inadequate, Captieux received
sixty railroad cars daily for the first six months of 1951, each loaded with
ammunition. Much of the ordnance sat along the soggy roadside.
By summer a profusion of insects infested the area; Captieux became
known as the Siberia of France. In September 1951 the 83d Engineer
Construction Battalion, which had arrived in late May as the first construction battalion assigned to France, began to drain the area. With bulldozers, cranes, draglines, and a supply of mosquito netting, they dug over
eight miles of drainage ditches; the principal ditch was over four-and-ahalf miles long. It took another year before the site began to resemble an
adequate facility.76
Construction of the line of communications across France began badly
in Captieux, and progress was distressingly slow. In January 1951 EUCOM
learned that Congress had appropriated $51.5 million for the construction.
By the end of the year, EUCOM had committed just over half ($29.4 million) to specific projects. More than eighty projects had been authorized
for 1951; by years end, fourteen were completed and only fifteen others
under way.77
To account for this unsatisfactory pace the engineers office in Orleans
listed twenty-one factors that contributed to delays in construction. The
list included differences in language and culture, absence of heavy construction equipment and power tools, limited experience of the French
construction industry with large-scale projects, tardiness and absenteeism owing to poor local transportation and living conditions, excessive
bureaucracy on both the American and French sides, and restrictions
which the American engineers identified as beaux artsimposed by a
French government agency charged with the aesthetic protection of the
French landscape. The engineers ventured a prediction: It is doubtful
that our program will be completed within time schedules thru contractual sources in France.78 Two years later a journalist from the Saturday
Evening Post visiting the line of communications found the same problems
still evident.79
Delays continued during 1951 because the Americans kept expanding the scope of the line of communications. At the same time they hoped
89
2/3/06 10:30:05 AM
In the early 1950s, U.S. troops in Trois Fontaines lived in tents and prefabricated
barracks, often under snowy and muddy conditions.
to negotiate a new agreement with the French. The French refused to

renegotiate. Continuing American pressure on the French did nothing to
improve relations.80
Poor planning, inefficiencies, and delays meant that U.S. troops arriving in France in 1950 and 1951 found only marginally adequate shelter. For
the first winter the men used tents; only one of the barracks made available by the French had central heating. Even in the winter of 19511952
nearly 10,000 soldiers still bunked ten to a tent. The Army engineers winterized the tents with wooden floors, siding of wood and tarpaper, and
a stove at each end, but they were no substitute for permanent housing.
Moreover, many tent camps were without conveniently located running
water. With inadequate paths and roads, the soldiers remained mired
in the mud.81 American military dependents in France fared little better.
They faced an almost total lack of housing and no schools, hospitals, or
service clubs. Because of the rapid influx of personnel, the rental market
was tight and overpriced.82
In seeking to build the line of communications across France, the
Army engineers fought more than mud, insects, and tight French control
of the construction process. They also faced interservice rivalry: The U.S.
Air Forces, Europe, had an agenda for construction in France that did not
always coordinate well with the agenda of the Army. Air Force personnel participated on both the staff of the 7966th EUCOM Detachment and
the staff of COMZ, but the Air Force chafed under the arrangement that
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placed military construction in France in the hands of what they considered an essentially Army command. Starting in December 1950 the
Air Force had done its own site surveys for airfields in France. In April
1951 the Air Force announced that it planned to build its own line of
communications and supply, raising the prospect that the two services
would collide and compete for contractors, heavy equipment, materials,
and supervisory personnel.83 Early in 1952 the Air Force opened its own
Construction Office in Paris and engaged the services of an engineering
company, Construction Management Engineering Associates, to manage
the Air Forces construction program in France.84
It was not just the Air Force that contributed to competition for personnel and supplies. In 1951 six independent U.S. military commands
operated in Europe.85 All were participants in the rapid expansion of
forces. All needed construction and needed it quickly. All wanted rapid
responses from the builders, but they were incapable of setting firm
programs for the engineers and contractors to follow. During 1951 and
1952 COMZs engineers received ten revisions of the Armys construction
program. Air Force specifications changed as often. These constant redefinitions of requirements led to logistical confusion, escalating costs, and
ever-increasing postponements of completion dates for specific projects.86
In addition, the COMZ engineers trying to push construction forward
had to contend with the French. On many of the air bases, construction
plans called for American engineers to build such elements as operational
pavement and hangars for U.S. aircraft, barracks for U.S. troops, and similar support facilities. These were, however, supplementary to French construction, which provided the basic construction and facilities for the air
bases being built for use by NATO. The U.S. construction was thus dependent on the progress of French construction, and American commanders
had no power to hurry their French colleagues.87
The U.S. military construction in Europe and in North Africa, combined with the demands of the Korean War, strained the capacity of the
Armed Services to manage the program and of the foreign economies to
absorb it.88 In France alone, the American military had launched a halfbillion-dollar construction program. The line of communications was
planned initially to store supplies for an army of 100,000 men for forty-five
days and within two years to expand to supply 260,000 men for sixty days.
In 1950 there were fewer than 10,000 U.S. military personnel in France to
manage this extensive program. Unlike the situation in Germany during
the occupation, the U.S. military had no authority in France to requisition
land and facilities. The Americans viewed the French construction industry as stolid and uncooperative. It was certainly overtaxed by the construction load stemming from the expansion of U.S. forces. By April 1952
forty-two projects, each worth more than $100,000, had been contracted,
but not one had been completed on time.89
In the face of these obstacles, the line of communications was only
haltingly taking shape across France. At Camp Bussac, twenty-nine miles
northeast of Bordeaux, the 83d Engineer Construction Battalion built a
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water system for 3,000 troops. The engineers established a water purification point and laid out a system of pipes across the post to distribute
water. They repeated the work in Chinon, where they added a water cistern on a ten-foot tower that created enough pressure from gravity to distribute the water throughout the post.90 In Bordeaux, this unit converted
an old Ford Motor Company plant for use by the Air Force. The buildings
had been heavily damaged during the war and needed concrete floors,
reinforcing for walls, and windows. At the Merignac Air Force Base just
outside of Bordeaux, the 83d also furnished utilities and equipment for
French prefabricated buildings that were used as mess halls and latrines.
Its personnel surveyed about a dozen different campsites throughout
France for placement of prefabricated housing.91
Other sites also came on line: a tank farm at Toul, an engineer depot
at Chinon, ordnance storage at Angoulme, quartermaster facilities at
Metz, signal corps facilities at Saumur and Verdun, and a pipeline to
transport petroleum products from western French ports into Germany.
When the military exercise COMBINE was held in West Germany in the
autumn of 1951, military materiel traveled along the line of communications across France rather than along the Bremerhaven line.92 By 1952 over
fifty American installations dotted the supply line from Bordeaux to the
German border.93
The results of two years of effort were not, however, commensurate
with either the need or the money available for the line of communications in France. With the confusion of the ever-changing construction
programs, the waste and friction of the interservice rivalries, and the
slowness of progress traceable to problems with the French system,
the enterprise was clearly floundering.94 Although EUCOM created the
Communications Zone in mid-1951 to manage the augmentation of U.S.
forces in France and to oversee the construction of the new line of communications, it failed to staff it adequately. When Maj. Gen. Samuel D.
Sturgis assumed command of COMZ in early 1952, he found that the
officer contingent assigned to him represented only 5 percent of EUCOMs
officer strength, but that it carried 40 to 45 percent of EUCOMs officer
shortage. In his judgment, COMZ was so understaffed that maintaining
a coherent construction program remained virtually impossible. He spent
the balance of the year working to correct the commands shortcomings.
In November 1952 Sturgis succeeded Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick as chief of
engineers and returned to Washington.95
The incessant delays in France prompted officials in Washington
in 1952 to propose that they establish a single agency to act as the
Department of Defenses executive agent for all construction within the
authority of the commander in chief for Europe. Beginning in 1953 management of all military construction in Europeexcept Germanywould
be brought under one team with representatives from the Army, Air
Force, and Navy working under the Secretary of the Army.
By the end of 1953 the U.S. Army engineers working under the
European Command had extended their support network into Turkey.
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They had begun to construct bases in France to oversee the new, more
secure line of communications from the Atlantic into Germany. They had
also established an American military presence of impressive dimensions
within the French zone of occupation in the Rhenish Palatinate and, in
the U.S. zone, built the facilities necessary to handle the rapid increase of
American troops and personnel from fewer than 100,000 to over 250,000.
Work in France would expand throughout the rest of the decade; in West
Germany, the engineers would face the adjustment necessary to cope
with the establishment of political autonomy, the lifting of the occupation
regime, and, accompanying that change, the end of Deutschmark funding
of the American military presence.
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2/3/06 10:30:07 AM
4
CONSTRUCTION IN THE
MID-1950s
he military buildup in Germany and France and the periphery

of the Soviet Union strained American military engineer resources. By 1953 the Engineer Division of the European Command
(EUCOM) asserted sufficient management control of the expanding construction program in Germany to achieve orderly progress. In
France, by contrast, progress was neither orderly nor satisfactory. The disarray prompted the U.S. defense establishment to reorganize management
of the overseas construction program. In January 1953 the Department of
Defense created the Joint Construction Agency (JCA) to oversee construction for all of the military services in Europe outside of Germany.
Despite progress in Germany, the Army faced challenges that
impinged on the construction program. After the end of the war the
German government had borne the costs of the occupation, including
the costs of military construction. As the Federal Republic of Germany
became an ally, arrangements to pay the costs of occupation changed. The
Engineer Divisions budget now depended on the appropriations process
in Washington and congressional review.
Deutschmark Construction in Germany

Germany was the only North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
country in Europe that fell outside the construction authority of the JCA.
U.S. military construction between 1953 and 1957 continued under the
procedures worked out with the government of the new Federal Republic
of Germany. In contrast to all other construction, the West German government was still paying for construction in Germany in Deutschmarks
(DM), an extension of its responsibility to bear the costs of the occupation.
For the period 1 July 1953 to 31 December 1957, Deutschmark construction for the U.S. Army cost DM 1.64 billion, the equivalent of $390.9 million at the prevailing rate of DM 4.2 to the dollar. Between 1950 and 1953
the Federal Republic of Germany had funded another DM 2.5 billion of
07F_Chap04_Final.indd 1
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American military construction ($595.2 million at the exchange rate for
the early 1950s).1
By 1953 the three Western Powers occupying Germany had made
a clear commitment to extend full sovereignty to the Federal Republic.
Sovereignty meant the end to Deutschmark funding, but negotiations on
sovereign status were delayed by their inextricable link to parallel negotiations among the West European states to include West Germany in a
European defense community. The negotiations influenced the United
States Army, Europe (USAREUR) construction program only insofar as
Army planners kept expecting the Deutschmark funds to end. When
the Federal Republic did attain full independence, it agreed to continue
Deutschmark funding through 1957 to allow orderly completion of existing projects. During the transition, between 1953 and 1956, American
military construction in West Germany operated much as it had after
the Federal Republics creation in 1949, preparing facilities for U.S. troops
positioned to defend Western Europe and for their dependents.2
Dependent Housing
Between 1950 and the end of 1952, the buildup of U.S. forces to support NATO, with its dramatic increase in the numbers of U.S. troops, had
produced a demand for dependent housing that far exceeded availability.
Beginning in February 1951, dependents had been restricted from entering West Germany because of insufficient housing. The flow of troops
into Germany slackened in 1953, but a backlog of requests for dependent
residence kept the demand for housing high.3
During the autumn of 1953, USAREURs commander, Lt. Gen. Charles
L. Bolte, called for construction of new dependent housing. He wanted to
enable the command to return to German proprietors all but a few essential requisitioned properties. He also was determined to make government quarters available for dependents and reduce the timean average
of ten months by late 1953that a servicemans family spent separated
from him. Bolte commissioned a survey that identified a need for a minimum of twenty-five thousand new family housing units, most of which
would involve construction funded with Deutschmarks.4
A three-year plan called for construction of about 19,000 family housing units in the first year and 5,900 more over the final two years. The
plans proposed construction anticipated slightly fewer housing units
than Boltes survey had identified as the minimum need. Even at that,
it encountered obstacles that complicated its execution. In August 1953
Congress and the Department of Defense limited floor space to an average of 1,080 and a maximum of 1,250 square feet per unit.5 In January 1954
the Department of Defense temporarily froze all funds for construction of
new housing and directed that projects not yet initiated be resubmitted
for approval. The fear that Deutschmark funding would end in 1954 and
all the units would have to be funded with appropriated dollars also constrained American military planners.6
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Construction in the Mid-1950s

To take account of these pressures, as well as to meet the revised
specifications on floor space, the Army engineers devised a new standard
building with three stories and eighteen family units, equally divided
among two-, three-, and four-bedroom apartments. Most of the buildings
were furnished with central heating from a district plant that served
several apartment buildings.
Providing such a heating source for a group of apartment buildings
led in 1954 to one of the more unusual engineering solutions. The first
22 buildings of a 45-building, 810-apartment family housing complex in
Kornwestheim near Stuttgart were scheduled to be available for occupancy on 1 September, but Army engineers rejected the German contractors
plans for the central heating plant as below acceptable standards of efficiency. The redesign of the heating plant delayed its completion, and the
contractor was unable to provide heat in time for the scheduled arrival of
dependent families.
H. Jace Greene, construction engineer for the Stuttgart military district, rented three train locomotives from the German National Railroad
and attached them to the complexs heating system while work on the
central heating plant continued. The train engines became portable boilers. Mounted adjacent to the apartment complex on specially adapted
bases, they provided heat to the buildings for sixty-six days, until the permanent heating plant was ready. The cost of this arrangement per day for
each apartment was approximately 1 DM.7
The construction plan for 19541957 called for about 22,000 new family
housing units to be completed by the beginning of 1958. Ninety percent
of the planned housing was for U.S. Army personnel. Total cost of the
Railroad locomotives provided heating to an apartment complex in Kornwestheim.

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construction came to just over DM 1 billion ($238 million at the exchange
rate). The average cost per apartment unit ran about DM 42,000 ($10,000)
for fiscal year 1954 and about DM 54,600 ($13,000) for fiscal year 1955.8
From 1950 to 1957 dependent housing accounted for the largest single
share of construction money (42.3 percent). During the early years, spending was relatively high on troop housing and training facilities. As facilities for troops were completed, programs to provide dependent housing
took a greater part of the construction budget. Between 1953 and the end
of the Deutschmark construction program in 1957, spending on family
housing more than doubled.
Bachelor Officers Quarters

A shortage of bachelor officers quarters (BOQ) characterized the early
years of the buildup, and, in spite of the completion of over 4,000 BOQ
units, USAREUR still faced a substantial need in 1953. The command
encountered complications with the standard design for the BOQs. The
United States European Command (USEUCOM) guidelines had reduced
floor space per occupant, and the four-story design used during 1950
1953 exceeded the new regulations. The USAREUR engineers office had
standard plans for another BOQ building that met the new regulations
on floor space, but this two-story structure required more than twice as
much land per person as the four-story building. It had a second liability: Local authorities considered it an eyesore. To resolve the problem,
the USAREUR engineer sought and obtained from the Department of
the Army a modification of the USEUCOM criteria and thus was able to
continue to use the four-story structures, which the Germans accepted
without objection. Between mid-1953 and the end of 1957 a vigorous construction program created nearly 5,000 BOQ spaces and achieved a near
balance between demand and supply.
Community Support Facilities

Engineer programs also addressed basic utilities. The chlorinating
of water, an issue of public health in the minds of the American military
authorities, had been imposed on German communities by the occupation
authorities. Many of the German cities and towns from which the military purchased water strongly objected to chlorination. As West Germany
approached sovereignty, these communities made it known that they
would discontinue the practice. When the occupation statute officially
ended in May 1955, USAREUR had to set up its own chlorination program to supply water to U.S. troops and to family housing complexes. The
concentration of Americans in compact communities and casernes made
implementing this program relatively simple.
Medical facilities for the U.S. military in West Germany expanded rapidly during the 1950s. Between 1950 and 1953 Army engineers supervised
construction, rehabilitation, or enlargement of fifteen hospitals. In the
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next four years engineer programs put more emphasis on rehabilitation
and extension than on new construction, although a new 250-bed hospital
was built in Heidelberg. Of the ninety-seven Army medical dispensaries
in Germany in 1957, thirty-two were new or newly rehabilitated. The program provided nine new dental clinics over the same four years.
All these health facilitieshospitals, dispensaries, dental clinics, and
sanitary water suppliesabsorbed relatively little of the overall construction budget. They all fell into the funding category of administrative,
maintenance, air navigation, medical, and other facilities. Construction
in this category accounted for only 7.3 percent of total Deutschmark funds
spent between 1950 and 1957.
Miscellaneous work on facilities to support and serve the military and
dependent communities throughout Germany accounted for 6.4 percent
of the construction funding for the period. This work included schools.
Before 1950 a modest school system for military dependents had existed.
The funds expended between 1950 and 1957 financed the development of
an entire school system for American personnel in Germany.
Planning for the expansion of schools for dependents was poorly handled. The overall program to accommodate arriving dependents had no
comprehensive, long-range plan and did not take into account the needs
of each community. USAREURs dependent school unit did an excellent job of forecasting the school population from year to year, coming
within 2 percent of the totals of arriving schoolchildren, but the Logistics
Planning Board and the comptroller refused to accept these estimates and
The high school in Furth near Nuremberg was part of the extensive school
system constructed in Germany.
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directed that they be revised downward. As a result, most school buildings were overcrowded from the moment they opened. Even additions
proved inadequate to meet the existing demand. Between 1951 and 1953
three-quarters of the schools built had from three to fourteen additional
rooms under construction by the time they opened or shortly thereafter.
With construction costs increasing at a rate of 1520 percent a year in
Germany, such poor planning cost money.9
By the end of the school year in 1953, USAREUR operated eight high
schools and seventy-two elementary schools in Germany with an average monthly enrollment of just under 15,000. By June 1957 there were
twelve high schools; the number of elementary schools operated under
USAREUR had decreased to sixty-nine as a result of the transfer of three
schools to Air Force jurisdiction. Average monthly enrollment for elementary and high schools had virtually doubled, however, to 29,500.10
In addition to schools and medical facilities, community support facilities included chapels. From 1950 to 1957 Army engineers
built almost 100 of the 237 chapels available to service personnel in
Germany. The EUCOM Engineer Division, in consultation with the
chief of chaplains, developed four standard plans for chapels with
capacities of 175, 350, 500, and over 500 seats. The engineers recommended that communities of fewer than 1,000 people rehabilitate an
existing building or build a simple chapel designed for the specific circumstances of the community rather than construct a chapel based on
one of the standard designs.11
Community support facilities in Germany included chapels, such as this one

at Downs Barracks in Fulda.
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Troop Training Facilities
Construction of training facilities had taken precedence over dependent communities in the early years of the buildup. Between 1953 and
1957 it declined to less than 1 percent of the total spent on construction
(DM 9.5 million [$2.3 million at the exchange rate] of a total expenditure
of DM 1.64 billion [$39 million]).12 Still, the construction of a wide variety
of training facilitiesairstrips, liquid fuel dispensing facilities, communications and navigational aids, passive air defense structures, and tank and
other firing rangescontinued.13
Joint Construction Agency in France

Activated on 15 January 1953, the Joint Construction Agency had an
unenviable task. Although the United States Congress had supported the
program to construct a line of communications across France and had
appropriated substantial amounts of money, progress in placing construction had come to a standstill. The JCAs mandate was to get construction
moving. In practice, the JCA concentrated on construction in France; it
assumed responsibilities in Austria, Italy, Greece, and Turkey only in
1954.14
The Department of Defense expected the JCA to get the best buy for
the American construction dollar by eliminating competition between the
services, avoiding unnecessary duplication, and applying uniform criteria
and standards in design and construction. Contradicting its insistence
on rapid progress, the Department of Defense twice imposed freezes on
construction in France during the JCAs first two years of operation. These
freezes undermined the JCAs credibility and disrupted the agencys
efforts to overcome the bottleneck in construction placement developed
between 1950 and 1952. With some success, the agencys staff in both the
central and field offices cultivated cordial relations with the French officials in the military and civilian agencies that made decisions concerning
U.S. military construction. That success was undercut by the difficulty
of explaining to these officials why projects on which the JCA had been
pushing the French for urgent approval could be suspended so abruptly.
In addition, the agencys operations suffered from the tensions that developed between France and the United States over events in the Middle
East. These factors, all of which lay outside the JCAs control, substantially
impeded the agencys efforts; the JCAs short history has the quality of
a roller-coaster ride, plunging and rushing between absolute frustration
and commendable success.
The organizational plan for Europe anticipated that the Joint
Construction Agency would be directly subordinate to the U.S. European
Command; but initially USAREUR, with headquarters in Heidelberg,
exercised authority over the JCA through its Communications Zone
(COMZ) in France. By April a revised command arrangement put the
JCAs commander directly under the USEUCOM commander and at the
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same organizational level as the commanders of the commands other
component services.15 As a joint command involving all the services, the
JCA had three officers representing the Army, Air Force, and Navy and
acting as special staff assistants.16
Maj. Gen. George J. Nold took command of the JCA a month after its
activation, with Brig. Gen. Orville E. Walsh as his principal deputy. Both
were Army engineers. Nold served until July 1955, when another Army
engineer, Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson, succeeded him. As in the Corps
of Engineers organization in the continental United States, on which the
JCA was explicitly modeled, military officers commanded the agency, but
civilians held most of the staff positions. The structurea headquarters
office with district offices close to the actual construction sitespermitted centralized control and decentralized operations.17
The JCA first opened offices in Paris, but within weeks the agency
moved its headquarters to suburban Boulogne-Billancourt. Both the Army
and the Air Force, drawing from existing military construction operations
scattered throughout France, provided startup staff for the JCA headquarters. On 1 April 1953, the new construction agency took over the three
engineer districts that had existed under the Communications Zone and
incorporated them as the Port District, the Northeast District, and the
North District.18 (Chart 2)
The Port District had its office at Bordeaux, and the Northeast District
was located first at Verdun and later at Nancy; North District shared space
with the central office in Boulogne-Billancourt. As the JCAs activities
spread to other countries, the agency organized additional geographic districts to manage construction, but the three original districts concentrated
on reducing the backlog of work in France. The headquarters maintained
general supervision, overall control, and liaison with the French government. The commanders of the using services remained responsible for
identifying sites for construction, securing approval from the host nation
for the access to and use of the sites, and acquiring the land.19
Administrative Procedures
When the JCA began its work for the Army and the Air Force, the
combined programs in France involved about 2,500 individual projects at
some 120 sites from the Atlantic coast to the western frontier of Germany.
By the end of 1953 about one-quarter of the $400 million construction
program for the two services was value in place, that is, taking shape on
the ground although not necessarily finished. Less than 10 percent of the
overall construction scheduled for France had been completed.20
Explanation for the delays lay partially in the complexity of the contracting relationship with the French. Six agreements negotiated between
November 1950 and August 1952 placed all U.S. military construction in
France under the control of three French agencies: Gnie, the army engineers for military installations; Ponts et Chauses, the civilian agency for
bridges and roads for many of the supporting elements; and Service de
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2/3/06 10:34:42 AM
North
District
Navy Plans
Branch
Army Plans
Branch
Management
Branch
Procurement
Branch
Planning
Division
Audit
Branch
Northeast
District
Real Estate
Branch
Air Force
Plans Branch
Budget and
Accounting Branch
Comptroller
Division
Control
Branch
Engineering
Division
Legal
Branch
Construction
Branch
Administrative
Branch
Pavement, Soils and

Materials Branch
Executive Office
Chart 2: Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, 1953
Operations
Division
Port
District
Programming and
Estimating Branch
Structural Review
and Design Branch
Administrative
Services

lInfrastructure, the infrastructure committee for work involving NATO.21
The French insisted that projects initiated by the JCA be presented to one
of these agencies at each stage from design through construction and
inspection. Normally, the U.S. military engineers could deal with local
French contractors only indirectly through the appropriate French government agency.22 (Chart 3)
The process was cumbersome at best and paralytic at worst. Numerous
differences in administrative approach provoked problems for which
solutions had to be devised. For instance, the French insisted that money
be committed for the construction of any project before they called for
bids, even on its design. The U.S. Bureau of the Budget, by contrast, would
not obligate funds until a construction contract had been awarded. This
amounted to a situation in which the French would not start the contracting process until the money was available to complete construction, while
the U.S. government would not make the necessary money available until
there was a satisfactory contract. This impasse was bridged by the creation
of a special account from which the French government paid French contractors and into which the JCA paid the reimbursements that it received
from the military services.23
The special account allowed the JCA to assure the French agency that
funds were available when presented with the proper form for bids on
design.24 Unfortunately, instances occurred in which U.S. military services did not deliver funds that the JCA had guaranteed and on which it
had made good faith commitments to the French. These situations caused
acute embarrassment to personnel in the JCA and made French officials
mistrustful. 25 The development of standard operating procedures for
French bureaucrats working with the Americans was a painstaking task
that continued throughout 1953.26
Lack of coherent and consistent planning by the U.S. military leaders
contributed to disruption and delays in construction. Neither the Army
nor the Air Force had firm construction programs when the JCA began its
work, and the services changed their requirements and criteria with distressing frequency. The Air Force, for example, drew up its first construction program in January 1953, and the JCA began to implement it in March.
Toward the end of June the Air Force submitted major revisions, not as
an integrated program but rather in a series of construction authorization
forms. A short time later the Air Force informed the JCA that its program
would be substantially altered. Although the Air Force promised a new
program each month from October to December, it did not deliver one to
the JCA until January 1954. Additional revisions arrived three months later.
By the end of 1954 the Air Force had submitted six different construction
programs to the JCA in fewer than twenty-four months.27 Changes in specifications or scope not only lengthened the process but also undermined the
confidence of the French governments representatives in American assertions of urgency and commitment to specific projects.
The JCA also had to deal with delays in payment. The Air Forces
supplemental funds for construction, scheduled for payment to the JCA in
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U.S. European Command
Architect
Engineer
French
Liaison
Mission
Ponts Et
Chausses
or Gnie
District
Engineer
Design
Joint
Construction
Agency
Predesign
French War
Economy
Committee
French
Service de
L'Infrastucture
Ponts Et
Chausses
or
Gnie
Obligation
Chart 3: Joint Construction Agency Construction Procedure in France
French Member
NATO
Committee
District
Engineer
NATO
Technical
Review
NATO
Committee
Foreign
Minister
Include Signature
French
Governmental
Approval
Approval
Construction
French Construction
2/3/06 10:34:43 AM

April 1954, were not actually available until October. All the design work
for the projects was completed between May and September, but the JCA
could not solicit bids on construction until the money was in hand.28
Similarly, changes by the Army in the hospital construction program
and lack of information on equipment to be installed increased costs,
contributed to delays, and embarrassed the JCA. The whole pattern of late
changes, shifting criteria, and uncertain funding prompted the director of
the JCA, General Robinson, to make repeated demands that such practices
cease. He argued with staff in Washington that the JCA could make no
progress in France under a staff policy which permitted continuing program
and fund manipulation. Washington assured General Robinson that changes would be minimized; but the changes continued, creating administrative headaches for the JCA right up to its closing hours in July 1957.29
Despite shifting criteria and frequent changes in program, the
JCA made progress. Even by late 1953, when the Office of the Chief of
Engineers in Washington ordered a study of the agencys effectiveness,
the JCA had made measurable strides. The study concluded that the construction program was making more rapid progress than it had earlier
under the Army or Air Force independently, and that operations were
more efficient and economical.30
The JCA gained ground in processing the requests to build, but putting construction into the ground remained far behind schedule during
the agencys first year. By the end of February 1954 the agency could claim
construction starts on less than 15 percent of the jobs forecast just three
months earlier.31
The agency did make headway in handling the bureaucratic aspects
associated with its mission, especially in developing effective working relations with French agencies. The staff persuaded the French
that the urgency of construction necessitated waiving or modifying
standard administrative procedures. At the JCAs request the Service de
lInfrastructure suspended normal administrative procedures on work for
seven air bases in France, one of which was in Dreux (about twenty miles
north-northwest of Chartres), where an Air Force unit was scheduled to
arrive in the autumn of 1954. Streamlining procedures allowed construction to begin two months early, a critical saving that permitted the JCA to
take full advantage of the summer construction season.32
One incident illustrates how cooperation led to mutual benefit. In
November 1953 the commander of the French VI Military Region, General
Kauffeisen, encountered a chronic problem: He was seriously understaffed, especially considering the U.S. Army construction scheduled for
the Northeast District. In a letter to Brig. Gen. W. W. Ford, commander of
COMZs Advance Section, Kauffeisen estimated that he would need additional six or eight well-qualified engineer officers to carry out the planned
program. He informed General Ford that he had initiated a request for
these additional engineers through his own chain of command, but suggested that a tactful representation of the situation from the commanding general of COMZ to the chief of the French Liaison Mission might add
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weight to his request. Ford contacted his commander, who passed the
notice on to the JCA commander, General Nold.
Nold then wrote to the French army officer who directed the Gnie to
convey that almost $28 million of military construction was scheduled for
the JCAs Northeast District in 1954, all of which would be administered
by the Gnie of Region VI under General Kauffeisen. Nold diplomatically attributed to the JCAs Northeast District Engineerrather than to
General Kauffeisen himselfthe expression of concern about the adequacy of the French staff in the Region VI office. Did the office have sufficient
staff to administer so large a construction program? Nold then asked the
director of Gnie to inquire into the question of augmenting the present
staff in Region VI with the additional engineering and administrative
personnel to insure [sic] the successful and expeditious completion of
these facilities.33
The director the Gnie thanked Nold for his observations and for the
information on the magnitude of the construction program contemplated
for the region. He assured Nold that the necessary provisions had been
made to secure adequate civilian and military personnel to expedite the
program that the JCA had outlined for the area. General Kauffeisen got
the additional engineers he needed, and the work went forward.
The establishment of personal contacts at the highest levels of the
French civilian and military bureaucracies constituted one of the major
tasks of the JCA. Those personal contacts helped the agency reduce construction lead-time from the twenty-one months prevailing in early 1953
to fifteen months by mid-1954. By 1 September 1954, for the first time in its
operating history, the JCA enjoyed a thoroughly healthy situation, with a
backlog of work under contract and an established flow of design completions and requests for bids on design under way. Over the next two years,
the JCA reduced lead-time for construction projects to thirteen months.
Given the environment, this compared favorably with the nine-and-a-half
months of lead-time for construction projects in the United States.34
Personnel Recruitment
Although the JCAs structure called for about 600 people, the organization began with just over 220 employees. This nucleus came from the
Communications Zones construction districts, the Engineer Division
at COMZ headquarters, and the Air Force construction organization in
Europe.35 Recruitment became more difficult when, between January and
April 1953, the Department of the Army froze all construction while it
conducted an essentiality review.36 To fill positions, the JCA had to rely
on COMZ staff that handled personnel in France through district offices.
This meant that each JCA district engineer depended on the local COMZ
personnel office to provide candidates for positions. Little exchange of
information on available positions throughout France took place among
the local offices, so hiring depended on who happened into any particular COMZ district personnel office.37 Not only could the JCA not recruit
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its own personnel, but its staff had very little direct contact with COMZs
personnel office. It took as long as seven months to process an appointee
for a specific job.38
The JCAs recruitment suffered because government pay was relatively unattractive in 1953, while demand for professional engineers was
high in the United States. The agencys experience with the employees of
Construction Management and Engineering Associates (CMEA), an association of private contractors and construction management engineers,
illustrates its competitive disadvantage. The CMEA had contracted in 1952
to manage Air Force construction in France.39 With the creation of the JCA,
the CMEAs personnel faced unemployment when the contract expired in
September 1953. The JCA saw these employees as a potential pool of professionals and mounted a vigorous recruiting campaign, hoping to attract
half of the 196 CMEA employees facing layoff. Barely 10 percent even considered joining the JCA. Most of the CMEAs positions were in Paris, but
the JCA needed staff in its district offices, far from the attractions of the
French capital. By their own admission, many who joined the JCA did so
to obtain an income tax exemption for overseas employment.40
The JCA had greater success attracting professionals who already
had experience working for U.S. forces in Europe. Edward Zawisza, who
had fought in the war and then worked in the military government in
Germany, joined the JCA in 1953. Over the next eight years he held a variety of positions with the JCA and its successors in France, assigned first
to Bordeaux, then to the Chinon Engineer Depot project, then as resident
engineer in Poitiers and as area engineer in La Rochelle. When construction in France slowed down, Zawisza relocated to Germany, where he
continued working with the Army engineers into the 1980s.41 Saul Fraint
had worked in Austria and in Italy; his assignments for the JCA included
the Northeast District headquarters in Nancy, the North District, and the
headquarters office in Paris.42
By the end of June 1953, the JCA had managed to put together a staff
of between 750 and 800 employees, but even these numbers were insufficient.43 The JCAs personnel authorization increased, and by the end
of 1953 it had filled just over 1,000 positions. Its personnel included 105
officers from the three services, 424 Department of the Army civilians
(DACs), 478 French employees, and 3 third-country (non-American and
non-French) personnel. In general, these proportions continued until the
end of 1956 when, in anticipation of the agencys approaching dissolution,
the staff began to leave.44
Dependent Housing
From the beginning of the buildup of American troop strength in
France in 1950, finding adequate housing for military dependents had
proved difficult. In 1952 Congress authorized contracts for housing with
French construction firms, guaranteeing the builder 95 percent occupancy
for five years. The first contracts were awarded for 300 family housing
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units to be built in Orlans beginning in mid-1953. No additional housing
contracts were awarded until December 1954, when provisions were made
to construct up to 234 duplex houses in Nancy, Poitiers, Metz, Ingrandes,
La Rochelle, and Bordeaux. In 1955 an additional 984 units, including 300
at Orlans, were authorized. The housing program, with its guarantee
of rental income to the builders, produced unsatisfactory results. The
apartments built were very small, maintenance was poor, and rents were
high.45
New legislation passed by Congress in August 1954 raised the possibility of another solution to the housing problem in France: the creation of
rent-free housing financed by the sale of surplus commodity products on
the international market. In September 1955 USEUCOM received orders
to stop awarding contracts under the rental guarantee program and to
begin building surplus-commodity housing. The new program involved
a complicated series of interactions among independent agencies. The
U.S. government accumulated surplus agricultural products as a result
of its programs to support American farmers. The Commodity Credit
Corporation, which handled these surpluses, made them available to a
specially selected commodity trading company. The trader then sold the
commodities on the international market through a complex bureaucratic
process, and money from the sales became available to finance housing
for military dependents.
To begin work on houses in France, the JCA contracting officer issued
a certificate to a participating builder indicating an amount of money to
be paid to him in dollars or French francs. The builder in turn submitted the certificate to the commodity dealer, who paid the contractor from
the proceeds of the international sale of the commodities. The American
military personnel who occupied the new housing lived in the facilities
rent-free instead of receiving a housing allowance. Money they would
have received for housing went directly to cover the cost of utilities and
maintenance and to repay the Commodity Credit Corporation for the
commodities delivered to the dealer.46
Surplus commodity housing provided a slow answer to the urgent
need for housing in France. Negotiations between the U.S. military and
the French over the arrangement lagged. Initial sales of surplus commodities produced limited funds for construction. Both factors delayed
the JCAs invitation for construction bids under the program. In July 1956
the JCAs North District solicited bids and received four viable responses.
Negotiations with the bidders lasted until May 1957, when a consortium
of the French construction firm Compagnie Immobilire Marc Rainaut and
the commodity firm of Bunge Corporation in New York signed a contract
to proceed with the housing. By the time the contracts were in operation,
the JCA had ceased to exist and management of the construction fell to its
successor organization, the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France. In
total the surplus commodity program financed about 3,000 housing units
in a score of French communities between 1957 and the early 1960s.47 (See
Map 10.)
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2/3/06 10:34:44 AM

B E L G I U M
Dieppe
Cherbourg
LUXEMBOURG
tain
S
ei
ne
Reims
Marn e R
Verdun
Metz
PARIS
vreux
Paris
Vitry-le-Franois
Toul
Se
in
Fontainebleau
Chaumont
Orlans
Lo
ire
Ingrandes
Nantes
Saumur
Dijon
Chinon
Chteauroux
Poitiers
Fontenet
Lyon
Braconne
Bussac
Rhn
e R
U.S. MILITARY HOUSING CONSTRUCTION

FRANCE
Captieux
19571963
Site of Surplus Commodity Housing
0
50
100
150 Miles
Marseille
0
50
100
150 Kilometers
Map 10
Securing the Line of Communications across France

While the JCA struggled to bring the construction under control,
American leaders reevaluated strategic policy for the supply of U.S.
troops. The development of a supply line across France provided an alternative to the line in Germany south from Bremerhaven. In August 1952
the Department of the Army had asked USAREUR whether shipments
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2/3/06 10:34:45 AM

through the Port of Bremerhaven could be reduced to make the French
line the exclusive line of communications and supply. After an evaluation
that lasted more than a year, the department adopted a recommendation calling for a shift of all supply to the line of communications across
France. USAREURs plan, worked out in detail by March 1954, required
additional construction in France and considerable augmentation in support personnel. The plan assigned top priority to preparing logistical
support procedures and war plans; completing the pipeline for petroleum
products; making depots operational; and developing the ports, communications networks, and command facilities necessary to sustain the military in the field. The goal was to provide USAREUR with 70 percent of its
supplies through French ports by the end of 1957.48
This plan put additional pressure on the JCA to expedite construction,
but Washington suddenly imposed another freeze on construction. On
14 September 1954 the JCA received orders from the secretary of defense
that, other than honoring previous commitments, all contracting activity was to cease as of 28 September.49 General Nold protested vigorously,
predicting serious negative consequences for the construction program,
which had a total anticipated value of $31 million. About $800,000 had
already been spent on completed design for projects along the line of
communications, and the JCA was poised to let contracts for construction. Design had required intensive and wide-ranging coordination with
French government agencies, and their staffs had been augmented in
anticipation of the coming construction load. Postponement would mean
that these agencies would lose personnel again. Nold predicted that
American military construction would suffer long after the freeze was
lifted. The protest had no apparent effect; the freeze remained in effect
until January 1955.50
The $60 million pipeline for petroleum products and fuel (petroleum,
oil, and lubricants) was the JCAs single most expensive project in France.
The pipeline ran from Donges and Saint-Nazaire, north of the Loire
Rivers mouth, to Metz, a city near the German border just eighty miles
west of the Rhine. When finished, the pipeline extended from the Atlantic
across northern France for almost 400 miles and linked up with a similar
pipeline into western Germany. In June 1953, after roughly two years of
negotiations, France accepted both governmental and technical agreements covering the construction, operation, and maintenance of a pipeline, controlled by the United States, across the French countryside.51 Work
began on the Donges-Metz pipeline in May 1954. The French showed a
willingness to adjust to urgent demands when they allowed construction
to begin completely at the contractors expense and with only the assurance from the French administrative officers that formal contracts would
follow. About one-sixth of the segment between Donges and Melun was
laid before any papers formally cleared French ministries.52
Building the pipeline was a complex undertaking, involving facilities
for offshore unloading, pumping stations, and storage tank installations at
intervals across France. The line itself consisted of ten- and twelve-inch pipe
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(valued at more than $6.8 million) at a depth of 2.5 feet below ground and
protected under roadways by steel sleeves. An undersea segment connected
the off-shore unloading operation to land; and eight booster pumping stations moved petroleum products through the line under pressure of a maximum 1,250 pounds per square inch, providing a capacity of 2,450 gallons
of gasoline a minute. The pump houses were blast- and splinter-resistant
and spaced at about forty-mile intervals. The system included storage tank
facilities with a capacity exceeding 5 million barrels. The tanks at each storage farm had to be dispersed and positioned to minimize destruction by an
attack using either atomic or conventional bombs. Forward area tank farms
were partially buried for added protection.53
The construction freeze of late 1954 hindered progress, but by mid1957 the JCA had completed the work and the pipeline began operating. In
September 1957, by agreement with NATO, a linking of pipelines allowed
USAREUR to transport fuel from the Atlantic across France into Germany
and even to units east of the Rhine.54 With this line the U.S. military could
transport fuel equal to the capacity of 6,000 railroad tank cars from the
Atlantic to West Germany in twenty-four hours.55
The JCA also supervised a $60 million program to construct medical
facilities for both the Army and the Air Force. In fact, the JCA inherited
the hospital program from the Communications Zone, which had been
unable to complete it. Construction for the line of communications across
France included a requirement for 15,000 fixed hospital beds as essential
to support U.S. forces in Europe in the event of an armed conflict. To
meet this requirement, USEUCOM requested funds for standby hospital
facilities that could be used as troop billets in time of peace and converted
within forty-eight hours into fully operational field hospitals. Because
funds for troop barracks were more limited than for medical facilities, the
plan had the obvious advantage of putting readily available money to use
for less easily fundable facilities.56
The plan had less noticeable disadvantages that became factors in
retarding the development of adequate billets for the American soldiers
assigned to France. The hospital housing program conflicted with the
appropriate placement of housing facilities for the troops. The majority of
troops were concentrated in twenty or more widely dispersed locations
throughout France, whereas hospital space had to be concentrated away
from military targets in locations not related to other operating facilities.
This put one-third of the housing spaces in the wrong place and made the
establishment of a coherent troop housing program a difficult problem.
Moreover, the technical requirements associated with hospital design
subjected the program to repeated delays, which under the dual-purpose
plan also delayed completion of troop housing. The French also had very
definite issues of their own, including the desirability of locating the U.S.
military hospitals in places that gave them long-range value to the French
economy and medical services. Additionally, duplication of Army and Air
Force hospital programs provoked skeptical reviews in Washington and
prompted two suspensions of all work on the hospital/housing construc112
2/3/06 10:34:45 AM

tion during 1952. Finally, Congress delayed fiscal year 1953 funds for the
construction until it had reviewed all details of the plan for their dual utilization. These delaying factors were a primary cause in leaving fully 30
percent of the troops assigned to the Communications Zone in tents during the winter of 19521953.57
The JCA received the directive to construct dual-purpose hospitals
in March 1953, but it took until October to clear the way for the award
of design contracts. Construction began in 1954 after the JCA awarded
several multimillion-dollar contracts for the work. The Army program
projected eleven military hospitals and three medical depots at intervals
between the Atlantic and Germanys western frontier. (A twelfth hospital,
in the Paris area, was cancelled in 1956.) By July 1957 about 40 percent of
the planned construction for the hospital program was completed, and by
1958 six of the eleven hospitals were in use.58
The overall pace of construction under the JCAs direction intensified
late in 1955 because of political decisions in Washington. In July Congress,
reacting against the accumulation of unspent money committed to the
buildup of forces for NATO, passed Public Law 161 rescinding all authorizations for any construction approved before 1 October 1951 unless
funds for these projects were obligated before 1 July 1956. In other words,
if the U.S. military planners could not commit the money after nearly five
years, they would lose it. The JCA had a substantial backlog of projects for
which it stood to lose funding if it could not push them through the process of approval and contracting before the deadline. Approval, however,
depended on the French.
The JCAs director, General Robinson, met with the French Liaison
Mission on 22 December 1955 to explain the implications of the new
legislation. He presented a list of critical items with estimates of when
architect-engineer plans and specifications could be ready. He asked
the French whether they would take special steps to shorten the time
involved in their normal review of these projects. The French agreed to
cooperate fully, offered suggestions on how to accomplish the goal, and
worked out a set of procedures to expedite the processing. As a result of
this exemplary cooperation, the JCA was able to let work contracts for
$29.5 million between 1 January and 30 June 1956; only $1.3 million in
project funds was not obligated before the automatic cutoff imposed by
Congress.
By the summer of 1956 the JCA was spending $8 million a month
on construction for the Army and Air Force in France. The backlog of
designed work waiting for award of construction contracts had been
reduced from $73 million on 1 July 1955 to just $18 million a year later.
The monies obligated for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1956 were the
highest in the JCAs history; and the amount for June, just over $60 million, exceeded that of any earlier month. In a letter to the U.S. ambassador
in Paris, Robinson praised the extraordinary efforts on the part of the
French Services to assist the Joint Construction Agency in completing the
contracts before the deadline.59
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In late 1956, events beyond the JCAs control damaged this spirit of
cooperation and the momentum it engendered in the construction program in France. The United States vigorously opposed the incursion
into the Suez Canal Zone by French and British military forces in early
November 1956. When the United States embargoed oil shipments to
France to exert pressure on France to withdraw from the Canal Zone,
the French government responded in kind, cutting off petroleum for U.S.
military construction projects. The American engineers made emergency
arrangements so that French contractors working on other projects could
receive fuel from local U.S. military sources. The French government then
established its own system of fuel rationing. Fortunately, delays on the
most important projects turned out to be minimal.60
Joint Construction Agency outside France

The Department of Defense had planned for the Joint Construction
Agency to manage military construction in areas outside France. Although
nearly consumed with the construction program in France, the JCA began
developing plans in March 1953 to undertake work in Austria, Italy,
Greece, and Turkey.61
The Engineer Division of the United States Forces, Austria (USFA),
had directed construction in Austria and Italy immediately after the war.
When the Berlin Blockade prompted the United States to redistribute
its troops to reduce the numbers in Vienna, USFA constructed housing
and rehabilitated facilities such as Bindermichl. (See Chapter 2.) As work
in Bindermichl approached completion, USFA undertook another major
project to build a regiment-size camp in the U.S. zone. The site, which
eventually became Camp Roeder, was initially an empty field outside of
Salzburg with neither structures nor utilities, forcing the Army engineers
to build the camp from scratch. To manage the estimated $90 million in
contract work, USFA established the 7614th Construction Detachment, an
organization composed of American officers and enlisted men and more
than thirty DACs and civilian Austrian nationals.
In 1951 the command assigned engineer troops to construct roads and
electrical lines. It consigned the majority of the construction to Austrian
contractors. Over the following years there arose a small military city,
initially for 5,500 soldiers, consisting of roads, sewer lines, waterlines and
wells, electrical lines, barracks, mess halls, bowling alleys, theaters, clubs,
warehouses, and similar facilities. Work on Camp Roeder progressed
satisfactorily, but it remained incomplete when the United States turned
the facilities over to the Austrian national government in 1955 as Austria
regained its sovereignty and the occupying forces of the four wartime
Allied powers withdrew from the country.62
When the JCA began operations outside of France in 1954, it proposed
that construction in both Austria and Italy pass by stages to a district
office to be set up in Livorno, Italy. In March 1954 the JCA assumed
technical authority over construction for the Army and the Air Force in
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2/3/06 10:34:45 AM
Building Camp Roeder involved installing and constructing all utilities,

including a sewer system.
Italy and Austria, but the Engineer Division of USFA continued its management functions. In October the United States and Italy signed a new
memorandum of understanding to govern U.S. military construction in
Italy; in December the JCA opened the Southern District office in Livorno,
incorporating much of the existing engineer detachment there into the
JCA staff. (See Chart 4.) Because construction in Austria was already 90
percent complete and declining rapidly as Austria moved toward full
independence, the JCA opened no office there.63
The Austrian State Treaty of 15 May 1955 reestablished full Austrian
sovereignty and provided for the evacuation of all occupying military
forces from the country. To fulfill the terms of this four-power agreement, the Department of Defense decided to move U.S. military forces
from Austria to Italy, making rehabilitation of facilities for the troops in
Verona and Vicenza necessary. The Army command in Italy, called the
Southern European Task Force (SETAF), received an allocation for rehabilitation and a small amount of new construction. USEUCOM directed
the JCA to support SETAF by supplying technical assistance.64 In addition, the JCA monitored a modest amount of work in Italy for other
servicesfive airfield sites for the Air Force and warehousing, maintenance shops, and community facilities in Capodichino and Sigonella for
the Navy.65
The JCA took over responsibility for construction in Greece and Turkey
about the same time it assumed its responsibilities to support SETAF in
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Table 2
Workload of the U.S. Engineer Group, Turkey
1955 and 1956
Project
Design
Out for bid
31 December 1955
($ million)
$22.901
31 December 1956
($ million)
$ 16.259
2.313
Under construction
13.143
19.960
Completed
16.210
18.631
Inactive
13.409
9.031
Current working estimate
71.696
66.731
Funds available
37.173
44.149
Source: James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, Historical
Report, 15 January 195331 July 1957, p. 120.
Italy. In February 1954 the agency opened the Eastern District office in
Athens to supervise work in Greece and in Turkey (Chart 4); by years end
the office had 123 employees. By 1955 the Eastern District had contracts for
$52 million in work, of which approximately two-thirds was under construction. (Table 2) Future contracts were projected at less than $2 million.66
The active projects in the eastern Mediterranean in 1956 included a
trailer park, a hospital, a school for dependents, a commissary to support
the Iraklion airfield on the Greek island of Crete, and additional work for
the Athens airfield. The office in Greece also managed the programs that
had been set in motion by The United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) in
Turkey in 1950. With the reorganizations, TUSEGs staff came under the
authority of the JCA and its work in progress, involving almost exclusively
programs for the Air Force, continued much as before. In all, twenty-two
separate projects remained active in Turkey in December 1956, including
communications facilities, personnel support facilities, and a variety of
other small undertakings.67 Through its management of construction in
Greece and Turkey, the JCA supported the American military mission to
the very borders of the Soviet Union.
The Phaseout
The JCA succeeded in resolving the confusion that had characterized the early development of the line of communications in France. In
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2/3/06 10:34:46 AM
Legal
Branch
Air Force
Plans Branch
Political
Adviser
Eastern
District
Service
Branch
Construction
Operations Branch
Service
Branch
French
Consultants
Southern
District
Construction
Branch
Soil Mechanics and

Pavements Branch
Engineering
Division
Progress Reports
and Analysis Branch
Administrative and
Services Branch
Procurement
Branch
Design and
Review Branch
Advisory
Staff
Office of the
Director
Port
District
Budget and
Accounting Branch
Northeast
District
Planning
Division
Service
Branch
Shaded boxes indicate new districts.
North
District
Army Plans
Branch
Management
Branch
Comptroller
Division
General
Inspector
Advisory Staff
Chart 4: Organization of the Joint Construction Agency, September 1955, Depicting the New Eastern and Southern Districts

early 1953, when the JCA took charge, American soldiers in France still
lived in tents and moved about on muddy paths and roads. By 1957 the
tents had been replaced by barracks, the roads had been paved, construction in place exceeded a half-billion dollars, and the JCA actively supervised a construction effort that stretched from the Atlantic to the eastern
Mediterranean.68
By the mid-1950s the American military construction program in
Europe had stabilized. In France the JCA had asserted control over what
had been a chaotic program. Air Force construction had slowed, and it
would all be under contract by 1958. West Germany had been granted
sovereignty and admitted to NATO, and Deutschmark funding was
scheduled to run out at the end of 1957. In effect, construction for the U.S.
forces that flooded into France, Germany, and the European Theater had
caught up with immediate needs.
As early as autumn 1955, talk circulated in Washington about reorganizing the Joint Construction Agency. The U.S. forces in Europe no longer
needed such a high level of management authority for construction.69
Strategic realities also had changed. As West German troops augmented
NATO forces and tactical nuclear weapons became available, the line of
defense moved east from the Rhine to the border with East Germany.70 It
became clear that, with the development of more sophisticated Soviet weaponry, the line of communications across France was vulnerable. Because
Soviet air superiority would prevail in the early days of any aggression
from the east, the flow of supplies across France, dependent on French railroad lines, could be disrupted and stopped from the air. Stock dispersion
also was insufficient to ensure preservation of the materials stored. In any
event, it was likely that the Soviets knew where supplies were.71
Frances objections to the presence or passage of foreign nuclear weapons in, over, or through its territory also threatened the viability of the
line of communications. Beginning in late 1955, the French government
sought to renegotiate the terms of the agreement for the line of communications to exclude nuclear weapons from its territory. Simultaneously, tactical nuclear weapons took on increasing importance in NATOs strategic
planning.72 Moreover, the Suez crisis of late 1956 had amply demonstrated
that American and French national interests did not always run parallel.
The intense clash of interests over Suez reinforced the traditional French
tendency to maintain an independent military posture.
Economic considerations also modified thinking about logistics.
Supplying U.S. forces in Germany through France cost substantially more
than through a North Sea port. In 1956 the United States made temporary arrangements with the government of the Netherlands to open a
port facility in Rotterdam. From there, shipments could be made south
at considerable savings by using the Rhine. The United States replaced
this temporary arrangement with a permanent agreement in March 1957.
Using port facilities in both Rotterdam and Bremerhaven, military planners revised the expectation that USAREUR would receive 70 percent of
its supplies through the line of communications across France. Instead,
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they viewed France increasingly as a depot and storage area and as an
alternative or emergency supply route. By the end of 1957 only 40 percent
of U.S. military suppliesexcept petroleum products, of which all passed
through the Donges-Metz pipelinecame through France. Perhaps equally important to American planning as the availability of alternate port
facilities were signs that the Soviet Union had reduced its troop strength.73
Adding to this ferment, misgivings resurfaced in the Office of the
Chief of Engineers in Washington and at the JCA headquarters about the
joint nature of the agency. The assistant chief of engineers for military
construction, Maj. Gen. David H. Tulley, believed that the JCAs successes
in Europe had come despite its joint nature, not because of it. The Army
engineers had responsibility for all military construction in Europe, and
Tulley argued that any construction agency executing that work ought
to be controlled by the Army engineers; the JCAs joint character should
be ended and construction should return to an Army command. In correspondence with the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis,
General Nold (recently retired) argued that the JCA, which he had commanded between 1953 and 1955, got along during my time primarily
through your generosity in loans of personnel and your extraordinary aid
in recruitment of all categories. Nold concluded, This situation cannot
continue indefinitely. Parallel recommendations that the agency be reorganized circulated during 1956 among the JCA staff, although they were
never forwarded to higher levels of command.74
Given the progress made in constructing facilities for the Air Force
and the Army in France, the sharp decline anticipated for construction
budgets in the late years of the decade, and changes in the economic,
diplomatic, and strategic situations, the dissolution of the JCA appeared
likely. During the first quarter of 1956, the JCA consolidated its Southern
and Eastern Districts into a single unit headquartered in Athens, Greece.
Before the end of 1956 further consolidation left the Southern District,
now in Livorno, Italy, as the only JCA office in the area. These moves eliminated eighty-seven positions and saved about $388,600 in salaries, allowances, and overhead costs. On 1 November 1956, the agency consolidated
its three district offices within France into the North District, with offices
located with the JCA headquarters near Paris. This move further reduced
manpower by 199 spaces at an estimated annual savings approaching $1.1
million.75
On 1 August 1957, the Joint Construction Agency was abolished.
Responsibility for military construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey
passed to the Mediterranean Division under the Office of the Chief
of Engineers in Washington. Responsibility for military construction
in France passed to the United States Construction Agency, France
(USACAF), a new agency under USAREUR constituted from the JCAs
North District. Col. Lynn C. Barnes, who had commanded the North
District under the JCA, was named as the first director of USACAF.76
Construction for the U.S. military continued in France for several
years, but at a greatly reduced rate. In 1958 USACAF awarded $24 mil119
2/3/06 10:34:47 AM

lion in contracts. The surplus commodity housing program that had been
planned and contracted under the JCA accounted for a substantial part of
USACAFs activity. In addition, USACAF supervised the construction of
Class V depots, designed for the storage of atomic weapons. By late 1961
USACAFs work was so reduced that its staff had decreased from 530 to
80. On 1 October 1961, USACAF was redesignated as the U.S. Army Field
Engineer Office, France, to handle administrative matters such as claims
and recoupment of funds arising from the earlier programs. Construction
that needed to be done came under the purview of the Army engineers of
the Communications Zone.77
The U.S. Army engineers adjusted their definition of Europe in 1957
to correspond to the reorganization of engineer assets. For construction purposes, Italy, Greece, and Turkey came under the purview of
the Mediterranean Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers when
the division relocated from Morocco to Livorno. The chief of engineers
in Washington had direct command authority over the Mediterranean
Division. The Communications Zone in France controlled construction in France through USACAF. The commander in chief of USAREUR
exercised command authority over the Engineer Division of his logistics
office and in 1956 created a distinct engineer organization, the U.S. Army
Construction Agency, Germany, to supervise construction throughout that
country. It is through this agency and its successors under USAREUR that
the story of the management of U.S. military construction in the newly
defined Europe continues.
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5
MANAGING CONSTRUCTION
IN GERMANY, 19561966
etween 1950 and 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany financed

the military construction program that supported the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the expansion of U.S.
forces in West Germany. Once the Western Powers recognized
the Federal Republic diplomatically in May 1955, the occupation officially ended and the West German government had no further obligation to pay the costs of the U.S. troops on its soil. To manage construction in Germany, the United States created a new entity, the U.S. Army
Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG). Operating in a new fiscal
environment, USACAG managed the continuation of the construction
programs begun in the early 1950s. It also oversaw the design and construction requirements necessitated by the introduction of tactical and
strategic missiles into Europe in the late 1950s. Then, when the Soviet
Union threatened the independence of Berlin, USACAG managed urgent
construction to defend the city.
The German Environment

For the first time since 1945 the U.S. military had to work with a fully
sovereign German state that insisted on controlling construction within
its territory. Direct contracts awarded by the Army during the early 1950s
had overtaxed the German economic and social systems, provoking the
extremes of excessive profit and bankruptcy among local construction companies. Similar economic and social consequences had troubled the French
construction sector during the buildup of the line of communications.1 Since
1953even before the formal end of the occupation of Germanythe West
German government had insisted that its own Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung
(German Federal Construction Administration) participate in an increasing
share of the construction financed with Deutschmarks. During 1953 about
30 percent of the total value of United States Army, Europe (USAREUR),
construction contracts went to the Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung, which
08G_Chap05_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:35:17 AM

then awarded the contracts to construction firms. During the 19541955
program year, the amount approached 40 percent.2 Once sovereignty
became a reality in 1955, all U.S. military construction became subject to
German law and the Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung became the conduit for
both design and construction work for the U.S. military. In 1956 the Federal
Republics Ministry of Finance created the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe
(Technical Construction Working Group) to coordinate American and other
allied military construction programs at the German federal, state, and
local levels.
As USAREURs agent, USACAG dealt directly with the Ministry of
Defense or the Ministry of Construction in Bonn to develop an agreement
for each new construction program. The agreements were international
and intergovernmental in character in that they were between agencies of
sovereign powers; but each one was specific to a particular construction
program, such as Nike missile installations or housing for troops or military families. The construction agreements were subordinate to broader
diplomatic accords, such as the NATO Status of Forces Agreement or the
Dollarbaukontrakt (Dollar Construction Contract). USACAGs role always
depended upon a higher authority, such as USAREUR, and at the completion of any formal discussions it submitted copies of accords for review by
the secretary of the Army and the Department of State. The need to negotiate an implementing agreement on each new program delayed the construction; at times each installation site had to be negotiated individually.
The negotiations were, however, an unavoidable consequence of doing
business in a host nation. William E. Camblor, the USACAG director,
proved particularly adept at managing these negotiations and remained
involved in them with Germany and other NATO host countries for over
four decades.3
Any implementing agreement between USACAG and the Federal
Republics ministries of defense and construction in Bonn was only the
beginning. Each agreement next passed through the Federal Ministry
of Finances Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe, which maintained its offices in
Frankfurt. The federal ministries then issued orders to state construction
offices (Oberfinanzdirektionen), which in turn passed the orders for execution to a local office (called Landesbauamt, Staatsbauamt, or Finanzbauamt,
depending on which state it was in). USACAGs contracts for U.S. military
construction were with West German government agencies at the federal
level, not with the firms executing the work.4 By contrast, states and localitiesrather than federal agencieshad jurisdiction over all contracts that
engaged architect-engineer firms or builders. The entire system gained
the label indirect contracting.
The Dollarbaukontrakt, negotiated in 1956 and modified in 1961, coupled with the Supplementary Agreement to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement signed with West Germany in 1959, governed the indirect
contracting system and formed the basis for all U.S. dollarfunded design
and construction executed in the Federal Republic.5 During USACAGs
early years the Germans still allowed many of the dollar-funded projects
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2/3/06 10:35:18 AM
Managing Construction in Germany, 19561966

to be contracted directly. The new West German government progressively expanded the indirect contracting system so that by the early 1960s
indirect contracting had become the standard operating procedure for
construction in Germany. It remained for decades the aspect of engineer
activities in Europe least understood by the people not directly involved
with it.6
USACAG Organization
In organizing for the transition of U.S. forces from occupying power
to ally, the U.S. commander in chief for Europe delegated execution of
dollar-funded construction in Germany to USAREURs commander in
chief. Well before Deutschmark financing ended, planners had contemplated creating a new construction organization.7 They were motivated by severe budgetary pressure as well as by the change in West
Germanys international status and responsibilities. Although its obligation to support U.S. military construction was ending, the Federal
Republic nonetheless agreed to provide Deutschmark funding for construction obligations contracted before May 1955 so long as projects were
completed by the end of 1957. During fiscal year 1956, despite this commitment, German support for the U.S. military dropped by nearly $500
million. Because the bulk of these Deutschmark funds had gone into
wages and utilities, the U.S. military had to trim staff and consolidate
services. Lacking the funds for pay, the Army released 24,000 German
employees in fiscal year 1956.8
To manage contract construction for the U.S. Army, on 1 July 1956,
USAREUR activated its Construction Agency. Within a short time the
organization, subordinate to USAREURs Engineer Division but with
headquarters in Frankfurt, settled on the name U.S. Army Construction
Agency, Germany.9 USAREUR removed responsibility for contract construction from the area and post commanders and placed it under this single agency. (See Chart 5.) Centralized administration for contract construction remained characteristic of U.S. forces in Europe from 1956 onward.
The new organization enabled USAREUR to reduce personnel. Of
the 1,037 persons in construction employed in the area commands, by
1 January 1957, these commands retained only 76. USACAG operated
initially with about 210 employees, producing a net saving of more than
750 places. USAREUR expected a central construction agency to manage
the dollar-funded contracts more consistently than the area commands.
Furthermore, USAREUR saw an advantage in being able to transfer many
of the command and operating responsibilities of its Engineer Division to
USACAG, thereby allowing the USAREUR engineer to concentrate on his
staff responsibilities as adviser to the commander in chief.10
USAREUR appointed an American civilian, Camblor, to direct
USACAG. Before World War II, Camblor had worked in the New York
District of the Corps of Engineers. Mobilized as a reserve officer early
in the war, he had landed at Normandy shortly after D-Day and moved
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2/3/06 10:35:18 AM

through France and Belgium
with the Communication Zones
Adva nce Sect ion eng i neers.
In 1947 Camblor resigned his
commission and took a position in the Office of the Theater
Chief Engineer. By 1950 he had
become deput y chief of t he
Construction Branch. He served
under two European Command
engineers, Brig. Gen. David H.
Tulley and Brig. Gen. Frank M.
Albrecht, during the years that
U.S. forces expanded rapidly. As
West Germany approached full
sovereignty, Camblors proficiency in German, knowledge of
Army engineer operations, and
ability as a negotiator gave him
a significant supporting role in
William Camblor, shown here in the 1970s,
the talks between the United
was the first director of USACAG.
States and the Federal Republic.
He served as a resource person
on engineering issues in discussions leading to the agreements governing U.S. military construction in
Germanythe Auftragsbauten Grundstze 1955 and the Dollarbaukontrakt
in 1956.11
Although barely forty years old in 1956, Camblor had served as the
highest ranking civilian in the USAREUR Engineers Office for several
years. Tulley, who esteemed Camblors talent and service, had moved
to the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington; but he remained
in close contact with affairs in Europe. Tulley and his successor as
USAREUR engineer, Albrecht, gave Camblor strong support for the position of director of USACAG, as did Camblors immediate military superior
in Heidelberg, Brig. Gen. Charles McNutt.12
Camblors appointment as director of USACAG made the organization noteworthy in four ways. First, he was the only civilian ever to command an Army engineer agency of such scope. Second, because he was
not subject to the military cycle of rotating assignments, Camblor brought
continuity during his seven-year service that gave him increased influence
in dealing with his counterparts in the local German agencies responsible
for supporting U.S. military construction. Third, Camblor had an aptitude
for European languages. He conducted formal negotiations in English
aided by an interpreter and a legal adviser, but he established rapport with
officials in Europe by conversing freely with them in either German or
French. Fourth, as a Cuban-American, Camblor commanded USACAG at
a time when it was unusual for persons from ethnic or racial minorities to
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2/3/06 10:35:18 AM
2/3/06 10:35:19 AM
Provost
Marshal
Division
Armed Forces
Information and
Education Division
Adjutant
General
Division
Engineer
Division
Staff
Medical
Division
Ordnance
Division
Civil
Affairs
Division
Headquarters
Commandant
Historical
Division
Inspector
General
Division
Special Staff
Judge
Advocate
Division
Public
Information
Division
Special
Activities
Division
Finance and
Accounting
Division
Office of the
Comptroller
Transportation
Division
Labor
Services
Division
Signal
Division
Assistant Chief of
Staff, G4 Logistics
Secretary of the
General Staff
Quartermaster
Division
Technical Staffs and Services
Assistant Chief of
Staff, G3 Operations
General
Chief of Staff
U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG)
Chemical
Division
Assistant Chief of
Staff, G2 Intelligence
Chaplain
Division
Administrative Staffs
and Services
Assistant Chief of
Staff, G1 Personnel
Political Adviser
Commander in Chief
Chart 5: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 30 June 1956

hold executive positions in American institutions. It had been less than a
decade since President Truman ordered the military to integrate. Although
the military responded with greater speed than many other segments of
American society, it would still be many years before another member of a
minority group achieved a comparable position of leadership in the Corps
of Engineers.
Camblor set up headquarters for USACAG in Frankfurt in the summer of 1956. He quickly selected fourteen people and took them to Paris
to the headquarters of the Joint Construction Agency, where they spent a
week learning the regulations, rules, and procedures. He then returned to
Frankfurt and began recruiting personnel, drawing particularly on those
who had served in the USAREUR engineers office in Heidelberg or with
engineer offices in the area commands. USACAGs staffing level fluctuated between 210 and 250, including both the Central Office staff and the
staffs of district offices.13
Camblor brought John Tambornino from Heidelberg to USACAG as
chief of engineering. Tambornino already had over twenty years in government engineer positions, beginning in 1934 when he joined the Corps
of Engineers in the United States. From 1940 to 1942 he had worked in
Panama on the design of the third set of locks for the canal. He had come
to Germany in 1951 to serve in the post engineers office in Heidelberg
and then in the USAREUR engineers office. Tambornino served as chief
of engineering in USACAG and successor commands until he retired in
late 1974.14
Camblor recruited H. Jace Greene from the Southern Area Command
in Stuttgart.15 Active as an engineer in military communities in Germany
since 1946, Greene had turned Bundesbahn locomotives into a temporary heating plant for military family housing in Kornwestheim. Greene
moved from chief of construction for Southern Area Command to chief of
construction for USACAG.
Transfers came from other Army engineer offices throughout Europe.
In 1957 Saul Fraint, who had worked in Austria, Italy, and France, left the
Joint Construction Agency and joined USACAG as Greenes deputy in the
Construction Division. Fraint became head of the Technical Engineering
Branch in 1958 and served in varying capacities before his retirement in
1974.16
Camblor also recruited engineers just arriving in Europe. Paul Friesch,
for instance, had seen Germany at the end of World War II but harbored
a desire to see it again in better times. After completing his professional
education in the United States, he worked in the Detroit District of the
Corps of Engineers, spending a good deal of time on designs of facilities
in support of new missile systems. He applied for a position in Germany
and was accepted; but when he arrived in September 1956, the job had
been eliminated. He followed a suggestion and called Camblor, who
immediately offered him a position with USACAG. Friesch spent most of
the rest of his career in Europe, working with USACAG and its successor
and then with NATO in Brussels, from which he retired in 1990.17
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2/3/06 10:35:19 AM

Like Friesch, Louis Brettschneider had been looking for a way to
work in Europe. After graduating from college in 1944, Brettschneider
had joined the U.S. Merchant Marines. A job with the Joint Construction
Agency in Paris disappeared, but he too found his way to Frankfurt; he
joined USACAG in December 1956. A technical engineer of considerable
ability, Brettschneider continued with USACAGs successor organizations
into the 1990s.18
For every Department of the Army civilian (DAC), USACAGs staff
included two Germans (local nationals) in professional and clerical support capacities. The Germans reasons for seeking jobs with the U.S.
military varied. Some, like Hasso Damm, developed a sense of loyalty
and a strong commitment to the organization. A young student already
trained in classical Greek and Latin, Damm hoped to earn money to
continue his studies in law when he took a job as an estimator with
USACAG in mid-September 1956. In addition to his academic interests,
Damm was also a qualified stonemason, which gave him a range of
practical experience that served him well as USACAGs first estimator.19 Because USACAG had no legal branch, Camblor asked Damm to
research legal issues associated with applying the Dollarbaukontrakt
under which U.S. military construction operated. In addition to his estimating work, Damm conducted the legal research, although he never
returned to his formal studies. He stayed with USACAG and came to
head the Estimating Section that developed.20
Another young German who obtained employment with USACAG followed a different path. Georgi Reitzel received an engineering degree in
1949. Because of the limited opportunities for professional employment in
Germany, he spent several months working as a construction laborer and
carpenter. Hired as a draftsman for the Army at Tompkins Barracks in
Schwetzingen, Reitzel made a deal to teach one of his superiors German
in exchange for English lessons. In 1956 he was working at Headquarters
Area Command in Heidelberg, and he became one of the first appointees
to USACAGs Engineering Division. In March 1962 Reitzel left USACAG
to form his own contracting firm. Over the next thirty-five years he won
a variety of contracts from USACAG and its successors, from NATO, and
from West German government construction agencies. Reitzel considered
his experience at USACAG fundamental to his later success in business.21
Germans employed by the U.S. military came under different work
rules than those applied to DACs. These work rules changed as West
Germany emerged from the occupation. Between 1948 and 1952 post commanders were responsible for the salaries and social insurance surcharge
for all personnel paid in Deutschmarks. Beginning on 1 July 1952, the
United States paid each employees wages to the German Lnder (states).
The Lnder then disbursed the funds.22 In 1954 the United States accepted
an agreement that affirmed the right of German workers to belong to
unions. The agreement exempted U.S. forces from German civil laws that
mandated works councils in industry. USAREUR, however, authorized
works councils for its organizations employing Germans, limiting their
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2/3/06 10:35:20 AM

scope to the consultative role of making suggestions and presenting grievances and complaints on working conditions.23
USAREUR negotiated the terms of the local nationals employment
with the Federal Republic for all its subordinate organizations, including
USACAG. In 1955 allied forces in Germany agreed to establish uniform
pay schedules and policies and a 48-hour, six-day workweek as standard
for all German employees. In August 1957 USAREUR introduced a 45hour, five-day workweek.24
Because so many German nationals joined USACAG at the start, their
influence in the small organization was significant. Many stayed with the
Army engineers for their entire careers, despite improved employment
opportunities in Germany. The German employees felt they were valued
as an integral part of the organization. Many American professionals
viewed their German coworkers as the key to continuity in the organization and as a vital element in USACAGs operation.
USACAG had offices in an old, two-story, wooden, prefabricated
building behind the officers club at the rear of the I. G. Farben building
in Frankfurt.25 Camblor set up the organization on the model of a stateside
Corps of Engineers district, where the office of director was comparable to
that of a district engineer. Camblor and his deputy, at the outset a lieutenant colonel and later a full colonel, were the only authorized contracting
officers. Camblor operated with a small special staff, an advisory and
administrative staff to support the organization as a whole, and a technical staff to supervise design and construction.26 (Chart 6)
USACAGs assigned task was to execute the Armys (and later the
Air Forces) construction programs within the entire Federal Republic of
Germany. This marked a contrast with the area commands, which had
handled Deutschmark construction on a regional basis. For fiscal year
1957 USACAG executed 35 percent of the construction projects budgeted
by USAREUR. Repair and utilities agencies handled 60 percent of the
projects, and troops and combat engineer units handled the remaining 5
percent. By 1960 USACAG, at the direction of the commander in chief of
USAREUR, had taken on responsibility for construction in other areas of
Europe beyond Germany.27
USACAG Projects
The projects under Deutschmark funding included community support facilities and family housing.28 In fiscal year 1957, USACAGs first
year of operation, Congress cut the appropriated funds for Military
Construction, Army, from a projected total of $11.5 million to around $2.2
million and reduced the number of projects from twenty-eight to nine.
Total construction placement, including projects using Deutschmark
funds, amounted to around $5 million for the year.29
In December 1957, reacting to the military implications of the Soviet
launch of Sputnik, the NATO Council decided that stocks of nuclear warheads would be established in Europe and nuclear delivery weapons,
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2/3/06 10:35:20 AM
2/3/06 10:35:20 AM
Bad Kreuznach
Legal Branch created in 1960.
Bitburg
Resident
Pirmasens
Estimating
Section
Army and
Air Force
Section
Hahn
Advisory
Weapons
Section
Kaiserslautern
Structural
Section
Mechanical
Section
Modifications
and Additions
Branch
Electrical
Section
Civil
Section
Technical
Engineering Branch
Technical
Planning and
Estimating Branch
Legal Branch
Engineering Division
Office Services Branch
Purchasing and
Contractng
Branch
Wrzburg
Munich
Change Orders
and
Termination Section
Technical Supervision
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
Eastern
Projects
Section
Contract
Administration
Branch
Construction Division
Operations
Branch
Command
Katterbach
Frankfurt
OFFICES
Western
Projects
Section
Technical
Branch
Staff
Property and
Supply Branch
Budget Branch
Management
Services Branch
Comptroller Division
Special Staff
Reports and Analysis Branch
Fiscal
Accounting
Branch
Advisory and Administrative Staff
Office of the Director
Chart 6: Organization of U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany (USACAG), ca. 1961, Depicting the New Legal Branch
and Eleven Resident Offices

including intermediate-range ballistic missiles, would be placed at the
disposal of SACEUR [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe].30 To implement this decision, the United States increased its defense spending. Work
on missile sites and installations became a main part of USACAGs construction program. Construction placement more than doubled for fiscal
year 1958, to $11.6 million, as the organization assumed responsibility for
construction to support the new weaponry. In fiscal year 1959, the first
year of the Nike air defense missile program, construction placement rose
to $13.6 million. By fiscal year 1961 it had reached about $19 million as the
Hawk and the Mace missiles were also introduced into Europe.31
By September 1961 USACAGs backlog of authorized but unbuilt construction totaled $95 million, of which only $16 million was supported
with appropriated dollars. The balance ($79 million) was funded by the
Germans, principally under the Alternate Construction Program, or by
NATO. The U.S. military budget initially funded construction for the
Nike, Hawk, and Mace missiles. Subsequently, a substantial portion of the
construction for the missile programs qualified for financing under the
NATO Common Infrastructure Program and funding for the Nike installations shifted to the NATO budgets.32
NATOs Common Infrastructure Program paid for construction of
fixed structures and elements of any military installation necessary
to support forces committed for the common defense of Europe. The
expense was justified as a collective investment for all the nations of the
alliance. USACAG worked through the Common Infrastructure Program
on projects where U.S. forces would use the facilities.33 The infrastructure
program paid for design and construction; the host nation (on whose territory the installation would be located) acquired the land and provided
local utilities. The United States, whose forces assigned to NATO would
occupy the facilities, took responsibility for maintenance and for financing any construction features that exceeded NATO criteria.34
The construction program for the Nike missiles was the first large
NATO program in Europe. The Nike missile, about a foot in diameter and twenty feet long and armed with an explosive warhead, was
designed as an all-weather antiaircraft ground-to-air missile with a
range of about twenty-five miles. The Nike installation site had four
components: the launching area, an electronic command and control
center, a radar installation for tracking incoming aircraft, and housing
for the troops manning the facility. These components were located
within a total area of about thirty acres, but the control area could be as
far as five miles away from the launching area. One of USACAGs critical responsibilities was site selection, because the control and launching
areas required unobstructed line of sight between them.35 By the end of
the Nike program, USACAG had built some two dozen sites using definitive drawings developed by the Advanced Weapons Section headed by
Paul Friesch. These drawings provided the basis for all of the Nike sites
eventually built by NATO in Norway, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Greece,
and Turkey.36
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While construction of the Nike installations was still in progress,
the United States began the Hawk missile programalso for NATO
and USACAG had construction responsibility in Germany. The Hawks
were ground-to-air missiles designed to bring down low-flying aircraft.
Eventually about 100 installations were built.37 Hawk facilities required
only about half the space of Nike sites because the structures were concentrated in one location. USACAG also supervised contracts with architect-engineer firms designing Mace missile sites for the Air Force. Airbreathing subsonic Mace missiles were designed for underground shelters
capable of surviving an atomic attack and thus allowing a retaliatory
strike. Despite the design, the first sites built in Germany were at ground
level. Construction for all these weapons systems required attention to the
special requirements of sensitive electronic equipment.38
In 1958 USACAG also began work on storage sites for atomic and
chemical weapons. Other storage sites, built with a humidity control system, warehoused equipment pre-positioned for use by troops who would
be flown from the United States to Europe in case of emergency.39 These
new storage sites addressed a major tactical-logistical concern by providing dispersed depot facilities to replace storage heretofore concentrated
west of the Rhine during the buildup immediately after the Korean War.
The new depot complexes consisted of two major components: a large
earth-covered warehouse with a storage area of about 20,000 square feet
and a series of about fifteen 2,000-square-foot storage igloos that were
highly blast-resistant and distributed over protective terrain. The original
construction plan called for nine such depots.40
The warehouses created particular problems in community relations.
To keep the potentially hazardous materials away from population centers, the warehouses were located in what amounted to public parks
forest areas that Germans valued greatly. Of twenty-one sites considered
for the warehouse facilities, eight were finally selected as appropriate.
Selection did not mean final acquisition, however. The German state governments owned all the sites in question; they showed great reluctance to
turn them over to the U.S. military because it meant a diminution of their
forest areas. By October 1961 only two warehouses had been completed, a
third was close to completion, and three additional facilities were scheduled for completion by March 1962. Two of the sites still had not been
acquired because the community opposed the installations. The Army
finally sought expropriation of the land in question, and the governments
eventually acquiesced. Once a site became available, USACAG needed
eight months to complete the construction.
In November 1960 the German government granted USACAG permission to survey sites for six groups of storage igloos. By grouping
up to fifteen igloos in each site, USACAG achieved its goal of locating
seventy-four igloos on only five sites. In June 1961 the German government gave permission to proceed with construction at the five sites with
the condition that each site be secure from accident or intrusion. The Army
agreed, and USACAG designed fencing and fire protection for each area.
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2/3/06 10:35:21 AM

The security features added about $27,000 to the cost of each site. Costs
averaged another $350,000 each for the warehouses and about $870,000 for
each igloo area.41
While USACAG supervised this work in Germany, the United States
Construction Agency, France (USACAF), managed construction of similar
storage facilities near Metz, France. An engineer captain, James C. Donovan,
aided by a team of French and American technical specialists, supervised
construction.42 At each site, the French contractor excavated into the side
of a hill, set out forms, and poured concrete over reinforcing steel rods. As
a young engineer, Donovan was impressed by the quantity of reinforcing
rod that went into the structure. That re-bar was so close and there was so
much steel in those walls and in that roof that it could withstand a significant blast. In addition, the doors had a sensing device that would feel the
shockwave of a nearby explosion; trigger a release mechanism; and automatically close the mammoth steel doors, which were 12 or 16 inches deep
and extending clear across the entire opening.43
USACAG received orders to include these sensitive storage sites in a
major electronic radio network called troposcatter, a vast communications
system that ran 8,300 miles from northern Norway to eastern Turkey. Its
eighty-two sites were completed by 1963.44
A substantial share of USACAGs work came from the Alternate
Construction Program, sponsored by the Federal Republic of Germany.
In 1949 local communities had offered to construct alternate facilities
for U.S. troops in exchange for the return to its German owners of property previously requisitioned.45 During the final years of the Deutschmark
construction, the Alternate Housing Program provided 3,228 units of
family housing for U.S. military personnel. Once the occupation ended
in May 1955, continued American use of requisitioned property became
even more irritating to the Germans. The two countries resolved the issue
with an accord negotiated in 1957 and 1958, whereby the Federal Republic
agreed either to buy a requisitioned facility and make it available for use
by the U.S. forces or to construct an alternate facility.46 In August 1960
USAREURs commander in chief, General Clyde D. Eddleman, and West
Germanys defense minister, Franz Josef Strauss, signed an agreement that
extended the Alternate Construction Program to facilities not acquired by
requisition but wanted by the Federal Republic. German government
agencies and contractors accomplished all work under the Alternate
Construction Program, with the U.S. military user setting specifications
for the new facilities.47
The 1960 agreements covered five projects. The Germans constructed
about 1,000 family housing units at various locations in West Germany
in exchange for the release of about the same number of units. They
also rehabilitated and built new facilities at the Illesheim Caserne (completed in 1969) and rehabilitated the former quartermaster installation in
Giessen for use by the European Exchange Service (later Army and Air
Force Exchange Service). The 4th Armored Division vacated facilities in
Ulm for the Germans and received renovated facilities formerly used by
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2/3/06 10:35:21 AM

the European Exchange Service in Katterbach. The Germans provided
alternate facilities in the NurembergMunich area for administrative and
support units in return for American release of the Palace of Justice in
Nuremberg and the main customs office and other facilities in Munich.48
The Berlin Crisis of 1961

USACAG, like other American military organizations in Europe, owed
its very existence to the Cold War. This rationale was never more dramatically evident than in the intensity of USACAGs involvement in Operation
BAMBOO TREE in Berlin, a program designed to prepare West Berlin for an
airlift if the Soviet Union imposed a second blockade.49
West Germanys growing participation in NATO made the leaders of the
Soviet Union exceedingly uneasy. Their unease only intensified when, after
the Soviets launched Sputnik, West Germany agreed to station tactical nuclear weapons on its territory. Each time Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev
provoked a crisis over Berlin, he warned West European nations that they
were risking nuclear annihilation in the event of a war between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Far from disrupting NATO, as Khrushchev had
hoped, the series of threats to Berlin prompted Britain, Italy, and Greece to
authorize the installation of American medium-range missiles in their
countries in the summer of 1959.
Two years later, in June 1961, Khrushchev met in Vienna with the
new U.S. president, John F. Kennedy. At that meeting and in subsequent
exchanges, Khrushchev demanded a German peace treaty, the end of
allied occupation of Germany, recognition of East Germany as a state,
and establishment of West Berlin as a Free City, undefended by Western
military units. In the absence of a satisfactory settlement, Khrushchev
threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with the German Democratic
Republic on 1 January 1962 and turn over full control of Berlin to the East
Germans. Kennedy responded by requesting that Congress appropriate
an additional $3 billion for defense spending and by doubling draft quotas to increase the size of the Army.
As tension over Berlin mounted during the summer of 1961, thousands of East Germans fled from Communist rule simply by passing into
the western sector of the city and asking for assistance to fly from there to
the West. A total of 22,000 refugees fled in the first twelve days of August
1961.
At 2:00 A.M. on 13 August 1961, under cover of darkness, the East
German regime imposed its solution to this drain. Soldiers strung barbed
wire barriers along the entire line separating the western sectors from
East Berlin. Over the next several days, troops erected a formidable wall
of concrete and barbed wire guarded by watchtowers, dogs, and soldiers
who had orders to shoot anyone trying to escape. With all eyes on the
Berlin Wall, the West and the East seemed poised on the brink of war.
President Kennedys overt reaction was limited to rhetoric and military mobilization, and he took no steps to remove the wall. Secretly,
133
2/3/06 10:35:21 AM

however, he ordered Operation BAMBOO TREE. In September 1961, as part
of this covert operation, the Air Force instructed USACAG to improve the
landing and navigational facilities available at West Berlins three zonal
airportsTegel, Gatow, and Tempelhofand at several specific airfields
in West Germany. The orders, attributed to Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, stated that nothing was to stand in the way of the timely
completion of this mission. USACAGs staff interpreted the charge quite
broadly.
Camblor immediately set up an office in West Berlin and surveyed the
needs of the airports. USACAGs Engineering Division became the coordinating point for Operation BAMBOO TREE. Ignoring the normal process of
paperwork and requisition, USACAG engaged architect-engineer firms in
West Germany and construction firms in West Berlin. Design engineers
in Frankfurt worked through many nights that autumn preparing drawings and specifications. USACAG engineers literally pulled the designs
off the designers drawing boards, flew to West Berlin, and handed the
project specifications to the construction companies mobilized for the job.
Bidding was done on the spot. For the most important building, the base
for a tower that would house two large generators, Saul Fraint traveled to
Berlin with the design drawings. I gave them these three sheetsthats
all there wereand said, We need bids on this building. Its for a very
important projectand they knew what it was forday after tomorrow. He remained in Berlin to receive the bids, compared them, and
awarded the contract to Philipp Holzmann, A.G., to start work the next
day.50
USACAG managed construction at all three allied airfields with
good cooperation but little material help from the French and the British.
Air Force construction troops and American firms were also involved.
Contractors worked around the clock. Support from the West Berliners
who had a clear appreciation of what was at stakewas outstanding.
As Khrushchevs 31 December deadline approached, Fraint and Louis
Brettschneider sought a meeting with the director of Siemens and his
managers to appeal for their support and supervision of a very delicate
installation of electrical cable. Fraint and Brettschneider explained that
completing the job on time would demand work straight through the
Christmas holiday. After listening to their appeal, the director of Siemens
replied, I understand the need, and I will be there on Christmas Day.
He then turned to his managers and asked, Who will join me?51
The same spirit of cooperation that prevailed in the Siemens boardroom extended to the construction site. About two weeks after construction began on the building to house the generators, Fraint learned that
the equipment ordered by the Air Force would not be available on schedule because of a labor dispute in the United States. The Air Force located
substitute generators, but they were too long to fit into the building as
designed. Rather than take time to redesign, Fraint and Brettschneider
flew to Berlin and went to the construction site, where the contractor
was about to lay the foundation for the back wall of the building. They
134
2/3/06 10:35:21 AM

paced off an additional five meters and asked the construction crew to
change the specifications on the spot. According to Fraint, the foreman
said, Yes, Sir! To everyones relief, when the generators arrived they fit
into the redesigned building. By 1 January 1962, the essential work was
done. The crisis had also eased. Operation BAMBOO TREE remained in the
memory of those involved as a period of intense activity and a source of
great satisfaction.52
From USACAG to Engineer Element

In August 1962, after a record year in construction placement, William
Camblor took a years leave to study at the Industrial College of the
Armed Forces at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. One of five civilian
employees of the Department of the Army admitted into the program, he
felt it would enhance his credentials. Already a GS15, he had been recommended for promotion in 1959 but had not received the higher grade.
The year at the Industrial College seemed to be an opportunity to advance
his career.
About the time Camblor left for Washington, USAREUR reexamined
its organization of engineer resources. (See Chart 7.) With work declining
in France, the maintenance of separate construction organizations for
France and Germany seemed a costly duplication. At the same time, some
of the colonels who served under Camblor in USACAG bridled at being
subordinate to a civilian. They made their feelings clear to the USAREUR
engineer in Heidelberg and found a sympathetic ear when Brig. Gen.
Howard A. Morris took over that office in January 1963. Morris, who had
served as post engineer in Frankfurt in 19461947, felt strongly that an
engineer officer should direct military construction.53
USACAG had been one of several distinctive agencies the Department
of Defense organized in the 1950s to manage military construction. In
addition to the Joint Construction Agency and its successor, the United
States Army Construction Agency, France, the Army activated in 1956
the United States Army Construction Agency, Korea (USACAK), and the
United States Army Construction Agency, Japan (USACAJ). In the Pacific
the experiment had been short-lived. In a scant year, control of the contract construction resources for the military passed from theater commanders to the chief of engineers in Washington. USACAK and USACAJ
were inactivated in June 1957 and their functions taken over by the newly
formed Pacific Ocean Division of the Corps of Engineers.54
The construction agency in France also disappeared. In October 1961,
with the volume of construction declining, a smaller entity, the United
States Army Field Engineer Office, France, replaced USACAF. Of the special organizations created in the 1950s to manage U.S. military construction, only USACAG in Frankfurt survived. As the workload in France
declined, USACAGs workload increased through the late 1950s, reaching
its peak in 1962 at $40 million, more than five times its dollar volume in
1957.55
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2/3/06 10:35:21 AM
2/3/06 10:35:22 AM
U.S. Armed Forces

Institution, Europe
U.S. Army
Berlin
U.S. Army Dependents

Education Group
Karlsruhe
U.S. Military Liaison

Mission to CINC, Group of
Soviet Forces, Germany
Units
513th Intelligence
Corps Group
Southern Area
Command
U.S. Army European

Exchange System
Nuremberg
U.S. Army Special

Services Depot
Aschaffenburg
Stars and Stripes

Darmstadt
U.S. Army Signal

Brigade Europe
Northern Area
Command
10th Special Forces

Group (Airborne)
1st Special Forces
U.S. Army
School Europe
Commands
Commands
Special Ammunition Support

Command, Europe
Special Troops
USAREUR
Subordinate
Southern European
Task Force
U.S. Army Construction

Agency, Germany
American Forces
Network, Europe
9th Hospital
Center
7th Engineer
Brigade
U.S. Army Military

District, Europe
Communications
Zone
Seventh Army
Major
Headquarters
United States Army, Europe (USAREUR)
Chart 7: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1963, Just before the Dissolution of USACAG

USACAG outlasted the other construction agencies, but as an organizational anomaly. It had always been unusual because a civilian served
as director. Several factors conjoined to bring on its demise: Camblors
leave of absence during most of 1962 and 1963, USAREURs study of engineer resources, a Department of Defense study urging consolidation of
construction activities, the declining volume of work in France, and the
elimination of all other construction agencies. Camblors deputy, Col.
Paavo Carlson, became acting director of USACAG; by June 1963 Carlson
was signing documents as director.56 USAREUR appointed another military officer, Col. Ed Streck, to succeed Carlson. Camblor completed the
program at the Industrial College and continued his studies for several
months in Washington, earning a masters degree in business administration. By the time he was ready to return to Germany, USAREUR had
decided to reorganize its engineer activities.57
Camblor returned to Europe in September 1963 to serve in the
USAREUR engineers office in Heidelberg, not to his former position in
Frankfurt. Camblor accepted a new position as Morris special assistant
because he judged that serving at a higher headquarters might enhance
Figure 2: Annual Construction Placement of the U.S. Army Construction
Agency, Germany, and the Engineer Element, 19571966
40
30
20
10
0
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
Calendar Year
Infrastructure
Alternate
Construction
Military
Construction,
Army
Military
Construction,
Air Force
Nonappropriated
Funds
Operations &
Maintenance, Army
PEMA
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2/3/06 10:35:22 AM

his opportunity for promotion; but many of his civilian colleagues
viewed Morris offer as a device to remove him to install a military officer as USACAG commander.58 In February 1964 USAREUR consolidated
USACAG with the U.S. Army Field Engineer Office, France, to form a new
entity, the Engineer Element.59 (Figure 2)
The Engineer Element inherited USACAGs offices in Frankfurt and its
staff. A subordinate command of the USAREUR engineer, it supervised
dollar-funded military construction in Germany, France, and the Benelux
countries; monitored NATO construction and construction programs
financed from other sources; and provided professional and technical
engineering services to other USAREUR elements. For USAREUR, the
Engineer Element managed Operations and Maintenance, Army, designengineering projects costing between $25,000 and $200,000. USAREUR
assigned projects costing under $25,000 or involving no design to its
post engineers. In October 1965 USAREUR transferred management of
real estate to the Engineer Element. Since the end of World War II, major
subordinate commanders at the area level had handled real estate operations. Late in 1964 USAREUR had centralized these responsibilities under
the Army Area Command, with headquarters in Munich; a year later
the function and a staff of about eighty people passed to the Engineer
Element.60
The change from a civilian director of USACAG to an Army colonel
commanding the Engineer Element made little difference in the dayto-day work on such activities as Nike and Mace missile installations,
troposcatter, NATO infrastructure, Alternate Construction, and other programs and projects. Many long-term employees hardly remembered the
Engineer Element as a distinct organization. When interviewed twentyfive years later, only one person other than Camblor could recall by name
the colonels who commanded it from 1964 to 1966.
During an eight-year existence, USACAG achieved a distinguished
history. It had overseen the installation of missile sites and construction
of storage facilities to support atomic weaponry as NATO expanded its
military capabilities in the 1950s. It had responded to the challenge of
the Berlin Wall by preparing Berlin to receive supplies by air if the Soviet
Union tried to impose a second blockade. It had the unique distinction
among military construction agencies of being commanded by a civilian.
USACAG ceded place in 1964, but its successor, the Engineer Element,
gave way in 1966 to the Engineer Command, a unique organization that
brought together all engineer resources in the European Theater for the
first time.
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2/3/06 10:35:22 AM
6
ENGINEER COMMAND
19661974
he Engineer Command owed its origin to the determination

of the commander in chief of the United States Army, Europe
(USAREUR), General Andrew P. OMeara. When OMeara
assumed command in March 1965, he brought a wealth of experience in postwar Germany to his new assignment. From 1948 to 1951
he had served as chief of logistics planning at the European Commands
headquarters in Heidelberg; and in 1957, as commander of the 4th
Armored Division, he had moved the unit from Fort Hood, Texas, to
Germany, where he remained for a two-year tour of duty. OMeara had
developed strong opinions about what the Army engineers ought to be
doing for USAREUR.
Soon after arriving in Heidelberg in 1965, OMeara inquired about a
project he had launched while commanding the 4th Armored Division:
moving the rear elements of the division into the Nuremberg area.
OMeara learned that his plan had been approved in 1960, but the relocation had become stalled in negotiations for the Alternate Construction
Program. Incensed by the lack of progress, OMeara asked the USAREUR
engineer, Brig. Gen. Howard A. Morris, for an explanation. Morris said
that the district commanders were responsible for the delays; the district commanders put the blame elsewhere. OMearas review of other
engineer activities fueled his anger. Garrisons targeted for renovation
during his tour in the logistics division fifteen years earlier had not been
finished. USAREURs construction battalions had poor discipline and
inadequate supervision. And OMeara did not think that the labor service
units of skilled German and Baltic craftsmen were being used appropriately. OMeara dubbed the situation a stinking engineering mess and
demanded accountability.1
While OMeara questioned the deployment of engineer resources
within USAREUR, his control of these assets was being challenged in
Washington. Early in 1965 the Department of the Army asked the Office
of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) to study the organization of military
09H_Chap06_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 11:12:55 AM

construction in Europe, the only
Army command where contract
construction was not managed
by the OCE. The OCE study
concluded that contract construction currently assigned to
USAREUR ought to be assumed
by the Corps of Engineers and
managed by the Mediterranean
Division through a district office
in Frankfurt. When these recommendations were announced in
May 1965, OMeara immediately
dissented.2
OMeara insisted that control of all engineer resources
remain directly under his authority as USAREUR commander. The
Department of the Army asked
the Army Audit Agency (AAA)
General Young in 1970
to review the OCE study and to
present independent recommendations. The audit, completed in
October 1965, concurred with the OCE analysis. Among the staff of the
Engineer Element, rumors began to circulate of a power struggle for us
between USAREUR and the chiefs office.3
Despite the consensus between the OCE and the AAA, OMeara resisted. He wanted to consolidate all engineer personnel and resources directly
under the USAREUR commander. Months before OMeara assumed
command, USAREUR had consolidated its logistical support facilities in
Germany, creating a single logistical command to provide area support to
all Army forces in Germany except those in Berlin and Bremerhaven. The
new Army Area Command, headed by a West Point classmate of OMearas,
Maj. Gen. Tom R. Stoughton, managed all stocks and logistical activities
as well as installation support throughout Germany. Stoughton strongly
opposed OMearas proposal to create a competing engineer command,
as did most of OMearas general staff, including the USAREUR engineer,
General Morris. OMeara realized that he needed to go outside his own
staff to get another assessment of his idea. A personal friend and engineer
officer, Earl Peacock, recommended Col. Robert P. Rip Young, commander of the 7th Engineer Brigade. In July 1966 OMeara wrote Youngwhom
he had never metinstructing him to study the feasibility of organizing all
the engineer elements in Europe into an engineer command.4
Colonel Young had arrived in Frankfurt in September 1964 for his first
tour in Europe. A 1942 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, Young had
served with an airborne engineer battalion in World War II, commanded
an engineer battalion in Korea, and served as district engineer in the
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2/3/06 11:12:56 AM
Engineer Command, 19661974

Seattle District of the Corps of Engineers. Assigned as V Corps engineer
in 1964, Young was moved within weeks to deputy chief of staff of V
Corps. In July 1966 Young had begun an assignment as commander of the
7th Engineer Brigade. OMearas letter arrived almost immediately.5
Concerned about the task given to him directly by OMeara, Young
discussed the situation with Brig. Gen. Craig Cannon, Morris successor as USAREUR engineer. He quickly learned that OMearas idea was
unpopular with the staff in Heidelberg and opposed by the area commanders. Nevertheless, Young began with the assumption that a feasible
plan could be devised.
At the first briefing to discuss the feasibility of reorganization, the
USAREUR staff was hostile, but OMeara told Young to formulate an
implementation plan. General Stoughton objected that the engineers could
not supervise services such as snow clearing, packing and crating furniture, or other tasks that his Army Area Command provided to support
U.S. military installations throughout Germany. General OMeara agreed
to leave the engineer positions assigned for facilities maintenance with
the Army Area Command. When Young presented the implementation
plan, OMeara announced that the new command would be implemented
as outlined and that Colonel Young would head it.6
In a brief ceremony on 1 November 1966, USAREUR activated the
Engineer Command (ENGCOM). In the first phase of the implementation,
ENGCOM merged the Engineer Element (contract construction and real
estate) and the 7th Engineer Brigade (engineer troops and 6970th Labor
Service/Civilian Labor Group [LS/CLG]). Young set up offices in the
building in Frankfurt that had been used by the Engineer Element and
its predecessor, the United States Army Construction Agency, Germany
(USACAG). He moved headquarters of the 7th Engineer Brigade from
Karlsruhe to Frankfurt. The second phase of ENGCOMs consolidation
entailed the transfer of the repairs and utilities mission from the Army
Area Command to ENGCOM.
Beginning in May 1967, for the first and only time, the Armys major
engineer resourcescontract construction, troop construction, and facilities
engineeringoperated under one headquarters as a subordinate command
of USAREUR rather than as an element of the general staff office in charge of
logistics (G4). The reorganization preserved a unique aspect of the authority
of the commander in chief, USAREUR; only in Europe did the theater commander control engineer resources directly. (See Chart 8.) In all other major
Army commands, the OCE in Washington managed contract construction
for the Army and Air Force. OMeara had achieved what he wanted.7
Structure and Organization

In the face of overt opposition in the Heidelberg headquarters,
Youngs task of pulling the various components together into one
organization was not easy: It was, he recalled, a tug of war all the
way.8 The contract construction mission that ENGCOM took over from
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2/3/06 11:12:59 AM

Chart 8: Organization of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, and 7th Army, 1969
Headquarters,
United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and Seventh Army
V
VII
Corps Corps
U.S. Army
Berlin
Major
Commands
U.S. Theater
Army Support
Command
Europe
U.S. Army
Southern
European
Task Force
Assigned
U.S. Army
Medical
Command,
Europe
U.S. Army
Engineer
Command,
Europe
15th Military
Police Brigade
Assigned
European
Exchange
System
U.S. Army
School
Europe
U.S. Army Reserve

Affairs, Europe
Seventh
Army Training
Center
American Forces
Network, Europe
32d Army
USAREUR
Air Defense and Seventh
Command Army Troops
Units
Special Ammunition
Support Command,
USAREUR and
Seventh Army
Special Forces
Detachment
(Airborne), Europe
Activities
U.S. Military Liaison
Mission to the CINC,
Group of Soviet
Forces, Germany
U.S. Dependents
Schools, European
Area
Armed Forces
Recreation Center
USAREUR
Class VI Agency
USACAG and the Engineer Element encompassed the execution of

dollar-funded construction for U.S. military forces in Europe; the supervision and inspection of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
construction undertaken for U.S. forces and of alternate construction
provided by the Federal Republic; and the management of related real
estate functions.
ENGCOM also inherited from the 7th Engineer Brigade three missions associated with engineer troops: execution of construction for the
Army and the Air Force using troop labor, maintenance of combat readiness among the engineer troops, and readiness to execute contingency and
war plans. Throughout USAREUR (excluding Bremerhaven and Berlin),
ENGCOMs mission to support installationsfacilities engineering
covered the complex and essential tasks of maintenance, repairs, and provision of utilities. All elements of ENGCOM shared responsibility for furnishing professional and technical engineering services to the commander
in chief, USAREUR.9
Young organized ENGCOM headquarters in Frankfurt with an
Executive Command Section and seven directorates: Engineering,
142
2/3/06 11:12:59 AM

Chart 9: Organization of U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe, 1970
Commanding General
Special
Assistant
Chief of
Staff
Executive
Officer
Local
Nationals
Office
General
Council
Public
Information
Office
Headquarters
Commandant
Comptroller
Directorate
Deputy Chief
of Staff
Logistics
Directorate
Personnel
Directorate
Troop
Operations
Directorate
Facilities
Engineer
Directorate
Engineering
Directorate
Construction
Directorate
Operational
Control
Engineer
Groups
Headquarters
Company
Engineer
Districts
Resident Real Estate

Engineers
Offices
Construction, Operations, Facilities, Person nel, Logistics, and

Comptroller. (Chart 9) The Operations Directorate coordinated military
activities other than construction, and the Facilities Directorate managed
the repair and utilities mission. The Logistics Directorate supported
both troop units and the repair and utilities needs of the engineers serving military facilities (district engineers) and supervised the operations
of the real estate offices.10 ENGCOM maintained five offices in West
Germany to supervise the acquisition, disposal, and management of real
estate for USAREUR.11
Resident engineers, operating out of ten (early 1967) and then nine
(summer 1968) localities, executed the contract construction function.
Eleven district engineers carried out the repair and utilities mission (see
Map 11), supervising thirty-nine community engineers (also called post
engineers, although posts had been replaced by military communities in
USAREUR) and forty-five subcommunity engineers.12
143
2/3/06 11:13:00 AM

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
ENGINEER COMMAND
Hamburg
WEST GERMANY
Late 1960s
Bremen
District Headquarters
Berlin
50
100
0
0
50
Miles
Hannover
100 Kilometers
Rh
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
in
El
eR
be
Leipzig
BELGIUM
Erfurt
VOGELSBERG
Giessen
Hanau
RHINELAND-PFALZ
LUXEMBOURG
Dresden
HESSEN
Cologne
Bad Kreuznach
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
FRANCONIA
Frankfurt
TA U N U S
Wrzburg
Kaiserslautern
Nuremberg
Grafenwhr
Pilsen
7th ARMY
TRAINING COMMAND
Heidelberg
PA L AT I N AT E
N O R T H B AVA R I A
NORTH
B AVA R I A
Metz
WRTTEMBERG
NORTH
BADEN
Stuttgart
F R A N C E
Augsburg
S O U T H B AVA R I A
Mulhouse
A U S T R I A
Innsbruck
Map 11
Military, Civilian, and German Personnel

During 1967 and 1968 some 700 to 800 people worked at ENGCOM
headquarters, in district and resident engineer offices, and in real estate
functions. With nearly 7,000 soldiers and 14,000 civilians working on-site
144
2/3/06 11:13:00 AM

at the installations, the Engineer Command had an overall force of about
21,000.13
Personnel for the command consisted of military officers, Department
of the Army civilians (DACs), and German nationals. In general, Army
engineer officers headed major divisions in headquarters and in the
field offices. Young named Col. A. Darby Williams, Jr., commander of
the Engineer Element since the autumn of 1964, as chief of contract construction and deputy commander.14 A second colonel served as deputy
commander and chief of troop operations with responsibility for the 24th
Engineer Group (Construction) and the 6970th LS/CLG. In August 1967
a third colonel assumed office as deputy commander and chief of facilities engineering. ENGCOM consistently had problems finding qualified
officers to serve as engineers at the community level. The job called for
officers with the experience commensurate with the rank of an engineer
major; but competing demands, especially the war in Southeast Asia, left
only lieutenants available for most assignments.15
Civilians who had served with USACAG and the Engineer Element
provided both leadership and continuity in ENGCOM headquarters. John
Tambornino became chief of engineering, and H. Jace Greene remained
as chief of construction. William E. Camblor, former director of USACAG,
returned to Frankfurt to serve as special assistant to the commander.
Leonard L. Phillips, legal counsel in USACAG since 1960, became general
counsel. Saul Fraint served as chief of technical engineering, and John
Haugen continued as chief of planning. Adolph Faust, who had come
to USACAG after working for the Army engineers in Austria and with
USAREURs Northern Area Office, was named chief of civil engineering;
he later worked as chief of structural engineering. Louis Brettschneider
remained as chief of mechanical engineering (a section under USACAG
but now a branch) and, when Fraint retired in June 1973, succeeded him
as chief of technical engineering.16 When offices in France closed in 1966
and 1967, Jacques Bouchereau, a naturalized American citizen from Haiti
who had worked with the Joint Construction Agency and its successors in
France, joined ENGCOMs Engineering Division, as did John Shadday, a
former Army engineer officer.17
Other experienced civilians came into the organization when
ENGCOM assumed responsibility for facilities engineering. Randolph S.
Washington, a budget analyst, transferred from the Army Area Command
in 1967; he later served as deputy and supervisor of the Budget Office.
Edward Zawisza, who had worked for the Joint Construction Agency, for
the facilities engineer in Stuttgart, and with the Army Area Command,
joined ENGCOM as deputy chief of facilities engineering. Robert
Rodehaver first became chief of operation and maintenance programming
in the new Facilities Directorate and then in 1972 was promoted to chief of
buildings and grounds.18
Despite the continuity in leadership that these men provided,
American civilians made up less than 3 percent of ENGCOMs workforce
and the command remained short of qualified engineers in mid-level
145
2/3/06 11:13:00 AM
The 6970th Labor Service/Civilian Labor Group built this school in

Heidelberg in 1967.
positions.19 Germans and third-country nationals held more than 90 percent of the civilian positions as estimators, typists, translators, engineers,
legal aides, and contract administrators. During the late 1960s and early
1970s, ENGCOM had difficulty attracting Germans with professional
qualifications: Unemployment was low in the Federal Republic, and the
salaries offered by the Army were about one-third less than comparable
jobs in the West German economy. Although retaining qualified Germans
was even harder than recruiting them, some, including Hasso Damm,
who had joined USACAG in 1956, continued under ENGCOM.20
Engineer Troops
The Engineer Command included the 24th and 39th Engineer Groups
(Construction) and the 6970th LS/CLG. 21 Engineer troops in the 24th
and 39th were assigned to heavy construction, including earthmoving,
rehabilitation, and road building. The command also used troops for
crash programs such as constructing forty school classrooms, work that
involved preparing foundations, laying concrete, setting up Quonset huts,
and installing wiring.22
ENGCOM gained a unique resource in the 6970th LS/CLG. Each of its
six companies maintained a roster of about 150 men. Three companies
civilian labor groupswere composed of Germans; the other three
labor serviceincluded displaced persons from East European nations,
146
2/3/06 11:13:01 AM

especially the Baltic states that had been absorbed into the Soviet Union.
A headquarters company of about 200 men managed this organization
under the 7th Engineer Brigade. Members of the labor service units wore
uniforms and were commanded by officers from their own ranks who
were experienced in planning and executing construction projects.23
The U.S. Army of occupation created labor service units in early 1947
to augment its engineer units, and over the next twenty years the Army
developed contractual relations with the groups. The labor service personnel in the 6970th LS/CLG served an average of ten years and maintained
a high level of proficiency in crafts crucial to constructioncarpentry,
masonry, electrical wiring, heating, plumbing, and welding.
The standard workweek for the labor service personnel was fortythree hours on construction plus additional hours in training and improving skills. In 1950 the labor service men adopted the elephant as their
emblem to symbolize strength and endurance; their nickname became
Dickhuter, thick-skinned.24 For their tremendous morale, pride, dedication, and discipline, as well as consummate skill, they won the praise of
the Americans who worked with them.25
The ENGCOM structure permitted the labor service and civilian
labor groups to be employed quickly and effectively to support contract
construction, as they had previously supported troop construction.
Furthermore, troop units and the labor service units could be assigned
to a project together, with troops doing the initial site preparation and
roughing in a structure and the labor service troops finishing the project.26
Facilities Engineers
Before the creation of the Engineer Command, district engineers,
working under the eleven commanders of military districts in West
Germany, provided support for the military installations used by the U.S.
Army and Air Force. The district commanders in turn had reported to the
Army Area Command in Munich, whose deputy chief of staff for installations had supervised all activities connected with facilities engineering.
After 19661967, district engineers reported to the director of facilities
at ENGCOM headquarters and came under the immediate authority of
the ENGCOM commander, who endorsed their efficiency reports.27 The
engineers liked the centralization of resources in the Engineer Command
because it allowed them to establish uniform criteria for ranking projects
across USAREUR. Moreover, the weight of ENGCOMs authority made
the resources needed to accomplish an approved task more readily available to the district engineer.
The Engineer Command set rationalization and standardization as its
goals. At its recommendation, USAREUR approved a plan for establishing
priorities among competing demands for work on repair and utilities projects. Facilities and activities were divided into four categoriesoperational, tactical, recreational, and administrativeand assigned priority to the
147
2/3/06 11:13:01 AM

first two categories. It then set six levels of urgency within each category,
which helped district engineers prepare annual work plans with some
uniform benchmarks. ENGCOM also set standards for materials used in
repair and replacement, whether the work was done by contract, in-house
personnel, or engineer troops.28
ENGCOMs efforts to centralize decision making and to standardize criteria were similar to the attempt launched in the late 1940s by
EUCOMs chief engineer, Brig. Gen. Don G. Shingler, to centralize planning for maintenance and repair throughout the his command. Like
Shingler, ENGCOM organized mobile technical teams that included electrical, mechanical, and civil engineers. Teams in both periods traveled to
districts to offer assistance at the local level.29
The structure of the Engineer Command allowed its leaders to manage the limited resources available to USAREUR during the 1960s and
early 1970s. The command combined engineer troops, contract authority,
and facilities engineers, thus bringing to military communities in Europe
a range of assets that facilitated effective organization, comprehensive
planning, and standardization. The combination made possible more
effective delivery of engineer services with fewer people and at lower cost
than in the past.30
The Changing Environment in Europe

As Colonel Young worked to establish the Engineer Command,
USAREUR wrestled with two major developments that conditioned its
operations. The first was dramatic and relatively short-lived: Frances decision to leave NATO. The second was the growing American involvement
in Southeast Asia and pressures from within the United States to reduce
the financial drain of a large troop commitment in Europe. This development proved to be more consequential and had longer-lasting effects.
FRELOC Mission
In March 1966 French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew all
French military forces from NATO and stipulated that any foreign forces
remaining on French soil on 1 April 1967 would come under French
military authority and command. Faced with subordination to French
military authority, the United States and other NATO members decided to
relocate their military units from France. The U.S. removal bore the name
Operation FRELOC, for Fast RELOCation.
A major element in the relocation was how to allocate management of
USAREURs stocks and logistical activities, all of which were being concentrated in West Germany. The Communication Zone (COMZ) in France
had handled all logistical and area support for U.S. forces; USAREUR concluded that it should absorb the Army Area Command, which handled
similar functions in Germany from its headquarters in Munich. On 1 July
1967, COMZ headquarters moved from Orleans, France, to Worms, West
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2/3/06 11:13:02 AM
Army engineers built depots like this one in Hanau to store equipment arriving in
Germany as U.S. troops moved out of France.
Germany, and took over the responsibilities of the Army Area Command.
Exactly one year later, with no change of mission, COMZ was redesignated the Theater Army Support Command (TASCOM).31
The redeployment of American personnel and resources from France
in FRELOC involved moving about 30,000 troops and 40,000 civilians
from nearly 200 military installations. Both the Army and the Air Force
required new or expanded facilities to accommodate the units and the
equipment that would be transferred, principally to Belgium and West
Germany. 32 In preparation for constructing new facilities, ENGCOM
dispatched staff members to France. The deputy chief of construction,
Jacques Bouchereau, traveled with cost estimator Hasso Damm to see the
buildings that would be vacated and to estimate the size and probable
cost of replacement facilities.33
One especially tedious project that fell to ENGCOM involved taking inventory, segregating, packaging, and storing pieces of prefabricated buildings that had been dismantled and removed from locations in
France. Command leaders protested that the costs involved would exceed
the value of the materials salvaged, but the order remained in effect. The
first assessment undertaken addressed 302 prefabricated ammunition
storage huts shipped to Karlsruhe. As ENGCOM personnel predicted,
the cost of the work was twice the value of the materials saved. Similar
work indicated that parts from several types of buildings had been mixed
together when they were disassembled and shipped.34
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Initially, USAREUR assigned ENGCOM sixteen construction projects
funded at $18.6 million under the program for Military Construction,
Army. This included $5 million to provide 873,000 square feet of storage
and other support facilities in Germany. To accommodate the supplies
and ammunition stored along the line of communications in France, the
command expanded depot facilities, including controlled-humidity storage warehouses in Germersheim, Nahbollenbach, and Pirmasens. Design
and construction also proceeded on new command facilities in Stuttgart
to accommodate the headquarters staff of the United States European
Command (USEUCOM) and in Worms for COMZ.
The relocation of NATOs Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers,
Europe (SHAPE), to Brussels generated a number of construction projects,
including a house for the supreme allied commander, General Lyman L.
Lemnitzer; a headquarters building; and a school complex for the children
of U.S. military and civilian employees. The Belgians, eager to accommodate the incoming military staffs and families, worked to make it possible
to open the school for the 19671968 academic year.
ENGCOM assigned Bouchereau, deputy chief of construction and
responsible for estimating, as project engineer for the school in Belgium
because of his experience in both engineering and construction and his
fluency in French. To speed decisions, the Department of Defense sent
the assistant secretary for construction, Evan Harrington, to Frankfurt,
where Fraint and his staff rushed to draft design specifications and preliminary floor plans. Harrington approved the basic design on the spot,
and Bouchereau delivered the plans to the Belgian government, which
contracted with an architect-engineer firm to adapt the design to the site.
With the help of a Belgian realtor, Bouchereau located an appropriate
sitean apple orchard outside the small community of Sterrebeek, five
miles from the center of Brusselsand then negotiated for and bought the
property on behalf of the U.S. government.
Clearing began on the site before the Belgian government realized
that Bouchereau had acquired title to the land in fee simple; that is, the
property owner had surrendered absolute possession of the fourteen
acres. Individuals do not exercise sovereignty over their property, but a
country does; thus sovereignty over this property passed with the title
to the United States. It was an oversight the Belgians would not repeat.
In the government-to-government agreements negotiated in 1968, the
Belgian government insisted on a clause specifying that all land used by
the United States for its military forces remain the property of Belgium.
As late as 1992 the acreage on which the American school sat in Sterrebeek
remained the only piece of land in Europe that belonged in full title as
sovereign territory to the United States.
Bouchereau headed the ENGCOM resident office set up in Brussels
to oversee projects in Belgium, including the school complex and a dental clinic to be built at the same site. The school complex had to be made
completely self-sufficient, with a heating plant, transformer station, water
chlorinating station, and sewage plant. The school complex consisted of
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a two-story elementary school; a high school building; a gymnasium; a
sports field; and a one-story structure combining administrative offices,
cafeteria, library, kitchen, and shops. The final design for the school was
completed in two months. A Dutch company, Strabed, began construction
in July 1967 and used 55,000 square feet of prefabricated reinforced concrete panels to hold construction costs to $1.6 million. The school opened
in October.35
New construction for the relocation also involved creating a headquarters facility for the U.S. European Command, which since 1954 had
been located in France with SHAPE. When SHAPE moved to Belgium,
USEUCOM moved to Stuttgart and the Seventh Army headquarters
moved to Heidelberg to share space with USAREUR. ENGCOM also managed the construction of the command center for USEUCOM at Patch
Barracks in Stuttgart.
The command and control centerinformally referred to as C2 (Csquared)was a three-story building with wings to the east and to the
west constructed with a welded steel frame and reinforced concrete. For
reasons of physical and electronic security, the main building, 54,370
square feet of floor space, had only one window. The electronic equipment
needed for intelligence work and to exercise command and control was
housed on the first floor and shielded to prevent hostile monitoring of
electromagnetic signals. The main building also featured a two-story situation room with a command balcony and an eight-screen projection wall
furnished with the most sophisticated audiovisual equipment available.
The west wing contained the computers that processed intelligence information. The east wing contained the support systems. Pneumatic tubes
connected all the stations within the building and other sites in the headquarters complex. To accommodate heavy demand for electronic support,
the facility was equipped with two backup diesel generators.36
Design for the C2 project began in November 1966; ground was broken on 10 May 1967; and by 13 October ENGCOM and USEUCOM celebrated the roofing-in of the building with a Richtfest, the old German
construction ceremony. The C2 Richtfest honored the construction crews,
which included men from seven nations, and the engineers, all of whom
had worked sixty-hour weeks to enclose the structure before winter. The
workers installed the heating plant ahead of schedule, so work continued
uninterrupted throughout the winter. John Shadday oversaw the project
for ENGCOM. USEUCOMs liaison officer for the project was an infantry
colonel who insisted that the military users make prompt decisions and
drove them by threatening to make the decisions for them if they delayed.
The center became operational in July 1968, eliciting commendations for
ENGCOM for rapid completion of the project.37
On 31 March 1967, eight hours before de Gaulles deadline, U.S. forces
completed the evacuation of personnel and materiel from France. With
the approval of the French, a small residual force remained behind to
complete the liquidation of U.S. assets and to support U.S. dependents
authorized to remain until the end of the school year or until completion
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of facilities in Belgium. By the end of 1967 the U.S. Army had closed all
installations in France except facilities associated with the oil pipeline.
Under agreements negotiated in April 1967, the pipeline remained available for both American and French use. Civilian contractors operated the
facility, and the French government provided security. The United States
retained the right to inspect the pipeline, accompanied by French officials,
four times a year.38
The work that resulted from the movement of U.S. forces was not
over once the troops were relocated. Nor was all of it as satisfying as
the American school in Belgium or the command and control center for
USEUCOM in Stuttgart. Still, Colonel Young was proud of his commands
efforts. We really did a great job. Because we had put everybody, all
the engineers, under one commander we could move fast and effectively in using resources.39
Rethinking the Commitment to Europe

While ENGCOM struggled to integrate the various engineer
resources into an effective command and responded to the challenges
of FRELOC, political pressures in the United States mounted that would
influence Army engineer activities for many years. Since the beginning
of the 1960s the United States carried a balance-of-payments deficit
with the Federal Republic of Germany, prompting a growing American
political sentiment that the Germans ought to bear a greater share of
the financial burden for their own defense. Senator Mike Mansfield
(D-Montana) advanced this argument in August 1966 when he first
introduced his Sense of the Senate Resolution calling for a reduction
in U.S. forces in Germany. For the next several years the call to remove
U.S. troops from Germany sounded annually in the Senate, intensified
by the increasing burden of the conflict in Vietnam. These pressures
led the Department of Defense to withdraw about 35,000 U.S. troops
and 28,000 dependents from Germany between late 1967 and the end
of 1968. The West German government, although nervous about the
troop withdrawals, acquiesced.40
Concerned that the withdrawals not send a message of weakness or
lack of resolve to either the Europeans or the Soviets, the Department
of Defense devised a strategy called dual basing. Under this arrangement troops stationed in the United States would be airlifted each year
for training in West Germany with NATO army groups. The REFORGER
(REturn of FORces to GERmany) exercises were designed both to enhance
the military capabilities of the U.S. and allied forces and to reassure the
NATO participants of the firm U.S. commitment to the alliance.41
While the withdrawals took place and U.S. defense planners initiated REFORGER, the West German government accepted an arrangement to
help offset the costs of the U.S. military presence in Germany by buying
$500 million in medium-term treasury certificates. The arrangements to
fund modernization of facilities used by the U.S. military represented one
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additional effort in a long line of offset agreements. Undertaken by the
West German government, these arrangements became a recurring part
of USAREURs operations and provided substantial Deutschmark (DM)
funds for military construction during the 1970s. (See below in this chapter,
as well as Chapter 11.)
Workload and Funding

ENGCOM applied the combined resources of troop construction,
contract construction, and facilities engineering to manage work under
the NATO Common Infrastructure Program, a full array of military construction for the Army on projects ranging from airfields to schools to
washracks, and work under the Alternate Construction Program.
In summer 1968 ENGCOM had more than 400 active projects with an
estimated value of $198 million under contract in various stages of design
and construction. Forty contracts were for Air Force projects and seven
for NATO infrastructure projects; twenty contracts represented facilities
under the Alternate Construction Program with funds provided by the
Federal Republic of Germany.42 Army construction occupied the largest
percentage of ENGCOMs efforts, a total of ninety-two projects with an
estimated value of over $20 million.43 (See Table 3.)
Troop construction under ENGCOM accounted for 196 projects that
had a value of only $5.7 million. This did not include the operation and
maintenance work performed by troops in support of the district and
community (post) engineers. Although the dollar value of this work was
low, the involvement of troops in construction gave the command flexibility in carrying out its mission.44
Dozens of ENGCOM construction projects qualified for funding under
the NATO Common Infrastructure Program. These projects included
some of the facilities built in Belgium to accommodate the move of NATO
headquarters from France; many of the Hawk missile sites built in the
1960s and 1970s; aircraft shelters; and facilities for U.S. forces assigned to
NATO in Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.45
During the 1950s the United States had willingly advanced the money
for the construction of military facilities rather than waiting for NATO
budgetary approval. In the 1960s the practice of prefinancing declined,
because of U.S. concern about gold outflow and the financial demands of
the Vietnam War. The U.S. government wanted NATO to finance infrastructure projects from the start, but the NATO funding process involved
long and very complicated negotiations to get the unanimous approval of
the NATO member states required for each project.
In 1969 ENGCOM established a branch in the Office of the Comptroller
to recover funds from NATO for projects that had been prefinanced with
U.S. dollars. Headed by an American civilian, the NATO Recoupment
Branch initially included three German civilians, although this number grew as the volume of work increased. The work of this group was
enormously complicated by a fire in November 1968 when papers were
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Table 3
Military Construction for the Army
June 1968
Project Type
Operational facilities
Commercial facilities
Maintenance
Storage
Airfields (Army)
Number
10
31
1
15
9
Administrative and community
26
Total
92
Source: Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 June 1968.
charred, damaged by water, or lost entirely. The recoupment staff had to

develop regulations, policies, and procedures to govern its work. They
also had to pay painstaking attention to detail and complete numerous
NATO forms. It took years before the staffs efforts led to the recovery of
significant amounts of money.46
ENGCOM also discharged the task of developing and negotiating
all the alternate construction agreements for USAREUR. Once Germany
and the United States signed an agreement, ENGCOM provided the
German construction agency, the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical
Construction Working Group), with a scope of work on which to base
design and construction. Lower-echelon offices such as the Landesabteilung
(State Construction Division) or the Finanzbauamt (Office of Finance for
Construction) eventually produced preliminary designs for review by
ENGCOMs Engineering Directorate, a construction contract, and a finished project. The process involved two parallel operations: a contract
between ENGCOM and the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe and then contracts
between the Finanzbauamt and an architect-engineer firm (for design) and
a contractor (for construction). The process demanded significant staff
time.47
All of ENGCOMs programs involved real estate. To monitor this
dimension of the projects, the command maintained a Real Estate Division
with regional offices covering Germany, France, Italy (excluding Naples
and Sicily), and the Benelux countries. After the relocation of U.S. forces
from France, responsibilities there consisted only of leases with private
French contractors to manage and operate the petroleum pipeline that the
United States had built across France.48
Securing real estate became an ever more difficult task. West
Germanys booming economy, the presence of armed forces from several
nations, and a growing environmental sensitivity all created pressures on
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land use. During the early 1970s continued talk in the U.S. Senate about
reducing forces in Europe, as well as meetings of the major powers to
discuss detente in international politics, also made it difficult for many
Germans to understand why the Americans needed more land.49 By 1973
the Real Estate Division was hampered by having German employees in
positions where a familiarity with U.S. policies, procedures, and concepts
constituted major criteria for the work. ENGCOM lacked the funds to discharge its real estate mission. Indeed, it faced a budget gap for fiscal year
1974 of $115,000 just to cover the salaries of existing staff.50
Projects
The pressures created by Operation FRELOC strained the Engineer
Commands capabilities; but the elements drawn into the new command worked effectively together, and Young won the confidence of the
employees. General OMeara, who left USAREUR in March 1967, pressed
to have Young promoted to brigadier general, intending that he remain as
ENGCOM commander.51 Youngs name appeared on the promotion list,
but he did not remain in Europe. The chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Frederick
J. Clarke, selected him to organize the new Huntsville Division of the
Corps of Engineers, which was to design and construct the Sentinel/
Safeguard ballistic missile systems. Young was promoted to brigadier
general in September 1967 and left Europe the next month.52
Youngs successor as commander, Kenneth W. Kennedy,
was also on the August 1967
promotion list, but he arrived
in Germany on October 17 as
a colonel. Kennedy had served
two tours in repairs and utilities positions; ENGCOM was
his first assignment in Central
Europe. Kennedys promotion to
brigadier general came in March
1968.53
The Boiler Conversion Program

Upon assuming command,
Colonel Kennedy immediately
received directions to give high
priority to a specific problem.
On his first day in Germany, he
received a message from General
James H. Polk, OMearas successor as commander in chief
of USAREUR, instructing him
General Kennedy (right) with Chief of

Engineers Lt. Gen. William F. Cassidy in
June 1968
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to make a special effort to improve troop facilities. Ten days later the
USAREUR engineer, Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, wrote Kennedy about the
heating systems in the barracks. An attachment to Kelleys letter bore
the typed message, It can be expected that the commander in chief will
verify completion status during field trips throughout the command.
To that Kelley added the handwritten note, Strong CINC [commander in
chief] interest!54 The need to modernize heating equipment in American
facilities in Europe was the first of several major maintenance problems that
Kennedy faced.
Most of the buildings used by U.S. troops since the occupation
had been built for the German Army before World War II; many of
them dated back to the turn of the century. Heating equipment in the
facilities dated from the 1930s. By the 1960s the cast-iron boiler design
typical of these systems was antiquated, and repairs were difficult and
expensive. Although the boilers were designed to burn Ruhr coal, by
the early 1960s they were all fired with anthracite coal imported from
the United States, which had different mineral properties. Political pressures from the American coal lobby and economic pressures over the
outflow of gold reserves from the U.S. Treasury combined to persuade
President John F. Kennedy to order the U.S. Army to use American
coal in Europe. Kennedys presidential order added about $1 million a
year to USAREURs maintenance budget and, because the anthracite
coalowing to its propertiesburned poorly in the German boilers,
further decreased the efficiency of the existing heating systems. Because
USAREUR consistently received inadequate money for routine maintenance, the equipment continued to deteriorate. In 1964 the Engineer
Element had proposed converting to oil-burning furnaces throughout
Germany. The Department of the Army rejected the proposal but suggested that USAREUR submit requests to convert individual heating
plants.55
In addition to the boilers, the military in Europe also used hundreds
of single-room coal-fired space heaters to warm troop billets, latrines,
mess halls, and work areas. In September 1964 USAREUR authorized a
repair by replacement plan to systematically eliminate all space heaters over a five-year period. In March 1967 General OMeara declared that
he wanted the job completed before the next winter. In addition to being
inefficient, the space heaters were a major cause of fires in European
buildings.56
Kenneth Kennedy inherited a replacement plan for space heaters but
had no comparable plan for replacing the central heating boilers. In fact,
ENGCOM did not even have an accurate count of how many boilers the
military operated. Kennedy therefore ordered an inventory of almost 800
U.S. installations and learned that the military operated some 10,000 lowpressure boilers of various capacities. The equipment included forty-four
different German makes and models, 90 percent of them outmoded.57
With this new information, ENGCOM launched a plan early in 1968 to
modernize all heating equipment used in USAREUR installations. The
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command centralized approval
of boiler replacement and used
salvage stock on hand, including
oil-fired boilers recovered from
France during FRELOC to replace
worn-out coal-burning boilers in
Germany.58
Coal-fired boilers had the
additional disadvantage of being
labor-intensive in a scarce labor
market. Because coal-fired boilers needed to be stoked, they
required 60 percent more hours
of labor than oil-fired boilers.
The ENGCOM roster l isted
5,000 boiler-firemen, jobs filled
primarily by Germans. The
older German firemen who had
worked since the 1940s were
retiring by the late 1960s, and
Coal-fired boilers, like this one at Warner
few younger men wanted the
Barracks
in Bamberg, were prevalent in the
backbreaking job. Budgetary
1960s and 1970s.
pressures persuaded Kennedy
to mandate that the number
of Germans on his payroll be reduced by 20 percent. To achieve the
reduction and still keep the boilers heated, Kennedy persuaded Polk in
September 1968 to allow the use of troops to fuel the boiler fires.59
ENGCOM personnel were not surprised when inexperienced troops
damaged the antiquated boilers. Once damaged, a coal-burning boiler
automatically became eligible for replacement with an oil-burning boiler.
Replacing the old German boilers with steel boilers manufactured in the
United States increased efficiency and economy in heating, eliminated the
need for firemen, helped the American balance of payments, modernized
heating facilities, and reduced long-term expenditures for maintenance.60
The 6970th LS/CLG played a key role in the entire program to convert heating plants. Kennedy organized U.S. soldiers into teams to work
with the labor service units. By April 1970 ENGCOM had thirteen boiler
conversion teams in the field, nine made up of enlisted men on loan
from USAREUR troop units.61 The teams made good progress, but cuts in
ENGCOMs maintenance budget and a congressionally mandated moratorium on conversion to oil-burning boilers imposed on 12 October 1972
made completion of the program impossible.62 The program had converted less than half of the 8,755 boilers still in use when it was suspended.63
In 1972 Kennedys successor had to procure a small stock of U.S.-manufactured coal-fired boilers to replace those that inevitably broke down. In
late 1973, in the face of the oil crisis brought on by the Arab-Israeli War,
USAREURs staff considered converting back to coal.64
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Stem to Stern Renovations
The high priority that General Polk placed on boiler conversion only
highlighted the antiquated state of the facilities out of which the U.S. military operated in Germany. The newest buildings, constructed specifically
to accommodate the augmentation of U.S. forces in the early 1950s, had
been designed as temporary structures. Built to austerity standards, with
a life expectancy from five to fifteen years, they were at the end of their
functional usefulness. The balance of the facilities, taken over from the
German military, dated from before 1939 and was even more run down.
For years USAREUR had lacked the money and the personnel for
routine building maintenance. The repair and utilities budget equaled the
programmed requirements in only one year between 1956 and 1964; the
engineers could not even maintain the minimum standards prescribed by
Army regulations.65 As resources increasingly flowed to Vietnam, facilities in Europe deteriorated further. While the Pacific Theater spent $523
per square foot for repair and utilities and posts in the continental United
States averaged $384 per square foot, USAREUR had only $193 per square
foot for Germany.66
By the late 1960s troop barracks in Europe were in shockingly deplorable condition. Electrical systems and heating equipment failed regularly.
The high mineral content of the water clogged the plumbing systems, frequently leading to broken pipes. Mildew was rampant in the dank shower
rooms. Latrines drained through piping embedded in masonry walls.
When a leak developed in a latrine pipe, the entire barracks smelled of
urine. One officer recalled wryly, you never had to tell the new recruits
where the latrines were. [Conditions were] worse than a prison.67
In March 1966, to address the worst casernes, General OMeara had
earmarked about $5 million of year-end funds for use by the Engineer
Element. Because the Army engineers received the funds late in the fiscal
year, they had no chance to plan the repairs or to target the most critical
situations. As a result, only eleven casernes received piecemeal attention.68
General Kennedy resolved to attack the problem more systematically, and he developed a plan to renovate troop barracks and mess halls
sequentially. When he discussed the plan with one of the colonels in the
USAREUR engineers office in Heidelberg, the officer agreed that the
command needed to repair barracks and casernes from stem to stern,
a characterization that became the label for the program.69 To launch the
Stem to Stern program, ENGCOM asked the district engineers to assemble data on their facilities and prepare plans to renovate latrines, showers,
and mess halls. To keep costs down, he instructed them to use their own
in-house design capabilities. Kennedy then committed year-end funds
from fiscal 1967 to carry out these plans.70
The construction engineers from ENGCOM headquarters conducted a
complete survey of Sullivan Barracks in Mannheim, and Kennedy ordered
labor service troops to gut the buildingreplumb, rewire, and rebuild it
floor by floor.71 ENGCOMs Engineering Directorate identified Lucas and
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Associates in Rome as an architect-engineer firm with experience doing
work on repair and utilities for the military. In January 1968 ENGCOM
contracted with this firm to survey six other casernesthree from the
Seventh Armys V Corps area and three from VII Corpsand prepare
designs for their complete renovation. With year-end funds from fiscal
year 1968, ENGCOM began renovating four casernes. ENGCOM signed a
second contract with Lucas to survey another nine casernes.72
By December 1968 the Stem to Stern program was far enough along
that, ironically, Kennedy began to get criticism about its slowness. The
commanding general of V Corps complained about the slow pace of work
in his area, but Kennedy replied that projects in V Corps were the first to
be let for construction. He explained that to take advantage of year-end
funds, surveys of conditions, design, and the award of $6 million in contracts had to be completed in only four months. The Armys program to
limit the outflow of U.S. gold also required contractors to order such items
as floor tiles from the United States, further delaying the work. Despite
these problems, Kennedy cited progress on the mess halls at Rivers
Barracks in Giessen and at McPheeters Barracks in Bad Hersfeld and on
four barracks buildings at Downs Barracks in Fulda.73 Kennedy hoped
that commanders would understand that a systematic program such as
Stem to Stern meant that at some point all facilities would be renovated.
Of course, the U.S. military operated nearly 800 installations throughout
Germany. At the rate of threeor even tena year, it could be a long
wait.
As work under the Stem to Stern program continued, the ENGCOM
staff codified their experiences. Kennedy asked the design engineers to
prepare standard plans and specifications room by room so that the plans
could be given to district and community (post) engineers for adaptation
at any facility. ENGCOM headquarters also prepared lists of materials for
faster and more accurate procurement. These standardizations had only
limited value, because buildings varied from caserne to caserne and even
within a single caserne.74
With the war in Southeast Asia continuing, money remained a problem for ENGCOM. By early 1969 the backlog of essential maintenance
and repair reached $150 million, and Kennedy expected a reduction in
the ENGCOM budget for fiscal year 1970. The staff continued to dwindle,
making it difficult even to maintain the utility systems in place.75
Given the process for financing Stem to Stern work, ENGCOM could
not make the best use of the money it received. Most of the money came
at the end of the year from segments of USAREUR that wanted to commit
unspent money before it reverted to the U.S. Treasury. ENGCOM always
had a backlog of unfinanced projects, but it received the supplementary
money very near the end of the fiscal year (30 June). This timing meant
that the summer construction season was already well under way, activity
was intense, and prices for contracts were correspondingly high. Year-end
dollars thus produced fewer improvements than the command could have
gained if it could have placed contracts during the winter.76
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By the end of fiscal year 1969, the program had undertaken work at
seventy-seven barracks buildings and nineteen mess halls, less than 10
percent of the facilities that needed attention. Nine months later, by the
spring of 1970, Stem to Stern had spent $32 million for projects at about
twenty casernes. Kennedy estimated that, at the current rate of repair, correcting two decades of neglect would take at least another fifteen years.
He calculated that the program would require an additional $240 million
for standard renovation and an additional $333 million to improve supporting utility systems. Kennedy readily acknowledged that Congress
was unlikely to approve the money, certainly not until the permanency
of U.S. forces in Germany is settled once and for all.77 It is startling in retrospect to realize that, after twenty-five years of the U.S. military presence
in Germany, permanency remained an issue.
The Stem to Stern program and the deplorable conditions in the barracks began to attract attention in Washington. On a command visit in the
spring of 1971, the Army chief of staff, General William C. Westmoreland,
inspected renovated barracks. After the tour Westmoreland turned to
Kennedy and asked, Why dont you do this faster?78 At one point the
general saw huge quantities of black smoke belching from the heating
plant at Ferris Barracks in Erlangen. The scene convinced him of the need
for remedial action, and he directed that ENGCOM convert the heating plant from coal to oil in spite of existing congressional restrictions.
Within weeks of Westmorelands visit, ENGCOM received orders from
USAREURs deputy commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Arthur S. Collins, Jr.:
As a first priority undertake a massive project for the rehabilitation of
troop facilities to include messhalls [sic], sanitary facilities, and heating.79
Between June 1968 and April 1972 USAREUR put more than $50 million
into ENGCOMs Stem to Stern program.80
TAB VEE Program

A third priority program for ENGCOM grew out of experiences in
Vietnam and in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 that highlighted the vulnerability of aircraft parked on the ground. If the Soviet Union launched
an attack, even conventional weapons could destroy a good portion of
American air power in Europe. The Air Force therefore initiated a new
building program that ENGCOM managed. Called TAB VEE (Theater Air
Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise), the program aimed to improve
runways and provide shelter for aircraft at air bases in Germany, Holland,
and Turkey.81 The designers assigned one fighter aircraft to each hangar,
which consisted of simply constructed concrete walls on three sides and
a slightly arched concrete roof. The hangars did not have doors, but they
were located in a nonuniform pattern to minimize flak and blast damage.
Earthen berms were placed against the walls in some instances, and roofs
were painted in camouflage colors.82
TAB VEE construction began as a crash program in June 1968. The
first projects involved improvements to the pavement in Ramstein,
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2/3/06 11:13:06 AM

Bitburg, and Hahn. Seven months after the start, the first aircraft shelters began to go up at Ramstein Air Base. By late 1968 the Air Force had
won strong support in Washington for TAB VEE, and the estimate for
future construction placement under the program jumped from $10 million to $50 million for fiscal year 1969. At that volume it constituted more
than 60 percent of ENGCOMs scheduled construction placement for the
year. TAB VEE remained a high-volume project for all of 1968 and 1969.
It contributed to a record-breaking workload in design for February 1969,
embracing 153 projects and an estimated construction cost of $129 million.83 By January 1971 the TAB VEE program had accounted for $64.6 million in construction contracts for work at air bases in Ramstein, Sembach,
Bitburg, Spangdahlem, Hahn, Erding, and Zweibrcken in Germany;
Soesterberg in Holland; Aviano in Italy; and Incirlik in Turkey. By April
1972 ENGCOM had constructed 324 TAB VEE aircraft shelters.84
In high-priority programs such as TAB VEE it is commonplace to award
contracts before final drawings and specifications are available. Although
accustomed to that practice, the engineers still found the Air Forces initial specifications for TAB VEE distressingly imprecise. Furthermore,
the requirements changed frequently as the program progressed, delaying completion dates and escalating costs.85 ENGCOMs Construction
Directorate had to respond to the Air Forces objections to these delays at
the same time that it tried to maintain surveillance over construction projects and manage the indirect contracting. When the Air Force complained
about the charges that ENGCOM levied to manage the program, General
Kennedy flew to Washington to explain the complexities of indirect contracting and to defend ENGCOMs management of the program.86
ENGCOM Headquarters
An unexpected event interrupted ENGCOMs activities. In midNovember 1968 the two-story wood-frame building that housed command headquarters burned to the ground.87 Built immediately after the
war on the grounds of the I. G. Farben complex in Frankfurt, Annex B
was designed with a central spine and six wings off the back of the spine.
Although up to four people shared an office, every room had a window
and trees surrounded the building. Some staff considered it a pleasant
working environment; many regarded the building as a firetrap.
In November 1967 there had been a fire on the first floor beneath
Kennedys office. Flames burned through the floor between stories, and
the desk used by Kennedys sergeant major fell through to the floor below.
After the fire was extinguished, gas cans were found in the area. Kennedy
and others suspected arson, but there was no proof.88
A year later contractors were performing routine maintenance in the
building. About 8:00 P.M. on 13 November, Kennedy received the news at
his residence in Bad Vilbel of a fire. When he arrived at ENGCOM headquarters, one end of the building was blazing; fire fighters from Frankfurt
had an inadequate supply of water and were losing the battle to extin161
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guish the flames. As the fire burned, Kennedy and other staff members
ran ahead of the flames, throwing files and office equipment out the windows. Local newspapers called it the biggest fire in Frankfurt since World
War II. By 4:00 A.M. the building was gone; workers who arrived in the
morning saw only the shell.
A skeleton staff crowded into a few rooms in V Corps headquarters
and hurriedly arranged to lease an abandoned four-story factory building
near the Messe (market building) in Frankfurt as temporary headquarters.
Labor service troops cleaned the leased building and installed new boilers
so operations could continue.
Kennedy wanted a new building for the command. USAREURs commander, General Polk, was skeptical that the Department of the Army
would approve funds. To make his case, Kennedy flew to Washington
and met with the chief of engineers and officials at the Pentagon. They
approved a new building that was somewhat smaller than Kennedy had
wanted. Jacques Bouchereau coordinated design and construction of the
building, a three-story rectangular design featuring large open spaces and
few private offices. German contractors were encouraged to do something good for Engineer Command in calculating costs.89 The completed
building of pre-cast concrete cost about $12 per square foot, a reasonable
rate at the time.
Groundbreaking for the new headquarters was held on Thursday,
3 July 1969. Building 31 was completed, except for outside paving and
landscaping, on 15 January 1970. The day after an opening ceremony the
staff moved in. For the first time the Army engineers in Europe had a new
building that they did not share with any other organization.
Ammunition Storage Projects

One of the programs that continued under ENGCOM involved safe
storage for ammunition. Attention to ammunition storage intensified as
economic and demographic pressures moved the German population
closer to U.S. military facilities.90 By early 1968 seven storage projects
approved as a part of the NATO budget for 1963 had reached varying
stages of completion. One site remained behind the rest because of problems between the Federal Republic and the state of Hesse concerning the
real estate rights for an access road.91 Work on ammunition storage sites
frequently involved removing and disposing of old ammunition, an operation that the German government insisted on controlling and for which
its officials could find only one willing contractor.92
Incidents of terrorism in West Germany in the early 1970s prompted
both NATO and the United States to consider the vulnerability of their
ammunition storage facilities and to launch a program to improve security. The 59th Ordnance Brigade, commanded by Maj. Daniel Waldo, Jr.,
surveyed the storage sites in Europe north of the Alps and recommended
installation of new security towers and fences. In late 1972 ENGCOMs
commander anticipated needing $1 million in fiscal year 1973 to address
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the critical requirements identified by the Ordnance Brigades surveys.
When planning began for the fiscal year 1974 budget, the command projected a construction program of nearly $13 million. Construction would
extend into fiscal year 1977 and equip fifty-one sites with anti-intrusion
devices, special fencing, guard towers, and lighting. The program, which
continued to grow after 1974, was subsequently labeled the Long Range
Security Program.93
Challenges in the 1970s

General Kennedy completed his tour as commander of the Engineer
Command in June 1971 and retired. His successor, Brig. Gen. Carroll
N. LeTellier, a graduate of the Citadel, had served in Germany between
1956 and 1959 and again in 1966 and 1967 when he commanded the 10th
Engineer Battalion in Kitzingen.94 ENGCOMs first commander, Colonel
Young (later Major General), recruited LeTellier to replace the retiring
Col. A. Darby Williams as deputy commander and chief of contract construction of ENGCOM. LeTellier arrived in Frankfurt in October 1967, just
as Young was leaving. LeTellier served first as chief of the Construction
Directorate of ENGCOM and then from May to August 1968 as director of troop operations. In August 1968 LeTellier volunteered for a tour
in Vietnam. In June 1971 he was promoted to brigadier general; the next
month he assumed command of ENGCOM.95
When LeTellier returned to ENGCOM as commander, he found an
organization that had more than 570 design and construction projects
General LeTellier and His Staff in the Early 1970s

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with an in-place construction value of $434 million. The Vietnam War,
budget restrictions, and difficulties in recruiting, however, had reduced
the workforce to about 19,000 (a drop of about 2,000).96
The command continued to face strong outside criticism. Community
commanders still resented having to go outside their own staff for
approval of construction on their installations. LeTellier believed strongly
in ENGCOMs centralized authority and in its consolidation of engineer
resources. To counter the criticism and promote a more positive self-image
within ENGCOM, LeTellier used the commands fifth anniversary as the
occasion to set up an ad hoc committee to review the past and project a
five-year plan. He observed that ENGCOM had developed habits and
procedures through managing one crisis after another, sudden releases
and sudden withdrawals of funds, [and] continuous reorganization studies involving roles and missions.97 LeTellier hoped that the long-range
plan would help the command move beyond crisis management.
During 19651972 ENGCOMs overall workload and the numbers of
staff increased. (Table 4) By early 1972 ENGCOM had more than thirty
NATO infrastructure projects under design, including missile installations, radio relay stations for the Nike and Hawk systems, special ammunition storage sites, controlled-humidity storage warehouses, and tactical
and training sites. Ten other infrastructure projects with a value of about
$2 million were already under construction.98
Between 1967 and 1970 the Alternate Construction Program, funded
by the Federal Republic, had grown from $3.4 million to $11.8 million annually. In 1972 seven alternate construction projects were under
design, including housing units in Mainz, Frth, and Katterbach (near
Table 4
Engineer Command Construction Placement and Staffing
19651972
Placement and
Personnel
Placement
($ million)
1965*
1966*
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
26.0
30.0
19.9
20.0
48.2
75.7
69.7
100.0
77
82
87
92
93
104
127
141
Temporary duty
27
25
20
Temporary and
over-strength
32
40
47
Staff (actual)
Source: EUD Graphics file

*Work conducted by the Engineer Element.
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Nuremberg); an access road near Giessen; and an airfield in Bonames
near Frankfurt. Another thirty active construction projects had a value of
about $31 million.
Modernizing U.S. Facilities

By early 1972 ENGCOM managed nearly thirty separate construction programs.99 One of the newest and largest was renovation of U.S.
military facilities paid for by the Federal Republic of Germany. 100 From
1945 until the activation of the Engineer Command more than twenty
years later, improving facilities used by U.S. forces had low priority
because of scarce resources and the predilection of local commanders
for high-visibility projects. LeTellier termed the inclination of commanders for projects that showed visible results during their tours
the eighteen-month syndrome. Plumbing, wiring, heating plants,
and sewage linesinvisible maintenance projects that failed to garner
much notice and thus little credit for anyonereceived little attention.
The Stem to Stern program tried to address these mundane needs,
but it took care of one caserne at a time, with never enough money to
improve more than a small fraction of the casernes in any one year.
LeTellier called it a never catch up program.101
On 10 December 1971, the United States signed an accord with the
Federal Republic whereby the West German government agreed as part
of the burden sharing to contribute DM 600 million for the renovation of
U.S. military facilities in West Germany (almost $170 million at the official exchange rate). The agreement for Modernization of U.S. Facilities
(MOUSF) formed part of the recurrent West German effort to respond
to pressures from the United States to offset the costs of the American
military presence. Of the DM 600 million made available by the West
German government, DM 576 million, or 96 percent, was designated for
USAREUR. As a result, ENGCOM had two similar programs to administer simultaneouslyStem to Stern, which used dollars from USAREURs
budget for Operations and Maintenance, Army, and MOUSF, which was
funded with Deutschmarks.102
The Army engineers had far more freedom in using MOUSF money
than in using appropriated dollars.103 The congressional mandate that halted the conversion of boiler/heaters from coal to oil under Stem to Stern,
for instance, did not apply to MOUSF work. Starting in 1972 the Federal
Republic began renovating boilers and heating plants in accordance with
specifications and technical instructions supplied by ENGCOM.104 The distinction between dollar-funded and Deutschmark-funded work remained
important into the 1990s. Improvements funded by dollars have residual
value. As the U.S. military turned facilities over to the Germans, the U.S.
government could claim compensation for dollar-funded improvements
but not for improvements made under the MOUSF program.105
Payments for work contracted in Deutschmarks were complicated
by the changes in the international system of exchange rates for cur165
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rencies. In early August 1971 the United States abandoned gold payment on foreign-held dollars; and the value of the dollar on international money markets suddenly dropped, meaning that the dollar
bought considerably less in German money or services. By 16 August
ENGCOMs comptroller, Lt. Col. John L. Buxton, had calculated that
the command needed an additional $1.5 million to cover the increase
in outstanding obligations and commitments associated with the
decline in the dollars value.106 A second difficulty arose from the
Army regulation that ENGCOM had to convert any money that it held
into dollars. Because of this requirement, the command lost money
twice when settlement of the obligation would be in Deutschmarks
once on the exchange from marks to dollars and again on the exchange
from dollars back to marks to pay the bill. Buxtons deputy, Randolph
S. Washington, proposed creating a limited deposit account for marks
in a local bank; ENGCOM could use that account to pay German contractors doing work under any program that involved only marks.
LeTellier supported the idea, and ENGCOM opened an account despite
resistance in Washington.107
The tempo of modernization of facilities increased and came to represent the dominant program during most of General LeTelliers command.
By April 1972 ENGCOM had managed the partial renovation of 226 barracks and 26 mess halls under Stem to Stern and had placed contracts for
another 160 barracks and 31 mess halls. In the first two years of MOUSF,
the command completed designs on 283 barracks and 91 mess halls and
awarded contracts for the renovation of 77 barracks. Designs were ready
on another set of contracts for work on 251 more barracks and 74 mess
halls under a later phase of MOUSF.108
ENGCOM quickly initiated the renovations supported by MOUSF
funds using available designs prepared under the Stem to Stern program.
Construction on the first MOUSF project began in January 1972, just twentytwo working days after the agreement was signed. Saul Fraint, chief of
technical engineering, established procedures for the program, coordinated
design development, and worked with installation personnel on construction schedules. Two architect-engineer firms (Louis Berger with offices in
Frankfurt and McGahey, Marshall, and McMillan with offices in Italy) were
the principal designers.109
The MOUSF program, which concentrated on barracks and dining
facilities, did more extensive renovations than Stem to Stern, including suspending acoustical ceilings in dining facilities; completing new
shower and latrine facilities; and installing partitions in buildings,
facilities for washers and dryers at a ratio of one per thirty soldiers,
and mail boxes. Utility systems were totally replaced. The dining halls
received all new equipment, funded with dollars and purchased in the
United States to help counter the unfavorable balance of payments. To
minimize disruption for the troops who continued to live and work
at the casernes during the renovations, supervisors and contractors
had to maintain a continuous supply of utilities and shift the men and
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their equipment from one facility to another as the renovations progressed.110
As the work under MOUSF increased, Stem to Stern tapered off;
in 1974 the program ended officially. As the money made available in
December 1971 was progressively committed, design for future MOUSF
projects also began to slow. In late April 1974 a second MOUSF agreement
between the United States and the Federal Republic made DM 600 million
available for additional renovations ($203 million at the official exchange
rate); USAREUR received DM 503 million, about 84 percent.111
Upgrading Remote Sites

Attention shifted in the 1970s to U.S. military sites located in remote
areas. These installations included communications sites (listening posts),
monitoring stations along strategic borders, and missile-launching sites.
Generally, the locations were secret as well as remote. Both staff and materials usually had to be flown in by helicopter, and regulations prohibited
the ENGCOM staff from taking photos of the construction. The sites were
small and their facilities sparse: a building for living quarters, sometimes
a separate dining facility; warehouses or preparation buildings; and concrete slabs at the missile launching sites. In some locations a perimeter
fence was not necessary. Initially, many sites did not have commercial
power.112
Located as they were, these installations were not part of a community and did not have a network of support. ENGCOM tried to furnish
them with modular prefabricated structures that could be transported by
helicopter and assembled in a variety of configurations, depending on site
conditions and need. Starting in 1968, ENGCOM began erecting low-cost
prefabricated structures from Yugoslavia. On eight sites for the armored
cavalry stationed around Fulda, ENGCOM erected twenty-five buildings.
The work was deemed minor construction, and each project had a limit
of $25,000. To stay within budget, ENGCOM eliminated floor tiles, paint,
and other items considered optional. This sort of expedient compromise
produced facilities sufficient to complete the mission but severe enough to
prompt complaints from the users once the sense of urgency had passed.
In the first half of 1973, MOUSF money became available to improve
thirty-five remote sites. ENGCOM solicited bids through the Bautechnische
Arbeitsgruppe for prefabricated buildings at several sites; other sites called
for construction to be done by labor service units and engineer troops.
The improvements included barracks, dining facilities, administrative
buildings, recreational facilities, portable toilets where there were no
residents, and construction of external sewage and water supply systems.
MOUSF made $16 million available to ENGCOM to acquire relocatable,
prefabricated, air-transportable units and to install them and the utilities
to support them. By the end of 1973 work had begun at several sites, but
almost 90 percent of the 302 remote sites remained to be upgraded under
later programs.113
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The Phaseout
Consolidation of engineer resources under ENGCOM continued to
meet resistance into the 1970s. The negative attitude emanated from the
staff at USAREUR headquarters, commanders of military communities, TASCOM, and Washington. In August 1968 a member of a systems
analysis team from the Office of the Secretary of Defense remarked on
the general difficulties that were being experienced in accepting the
Engineer Command.114 Continuing skepticism and outright hostilityoften cloaked in data and presented in lengthy studiescould be
traced to three facts. First, community commanders in USAREUR resented ENGCOMs authority over engineer resources that had been available
to them previously for work on their installations. They complained that
they could not execute their mission effectively when important members of their staff answered to another command. Second, because the
Office of the Chief of Engineers did not manage contract construction in
Europeas it did for military commands elsewhere around the globe
ENGCOM had no advocate in Washington. Third, the distinctions
between the services provided by ENGCOM and by TASCOM were not
clearly delineated.
Both ENGCOM and TASCOM offered support for base operations.
ENGCOM concentrated on the engineering functions associated with repair
and maintenance, and TASCOM assigned facilities and retained the logistical
and procurement functions of the earlier Communications Zone in France.115
Initially, each command operated through eleven districts in West Germany.
In late 1968 TASCOM reduced the number of its support districts by half
to six. (Map 12) In 1970, under pressure to conform, ENGCOM grudgingly
reduced the number of its engineer districts, using the same boundaries as
TASCOM. (See Map 13.) The reorganization focused on simplifying the military communities access to support; it also placed the headquarters of the
support and engineer districts in the same city and, with two exceptions, in
the same barracks or caserne. The simplification did not work. Local commanders complained that they never knew whom to call when they had a
problem. The confusion was compounded because ENGCOM also maintained resident engineer offices to handle contract construction.116
None of ENGCOMs positive achievementsFRELOC, barracks renovation, boiler conversion, TAB VEE, remote site upgradeschanged the
negative attitude toward the organization. In addition, a larger issue
remained: Did USAREUR need two separate commands providing support services?
In 1971 USAREURs deputy chief of staff, operations, published a
study, Project FENDER: An Examination of the Missions, Organization, and
Functions of the U.S. Army Engineer Command, concluding that TASCOM
could effectively incorporate ENGCOMs functions. The study reluctantly
recommended retaining ENGCOM because of work in progress on Stem to
Stern and the ongoing negotiations with the Federal Republic concerning
what some months later became the MOUSF program.
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U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
THEATER ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND
Hamburg
WEST GERMANY
1970
Bremen
100 Miles
Berlin
50
0
0
Hannover
100 Kilometers
50
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
hi
El
ne
be
Leipzig
Dresden
Cologne
Erfurt
BELGIUM
HESSEN
LUXEMBOURG
Frankfurt
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
RHINELAND-PFALZ
Kaiserslautern
Grafenwhr
Pilsen
7th ARMY
TRAINING COMMAND
Nuremberg
NORTH
B AVA R I A
Metz
BADEN-WRTTEMBERG
Stuttgart
F R A N C E
Augsburg
Mulhouse
A U S T R I A
Innsbruck
Map 12
During 1972, discussions on the future of ENGCOM intensified. The

recommendations of FENDER II, issued 22 March 1972, proposed reducing ENGCOMs role to that of an agency assigned to TASCOM while
retaining the coordination of the three major engineer functionsfacilities engineering, troop construction, and contract constructionunder
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2/3/06 11:13:08 AM

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
ENGINEER COMMAND
Hamburg
WEST GERMANY
1970
Bremen
0
0
100 Kilometers
50
Hannover
100 Miles
Berlin
50
E A S T
Rh
G E R M A N Y
in
El
eR
be
R
Leipzig
Dresden
Cologne
Erfurt
BELGIUM
HESSEN
LUXEMBOURG
Frankfurt
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Grafenwhr
Pilsen
7th ARMY
TRAINING COMMAND
RHINELAND-PFALZ
Kaiserslautern
Nuremberg
Metz
BADEN-WRTTEMBERG
Stuttgart
F R A N C E
Augsburg
Mulhouse
A U S T R I A
Innsbruck
Map 13
one headquarters. USAREUR deferred any decision on subordinating

ENGCOM to TASCOM, but it did direct the USAREUR engineer and
ENGCOM to eliminate redundant positions and reduce their staffs by
twenty-seven and fifty-three positions, respectively.117 In April, coinciding
with the circulation of the FENDER II recommendations, Maj. Gen. Francis
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2/3/06 11:13:08 AM

P. Frank Koisch arrived in Heidelberg as USAREUR engineer. Koisch
quickly concluded that USAREUR did not have the kind of organization
that could accomplish its tremendous construction workload. He decided
that Europe needed the equivalent of an engineer district.118 In November
USAREUR ordered a study of the structure of the military communities in
the Federal Republic. The far-reaching Project RED WHEEL study coincided
with Department of Defense demands that the Army reduce the size of
management headquarters. The conjunction of pressures prepared the
way for a major reorganization of the U.S. Army in Europe.119
General LeTellier vigorously defended the ENGCOM integration of
contract construction, troop construction, and facilities engineering in
a vertical structure of command. Like his predecessors, Generals Young
and Kennedy, LeTellier thought it the most efficient and effective way to
provide engineer services to the U.S. forces in Europe. In August 1973
LeTellier was reassigned to the United States to head the South Atlantic
Division. As he prepared to leave Europe, he composed a ten-page report
for the commander in chief of USAREUR, General Michael S. Davison. In
addition to addressing a number of general topics related to the engineer
mission, LeTellier expressed concern about the future of the Engineer
Command. He observed that ENGCOM had been a step-child during the
allocation of resources and the whipping boy when supported organizations evaluate the style of life to which they believe they are entitled.120
Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan succeeded LeTellier at the Engineer
Command. Donovan had served as area engineer in Metz, France, and as
chief of the Design Branch in the U.S. Army Construction Agency, France,
from 1959 to 1962. He came to
Germany as a new general officer after three years as district
engineer in Sacramento.121
By t he t i me Donova n
arrived in Europe, ENGCOM
was under siege from several
directions. The insistence in
the Senate to reduce the presence of U.S. forces in Europe
and a general retrenchment as
the Vietnam War wound down
created pressure for change in
USAREUR. Secretary of Defense
James Schlesingers mandate to
increase the ratio of combat forces to support forcesthe toothto-tail ratiowas a manifestation of the changing atmosphere.
The increase in the volume of
ENGCOMs work, shortages in
General Donovan
the officer ranks, difficulties in
171
2/3/06 11:13:09 AM

recruiting German employees, and budget constraints added to administrative problems. As 1974 approached, the command faced the prospect
of running $14 million short of covering its salaries, utility bills, heat,
and other fixed costs.122
In September 1973 two operating principles crystallized in the
Department of the Army: Community commanders should control
their own resources and personnel committed to all support activities,
and USAREUR should cut its headquarters and management personnel sharply. In response, the USAREUR staff prepared a report titled the
Consolidation of Headquarters and Area Support Elements (Project
CHASE), which outlined a major reorganization in Europe. Project CHASE
recommended the abolition of both TASCOM and ENGCOM. To give
community commanders in Europe greater control over resources,
the plan transferred ENGCOMs responsibilities for facilities engineering to the regional commands: V Corps in Frankfurt, VII Corps in
Stuttgart, and 1st Support Brigade in Kaiserslautern. To reduce headquarters, ENGCOMs contract construction functions passed to the OCE
in Washington. TASCOMs responsibilities were distributed among the
military communities, the USAREUR engineer, and the new 1st Support
Brigade (later 21st Support Command).123
On 7 February 1974, the USAREUR commander in chief, General
Davison, approved the basic proposals outlined by Project CHASE for reorganization of engineer resources in Europe. With ENGCOMs three major
responsibilities removed, the core of the organization disappeared. The
Office of the Engineer in USAREUR could assume authority over troop
construction, real estate, and the U.S. Army Topographic Center.124 The
pressures that General OMeara had successfully overcome in 1965 and
1966 won out in 1974.
As soon as General Davison made his decision to redistribute
engineering resources in Europe, USAREUR in Heidelberg, OCE in
Washington, and ENGCOM headquarters in Frankfurt initiated planning
to implement the new arrangement. Chief of Engineers Lt. Gen. William
C. Gribble, Jr., created a new division and named General Donovan to
command it, with Donovans chief of staff, Col. Edwin S. Townsley, to
serve as deputy division engineer. Townsley took charge of establishing policies and coordinating procedures for the transition, appointing
the deputy comptroller, Randolph S. Washington, as action officer. The
chief of engineers assigned members of his Washington staff to work
with Townsley on administrative and managerial tasks such as drawing up support agreements with USAREUR and drafting organizational
plans and procedures so that the new division would conform to Corps of
Engineers structure and practice.125
To reassign the 25,000 people from the support commands being inactivated, the receiving organizations had to write provisional descriptions
for the transfer positions, develop tables of distribution and allowances,
and prepare formal job descriptions to be processed through the Civilian
Personnel Office. The process was tedious and laborious.126
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2/3/06 11:13:09 AM

The positions associated under ENGCOM with contract construction
passed to the new Engineer Division. Administrative support positions
attached to ENGCOM headquarters were transferred to the three regional
USAREUR commanders to provide manpower for base support functions.127 These transfers left the new division without the positions necessary to support contract construction, its principal mission. Although the
Office of the Chief of Engineers authorized a manpower level of 438 for
the division, USAREUR transferred only 310 spaces from ENGCOM and
the division received only 280 people who had experience or training in
contract construction.128
OCEs deputy chief of engineering, Frederick B. McNeely, headed a
team of nine people who worked in Frankfurt during April and May 1974
to set up the administrative structure for the new Corps of Engineers.
They reviewed staff functions and procedures and wrote job descriptions. Despite their efforts, many employees waiting for new assignments
worked the summer of 1974 without knowing to which position, at which
grade, or in what branch they would be assigned.129
Special attention was given to the Germans who had worked in
the Engineer Command. They were indirect-hire employees paid in
Deutschmarks by the Federal Republic. USAREUR reimbursed the
Federal Republic for their salaries and benefits and paid an administrative
surcharge.130 Over the years USAREUR had signed a series of tariff agreements with the Federal Republic which affirmed that U.S. forces employing local employees would comply with German labor laws on issues
of pay, annual leave, sick leave, maternity rights, hours, holidays, and
termination procedures.131 USAREUR and the OCE agreed that the OCE
would not negotiate an independent agreement with the Federal Republic.
Germans hired to work in the new division would continue to be included
with the USAREUR budget and work under USAREUR agreements. Thus,
the Germans working at the Engineer Division were not employees of the
Corps of Engineers.
On 1 July 1974, the OCE activated the United States Army Engineer
Division, Europe, and a new chapter in the organization of engineer
functions for Europe began. The Engineer Command had undertaken
major new projects, including FRELOC construction, facilities rehabilitation
under Stem to Stern and MOUSF, and TAB VEE. It had also continued
projects begun under predecessor organizationsconverting heating
plants; building missile and weapons sites; providing hardstand parking for tanks and other military equipment; securing ammunition storage facilities; and building schools, chapels, and recreational facilities.
Construction placement in 1974 totaled $152 million, a 50 percent increase
over 1972. Although the Engineer Command ceased to exist, the construction mission continued.
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2/3/06 11:13:10 AM
PART THREE
THE EUROPE DIVISION
19741991
10I_PartIII Intro_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:42:51 AM
2/3/06 10:42:52 AM
INTRODUCTION
he Europe Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began

its activities in a geopolitical environment in which the status quo
was more settled than at any time since 1945. The relative stability occurred because the four powers that had occupied Germany
had reached an agreement in September 1971 on the status of Berlin. In
the agreement the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet
Union all recognized the right of each power to remain in Berlin in its
respective sector. The accord affirmed the special relations between West
Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany without, however, conceding
that the city was a part of West Germany.
The four-power accord formed part of German Chancellor Willy
Brandts new policy toward the East, Ostpolitik, which he had pursued
with energy since assuming leadership of West Germans government
in 1969. Using the concept of two states within one nation, Brandt
linked the Berlin settlement to a formal accord, the Basic Treaty, signed
in December 1972 with East Germany. The treaty gave de facto acknowledgment of the German Democratic Republic without granting the full
diplomatic recognition that the East German regime wanted. Still, in
September 1973 the two German states were admitted to the United
Nations as separate sovereign entities. West German Ostpolitik included
not only the stabilization of Berlin and the intra-German Basic Treaty, but
also a series of agreements that the West German government signed with
eastern neighbors: the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. These
agreements confirmed West German acceptance of the territorial status
quo of the post-1945 settlement in Eastern Europe and thereby resolved
one of the most potentially troubling aspects of the postwar settlement.
Ostpolitik did not mean that the Cold War was over, only that political
conflict between East and West in Europe had become less volatile and
that the tensions surrounding Berlin, long a flashpoint, had diminished.
The military threat represented by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact
nations remained the focus of the strategies and tactics that dominated
the thinking of U.S. military planners. Nonetheless, the more stable territorial situation allowed these planners to rethink issues such as troop
deployment, training, and the relative strength of combat forces to support forces, a debate that came to be labeled the tooth-to-tail ratio. The
reassessments led to the rotation of combat brigades from the United
States to West Germany, construction of a new garrison in northern
Germany near Bremerhaven, and construction of storage facilities for
equipment and ammunition needed to support the rotation exercises and
U.S. combat units stationed in Europe. During the 1970s military planners
2/3/06 10:42:52 AM

also had to pay increasing attention to the vulnerability of ammunition
and weapons stored in Europe to terrorist attacks. This attention led to the
long-range security program, a design and construction effort to enhance
the security of storage facilities.
While the United States and its NATO allies sought to improve the
readiness of their military forces, so did the Soviet Union. One of the most
significant developments of the 1970s involved the deployment by the
Soviet Union of the SS20, a new generation of intermediate-range missile.
This missile was a multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle with a
range of 3,000 to 5,000 miles. The SS20 carried several nuclear warheads
that were released at the height of its trajectory; each warhead was independently programmed to hit a different target, thus increasing the difficulty of defending against them. The missiles were also easily moved
and therefore hard to detect and track. Furthermore, the missiles released
their warheads much closer to their destination than to their launching
point and thereby increased the probability that at least some nuclear
devices would reach their targets.
The SS20 worried West European statesmen. Its range made all of
Europes major cities susceptible to nuclear attackGerman cities could be
struck twenty minutes after launchand locations in the Middle East, South
Asia, and China were equally as vulnerable. West European leaders feared
that the Soviet tactical superiority, even if temporary, would create pressures
to make political concessions unless the United States could take countermeasures. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt vigorously promoted deployment
to Western Europe of U.S. missilesthe Pershing II and ground launched
cruise missilescomparable to the SS20. At a mid-December meeting of the
NATO Council in 1979, the member states approved the deployment but coupled the decision with a resolution to seek a negotiated removal of the Soviet
missiles. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late December, only two
weeks after the decision of the NATO Council, hardly encouraged optimism.
Nonetheless, NATO policy throughout the 1980s followed the two tracks
of negotiation and preparation for deployment. Thus, U.S. Army engineers
prepared to install the new U.S. intermediate range missiles while diplomats
representing NATO pursued negotiations with the Soviet Union to remove
the SS20s and reduce the level of arms in Europe.
When the threat of the Soviet SS20s arose, U.S. commanders in
Europe, particularly in Germany where the largest number of troops
served, became acutely aware of the abysmal living conditions that their
troops faced in barracks and in family housing. The effort to improve
morale and welfare by funding remedial and new construction of barracks and housing greatly expanded the construction activities of the
Europe Division during the 1980s.
The Europe Division managed construction in Europe for the U.S.
military from the early days of 1974 though the 1970s and 1980s. The division succeeded in building the installations to support the new missiles
while it handled the expansion of construction on housing, welfare, and
recreation facilities that developed in the 1980s. While its staff and work178
2/3/06 10:42:52 AM
Introduction
load expanded to deal with the growing volume of construction, the diplomatic efforts toward arms reduction also bore fruit. In December 1987
the United States and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the reduction of intermediate-range nuclear forcesthe INF Treatythat called
for the elimination of these missiles from the arsenal of both powers. The
success in reducing the level of armaments aligned across Cold War barriers in Europe presaged even more dramatic changes that overtook the
Continent during the following several years and that brought an end to
the Cold War.
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2/3/06 10:42:52 AM
7
THE TRANSITION PERIOD
19741978
he establishment of the United States Army Engineer Division,

Europe (USAEDE), on 1 July 1974 marked the first time that the
chief of engineers rather than the theater commander controlled
contract construction for U.S. forces in Europe. Although the
line of authority and command governing engineer services was new,
the tasks remained much the same. On both sides of the Atlantic, people
worked to make the transition from the United States Army, Europe
(USAREUR), to the Corps of Engineers successful, to redistribute the
resources of the Engineer Command (ENGCOM), and to reorganize
USAREURs other support services. The organizational changes affected
thousands of Americans and Germans working in Europe.
The Corps of Engineers introduced a new culture and a different way of
doing business. The people working in Frankfurt and throughout the area
covered by USAREUR already had years of experience doing business in
Europe and thought that their experience would be valued. In spite of the
tensions that developed, division personnel provided the services expected
of them. On a purely administrative level, the reassignment of people and
distribution of resources was completed quickly; but the transition period
persisted through 1978, and turbulence and dislocation remained the dominant feelings recalled by those who lived through it.
Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan, serving under the USAREUR commander in chief, commanded the new division only until mid-August
1974, when he was reassigned.1 It fell to Donovans successor, Brig. Gen.
Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., to shape the new entity as an operating division of
the Corps of Engineers. And it was the task of his successor, Brig. Gen.
Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., to forge a cohesive organization from the oldtimers who remained and the newcomers from the United States.
New Management
General Prentiss, whose father had been deputy theater chief engineer under United States Forces, European Theater, in 19461947, report-
11J_Chap07_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:36:05 AM

ed in Frankfurt on 1 September
1974. He was the first division
engineer to serve under the chief
of engineers in Washington.
Prentiss came to Frankfurt from
Stuttgart, where he had served as
commander of the 7th Engineer
Brigade, VII Corps engineer, and
community commander since
July 1973. 2 Prentiss graduated
from the U.S. Military Academy
in 1950 with Donovan. As a new
lieutenant, Prentiss served three
years in Germany with an artillery unit. When he returned to
Europe in 1973 as the staff engineer for the VII Corps commander, Lt. Gen. George S. Blanchard,
Prentiss heard firsthand the dissatisfaction of the corps comGeneral Prentiss
manders wit h t he Engineer
Command.
The agreement of April 1974 transferring engineer functions from
the commander in chief of USAREUR to the chief of engineers defined
USAEDEs responsibilities very generally: to plan, direct, and supervise
design and construction of new military construction and family housing programs; to inspect and supervise design and construction carried
out for the Army by host-nation agencies under indirect contracting;
and to furnish design and construction services on a reimbursable basis
as requested by USAREUR.3 Because USAEDE was an operating division, headquarters incorporated both the oversight and review functions
assigned to a stateside division and the contracting and project management functions assigned to a stateside district. Civilian administrators
from the Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) had worked with the
organizations deputy division engineer, Col. Edwin S. Townsley, and
other staff to create the structure.4 (Chart 10) Prentiss found the new engineer organization still in its formative stages.
Exactly how the USAEDE would fulfill the terms of the April agreement became one of Prentiss major concerns. Between April 1974 and
January 1976, the division negotiated a dozen supplemental or implementing agreements covering such matters as USAREURs provision of civilian personnel and real estate services, base support, funding and billing,
and the services that the division would provide to USAREUR regarding
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) construction and recoupment, Alternate Construction, and project development.5
Prentiss and division staff also had to establish internal operating procedures and mold the organizational pieces of the division into a function182
2/3/06 10:36:06 AM
The Transition Period, 19741978

Chart 10: Organization of the Europe Division, 1974
Special
Assistants
Office of the
Comptroller
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe

Executive Office
Division Engineer
Office of
Council
Personnel
Office
Engineering
Division
Boards and
Committees
Office of
Administrative
Services
Automated Data
Processing Office
Construction
Division
Procurement and
Supply Division
Project
Management Branch
Contract
Administration Branch
Contract
Branch
Budget and
Reports Branch
Office
Engineering Branch
Supply
Branch
Design
Branch
Supervision and
Inspection Branch
Technical
Review Branch
Area Office
Frankfurt
Area Office
Kaiserslautern
Area Office
Stuttgart
ing whole. Adding to the challenge, the division was understaffed; and
Prentiss faced low morale, changes in senior leadership, additions in territorial responsibility, and growth in the workload. Years later he recalled
his tour as a very difficult period, because nothing was normal.6
The issue of what name the new organization would use was symptomatic of the need to define everything. Although officially designated
the United States Army Engineer Division, Europe, the organizations
common names became European Division and EUD. After the Corps of
Engineers became a major command in 1979, headquarters asked the division in Frankfurt to use the name Europe Division. EUD continued to be
the most frequently used short designation.7
Administrative tasks in the early weeks included organizing recruitment, drafting procedural documents, implementing Corps of Engineers
reporting systems, establishing field offices, and purchasing equipment.
This work was complicated by uncertainties regarding levels of funding
and staffing and by changes in mission assignments.8
Area Offices
The 1974 reorganization of USAREUR created three regional commandsV Corps, VII Corps, and 1st Support Brigade (later 21st Support
183
2/3/06 10:36:08 AM

Command)and each region became the focal point for the base support
functions and the facilities engineering support previously provided by
the Theater Army Support Command and ENGCOM. The headquarters
of each region provided utilities and maintenance and limited engineering design to the community commanders who managed installations
within the regions. (Map 14) The Europe Division provided support when
engineering tasks exceeded the professional skills available through the
regional staffs.9
By terms of the agreement between USAREUR and the chief of engineers, the Europe Division located area offices with V Corps headquarters
in Frankfurt, with VII Corps headquarters in Stuttgart, and with the 1st
Support Brigade headquarters in Kaiserslautern. During the first year the
division headquarters struggled to provide personnel and administrative
assistance for the area offices and their subordinate resident and project
offices. Because of other priorities, the division gave staffing and support
of the three area offices secondary consideration.10
Initially, military and civilian personnel who had served in
ENGCOMs resident offices staffed EUDs field offices.11 Many of the
positions previously held by military officers were converted to civilian
slots. Nevertheless, the division had considerable difficulty stabilizing the
military leadership in the area offices. In late 1974 Lt. Col. John L. Buxton,
former comptroller of ENGCOM, was named area engineer in Frankfurt;
Lt. Col. M. R. Carson served in Stuttgart. A civilian, E. M. Grigsby, served
as acting area engineer in Kaiserslautern until Maj. Robert M. Faxon took
over early in 1975. In July 1975 Maj. Brian W. Teates, Jr., replaced Faxon,
and on 1 August Lt. Col. T. L. Doherty replaced Carson in Stuttgart.12 This
rapid turnover of leadership in the area offices complicated the effort to
achieve stability.
Despite the organizational changes in Frankfurt, field offices continued to oversee construction projects, even with inadequate administrative
support. Jim Wise, a civilian from the Fort Worth District on temporary
duty in Bad Kreuznach, reported that the secretary in the field office there
had established a barter arrangement with local German contractors:
I was just flabbergasted, coming from a structured and long-standing organization in the States, [where] logistics is something you
dont even think about. Simple things like suppliestypewriter ribbons, paper, pencils, paper clips, all that type stuffwe couldnt beg,
borrow, or steal within the organization. Our people were typing letters for contractors in exchange for supplies!13
Dave Cox, assigned to the Wrzburg resident office in late 1974,
recalled the chaos of new procedures, the limited support, and difficulties
acquiring and maintaining vehicles.14
The creation of a fourth area office severely taxed the divisions resources. In May 1975 EUD activated the Northern Area Office in Dortmund
to manage two growing construction programsaircraft shelters and
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2/3/06 10:36:09 AM
U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
S W E D E N
WEST GERMANY
1975
D E N M A R K
Regional Boundary (approximate)

Regional Headquarters
N O R T H
S E A
0
0
B A
L T
I C
100
50
50
150 Miles
S E
A
150 Kilometers
100
1ST SUPPORT BRIGADE
A
D
BERLIN
Elbe R
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
Rh i n
B E L G I U M
V CORPS
e R
Frankfurt
M
ai n
LUXEMBOURG
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Kaiserslautern
1ST SUPPORT
BRIGADE
VII CORPS
R
Rh
in
F R A N C E
D a nube
e R
Stuttgart
LIECHTENSTEIN
Map 14
2/3/06 10:36:09 AM

ammunition securitycentered in the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern
Germany. The chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, Jr., denied
Prentisss request for an additional lieutenant colonel, but Prentiss obtained
a transfer for Lt. Col. Roy A. Brown, who was already in USAREUR and
eager to change assignments.15 When the new office opened, the other three
area offices were renamed with geographic designations: the Central Area
Office (Frankfurt), the Southern Area Office (Stuttgart), and the Southwest
Area Office (Kaiserslautern).16 (Map 15)
EUD established a fifth area office when the Corps of Engineers reorganized military construction activities in the Mediterranean. Beginning
in 1952 the Mediterranean Division had performed design and construction for U.S. forces and other U.S. agencies in Africa and the Middle East.
Since 1957 it had also supervised construction for U.S. forces in Italy,
Greece, and Turkey. By the mid-1970s, 90 percent of the divisions work
had shifted to Saudi Arabia and work in Italy and Greece had declined.
The work in Turkey all but stopped as a result of the reaction of the
Turkish government to an arms embargo imposed by the U.S. Congress
in the wake of the Turkish-Greek clash over Cyprus in 1974.17 In January
1975 the Office of the Secretary of Defense circulated a draft audit report
recommending a general reorganization in which the Mediterranean
Division would merge with the Europe Division.18
OCE strongly objected to this suggestion and cited political, logistical,
and economic reasons against the merger. Politically, Saudi Arabia wanted
to have the engineer headquarters in its own capital. Logistically, EUD
would be strained beyond its capabilities if it tried to supervise work
from the North Atlantic to the Arabian Peninsula. Economically, OCE
argued, the savings that had been predicted from consolidation were
greatly overstated.19 USAREUR responded that while it had no particular interest in how the Corps of Engineers organized its work around
the world, it had a strong interest in any change that would bring all
NATO construction functions under EUD cognizance. USAREUR also
expressed opposition to the transfer of any functions to Europe Division
not related directly to NATO.20
Out of this exchange, the Corps of Engineers developed a plan to
retain two divisions but to redistribute responsibilities. In 1976 the
Mediterranean Division was inactivated and a new Middle East Division
was established with its headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. EUD took
over responsibility for military construction in NATO member states
south of the Alps and established the Mediterranean Area Office at Camp
Darby, near Livorno, Italy, with Lt. Col. Kermit Oelberg as area engineer.21
Personnel from the inactivated division staffed the office, which included
a design section of about twenty Italians. By June 1976 EUD assumed
management of the personnel and projects of the Mediterranean Division
for work in Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Portugal.22
The volume of work that EUD inherited south of the Alps was not
largeconstruction placement between $10 million and $20 million annually in the 1970sbut the geographic expanse was considerable. Prentiss
186
2/3/06 10:36:09 AM

U.S. ARMY ENGINEER DIVISION, EUROPE
SWEDEN
FIELD ORGANIZATION
1975
D
Area Office Boundary (approximate)
Area Office Headquarters

Resident Office
0
50
50
100
150 Miles
150 Kilometers
100
Hamburg
Jever
IS
WEST GERMANY
AMSTERDAM
BERLIN
Hannover
NETHERLANDS
The Hague
EAST
GERMANY
NORTHERN AREA
Dortmund
(original site)
Leipzig
Hoensbroek
(relocated site)
CENTRAL
AREA
B E L G I U M
Giessen
Frankfurt
Bitburg
Bad Kreuznach
Wrzburg
LUXEMBOURG
Kaiserslautern
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
SOUTHWEST
AREA
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
BRUSSELS
SOUTHERN AREA
Stuttgart
Dijon
Augsburg
Zrich
LIECHTENSTEIN
A U S T R I A
Map 15
knew that supervising that work in the new countries added expenses
and problems of communications and transportation to EUDs budgetary
and management responsibilities. He requested help from OCE to facilitate travel and communications, arguing that bluntly, we cannot perform
187
2/3/06 10:36:09 AM

the mission down there without an aircraft. EUD finally received an airplane in late 1976, several months after Prentiss had left.23
Staff Continuity and Morale

A constellation of problems in the Europe Divisions headquarters
confronted Prentiss during his first months at EUD. The division had four
major categories of employees: military personnel, Department of the
Army civilians (DACs), Germans, and dependents of other military and
civilian personnel serving in Europe (dependent hires). The division had
only a few military officers, all in supervisory positions. Some positions
had been designated for German citizens, and these employees provided
stability in the work force. Employees carried over from the Engineer
Command initially occupied the positions designated for DACs, but division leaders had the most flexibility of recruitment and selection in this
category.
In the transition from the Engineer Element to the Engineer Command
in 1966, experienced civilian personnel had been encouraged to stay on,
but in 1974 leaders at OCE in Washington thought that the transition
offered the opportunity to make some needed personnel changes in the
engineer hierarchy then in Europe.24 A 1973 study had suggested that
personnel with long service who occupied top management positions
in ENGCOM be encouraged to retire or to seek positions in the United
States.25 The old-timers had experience in dealing with the unique problems of overseas construction, and many were fluent in German and other
European languages; but they were entrenched in positions and at salaries
that blocked new employees.
The first major personnel change came quickly. In the summer of 1974,
John Tambornino, chief of engineering since 1956, decided to retire on 30
November. OCE drew up the list of candidates for his position and included no one with experience working in Europe. Ralph Wheeler, assistant to
the chief of construction at OCE, Frederick McNeely, emerged as the leading candidate; and General Donovan appointed him as chief of engineering. Other people from the Corps of Engineers subsequently filled top
vacancies in Frankfurt; the lists that OCE prepared seldom included EUD
staff or persons with experience in Europe.26 OCEs priority was placed
on familiarity with Corps procedures.27 Washington recruited employees
from Corps districts and divisions in the United States to help institute
the Corps system in Europe, and in the first several months forty-one
persons took temporary duty assignments of ninety or more days in EUD.
The newcomers to Europe received no briefing or orientation before
they arrived.28 The incoming chief of the Office of Administrative Services,
R. L. Rousseau, described the situation in Frankfurt as chaotic.29 Jim
Wise, who later returned to a permanent position in EUD, recalled that
there were a lot of people in a very limited space. They were sitting
out in hallways; where they were inside offices, you could barely walk
between the desks.30 Notwithstanding the confusion, many who came
188
2/3/06 10:36:10 AM
General Prentiss (left) with John Tambornino in November 1974
from the United States described their experience in the new organization
as exciting.31
Those who had been working in Europe viewed the transition period
differently. 32 American civilians who had been recruited for work in
Europe by the Corps in the 1950s and 1960s thought that they had always
been a part of the Corps of Engineers family. William E. Camblor, who
had served as director of the U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany
(USACAG), beginning in 1956, drew attention to this attitude during a
1961 inspection tour by the visiting chief of engineers. Camblor explained
that he had organized USACAG along the basic lines of a normal stateside Corps of Engineers district.33 The attitude of the newcomers distressed the old-timers, who felt their professional competency and their
patriotism were being challenged. The choice of Wheelerrather than
someone already in Europeto succeed Tambornino increased suspicions
that Tambornino had been targeted for removal.34
Most of the several thousand Germans who had worked for the
Engineer Command had served in facilities engineering. Those who
joined the Europe Division worked in military communities, where they
provided the new organization with valuable continuity in managing
projects and in estimating, indirect contracting, real estate, NATO recoupment, and legal affairs. The attitudes of the newcomers also distressed
these employees: They said, this is not the way the Corps does it. They
didnt pay any attention to the fact that they are not in the States, [that] we
are working under entirely different rules and conditions.35
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2/3/06 10:36:10 AM

The newcomers had little knowledge of indirect contracting, little
regard for the experience and knowledge of the old-timers, and little
disposition to learn from their new colleagues. Almost two decades after
the activation of the division, long-term employees spoke of the 1974 transition as traumatic and horrible. The adversarial atmosphere remained
one of the strongest memories of the period.36
Division leaders soon realized that they did not have adequate staffing for their mission. General Prentiss thought that OCE had failed to
take into account the difficulties of doing business in Europe, where staff
had to observe both American and European design criteria. Also, indirect contracting required project managers to coordinate with layers of
host-government agencies, and the language differences made translators
and interpreters essential. These factors made EUDs work more labor
intensive than managing construction in the United States. The division pressed its recruiting effort to fill vacant positions with permanent
employees. By March 1975 EUDs staff had increased from the 280 who
transferred from ENGCOM to just over 400. By the end of the year the
staff numbered almost 500.37
In September 1975 the chief of engineers, General Gribble, told Prentiss
to expect some reduction in military spaces in fiscal year 1976 because
of ceilings that Congress had placed on the military. Prentiss protested
that EUD needed more employees.38 A manpower survey conducted in
mid-October confirmed that the divisions workload justified nearly 600
employees, but Gribble informed Prentiss that the staff would remain
below 500 for the foreseeable future. OCE suggested the continued use of
personnel on temporary duty.39
In addition to the shortage of personnel, Prentiss had to deal with the
growing concern in OCE over the position of women and minorities in
the Corps. The command inspection team visiting EUD in September 1975
advised the division to create an equal employment opportunity (EEO)
function and a race relations program. Prentiss had begun to implement
such programs, but he had so few people that he chose to staff the EEO
position only part time. Because USAREURs Civilian Personnel Office
in Frankfurt served EUD, the division prepared only a supplement to the
USAREUR Equal Employment Opportunity Action Plan.40
Prentiss began to make personnel changes. As he came to realize
the importance of establishing and maintaining good relationships
with international leaders, Prentiss involved William Camblor more
extensively, especially in contracting. Commensurate with Camblors
rank (GS15), his experience, and his skills as a negotiator, Prentiss
changed his title from assistant to the division engineer to assistant
division engineer for intergovernmental affairs.41 After appointing the
comptroller, Colonel Buxton, as area engineer for the Frankfurt Area
Office, Prentiss promoted Buxtons deputy, Randolph S. Washington, to
the position of comptroller. Prentiss believed that this promotion made
Washington the only African American civilian managing an administrative division in the Corps of Engineers.42 Another African American
190
2/3/06 10:36:11 AM

civilian, Jacques Bouchereau, served as deputy chief of the Construction
Division.
Prentiss was not satisfied with the chief of construction, H. Jace Greene.
Greene had served in Frankfurt since the beginning of USACAG, and his
involvement in military construction in Europe went back to 1946. Prentiss
asked his deputy, Colonel Townsley, to monitor Greenes performance;
Greene found this supervision insulting, and a contest of wills continued
for months. In November 1976, after an extended medical leave, Greene
retired. By that time both Prentiss and Townsley had left the division, leaving it to the next commander to select a new chief of construction.43
Adjustments in the Comptrollers Office

When the command inspection team submitted its report, it acknowledged that the transition from the administrative and command procedures
of Engineer Command to those of the Corps of Engineers created major
problems for the Europe Division. These difficulties were compounded by
the shortage of experienced personnel in the administrative activities. As a
result, the team concluded, full and effective support of the operational mission was lacking.44 Harmonizing practices in the new Comptrollers Office
presented special challenges for the Europe Division. The dissolution of
ENGCOM had shifted employees who had little accounting experience into
the Finance and Accounting Branch. Turnover among staff in the basic clerical positions was exceedingly highat times over 100 percent a yearwhich
made it especially difficult to maintain continuity, to train, or simply to get
the work done.45 Several key positions in the Comptrollers Officechiefs
of finance and accounting, budget and programs, and cost accounting
remained vacant for several months.46
OCE sent people on temporary assignments from other Corps offices
to work with EUD staff while recruitment continued. They were not prepared for the complexity of tracking costs of projects in seven countries
and seven currencies, each at varying rates of exchange for the dollar.
Furthermore, each project might use funds from a mix of two or more
sources or appropriations.
In EUD all posting was done by hand. Comptroller Washington and
the deputy division engineer, Colonel Townsley, had expanded the standard five-column account sheet used in the United States to fourteen
columns. The additional columns allowed them to monitor fluctuations
of the exchange rate between the day EUD awarded a contract and the
actual payment for work, delays arising from the indirect system of contracting through host-nation agencies, and a half-dozen other variables
that stateside offices never had to worry about. One of those variables
inflationcompounded the comptrollers headaches: In 1975 inflation
amounted to 20 percent on dollar purchases and 7 percent on purchases
in Deutschmarks, the worst rates in over twenty years.47
OCEs plan to implement the Corps of Engineers Management
Information System (COEMIS) encountered serious problems. Overall,
191
2/3/06 10:36:11 AM

COEMIS was ill suited to the European environment: It could neither
handle multiple currencies nor maintain the personnel records of a labor
force that included German employees, DACs, and locally hired dependents. EUDs computers, installed in 1974, turned out to be incompatible
with COEMIS.
The command inspection team that visited EUD in August 1975 did
not appreciate the ingenuity of the system that Washington and Townsley
had cobbled together. They saw only that the system was complex and
unwieldy, the general ledger frequently did not correspond with subsidiary records, and the records proliferated in distressing ways.48
Townsley and Washington cooperated with the Comptrollers Office
at OCE to reconcile the two systems and to recruit new employees, but
progress in the Comptrollers Office was painfully slow. Incompatibilities
between COEMIS and EUDs needs took many years to resolve.49
In-House Design
Tensions arising from the clash of old and new personnel and procedures were exacerbated by the OCE decision to establish an in-house
design capability to EUD. None of the Europe Divisions predecessor
organizations had maintained such a capability, although stateside Corps
districts generally accomplished from 25 to 50 percent of their design inhouse. This practice helped maintain the technical proficiency of engineer
personnel and saved money. Thinking to apply the same logic to Europe,
the transition team wrote a design branch into the Engineering Division
in EUDs organization chart.50
When Ralph Wheeler arrived in Frankfurt as the chief of the
Engineering Division in the autumn of 1974, he intended to develop
a Design Branch capable of handling about a quarter of the divisions
design requirements. He expected the remaining 75 percent of the work to
be passed to architect-engineer firms either under direct contract to EUD
or as indirect contracts through a host-government agency. 51 Wheeler
received approval from OCE for an authorized strength of more than
eighty people for the Design Branch and began recruiting when notified of his appointment as chief of engineering. By the time he arrived in
Frankfurt, more than twenty people from all over the United States were
committed to the Design Branch.52
Wheeler was conscientious and enthusiastic, but neither he nor his
recruits understood the international agreements and conventions that
governed indirect contracting and limited the divisions ability to do
design work in-house. Neither were they equipped to prepare design
documents in metric measurements and in both English and the language
of the host country.53
Wheeler also failed to appreciate that the Europeans took a radically
different approach developing a design package from Americans. As a
result, his arriving personnel would have to learn a totally new system of
preparing contract specifications. American design engineers put every192
2/3/06 10:36:11 AM

thing that the design demands on the drawings (plans) for the project.
Specifications then define how or according to what standards various
jobs are to be accomplished, for example, how to mix the concrete, prepare
a surface before painting, and lay roofing. Construction contractors, working from the drawings, determined the scope of services, quantities of
materials, and type of equipment needed to complete the work. Then they
submitted a bid based on their own calculations.54
Specifications in the German design package had to contain a detailed
list of the materials and services required by the project. American engineers expected the contractors to generate their own list. For standards on
the quality of workthe how to set out in American specifications
Germans turned to the Deutsche Industrie-Normen (DIN). The Germans
had a DIN on roofing, a DIN on painting, and a DIN on structural steel,
and so on, each of which tells how to do specific tasks in every phase of
construction.55
The German specifications became an expanded bill of materials so
that all bidders started with the same definition of how much work was
to be done. This approach placed the responsibility and the risk on the
designer rather than on the contractor. Europeans didnt want construction firms going broke because somebody had underestimated the job.56
The American approach placed greater responsibility and risk on the construction contractor. He had to calculate how much material to purchase
and risk losses if his estimates were wrong. Joe G. Higgs, who succeeded
Wheeler as chief of engineering at EUD, explained: In the United States
you look at the plans and then you read the specs. In Germany they read
the specs, and they dont even look at the plans until they start construction. In Germany, if it is not in the specs, it doesnt count.57
Wheeler put a tremendous amount of personal effort into making in-house design succeed, but there were too many obstacles. The
learning curve for the new staff was steep, and the backlog of design
increased. In-house design never exceeded 11 percent of the workload of
the Engineering Division and averaged below 5 percent.58 Wheeler had
compounded the problems when he put almost twenty of the long-time
employees who could have helped the new design engineersthey had
experience with the DIN, metrics, and local materialsinto a Technical
Review Branch.59 After less than two years he recombined the Design
Branch and the Technical Review Branch into a technical engineering
branch headed by Lou Brettschneider, the engineer who had served as
chief of that branch after Saul Fraint retired in 1973.60
Support for Facilities Engineers

The April 1974 agreement signed by the chief of engineers and the
commander in chief of USAREUR provided that the new Corps organization would furnish engineering design and construction services to the
regional commanders as requested, and referred specifically to OMA
[Operations and Maintenance, Army] and minor military design and con193
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struction projects, which EUD was to execute on a reimbursable basis.
Although USAREUR expected this support for the facilities engineers, it
could offer EUD no staff positions to cover the work.61
In the inactivation of the Engineer Command and the establishment
of the Europe Division, the regional corps commanders assumed the
function for installation support. The transfer of responsibilities did not
go smoothly, and relations between the EUD staff and facilities engineers
were not cordial. No one had a very clear idea which new tasks or projects
would go to the regional Directorates of Facilities Engineering and which
would go to EUD. People at EUD doing work very similar to the work
done in facilities engineering positions had been given higher grades and
salaries. The facilities engineering personnel in the regions saw no reason
to channel new work to Frankfurt.62
The divisions first challenge was to complete projects left unfinished.
Brettschneider recalled that ENGCOMs Facilities Directorate had a large
number of projects under way in 1974, and the departing staff dumped
cartons into Mr. Tamborninos office. It took months and months of
tremendous effort to clear the decks.63 To complete design work on these
projects, the division turned to stateside districts for help and intensified
recruiting for additional personnel.64
General Prentiss placed a high priority on establishing good relations
between EUD and the facilities engineering organizations. He did not
want to be criticized, as ENGCOM commanders had been, for failing to
provide adequate engineering support to the military communities. In
early October 1974 he met with the regional directors of facilities engineering for V Corps, VII Corps, and the 1st Support Brigade to outline EUDs
capabilities and to offer assistance with architect-engineer contracts and
with the supervision of construction and design.65 From his experience in
Stuttgart, he thought that facilities engineers in the communities needed
EUDs technical expertise and help in managing contracts. He also knew
that the facilities engineering workforce had little capability for even
minor new construction or inspection.66
Prentiss and Wheeler told the commanders that EUD would help
them with their operations and maintenance program.67 Division personnel met monthly with facilities engineers. The three directors of facilities
engineering began asking the division to assist with design and supervise
construction. Project funding came from family housing maintenance,
nonappropriated funds, and OMA budgets.68
EUD also devised a new way to obligate year-end OMA funds that
might otherwise have reverted to the U.S. Treasury. The procedure
involved encumbering funds by using reimbursable ordersa form of
purchase order between government agenciesfor work to be done in the
next fiscal year. Once obligated, the funds were carried over into the next
fiscal year to finance work in progress.69
Prentiss and Wheelers efforts succeeded almost too well: The workload increased rapidly. In April 1975 Wheeler created the Facilities
Engineering Support Section to handle the influx of work. Headed by
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Tom Conner, the section began with just three project manager positions;
by June the regional Directorates of Facilities Engineering had given them
300 projects with a value of $47 million. By August they had more than
450 projects with a total value of $54 million; some single projects were as
low as $1,700. The section grew to six people, and by the end of 1976 the
number of projects had more than tripled.70
A severe backlog of design work developed in the Engineering
Division and attracted the attention of OCEs Directorate of Military
Construction. OCE warned the division against taking on too much
work in facilities engineering. The command inspection team that visited the Europe Division in August 1975 recommended that USAREUR be
requested to provide adequate manpower spaces to EUD to undertake
the work [for facilities engineering].71 To General Prentiss, this advice
exemplified OCEs lack of understanding of the divisions mission. He sent
the director of military construction, Maj. Gen. Bates C. Burnell, a copy of
the USAREUR agreement with pertinent passages underlined. Calling
USAREURs requests for engineering services legitimate, Prentiss questioned whether the people in OCE had read the agreement.72
Work for the facilities engineers remained an important part of EUDs
operation and a concern for each successive commander. Army auditors
ruled that the divisions device of obligating the year-end money through
special purchase orders violated government regulations, but the division
developed other instruments such as open-ended contracts that allowed
the communities to group small jobs into larger bid packages. The division
also established guidelines that eliminated the very small contracts. Both
of these steps eased some of the pressure on the Engineering Division.73
Assessing the First Two Years

In May 1976 General Prentiss moved to the position of deputy chief of
staff, engineer, in USAREUR.74 In his final letter to the chief of engineers
from Frankfurt, Prentiss boldly addressed his difficulties with OCE. He
protested against those on your staff with great authority and no responsibility, against inspection teams who arrived in Frankfurt with an obvious bias, and against the lack of information in headquarters about indirect contracting and about our support agreement with USAREUR. He
called OCEs control of referral lists for staff openings a major irritant
and cited his search for a new chief of construction. The list he received
included only three names that I recognized, two OCE long-timers and
another former OCE member who refused my offer of a job a year ago.
He was amazed to find neither of the two names he had recommended
on the list. Prentiss had registered these complaints months earlier in correspondence with OCE, and many of his successors echoed them.75
For all the problems, Prentiss had a sense that the division had made
progress. Although there were many procedures and administrative
guidelines to be worked out, he felt that EUDs energetic support of facilities engineers at the community and regional levels and its acceptance of
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expanding responsibilities in the Mediterranean had earned the organization credibility throughout the Army.76
The assessment Prentiss presented to his own staff was more critical
than that in his report to OCE. In one of his last staff meetings he pointed
four administrative shortcomings: missed deadlines, failure to supply
interim responses alerting customers to delays, poorly written correspondence, and failure to record policy decisions. He commented on the
tendency to conceal problems so as to avoid criticism and urged just the
opposite, that civilian employees bring problems into the open for discussion.77 Two years after its activation, the division had dissatisfied people
and sloppy procedures.
Change of Command
General Delbridge arrived at the division a few days after General
Prentiss moved to Heidelberg. At the end of the war Delbridge, just eighteen, had enlisted in the Army and had gone from the ranks to Officers
Candidate School. As a young lieutenant he supervised airfield construction in Berlin from 1947 to 1949. He then won an appointment to the
U.S. Military Academy, where he graduated in 1953. Delbridge served
three years (19581961) with the U.S. Engineer Group in Turkey. In 1975
1976, just before taking over at EUD, he had commanded the Support
Command of the 3d Armored Division in Frankfurt.
Delbridge was gregarious, and he wanted to create an atmosphere at
EUD in which the staff would feel they were part of a large family and
share in the closeness and professionalism associated with the Corps.78
From his first days at the division, however, he was troubled by the cliquishness among the staff and the absence of cordiality toward him and
his family. Delbridge concluded that there was something desperately
wrong.79
The new commander began to work on staff morale immediately.
During a command inspection, Delbridge asked for pictures he could use
for a briefing, emphasizing that he wanted photos not only of construction projects, but also of division personnel at work: secretaries typing,
inspectors inspecting, supervisors supervising, reviewers reviewing.80
He also went shopping for a full-time public affairs officer, someone
to take responsibility for the internal issues of staff morale and cohesiveness as well as the public image of the division. He remembered a young
woman from the San Francisco District who had given a magnificent
presentation full of fire and humor. Early in the summer of 1976
Delbridge contacted Shirley Kappa, and she agreed to come to Europe.81
Kappa took over editorship of the divisions newsletter and put it on a
monthly publication schedule. She filled it with news about staff members
and division activities. The newsletter featured pictures of both military
and civilian employees, with prominent attention to German employees.
Initially, the publication used the title EUD Bulletin, but Kappa asked for
suggestions for a more imaginative name. The July 1977 issue featured the
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2/3/06 10:36:12 AM

new mastheada woodcut print
of ten hard-hatted men linked
shoulder to shoulder, each with
one very large shod foot kicked
high in the air. (Figure 3) Across
the soles of the shoes appeared
the letters c-o-r-p-s--l-i-n-e.82
Kappa also organized Kastle
Keepers, a group of American
and German staff members who
planned activities for employees and their families, including
ski trips, holiday parties, sports
teams, and Meet and Mingle
afternoon get-togethers. To welcome new employees, Kappa put
together a photo brochure on the
division and set up a program
matching an employee sponsor with each new employee.
She promoted the idea of business cards for staff and had them
General Delbridge
printed. Delbridge believed that
Kappas little things helped to
foster an identity for EUD and to
improve staff morale.83 Her energy and enthusiasm mirrored Delbridges
style of management: His deputy, Col. Carlyle Chuck Charles, said, I
dont think there was a person he didnt know by first nameand what
they did.84
The Projects Board

Delbridge wanted people at EUD to see themselves as part of a team,
to look beyond their particular jobs, and to develop a sense of the entire
organization. In his first meeting with the staff, on 25 May 1976, he
described this philosophy and quoted the renowned English physicist
Figure 3: New Masthead of the Europe Division Newsletter
J uly 77
U. S. Army Corps of Engineers European Division Frankfurt, Germany
e
Vol II No. 6
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and novelist C. P. Snow: Judgment is the ability to look at many things
at once in their interdependence, their related importance, and their consequences. In his first weeks at the division, Delbridge found that too
many people were making judgments by looking down a straw.85
When he looked at the EUD workload, he found that the staff was not
able to report on all of the active projects and contracts. He concluded that
the division needed a tracking and reporting system to monitor expenditures and keep work on schedule. Such a system could also encourage
everyone to take a broad view of the work and activities. Delbridge asked
each division to prepare reports for staff meetings. He also asked them
to devise a method to permit monthly review of key projects [to be
conducted] as part of a monthly review by the entire EUD staff in the new
conference room, which will be designed to present the total workload of
this division in a visible manner.86
The board became a fixture of Delbridges tenure. Three walls of the
conference room were hung with large magnet-sensitive display boards;
each of the nearly 1,400 projects under contract within EUD was listed on
a separate magnetic card about ten inches wide. The cards contained the
pertinent information for the project, including project manager, contractor, amount spent, and current status; they were arranged on the boards
by funding source, and they could be updated in grease pen. Delbridge
made the board review a monthly event, and just before the review the
comptroller put a red flag next to any project on which reports showed
overspending or deviation from the schedule.87
The review sessions were detailed and time-consuming, because
Delbridge asked the project managers to report on every project. When
Delbridge judged an explanation inadequate, he bore down hard and
demanded answers. John Lewis, who had arrived from the Huntsville
Division on 1 September 1976 to succeed Greene as chief of construction,
managed about 250 projects in his division and acquitted himself well.
Ralph Wheelers task was much more difficult: The Engineering Division
had to track more than 1,000 projects. Preparing for board reviews took
hours of work, and the reviews could last all day. Heated exchanges
among the participants were frequent, and the whole exercise was very
controversial. Some staff found the demands of accountability personally exhilarating and invigorating for the organization. Others resisted,
complained that they were drowning in detail, and labeled Delbridge a
micromanager.
Few people in the division understood the board review as a device.
Delbridge wanted to jolt people into seeing the various individual projects
in their interdependence, their related importance, and their consequences. Despite the staff time required to keep the board updated, Delbridge
thought that on balance the board succeeded. Several people who worked
with him agreed: Lt. Col. Roy Brown, Northern Area engineer, described
the period as a most dynamic time, in which the organization improved
because Delbridge put many peoples feet to the fire. The division counsel, Allan B. Aaron, observed that Delbridge pushed us to do things we
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probably didnt think we could do in the time frames that were demanded, but we managed because our commander pushed us. Delbridges
deputy, Colonel Charles, said the esprit de corps was super in the organization unless you were a slackard [sic]. It was probably a high point of
my career to see an outfit work like we were doing.88
From the monthly reviews, evidence mounted that the Engineering
Division could not handle the increasing design workload. The review
of 24 January 1977 revealed that 70 percent of the projects in the division were behind schedule; the prediction for February was 80 percent slippage. Delbridge exploded! Although he acknowledged that the
Engineering Division was understaffed, he held the chief of engineering,
Wheeler, personally accountable for the delays.89
Addressing Personnel Shortages

Division and branch chiefs reported to Delbridge the same personnel
shortages about which Prentiss had complained. The new commander
quickly concluded that the shortages hurt EUDs ability to accomplish its
mission.90 To address the problem, Delbridge took two courses of action.
First, to make the division more attractive to potential employees, he
requested both an increase in authorized positions and an increase in the
average grade structure. Second, he ordered internal reviews to evaluate how EUD was using people. Completed in October 1976 and January
1977, these studies showed that if the division carried its locally hired
dependents as temporary rather than permanent full-time staff, as many
as thirty-five additional spaces could be regained and filled with DACs.
Although most of the dependents worked in clerical and secretarial positions, the recovered spaces could be set at a higher level, making it possible for the division to recruit additional professional staff. Delbridge
directed that the spaces be reallocated internally to the Engineering
Division, particularly for project management.91
Delbridge ran into trouble when OCE reviewed his requests for an
increase in authorized strength. In a visit to Frankfurt in March 1977, the
chiefs of engineering and construction, Lee Garrett and Fred McNeely,
respectively, challenged the purported needs and EUDs recruiting ability, noting that the division had not filled all its authorized positions.
They proposed that EUD use stateside districts to do more of its design
work and that the division contract out other work. They also questioned
the alleged need to use indirect contracting for design. Overall, they
seemed unsympathetic to EUDs problems; OCE turned down Delbridges
request.92
Delbridge won modest support from the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen.
John W. Morris, when the two met at NATO headquarters in Brussels in
May 1977. Delbridge returned to Frankfurt with assurances from Morris
of limited increases in the authorization for senior-level civilian positions,
an increase of thirty-two positions in overall professional strength (seven
military and twenty-five DACs), and an increase in the average grade, all
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to be added to the authorization for fiscal year 1978. The new authorization was less than the forty-five positions Delbridge had requested, but it
was a start.93
The new spaces, plus the spaces recovered by internal reallocation
and openings created by normal attrition or rotation, allowed Delbridge
to bring in more people with Corps experience. In the summer of 1977
Delbridge had to select a new chief of construction to replace John
Lewis, who accepted a comparable position with the new Middle East
Division in Saudi Arabia. McNeely at OCE did the recruitment and preliminary selection for this position. His choice, Jose Cruz, had twentyfive years of experience in the Corps of Engineers, most recently as
assistant chief of construction in the Fort Worth District, but had never
worked in Europe. Cruz started work in Frankfurt in September 1977,
allowing a brief overlap with Lewis, who remained with EUD until early
October.94
In this same period General Delbridge decided not to renew Wheelers
three-year contract as chief of engineering. After a national search during
which he returned to the United States to interview candidates, Delbridge
selected Joe G. Higgs, chief of engineering in the Savannah District.
During his career with the Corps of Engineers since 1954, Higgs had
worked in the Huntsville Division and Mobile District but had not worked
overseas. Higgs and his family arrived in Europe late in February 1978.95
The decision to replace Wheeler, the selection of Higgs, and the battle
over authorized positions took place while Delbridge struggled with a
delicate issue involving the personal links among his superiors in the
chain of command. Delbridges predecessor, General Prentiss, had joined
a close-knit team of engineer officers serving under USAREUR commander, General George S. Blanchard. Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. Cooper, deputy
commander in chief, had graduated from the U.S. Military Academy with
Blanchard in 1944. The chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Richard H. Groves, class
of 1945, was Prentisss immediate superior. General Burnell, also class of
1945, served as director of military construction in OCE. Burnell initiated
an exchange of letters with Prentiss, and in early 1977 Prentiss reinstituted
the practice of informally updating the chief of engineers each quarter
on the engineer activities of USAREUR.96
From his arrival at EUD in May 1976 to the end of 1977, Delbridge
exchanged letters with Prentiss and Burnell about the policy directions
EUD should pursue. As the junior officer, Delbridge felt uneasy. Support
for him at OCE seemed equivocalthe response to his removal of
Wheeler and his selection of Higgs being examplesand he thought, as
Prentiss had, that the senior civilians in Washington were undercutting
him. Some at EUD, including Delbridge, thought that he might be relieved
as commander.97
Delbridges concerns increased when in September 1977 Prentiss gave
Burnell a series of suggestions for revising EUD procedures, particularly urging that the division turn more work over to host nations under
the indirect contracting system. Delbridge prepared a lengthy reply. He
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reiterated the divisions challenge of executing an extremely large program with a disproportionately small staff; but he concluded that the
Corps and its European customers would best be served by retaining
present EUD flexibility which allows us to go either directly to industry,
indirectly to the host nation, or to any CONUS [Continental United States]
district for services.98
Delbridges defense reached a new team of military leaders at OCE.
Brig. Gen. Richard M. Connell had replaced Burnell as director of military
construction, and Maj. Gen. Ernest Graves, deputy chief of engineers from
July 1977 to March 1978, emerged as a supporter. Graves helped to resolve
the impasse over manpower, and he shored up Delbridges authority to
make decisions for EUD.
General Graves was particularly well prepared to judge whether the
Europe Division needed the workforce that Delbridge had been requesting. In 1970, while serving as deputy director of military construction, he
had devised a formula for calculating the appropriate ratio of employees
to any given level of work in military construction.99 In December 1977
Graves, accompanied by Garrett and McNeely, made the first of two visits
to Frankfurt to discuss the divisions personnel issues. About two-thirds
of the way through Delbridges briefing, Graves slammed his hand down
on the deskscared everybody to deathand said, Dammit! You needed
100 people six months ago! Delbridges initial reaction was anger, but
then he realized, [Graves] wasnt talking to me, he was talking to the
guys on either side of him.100 Graves told Delbridge to have his staff prepare a detailed statement of the divisions manpower requirements.
In March 1978 Graves returned to EUD with Garrett and McNeely
to review the manpower requests. Higgs, who had recently arrived to
head the Engineering Division, took Garrett and McNeely aside and
asked them to leave us alone. Give us a chance give me time to work.
Within weeks EUD received authorization to recruit 120 new employees,
and in the ensuing months the frequency of visits from OCE declined.101
His confidence bolstered, Delbridge launched a broad recruitment
campaign to fill the new positions. In May 1978 the division sent a fiveperson recruiting team, headed by Shirley Kappa, to the United States.
Team members visited Washington, Baltimore, Kansas City, New Orleans,
Sacramento, Portland, and Seattle. They gathered several hundred applications from Corps employees, and more than 70 percent of those who
received offers accepted. This success was especially satisfying because
Garrett and McNeely had predicted that fewer than half the people
offered positions would actually accept. With the new positions, routine
departures at the end of contracts, and an authorized overhire of 70
DACs, EUD added about 120 new employees in the summer and autumn
of 1978. In the divisions initial year, 1974, its staff numbered 280. That
increased to 589 by October 1976, five months after Delbridge had taken
command. In the fiscal year ending October 1977, staff size increased by
less than 5 percent, but the rate of expansion tripled in Delbridges final
year, bringing the total to about 700 by October.102
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Visiting TUSEG
During his tour as commander of EUD, General Delbridge took special pleasure in returning to Turkey, where an old acquaintance, Herb
Wooten, represented U.S. Army engineer interests.103 After mustering
out of his allAfrican American unit at the end of World War II, Wooten
had stayed in Paris to indulge his love of classical music. He had held
various government positions in Europe before joining The United States
Engineer Group (TUSEG) in Turkey in 1955.104 Wooten had remained in
Ankara through many organizational changes. When the Mediterranean
Division was inactivated and TUSEG transferred to the Europe Division
in 1976, Wooten used his contacts in the government of Turkey and with
the Turkish General Staff to the advantage of EUD. He had also traveled to
Frankfurt to help plan EUDs takeover of responsibilities and had worked
at the area office in Italy to arrange the final transfer of equipment and
vehicles from the Mediterranean Division.105
As a captain in Turkey in the early 1960s, Delbridge had known
Wooten as a GS5 office manager. By 1977 Wooten had hardly advanced
in grade, but the general saw immediately the advantages that his longevity brought to EUD.
When I landed in Turkey Herb came out on the tarmac to meet me
and had a retinue of people and a car. About 50 yards away was
an airliner that had landed with several Air Force generals. They
were all standing in line going through customs and getting the traditional hard time. We just bypassed it all! When [Wooten] flashed
his ID cards, they were all the ID cards we had in the 50s. They all
thought he was a spook, a CIA guy. And since he knew so much
about the area, the ambassador would call him in on occasion, which
again added to the mystery and mystique of Herb Wooten.106
Although U.S. military construction in Turkey declined in the aftermath of the Cyprus dispute, Wooten remained in Ankara even after
Delbridge left EUD. When work picked up again in 1979, he helped reopen
the TUSEG office.107
During the second year of General Delbridges tenure EUD achieved
a degree of stability. New procedures were helping incoming employees
adjust to life in Europe, and increased social activities improved staff
morale. Much of the tension between the newcomers and the old-timers
had dissipated. Joe Higgs and Jose Cruz, the new chiefs of engineering
and construction, appeared to be getting the workload under control.
Their cooperation helped to dispel friction between their divisions and
get staff members to work together to review projects, thereby reducing
the late modifications to contracts.108
Whereas General Prentiss had spent his eighteen-month tour as division engineer struggling to put the new organization into operation,
General Delbridge had sought to gain control of the workload, establish
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regular procedures, and improve morale. Their efforts brought results. By
1978 Delbridge began to feel that EUD had become a hard-charging organization made up of enthusiastic people who enjoyed working together.
His gregariousness put some people off but engaged others and, in their
view, changed the atmosphere dramatically. Though the review board
was onerous, it helped establish more effective project management and
control of funds.109 By the summer of 1978 EUD had moved through its
transition period.
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2/3/06 10:36:15 AM
8
DECADE OF CONSOLIDATION
AND GROWTH
t took only the stroke of a pen in 1974 to establish the United States
Army Engineer Division, Europe (Europe Division or EUD) of the Corps
of Engineers, but almost four yearsuntil 1978to develop a cohesive
organization. Brig. Gen. Norman G. Delbridge, Jr., who succeeded Brig.
Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., as commander of the Europe Division, felt that he
had overcome the tensions that characterized the transition to management
of military construction in Europe by the Corps of Engineers. Taking leave
of EUD in July 1978, Delbridge observed: The last two years have been a
challenging period; challenges will continue, but flowers are now ready
to bloom. We have procedures, more people on the way [a] closer and
warmer relationship between everyone here in EUD.1
From the base that Prentiss and Delbridge had established, their
immediate successors concentrated on the challenges facing a growing
but fundamentally stable organization. In the five years after Delbridges
departure, two commanders (Brig. Gens. Drake Wilson and George K.
Withers, Jr.) strove to adjust the divisions personnel allotment to fit its
workload, to balance its management responsibilities, and to address
and meet the needs of the divisions customers. All of the division commanders management decisions had to be made in light of changes in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) strategic thinking, shifts in
the European political order, and new U.S. military weapons.
After five years of relative stability in leadership, in fewer than thirty
months between June 1983 and the autumn of 1985, three brigadier
generalsScott Beecher Smith, James W. van Loben Sels, and James W.
Raycommanded the division in swift succession. The rapid turnover
of leaders and their varying styles of management challenged division
personnel. This period of turmoil coincided with a marked expansion of
workload in the 1980s, which in turn prompted a tightening of management control. By 1986 balance had returned once again, and the division
enjoyed a few years of stability and a sense of confidence in their future
as the end of the decade approached.
12K_Chap08_Final.indd 1
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Delbridges successor, Brig.
Gen. Drake Wilson, arrived on
15 August 1978 to assume command of the Europe Division.
Before this assignment Wilson
had served as deputy director of civil works at the Office
of the Chief of Engineers (OCE)
in Washington, but he was no
stranger to Frankfurt. As an
Army dependent, Wilson had
lived in Germany and had graduated from the Department of
Defenses Frankfurt High School
in 1947. He attended the U.S.
Military Academy, graduated in
1952, and returned to Germany
as a junior officer assigned to the
United States Army Construction
Agency, Germany (USACAG),
General Wilson
from 1958 to 1961. Wilson also
served with NATOs Central
Army Group in 19701971 and in
Stuttgart on the engineer staff of VII Corps from 1971 to 1973.2
In his first staff meeting at EUD, General Wilson emphasized his
desire to be kept informed of issues and his intention to let people do
their work without intervening. Wilsons subordinates described him as
comparatively formal, straightforward, and decisive. They remember his
two-year tour as a relatively quiet period despite the divisions uneven
workload.3
Balancing Manpower and Workload

Like Prentiss and Delbridge, Wilson confronted a personnel situation
characterized by sharp fluctuations in the number of staff and in the volume of work. Unfortunately, staff size and workload frequently moved in
opposite directions. Most American civilian employees signed contracts to
work three years in Europe. Because of the time needed for processing in
and out and for learning how the division functioned, only two years of
a term proved to be fully productive. Frequent turnovers contributed to
the ongoing need to recruit experienced Corps employees from the United
States.4
The recruiting trip that Delbridge organized to the United States
in May 1978 had been very effective. At the end of October, however,
President Jimmy Carter announced a hiring freeze. Although the freeze
was lifted at the end of January 1979, ceilings for new hires were set in
line with the overall reduction in numbers for the Army. These ceilings
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Decade of Consolidation and Growth
Europe Division workload included build-to-lease family housing projects for

the Hanau community.
were below those anticipated when the hiring had taken place under
Delbridge, and General Wilson had to manage the size of his staff and the
workload within these new limits.5
Personnel Manipulation
Throughout 1978 Joe G. Higgs and Jose Cruz, EUDs chiefs of engineering and construction, respectively, worked to reduce the huge backlog
of contracts that had accumulated during the divisions initial years. By
the spring of 1979, as the workload came under control, Wilson realized
that EUD had too many people. As one way to reduce staff, Wilson told
his managers to facilitate the return of willing U.S. civilian employees to
the United States as they completed employment contracts.6
The departure of Americans caused German and third-country employees to worry about a possible reduction in personnel in the field offices.
The matter caught the attention of EUDs Works Council, the body elected
to represent local employees as authorized by USAREUR and the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement (1963 supplement).7 Hasso Damm, who had
served since 1974 as the full-time chairman of the Works Council, noted
that the increases in personnel at EUD between 1975 and 1979 were primarily in positions for Department of the Army civilians (DACs). Accordingly,
he argued, the personnel cuts should come from this group and not disproportionately from the Germans and third-country nationals.8
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After meeting with Damm, Wilson authorized a memorandum stating
that the total number of local national employees would not be reduced,
although geographic shifts of personnel might be made. On the broader
issue of the proportion of these workers in the divisions workforce,
Damm obtained an oral commitment from General Wilson that reductions, when necessary, would be taken first and more heavily from the
DAC roster of employees. This oral agreement, which Damm confirmed
with each successive EUD commander, produced a core group of locally
hired workers who provided continuity for the organization.9 As a further gesture of support for the non-American workers, Wilson designated
the chairmanship of the Works Council a full-time position, even though
German law did not require a full-time chairman for a council representing fewer than 300 local national employees.10
During 1979 and 1980 the number of employees at EUD continued to
fluctuate, even though the workload was increasingan irony noted by
Wilson. For most of fiscal year 1979 the division averaged 860 employees. Between January and June the division cut twenty-five positions as
a result of Army-wide cutbacks.11 More cuts were made in August 1979,
and by 30 September EUD had reduced its staff to 707, the same level as
before Delbridges recruitment campaign in 1978. The number of employees increased to an average of 780 throughout most of fiscal year 1980 but
dropped back at the end of the year to 690. The division operated in effect
with one level of staffing throughout most of the fiscal year and then, to
meet authorized levels, reduced its staff by releasing temporary employees and leaving positions unfilled. Once the division reported the staff
numbers, the temporary positions could be refilled quickly.12
Wilson and his management team worked hard to build a strong core
staff. In the spring of 1979 Wilson requested authorization from OCE
for thirty-one new upper-grade positions (GS13 to GS17) to improve
middle management and to enhance the level of technical proficiency in
the division. OCE eventually approved fourteen positions, most of them
in the Engineering Division, where Higgs tried to create a grade structure
that would attract people from districts in the United States.13 To provide
more continuity and to reduce turnover, Wilson changed his earlier policy
guideline and began actively encouraging American civilians to remain
in Europe for up to five years.14 Recruiting continued to be a major activity
for the division.15
To promote efficiency and accountability, Wilson revised the roles of
the two colonels serving as deputy division engineers by assigning each
deputy a principal area of responsibility. He gave Air Force programs and
special projects, particularly schools, to Col. Glen Smith. Col. Valentine
Carrasco oversaw all work for the Army, which was the bulk of EUDs
program. Wilson explained the arrangement by saying, The heaviest dollar volume, Carrasco had; the most problems, Smith had. Both deputies
and the commander had authority to sign contracts.16
Under Wilsons command William E. Camblor finally received the
promotion that he had first sought while director of USACAG in 1959.
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While assigned in USACAG as a junior officer, Wilson worked closely
with Camblor and appreciated his administrative skills. Early in his tour
at EUD, General Wilson requested approval to upgrade Camblors position, assistant division engineer for intergovernmental affairs, to a GS16.
He then recommended Camblor for the position, and in 1980 Camblor was
promoted to SES4, a ranking in the Senior Executive Service equivalent
to GS16.17 That promotion gave the organization two SES positions; Joe
Higgs had been promoted in July 1979 when the Senior Executive Service
was established.
Managing Resources
In October 1979 an OCE command inspection team suggested that
EUD needed to rethink how it managed construction, particularly the
structure of field offices that reported to the Construction Division. For
several months the staff examined workload and flow of work at headquarters and in the area offices. The area offices had been established in
1974 as coordinating and reporting offices, while resident offices handled
direct project oversight. The military officers and civilian staff in both the
area and resident offices expressed frustration and dissatisfaction with
the multiple levels of review that they faced and with the delays in getting decisions from headquarters.18 To address these concerns, the chief of
construction, Jose Cruz, established a task force led by Dwight Beranek,
chief of the Construction Management Section. The reorganization recommended by the task forceintended to improve communications and to
speed decision making within headquarters in Frankfurttook effect at
the beginning of the new fiscal year, 1 October 1980.19
Several measures implemented along with the reorganization were
designed to respond specifically to the issues raised by field personnel. The Supervision and Inspection Branch was split into two sections,
and the number of staff positions was increased to augment technical
support to the field. Personnel were also added in office engineering to
improve management of funds, troop construction, and accountability
for real property. The Contract Administration Branch was reorganized
into three sections, each handling projects for a specific geographic area.
Construction managers were assigned to serve specific area offices rather
than specific programs.
The field offices themselves underwent significant change. The division redefined the old Central, Southern, and Southwest Area Offices
and closed the Mediterranean Area Office. The new area offices had
larger workloads and a greater number of personnel. Several area offices
took the name of the city in which they were located: Kaiserslautern,
Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Nuremberg, and Wrzburg. Only the Northern Area
Office kept its name and location. (See Map 16.) The division set up resident offices in Vicenza, Italy; in Sigonella, Sicily; and in Athens, Greece,
and retained The United States Engineer Group (TUSEG) Resident Office,
which had been reestablished in 1979 in Incirlik, Turkey.20 All area and
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2/3/06 10:36:39 AM

SWEDEN
NORTHERN EUROPE
FIELD ORGANIZATION
1983

Resident Office
Project Office
0
50
100
50
150 Miles
150 Kilometers
100
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
WEST
GERMANY
BERLIN
The Hague
Hannover
NETHERLANDS
EAST
GERMANY
NORTHERN AREA
Leipzig
Mnchen-Gladbach
BRUSSELS
Hoensbroek
FRANKFURT
AREA
Teveren
WRZBURG AREA
B E L G I U M
Giessen
Bitburg
Fulda
Frankfurt
Hahn
Bad Kreuznach
LUXEMBOURG
KAISERSLAUTERN
AREA
Kaiserslautern
Baumholder
Landstuhl Heidelberg
Wildflecken
Schweinfurt
Aschaffenburg
Bamberg
Wrzburg
Grafenwhr
Vilseck
Nuremberg
NUREMBERG
AREA
Karlsruhe
AMSTERDAM
Stuttgart
HEIDELBERG
AREA
Augsburg
STUTTGART
AREA
Dijon
Zrich
LIECHTENSTEIN
A U S T R I A
Map 16
resident offices reported directly to the Construction Division. The reorganization centralized legal services in headquarters, and lawyers Terry
Trowbridge from the Mediterranean Area Office and Carl Korman from
Stuttgart moved to Frankfurt.21
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The permanent orders signed by General Wilson stated that changing
the status of any unit to or from an area office or resident office would
no longer require additional permanent orders. The basic field structure established in 1980 changed little during the following decade. As
changes in workload dictated, the division closed the Sigonella office and
upgraded Heidelberg and TUSEG to area offices. The new administrative
arrangement allowed EUD to establish other resident offices and project
offices as needed.22
Organization Headquarters
In 1979 General Wilson agreed to mandate a single form for the organizations name. Rather than continue the vacillation between the use
of European Division and Europe Division, Wilson ordered that Europe
Division be used consistently; it was the form that Headquarters, United
States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), in Washington preferred.23
Because this decision required a new sign on the building and new letterhead, it seemed an appropriate moment to give the headquarters building
a commemorative name.24 The division counsel, Allan B. Aaron, proposed
that the headquarters building be named in honor of Leonard L. Phillips,
who had served with USACAG, Engineer Command (ENGCOM), and
EUD between 1962 and his death in February 1976. Before serving with
the Corps, Phillips had participated in the Nuremberg war crimes trials.
In 1960 he joined the Corps of Engineers as a trial attorney while remaining an Army reserve officer. As general counsel for ENGCOM and division
counsel for EUD, Phillips worked on legal issues surrounding the relocation
of U.S. forces from France; helped negotiate the first construction agreement
with the government of Belgium; drafted and negotiated the prototype
Guarantee Rental Housing Agreement that became the United States Army,
Europe (USAREUR), standard; and helped create the legal basis for implementing the Stem to Stern program.25 Colleagues praised his precise legal
mind, integrity and loyalty, wit, and reserved demeanor.26
Wilson supported the request to name the building after Phillipsa
civiliannoting that more than 60 percent of the personnel working in
the division were American civilians. At the annual awards ceremony on
11 July 1980, the headquarters building on the former I. G. Farben property in Frankfurt was officially named the Phillips Building.27
Addressing EUD Customers

In mid-September 1980 Wilson, by then promoted to major general,
left EUD and returned to Washington. As of 16 June 1979, the Corps had
a new status as an Army major command; its headquarters became U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers. Wilson became director of military programs
at the newly designated Headquarters, USACE (replacing the Office of the
Chief of Engineers), and General Withers succeeded Wilson as commander of the Europe Division.
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Phillips Building in the Mid-1980s
General Withers, a 1956 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, served

in Europe from 1974 to 1976 as commander of the 24th Engineer Group,
predecessor to the 18th Engineer Brigade. Before being assigned to EUD,
Withers served in the Department of the Armys Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations. He projected a quiet, reserved, and scholarly
demeanor.
During his tour as commander of the 24th Engineer Group, Withers
perceived a general dislike of EUD among much of the U.S. Army in
Europe. This attitude disturbed him, and he set out to develop a new
climate. He particularly hoped to fulfill the needs of the commanders of
V Corps, VII Corps, and 21st Support Commandwho did not think they
were getting enough support from the engineers in Frankfurtand the
Directorate of Engineering and Housing (DEH) in each of the military
communities. His other management priority was to keep up with the
greatly expanding military construction mission.28
The substantial growth in the defense budgets in the late 1970s created
a burgeoning workload. New weapons systems and the improvement of
facilities in Europe scheduled under these enlarged budgets increased the
design and construction activity for EUD. To emphasize his commitment
to better service for the communities, Withers raised the managerial level
at which EUD handled this support. He created the position of assistant
division engineer for DEH support and appointed Lt. Col. Robert Tames
to the position in January 1981. Tames, who reported to the chief of engineering, Higgs, was expected to meet individually and frequently with
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the facilities engineers in their
communities. Under the concept
of one-stop installation support, Tames was the person in
EUD to whom community commanders and engineers could
turn for help. By all accounts this
strategy worked, and the division retained the position, filling
it successively through the 1980s
with Lt. Cols. Robert OToole,
John Moravec, Ray Powell, and
Douglas Lamothe.29
In his first weeks on the job,
Tames visited every one of the
more than thirty USAREUR
communities. As Congress began
to fund improvements in living conditions for soldiers, and
as Operation and Maintenance,
General Withers
Army (OMA), money began to
arrive, the community commanders and DEHs realized that
they did not have the capacity to do either the requisite design or the construction themselves. They gave the work to EUDsomewhat reluctantly
according to General Withersand the division responded. Technical
assistance to the facilities engineers for projects to maintain and to repair
barracks came from the Facilities Support Section in the Engineering
Division.30 In 1981 Higgs appointed Steve Kupec as chief of the Facilities
Support Section. By the end of fiscal year 1982, Kupecs section had grown
from nine to thirty-six people and handled over $50 million of work on
134 projects.31 (See Map 17.)
In another effort to promote better cooperation between the Army
engineers and the military communities, General Withers joined the
deputy chief of staff, engineer (DCSENG), at USAREUR, Maj. Gen. Henry
J. Hatch, Jr., in convening two-day meetings to review the OMA projects.
The meeting location varied: EUD headquarters, an area office, or Hatchs
office in Heidelberg.32 Both Hatch and Withers attended, and they urged
commanders from VII Corps, V Corps, 21st Support Command, 26th
Support Group, and Seventh Army Training Command to attend. The
generals chaired the meetings as an inducement for the colonels to attend.
According to Higgs, he and Withers wanted to engage and work directly
with unit commanders rather than with subordinates.33
The effort succeeded in expanding the EUD workload. In recognition of Higgs efforts in leading the Engineering Division through this
expansion, the Society of American Military Engineers awarded him the
1981 Wheeler Medal, named in honor of Lt. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler,
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2/3/06 10:36:41 AM

SWEDEN
January 1983
Directorate of Engineering
and Housing (DEH)
0
50
50
100
150 Miles
150 Kilometers
100
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
BERLIN
AMSTERDAM
NETHERLANDS
The Hague
Hannover
EAST
GERMANY
WEST GERMANY
Rheinberg
Leipzig
NATO/SHAPE
Brussels
B E L G I U M
Wiesbaden
Bad Kreuznach
Baumholder
Kaiserslautern
Reims
Schweinfurt
Aschaffenburg
Bamberg
Darmstadt
Wrzburg
Worms
Grafenwhr
Mannheim
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
Pirmasens
Ansbach
Hohenfels
Heilbronn
Karlsruhe
Mainz
LUXEMBOURG
Zweibrcken
Fulda
Wildflecken
Frankfurt
Hanau
Stuttgart
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Erfurt
Giessen
Gppingen
Neu Ulm
Augsburg
Munich
Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Dijon
Bad Tlz
Zrich
LIECHTENSTEIN
A U S T R I A
Map 17
a former chief of engineers. The award recognized Higgs leadership in

managing a sixfold increase in the Military Construction Program for
Europe, in achieving the substantial reduction of the design backlog, and
in increasing contract awards.34
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Persistent Manpower Problems
General Withers faced one of the cyclical discrepancies between staff
numbers and workload that beset EUD. Continuing problems in recruiting and retaining qualified people hindered Withers ability to keep up
with the volume of work and meet schedules. In reports to Headquarters,
USACE, he repeatedly argued that EUD had an inadequate number of
staff positions, inappropriately graded positions, poor leadership in some
key divisions and branches, and too much turnover.35
In March 1981 EUD had 730 people, just slightly above the year-end
levels maintained by Delbridge and Wilson from 1978 to 1980. Turnover
continued, particularly in the lower grades, where the rate was about
120 percent a year.36 Many of the clerical workers were military dependents and subject to frequent moves. To combat turnover in the Resource
Management Office (formerly Comptrollers Office), Withers upgraded
positions to make them more attractive to Corps employees working in
the United States.37
Anticipating the higher workload projected for fiscal years 1982 and
1983, Withers asked Headquarters, USACE, for more officer spaces and
about 100 additional civilian spaces.38 Because EUD had about 75 vacancies, he also organized a recruiting trip to the United States. In April
1981 a recruiting team went to districts in Norfolk, Mobile, Fort Worth,
St. Louis, Omaha, and Seattle and to headquarters in Washington.39 The
team contacted 1,000 potential candidates, but only 42 signed on. By the
autumn of 1981, EUD had 855 authorized spaces but only 740 employees.40
To attract strong civilians to the division, Withers requested approval
to upgrade two positionschief of resource management (to GS15) and
chief of construction (to SES). With approval of the new grades, Withers
took the opportunity to search for candidates outside his current staff. He
explicitly told the comptroller, Randolph S. Washington, and the chief of
construction, Jose Cruz, that the promotions were not necessarily theirs.
For both positions Withers chose applicants new to the division and to
Europe.
Withers selected Ray Walker from Picatinny, New Jersey, as the new
chief of resource management. Although offered the position of deputy
comptroller, Washington did not want to serve as a subordinate in a division that he had headed since 1974. In mid-May 1981 he left for a job with
the U.S. Support Command to Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers
Europe, in Belgium.41
Withers selected John Blake as the new chief of construction, and Cruz
returned to the Fort Worth District. Blake had a wide range of experience
managing overseas construction for the Corps. He had served in Korea,
in the Marshall Islands, in the Mediterranean Division, in Saudi Arabia,
and, before his arrival in Frankfurt, in Israel, where the Corps built two
air bases that were part of the Camp David settlement between Israel and
Egypt. Blake liked to be in the field, and he knew firsthand the difficulties of working with sovereign nations and managing both people and
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projects in remote locations. In November 1981, just after arriving at EUD,
Blake received the Meritorious Civilian Service Award, the Armys second
highest civilian honorary award, for his work in Israel.42
The effort that Withers and his staff devoted to stateside recruiting
finally began to pay off by early 1982. Both Blake and Walker were on
board, and Withers reported to the chief of engineers that overall strength
had grown from 740 in September 1981 to 830 in January 1982. Withers
was pleased with the successes but frustrated by continuing problems in
recruiting. Corps district leaders in the United States let employees move
to overseas assignments only grudgingly, and coworkers resented employees who went overseas but retained reemployment rights in the stateside
district. Nevertheless, in May 1982 EUDs authorized strength reached
906. German and third-country employees made up 276 of the total.43
The continuous growth in personnel created overcrowding at EUD
headquarters. In 1978 the division began leasing space a few blocks from
the I. G. Farben complex. In 1979 EUD constructed the first annex to the
headquarters building; work began in the spring of 1982 on a second
annex. Completed by October 1982, the second annex accommodated
ninety employees.44 This, too, was insufficient, so EUD rented a building in the Dornbusch area of Frankfurt. Initially, the Civil Section of the
Technical Engineering Branch and the master-planning unit shared the
Dornbusch offices with the Frankfurt Area Office, but soon the area office
moved to leased space in Fechenheim, another area of Frankfurt.45
Developing the Engineering Division

Master planning developed as a significant new activity in EUD
efforts to provide services to the military communities in Europe. While
serving as the USAREUR engineer in Heidelberg, General Prentiss came
to recognize the possibilities for the division to help the military communities develop individual master plans for their complexes and facilities. In
January 1977 he raised the issue with the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. John
W. Morris, by reporting that there was no entity in Europe able to review
and comment on master plans developed by the communities. Because
he knew that EUD did not have the capacity to handle the assignment,
Prentiss began to search for assistance from a private sector contractor.46
Joe Higgs, who arrived at EUD in February 1978, grasped this situation as an opportunity. Higgs wanted to expand the capability of his
Engineering Division so staff could develop master plans for USAREUR
communities and then help them prepare the project descriptions and
paperwork to submit projects to Congress for funding. Master planning at EUD was still handled by only one man, Vic Schulman, so Higgs
looked for help. The chief of engineering at headquarters approved the
EUD request for funds from the OMA budget to hire three people for six
months.47
By the time General Withers took command in late 1980, the division
had six people in master planning and support from USAREUR to expand
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2/3/06 10:36:42 AM

this service. By the end of 1982 the Master Planning Section had grown to
thirty-eight. Work had increased from eight contracts involving thirty
projects, representing architect-engineer fees of $600,000, to a program of
eighty contracts covering nearly 600 projects and totaling $50 million in
architect-engineer fees.48 Master planning had indeed become a major service provided by EUD to USAREURs military communities.49
As chief of the Engineering Divisions Planning Section, Terry
Emmons coordinated the provision of master planning and other planning services to USAREUR, its six major subordinate commands, and their
forty-eight communities and planning areas. At the beginning of 1981, his
first full year at EUD, Emmons section handled 40 projects. By the end of
the year the number was 250, and Emmons was named Employee of the
Year for 1981. Under his leadership the division developed a two-week
master-planning course, prepared planning reference manuals and handbooks, and set up a program to provide definitive drawings for improvements that the military communities routinely requested.50 On 1 July 1982,
the Planning Section became the Planning Branch with three sections:
Engineering Systems, Future Development, and Project Support.51
Beginning in the mid-1980s, EUD contracted with U.S. architect-engineer firms to develop master plans for all USAREUR communities. The
results were mixed. The first firms hired had experience in master planning; but as the workload grew larger, EUD had to use firms with less
experience in planning and often with only minimal familiarity with
Europe. In hope of furnishing their customers in the U.S. military communities with better service, Higgs and Emmons turned to German architect-engineer firms.52
At a minimum, the planning studies conducted under EUD auspices
provided an inventory of the eight hundred installations that USAREUR
maintained. USAREUR kept very poor records of its facilities: the number
and condition of the rooms, the capacity of electrical plants, where sewer
lines ran, and so forth. EUDs goal was to provide each user with a plan
that described existing conditions and assigned projections for three phases
of development: the first year, over five years, and over twenty years.53
In the summer of 1985 EUD hired a new chief of the Planning Branch,
Kristine Allaman. Having worked for the Installation Support Activity,
Europe, the agency that combined all the installation support activities
that came under USAREURs deputy chief of staff, engineer, Allaman
viewed planning as a service and a supplement to the communities own
engineering work. Reflecting her strong commitment to customer service, she reorganized the staff, combining people with different technical and planning skills to form teams to provide comprehensive services
to specific communities. She encouraged the teams to get into the field,
attend local master-planning meetings, and show the participants what
EUD could offer. A GS14, Allaman remained for several years as EUDs
highest-graded female manager.54
By 1987 the Planning Branch had grown to fifty-six people. It covered
all its costs with fees paid by the customers requesting its services. By
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then the services also included interior design, energy studies, and sewer
studies. EUD offered customers three phases of analysis and projections: a
computer-aided design and drafting system that generated basic information maps and analyzed existing conditions; tabulations of existing and
required facilities, as well as plans and analyses oriented toward future
development; and comprehensive studies of both existing and required
utilities. The planners also offered communities a land-use plan, a total
plan for future development, and a master-plan report that even someone
who had no background in planning could understand. In the late 1980s
the branch annually handled more than 450 projects and $50 to $60 million in contracts. The Planning Branch also managed an environmental
program for USAREUR involving over ninety contracts with an estimated
programmed amount of $12 million. The environmental program services
dealt with concerns such as asbestos, soil and ground-water contamination, hazardous waste, landfills, and radon gas.55
In June 1988 master planning received additional impetus from a new
program, Army Communities of Excellence, sponsored by General Carl E.
Vuono, the Army chief of staff. This program promoted consistency in a
communitys physical appearance and function, the establishment of standards for all construction, and the use of installation design guides, all
elements that EUDs master planners emphasized in their approach to the
military communities.56
The expansion of master planning illustrates EUDs commitment to
provide its customers with comprehensive engineering services. In addition, Higgs oversaw growth in other sections in the Engineering Division.
Like planning, the Foundations and Materials Branch had only one engineer when Higgs arrived. Over time he increased this branch to seventeen
people, and EUD used the added manpower to broaden the range and
quality of services that the division could provide to customers.57 During
19761988 the Engineering Division staff strength fluctuated but grew
steadily overall. (Table 5)
Managing the Workload

Although the Construction Division had been reorganized in the
autumn of 1980, John Blake made additional changes after he arrived to
head the division. Projecting a large increase in the number of construction projects and acting in accordance with his philosophy of decentralized management, Blake moved to streamline headquarters further and to
give area offices even more authority. He saw that the division headquarters combined contract administration and construction management.
Blake believed that the two jobs demanded totally different personal temperaments, making it difficult for one person to do both well:
The guy who is the contract administrator has got to be someone
who loves detail, who is willing to sit down and very meticulously
write a mod[ification], go through the details, chapter and verse,
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2/3/06 10:36:43 AM

Table 5
Engineering Division Staffing, Europe Division
Fiscal Years 19761988
Year
Personnel*
Year
Personnel*
1976
161
1983
402
1977
184
1984
399
1978
271
1985
419
1979
230
1986
419
1980
230
1987
421
1981
261
1988
389
1982
363
*Year-end figures
checking numbers, making sure everything is lined up in the right

order. A construction manager, on the other hand, is normally an
out-going young fellow who is full of vinegar, runs around and
makes arrangements for everything, pulls it all together.58
Blake moved the functions and staff concerned with contract administration to the area offices and retained a strong group of construction
managers in Frankfurt. He also received approval to strengthen the
area offices by upgrading the civilian position of deputy area engineer
to GS14, the grade equivalent to the military rank of lieutenant colonel
held by the area engineers. Revised procedures reduced duplication of
effort among project offices, resident offices, the area offices, and headquarters, particularly in preparation of contract modifications. Additional
technical support positions strengthened area offices, and headquarters
provided supplementary support.59 Richard Grimm, who had served in
the Stuttgart Resident Office in the late 1970s and who returned to EUD
as deputy area engineer in Turkey in 1982, recalled that the changes made
the division a lot more streamlined, a lot more efficient. You could get
[things] done so much faster.60 Withers supported the decentralization
because he too felt that deferring decisions to Frankfurt and the headquarters staff led to delays that added costs to construction contracts.61
Blake also had Withers support in transferring responsibility for
negotiating and awarding construction contracts from the Construction
Division to the Procurement and Supply Division (later called the
Contracting Division). Blake experienced firsthand the pressures of an
end-of-year contracting cycle within a few weeks after his arrival when
almost a dozen people were brought in from the area offices to handle
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2/3/06 10:36:43 AM

the paperwork. After that experience, which he described as a three-ring
circus, Blake wanted contracts handled by the Procurement and Supply
Division as they were in other Corps offices. The current system had
evolved because of dissatisfaction with a chief of procurement and supply that had since departed. The incumbent chief, Theresa Watson, was
competent and respected; both Blake and Withers were confident that she
could handle the contracting responsibility. Accordingly, the Construction
Division returned authority to award construction contracts to the
Procurement and Supply Division.62
Construction in Turkey
The construction program developing in Turkey presented Blake
with one of his first major challenges in the field. EUD had assumed
responsibility for construction in Turkey in 1976 but had little to do. The
government of Turkey had put U.S. military forces under provisional
status in July 1975 because it felt that the U.S. Congress had broken the
bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey by imposing the
arms embargo after the Turkish-Greek clash over Cyprus. The provisional
status curtailed American intelligence gathering, banned U.S. flights and
cargo shipments through Turkey, and prohibited most new construction
projects.63
In 1978 Congress lifted the arms embargo, and the two governments
began negotiations for a Defense Economic Cooperative Agreement,
signed in March 1980. In the new atmosphere, both the Army and the
Air Force decided to undertake projects for the U.S. military assigned to
Turkey. To support that decision, EUD sent a team led by General Wilson,
Jose Cruz, and Joe Higgs to assess the extent of the work needed in
Turkey and to establish the necessary diplomatic relations. After Congress
approved funds for new construction to improve the living and working conditions and the security at Incirlik Air Base and five remote sites
(Erzurum, Cakmakli, Corlu, Izmit, and Ortakoy) occupied by Army custodial artillery personnel, Wilson requested an Army captain to staff the
TUSEG Resident Office.64
The designated officer, Capt. M. Stephen Rhoades, received a briefing
in Frankfurt and arrived in Incirlik in July 1979 with a set of plans under
one arm and specifications under the other.65 He had been sent to Turkey
to identify contractors, solicit bids, and start a project. Rhoades had a
bachelors degree in systems engineering and a masters degree in civil
engineering from the University of Florida but no prior experience in contracting and no experience in the Corps of Engineers.
With assistance from Herb Wooten, the long-time TUSEG employee
serving as liaison at the Joint U.S. Military Mission Aid to Turkey, Rhoades
located the office on the air base in Incirlik that TUSEG had abandoned
when construction ceased. Rhoades reclaimed the quarters from the Red
Cross, retrieved the office equipment and vehicles, and he hired a secretary. It took almost a full year to get TUSEG back into operation.66
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The first site scheduled for an upgrade was in Erzurum, a difficult
place to start. The citys name means the eastern edge of Rome, that is, the
boundary of the old Roman Empire. Located on a high plain in the mountains, it is close to the Turkish-Russian border and east of Moscow. The
weather is very severelong, cold winters with abundant snow. The first
contract called for bachelor officers quarters, bachelor enlisted quarters,
a multipurpose building, and interior refurbishing of a number of existing buildings, all designed with features to protect the troops from the
extreme weather and to make the buildings solid and well insulated. The
isolated location made troop comfort and recreation especially important.
Over time the construction came to include a new dining hall, a racquetball court, a gymnasium, and covered walkways between buildings to
avoid the snow that drifted to depths over ten feet.67
Rhoades had difficulty finding a contractor willing to go to Erzurum.
In 1980 he awarded the first contract for construction. There was no local
labor market, so the contractor had to bring in workers and build a dormitory to house them. Within months the project was behind schedule.
EUDs Construction Division sent people on temporary assignment to
help Rhoades process contract modifications. To help resolve persistent
problems, the divisions deputy commander, Col. Philip Cowles, and
the assistant division engineer for intergovernmental affairs, William
Camblor, went to Turkey in October 1981. On 5 October Cowles, Camblor,
and Rhoades met with a Turkish colonel from the Ministry of Defense
to review the construction problems in Erzurum and to discuss ways to
facilitate construction contracting in Turkey.68
In a report of the trip, Colonel Cowles wryly described work in
Erzurum: The history of this project is at times amusing and at other
times sad. The design package had been prepared in English by the divisions design group in Italy. Only after problems arose did the contractor
in Erzurum admit that neither the foreman nor any of the workers could
read English or understand the plans or the specifications. Moreover, the
designers projected a construction period for the contract of 600 days,
despite the fact that Erzurums severe weather limited construction to
about 180 days a year.69
Cowles report listed a number of requests that Rhoades had made,
including cold-weather gear for his employees and racquetball kits. He
also asked for semiweekly telephone calls placed from Frankfurt to Turkey,
because long-distance telephone service from Turkey was unreliable. The
report suggested revised procedures and concluded with an admonition:
In the future we should plan and tailor our procurement, we
should pre-qualify contractors if we are not sure of them, we need
strong capable field people to deal with a problematic contractor and,
in Turkey, we need government assistance to ensure materials are
available to the contractor. The entire project gives one the impression of building according to a standard prevalent in Korea in 1965 or
in America, perhaps 50 years ago.70
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Army engineer projects in Turkey included the barracks in Cakmakli and this water
tower (inset) under construction in Izmit.
John Blakes experience with construction in Saudi Arabia and in

Israel gave him a good understanding of Rhoades problems. Some experienced and willing construction managers, including Richard Grimm,
became available for the work in Turkey when the air base projects in
Israel ended. Grimm had worked under Blake on the missile sites in
North Dakota in 1972 and had been a resident engineer in the Stuttgart
Area Office in the late 1970s before he worked in Israel. As the program
in Israel wound down, Grimm contacted Blake, who offered Grimm the
position as deputy area engineer in Turkey.71 Grimm arrived at Incirlik
in January 1982, when EUD upgraded TUSEG from a resident office to an
area office. During the 1982 calendar year the number of people at TUSEG
increased from nine to twenty-one. The workload increased from four
projects under construction to ten ready for advertisement and an additional twenty-four under design.72
With improved procedures and more experienced staff, the TUSEG
office awarded contracts for work at four other remote sites: Corlu,
Ortakoy, Izmit, and Cakmakli. EUD had lump-sum allocations to rebuild
these sites; over time he supervised complete rehabilitation, including
underground utilities, at all five installations.73 TUSEG managed to award
contracts at about 50 percent of the estimates and as a consequence found
that they had ample money to get the work done.74
By all accounts Captain Rhoades was exceptionally mature and
energeticone of those outgoing people that just thrived on adver222
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sity. Rhoades, his wife, and two children lived on the Incirlik base
in an eight-by-forty-foot house trailer. Other TUSEG staff lived on the
economy, frequently in buildings without central heating, sometimes
without hot water. Electricity was unreliable, which meant that the
availability of water was unpredictable. There was a long waiting list for
commercial telephones.75 The Society of American Military Engineers
awarded Rhoades the 1981 Sverdrup Medal established in memory of
distinguished military engineer Maj. Gen. Leif Sverdrup. The award
recognized Rhoades extraordinary achievements in building the area
office and in directing construction in remote sites throughout Turkey.
In July 1982 Rhoades left Turkey to work with the Construction Branch
of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, at USAREUR in
Heidelberg.76
Tightening Organizational Control

Withers completed his tour as division engineer early in June 1983,
and Brig. Gen. Scott B. Smith succeeded him. Smith had graduated from
the U.S. Military Academy in 1956, the same year as Withers, and had
served in Europe with the 12th Engineer Battalion from 1962 to 1965.
Smith was assigned to OCE in 19731974 and served as district engineer
in Huntington, West Virginia, from 1974 to 1977. Unlike any of his predecessors at EUD, he had experience as a division engineer: From 1980
to 1983 he commanded the North Central Division with headquarters in
Chicago, Illinois.
By his recollection, Smith arrived at EUD with a definite management philosophy and what he characterized as a fair amount of
skepticism that the organization was on track. He asked a lot of
questions, found that the answers were not totally comforting, and
concluded that EUD needed to shift its direction. Smith set for himself
three principal tasks: shift the management attention of the division to
the customer; improve relations with the Air Force; and improve internal procedures.77
For General Smith, all of his specific actions formed part of a plan to
tighten the reins on the organization. To this end, he challenged a wide
range of practices and procedures that he felt were hindering timely
completion of work, detracting from achieving the mission, undermining discipline, or obstructing relationships with customers. He displayed intense concern about fraud, waste, and abuse, particularly in the
procurement process and in the administration of contracts. An internal
investigation revealed more than seventy-five instances of procedural
irregularities that the division needed to send to Washington for review
by USACE. Most were procurement irregularities, including unauthorized contract modifications that probably resulted from attempts by
midlevel managers to get work done in a rush; none involved statutory violations. Revised procedures, training, and a greater emphasis on
detail improved the situation.78
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Shifts in Emphasis and Direction
From conversations with the
chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph
K. Bratton, Smith perceived a
need to change the overall operating strategy of the division from
an emphasis on architect-engineer selection boards and design
reviews to construction that satisfied the customer. He believed
that the elements of process,
which are a necessary part of
any project, ought not to be evident to the consumer, whose real
concern was with the final product. He found that attention in
EUD focused on the Engineering
Division, which measured productivity in terms of design
General Smith in 1987
placement, rather than on the
Construction Division, which
emphasized completed projects.79
General Smith took several immediate steps to shift the divisions
emphasis and direction. He reinforced efforts General Withers had started to give the chief of construction and the area engineers more authority,
resources, and independence. He wanted area offices to have a procurement operation, legal support, and some capability to work with the government agencies in the host nations.80
Smith also changed the rating procedure for area engineers. In EUDs
first two years, the area engineers reported to the EUD Executive Office.
During General Delbridges tenure, the deputy division engineer, Col.
Carlyle Chuck Charles, instructed the area engineers to report directly
to the chief of the Construction Division, although Charles and his successors continued to give the area engineers their performance ratings.81
In 1983 Army regulations changed to permit the division commander to
delegate the rating function to a civilian. Smith thought that it made sense
to give responsibility for rating area engineers to the chief of construction
because it was Blake who regularly met with them. The change meant that
Blake, who as an SES held the civilian rank equivalent to general officer,
would do the officers efficiency rating for the area engineers who were
military and comparable performance evaluations for the civilian area
engineers. Whatever apprehensions the area engineers had, the change
was implemented without protest. The commander of EUD, a general officer, remained the senior rater.82
General Smith broadened the divisions senior leadership group to
include the equal employment opportunity (EEO) officer, the personnel
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officer, division counsel, and the chief of procurement and supply. He
encouraged each participant in staff meetings to draw from his or her
professional and life experiences solutions to the problems and challenges
of the division. Smith also asked Blake to make sure that he took support
elements, especially Joanne Jodie Close, the EEO officer, with him to the
area offices, particularly the remote offices in Turkey and Greece.83
The Air Force as Customer

Shortly before General Smith assumed command at EUD, he attended
a professional meeting with General Bratton, who was known for his lowkey, soft-spoken style. According to Smith, Bratton drew him aside and
said, Theres a guy here that I want you to meet, and its very important
to me that you get to know him. Introducing Smith to Air Force Brig.
Gen. Joseph Bud Ahearn, Bratton said, You and Bud are going to get
to be good friends. Smith concluded, That was his way of telling me,
Make sure the Air Force knows you love them, and make sure the Air
Force gets prime support. Dont forget the guys in blue.84
About the time that Smith was assigned to head the Europe Division,
Ahearn took over as base civil engineer at Ramstein Air Base in Germany
and as chief of engineering services for United States Air Forces in Europe
(USAFE). The Air Force had been a major customer of centralized contract
construction in Europe since the days of USACAG. Over many years an
attitude had developed that one division engineer summarized: The Air
Force is a very difficult customer in general for the Corps of Engineers.
A chief of contracting admitted: Youd be hard-pressed to find somebody
[in EUD] thats a real fan of the Air Force.85 Differences in procedure
between the two services in handling both contracts and money and the
Air Forces latitude in shifting funds from one project to another gave the
appearance of [their] not having a long-range, coherent program.86
General Withers had encountered difficulty with his counterpart in
the Air Force, Brig. Gen. Sheldon J. Lustig. As chief of engineering services for USAFE, Lustig indicated a strong desire to get EUD out of
NATO projects for the U.S. Air Force. In May 1982 Withers reported that
execution of Air Force work continued to be late because of late receipt
of design instructions and criteria, conditions for which he held the Air
Force, not EUD, responsible.87
General Smith strove to overcome the prevailing negative attitude
toward the Air Force and to develop a good working and personal relationship with General Ahearn. Smith reinstituted the system of assigning
one EUD deputy solely to the Air Force work and the other to the Army
projects, a measure designed to establish that work for the Air Force
was as important as what the division did for the Army. Col. Donald E.
Hazen became Mr. Air Force, and Smith again offered Ahearn the services of the division in support of Air Force construction under the NATO
Common Infrastructure Program. Smith held team-building sessions with
both USAREUR and USAFE to demonstrate that EUD had valuable servic225
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es to offer the total military family. Within six months Smith reported
notable improvement in the relationship.88
EUD Wartime Responsibilities

One of several agreements signed in 1974 by the commander in
chief of USAREUR and the chief of engineers stipulated that the Europe
Division would provide engineering services to USAREUR in the event
of war. Variously referred to as contingency planning or mobilization
planning, the function received little attention during EUDs early years.
The issue of mobilization became a major concern of strategic thinkers in
the late 1970s. Their debate turned around whether the next war would
be a quick, short engagement, such as the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, or
a longer, more protracted campaign that would require total mobilization of the enormous economic and industrial resources of the United
States.89
Most of this debate bypassed EUD as the division focused on the
expansion of design and construction activity, although stateside divisions
had been involved in planning and exercises for mobilization. General
Smith, having served as commander of the North Central Division before
coming to Frankfurt, addressed this concern. In October 1983, within
weeks of his arrival, Smith established a separate staff element to develop
and coordinate mobilization and wartime planning.90
General Smiths emphasis on planning for mobilization and wartime
coincided with his broader intent to reinforce EUD as an Army unit. From
the conduct of division staff, he concluded that EUD employees were pretty lax in the way they thought about war. USAREUR personnel wore battle
dress uniforms and engaged in field exercises, but EUD never participated.
He also objected to the way the divisions military personnel dressed:
[They wore] their green uniforms like it w[as] Chicago or Vicksburg
or San Francisco. It just seemed to me a complete incongruity not to
be aware of the fact that things could go wrong. I had been in Europe
during the first Berlin crisis as a captain. I was aware of the fact that
things could go pretty wrong without a whole lot of warning.91
In March 1984 General Smith went to Washington to develop with
the USACE staff a detailed mobilization plan for EUD. In June he went
to Heidelberg for similar meetings with the USAREUR staff. By July
the Europe Division, USAREUR, and USACE had a draft agreement
to implement a mobilization plan.92 The military personnel serving in
EUD would be bound by any mobilization order; certain civilian positions were designated emergency essential so the incumbents would
remain in service in the event of mobilization. During mobilization,
EUD would place its operations at USAREURs disposal so that we
would use our expertise to contract with the host nation for construction supply services.93
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Assessing EUD Management

Without doubt it was General Smiths personal style, rather than
any organizational changes he instituted, that had the most significant
impact on the people at EUD. He was intense, demanding, and abrupt.
He worked very long hours, and some called him driven. The people he
met with regularly became familiar with his impatience and intolerance
for imprecise answers. Some staff members were angered or frightened by
his aggressive style; from others it elicited respect.
The division counsel, Allan Aaron, was one of the latter. Aaron had
worked in Corps district and division offices in the United States (North
Central, Albuquerque, and Detroit) before he came to the Counsels Office
in the Engineer Command in 1973; after the death of Leonard Phillips in
1976, Aaron was promoted to division counsel. Aaron worked with Smith
on cleaning up the procurement irregularities and won Smiths confidence. Smith gave him other special assignments, such as chairing a task
force on automation. Aaron was often the target of Smiths outbursts of
frustration, but with a distinct purpose:
In a public forum, when I wanted to jerk somebodys chain so that
everyone else would get a certain message, Als chain would get jerked.
Normally it was about something that many people besides Al had
had a hand in. Maybe Al didnt even know what it was all about. But
others would see [him as] the good-hearted and constructive recipient
of a spur to the flank and would, I believe, be impressed and themselves motivated by his unfailingly positive responses.94
Aaron apparently understood Smiths intentions and his own role. He
later affirmed that he would go anywhere and do anything [for General
Smith]. I really feel very strongly that General Smith was one of the
high points in my career with the Corps of Engineers. Hasso Damm,
long-time chairman of the Works Council, felt that Smith never acted
capriciously and that he respected workers rights. Damm thought that
USACE did the right thing by sending General Smith [to EUD].95
By contrast, most of EUDs personnel failed to see the vision for the
division that Smith had formulated so clearly in his own mind. With the
expectation that he would be at EUD for two, possibly three years, Smith
applied intense pressure at the outset. The commander expected to be able
to ease that pressure once he had the entire staff moving as a team in the
proper direction. Smith reflected:
It is infinitely more suitable to be fairly rigorous and demanding
up front, and then, as the situation allows, to become comradely and
more relaxed, as opposed to coming in, being everybodys friend,
and then finding out that something is not being done as well as
everyone would wishand then trying to turn up the heat on that
particular part of the operation.96
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Smith and the Europe Division never had the luxury of time that might
have allowed the organization to settle down after his harsh interventions.
After less than a year in Frankfurt, Smith was promoted to major general
and reassigned to Heidelberg as USAREURs deputy chief of staff, engineer.
He left behind an organization in which most of the staff felt profoundly
discomfited by his aggressive management style and actions.
Change of Command
Smiths successor, Brig. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels, who came
directly from commanding the North Pacific Division of the Corps of
Engineers, arrived in July 1984. Van Loben Sels European experience had
begun with the 23d Engineer Battalion, to which he was assigned from
1960 to 1963. In 1975 he had returned to West Germany, to the office of
DCSENG. During that assignment he participated in planning the new
Army garrison in Garlstedt in northern Germany. He remained in Europe
from 1977 to 1981 as commander of the 18th Engineer Brigade, which
included the combat heavy engineer battalions and a labor service group.
A majority of the brigades troop construction was done in support of the
DEH, but the brigade also assumed a major responsibility in the planning
and preliminary work on the range upgrade in Grafenwhr. Van Loben
Sels had asked that his tour with the 18th be extended to a third year so
he could complete a full phase of the work in Grafenwhr.97
Soft-spoken, gentlemanly, and reserved, General van Loben Sels
demeanor was a relief from the intensity of General Smith. The staff
quickly recognized his keen intelligence and excellent memory; they
appreciated his directness, precision, and calm authority, which they
perceived as a sharp contrast with Smiths volatility.98 He approached his
command quite differently from his predecessor, because of basic differences in personality and because he took into account Smiths impact:
I found an organization that had had its socks pulled up. I came
in with a different style. I came in with a view of going for the longterm, a three-year commitment, to build on the energy, if you will,
that [Smith] had built up. Then [I] attempted to shape the organization, heal the wounds that seemed to be around the battlefield, and
focus on the long-term.
He focused his attention on morale, organizational structure, and the
need to develop a sense of identity for this large and geographically dispersed organization. He wanted to promote the organization, to build
a team from this group of folks, some of whom were fighting with one
another and to cope with this huge workload.99
To improve morale and the organizations self-image, General
van Loben Sels arranged social events, such as dances, parties, and a
Christmas ball, to which every member of the staff was invited. Such gala
gatherings had not taken place in recent experience. We brought them
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all together, van Loben Sels
recalled, and we had our uniforms ondress uniforms. Most
of them had never seen us in our
military dress uniform.100
Van Loben Sels promotion
to major general offered another opportunity to build up the
divisions self-image. Like several of his predecessors, he was
promoted during his command
at EUD, but, as Damm noted,
He was the first one to make
it into a great ceremony.101 Van
Loben Sels asked the V Corps
commander for a parade, and he
invited representatives from the
German government and military, German construction agencies, and U.S. military commandGeneral van Loben Sels
ers, including General Ahearn
from the Air Force. At the ceremony on the parade grounds, the
chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. E. R. Heiberg III, pinned on van Loben Sels
second star. After the parade and ceremony General van Loben Sels and
his wife hosted a reception at their quarters in Bad Vilbel.102
Organizational Structure and Data Systems

In addition to ceremony as an enhancement to self-image and morale,
van Loben Sels turned his attention to the structures through which
EUD operated: the divisions organizational framework and its use of
information processing systems. Shortly after he arrived at the division,
van Loben Sels launched a study of the division to identify an organizational structure best suited to accomplish its mission. A study team
from the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center (ESC), an agency of USACE
located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, worked with an advisory group at the
division to consider a wide range of issues: goals, problems, current and
projected peacetime volume of work, geographical boundaries, operating
environment, host-nation responsibilities, potential wartime mission, and
requirements for interacting with customers. After the divisions executive committee reviewed the ESC study in February, the final report was
published in April 1985.
The study concluded that EUDs problems could be summed up in
three wordsits too big. The report continued: No internal reorganization will resolve its physical space problems; no centralized operating
division structure can service so many varied clients responsively. [EUD
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should adopt] the traditional USACE decentralized division HQ/district
structure, but with some modifications.103 Specifically, the report recommended that EUD have a division headquarters in Frankfurt with district
offices in Frankfurt, Kaiserslautern, and Stuttgart. Only Turkey would
remain as an area office.
General van Loben Sels rejected the recommended organizational
structure. He was not convinced that the volume of work would remain
high enough to make the costs of reorganization acceptable, and he reasoned that the overhead required by the district structure would be very
high. Instead, he continued to decentralize by giving more authority and
additional resources to the area engineers. By enhancing the authority of
the divisions area offices, van Loben Sels hoped to eliminate administrative bottlenecks and achieve greater productivity, thus accomplishing
what the report recommended without the costs of the reorganization.104
General van Loben Sels also established a study group of senior
division personnel to address automation. He saw this effort as building on the study by the ESC that had identified the paucity of automated data processing (ADP) in the division as a serious problem.
The ESC study was particularly critical of support to the area offices,
noting the minimal utilization of ADP capability and communication from the division offices to the field. Furthermore, The [ADP]
environment is archaic, even compared to Corps standards. ADP
equipment is scheduled to be placed in the field in the near future,
but there does not appear to be any plan to provide standard programs, the required ADP skills to utilize the equipment, or specific
guidance on utilization.105EUDs experience with data processing had
been unsatisfactory long before van Loben Sels initiated his study.
The divisions first commander, General Prentiss, had had little success in bringing the new organization into conformity with Corps of
Engineers use of two automated reporting systems, COEMIS (Corps of
Engineers Management Information System) and AMPRS (Automated
Management Progress Reporting System). The systems had been
designed with no regard for the divisions unique requirements, and
their implementation was complicated because of EUDs distance from
Washington and the frequent turnover of branch chiefs and operators.106
COEMIS recorded accounting data and produced reports on the
financial results of operations and on current or updated financial conditions. In investigating possibilities for implementing COEMIS in 1975,
EUD staff learned that the computer hardware on hand was incompatible
with the software. Furthermore, it was not feasible to change hardware
and retrain staff, nor was COEMIS able to handle the divisions special
requirements, particularly tracking the different categories of employees
(DACs, local nationals in several countries, local hires) and the multiple
currencies in which the division conducted business. EUD decided to use
the Measurement Information Data Acquisition System project management software developed at the Fort Worth District and to set up an interim finance and accounting system. EUDs commander in the late 1970s,
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General Wilson, planned to complete conversion to the COEMIS system in
fiscal year 1979, but the division did not meet the target date.107
Discussions of the applicability of AMPRS, a system for monitoring
execution of the total construction program, paralleled the discussions of
COEMIS. Implementation of AMPRS did not begin until 1977. EUD staff
supplied managers in Washington with information showing the modifications needed to make the software usable in Europe. When the division
finally began to use AMPRS in 1978, the system failed to meet its needs.
The softwares shortcomings were not restricted to EUD. Fewer than half
of the seventeen districts using AMPRSthose that already had a strong
in-house computer staffreported finding it useful.108
In the summer of 1980, as General Withers prepared to take command
of EUD, the deputy director of resource management in Headquarters,
USACE, told him that the Europe Division was the only part of the Corps
that had not been integrated into COEMISs finance and accounting module. Withers decided that he needed to upgrade the position of chief of
the Resource Management Office and to recruit civilians from the United
States who had experience with this software. During the next two years,
Withers emphasized implementing COEMIS, a goal the division finally
achieved by the end of fiscal year 1982. When Withers completed his tour,
the division had also installed an automated funds control system.109
When General Smith took command of EUD, he also perceived the
value of automation, particularly as a tool to connect the area offices with
division headquarters in Frankfurt. The staff had widely divergent levels
of computer expertise, and Smith did not want the most computer-competent persons to dominate the EUD decision-making process. He asked the
division counsel, Allan Aaron, to convene a task force to weigh the best
uses of the technology for EUD. The committee continued after Smiths
departure to develop a plan for purchasing and installing IBM-compatible
microcomputers at headquarters and in the field offices.110
The information systems planning team formed by General van
Loben Sels continued studying COEMIS and AMPRS. In 1985 it articulated a new level of insight: EUDs problems implementing the Corps of
Engineers software programs stemmed from the character of the systems
themselves. They were reporting systems, not management systems. The
systems collected information only for reporting up the chain of command; the data were not used in the day-to-day management of projects
or personnel or to assess trends and anticipate needs. Thus EUDs project and construction managers had little practical use for AMPRS and
COEMIS and little incentive to make reporting a priority. Van Loben Sels
study team also acknowledged that there is, and always has been a
perceived lack of data integrity in AMPRS.111
When General van Loben Sels reviewed the status of automation at
the division in 1985, computer hardware consisted of an in-house Harris
800 super-minicomputer and an assortment of microcomputers acquired
in 1984 and distributed throughout the division, including to the field
offices. Under the supervision of the ADP office, EUD was using standard
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Corps of Engineer software applications, including AMPRS and COEMIS.
The microcomputers had word processing, spreadsheet, and database
software. The word processing center, established by General Delbridge in
1977 with the Wang hardware-software system, remained under the purview of the Office of Administrative Services, rather than the ADP center,
and it was not heavily used. New technology had made the very idea of a
dedicated word-processing typing pool out of date.112
To assess EUDs data processing needs, General van Loben Sels
decided to use the IBM Information Systems Plan, a structured planning
approach by which organizations examined their business processes to
determine what data were needed before they looked at automation. The
objective was to develop a plan that would satisfy the short- and longterm requirements for information within the organization. Van Loben
Sels conjectured that this process would engage the staff throughout the
organization and facilitate planning. The information systems planning
study did help the staff understand business processes, but General van
Loben Sels did not find that it significantly improved automation. Nearly
a decade later he expressed disappointment in the results of the study process.113 Nonetheless, the teams recommendation and a Department of the
Army directive prompted EUD to establish an Information Management
Office that combined ADP operations, programming functions, and wordprocessing activities, and included communications, records management, visual arts, libraries, and printing and publications. The new office
opened on 1 April 1986, months after van Loben Sels departure.114
Despite a desire to stay at EUD for three years, General van Loben
Sels was reassigned after only fifteen months. In late September 1985 he
assumed command of Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. On the short tenures
of Smith and van Loben Sels, Hasso Damm reflected: The sequence of
the two made out of the shapeless organization a formed organization,
first shaking up, and then [taking] the shaking portions and put them
together again in one body.115
Stability Achieved
The chief of engineers, General Heiberg, tapped Brig. Gen. James
W. Bill Ray, commander of the Middle East Division, to fill the unexpected vacancy in Frankfurt, making Ray the fourth division engineer
at EUD in as many years. The mammoth construction program managed by the Corps in Saudi Arabia was drawing down, and General
Ray had received orders to move to the divisions rear headquarters
in Winchester, Virginia. Instead of returning to the United States, he
moved to Frankfurt.116 Rays previous assignments included district
engineer in Omaha; assistant commandant, U.S. Army Engineer School;
commander, 35th Engineer Battalion in Vietnam; and assistant director
for civil works in Headquarters, USACE. He had also served as chief,
Forces Modernization Division, and as secretary of general staff of
USAREUR.
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From the outset, EUD staff perceived General Ray as open, friendly, and
outgoingsomeone you could talk to. He had a good sense of humor and
was very sociable; he and his wife participated frequently in ski trips and
outings organized by a volunteer committee in the division. Although not a
forceful public speaker, Ray had good communication skills; area engineers
and field staff respected his knowledge of construction.117
One segment of the staff felt especially close to General Raythe people who had worked for the Corps on the construction program in Saudi
Arabia. During the drawdown in Saudi Arabia, General van Loben Sels
had encouraged EUD to hire people leaving the Middle East Division; as
a result, the division had several dozen Saudi people. A special camaraderie existed within this group, and they included General and Mrs. Ray
in the Saudi parties. Some division staff resented the close social circle
maintained by the people from Saudi Arabia.118
As a manager, General Ray disliked ad hoc actions and pressed
the staff to develop systems. He practiced participatory management,
respected the opinions of his staff, and paid special attention to working conditions and staff morale. General Ray adopted the two goals that
General van Loben Sels had articulated for the Europe Division: (1) construct excellent facilities that are on time, within budget, attractive, and
maintainable; and (2) be an excellent organization. Ray wanted to make
EUD a place where people would want to come to work every day; his
long-term goal was to develop a plan for the division for the 1990s.119 With
these goals and his systematic approach to management, General Ray
guided the Europe Division through several organizational changes and
instituted an innovative program that focused staff attention on quality
and excellence.
Organizational Changes
Several significant organizational adjustments occurred during
General Rays tenure at EUD. Following Army directives, the division established the Information Management Office and the Logistics
Management Office, which handled transportation services and
some functions previously performed by the Office of Administrative
Services.120 Ray redefined the responsibilities of the divisions deputies
in an attempt to consolidate and clarify contracting authority within the
division. He also redistributed the activities related to intergovernmental
affairs when long-time employee William Camblor retired.
General van Loben Sels had asked the chief of engineering, Joe Higgs,
to reorganize the Project Management Branch in his division by geographic
areas. Van Loben Sels wanted project managers to work more closely with
individual directors of engineering and housing. He also wanted each
director of engineering and housing to have a single point of contact in
engineering at EUD.121 Higgs resisted the reorganization because this structure made balancing the workload among project managers more difficult.
Nonetheless, during General Rays tour, Higgs effected the changes.122
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In January 1987 General Ray
approved a reorganization of the
Construction Division aimed at
placing responsibility for dayto-day problems with midlevel
supervisors, allowing branch
managers to concentrate on longrange planning. (Chart 11) The
chief of construction, John Blake,
served as the catalyst for this
reorganization, which finally
took place after a year of consultations with USACE headquarters
in Washington. The reorganization established three branches
within the Construction Division:
Office Engineering, Construction
Management, and Supervision
and Inspection. Except for medical facilities, certain unique projGeneral Ray
ects, and contract modifications
of more than $100,000, the division gave the field offices authority to administer these contracts without referring issues back to headquarters for decisions.123
Soon after General Ray arrived, he began to examine the roles of the
two deputies, particularly in reference to their authority over contracting.
From the beginning of the division, both deputies had contracting authority; since 1983 one deputy had handled contracts for the Army program,
the other for the Air Force program. The 1985 report by the Engineer
Studies Center identified the involvement of two deputies in contracting
as a management problem. Because each deputy processed over 1,000 contracts each year, both were overwhelmed by their operational responsibilities. The report observed, No one is planning because they are too busy
performing operations.124
The system also created potential conflicts of interest, because a
deputy worked with the customer/user and then signed the contracts
involving the same clients. After consulting with Division Counsel Aaron,
Higgs, Blake, and the chief of contracting, Richard Wisdom, General Ray
decided only one deputy and the chief of contracting should have contracting authority. In June of 1986 Ray appointed the deputy division engineer, Col. John Moravec, with contracting authority. Moravec had already
served for fifteen months in EUD as assistant commander for DEH support. General Ray gave his other deputy, Col. Dennis Culp, responsibility
for management and planning.125
Ray also transferred additional contracting authority to the area engineers and put lawyers in five area offices: Stuttgart, Kaiserslautern, and
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2/3/06 10:36:49 AM
2/3/06 10:36:50 AM
Planning
Branch
Technical
Engineering
Branch
Foundations
and Materials
Branch
Northern Area Office

Hoensbroek, Netherlands
Stuttgart Area Office

Stuttgart, Germany
Special
Assistants
General
Engineering
Branch
Audit Office
Office of Council
Project
Management
Branch
Engineering
Division
Resource
Management
Office
Special
Assistants
Nuremberg Area Office

Nuremberg, Germany
Heidelberg Area Office

Camp Darby, Italy
Safety and
Occupational
Health Office
Supervision and
Inspection
Branch
Construction
Management
Branch
Office
Engineering
Branch
Construction
Division
Public Affairs Office
Personnel Office
Wrzburg Area Office

Wrzburg, Germany
Frankfurt Area Office

Frankfurt, Germany
Host Nations
Contractraing
Branch
Acquisition
Branch
Mobilization
Planning Office
Logistics
Management
Office
Boards and
Committees
The U.S. Engineer Group

Area Office
Incirlik, Turkey
Kaiserslautern Area Office

Kaiserslautern, Germany
U.S. Air Forces

Europe Liaison
Officer
Policy and
Compliance
Branch
Contracting
Division
Information
Management
Office

Executive Office
Commander and Division Engineer
Chart 11: Organization of the Europe Division, July 1988
Construction of recreational facilities provided opportunities for social outings,

such as ski trips to Garmisch.
Frankfurt in Germany; TUSEG in Turkey; and the Northern Area Office now
located in the Netherlands. The lawyer in Stuttgart also served the area offices in Nuremberg and Wrzburg. This reorganization reversed the centralization that had taken place in 1980 when the lawyers from the Mediterranean
and Stuttgart Area Offices were reassigned to headquarters in Frankfurt.
Ray assigned supervision and oversight of the Office of Counsel and its supporting elements in the area offices to Moravec.126 This reorganization gave
EUDs area offices independence in contracting comparable to the authority of districts in the United States. Because it was an innovation within the
Corps of Engineers, the measure required USACE approval.127
General Ray sought to add flexibility to contract administration by
promoting and improving the use of indefinite delivery (open-ended)
types of contracts. The division negotiated prices for various services with
selected architect-engineer firms and signed contracts up to a maximum
of $500,000. When a community had a project costing less than $50,000,
the director of engineering and housing only specified the services he
needed on a delivery order to the firm under contract and the firm began
the work. The indefinite delivery contracts eliminated the need to negotiate a separate contract for each small job. The architect-engineer firm
could deliver services on individual projects up to the maximum amount
of the contract.128
In 1986 the division received permission to allow a second-year extension to the contracts with architect-engineer firms, and the directors of
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2/3/06 10:36:50 AM

engineering and housing received permission to write delivery orders up
to $85,000. These new procedures reduced administrative labor, particularly the hundreds of hours of overtime normally expended to prepare
and place contracts at the end of a fiscal year. In 1988 EUD held seminars
to bring together architect-engineer firms and the engineering staffs from
military communities to familiarize everyone with the regulations governing the indefinite delivery contracts.129
Intergovernmental Affairs
The retirement on 4 July 1987 of Camblor, deputy division engineer
for intergovernmental affairs, necessitated a reorganization. Camblor had
served in Europe continuously since 1944, first as an Army officer and
then for forty years as a civilian in the military construction organizations
that had preceded EUD. During this long career, Camblor won a number
of awards, including designation as a distinguished post member of the
Society of American Military Engineers in Frankfurt in 1977, a decoration for Meritorious Civilian Service in 1985, and the Exceptional Civilian
Award from the Secretary of the Army in 1987. From 1983 until his retirement he served as chairman of the Sending States Construction Group,
which included representatives of the six NATO nations that had troops
in the Federal Republic of Germany. In recognition of his extraordinary
career, Camblor was honored with a formal retirement ceremony on the
grassy area in front of the Phillips Building. Officials from USAREUR, V
Corps, and a number of the NATO host nations attended the ceremony.
U.S. military units marched, and a German army band played. At his
retirement dinner, Camblor received medals from several nations, including the Federal Republic of Germany, whose minister of construction presented him with Das Grosse Deutsche Verdienstkreuz (The German Grand
Service Cross). After the ceremony, EUD hosted a retirement dinner at the
officers club.130
General Ray and others described Camblor as a unique asset to the
organization and essentially irreplaceable.131 Because the division could
not fill the SES position that Camblor had held nor replace his years of experience, Ray chose to divide Camblors responsibilities three ways. The chief
of engineering, Higgs, was named deputy division engineer for intergovernmental affairs and designated to attend meetings of the Sending States
Construction Group. Camblors former assistant, Michael Mele, reported to
Higgs. The chief of construction, Blake, took over responsibility for activities in the technical area, and the division counsel, Aaron, conducted the
negotiations with foreign nations required to implement new programs, in
addition to interpreting the intergovernmental agreements.132
Focus on Customers and Quality

Early in his tour at EUD, General Ray took up the 1986 USACE theme,
Leaders in Customer Care. Generals Smith and van Loben Sels had
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emphasized the importance of satisfying customers by delivering a highquality product, but neither commander had established a specific program. General Ray chose Total Quality Management (TQM), a program
developed by the 3M Corporation, as the vehicle for making customer
care a top priority for the division. Ray proposed that EUD develop a
TQM program and appointed Colonel Moravec as quality director to
spearhead the effort.133
At a three-day conference of the divisions managers in January 1987,
General Ray reminded them that President Ronald Reagan had issued a
directive requiring all federal government agencies to become 20 percent
more productive by 1992. Ray stressed that the division could be a leader
in customer care while meeting the presidents goal. A spokesman for
3M Corporation explained the Total Quality Management concept. A few
weeks later thirteen supervisory-level employees from EUD attended a
five-day workshop on TQM at 3M headquarters in St. Paul, Minnesota.
They returned to Frankfurt as trained facilitators, eager to implement
a modification of the program they dubbed EUD Quality Management
(EQM).134
In 3Ms terminology, quality management is a process that focuses on
people, not on products:
EQM is designed to provide a new culture to the Division and
every employee who works here. Its deceptively simple process is to
do right things right. And at the basis of the program is the goal of
100 percent conformance to customers expectations. That is, if our
customer expects us to be able to do it, we will do it100 percent of
the time. If we cannot do it, we will change our customers expectations.135
Total Quality Management defines a customer as any person within
an organization who expects work products from other employees.136
EQM challenged the very nature and orientation of the personnel at EUD:
The organization has been product-oriented for so long that to
talk about being customer-oriented is a major change. That doesnt
mean you ignore the product, but there is more to meeting customer
expectations than delivering the product. Its the manner in which
we deliver the product. Its how we explain to the customer what
we can and what we cannot do.137
During 1987 and early 1988 articles in every issue of the Corps Line
explained EQM, gave the reactions of staff, and reiterated the importance
of quality. General Ray asserted often that training employees was the
most important thing we are going to do in EUD in the next two years.138
In the first phase of EQMs implementation, every employee participated
in a mandatory full-day session. The first group of facilitators trained
others; in August 1987 a second group of facilitators was trained. By
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2/3/06 10:36:52 AM

September, more than 800 people had participated in a session that covered the concepts, principles, and skills of EQM. Personnel throughout
the organization responded enthusiastically, discovering that the program
generated a lot of energy by providing all employees with an opportunity
to be included in the management of the organization.139
To explain the need for EQM, General Ray used a parable, the story
of the frog in a pot of water. The frog, Ray recounted, is an adaptable
creature that adjusts his body temperature to his environment. Whether
the water is hot or cold, the frog adjusts until he is comfortable. In a pot
of water over a fire, the frog is a slave to his proven routine and continues with the same response as the heat increases. By the time the water
reaches a boil, the frog has adjusted himself right into oblivion. The heat
is on for organizations that want to succeed in these changing times, Ray
told his staff. To be successful, organizations must change with the environment and find new ways to adjust or risk ending up like the boiled
frog. The frog became the unofficial emblem of Rays leadership, and he
was inundated with gift frogs. The story of the frog conveyed a serious
messagewhat worked in the past might not work in changing times.
Productivity and its ability to attract customers would be the measure of
EUDs success in an increasingly competitive environment.140
By the autumn of 1987 the EQM initiative attracted the attention of the
deputy assistant secretary of defense for installations, Robert A. Stone,
who singled out the division for special commendation. The following
January EUD provided a display describing EQM for the Department of
Defenses Productivity Month celebration in the Pentagon. In his spring
1988 visit to Frankfurt, the chief of engineers, General Heiberg, praised
the program, saying, General Ray did not invent the word quality, but
[he] has put new meaning into the word.141 In May 1988 Ray was able
to report that Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci had signed up for the
TQM process, and he has ordered this division to continue working on
total quality management.142
General Ray strove to make EUD a place where people wanted to
work. To advance this goal, he introduced physical changes in the working environment. He had the division replace the old gray metal desks
and file cabinets with space-saving modular office furniture.143 To emphasize his belief in the importance of the divisions work, and to record
division activities and work in a tangible and easily accessible form, Ray
allocated funds for this history of the Europe Division and its predecessor
agencies.
General Ray perceived the implementation of Total Quality
Management as the most far-reaching change he would make as Europe
Division engineer.144 The concept incorporated his values by emphasizing
the positive, building team spirit, and engaging everyone across departments, nationalities, and civil service grades. The energy, enthusiasm, and
cooperation generated by participation in EQM added to the loyalty and
confidence General Ray personally inspired in those who served with
him at EUD.
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2/3/06 10:36:52 AM

In the spring of 1988 the Europe Division was operating smoothly
and the staff felt optimistic. Construction placement for the fiscal year
ending 30 September 1987 had been an all-time high of $527 million;
leaders expected placement for fiscal year 1988 to be even higher. EUD
workforce numbered nearly 1,200 in headquarters and in eight area
offices: Frankfurt, Northern Area, Stuttgart, Kaiserslautern, Nuremberg,
Wrzburg, Heidelberg, and Turkey.
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2/3/06 10:36:52 AM
9
MANAGING DESIGN AND
CONSTRUCTION
lthough the Europe Division (EUD) evolved as an organization

under a succession of commanders between 1977 and 1988,
the engineer mission in Europe remained constant. John Blake,
who served as chief of construction during most of that decade,
trenchantly defined that mission: The real reason we are here is to build
things, [to] repair things for the benefit of the soldiers and airmen in
Europe.1
Building things for soldiers involved EUD in an increasingly vast,
volatile, and complex operation. By 1980 the division managed military
construction in countries from the North Sea to the eastern Mediterranean
and the Caspian Sea, a land mass roughly one-third the size of the United
States that stretched over a distance slightly greater than that between
New York and San Francisco. In 1977 EUD operated under eleven different working agreements in seven countries; by 1987 that had increased to
twenty agreements with eight countries. (See Map 18.) Staff in the division
conducted business daily in a variety of languages and under a multiplicity of national laws, regulations, and customs.2
Although the volume of work measured in dollars was not the largest
in the Corps of Engineers, EUD workload, when measured by the number
of projects, was larger than any other engineer organization in the world.
In 1977 the division administered 1,800 projects in design and another
300 in construction. Over the next decade the number of design projects
remained in the same high range, while the volume of construction placement increased as design projects moved to the construction phasefrom
$130 million in 1977 to $492 million in 1986. The EUD leadership cadre
judged its task in dealing with these projects, many of them quite small,
as far more complicated than administering a handful of multimilliondollar contracts for a single customer, as the newly created Middle East
Division seemed to be doing. By 1986 EUD had more than twenty customers, including the Army, the Air Force, the Navy, and eight Department of
Defense agencies. The divisions funds were drawn from fifteen sources,
13L_Chap09_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:45:13 AM

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
1987
Area of Responsibility
500 Miles
500 Kilometers
N o r t h
S e a
NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
WEST
GERMANY
LUXEMBOURG
I TA LY
c k
B l a
S e a
Sardinia
M
e
G R E E C E
t
e
Sicily
r
Map 18
and it paid its bills in almost as many currencies, each of which had different and fluctuating rates to the dollar, a factor often ignored by Congress
and planners in the Pentagon.3
Many of the Europe Divisions tasks demanded quick action and rapid
completion. Design and construction frequently had to be executed in
fewer than twelve months. On longer projects, initiation was often urgent;
work had to be started before all the requirements had been defined.
This meant that the scope of projects changed as the work progressed,
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2/3/06 10:45:14 AM
Managing Design and Construction

complicating execution and increasing the costs of both design and construction.4 This volatility had been characteristic of the engineer mission
in Europe for much of the period since the end of World War II. It was
not a characteristic of most civil works projects managed by the Corps of
Engineers in the United States.
The vastness, complexity, and volatility of EUDs work make it difficult to describe in simple and consistent terms. Indeed, a single descriptive framework cannot adequately portray the divisions many tasks.
Several of the many ways in which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Europe Division, and its customers described and measured the divisions
activities are explored below, including methods of contracting, sources of
funding, and management of the work through the field offices.
Methods of Contracting
Like its predecessor organizations in Europe, EUD relied largely on
contractors. Architect-engineer firms designed projects and construction
companies built facilities ranging from missile sites, hardstands, and barracks to hospitals and bowling alleys.
In the European context the predominant method of contracting
was indirect; that is, U.S. military engineers depended on host-government agencies to award contracts for design, construction, or both.
Representing the interests of the U.S. government and the military user,
EUD prepared the original contract package, whether for design
or construction, and approved
the final product. 5 The process
was called direct contracting when
EUD awarded contracts without
a host-government agency as
intermediary.
Three options existed for a
project assigned to the Europe
Division. First, design and construction could be indirect,
in which case the host nation
awarded the design and construct ion contracts. Second,
design and construction could
be direct, in which case EUD
awarded both contracts. Third,
EUD could contract directly for
design and indirectly for construction, meaning that EUD
awarded the design contract and
The Europe Division generally relied on
contractors to complete facilities, such as
the host nation awarded the conthis prison in Mannheim.
struction contract. Theoretically,
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2/3/06 10:45:14 AM

a fourth option existed, but a
project designed by a host nation
would almost invariably be built
by it as well.6
The process for handling
any particular project was determined by one of the many country-to-country agreements under
which EUD worked. Generally,
those agreements specified that
the host nation retained control
of all construction within its territory. Each nation, of course,
followed different rules and
customs concerning the nature
of the contract, contracting procedures, selection of materials,
guarantees, and the like. A look
at contracting in two countries,
Turkey and West Germany, illustrates some of the complexities
EUDs management personnel
handled.
Construction of even this simple warehouse

near Ankara involved special measures to
strengthen the Turkish construction
industry.
Contracting in Turkey
Turkey was geographically remote from the center of the U.S. military
presence in Europe, and its construction industry was less sophisticated
than that of central and western European countries. These factors conjoined to make Turkey the focus of disproportionate attention from EUD
personnel.
EUD inherited a difficult arrangement in Turkey. The United States
had imposed an arms embargo in 1974 in response to Turkish action during a crisis over Cyprus. The government of Turkey thereupon cancelled
the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement that regulated U.S.
military construction in the country. In negotiations for a new agreement in 19751976, the Turkish government insisted on extensive control
over contracting and construction. All projects had to be approved by the
government of Turkey, which reserved the right to review all contractual
documents. The Turkish government submitted names of approved bidders for contracts; bid openings and negotiations had to include official
Turkish representatives; the government insisted on placing a resident
engineer on each job; and, for projects prefinanced by the United States,
the Turkish government received 3 percent of all funds recovered from
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).7
The new Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement also committed the United States to foster Turkish economic development as well as
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2/3/06 10:45:15 AM

joint defense. To the extent feasible, the United States agreed to procure all
materials, labor, and all other services in Turkey. The Turkish government
strictly enforced the limits on imports and insisted on approving lists of
construction materials before construction could even begin. These procedures contributed substantially to delays in construction.8
To fulfill the United States commitment to foster economic development, EUD sought to introduce advanced methods into the Turkish construction industry whenever possible.9 The United States Engineer Group
(TUSEG) provided training for both contractors and workers, including
on-the-job training, films, and seminars on topics such as contracting,
construction methods, and asbestos removal. This special effort enabled
more Turkish contractors to meet U.S. specifications.10
Contracting in West Germany

The authority that the Turks insisted on retaining over decisions
concerning U.S. military construction graphically shows how important
the issue of control is in any country. It was no less important in West
Germany, where the Europe Division constructed the majority of its projects and where relations between the United States and Germany had a
very different history from the relations between the United States and
Turkey. The agreements governing contracting for military construction
in Germany first took shape during the 1950s, when the Federal Republics
sense of sovereignty was tentative and Soviet power threatened Western
Europe. As West German self-confidence grew and as Germans began to
discount the Soviet threat, the Federal Republic asserted its right to control military construction within its own boundaries.
United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), and West Germany signed
the basic agreement, the Dollarbaukontrakt, (Dollar Construction Contract),
in 1956. Modified in 1961, this agreement formed the basis for all dollar-funded design and construction executed in the Federal Republic.
Coupled with the supplementary agreement to the NATO Status of Forces
Agreement signed in 1959, these accords governed indirect contracting for
U.S. military construction.11 According to the basic law (constitution) of
the Federal Republic, the ten West German Lnder (states) were the enforcing agencies of federal statutes. Under this decentralized system, federal
laws were frequently interpreted differently at each building site, forcing
Army engineers to prepare designs to meet the standards in different
German localities.12
In the mid-1950s, when West Germany achieved sovereignty, new procedures replaced those governing U.S. military construction. With adaptations that strengthened German control, these procedures remained in
force in 1974. Thus, EUD dealt directly with the Ministry of Defense or
the Ministry of Construction in Bonn primarily to work out general agreements concerning construction programs. At the local level, where actual
building took place, contracts with builders came under the jurisdiction
of states and localities. The Bonn ministries signed contracts with the
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2/3/06 10:45:16 AM

U.S. agency and issued federal construction orders to state construction
offices (Oberfinanzdirektionen), which in turn passed the orders to local
construction offices (called variously Landesbaumter, Staatsbaumter, or
Finanzbaumter) for execution. EUD had only indirect contactand no
contractswith the company executing the work. The divisions contracts
for U.S. military construction were with the appropriate West German
governmental agency.13
For reasons of coordination, contracts drawn up by EUD for the
Ministries of Defense or Construction passed through the West German
governments Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical Working Group for
Construction), created in 1956.14 This agency, which maintained its offices
in Frankfurt, proved over the years an indispensable ally. In recognition
of the value of its role, EUD presented the director of this German agency,
Viktor Krupinski, with the U.S. Department of the Armys Outstanding
Civilian Service Award days before his retirement after a nineteen-year
tenure. In a small ceremony on 26 February 1976, EUD lauded Krupinskis
role in facilitating construction for the Nike and Mace missile programs
of the early 1960s, the Hawk program of 19651968, the TAB VEE (Theater
Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise) aircraft shelter program, and
the two German-financed programs of the 1970s to modernize U.S. facilities.15
As West Germany became more confident of its position in international affairs, it sought to bring U.S. (and other) military construction
under its control. The effort culminated during the 1970s in negotiations concerning the Auftragsbautengrundstze (ABG75), the principles of
contract construction formulated by the Federal Republic to replace the
bilateral agreements of earlier years. In the negotiations for ABG75, the
West Germans maintained that one single accord ought to govern all six
NATO countries with troops in Germany and that construction should
be contracted through German government agencies, that is, through
indirect contracting.16 These were all assertions of sovereignty that France
had insisted upon thirty years earlier. Most of West Germanys NATO
partners signed ABG75 in the late 1970s, but the United States resisted
signing until 1982.17
The United States held out for several years because it continued to
find advantage in the older agreements that permitted it to engage in
direct design, without the intermediary of an official German agency,
and some direct construction. In addition, U.S. law prohibited some of
the financial arrangements accepted by the other nations. Over several
years EUDs experience showed that, compared to projects designed indirectly, projects designed directly encountered more frequent delays in
the German review process and required an undue number of contract
modifications, leading to missed schedules and increased costs. Brig. Gen.
George Kenyon Ken Withers, Jr., concluded that the German administration of construction was doing a good job, and he favored signing
ABG75. He argued that implementing it would have a negligible effect
on EUDs internal operations. On 29 September 1982, the United States,
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2/3/06 10:45:16 AM

represented by USAREUR, and the Federal Republic of Germany, represented by the Ministry of Construction, signed the agreement; it became
effective on 1 October.18
Projects and the Process

Because managing the design and construction process from start to
finish made up a major part of EUDs day-to-day work, the process itself
merits review. The division processed the idea for any project through
three phases: (1) planning, which shaped the idea and secured funding
for it; (2) design, which translated the plan into a constructible project;
and (3) construction, which turned it into mortar, bricks, and boards, giving the original idea its three-dimensional reality.
Planning
If a project idea arose in a military community, the community commander turned first to his facilities engineer, who defined the idea in relation to the communitys mission and decided whether the local engineer
staff had the resources to develop the concept design sufficiently to obtain
congressional funding. The facilities engineer assessed the characteristics
of the site in relation to the project, checked access to utilities and communications, and weighed any other economic or environmental factors that
bore on the prospects of completing the project. If the local facilities engineer could not provide these basic design services, the military community turned to the next highest level, USAREURs Directorate of Facilities
Engineering (reorganized and renamed the Directorate of Engineering
and Housing [DEH] in 1976). Either the facilities engineer or the DEH
could also decide to bring in EUD to help with this advanced planning.19
If the project originated as a part of a new weapons system or some
other aspect of direct combat support, it would come to EUD at the end
of the concept design or advanced planning stage, because the Europe
Division acted as sole agent to manage design and construction for all
Military Construction, Army (MCA), projects and, upon request, for the
Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF), projects. By contrast, EUD
might or might not manage Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA),
projects or projects funded from other sources.
By the late 1980s, in an effort to improve customer satisfaction, EUD
had instituted a predesign conference for each project as part of this planning phase. This became the initial and most critical point of interaction
between the division staff and the originators of the project idea. At this
meeting, the participants reviewed all documents, especially the initiating document (Department of Defense form 1391) and the project development brochure, and determined whether the scope of work accurately
reflected the users needs.20
When completed, the planning phase brought the project to 35 percent completion of design. The Army engineers had calculated a current
247
2/3/06 10:45:16 AM

working estimate, the total cost of the project through final construction, required of any project included in the military budget presented to
Congress. When Congress approved a project, it used the current working estimate as the program amountthe total funds authorized and
appropriated for the project.21 EUD also used the working estimate when
describing its workload; the volume of work was generally expressed as
the total working estimate of all projects currently under design.
By the mid-1980s, an EUD-organized conference had evolved to review
work before USAREUR proposed a project to the Department of the Army.
The DEH, the user, the designer, and the EUD representative discussed the
review comments received during the planning phase, resolved their differences, and approved the concept design. The assumption was that once
concept review was completed, no further changes would occur in either
the operational or the functional requirements for the project.22
Design
The design phase, managed by EUDs Engineering Division, had its
own three stages: preliminary design, which built on the earlier planning phase; prefinal design; and final design. Staff in the division might
do direct design of a project, or EUD might engage an outside architectengineer firm to execute direct design. For indirect design, either a
German government agency executed the work or the agency engaged an
architect-engineer firm to complete the design. In these cases, EUD monitored, verified, oversaw, and cajoled to bring the work to completion on
time and within the budget.23
The preliminary design phase carried the project from 35 to 50 percent design. EUD screened the project again to ensure that it conformed
to statutory, regulatory, and administrative requirements and qualified
for the designated funding category (OMA, MCA, and others). The staff
verified that a project had a clearly defined scope of work and realistic cost estimates, checked the adequacy of the funding made available
for design, and calculated EUD management fee as a percentage of the
design costs. The divisions Technical Review Branch reviewed architectural drawings and functional layouts in detail to ensure the adequacy of
electrical, mechanical, and other distribution systems. EUD review of the
preliminary design stage also encompassed exterior utility systems, roads,
parking areas, landscaping, and secure sources of power and water. Staff
reviewed the projects completion dates and coordinated necessary changes with the user. Completion dates were critical for projects funded by
OMA, because these funds had to be returned if not obligated during the
fiscal year in which the project was approved.24
Near the end of the preliminary phase, EUD coordinated a user
review of the original cost estimates to refine and check them against the
approved budget. All parties then checked the preliminary design again.
When EUD received the signed approval of design and cost estimates
from the user, the next stageprefinal designbegan.25
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2/3/06 10:45:16 AM

During the prefinal stage, EUD design staff or contractors prepared
detailed drawings of the facilities involved in the project. This stage also
included the final calculations and structural analyses, the preparation
of complete specifications, and a detailed review of costs based on actual
quantitative measurements taken from the drawings. The design team
again checked all elements of the design for technical accuracy and completeness. When the prefinal stage was completed, a project was 90 percent through the design cycle.26
During final design, the division staff prepared or monitored a contractors preparation of construction drawings and specifications, again
coordinating the work with the user. EUD also prepared any special
statements relating to legal and administrative aspects of the contract as it
put together the final contract documents. Staff assembled the completed
drawings, the specifications, and the legal paperwork into a bid package
for construction.27
The final review conference marked the culmination of the design
phase. A project manager in the Engineering Division gathered the final
design documents and sent them to all the participants with notice of the
date for the design conference. One last review of the design was done to
ensure that the facility as designed met the operational and functional
needs of the intended user.28
If a revised working estimate for the project exceeded the program amount appropriated by Congress, EUD had to send an explanation to Headquarters, United States Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE) in Washington, which administered the appropriated funds.
USACE sent EUD an authorization to solicit bids or to award the construction contract. At the moment of approval, USACE transferred
to EUD 85 percent of the amount appropriated by Congress for the
project. Once the division received the money and all clearances, the
bid package was distributed to construction contractors qualified to
handle the work. 29
Construction
With the design phase completed and the project funds received, the
construction phase began, with EUDs Construction Division monitoring the project. Much of the day-to-day work passed to the area offices,
resident engineer offices, and project offices. The preconstruction conference brought together the representatives of the contractor (and principal
subcontractors) and EUD area or resident engineer. The conference also
frequently included representatives of the user and the community, the
facilities engineer, or additional EUD personnel at the invitation of the
area or resident engineer.30
Field personnel monitored progress at the construction site, including necessary testing, property administration, cost reporting, user
liaison, record keeping, labor relations, safety, job site security, quality
assurance, and personnel administration. When the volume of work
249
2/3/06 10:45:17 AM
Europe Division personnel in Sinop, Turkey, monitored each construction project

as it progressed.
or the remoteness of the site warranted, the Europe Division opened a

project office at or near the job site. Throughout the construction phase,
staff in the Construction Division in Frankfurt provided an array of
support and technical expertise to solve the more difficult problems.31
Monitors ensured that the contractor stayed on schedule, adhered to
the contract price, and executed the plans special and general conditions and specifications. Field office personnel also tracked funds and
negotiated changes, within limits, while they forwarded to Frankfurt
any changes that exceeded their authority.32
The Construction Division managed periodic inspections, controlled funds, and administered the contract to ensure that the contractor delivered high-quality work on time and within budget.
Headquarters staff and field personnel worked in concert to conduct
the prefinal inspection of the construction site before turning the facility over to the user. They also assessed and acted upon any deficiencies
identified in the final inspection.33
Because the indirect method of contracting put a bureaucratic
layer between EUD and the executor of the work, EUD had little
leverage to delay payment to the contractor or to cancel the contract. The indirect method of contracting in the Federal Republic of
Germany also fostered opportunities for delay. (Chart 12) The average
time involved in seeing an indirect contract to completion was 24.5
months. 34 (See Chart 13.)
250
2/3/06 10:45:17 AM

Chart 12: Indirect Contracting Process in the Federal Republic of Germany
Construction Authorization
European Division
Forward estimated basis
Title IA, II and III Contract to BAG
BAG (Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe)

Translation administrative action and forwarding contract(s)
to pertinent ministry in Bonn for acceptance and signature
Applicable Federal Republic of Germany Ministry

Coordination and contract signature
Issues construction order and contract(s) to applicable OFD
Returns signed contract(s) to the BAG
OFD (Oberfinanzdirektionen)
Issue construction order to BAUAMT
BAG
Return contract
EUD
BAG
Record contract obligation

concur with bidders
list review award
recommendation initiate
contract modifications
Coordinate bidders list

recommend construction
award sign and accept contract
modification issue revised
construction order
Monitor
construction
BAUAMT
(local contract office)
Prepare bidders list
Solicit, evaluate proposals
and recommend award to EUD
Award construction contract
BAUAMT
Contractor
Perform Title II Services
Execute Construction
Value Engineering
In addition to guiding a project through the various phases of design
and construction, EUD administered a value-engineering program. Value
engineering is a systematic approach to reducing costs in a project without changing its original function or scope. Designs for a project selected
for value engineering might be reviewed by an in-house team or examined by an architect-engineer firm to see how savings could be achieved
by changing aspects of the design or construction.35
In 1974, when the Europe Division was established, regulations set out
by the Office of the Chief of Engineers located the value engineering function in the divisions Executive Office. Although value engineering was
applied to direct design projects during the 1970s, the German construction industry never thought it necessary, asserting that they did it in the
251
2/3/06 10:45:18 AM

Chart 13: Indirect Method of Contracting and Project Milestones
(MOC)
Ministry of
Construction
Proponent
Using Agency
Europe
Division
Directorate of
Engineering
and Housing
Receive Design
Directive,
Criteria,
DD 1391 and
Design Funds
0
2
OFD
Oberfinanzdirektion
Architect/
Engineer (A/E)
Construction
Contractor
Bauamt
(local contract
office)
ABG3 to
Bauamt
Process
MOC, OFD
Contract A/E
ABG3
and Bauamt
Start Design
2
7
7
15 15
19
Receive Concept
Submission;
Reproduce and
Distribute for
Review
19
33
Concept
Review
Conference
33
41
Public Coordination by Bauamt

Receive Concept
Bauamt
Process
Receive Final
Approval;
Direct A/E
ABG3
Submission;
Design
to Start
Modification
Reproduce
Authorization
Final
and Forward
and
Distribute
and Design
Design
to Bauamt
for Review
Funds
49 49
51 51
69
41
44 44
Bauamt Advertise,
Open Bids, Evaluate
and Forward Package
with Recommendations
83
93
Receive ABG4
Evaluate Bids
and Request Funds
93
ABG, Auftragsbautengrundstze
95
Final
Review
Conference
69
77
Backcheck
77
83
Process, ABG4 and

Award to Industry
95
98
Legend
(Weeks)
Milestone
Start
End
normal course of design. In fiscal year 1983 the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, concerned about the rising costs of military construction, set a
goal to save 2 percent of the total budget for military construction through
value engineering. The Pentagon increased the goal to 5 percent in fiscal
year 1984 and to 6 percent in fiscal year 1986.36
The committee established to oversee the value engineering program
at EUD selected projects for examination that promised potential savings.
This committee, headed by the deputy commander, tried to apply value
engineering during the design phase of a project, before the concept review
meeting. The value engineering report went to the original designer, who
252
2/3/06 10:45:19 AM

reviewed it and incorporated appropriate changes into the design. During
the construction phase, the contractor could initiate a value-engineering
change proposal, documenting an alternate and more economical solution
or method of accomplishing specific parts of the project. If the proposal was
accepted, the contractor received 55 percent of the net savings.
In fiscal year 1984 the chief of engineering, Joe G. Higgs, took
over responsibility for value engineering and located it in the Project
Management Branch. During fiscal years 1985 to 1987, EUD doubled the
number of its value-engineering studies from twenty-four to approximately fifty annually. More savings through the application of value
engineering translated into more construction projects, because additional
projects could be authorized from the savings on previous projects. In
1989, to conform to USACE regulations, the division engineer returned
value engineering to the Executive Office.
The elements of design and construction in EUD were long, laborious, and labor-intensive in ways peculiar to the European setting. The
Engineering Divisions Project Management Branch tracked each project
through the design phase, at which point responsibility for the project
passed to the Construction Division. Effective communication between
the two divisions was crucial to the process but not always achieved.
People who worked in the Construction Division frequently complained
that designers took too little account of constructibility and failed to
incorporate into subsequent designs the lessons learned during construction. People in the Engineering Division claimed that those in construction lacked imagination, flair, and creativity.37
Projects and Funding

Money for design and construction, or for other technical activities such
as design review or advice on master planning, came from one of three
sources: the United States government, NATO, or the governments of the host
nations. Each of these lines of funding supported a variety of programs.
Tracking the funds for any one project was complicated because,
within legal limits prescribed by the funding authorization, EUD was
able to combine funds from several sources to support projects. Hospital
renovations, for example, used dollars from MCA and OMA appropriations, Deutschmarks from the Modernization of United States Facilities
(MOUSF) program, and (or) other host-nation funds. Some funding
arrangements were straightforward, such as MCA programs within
USAREUR. Others were more convoluted: For certain facilities the United
States initiated construction and then sought compensation from NATO,
so that NATO monies became mixed with MCA funds.38
U.S. Funding
U.S. funds included several categories of monies appropriated by
Congress: Military Construction, Army (MCA); Minor MCA (MMCA);
253
2/3/06 10:45:19 AM

Table 6
Military Construction, Army, Annual Allotments
Fiscal Years 19751986
Fiscal Year
Program Funding
($ million)
Fiscal Year
Program Funding
($ million)
1975
$ 31.641
1981
201.0
1976
58.188
1982
294.0
1977
59.995
1983
262.0
1978
185.675
1984
313.0
1979
213.875
1980
113.0
1985
1986
255.0
337.0
Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF or MCP); Military Construction,

Navy (MCN); Operations and Maintenance, Army; Air Force family housing; Army family housing; Department of Defense contingency funds;
and Department of Defense dependent schools. EUD also worked with
nonappropriated funds and commissary surcharge monies. This list is
suggestive, not exhaustive.
EUD managed all work in Europe funded under MCA (Table 6) and
all work funded under the agreements with Germany to pay the costs of
U.S. forces protecting their territory. During the 1970s USAREURs entire
allotment of MCA money averaged less than $50 million annually. 39
Still, within these limits EUD workload increased significantly between
July 1975 and late 1977. Design workload, expressed as the programmed
cost of building the projects in design, went from $279 million and 246
projects in fiscal year 1974 to about $430 million and 554 projects in fiscal year 1975, then jumped to $1.3 billion by late 1977. The largest dollar
increases came in work funded by MCA, but work to support facilities
(OMA and family housing rehabilitation) supplied the greatest number
of projects.40
Between May 1976 and August 1978, EUD completed $34.4 million of
MCA construction.41 By the end of the decade, USAREURs annual MCA
allotment had increased to over $200 million. EUD workload increased
accordingly, and it continued to increase during the 1980s. The trend was
not an uninterrupted progression, however; in the summer of 1979 EUDs
division engineer, Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson, notified the chief of engineers,
Lt. Gen. John Morris, that his most serious problem was the current
shortage of MCA design funds.42
In addition to projects such as ammunition storage and medical facilities, MCA funds paid for facilities modernization (the dollar-funded pro254
2/3/06 10:45:19 AM

gram that followed MOUSF), pollution control, storage of weapons and
equipment, missile sites, energy production, training and training facilities, weapons facilities, physical fitness, barracks, and projects related to
the combat mission of the forces. EUD also executed work for the Air
Force and the Navy with funds appropriated for MCAF and MCN.
Funds allocated for OMA financed alterations, repair, and maintenance.
Appropriated annually, OMA funds had to be obligated in the same fiscal
year, and their use was restricted to specific purposes. During the 1970s,
OMA funds were limited to new construction or alterations costing no
more than $75,000 and to repair projects costing less than $300,000, as long
as the costs of repair did not exceed half of the cost of replacing the facility. The secretary of the Army had to approve repair projects involving
new construction that exceeded $300,000 and maintenance projects that
exceeded $300,000. Practically speaking, such projects came within the
approval authority of the community commander, because they were routinely approved in Washington.43 New programs initiated in the late 1970s,
including maintenance, repair, and improvement (discussed in Chapter 12),
increased EUDs flexibility in using OMA funds.
MCA, MCAF, MCN, and OMA funds provided the largest part of
EUDs regular funding from dollar appropriations. Dollar funding for
programs other than MCA and OMA was less predictable, and these programs were therefore less significant in EUDs early years. Family housing, facilities modernization, schools, and other quality-of-life projects
became a major focus of the divisions attention only in the 1980s. OMA
and German-funded projects provided the basic workload during the first
two years of the Europe Division.44
Host-Nation Funds
To cover some of the costs of stationing U.S. troops as a part of the
NATO mutual defense pact, countries provided host-nation funds.45 By
far the most important country for the support of USAREURs combat
mission was the Federal Republic of Germany. Since the end of the occupation in 1955, the West German government had provided various forms
of financial support to the United States to offset the costs of stationing
troops in the Federal Republic of Germany. The MOUSF program, for
example, was paid for through the agreements between the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany.46 (See descriptions of MOUSF projects
in Chapters 6 and 10.)
Another program, Alternate Construction, was derived from practices
begun before the end of the occupation. A series of bilateral agreements
dating from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s formalized the program. In
exchange for a facility occupied by U.S. forces, the government of the
Federal Republic would construct an equivalent facility at a site agreeable
to the United States. When the Germans wanted a facility returned, negotiations for an alternate facility revolved around the scope of work, the
quality, and the location, but not the cost. German agencies and contrac255
2/3/06 10:45:19 AM
NATO provided funds to support the Common Infrastructure Program, which

included this operations building in Incirlik, Turkey.
tors did all the design work as well as the construction. USAREUR provided OMA funds to cover EUDs costs of managing the program.47
NATO Funds
EUD had little to do with NATO construction when the U.S. forces did
not use the facilities. When the United States was designated primary or
exclusive user, the division reviewed plans and monitored construction
for the project as requested by USAREUR or the United States Air Forces
in Europe. NATO funding supported a diversity of construction projects
and programs as a part of the common defense mounted by the countries
of the Atlantic alliance. The largest category of NATO funds supported
the Common Infrastructure Program, which financed such undertakings
as airfields; facilities for petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); naval bases;
communications facilities; navigational aids; training facilities; headquarters facilities; warning installations; surface-to-air and surface-to-surface
missile sites; ammunition storage sites; forward storage sites; and reinforcement support.48
Projects in these categories could be funded in three ways. First, they
could be funded solely by NATO under its annual budget, where an allotment is designated as a tranche in French and translated as a slice in
English. These annual NATO allotments for construction began in 1950 and
were numbered consecutively.49 The NATO program trends and slice num256
2/3/06 10:45:20 AM

bers for fiscal years 19751981 are Table 7
given in Table 7. Second, projects
could be conjunctively funded;
North Atlantic Treaty
that is, the United States contribOrganization (NATO) Annual
uted funds to provide for features
Allotments
that NATO criteria would not
Fiscal
Years 19751981
allow. NATO criteria, drawn with
wartime conditions in mind, were
Program
exceedingly austere. Because U.S.
NATO
Fiscal
Funding
Slice
Year
($ million)
troops used the facilities extensively in peacetime, the United
26
1975
$ 26.0
States upgraded NATO projects
27
1976
10.7
to provide more amenities. When
an American project and a NATO
28
1977
13.5
project shared common features,
29
1978
57.8
usually utilities, the costs of such
30
1979
16.8
features were shared based on a
ratio of projected usage. A proj31
1980
287.3
ect might have both conjunctive
32
1981
277.5
funding and cost sharing.50 Third,
projects could be prefinanced; that
is, the United States put up the money in the expectation that NATO would
reimburse the advance. To ensure recoupment (the word used by both
NATO and the United States), EUD personnel maintained detailed records
during the project to satisfy NATOs accounting requirements. The Europe
Division continued the Recoupment Section established by the Engineer
Command. The recoupment process was tedious, and there was no assurance that NATO would approve repaying the money. EUD received special
funding from Congress to pay the overhead in monitoring projects funded
by NATO or prefinanced by the United States.51
Construction Workload
The execution of EUD construction between May 1976 and August
1978 is summarized in Table 8.52 In this 28-month period, fiscal year statistics were skewed because the government created a fifth fiscal quarter (FY
7T, 1 July to 30 September 1976) when it shifted the beginning of its fiscal
year from 1 July to 1 October. Nonetheless, the table represents EUDs
activity in the years before the increased tempo of the 1980s.
The first seven programs listed, funded by U.S. dollars appropriated by Congress, constituted almost 60 percent of EUD construction.
Modernization of U.S. Facilities, Alternate Construction, and the garrison
in Garlstedt were funded by the Federal Republic and represented another 35 percent. NATO funded the A Priori program, and the government of
the Shah of Iran paid for work in Iran.53
It is difficult to compare the workload of the Europe Division for 1976
1978 with the EUD construction in fiscal year 1984 (see Table 9) because the
257
2/3/06 10:45:21 AM

Table 8
Europe Division Construction Execution
May 1976August 1978
Program
Military Construction, Army
Number of
Projects
40
Program Funding
($ million)
$34.4
Percent
of Total
15.1
Minor Military Construction, Army
17
2.76
1.2
Operation and Maintenance, Army
23
5.18
2.3
Military Construction, Air Force
32
82.0
36.0
Military Construction, Navy
11
7.1
3.1
Family Housing
27
3.4
1.5
Other
10
0.9
0.4
Modernization of U.S. Forces
59
44.9
19.7
Alternate Construction
8.0
3.5
NORTHAG [Garlstedt]
26.0
11.4
A Priori
3.2
1.4
Iran
10.0
4.4
237
$ 227.84
100
Total
Adapted from EUD in Perspective, 19761978.
division did not use comparable statistics. Only three categoriesMCA,

MCAF, and OMAremain the same. As a result, the figures indicate trends
and significant shifts in the quantity of work at hand; they cannot be a precise measure of specific categories of work from one period to the next.
By 1984 the volume of work handled by EUD had increased dramatically. In construction placement, the total dollar value for the first nine
months of 1984 ($269 million) exceeded the total value for the twenty-eight
months from May 1976 to August 1978 ($227.8 million). For the entire fiscal year of 1984, construction placement totaled $403 million.54 The share
of funding for construction placement coming from dollar appropriations
(72.8 percent) rose sharply. The NATO share for 1984 totaled $255 million.
Host-nation funding does not appear in any identifiable category in the
figures for 1984.
Projects and Area Offices

In addition to analyzing the types of contracts and sources of funds,
the work of the Europe Division may also be reviewed in terms of where
258
2/3/06 10:45:21 AM

Table 9
Europe Division Construction Execution
1984
Program
Number
of Projects
Design Workload
of all Programs
Fiscal Year 1984
Program
Funding
($ million)
Percent
Construction
Placement
(Fiscal Year 1984
to June 30 Only)
Program
Funding
($ million) Percent
Military Construction,
Army
396
$1.428
41.8
$127.0
47.2
Minor Military
Construction, Army
418
795.0
23.3
15.0
5.6
Operation
and Maintenance, Army
221
202.0
5.9
45.0
16.7
NATO
76
255 .0
7.5
52.0
19.3
Department of
Defense/National Air
Force (NAF)
84
227 .0
6.6
21.0
7.8
63.0
1.8
--
--
112
296.0
8.7
--
--
--
--
--
9.0
3.4
45
151.0
4.4
--
--
1,354
$3.417
100.0
$269.0
100.0
AFFH
AFH
FH
Miscellaneous
Total
Source: Engineer Studies Center, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD), Organization Study,
April 1985, pp. 711.
the projects were located. In 1974 EUD territory was entirely within
continental Europe, and the vast majority of work was in the Federal
Republic of Germany. EUD initially established area offices in Stuttgart,
Frankfurt, and Kaiserslautern, the cities in which USAREUR maintained
headquarters for its three major commandsVII Corps, V Corps, and
the 1st Support Brigade (later the 21st Support Command), respectively.
Each area office maintained a resident engineer office in its home city
and established other resident offices to serve clusters of military communities. In 1974 the division had resident engineer offices at Bad
Kreuznach, Giessen, Nuremberg, Wrzburg, Augsburg, Bitburg, and
Heidelberg.
259
2/3/06 10:45:21 AM
Aviano
Vicenza
I T A L Y
Camp Darby
LISBON
ROME
San Vito
Sardinia
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
MEDITERRANEAN AREA
Mid-1970s
Sicily
Sigonella
r
Resident Office
Project Office
Liaison Office
0
0
500 Miles
500 Kilometers
Map 19
From this basic structure of field offices, EUD opened and closed area
offices, resident offices, and project offices as the construction workload
shifted.55 The Northern Area Office opened in 1975. Located first in West
Germany, it soon moved to Hoensbroek, Netherlands, just across the
border from Aachen, West Germany. The Northern Area Office managed
work in Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and northern Germany,
a geographic area equal to the combined area of all the other area offices
in Germany.56
In February 1976 EUD assumed the responsibility for USAREUR and
NATO construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey. EUD took over office
space from the Mediterranean Division at Camp Darby near Livorno,
Italy, and incorporated some staff to create the Mediterranean Area Office.
In addition to a resident office at Camp Darby, EUD established a resident
office in Aviano and project offices in Vicenza, San Vito, and Sigonella in
Italy, as well as a resident office in Athens, Greece, and a project office in
Iraklion on the island of Crete. In Turkey, EUD inherited a resident office
at Incirlik Air Base near Adana, the TUSEG Liaison Office in Ankara, and
a project office in Sinop on the Black Sea.57
Although Iran was outside its defined geographic area of responsibility,
EUD also accepted fully reimbursable construction work in Tehran.58 The
260
2/3/06 10:45:21 AM
Sinop
Ankara
ANKARA
G R E E C E
ATHENS
Athens
Adana
Irklion
e
a
Crete
Mediterranean Division had handled work in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s,
and Brig. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., commander of the Europe Division in
the mid-1970s, accepted the turnover of responsibility to the division, citing
this work as an example of EUDs ability to respond to challenges. In May
1976 the work involved only design, but within two years EUD had placed
over $10 million in construction funded by the Iranian government.59
Incorporating several Mediterranean countries into EUD in 1976
marked the last major addition of territorial responsibility for the division.
In 1980 responsibility for construction in Italy and Greece passed to the
Navy, but within two years the Navy asked EUD to reassume management of construction in those countries.60
Volume of Work in the 1970s

Throughout the 1970s EUDs five area offices supervised a growing
number of construction projects for the U.S. military. The Mediterranean
Area Office had the lightest construction load but a fairly large staff because
of its far-flung resident offices and the requirement to retain locally hired
Italians when the Mediterranean Division was inactivated. (Map 19) In 1980
its construction placement was less than one-eighth that of the Southern
261
2/3/06 10:45:22 AM

Area Office in Stuttgart, which had
the largest placement, and onefourth that of the Northern Area
Office. The unevenness of work for
the area offices is evident from the
construction placement for fiscal
years 1979 and 1980.61 (Table 10)
This unpredictability made
planning and manpower assignments very difficult. For fiscal year
1979, for instance, the Southwest
Area Office had projected construction placement of $52 million; the
office constructed only half that
amount because the Air Force shifted projects to NATO.62
Table 10
Construction Placement
by Area Office
Fiscal Years 1979 and 1980
Area
Office
Northern
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year

1979
1980
($ million) ($ million)
$36.6
$32.1
Central
38.3
58.5
Southwest
25.8
48.5
Southern
61.5
60.5
8.8
8.2
Mediterranean
Projects in the 1980s

As construction placement increased, EUD headquarters recognized
bottlenecks in the decision-making process. In 1980 EUD reorganized the
Construction Division, redefining the relationship between area and resident offices and headquarters and establishing additional area offices in
Nuremberg and Wrzburg. A year later the division increased manpower
and administrative support in the area offices and upgraded both TUSEG
and Heidelberg to area offices. Under the influence of John Blake, chief of
construction after 1981, the trend toward decentralization and increased
support for the field continued as construction placement increased during the 1980s.
Throughout most of the 1980s the Frankfurt Area Office led other area
offices in construction placement, with a full range of projects for V Corps
military communities. In 1986 Frankfurt had as much work as several of
the other area offices combined, but by the late 1980s its workload had
decreased to $60 million annually.
In 1984 the Stuttgart Area Office had a relatively small staff of between
twenty-eight and thirty-two people, some of whom worked in the area
office and others in the Augsburg Resident Office. In the next four years
construction placement jumped from around $24 million to $60 million
annually, and Stuttgart opened a resident office in Garmisch. In 1989,
when work in the Heidelberg area declined, that area office was downgraded to a resident office and put under the Stuttgart Area Office.
In the 1980s as much as 80 percent of the Kaiserslautern Area Office
workload was for the Air Force. With resident offices in Bitburg and
Hahn, this office served six air basesRamstein, Sembach, Zweibrcken,
Spangdahlem, Hahn, and Bitburgas well as Army installations in
Kaiserslautern, Pirmasens, Worms, and Zweibrcken. In 1984 the
Kaiserslautern Area Offices construction placement was $36 million; in
262
2/3/06 10:45:22 AM
The Nuremberg Area Office supervised the construction of Pinden Barracks

in Nuremberg, Germany.
1987 that amount more than doubled. In 1989 construction placement

topped $100 million.
The Nuremberg Area Offices major customers were the 1st Armored
Division, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Seventh Army Training Center,
and Department of Defense Dependent Schools. (See Map 20.) This office
handled the programs to upgrade the firing ranges in Grafenwhr and
construction at the training areas of Hohenfels and Vilseck. In 1985 construction placement was $68 million; in 1986 it was $85 million; and by
1989 it had risen to over $100 million. Staff increased from thirty-eight
in 1985 to eighty in 1989. To manage this construction, the area office
was organized with resident offices in Nuremberg and Vilseck and project offices in Ansbach, Nuremberg, Bamberg, Grafenwhr, Vilseck, and
Hohenfels.63
The EUD office in Wrzburg supported the 3d Infantry Division
and all of its subelements. The office also handled construction projects
associated with the Wildflecken Training Area and supported an airfield
in Giebelstadt. In 1980 EUD upgraded Wrzburg from a resident to an
area office. The Wrzburg office had eleven staff members; the number
increased to twenty-three by 1982 and continued to rise until 1990. EUD
also established resident offices in Schweinfurt and Wrzburg and project
offices in Wildflecken and Aschaffenburg.
The Northern Area Office, the only area office to retain its geographic
name after the reorganization of 1980, continued through the 1980s to
263
2/3/06 10:45:22 AM

NUREMBERG AREA
1980s
E
lb

Resident and Project Office
Kassel
Leipzig
Project Office
100 Miles
50
100 Kilometers
50
EAST
GERMANY
Erfurt
Dresden
Frankfurt
C Z E C H O S L O V A K I A
Ma
in
Bamberg
Grafenwhr
Pilsen
Vilseck
Nuremberg
Heidelberg
Ansbach
Hohenfels
Danube R
Stuttgart
Isa
rR
WEST GERMANY
Munich
SWITZERLAND
Map 20
serve air bases in the Benelux countries. When the Ground Launched
Cruise Missile program was introduced, construction was extended to air
bases in Florennes, Belgium, and Woensdrecht, Netherlands; in 1986 resi264
2/3/06 10:45:23 AM
The Northern Area Office was responsible for this headquarters building at an
air base in Florennes, Belgium.
dent offices were established at both bases. The volume of work for fiscal
year 1987, $79 million in construction placement, was 172 percent higher
than the workload for fiscal year 1986.64 In 1988 the Rheinberg Resident
Office opened, and a project office for the Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Powers Europe, opened in February 1989. In the late 1980s the Northern
Area Office extended its territory when the Navy asked EUD to oversee
construction of two NATO-funded contingency hospitals in northern
Norway. Norway would not allow EUD to establish an office near the
construction, so Northern Area Office personnel handled the projects
from Hoensbroek on temporary duty assignments.65
In Turkey, the construction program that began with a single contract in 1980 grew rapidly as the Army, Air Force, and NATO sought to
improve living and working conditions for soldiers and airmen and to
strengthen Turkeys ties to North Atlantic defense. Brig. Gen. James W.
Ray, the commander of the Europe Division in the mid 1980s, observed,
From the overall perspective of the Europe Division, the construction
program in Turkey was important, and more important than the amount
of money would indicate.66 The construction program in Turkey had four
components: (1) upgrades of MCA facilities at five remote sites (Erzurum,
Corlu, Ortakoy, Izmit, and Cakmakli) used by the Army group headquartered outside of Istanbul; (2) construction to improve working and living
conditions for the Army intelligence command in Sinop on a spit of land
jutting into the Black Sea; (3) construction for the Air Force at the main
operating air base of Incirlik near Adana and at a second smaller air base
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near Ankara used by airmen assigned to Turkey-U.S. Logistics Command;
and (4) prefinanced construction for NATO of two air bases, one an
entirely new base in Mus in eastern Turkey near Lake Van, and the other
in Batman, a base built under austere NATO standards in the 1950s.67
(Map 21)
Although the Navy assumed responsibility in 1980 as the Department
of Defense agent for construction in Greece, political turmoil and public
objections to U.S. bases made it difficult to work on the projects approved
in the fiscal year 1984 MCA budget. The U.S. European Command asked
EUD to help, and in the autumn of 1985 William Camblor began new
negotiations that led to an agreement signed with the Greek government
in the summer of 1986. Camblor negotiated direct design, but all construction remained indirect.68 In the late 1980s the Greece Resident Office
monitored work on seven special warehouses under programs designed
to make stored ammunition secure against theft by terrorists.69
Concerns in the Field

Maintaining continuity of supervision in the field concerned EUD
leaders. Although lengthy construction projects might have three or
four American civilian project engineers, the locally hired employees
(Germans, Turks, Greeks, and others) helped provide continuity. Military
officers received three-year assignments as area engineers, although
several serving in the 1980s arranged to stay longer. Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio
Europe Division construction sites in Turkey included Sinop on the Black Sea.
266
2/3/06 10:45:25 AM
Map 21
Denizli
Bandrma
Afyon
Izmit
Eskisehir
Kseky
akmakl
orlu
Istanbul
Balkesir
Izmir

Cumaovasi
Ortaky
GREECE
Burgas
B U L G A R I A
BUCHAREST
R O M A N I A
C
K
ANKARA
CYPRUS
Ankara
Konya
Sevastopol'
Sinop
Karatas
Adana
Incirlik

Kayseri
Merzifon
Gaziantep
hr
at
100
200
S Y R I A
Diyarbakr
Trabzon
100
Erzincan
Eup
Batman
Mus
gr
Erzurum
is
Tbilisi
300 Miles
I R A Q
IRAN
UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
Lake
Van
300 Kilometers
200
NATO Base
U.S. Air Force Base
U.S. Army Base
Resident Office
1980s
TURKEY
es
Ti
2/3/06 10:45:26 AM
Europe Divisions acquisition of an airplane facilitated staff travel to and from the
divisions far-flung offices. John Blake, Chief of Construction, is at right.
served as Stuttgart area engineer from 1984 to 1990. Lt. Col. Grosvenor
Bud Fish, Jr., remained in Nuremberg from 1982 to 1992, first as a
community director of engineering and housing and then as EUD area
engineer. Similarly, Lt. Col. Robert Mentell served as director of engineering and housing in Wrzburg from 1982 to 1985 and then as area
engineer from 1985 to 1988. Civilian Robert Rodehaver served in the
Frankfurt Area Office as deputy from 1974 to 1980 and then as area engineer for more than a decade. In area offices where military commanders
changed frequently, the civilian deputy provided continuity: Richard
Grimm served in Turkey from 1982 to 1990; Wayne Lewis worked in
Kaiserslautern as office engineer from 1975 to 1980 and as deputy from
1982 to 1990; Dave Cox was in Stuttgart from 1977 to 1979 and from 1983 to
1991; and Jim Mulford stayed in Wrzburg from 1981 to 1990.
Headquarters in Frankfurt had trouble keeping in touch with the field
offices. When EUD took over the Mediterranean area, General Prentiss
argued in vain for an airplane to give him access to the far-flung territories. Prentiss did not get an aircraft, but his successors did; from 1976 to
1988 the division had a twin-engine Beechcraft airplane and four pilots.
The plane greatly facilitated travel for the commanders and program
managers, particularly to Italy, Greece, Norway, and Turkey. John Blake
made an effort to visit each area office at least quarterly.
Blakes visits to Turkey were particularly important because the difficulties the TUSEG staff encountered when communicating with Frankfurt
268

could be overwhelming.70 Military telephone service was uncertain and
commercial service no better. Computers with modems were installed
during the mid-1980s, but only when EUD introduced facsimile machines
in the area office and in each resident and project office in the summer
of 1989 did communications for the staff in Turkey become satisfactory.71 Veronica Rovero, an engineer who had worked at headquarters in
Frankfurt before her tour in Turkey, observed that the fax serves as both
instant communications and an answering machine, since the one guy in
the field is usually out of the office. Being able to send a message via fax
saves making numerous unanswered phone calls.72
Technology could not, however, change attitudes or alter feelings.
Overall, the staff in area, resident, and project offices felt removed from
the activities, tensions, and changes in Frankfurt. For many, work in the
field meant action, excitement, independence, and satisfaction. But they
also experienced isolation and, in some instances, hardship conditions.73
Veronica Rovero articulated the feelings of frustration felt by some EUD
employees in the field: The Phillips Building is EUD for those people.
They forget about the people out on the fringes who are struggling, floundering, and doing the best that they can under whatever circumstances.74
Throughout the organizational changes, fluctuations in funding, and
turnover of personnel, the mission of the Corps of Engineers in Europe
remained unchanged. To accomplish its mission, EUD needed people to
move the projects through design to construction and to monitor contractors in half a dozen languages. The range and array of programs and projects managed by the Europe Division was vast.
269
2/3/06 10:45:27 AM
2/3/06 10:45:28 AM
10
PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS
he changes in the management and organization of the engineer

resources that led to the creation of the Europe Division (EUD)
in 1974 did not halt work on projects begun under the Engineer
Command. EUD continued to execute the Modernization of
United States Facilities (MOUSF), funded by the Federal Republic of
Germany; the aircraft shelter program begun as TAB VEE (Theater Air
Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise); and work for the U.S. Navy
in Sigonella, Sicily, inherited from the Mediterranean Division. During
EUDs early years these holdover programs constituted a substantial
part of the divisions workload. Late in the decade new programs began
to emerge to improve the security of stored ammunition (the Long
Range Security Program, or LRSP) and to position materiel to support
rapid deployment and combat readiness (Pre-positioned Organizational
Materiel Configured to Unit Sets, or POMCUS).
Holdover Projects
Just as the engineering mission remained constant through the transition in 1974 from the Engineer Command (ENGCOM) to the Europe
Division, so too did the execution of programs and projects. Programs and
contracts initiated under ENGCOM or transferred from the Mediterranean
Division continued under the Europe Division. Only later in the decade
did new programs begin to dominate EUDs work.
Modernizing U.S. Facilities

The transition from the Engineer Command to the Europe Division
slowed progress on the MOUSF program, which the Federal Republic of
Germany had first funded in December 1971. In April 1974, in ENGCOMs
last weeks of existence, the United States and West Germany signed
a second MOUSF agreement. To supervise and administer the 1971
MOUSF projects, ENGCOM had depended on Military Construction,
Army (MCA), funds appropriated by Congress in 1972. The Engineer
14M_Chap10_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 11:12:02 AM

Command had no similar appropriation for the projects envisioned under
the 1974 MOUSF agreement. Moreover, the projects in the first phase had
advanced quickly because ENGCOM had a backlog of projects already
designed under its Stem to Stern program for the rehabilitation of barracks. With the reshuffling of personnel and resources that accompanied
the transition from ENGCOM to EUD, the funds that had supported both
design and supervision for the MOUSF program, taken from USAREURs
Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA), budget, either ran out or
remained tied up in ENGCOM accounts. These factors threw the administration of work under MOUSF into question.1
In the summer of 1974 the administrative home of MOUSF remained
undecided. Renovation of barracks and mess halls was closely akin
to the maintenance and repair work discharged by the facilities engineers whose chain of command shifted in mid-1974 from ENGCOM to
USAREUR community commanders. EUDs first commander, Brig. Gen.
James C. Donovan, and his successor, Brig. Gen. Louis Prentiss, Jr., both
argued forcefully that the Europe Division should supervise the MOUSF
work. Only EUD had the personnel and structure to perform construction
agency services, including estimates, technical review, and engineering
assistance. The facilities engineers and USAREUR had little capacity in
these areas.2
When ENGCOM began its work on MOUSF in the summer of 1972,
it received authority to requisition forty engineer officers assigned to the
24th Engineer Group to serve as MOUSF project officers. By late 1974,
because the work had slowed down so substantially, only twenty-six
MOUSF officers remained active on the projects. To support the MOUSF
projects, EUD needed about forty clerical and technical personnel in resident offices and at least twenty more in area offices and headquarters, but
the division had very few people at its disposal.3 The tight staffing situation limited the divisions ability to initiate work on the projects scheduled for the second MOUSF program, and just five new MOUSF design
contracts were awarded in its first months.4
In October 1974 EUDs situation improved when the Federal Republic
agreed to pay for secondary services that the division provided on other
construction projects. The division could then use these monies to pay
for design for MOUSF projects. EUDs principal negotiator in this, as in
all discussions of MOUSF with the Germans, was the assistant division
engineer for intergovernmental affairs, William E. Camblor. The deal
that Camblor negotiated was so delicate that it cannot be put in writing
because of the political aspect, i.e., the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]
will not pay any direct cost for the forces because it smells of occupation.
Indeed, the agreement was so politically sensitive that Prentiss chose to
eliminate the detailed description of it, including the phrase just quoted,
from his report to the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, Jr.,
in October 1974.5
The extent of USAREURs support for MOUSF remained unclear
throughout 1974. Prentiss did not learn until December that the project
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2/3/06 11:12:03 AM
Programs and Projects

officers previously assigned would continue to be available to EUD, subject to Department of Army personnel policies.6 In March 1975, under
pressure to free officer spaces, USAREUR began to reduce by attrition
the number of engineer officers assigned to MOUSF. Instead of providing personnel to supervise this construction, USAREUR proposed to
pay EUD, and in July 1975 the command signed an agreement with EUD
governing MOUSF work.7 Progressively, as USAREUR removed engineer
officers from MOUSF, the division hired civilian engineers to take their
places. It was not until January 1976 that General Prentiss deemed that
the MOUSF program had recovered the momentum it had lost during the
transition.8
Whether civilian or military, the MOUSF project officer was the key
to effective coordination with the German construction agencies and
contractors who, through indirect contracting, renovated the U.S. facilities. The MOUSF agreements provided that the Federal Republic would
perform all the programs supervision and administration functions.9
Project officers served as the link between the construction agencies and
the user in the U.S. military community. They worked with the contractors to ensure compliance with the criteria and monitored requests from
the users for additional work, verifying whether the work qualified under
MOUSF regulations.10
Experience in executing the 1971 MOUSF agreement demonstrated
that German construction agencies did not always hold contractors to the
required contract standards. The agencies sometimes approved major
deviations from the plans and specifications as stipulated in the design,
accepting what the project officers considered substandard equipment and
materials. The American side of the operation was no easier for the MOUSF
project officer to handle. Users initiated numerous requests for change, typically four or five small changes per week, and an average of four changes
per project, which exceeded the 10 percent limitation on cost overruns. The
German agencies frequently accepted user requests for changes uncritically;
they had no particular interest in distinguishing between nice to have
items and permissible inclusions. The MOUSF project officer monitored
requests for changes and negotiated reasonable charges. Contractors often
levied excessive charges. The German agencies had little incentive to limit
overall costs; the contractors had great incentive to raise them, because their
profit margins increased along with costs.11
The MOUSF project officer influenced the final quality of the work
by inspecting the construction as it progressed. On 70 percent of the construction undertaken, German authorities exercised little or no inspection.
When they did inspect, officials at times sided with the contractors in
disputes over whether the quality of materials or of the construction itself
met the required standards.12 In general, EUD judged the level of technical staffing maintained by the agencies of the Federal Republic inadequate
to the task of monitoring MOUSF construction and saw no indication that
government inspection services would improve or expand under the second agreement.13
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2/3/06 11:12:03 AM

Regulations to buy American products complicated the process further. For instance, government-procured mechanical kitchen equipment
had to be installed in the renovated dining facilities, but the equipment
delivered often did not meet the specifications listed on the orders. EUD
might order equipment that burned liquid petroleum but receive equipment engineered for natural gas. Despite specifying the standard for
European electrical equipment at 220 volts and 50 cycles, the division
often received standard American materials at 110 volts and 60 cycles. In
several instances such equipment was shipped with 220V/50 cycle specification plates simply attached in place of the accurate description, a fact
discovered unfortunately only after energizing the equipment.
These problems with the kitchen equipment led to extensive delays
for which EUD was blamed, although the division had no control over
the mandate to buy American. In frustration, Brig. Gen. Norman G.
Delbridge, Jr., commander of the Europe Division, appealed to the commander in chief of USAREUR in 1977 to convene a meeting of all concerned and responsible personnel to establish a corrective action program
that will assure timely delivering of operationally correct MKE [mechanical kitchen equipment].14
Despite all of the administrative reshuffling and the difficulties of
supervision, EUD did make progress in renovating and improving the
living conditions of U.S. military personnel. During 1975 EUD supervised twenty-two projects completed under the first MOUSF program,
bringing the total of completed projects to fifty. Of the Deutschmark
(DM) 576.4 million allocated to USAREUR in 1971 (roughly $176.8 million), ENGCOM and EUD obligated 99 percent by the end of 1975;
and the value of in-place construction financed by the 1971 agreement
amounted to DM 538 million ($165 million). By the end of 1976 the division had essentially finished work under the first MOUSF agreement.
Renovation had taken place at 54 casernes, accounting for about 590 barracks buildings and 136 dining facilities serving 55,000 troops.15 In spite
of inadequate management and monitoring, the results were satisfactory. An Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE) command inspection team
that visited EUD in August 1975 singled out the quality of the MOUSF
work for special mention.16
The second MOUSF agreement of 1974 yielded less spectacular statistics because it involved smaller jobs at more remote facilities. By the end
of 1975 German construction agencies had awarded contracts for renovation at only 16 casernes under this agreement; another 3 projects awaited
contract and 19 remained in design.17 By the end of 1976 contractors had
completed work on only 12 of the 38 casernes programmed for renovation. The program completed improvements at 12 remote sites during
the same year, and the remaining sites included in the plans were under
contract. Thirty percent of the 1974 allocation remained to be dispensed.
Inflation and exchange rate fluctuations had cut into the buying power of
the money allocated. The scope of work had increased at individual sites,
particularly for utilities such as electrical and water systems; many of the
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2/3/06 11:12:04 AM
MOUSF projects included renovating military housing, such as the enlisted

mens barracks in Bremerhaven, Germany.
barracks involved higher outlays than originally programmed.18 Such factors translated into fewer projects for the money expended.
By the end of 1978 the MOUSF program had nearly run its course.
Funds from the Federal Republic had financed the renovation of nearly
800 barracks buildings housing about 90,000 U.S. troops and the reconditioning of about 200 dining facilities. The program had also renovated
or enhanced facilities at 35 remote sites in West Germany, ranging from
8-person border posts to company-size air defense sites. By late 1979 only
about 5 percent of the original DM 1.1 billion ($482.2 million) allocation for
MOUSF remained unspent. Over the next several years that money went
into new facilities. By the end of 1984 only about 1 percent of the total
funding remained to cover costs associated with projects still under way.19
The MOUSF program won consistent praise for its tangible and visible improvements to the facilities for U.S. troops in West Germany. It
took several more years before the U.S. government began to fund similar
improvements in the living facilities used by the troops on a daily basis.20
Air Force Aircraft Shelters

Just before the establishment of the Europe Division, the U.S. Air
Forces in Europe engaged the Engineer Command to build atomic-resistant shelters to protect fighter aircraft at three North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) airfields in Germany and at two airfields in the
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2/3/06 11:12:04 AM

Netherlands. Like the MOUSF program, the Air Forces program suffered
during the transition. The Air Force was impatient to proceed and asked
for a special meeting in late June 1974, several days before EUDs official
activation, with representatives of EUD and the German construction
agencies that would be involved.21
To accommodate the Air Forces sense of urgency, Camblor set up
a meeting on 21 June. He persuaded representatives from the German
Ministry of Defense to meet in Mainz rather than in Bonn, where protocol
dictated that such meetings take place. The meeting included representatives from the Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical Working Group for
Construction) and the state financial and construction offices that would
be involved in the project from the German side. Two lieutenant colonels
represented the Air Force, while Camblor and two staff members represented EUD.22
The Air Force spokesman outlined the program for three sites
in Germany: Lahr, in Baden-Wrttemberg, just north of Freiburg;
Spangdahlem, near the Luxembourg border in the west; and a third site
undetermined at the time of the meeting (eventually Jever in the north
between Wilhelmshaven and the Dutch border). The Air Force planned
two sites in the Netherlands: Soesterberg and Gilze-Rijen. The facilities
at all the sites would be the same: aircraft shelters and the paved aprons
surrounding them; storage for conventional ammunition and liquid oxygen; and petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) storage facilities. Only the
number of shelters or ammunition storage igloos would differ from site
to site.
The shelters, third-generation modifications of aircraft shelters already
in use, would protect the aircraft in the event of very severe external
explosions and allow the pilots to start the engines in the shelter itself to
speed takeoff. A design existed for a shelter seventy-one feet wide and
forty-eight feet high. Concrete was to be poured to a uniform thickness
around double corrugated metal liners. The shelter needed doors that
could withstand the kind of attack envisioned and open even if debris
were strewn around. The doors had to close quickly in the event of an
attack and reopen quickly to allow the plane to taxi out and take off. At
the time of the meeting in June 1974, the door-operating mechanisms and
the doors themselves had not been designed. The Air Force anticipated
that design drawings scheduled for delivery by 1 October would bring the
project to 80 percent design completion; the final 20 percent of the design
work would be left to the contractor to complete with his site adaptation.
The Air Force planned to use an existing design for the ammunition storage structures.23
At the meeting in Mainz, Camblor negotiated a streamlined procedure
with the German construction agencies and the West German Ministry of
Defense to expedite handling of the initial bid solicitations. He also pointed out that although this was a NATO project, the United States was prefinancing the design. In general, the Germans responded well to the appeal
for urgent treatment of the project; but they were concerned about coordi276
2/3/06 11:12:05 AM

nation with the German military, with local German construction agencies, with the Canadians who also used Lahr Air Base, and with NATO.24
When General Prentiss took command of EUD three months after the
June meeting in Mainz, he identified the aircraft shelter project as our
most pressing mission.25 Because Ralph Wheeler had arrived in Frankfurt
before EUDs incumbent chief of engineering, John Tambornino, retired,
Prentiss assigned Wheeler to spearhead the project from October 1974
until he took over as chief of engineering on 1 December. Wheeler recognized that one overwhelmed project manager could not monitor the
program. He chose to form a team of three menGary Sturman, John
Tsingos, and Tom Nissento work under his direct supervision, saying,
You have nothing else to do except execute this program, and you have
six months to do it!26 Camblor continued to be involved in all negotiations with the German and Dutch officials.27
Wheeler and his team arranged weekly meetings with the Air Forces
point man for the project, the base civil engineer at Ramstein Air Base,
Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Clifton D. Duke Wright. In late December 1974
EUD issued a notice to proceed on a contract that called for design of
the standard aircraft shelter with closure. The contract also included the
fabrication and erection in Ramstein of a prototype to test the closure.
As finally constructed, two doors, each weighing about eighty tons, were
installed at each shelter. About the same time the Dutch authorities, under
contract with EUD, began design on the two projects for Gilze-Rijen and
Soesterberg. The Dutch proved very cooperative and allowed the work
on design to begin even though they did not yet have a signed agreement to station both U.S. and Dutch forces on the air bases in question. By
March 1975 EUD received for review the final design for the facilities in
Spangdahlem in West Germany.28
Pesky little problems kept cropping up for the aircraft shelter program.
Much of the work on the shelters would take place in northern Germany,
Belgium, and Holland, so Prentiss wanted to establish a Northern Area
Office to monitor activities in the region; OCE had no extra personnel it
could assign him. The program started so quickly and with such indefinite criteria that as late as September 1975 EUD had no current working
estimates for individual projects. Comptroller Randolph S. Washington
reported to Prentiss that he could not release funds for the work under
these conditions without violating funding guidelines.29
To complicate matters, NATO refused to fund the storm-drainage system designed for the aircraft shelters. When NATO officials indicated that
they would support only a small oil separator and a dry well, EUD sent a
letter requesting that the German agency handling the project seek the necessary changes from the contractor. Congress reduced the appropriation for
the program in fiscal year 1975 from $62 million to $54.5 million, an action
that disrupted EUDs planning. The funding program included no provisions for increases in wages, although the Dutch contracts explicitly included as a standard feature an escalation clause for wages. Because wages
represented a third of the costs in those contracts, this was a serious omis277
2/3/06 11:12:05 AM

sion. Furthermore, the Air Force did not always respect Army Engineer
procedures. Through a German project manager on one project, Air Force
personnel directed a contractor to begin a project, over the EUD resident
engineers protests, for which a contract had not yet been awarded.30
Despite the snags, the aircraft shelter program progressed. EUD
approved advertising construction contracts for Lahr and Spangdahlem in
April 1975 and advertised contracts for Jever, Soesterberg, and Gilze-Rijen
in May. Because bidding was lower than expected, EUD programmed five
additional shelters in both Soesterberg and Spangdahlem. Prentiss committed the Engineering Division to work on project management for the
additional aircraft shelters, although he recognized that Congress might
cancel the program or reduce its scope.31
During construction, problems arose regarding the liners used in
all of the initial aircraft shelters. The liners came as U.S.-governmentfurnished property from stocks left over from Vietnam. EUD took special steps to inform the German government that government-furnished
materials were being used. EUD kept unusually strict inventory on the
equipment and all its parts, and both the Engineering and Construction
Divisions maintained careful records and segregate expenditures on these
items.32
When the materials arrived in Bremerhaven, the major issue became
how to get the liners to the five sites. Rail lines ran directly to Lahr and
Spangdahlem in southwestern Germany and to the two Dutch sites in
Gilze-Rijen and Soesterberg, but no rail line ran to the Jever base in north-
A helicopter squadron transported metal liners needed in remote Jever, Germany, to

construct atomic-resistant aircraft shelters equipped with doors weighing eighty tons.
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Aircraft shelters resistant to atomic attacks were constructed in 1976 and 1977
in Gilze-Rijen in the Netherlands.
ern Germany. The area engineer for the Northern Area Office, Lt. Col.
Roy A. Brown, heard that a Chinook helicopter squadron was looking for
flying time. He contacted the squadron, and the commander agreed to
ferry his liners from Bremerhaven to Jever in slings under the Chinooks.
The operation was a success: The helicopter crews got their training and
Brown got the liners delivered to the site.
Brown might have been happier had the Chinooks actually lost the
liners in transit, because they proved a headache to install. Each liner had
to be reshaped to fit the design of the new shelters. Because reshaping left
all the existing bolt holes misaligned, new holes had to be bored to bolt
sections of the liner together. Years later Hasso Damm, who had long service with EUD as a cost estimator, observed that the division had paid
more for reboring the holes than the whole sheet metal would have cost
new!33
Eight months after the construction contract was awarded, Colonel
Browns team in the Northern Area Office took the final steps to complete
the first shelters. On 14 January 1976, working from 5:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M.
in 45-degree weather with occasional showers, crews poured concrete
around the liners in Gilze-Rijen. About a week later they placed concrete
in Jever.34 The first placement went in Spangdahlem on 21 April, and
from that point completions proceeded rapidly. Contractors transferred
completed facilitiesthe shelters, taxiways and aprons, ammunition
storage igloos, and the POL storage and pumping facilitiesto the Air
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2/3/06 11:12:07 AM

Force in Gilze-Rijen and Jever in January and February 1977, respectively.
Construction in Soesterberg continued throughout 1977, although the Air
Force used the base while construction progressed. By the end of the year
the Northern Area Office had supervised construction of fifty-one aircraft shelters. In aggregate, the construction placed by the Northern Area
Office between 1975 and 1977 totaled $40 million.35
All in all, the program to build aircraft shelters and the attendant
ammunition storage facilities succeeded. Wheeler and Prentiss established
good working relations with the Air Force. Even though funds had been
erratic and personnel short, they delivered the shelters and supporting
facilities in a reasonable time. Camblor maintained effective communication and cooperation with the governments involved. Planning and
design for the Air Force project had started in 1974, in the midst of the
changeover from the Engineer Command to the Europe Division, and all
five air bases had the new facilities in place by 1977. Those who worked on
the projects felt their share of frustration but also felt satisfaction because
they had delivered on a short fuse, high-profile project.36
Naval Facilities in Sigonella, Sicily

Construction at the Naval Air Facility in Sigonella, Sicily, became
one of EUDs most sensitive projects in the early months of the divisions existence. In April 1971, three years before EUDs activation, the
Mediterranean Division had begun work in Sigonella on a multimilliondollar project. Construction encompassed a naval airfield, runway lighting, POL storage facilities, dormitories, warehouses, terminals, photographic-processing laboratories, a gymnasium, and roads.37 The work did
not progress satisfactorily. Two contractors failed to perform adequately,
and their contracts were terminated. For fiscal year 1975 Congress authorized an increase in funds to complete the construction. In June 1975
the Mediterranean Division readvertised the work and awarded new
contracts amounting to $1.1 million.38 Less than a year later the Europe
Division inherited the seven contracts for Sigonella, worth about $4.624
million in construction placement.39
In May 1976 the commander at the Sigonella Naval Base prepared a
forty-page report detailing the deficiencies of construction at the facility
and had it hand-delivered to the Naval Command in Norfolk to protest
what he considered inferior and unsatisfactory work. EUD dispatched the
deputy chief of construction, Jacques Bouchereau, to Sigonella to examine
the work on site and to cooperate with the Navys engineers. Fortunately,
the naval officer in charge of construction in Spain, whose area of responsibility included the work in Sigonella, was more interested in resolving the
problems and securing adequate construction than in an interservice fight.40
In early June the Engineering Division at EUD examined the foundations of fuel tanks and the photographic laboratory in Sigonella. The
EUD commander, General Delbridge, requested a complete analysis of
problems related to the lighting system for the taxiways at the Sigonella
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airfield. He also scheduled a trip to Sicily in July with OCEs chief of military construction, Maj. Gen. Bates C. Burnell, to demonstrate to the Navy
that we want this problem resolved.41 Delbridge was prepared to replace
the entire lighting system if that was what it would take to satisfy the
Navy. As a further sign of his resolve to get it right, he called on OCE
in Washington for help. OCE dispatched engineers from the Waterways
Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Mississippi, who specialized in soil
analysis and other matters under investigation in Sigonella.42
Delbridges attention to the Navys needs in Sigonella paid off, and
the Navy awarded EUD a contract to correct deficiencies. EUD also won
a contract to manage construction for the Navy of a satellite communications terminal in Naples. Between 1976 and 1978 EUD placed over $7
million in construction in Sigonella. In that time the division completed
an air passenger terminal, taxiways, POL storage and fueling facilities,
maintenance hangars, storage buildings, a base exchange, barracks, gymnasiums, officers clubs, and several water treatment plants.43
Construction in Sigonella continued into the 1980s on new bachelor
officers quarters, a mess hall, and modernization of the bachelors enlisted quarters. The fuel tanks that had been programmed in 1971 and had
run into foundation problems were completed and put into operation on
24 May 1979. This was the last of the projects from the ill-fated construction contracts of fiscal years 19711974.44 By correcting inferior work, EUD
redeemed the Corps reputation with the Navy.
New Programs
MOUSF, the aircraft shelter program, and the facilities in Sigonella
dominated EUDs workload in design and construction during 19741977.
In 1977 the divisions focus began to change as prospects improved for
increases in appropriated funding for military construction in Europe.
ENGCOMs annual placement rate for design had been about $100
to $150 million a year. By comparison, EUDs design placement went
from $430 million in July 1975 to $1.3 billion by late 1977, a 300 percent
increase in a little over two years and roughly a tenfold increase over the
ENGCOM annual average. During fiscal years 19771978, the amount of
MCA money coming to USAREUR more than tripled, from just under $60
million to over $185.6 million. In 1979, 1980, and 1981, MCA funds alone
averaged more than $170 million each year. In 1982 MCA funding reached
$294 million and continued at that level through fiscal year 1986.45 This
dramatic increase in funds available for military construction in Europe
began in the latter half of the administration of President Jimmy Carter
and continued under President Ronald Reagan. The new funds made
possible two complementary developments in military construction in
Europe: the intensification of work on projects already under way and the
introduction of several new weapons systems.
The tempo of work at EUD picked up as more money became available. Projects related to the military infrastructure of the U.S. and NATO
281
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forces in Europe (for example, ammunition storage and the improvement
of warehousing facilities for pre-positioned equipment) received $160 million between 1976 and 1980. This translated into a dramatic increase in
construction.46
Ammunition Storage Facilities

In the late 1970s EUD initiated new projects directly related to the
infrastructure that supported the combat mission of U.S. troopsammunition storage and the Long Range Security Program. Work on ammunition storage was hardly new. During the 1950s in France and the 1960s
in Germany, Army engineers had managed construction programs to
improve storage facilities for ammunition.47 In the 1970s, however, terrorist
organizations, such as the Baader-Meinhof Gang, began to direct hostility
in particular against the United States and its military presence in Europe.
The imperative to increase security for U.S. nuclear weapons and missiles
intensified with this growth of terrorism in Germany and in Europe.48
At the beginning of the decade, the 59th Ordnance Brigade, commanded by Maj. Daniel Waldo, Jr. (later a deputy commander and then
commander of EUD), conducted a survey of ammunition storage sites that
the Engineer Command used to formulate plans for improving facilities.
ENGCOMs planning and design, designated as the Special Ammunition
Storage (SAS) program, initially dealt with fifty-one sites and projected a
number of measures to delay terrorists long enough to permit additional
security forces to respond. The construction program, scheduled to begin
in 1974, called for special fencing, a clear zone both beyond and inside the
security fence, guard towers, special lighting, and an intrusion-detection
alarm that would alert the security force on site to any attempted penetration of the secure area. Within the area, the security measures called for
special bunkers or reinforcement of existing bunkers to store the munitions. The basic design for the bunker used the Stradley igloo that had
been used in relocating munitions from France in 19661967. The bunker
was a fully reinforced concrete structure, normally built above ground
and covered with two feet of dirt and grass. The earthen cover was
designed for camouflage, to limit the damage from any accidental internal
explosion, and to lessen the impact of any external explosion.
ENGCOM initiated limited construction early, using OMA funds available in 1973, to correct security deficiencies at existing ammunition storage
sites. Work on design for the larger part of the program funded by the MCA
budget ran through late 1973 and early 1974, with the award of construction contracts scheduled for May 1974. Attention to the program intensified
when, during 1973, the Department of Defenses Explosives Safety Board
called upon the Corps of Engineers to furnish drawings and specifications
to improve magazines for the storage of explosives.49 (Figure 4)
The schedule that ENGCOM had projected in 1973 could not be
maintained through the early months of the transition to the Europe
Division. Only in October 1974 did EUD receive the directive from OCE
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Figure 4: Drawing of a Proposed Ammunition Storage Site, 1981
in Washington authorizing final design for special ammunition storage.

The authorization expanded the list by about a dozen from the earlier
total of sites included in the ENGCOM special program. OCE designers
also added a new building to the project that incorporated entry-control
facilities, a site security control and alarm center, and quarters for a combined response force of thirty-five soldiers. EUD adjusted its design and
site adaptations for the new building. Design specifications also mandated a new intrusion-detection alarm system for the storage igloos and
the perimeter fencing, improvements in perimeter lighting and fencing,
standby power and communications systems, and improvements in utilities.50 Some rudimentary construction began in late 1974 when the 24th
Engineer Group (later the 18th Engineer Brigade) received an assignment
to improve the security of an ammunition dump near Kaiserslautern. The
group repaired fences and secured bunkers, but without the benefit of
newly designed systems.51
EUDs revised schedule for the new ammunition-storage program
targeted spring 1975 for the award of initial design contracts, with construction anticipated in fiscal year 1976. In a public debate in the spring of
1975, Senator John Pastore raised the need for enhanced security for U.S.
weapons. He revealed a hitherto secret two-year-old report that detailed
deficiencies in the system to secure atomic weapons in Europe. The report
indicated that during 1972 more than 200 security-force soldiers had been
relieved of duty for a variety of infractions, eighty-three of them for drug
abuse. Discussions of the report in the press evoked general concern about
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the security of U.S. weapons and ammunition, as well as about the combat readiness of equipment stored in depots throughout Europe. The U.S.
Army faced further embarrassment when in June 1976 a weapons depot in
Wildflecken was robbed of fifteen light antitank weapons that had a range
of over 300 yards. The thieves got in and out without a trace, and experts
concluded that they had detailed knowledge of both the location and the
security procedures of the storage site.52
Even before Pastores revelations, USAREUR had urged that the
United States promote secure storage by prefinancing increased security
measures for NATO ammunition-storage sites where the United States
was the sole user. The increasing public scrutiny turned the work at
ammunition-storage sites into high-priority projects.53
During 1976 OCE contributed the support of its engineering staff
to EUDs work. The OCE engineers prepared plans and specifications
to upgrade ammunition-storage facilities and evaluated proposals for
procuring and installing intrusion-detection alarm systems at forty-six
storage sites in West Germany. The United States had about 7,000 nuclear
weapons in West Germany distributed among 100 sites.54
As often occurred with high-pressure projects, the program to
enhance secure storage of ammunition began with no more than draft
criteria. As criteria evolved, they were not always consistent, and correcting the inconsistencies caused delays. As previously noted, OCEs
concept design had introduced a new building at each site to house the
entry control facilities and to provide living space for the alert force.
This clashed with the Secretary of Defenses directive that EUD use to
the extent possible existing structures at or adjacent to the sites. Another
problem arose because the design specified a minimum of thirty feet
of separation between the perimeter fence and any interior structure to
accommodate a specific intrusion-detection alarm system. Because the
fences at all the existing sites had only about twenty feet of clearance,
the requirement would have forced construction crews to move every
fence.55
Changing criteria also disrupted design work at OCE. When General
Prentiss asked the chief of engineers, General Gribble, about the definitive
designs for ammunition storage facilities in early 1975, Gribble replied that
the designs were being held up because OCE had not yet been provided
with an anticipated change to the criteria manual.56 All this translated
into repeated deferral of the deadline for awarding contracts. Nonetheless,
by late May 1975 EUD had awarded design contracts for all sixty-four
sites. With the money available, Prentiss estimated that EUD could count
on construction at twenty-eight sites during fiscal year 1976.57
In July 1975 Prentiss asked his staff to differentiate between security programs for storing conventional and nuclear ammunition. By the
autumn of 1975 the Engineering Division began to use the designation
Long Range Security Program in place of the earlier project title, Special
Ammunition Storage. The records do not make clear whether this new
label applied to enhanced security for conventional or for nuclear weap284
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ons in storage, the ammunition storage shelters (igloos) or the security
devices surrounding them, or any or all of the above.58
In fiscal year 1976 EUDs Engineering Division completed its design
for projects with a construction value of $34 million on seventeen sites
labeled LRSP. In the following fiscal year the division completed design
for another twenty-six sites at an estimated construction value of $38.6
million and awarded construction contracts on eleven of these. In fiscal
year 1978 EUD finished design on six more sites, but only one went to
construction contract. Adding to this work, EUD awarded a contract late
in the year worth $13.9 million for intrusion-detection alarms.
The vocabulary used at EUD in describing the projects remained
internally inconsistent, with the Construction Division and the
Engineering Division using different terms. The Construction Division
described three different activities. First, storage facilities worth $34
million were completed under the ammunition program (in Italy
at Camp Darby and in West Germany in Bernbach, Bad Hersfeld,
Fulda, Hohenfels, Bindlach, Schwabach, Schweinfurt, Wildflecken,
Bad Kissingen, Miesau, and Weilerbach). Second, construction was
under way for what the Construction Division labeled the Long Range
Security Project at twenty-eight sites. Third, the project for conventional
Ammunition Storage Facilities in Koeppern had a listing separate from
that for the work on LRSP.59 The labels make it difficult to assess which
construction activities belonged to which programs.
It is nonetheless clear that by late 1978 construction had begun under
EUD supervision on new ammunition storage igloos and on improvements in security for ammunition storage facilities in five different
European countries, with work concentrated in the Federal Republic of
Germany. During that year EUD reached the final stages of design for
seventy other NATO sites, so that it had work continuing on more than
100 ammunition storage projects.60 The LRSP, prefinanced with MCA
funds, was supplemented beginning in 1979 by NATO funding, as shown
in Table 11. The original program for 132 sites had been consolidated to 103
sites, of which one was not eligible for NATO financing.61
Managing the construction for ammunition storage projects
involved unusual annoyances. Security at the sites was tight, and
everyone had to have an armed escort inside the secure area, including
all personnel employed by the contractor and even EUD representatives from the area or resident offices. Concerns for security imposed
limits on how many people could be admitted to the area at a time,
thus affecting the size of work crews. Security also dictated that pertinent information, such as the location of the utility lines, could not
be given to the host-nation contractors directly. This led to delays in
construction and occasionally to damage to existing utilities. Projects
prefinanced by the United States for NATO had to conform to NATO
criteria to be eligible for full recoupment of costs, but many of the
change orders issued on these projects either overlooked or ignored
NATO criteria. Additional complications arose because no one at EUD
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Table 11
Long Range Security Program, 19761982
Military
Construction,
Army
Year
($ thousand)
Othera
NATO
($ thousand) ($ thousand)
Total
Number
of Sites
Fiscal year 1976
$340
--
--
$340
17
Fiscal year 1977
419
7,500
--
7,919
26
Fiscal year 1978
68
3,200
--
3,268
Slice 28
--
--
1,800
1,800
Slice 29
--
--
57,400
57,400
27
Slice 30
--
--
5,700
5,700
Slice 31
--
--
40,500
40,500
24
TOTAL
$827
$10,700
$105,400
$116,927
103
Source: Briefing Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr.
a
Congress specified funds to purchase intrusion detection system (IDS) components.
b
North Atlantic Treaty Organization allocations (Slice 28 and following) overlap with U.S. fiscal
years 1977 and following.
had the responsibility to keep the project managers current on NATO

requirements. EUD provided no clearinghouse for sharing experiences
with change orders or other lessons learned so that any project manager could draw on the information.62
Jose Cruz, who had become EUDs chief of construction in late 1977,
recalled the difficulties associated with the ill-defined and shifting criteria typical of the LRSP projects. When criteria were issued in 1977, EUD
came up with what we thought were pretty elaborate plans; but these
measures never quite satisfied the Armys planners. Theyd come back
and say, Well, thats not going to do. This control tower has to have bulletproof windows, and then theyd say, Well, those are bullet-proof but they
scratchyou cant have anything that scratches. They kept changing
the criteria.63
General Wilson had similar memories of the work on LRSP: We could
never get that right. There were too many cooks [too many] experts
from USAREUR who urged EUD to upgrade the sensor system, change
from the design wed already approved, and go on to the next generation. Fence sensors were so delicate that the wind could set them off; and
despite EUDs rodent fences, small animals occasionally set off the motion
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sensors inside the ammunition storage igloos. Wilson termed the program
frustrating; Cruz called it a nightmare.64
It was frustrating for other personnel associated with the projects, too.
The Dutch complained that EUD assigned different project managers to
every little project.65 Within the division the volume of LRSP paperwork
and the frequent claim that it was a high-priority endeavor generated a
complaint from the Office of Administrative Services. The paperwork for
LRSP began to interfere with the timely completion of other work. The
director of the office asked that those requesting office support for LRSP
use the urgent designation with greater discretion.66
Because of the scope and complexity of the LRSP, USAREUR established a task force in June 1979 to coordinate the programs development
and progress. The deputy commander in chief, Lt. Gen. Pat W. Crizer,
took charge. Under Crizers personal supervision, the deputy chief of staff
for operations established a master milestone chart to track progress
on LRSP projects. Also in 1979, NATO finally approved criteria for the
program. In September 1980 Brig. Gen. George Kenyon Ken Withers, Jr.,
successor to General Wilson as commander of the Europe Division, recognized that responsibilities were becoming more clearly delegated and that
systems existed to correct deficiencies. Withers attributed the improvements in management of the LRSP to the fact that someone finally took
charge of this program.67
Storing ammunition involved more than providing sufficient storage space. It also meant putting the ammunition in the right place to
support the troops in the initial phase of an all-out attack. In the late
1970s USAREUR began a program called Ammunition Upload to furnish its tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces with the
initial basic load needed to operate in an emergency. To accomplish this,
USAREUR requested construction of additional paved parking areas and
storage surfaces and more fencing for forward ammunition storage sites.
This added another dimension to EUDs work on ammunition storage and
security. The United States financed projects to upgrade storage and to
secure parking for the basic load and construction connected with the forward storage of ammunition, whereas NATO financed similar construction for reinforcement forces.68
In March 1981 Withers reported on the progress of LRSP to the chief of
engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton, who was visiting EUD. The United
States had prefinanced forty-eight LRSP sites and had drawn up designs
for thirty-eight others to be funded by NATO. Host nations had designed
another twenty-one sites, also for NATO funding. Thus, EUD supervised
work in progress at a total of 107 sites ranging across West Germany, Italy,
Greece, Turkey, and the Netherlands. (See Maps 2226.) Eight different
NATO nations (the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Italy,
Belgium, Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Britain) operated these 107
sites as user nations. Construction had progressed in two phases. First, the
civil works package consisted of the site security control center or the entrycontrol building with living quarters, one or more guard and observation
287
2/3/06 11:12:12 AM
U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
S W E D E N
WEST GERMANY
1981
D E N M A R K
Long Range Security Program (LRSP) Site
N O R T H
S E A
B A
100 L T
I C
50
50
150 Miles
S E
A
150 Kilometers
100
Meyn
Kellinghusen
Hhenkirchen
Dornum
S
D
N
A
L
E
T
Wagenfeld-Hasslingen
BERLIN
N
Hamminkeln
Vrden
Schppingen
Schnemoor
Westerscheps
Syke
Varrelbusch
Barme
Duesen
Lahn
Barnstorf
Vechta
Liebenau
Rodenkirchen
Wiesmoor
Borgholzhausen
Mnster-Nord
Westkirchen
Dlmen
Datteln Werl
Buchhagen
Elbe R
Sennelager
Sonsbeck
B E L G I U M
Bren
Unna
Soest
Kapellen
Hemer
Hinsbeck
Arsbeck
Marienheide
Ptz
Wahnerheide Nutscheid
Geilenkirchen
Treysa
Herborn
Giessen
Lipper Hhe
Dren
Billiger Wald
Obersayn
Montabaur
Dichtelbach
Hontheim
Wschheim
Wackernheim
LUXEMBOURG
Baumholder
Oberauerbach
Salzwoog
E A S T
G E R M A N Y
Alten Buseck
Steinbach
Kemel
Finthen
Hanau am Main
Aschaffenburg
Mnster-Dieburg
Lehmgrube
Dexheim
Kriegsfeld
Kitzingen
Quirnheim
Miesau
Hardheim
Philippsburg
Dallau
Clausen
Feucht
Siegelsbach
Landau
Hemau
Heilbronn
Fischbach
Gross-Sachsenheim
Wurmberg
Dan ube R
Gross-Engstingen
R
Gnzburg
ine
Rh
F R A N C E
Lechfeld
Inneringen
Landsberg
Pfullendorf
Leeder
LIECHTENSTEIN
Map 22
2/3/06 11:12:12 AM
A U S T R I A
EUROPE
S W I T Z E U.S.
R L AARMY,
N D
ITALY
1981
Bressanone
Bolzano
100 Miles
50
100 Kilometers
Cordovado
Codogn
50
Portogruaro
Oderzo
Ceggia
Vicenza
Milan
Montichiari
Venice
Longare
Verona
Bovolone
Conselve
Y
Chioggia
Zelo
A D R I A T I C
S E A
Parma
Map 23
B U L G A R I A
Y U G O S L AV I A
U.S. ARMY, EUROPE

TIRANE
GREECE
1981
Y
Drma
Yiannits
ALBANIA
100
200 Kilometers
100
200 Miles
Perivolki
I TA LY
A
E
G
E
A
N
Erithra
ATHENS
S
Kerata
Elefss
Korop
Map 24
2/3/06 11:12:13 AM

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
BULGARIA
k
a c
B l
a
S e
TURKEY
1981
akmakl
orlu
Istanbul
100
200
Ortaky
0 Merzifon
100
Kseky
Balkesir
Izmir
200
300 Miles
300 Kilometers
Erzurum
ANKARA
Mus
Afyon
Kayseri
Diyarbakr
Ti g r i s R
E up hrates
CYPRUS
S Y R I A
I R A Q
Adana
Map 25
towers, fences, and other general

work. Second, the security and
communications package included the intrusion-detection alarm
system, lighting for the grounds,
and communications facilities.
At the time of Brattons visit
to EUD, the schedule called for
the original civil works part of
the construction on all fortyeight of the U.S. prefinanced sites
to be completed by July 1981. The
supplementary towers, recently
approved by NATO, were to be
erected at twenty-one of the sites
by June, and lighting and communications facilities were to be
installed at all sites by August
1982. The intrusion-detection
alarm system remained under
testing in March 1981.69
Late in 1981 ammunition storage and weapons security again
Facilities at ammunition storage sites included guard and observation towers,

such as the tower in Heilbronn, Germany.
290
2/3/06 11:12:13 AM

U.S. ARMY, EUROPE
NETHERLANDS
1981
0
0
100 Miles
50
100 Kilometers
50
Ter Apel
Steenwijkerwold
AMSTERDAM
Harde
Almelo
The Hague
W E S T
G E R M A N Y
Rh
in
eR
Dsseldorf
B E L G I U M
BRUSSELS
Cologne
Map 26
became the focus of intense attention. Two spectacular terrorist attacks on

U.S. military personnel occurred in the autumn: one in Ramstein, which
resulted in several deaths, and a second against USAREURs commander
in chief, General Frederick J. Kroesen, in Heidelberg. These attacks heightened concern about security, particularly at the ammunition-storage facilities. The incidents put increased pressure on EUD to install the intrusiondetection alarm systems at weapons storage sites.
291
2/3/06 11:12:14 AM
To protect ammunition at LRSP sites, the Europe Division fitted bunkers

with heavy doors, like these in Miesau, Germany.
In June 1980 the Weapons Access Denial System (WADS) had emerged
as an addition to LRSP.70 After the terrorist attacks, work on WADS intensified; construction began during the summer of 1982. The program provided
special security devices at thirty sites in West Germany and one in the
Netherlands. The components for WADS included exterior cages around
doors, deadbolt locks for the ammunition igloo doors, concertina wire blankets over weapons as interior barriers, a smoke-generating system, sounddeterrent systems, and weapons security cages and tiedowns. The United
States prefinanced much of the early work, as it had done for LRSP.71
To implement the WADS components as quickly as possible, EUD
formed teams of engineers to work directly with designers of the alarm
system in American test laboratories. One of the participants, Jim Wise,
described the teams as having a range of expertise that allowed EUD
to pull [an idea] off the drawing board and come to Europe and build
it, making design changes as construction progressed. Project managers from the Engineering Division and construction managers from
the Construction Division worked together on a particular project as a
wholedesign and construction working in tandem rather than sequentially.72 Reflecting on the urgency of the program, the EUD chief of construction, John Blake, noted that construction agents are not supposed to
do research and development, [but] it was unavoidable with LRSP.73
The ammunition-storage program remained a nettlesome management problem well into the 1980s. When Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) James
292
2/3/06 11:12:14 AM

W. van Loben Sels commanded EUD in 19841985, he also wrestled with
LRSP:
Either [designs] were done very poorly or we kept changing our
mind. I think both. You know, towers with blind spots. Lighting with
dark spots and areas not covered. And just about the time you got
it done, then theyd have another vulnerability analysis and decide
that they would get another set of barriers. It seemed like a neverending program.74
Blake called LRSP maybe the most troublesome [program] that I ever
dealt with in my whole career.75 The LRSP went on despite the headaches
that it caused. In June 1990 EUD finally completed a construction package
in Kaiserslautern that it had begun in November 1986.76
Pre-positioned Materiel
Caring for ammunition was but one of the storage problems that the
U.S. forces in Europe faced. Since the early 1960s American and NATO
military strategy had depended on materiel stored in warehouses across
Western and Central Europe. American military units stationed in the
United States, but designated for service with NATO, trained on the same
equipment at home. During the REFORGER (REturn of FORces to GERmany)
exercises begun in 1969 or in the event of an emergency, these units
would be airlifted to West Germany and locate the necessary equipment
pre-positioned for them. The official label for the stored equipment was
Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit Sets. One of
the major construction programs of the 1970s involved the improvement
of the POMCUS storage facilities.
Pre-positioned materiel had been drawn down sharply during and
immediately after the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. During that conflict the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, overruling protests by the Army,
ordered the most modern and battle-ready equipment withdrawn from
warehouses in Europe and sent to resupply the Israeli Army. To comply,
the U.S. Army shipped 400 tanks, 900 armored vehicles, and 100 howitzers to Israel from stocks in Germany. By the mid-1970s little of this equipment had been replaced.77
In May 1975 a General Accounting Office (GAO) report sharply criticized the condition of equipment maintained and stored in Europe. Eight
arsenals in West Germany contained materiel that according to regulations
was to be ready for use in six hours. The GAO concluded that the six-hour
deadline was a fantasy under existing conditions. The report also acknowledged the enormity of the problem that the Army faced in caring for vast
quantities of materiel. While recognizing the difficulties involved, the GAO
judged that the situation had reached crisis proportions. Indicative of the
problem, GAO reported that over 36 percent of the vehicles and trailers
examined had missing, faulty, or improperly installed parts.78
293
2/3/06 11:12:16 AM

The Army knew that its storage facilities needed attention, but it had
no money even to pay for removal of the World War II ammunition and
equipment that still clogged its warehouses. In 1976 Congress funded
the POMCUS program, permitting the removal of the obsolete materials. The program also made $200 million available to expand USAREURs
controlled-humidity storage space for pre-positioned equipment. The
appropriation covered improvement of existing warehouses and construction of new ones with as much as 40,000 square feet of storage space each.
Humidity control, achieved by lining Quonset-type buildings with a vinyl
skin, reduced rusting significantly and slowed other deterioration, such
as the cracking of rubber seals, that could reduce the readiness of equipment.79
Congress approved an additional $33.5 million in fiscal year 1978
MCA money for eight POMCUS projects in West Germany. At the same
time, the source of support for POMCUS began to shift, with less money
coming from MCA and more from the NATO Common Infrastructure
Program. In subsequent years the United States convinced its NATO
partners that new funding categories for NATO infrastructure projects,
including strategic stockpiling of equipment and ammunition, were necessary to increase the early readiness of the forces in Central Europe. By
the late 1970s USAREUR obtained significantly more construction funding from NATO than from Congress.80 In May 1979 the NATO ministers
approved funding for POMCUS; in the following years budget POMCUS
received the equivalent of $108.6 million, and more than double that figure was programmed for 1982.81 By 1981 the Europe Division completed
storage for sets of equipment for three divisions and had warehouses
nearing completion for a set of equipment for a fourth division. Design
had begun for a fifth set in Belgium, and plans called for a sixth set in the
Netherlands.82
Stored equipment must be cleaned and maintained, and the program
to enhance storage facilities included improvements in maintenance areas
and storage space. Program managers found it necessary to upgrade utilities to take into account the new equipment and new conservation and
environmental concerns. Connections with existing water-distribution
and sewer-collection facilities were therefore incorporated into the new
facilities for washing vehicles. Heating plants and distribution lines were
augmented. Fueling stations were installed.83
Because vehicles and field equipment had to be thoroughly washed
after use, the new construction provided facilities such as tank washracks,
paved areas (hardstands) for parking vehicles out of the mud, and appropriate maintenance buildings for draining equipment of gasoline and
oil.84 In the new tank and vehicle washing facilities, nozzles sprayed
water under pressure onto tanks and other vehicles to blast the mud off
of the tracks, wheels, and undercarriages. Water from retaining basins
could be drained off and used again, and the mud could be scooped out
and trucked away. Oil separators recovered petroleum waste for proper
disposal. In the late 1980s EUD began to sandblast using pulverized
294
2/3/06 11:12:16 AM
Vehicle shelters, like this one in Mnchengladbach, Germany, were an integral part of the
POMCUS and POMSS construction programs.
walnut shells as the abrasive element. The shells degraded biologically,

eliminating cleanup and disposal.85
New maintenance equipment and facilities included battery storage shops, sandblasting rooms, spray-paint apparatuses, and work areas
designed to accommodate other equipment such as radio sets, hand weapons, and helmets.86 With the introduction of these sophisticated facilities
beginning in the late 1970s, effective maintenance and proper storage of
equipment became possible. Batteries could be removed from vehicles for
separate storage, checked, and charged in special shops adjacent to the
controlled-humidity warehouses in which the vehicles remained stored.
Equipment that needed repair after a REFORGER exercise could be removed,
fixed, painted, and stored. As the maintenance facilities expanded, it became
possible to handle in phases the vast array of items in use during an exercise.
Items went first to outdoor storage, where maintenance crews inspected each
piece, taking those that needed attention through the shops and then placing
them in controlled-humidity storage until the next exercise. The sites also
included lubricating stations and fuel-storage areas, utilities, and roads.87
By the early 1980s NATO was the predominant source of funding for
construction of storage facilities, and the program came to be referred
to by a new name, Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Storage Sites
(POMSS). Although many of the early sites had been built in the area
around Heidelberg, much of the construction during the 1980s took place
in northern Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands.88 (See Map 27.)
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Bremen
Ter Apel
Coevorden
AMSTERDAM
Almelo
Hannover
NETHERLANDS
The Hague
W E S T
G E R M A N Y
Twisteden
Herongen
Grobbendonk
Kassel
Mnchen-Gladbach
Brunssum
Zutendaal
Cologne
BRUSSELS
Lige
se R
Rh
Meu
in
e
B E L G I U M
Frankfurt
M
ai
se
lR
Mo
LUXEMBOURG
Kaiserslautern
Mannheim
Miesau
Heidelberg
Pirmasens
Metz
Germersheim
Heilbronn
Karlsruhe
ne

R
hi
POMSS LOCATIONS
Stuttgart
1981
Pre-positioned Organizational
Materiel Storage Site (POMSS)
0
0
100 Miles
50
50
100 Kilometers
Map 27
2/3/06 11:12:17 AM

In 1981 Al Opstal of EUDs Northern Area Office became involved
with POMSS projects as plans took shape for construction at sites in
Belgium and the Netherlands. A naturalized American citizen and Air
Force veteran, Opstal had been born in the Netherlands. His fluency in
the Dutch language gave him an advantage in the Flemish-speaking areas
of Belgium, as well as in working with Dutch construction crews and government officials. Opstal monitored POMSS construction at more than a
half-dozen sites, including Brunssum.
The POMSS site in Brunssum in the Netherlands, nicknamed Hendrik
Caserne by the 350 American and Dutch personnel who served there, presented a range of problems typical of such projects. The building site was
on a heap of coal slag that had to be leveled into a plateau before work
could begin, and work had to respect a concrete batch plant that could
not be moved. Construction began in April 1982 and was completed in
December 1984 at a cost of $18.5 million. The twenty warehouses covered
116 acres and were maintained by a score of Americans and over 300
Dutch. In 1989 NATO anticipated expanding the site in Brunssum by adding five additional storage warehouses.89
Opstal also monitored work at other sites in the Netherlands, including Ter Apel, Almelo, and Coevorden, all completed in 1984 and 1985 at
a total cost of just over $50 million. Similar POMSS construction took
place in Zutendaal and Grobbendonk, Belgium. Several of the sites also
incorporated unit basic load storage projects. Unit basic load sites consisted of earth-covered bunkers arranged to provide the various types of
ammunition to supply a specific unit whose equipment was stored in the
controlled-humidity warehouses on the same site.90
The POMCUS construction that continued throughout the 1980s
improved equipment readiness dramatically. During the GAO survey of
equipment in Germany in 1987, only 18 of the 8,654 wheeled and tracked
vehicles brought out of the Brunssum storage site in the Netherlands for
REFORGER 87about 0.2 percent of the totalwere inoperable.91
Throughout the 1970s EUD had steadily pursued its mission to build
for the U.S. soldier. The MOUSF program addressed the living conditions
for the troops in the barracks, but MOUSF funds were largely spent by
1980. In Sigonella, Sicily, work for the Navy and the Air Force under the
aircraft shelter program declined. Only LRSP and POMCUS projects carried into the new decade. As the 1970s ended, the focus of EUDs work
began to shift to projects involving new weapons and the facilities to support them, projects intended to enhance the U.S. militarys ability to meet
the combat mission of the 1980s.
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2/3/06 11:12:18 AM
11
SUPPORTING THE COMBAT
FORCES
uring the 1970s the Federal Republic of Germany made increasingly significant military contributions to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). This allowed U.S. military planners to reassess the strategic positioning of U.S. troops in West
Germany and to conclude that they could redeploy combat elements to
improve the Western alliances defenses. As the plans for redeployment
developed, new weapons systems came into production, making sophisticated technologies available. Both of these trends created new work for
the Army engineers. Redeployment led to construction of a new garrison
in northern Germany, and new weapons systems stimulated construction
of new support facilities. These developments significantly increased the
workload of the Europe Division in the late 1970s and throughout the
1980s.
Redeploying U.S. Forces

The R EFORGER exercises (REturn of FORces to GERmany) began in
the late 1960s to deflect political pressures and reduce the number of
American soldiers in Europe. Balance-of-payment problems, exacerbated
by overseas spending to sustain the Vietnam War, intensified political
demands to reduce troop levels and shift the burden of mutual defense
to European nations, especially Germany. In response, the West German
government accepted minor withdrawals of U.S. troops in the late 1960s,
increased its financial contribution by accepting a series of agreements to
offset U.S. costs, and initiated the Modernization of United States Facilities
(MOUSF) program.1
As American military strategists faced the 1970s, they undertook a
reexamination of the geographic position of U.S. forces, realizing that
troop deployment had more to do with history than with current strategic needs. U.S. troops remained concentrated in southern Germany, the
area assigned in 1945 as the U.S. zone of occupation. By the 1970s West
15N_Chap11_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:50:30 AM

German military forces could assist in an effective defense of that region.
Moreover, if an attack came, Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces might just as
readily strike at the north German plain as at positions in the south. In the
north, British forces had been reduced out of economic necessity, and they
and the Belgian forces responsible for defending the region were thinly
stretched. The open northern terrain invited a rapidly moving mechanized attack that might overrun Western Europe before U.S. and other
NATO forces had time to deploy.
The new line of strategic thinking contended that the United States
could enhance its contribution to NATO and simultaneously reinforce the
credibility of its commitment to defend against a Soviet attack by stationing troops where a potential attack was most attractive.2 The strategic
plan that grew out of this reconsideration led to two major events. First, it
prompted the redeployment to Germany of elements of two divisions stationed in the United States under the dual-basing plan. Second, it brought
about the construction of a new garrison in the northern German community of Garlstedt to accommodate one of the redeployed units.
Garrison in Garlstedt
Planning to reposition Army combat forces in northern Germany
began during the tooth-to-tail debate in the early 1970s. Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger decided to redeploy combat brigades from
the United States to Germany beginning in fiscal year 1975. The Army
assigned one brigade of the 2d Armored Division to Germany in 1975
(Brigade 75) and one brigade of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) in
1976 (Brigade 76). In March 1975, Brigade 75 deployed to temporary positions in the major training areas controlled by the United States Army,
Europe (USAREUR)Grafenwhr, Hohenfels, and Wildfleckenall in
the area over which NATOs Central Army Group exercised responsibility.
Brigade 76 moved into Wiesbaden Air Base, which was also in the Central
Army Groups area.3
Between 1974 and 1976, and paralleling the repositioning of the brigades, the United States engaged in multilateral discussions with the West
Germans, the British, and the Belgians that led to the decision to construct
a new garrison. The location chosen, near Garlstedt, thirty miles south
of Bremerhaven in the area defended by NATOs Northern Army Group,
would become the permanent home for Brigade 75 from the 2d Armored
Division. (Figure 5) It would include a brigade headquarters and headquarters company as well as a support battalion that would be permanently
reassigned from the United States to West Germany. The plan called for
several other units to be deployed on a temporary basis and rotated every
179 days with replacement units from the United States. Ultimately, the
plan for units on temporary assignment was dropped, and all elements of
the brigade took permanent station in Garlstedt.4
The project had high political visibility and endorsement. President
Gerald Ford and West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt signed a
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Supporting the Combat Forces

Figure 5: Site Plan of the Garrison in Garlstedt, 1977
TO BREMERHAVEN
GARLSTEDT GARRISON
Site Plan
1977
1 : 7,500
cost-sharing agreement in mid-July 1976 for the construction of the new

facilities in Garlstedt. The Federal Republic agreed to pay Deutschmark
(DM) 171.2 million (about $68 million at the prevailing exchange rate)
for the construction of permanent facilities such as troop billets; dining
halls; officers quarters; and facilities for supply, maintenance, administration, and utilities. This represented about half the anticipated costs of the
complex. The United States agreed to pay the costs for facilities that the
German Army would not normally construct for its soldiers, who were
stationed close to home where community facilities existed. Amenities
such as an open mess hall; a chapel; and athletic, recreational, and community service facilities received the label U.S. peculiar and were
financed with appropriated funds. In addition, USAREUR programmed
1,027 units of housing for the families of U.S. soldiers, to be funded by the
United States and built by German civilian contractors under a build-tolease arrangement.5
During the negotiations for the Garlstedt garrison, the Europe Division
(EUD) provided technical assistance to USAREUR concerning the planning.
In October 1975 EUD arranged meetings with the Oberfinanzdirektion (State
Financial Office) of Hanover to discuss plans for housing U.S. troops temporarily in renovated structures. Late that month EUD received $4.3 million
in construction authorization from the secretary of defenses contingency
funds to begin design on facilities for Brigade 75.6
Priorities kept changing. In April 1976, when USAREUR and the West
German military decided to put Brigade 75 into the area permanently
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rather than temporarily, the master plan that EUD developed had to be
modified. Revisions included eliminating several maintenance complexes
but adding a club for noncommissioned officers, an elementary school,
and a high school.7 At the end of April 1976, the West German ministries
in Bonn sent a letter to the Land (state) government of Niedersachsen
(Lower Saxony), where the construction would take place, requesting
approval to solicit bids for the project.8
From the start, planners were conscious of the importance of public
relations to the success of their project. Although the Garlstedt area had
long been a military range and training site, the German population
prized the heath around it for recreation and open-air activities. U.S.
troops had never been present in the area, and the West German government expected resistance to the new military installation. Officials
therefore chose to reveal the plans for the garrison by degrees to give the
local population time to adjust. The concern was justified. By spring 1976
German opponents of the planned garrison had gathered 40,000 signatures on a protest petition, and in May a human chain containing 75,000
to 100,000 protesters formed around the proposed construction site.9
Plans went forward. On 23 September 1976, the Oberfinanzdirektion
of Hanover opened the first bids on construction contracts for the troop
facilities in Garlstedt. A month later the state legislature in Lower Saxony
formally approved the stationing of a U.S. brigade in the region, the last
formal endorsement that the project needed. Sensitive to the opposition
that the project had generated, the legislature directed the state government to ensure that the legitimate rights of the population of the country
are safeguarded to the greatest extent possible. As a spokesman for the
government put it, the stationing depended upon safeguarding the environment and ensuring the continued utilization by the people of adjacent
recreational areas.10
Mindful of public concern regarding the environmental impact of
the construction, the contractors erected special fences, ten feet high, to
protect two well-known prehistoric graves located near the new installation. They also spent more than DM 4 million ($1.6 million at the prevailing exchange rate) to restore open areas to more general use by removing
undetonated ammunition, some of which dated back to World War I. The
removal, begun in August 1976, eventually covered areas adjacent to the
installation at an estimated cost of an additional DM 16 million ($6.35 million). Workers removed more than thirty tons of dud ammunition from
the sands of the surrounding heath.11
Both design and construction were handled by indirect contracting.
Local officials approved the first construction contracts for the project in
late January 1977, and workmen began preparing the site in Garlstedt in
February. In April construction actually began on the largest single project, fourteen enlisted mens barracks and three dining facilities for 2,800
soldiers. On 5 May 1977, West German Minister of Defense Georg Leber
hosted U.S. Secretary of the Army Clifford L. Alexander in a formal cornerstone-laying ceremony at the construction site.12
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Family Housing in Osterholz-Scharmbeck, Germany
In July 1977 the Oberfinanzdirektion of Hanover announced that

Osterholz-Scharmbeck, a town of 2,400 just a few miles east of the
Garlstedt installation, would become the site for the 1,027 build-to-lease
housing units and one of the schools for U.S. dependents. As anticipated,
some elements of the community protested the concentration of so many
Americans in such a small town. To address local concerns, community relations groups from both the American and the German sides met
together. To gather information about living near large concentrations
of U.S. troops, representatives from Osterholz-Scharmbeck traveled to
other communities in Germany where U.S. troops were permanently stationed and to Washington, D.C., and Fort Hood, Texas, the home of the 2d
Armored Division.13
These early contacts fostered good relations, and in early November
1977 the Sports Club of Osterholz-Scharmbeck hosted a group of brigade officers and their wives at the traditional club ball. As a sign of
honor and acceptance of the new residents of the community, the club
flew the American flag outside the hall where the ball was held. The
wife of Osterholz-Scharmbecks city manager organized Operation
New Neighbor and used computers to match German and American
families based on common interests. Many of the local families adopted
incoming families and entertained them. Nearly every new family that
expressed an interest in having a local sponsor received one. English lessons became popular with the townspeople.14
On 5 December 1977, officials laid the cornerstone for the housing
units in Osterholz-Scharmbeck. (See Map 28.) The new accommodations
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2/3/06 10:50:33 AM
A27
Bremerhaven
Nordenham
A27
A29
Garlstedt
Osterholz-Scharmbeck
W
es
er
Riv
er
Oldenburg
Bremen
A28
Delmenhorst
A1
A29
A1
UPPER WESER REGION

WEST GERMANY
1978
0
0
20 Miles
20 Kilometers
Map 28
2/3/06 10:50:34 AM

(589 apartments, 425 row houses, 12 duplexes, and 1 single-family house)
were interspersed among existing housing at six locations in the community. To avoid creating an American ghetto, the planners selected
designs similar to the German houses in each neighborhood.15
To limit the impact of the U.S. military presence on the community of
Osterholz-Scharmbeck, USAREUR planned a minimum level of support
for the new living area. Troops and families could use the shopping facilities in nearby Bremerhaven, including a post exchange and a commissary.
The build-to-lease program in Osterholz-Scharmbeck included a multiuse
building containing an Army Community Service office, child care and
dependent youth activity centers, a commissary annex, an Army and Air
Force Exchange Service (AAFES) pickup point, a Stars and Stripes bookstore,
and limited facilities for the sale of beverages and merchandise. The complex also had four outdoor multipurpose recreational courts (for basketball
and tennis) and a fifty-car parking lot adjacent to the community center.16
At the Garlstedt installation, the soldiers and their families could find
a bowling alley, a chapel, a theater, a barber and beauty shop, and a bank.
Garlstedt also had its own recreation center and indoor and outdoor athletic facilities. All these facilities, which USAREUR approved for construction in December 1977, were built with U.S. funds as enhancements to the
quality of life for U.S. service personnel.17
By August 1978 EUDs Northern Area Office, working through a resident office in Garlstedt, had supervised the completion of $26 million of
construction, including the fourteen barracks buildings. Despite delays
occasioned by an unusually wet summer, the prefinal inspection of the
first barracks building occurred on 5 July 1978. Communications facilities for telephone and television advanced as planned, and in September
a microwave link between Garlstedt and Bremerhaven was fully operational. That same month the Armed Forces Network Television began
transmitting its programs to the area. Telephone circuits connecting the
caserne with Fort Hood, Texas, became available after the advance elements of Brigade 75 took up residence.18
The decrease in the value of the dollar from DM 2.56 to DM 1.85
between 1976 and 1978 created financial problems for the construction in Garlstedt. To cover the shortfall at the end of the 1978 fiscal year,
USAREUR had to apply about $5.5 million from funds earmarked for base
operations directly to the U.S.-funded part of the construction. With funding secure, the brigade headquarters and headquarters company and the
498th Support Battalion began moving into their new permanent facilities
in Garlstedt. The first units of the 2d Armored Division, about 200 people,
moved into the installation in September 1978. The first dependent family moved into one of the newly constructed housing units on 16 October.
The following day, German Defense Minister Hans Apel and Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown participated in a formal ceremony transferring the
facility to the United States.19
The mayor of Osterholz-Scharmbeck personally greeted the first
American family with traditional German gifts: a loaf of brown bread,
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2/3/06 10:50:34 AM

a filled shaker of salt, and a new one-pfennig piece for good luck. By
the end of 1978 a total of 282 family housing units were occupied and
410 more were ready for occupants. Interim support facilities opened in
Garlstedt, and AAFES, Europe, opened a snack bar in a truck. The community center that eventually housed these and other activities opened in
1979.20
Because of construction delays, special arrangements had to be made
to have schools for the American children by the opening of the academic
year in the autumn of 1978. A leasing arrangement with a local German
school provided eleven rooms in Osterholz-Scharmbeck for grade school
classes during the autumn term; high school students had to travel to the
Department of Defense dependent school in Bremerhaven for the first
semester. On 1 January 1979, an elementary and high school complex of
six buildings officially opened in Osterholz-Scharmbeck.21
American medical facilities were expanded to accommodate the growing community. Construction of a clinic at Garlstedt Caserne fell behind
and opened only in March 1979. In the early 1980s the military hospital in
Bremerhaven increased its staff, and its capacity rose from twenty-five to
seventy-five beds.22
Several unique characteristics distinguish the Garlstedt project, making it difficult to use as a model for any other undertaking. From the
outset it had the entire weight of the West German political and military
establishments behind it. Few projects commanded the level of attention
evident in the very fact that the U.S. president and the West German chancellor signed the agreement authorizing the project in July 1976. Funding
came directly from the Federal Republic, a factor that gave the project
two advantages in the early phases. First, German-funded elements were
easier and faster to initiate, execute, monitor, and release to the American
users than dollar-funded projects. Second, the American statutory, regulatory, administrative, and technical legal requirements that often delayed
dollar-funded work did not apply where Deutschmarks were used.
The project also benefited because most buildings in Garlstedt used
existing, off-the-shelf designs, a one-time advantage that facilitated
early start of construction. From the beginning the Oberfinanzdirektion
of Hanover had sufficient personnel to handle the volume of work that
Garlstedt entailed. USAREURs middle- and top-level management
devoted time and talent to the project, underscoring the importance and
urgency of the endeavor in the minds of the German authorities. EUD
also gave top priority to the project, assigning its most experienced and
qualified German engineers and its most proficient German-speaking
American employees to the work. All the construction took place in a
relatively limited geographic area and consisted of repetitive structures.
The combination of these factors certainly contributed to the Garlstedt
projects success.23
By February 1979 the coordination between EUD, USAREUR, German
government agencies, and civilian contractors had produced facilities for
4,000 troops of the 2d Armored Division, Forward. Establishing the new
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home for the brigade took less than two years from the start of construction, though not all the support facilities were complete. In October 1978
the installation had been formally dedicated as General Lucius D. Clay
Caserne in memory of the former commander in chief of U.S. forces in
occupied Germany and Berlin. General Clays efforts on behalf of the
Germans, especially during the Berlin Airlift of 19481949, made him
revered in Germany; naming the caserne after Clay paid fitting tribute
to the cooperation between German and American authorities in the creation of Garlstedt.24
Forward Stationing in Vilseck

The repositioning of American combat units to northern Germany
was one manifestation of new strategic thinking that developed in the
1970s. An extension of that thinking, forward stationing, became evident in the 1980s. The concept was simple: Move U.S. troops out of areas
west of the Rhine to positions close to the border with East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, points at which the Soviets might launch a preemptive
ground attack. Although formulated in the mid-1970s, the strategy of
forward stationing gained allied and West German approval only in the
early 1980s.25
The new strategy and repositioning of troops meant increased construction to support the consolidation of armored and infantry units
around Vilseck and Hohenfels, northeast and southeast of Nuremberg,
respectively. Design began in the early 1980s on operational and support facilities. When the chief of construction, John Blake, first visited
Vilseck in 1981, he saw Sleepy Hollow, a quiet, rural community with
little activity. All that changed with the beginning of construction in 1985,
starting with two buildings for battalion headquarters.
In 1987, as a part of USAREURs Total Force Modernization program,
the first elements of a planned five battalions of VII Corps (2 armored, 1
mechanized, 1 field artillery, and 1 forward support) began to move into
Vilseck. One of the innovative construction techniques applied during the
work in Vilseck involved a school begun in March 1987 and completed
in August of 1988. The building contained about forty classrooms, but
according to Walt Bogdanow, chief of EUDs Vilseck project office, they
were not at all your standard square classrooms. The building looks
like a ships screw and used cast-in-place concrete, a technology that
Bogdanow described as very time-consuming but one that allowed
construction of an unusual design. The school also had masonry work
exposed on exterior and interior walls.26
By 1989 EUD had completed or had plans for sixty projects related to
Vilseck with a construction value exceeding $300 million. In the Vilseck
project office an on-site force of eleven engineers and technicians supervised 30 projects, including 6 headquarters buildings; 7 maintenance
facilities; 8 barracks buildings; chapel; fire station; police station; 5 recreational facilities; and 882 factory-built housing units, of which 225 were
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2/3/06 10:50:34 AM
In 1987 U.S. military personnel moved into newly constructed facilities in Vilseck,
Germany, northeast of Nuremberg.
already occupied. Projections called for an increase in the size of the

Vilseck military community from 3,000 to more than 10,000 people by
1992.27
All this activity in Vilseck took place in an area of about two square
miles, making the coordination of contractors and work crews a major
concern. The Vilseck military community, which had to continue in operation throughout the construction, had to be included in the coordination
effort. Because there was essentially only one way into and out of the post,
the construction turned peoples lives upsidedown.28
One of the most difficult and disruptive aspects of the construction
was the installation of district heating, a system that had not been a part
of the original design. The introduction of this heating system rather
than coal-fired boilers involved changing all the specifications. Vilsecks
director of engineering and housing started supervising the district heat
system, but EUD took it over midway through the work. The district heat
lines were two feet wide and ran in all directions from the boundary of
the post to a main heat substation. Excavations for them cut across nearly
every road on the complex.29
With its potential for disruption of daily living, construction in Vilseck
could have been a public relations disaster, but it was not. According to
the area engineer in the Nuremberg Area Office, Lt. Col. Grosvenor W.
Bud Fish, Jr., much of the credit for making the Vilseck project work
smoothly belonged to Capt. Kent Henson, the project offices liaison officer to the military community.30
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Henson met daily with Vilseck community officials to keep them
apprised of the status of construction. He participated in weekly community staff meetings and a monthly meeting with the community commander; Blake frequently traveled from Frankfurt to participate in the
monthly meeting. Henson also attended meetings with each of the housing communities on the post to give the soldiers and their families the
latest information about road closures or utilities disruptions. Hensons
efforts notably improved EUD relations with the military community.
Problems arose in coordinating the construction with the surrounding German community. As Bogdanow noted, The forest belongs to the
German government even though it is on a U.S. post. We just basically
rent the land. Theyve got rights to say what happens to their trees, what
happens to their soil. The Germans also exercised the right to say what
happened to their birds. When shore swallowsbirds on the German
endangered species listwere found nesting in one of the open storage
areas, construction stopped until the fledglings had left the nest. The stoppage delayed the project and the contractor became eligible for payments
to cover his costs.31
As the tempo of construction increased through 1989 and into 1990,
Blake observed that Vilseck had changed from Sleepy Hollow to probably the biggest concentration of work that weve had since Ive been in
Europe. We have overhauled every square inch of Vilseck. One of the
Vilseck project officers, Doug Sommer, marveled, Vilseck has gotten one
new of about everything that you can think of.32
Supporting New Weapons Systems

Late in the 1970s the Army began to introduce a series of major
new weapons systems that required enhanced facilitiesthe AH64
Apache attack helicopter, the Black Hawk troop transport helicopter, the
Abrams M1 tank, the Bradley armored personnel carrier, and the Patriot
air defense missile. Nearly simultaneously, planning also began for the
Air Forces Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and the Armys
Pershing II missile. The EUD commander, Brig. Gen. George Kenyon
Ken Withers, Jr., knew that one of the divisions main tasks early in
the 1980s would be to prepare the training ranges, the barracks for the
soldiers who would man those systems, and any other facilities necessary to accommodate [the weapons] introduction into Europe.33 Withers
had no doubt that this is what the chief of engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K.
Bratton, wanted. He drew his conclusion from an offhand comment that
Bratton had made during a visit to EUD in March 1981: Ken, the CINC
USAREUR [commander in chief, USAREUR] mentioned to me that he
didnt want the Corps of Engineers responsible for the delay in fielding
any major weapons system in Europe.34
In fiscal year 1980 USAREUR received $1.7 million from Congress to
provide realistic practice firing ranges in Grafenwhr and Wildflecken to
train crews manning the Abrams tank and the Bradley armored personnel
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2/3/06 10:50:36 AM
Apache Attack Helicopters in a Maintenance Hangar in Crailsheim, Germany
carrier. EUD acted as the construction agent; Louis Berger International

designed the new ranges; and the 18th Engineer Brigade provided troop
labor for construction.
Upgrading the Ranges

EUD planned to procure materials for construction at the Grafenwhr
range in April 1981, with completion of design programmed for the following autumn. USAREUR scheduled the 18th Engineer Brigade, under
command of Col. James W. van Loben Sels (who became EUD commander
in 1984), to begin construction in April 1982. Aside from the valuable
training for engineer troops that the project offered, the 18th received the
assignment because EUD could not find at a reasonable price a private
contractor willing to work on the range given the danger of unexploded
ordnance.35
Working in the Grafenwhr live-fire range necessitated removing the
unexploded ammunition that had accumulated. Continuous use of the
range during the renovations prompted Louis Berger International to limit
its soil investigation to topographical studies from the air. Ground verification could only be done on Sundays, when the range was not in use.
Once on site, the 18th Engineer Brigade found shortcomings in the design
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based on its own analysis of the soil. Much of the area occupied by the
Grafenwhr range was a peat bog with a high water table. The engineer
brigades inspection showed that the ground, a mixture of peat and sand,
flexed considerably under weight. Any rupture of the peat layer caused
the sand to liquefy and the ground to sink. The brigade requested design
modifications and recommended a geotextile fabric, generally called a filter fabric, which would allow water to pass through yet contain and stabilize the sand. The designers incorporated the filter fabric, allowing much
of the bog to be reclaimed and used for roads, target areas, defilade firing
positions, and parking.36
In September 1981 other changes in design for the range arrived,
adding roads at two ranges, changing the elevations of target pits, and
modifying the orientation and location of buildings. These changes had
not been adequately coordinated with the German forest service, which
disapproved many of the relocations when construction began. The 18th
Engineer Brigade received the changes so late that delays in construction
were inevitable.37
The procurement of materials and equipment ran particularly smoothly in Grafenwhr because, starting early in the planning process, the 18th
Engineer Brigade and EUD cooperated to develop effective procedures
for tracking procurement of materials. As they identified problems, they
moved quickly to avoid possible bottlenecks. They also prevailed upon
the deputy commander in chief of USAREUR to keep the U.S. Army
Contracting Agency, Europe, working overtime to maintain the procurement schedule. Despite the quantity of materials involved, worth about
$17 million, procurement always kept pace with construction, and the
appropriate supplies remained available at each stage of the work.38
Between 1 April and 30 November 1982, the 18th Engineer Brigade
placed seventeen moving target systems totaling more than 14,500 feet
across six ranges. It created 549 concrete target pits that held electrically
operated targets depicting vehicles and personnel that popped up automatically. The brigade also lay over thirty miles of gravel roads for use
by tanks practicing firing and for maintenance of the targets themselves.
Wherever tanks turned on the roads, the engineers installed concrete
pads to limit damage. The brigade furnished the Grafenwhr range with
7 buildings for billeting troops, 4 dining facilities, and 5 target maintenance buildings with running water and latrines. These facilities reduced
the time that soldiers spent commuting to the range and made maximum
use of their training time. Five range control towers and one observation
tower helped soldiers monitor range activity. Five parking areas, each providing 8,900 square feet of concrete surface, accommodated the tracked
vehicles, and nine gravel parking areas took care of wheeled vehicles. The
engineers installed 13,000 feet of fencing, 1,600 feet of concrete roads, and
more than 200 culverts for drainage.
Grafenwhr was the largest troop construction project ever attempted
in peacetime. At its peak the project employed over 4,000 soldiers in seven
reinforced engineer battalions.39 Private contractors handled work too
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Pop-up targets were a part of the modernization of the Grafenwhr training

range during the 1980s.
technically sophisticated for the troops, and EUD project staff coordinated the construction to minimize the time that the range would have to be
closed.40 The contractors built water wells, programmable control units to
regulate the targets, self-propelled trolleys for carrying targets at speeds
from ten to twenty-five miles an hour, and electrical transformer stations.
They also made the automated targets sensitive to the thermal-imaging
night sights that the combat vehicles used. The targets popped up according to a command and control system that could be programmed for a
variety of situations.41 The moving targets provided more realistic gunnery training than in the past. Stationary firing positions and roads for
firing while moving provided training for both defensive and offensive
situations. Combat commanders reported that their range training efficiency improved by 50 percent during the first year of exercises on the
upgraded range.42
EUD made adjustments for 1983 based on the experience gained
during the first year. A single supplier was chosen for the targetry and
computer-based control units, reducing costs and eliminating problems
of installing differing systems. By 1985 Grafenwhr had become the most
modern firing range for tanks and the largest training area in Europe. In
addition to improving the range, the redesign aimed to conserve energy
wherever possible and to reduce noise levels.43
In 1987 EUD initiated work on a prototype for a test firing range that
would use space efficiently and employ a new material. Standard rifle
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ranges in the United States, where space was plentiful, were built thirty
yards wide. In a test conducted between 17 November and 10 December
1987, EUD set up the prototype of the new range with four firing lanes,
each 5.5 yards wide. The prototype used shock-attenuating concrete to
cover the target banks instead of the customary wooden covers. This substance consists of an aerated concrete mixed with small steel fibers, developed for use in facilities designed to train for military operations in urban
terrain. It offered four advantages over wood. First, it limited ricochets, a
critical factor with ranges set so close together. Second, it withstood the
repeated impact of ammunition much better than wood. Third, it was
easier to replace than shattered wooden panels. Fourth, it absorbed more
sound. These tests prepared the way for contracts in 1988 and 1989 to
build eleven new rifle ranges at a cost of $30 million.44
The Army invested large sums of money during the 1980s in a second firing area, Wildflecken, northeast of Frankfurt and directly north
of Wrzburg. The local populaces objections to the noise level at the
firing ranges held up work in Wildflecken for years, but in early 1989
EUD began work, combining troop constructionbattalions of the 18th
Engineer Brigadewith contract construction for the more sophisticated
work.
The work in Wildfleckento provide training areas for Bradley
personnel carriers and Abrams tanksincluded 7 moving targets, 73
stationary vehicle targets, and 136 personnel targets, plus defilade firing
positions and the associated roads and turning pads. With the approval of
the West German government, tree cutting for the project began in March
1989. By April EUD engineers had discovered serious design flaws: All
five of the new Bradley battle positions and three of the defilade positions
left the vehicle without a clear line of sight to the moving targets. The
design had to be changed. By the end of the 1989 fiscal year, the project
was only 20 percent completed.45
USAREUR needed to continue development of Grafenwhr and
Wildflecken because so many of its forces were stationed in urban areas
and had no training space. As German cities expanded, they enveloped
installations that had once been in the countryside. Because Grafenwhr
remained one of the few relatively open areas, more rifle firing ranges
were concentrated there, in addition to the tank ranges. EUD continued to
oversee work related to Grafenwhr to the end of the decade, and similar
work in Wildflecken extended into the 1990s.46
Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels

The Army was well aware that not all future combat would take place
from tanks and armored personnel carriers; much of it was likely to occur
in urban settings. To provide the troops in Europe with training to prepare
them for street-to-street fighting, USAREUR developed the combat maneuver training center in Hohenfels, a small town situated at the southern apex
of a triangle formed with Nuremberg and Grafenwhr as the western and
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Training at the MOUT village in Hohenfels, Germany, prepared troops for

urban combat.
northern apexes, respectively. USAREUR hoped to offer through the training center force-on-force training under conditions closely resembling those
at the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. The center in Fort
Irwin had 640,000 acres, allowing it to put about thirty-six battalions a year
through training. The training terrain in Hohenfels extended over only
40,000 acres, 6 percent the size of Fort Irwin, but the program for Hohenfels
called for training fifty-two battalions a year.47
To overcome the lack of space in Europe, USAREUR decided to concentrate sophisticated facilities for training combat maneuvers in Hohenfels,
just as it had concentrated facilities in Grafenwhr and Wildflecken for
training the gunners and crews in armored vehicles. Hohenfels became
a complex that provided realistic, stressful training at the level of the battalion task force. It combined an opposition force permanently stationed
at the facility with the use of the multiple integrated laser engagement
system and the integration of combat support and combat service support.
The opposition forces familiarity with the terrain and the exercises could
make the training forces pay for any mistakes that they made during
the exercises. Each commander received a detailed, computerized assessment of how soldiers performed at any given point in a mock battle. The
assessment, which included tapes of the radio traffic during the battle,
could be reviewed in detail to improve future performance.48
As a key element in the training in Hohenfels, USAREUR projected
the creation of a mock village called the MOUT (military operations in
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urban terrain) site. The village, constructed in 1989, resembled a typical
German town, complete with a church, a cemetery, a city hall, a barn, and
even buildings in rubble as if they had been bombed. The design called
for hideaways, corners, and creep-through sewers to allow soldiers to
infiltrate from one area of the town to another. The architecture and the
landscaping of the mock city won it an honorable mention in the chief of
engineers Design and Environment Awards Program for 1989. The buildings were also attractive enough from the outside that the local media
described them as ready to occupy. Nurembergs area engineer, Colonel
Fish, under whose office the project was executed, claimed that all the
local mayors offered to trade their buildings for those in the MOUT village. They were only shells, however, designed to present the training soldier with situations that might arise in urban combat.49
In addition to the MOUT village, construction in Hohenfels included a
storage and maintenance warehouse, also completed in 1989, that featured
24 covered loading docks, 32 concrete vehicle parking areas, and more
than 1,400 square yards of storage space. From this facility the vehicles
and personnel from incoming units were to be outfitted with the equipment that allowed laser tracking of their movements during exercises.
The operations center for the range housed DM 18 million ($11.14 million)
worth of high-tech equipment in a DM 5 million ($3.09 million) building.
Completed during the summer of 1990, it controlled the field exercises
over the entire range. Using the sensor equipment carried by the troops
and vehicles, the operations center could monitor and record all movements and provide a record of the training. USAREUR anticipated another
75 percent growth in the program in Hohenfels during the early 1990s.50
Modernizing Operational Facilities

The training facilities necessary to develop proficiency in the new
weaponry had to be supplemented by new and improved operational
facilities that directly supported the deployment and day-to-day activity
of combat and combat support units. Such operational facilities involved
surfaced parking areas, airfields and associated buildings, ammunition
and equipment storage areas, specialized troop housing such as that
needed for rotating border duty, and operations control buildings.51
The poor quality of such facilities, in which the service personnel
worked every day, and the inadequacy of maintenance facilities throughout Europe had contributed to the deterioration of equipment during the
1970s. Even simple maintenance could not be performed in the mud; as
a result, soldiers deferred routine maintenance until problems became
serious and costly to correct. A survey conducted in 1976 of 1,800 maintenance facilities in USAREUR indicated that 98 percent were substandard
because they lacked space, running water, heat, toilets, and lift capacity.
Many of them also failed to meet Army safety standards.52
Since the late 1970s, EUD had been involved in efforts under a program called Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to Unit
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Sets (POMCUS) to provide enhanced maintenance facilities. During the
1980s USAREUR undertook to assure adequate maintenance facilities for
its new and complex modern equipment. The Facilities Modernization
Program formed one part of this effort. USAREUR initiated it in the late
1970s for the rehabilitation, modernization, and alteration of substandard
maintenance facilities. Under this program, Military Construction, Army
(MCA), funds could be used for any and all maintenance and repair work,
not just for work that involved new construction, as had been the case
with earlier programs. In other words, MCA money could be applied to
reduce the backlog of maintenance and repair, normally funded only by
money for Operations and Maintenance, Army (OMA). In addition, the
program permitted facilities to be completely replaced when estimates
suggested that to be more economical than rehabilitation. Money from
the Facilities Modernization Program could also be used to satisfy safety,
environmental, or energy conservation requirements.53
Even this special program was not enough to counterbalance all the
years of neglect. During his first two years as commander in chief of
USAREUR, General Frederick J. Kroesen became convinced that more
had to be done to fund operational facilities. On 1 April 1981, Kroesen
sent a report to the Senate Armed Services Committee titled Living
and Working Conditions in United States Army, Europe. The booklet,
prepared by USAREURs Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer,
detailed the deplorable conditions of the facilities in which U.S. troops
lived and worked. General Kroesen underscored his concern and frustration in a cover letter to a member of that committee, Senator Gordon J.
Humphrey:
Senator Humphrey, I thank you for your interest, but I want you
to know also that many of us in Europe remember any number of
reports of this nature which have been submitted in the past years.
I was personally responsible for one which was prepared five years
ago. Each of those past reports was either staffed to death, filed for
future reference, or ignored when budget formulation time arrived.
We cannot afford to have that happen many more times or we will
have no facilities left for sustaining the Army.54
The report had the intended effect, and Congress began to make
money more available. The work undertaken under the Facilities
Modernization Program continued, but additional programs now supplemented it. During the 1980s Kroesens contention that proper facilities
played a vital role in making both troops and modern equipment effective
won increasing support among the leadership of the U.S. defense establishment.55
The new support generated by Kroesens appeal to the Senate made
possible the expansion of building programs, such as five new maintenance shops at Smith Barracks in Baumholder. The facilities provided
over 9,500 square yards of space; drive-through capability for machinery;
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Army engineers also constructed washracks for tanks, trucks, and other vehicles.
overhead cranes; carbon monoxide exhaust systems; and systems for heating and ventilation, compressed air, lighting, and power. The construction
included access roads; paved parking areas; and an extension of the distribution lines of the existing heating, electrical power, and sewer and water
systems. The design incorporated drainage and oil separators so that rain
water running off the vehicle parking areas could be processed to safeguard the quality of the local ground water.56 New construction included
tank washracks that used high-pressure water nozzles to blast mud and
grime off tank treads and undercarriages, high-pressure wash facilities
for helicopters, and hot-point fuel spots that allowed helicopters to refuel
without shutting off their engines.57
These modern facilities presented varying degrees of engineering
challenge. Pouring acres of concrete holds little fascination, although its
impact on troop morale was potentially high. Designing and constructing
wash facilities that incorporated the pumps and pressurized water sprays
to clean a tank or helicopter presented a greater challenge. Still, the greatest challenge frequently lay in making the facility truly usable. Richard
Birner, a German engineer employed by EUD in the Nuremberg Area
Office, explained the challenge: [The average soldier] doesnt know anything about watts and volts and amperes [or] the strength of concrete.
He knows how to push a button. But there [the challenge] starts already,
because [one] soldier pushes the button with his foot and the other operates it the right way.58 Designers had to ensure that the facility would
operate even if misused, and designs were modified as the equipment
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changed. In April 1982 EUD had to adjust its designs for washracks to
accommodate the new Abrams tank and allow for more effective cleaning
under the skirt. General Withers instructed his design staff also to incorporate suggestions from the commander of the 3d Armored Division,
whose men were using the equipment.59
Overcoming the long-standing neglect took more than a few programs
and a few years. In 1984, although a third of the U.S. Army was stationed
in Europe, only 40 percent of the combat battalions maintained their
vehicles in motor pools with adequate hardstands; the rest were in the
mud. The vice chief of staff of the Army proposed using troop labor to
speed construction to change that condition. USAREUR quickly formed a
hardstand attack group and gave it the mission of getting the troops in
Europe out of the mud. By late 1987 USAREUR had eighty-one projects in
the hardstand-building program, construction valued at $147 million.60
In an effort to stretch the construction dollar and as a part of its mission to use new construction technologies, EUD experimented with rollercompacted concrete pavement as a new method of providing hardstands.
The method, though new to Europe, had been used in Canada for about
a decade and in the United States since the early 1980s. The name derives
from the technique. Over a prepared surface a machine resembling the
equipment used to lay asphalt dispenses under pressure a relatively dry,
coarse concrete mix. Vibrators and rollers then pass over the concrete to
compact it in place. Because the resulting surface is not as smooth as traditional methods yield, it cannot be used for highways or airfield runways,
but is perfectly adapted to hardstands. In its use, speed was not only a
virtue but also a necessity. The integrity of the concrete was compromised
when the time between the preparation of the mixture and its application
exceeded an hour. The process also promised cost savings up to 30 percent, attributable in part to the limited manual labor needed.61
In July 1986 engineers from the Europe Division and the Corps of
Engineers Waterways Experiment Station in Vicksburg, Mississippi,
supervised the pouring of a 2,400-square-yard test section of roller-compacted concrete in Kitzingen, West Germany, as part of a 19,000-squareyard hardstand. Because this was a relatively new process, it was not
recognized by German construction regulations; and the West German
government would not allow it to be incorporated into the standard bidding process when EUD let contracts. For months after the experiment in
Kitzingen, EUDs staff worked with contacts in the German government
ministries to devise procedures that would establish criteria to allow
routine use of roller-compacted concrete in contracts for U.S. military
construction in the Federal Republic. Initially, they could win no better an
arrangement than to permit this process as a change order or as an alternate bid on a contract. Bureaucratic resistance to the new method slowed
its application to construction projects. By 1989, however, EUD negotiators
had gained new guidelines and the use of this method began to increase.
The combined total of roller-compacted concrete used from fiscal year
1986 to 1988 amounted to over 58,500 square yards. In the first ten months
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Roller-compacted concrete was used to construct hardstands in Kitzingen, Germany,

in 1986 and 1987.
of fiscal year 1989, EUD awarded contracts totaling 340,000 square yards.
All these contracts were awarded under the alternate bid procedure.62
In all, between 1981 and 1987 USAREUR spent approximately $766
million from its military construction budget and its operation and maintenance budget to improve the Armys maintenance facilities.
Patriot Missile Program

Like the Abrams tank and the Bradley armored personnel carrier, the
Patriot missile represented a new level of technology with several advantages over its predecessors. The Patriot system offered medium- to highaltitude air defense using mobile ballistic missiles that could operate in all
weather conditions. It required fewer pieces of equipment to operate than
the systems it supplanted and therefore demanded less logistical support.
It also required fewer people. The Nike Hercules had more than 1,000
soldiers in its basic firing unit, and the improved Hawk had 878 soldiers;
whereas the Patriot battery was operated by 765 persons, although the
number might vary depending on the number of firing positions at any
given site. Being a missile with a conventional warhead, the Patriot also
demanded fewer security and safety measures.63
Planning for the installation of the Patriot began in the late 1970s. By
1981 EUD and its NATO counterparts had initiated design and developed a schedule that called for construction to begin in 1984. General
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Withers closely supervised the Patriot schedule because of the admonition from General Bratton not to let the Corps be the cause of any delays.
Construction began in Giessen, north of Frankfurt, then in Hanau to the
east, and later in Ansbach to the southeast. The program reached a milestone on 7 April 1982, when the first bids were opened for Patriot facilities;
the first construction package was awarded at the end of May. Dexheim,
Kaiserslautern, Giebelstadt, Illesheim, and Bitburg all eventually had
Patriot batteries installed.
Design for the support facilitiesthe launching area, the administrative area, and the control areain Giessen, Dexheim, and Kaiserslautern
went to the architect-engineer firm of Georgi Reitzel. A former USACAG
employee in the 1950s, Reitzel became a private contractor and won contracts on Nike and Hawk installations during the 1960s and 1970s. Louis
Berger International, another company that worked on Nike and Hawk
facilities, designed Patriot installations in Hanau and Babenhausen, a
missile storage area in Mnster-Dieburg, and administration and support
facilities in Grossauheim.64
NATO and the United States conjunctively funded all the Patriot facilities. That is, NATO paid for the elements it deemed essential for war: the
readiness and operations buildings; the systems maintenance building;
the generator buildings with converters; paving, earthwork for the protective berms, and electrical systems for the control, radar, and launcher; the
central missile storage area; and the facility for the direct support unit.
NATO also paid for about 86 percent of the costs of a maintenance shop
at each site and about two-thirds of the costs of the battery administration
and battalion headquarters buildings. The United States funded the barracks and dining facilities for the enlisted soldiers manning the system,
the remaining costs for the maintenance shop and the battery administration buildings, the nuclear-biological-chemical decontamination cell, storage for the basic load of ammunition, and defensive fighting positions.65
Unlike the older Hawk installations, which had very rudimentary
facilities, the Patriot installations were built as fully functioning, almost
independent posts. Each new Patriot facility had a small shop where
soldiers could buy items for their immediate needs and living quarters
that provided far more comfort than the open-bay barracks with cots at
the Hawk sites. The facilities consisted of an engagement control station,
a battery control group, emergency power equipment, radar equipment,
and unmanned launchers. Each Patriot missile was mounted on a sixteen-wheeled articulated transport vehicle called a Hummtee (HEMTT, or
heavy expanded mobility tactical truck), in which power passed to every
wheel, making the transporter effective in almost any terrain. At the initial readiness point on the site, the missiles and transporters were positioned behind dense earthen berms with reinforced concrete walls. In the
missiles raised and ready firing position, only a lightning rod rose higher
than the missile itself.66
The Patriot installations required multiple contracts for design. For
instance, EUD issued eighty contracts to architect-engineer firms for the
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Patriot missile facilities, like this one in Hanau, were eventually located
throughout Germany.
Patriot facility at the Bitburg Air Base. Design began in 1985, and the
contractor broke ground for the construction in 1987. EUD turned over
the facilities on 5 July 1989.67 That same summer EUD turned over several other Patriot installations in Kaiserslautern. By the end of the decade,
EUD had provided facilities for seven Patriot air defense artillery battalions and one brigade headquarters at a cost of $230 million, of which
NATO paid about $130 million (56.5 percent) and the United States paid
the rest.68
The introduction of other new weapons systems provoked animated
protests in Germany, but installing the Patriot air defense system caused
hardly a ripple within the local population.69 The radar systems that
governed each battery overlapped to provide a missile-defense umbrella
for much of the West German territory. Although the American planners intended that the Patriot missile system replace the older Hawk air
defense system, not enough Patriots had been installed by 1990 to blanket
West Germany entirely; so NATO decided to upgrade and renovate selected Hawk emplacements as well. EUD continued to work on Hawk sites
into the 1990s in close coordination with USAREUR and NATO.70
Cruise and Pershing Missiles

In contrast to the Patriot air defense system, the introduction into
Europe of a new generation of intermediate range, surface-to-surface mis321
2/3/06 10:50:46 AM

siles during the 1980s attracted widespread public attention and vocal
protest. Two systems caused a dramatic uproar: the Air Forces Ground
Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and the Armys Pershing II, a second
generation of the Pershing missile stationed in the Federal Republic of
Germany since about 1969. Unlike the Patriot, both the GLCM and the
Pershing II were designed to carry nuclear warheads. The Pershing II was
an improved version of an earlier ballistic missile, whereas the Cruise
represented quite a different technology. The Cruise missile was a small,
relatively inexpensive, self-guided, pilotless, miniature aircraft that could
be programmed to fly low, underneath Soviet radar coverage, to a predetermined target. The GLCM, like the Pershing II and Patriot missiles, was
a mobile system with two basic elements, a control module and a transporter-launcher.71
The pressure to station GLCMs and Pershing IIs in Europe came not
from the U.S. government but from the member states of the Atlantic alliance acting through NATO. During the second half of the 1970s, the Soviet
Union had modernized its arsenal with a powerful land-based surface-tosurface nuclear missilethe new Soviet SS20, which had a 3,000-mile
range and multiple warheads that could be independently targeted. It was
also mobile and therefore more difficult to locate and destroy than earlier
systems. From its new forward positions in Eastern Europe, the missile
could reach targets in West Germany in twenty minutes. NATO allies,
particularly the West Germans, became uneasy about possible Soviet tactical nuclear superiority over the United States in Central Europe.
To counter the Soviet threat, the NATO Council voted on 12 December
1979 to deploy several hundred Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Britain,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and West Germany. If the Soviet Union
failed to agree to an accord eliminating its SS20 threat to Europe, the
American missiles would be put into place beginning late in 1983.72
The Europe Division began preparing for the deployment of these
intermediate range nuclear weapons in three of the five countries into
which the weapons were to be introducedBelgium, West Germany, and
the Netherlands. On 27 July 1982, the division signed a technical agreement for the construction of the first GLCM installation. At an estimated
cost of $50.2 million, NATO and the United States conjunctively funded
the GLCM installation. EUD funded all support facilities (about seventy individual projects) and operational facilities, particularly those that
NATO did not fund, such as fire protection, safety, and welfare facilities.73
The GLCM program lagged in fiscal year 1983 because of congressional delays in approving the design program for permanent facilities.
The Air Force had made contractual commitments on the basis of the
original schedule, and it asked EUD to help meet them. The deputy division engineer, Col. Donald E. Hazen, and the Northern Area Office engineer, Lt. Col. Kenneth W. Kvam, suggested that the division establish
a program management office to concentrate exclusively on the GLCM
projects. Kvam, in whose area much of the GLCM work would be constructed, would head the office. The division engineer, Brig. Gen. Scott B.
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Smith, accepted the idea, even though it meant taking the unconventional step of dividing the Northern Area Office into two elements. Kvam
would oversee the GLCM work and report to Smith through Hazen;
Kvams civilian deputy, Charles Schneider, would manage all other work
and report to the chief of the Construction Division.74
Hazen and Kvam began to organize the new GLCM office in October
1983. Smith announced that LTC Kvam is now a senior member of
the EUD Staff. He is no longer speaking through Construction as the
Northern Area Officer. He is now the Creek [code word for GLCM] Project
Officer. Give him your full support.75 During November and December
Kvam selected people from headquarters and from the area offices to fill
positions in the program management office and in resident offices at
the GLCM sites. In February 1984 General Smith reported to the chief of
engineers, General Bratton, that the program management concept will
successfully deliver a quality project to one of our most important customers, the Air Force. He added that the project enhances NATO preparedness and has the potential to strengthen USACEs [U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers] relationships with the Air Force.76
By the summer of 1984 the GLCM office established a cradle-tograve tracking system that followed projects through design and construction on a monthly basis, analogous to what Brig. Gen. Norman G.
Delbridge, Jr., commander of the Europe Division in the mid-1970s, had
hoped to promote with his big board. Each month the staff saw whether
they were ahead, keeping pace, or falling behind the schedule established
by the Air Force for completion of facilities. After the end of June 1984,
project managers had 5 percent of the program completed or in construction, 55 percent in design, and 40 percent awaiting initiation of design.77
The GLCM projects continued to have both high public visibility and
geopolitical sensitivity, factors that made keeping them on schedule of
paramount importance. In fiscal year 1984 EUD performed 23 percent
($795 million) of its design workload and 6 percent (about $22 million) of
its construction placement for the Air Force. The volume of work increased
as the GLCM project progressed.78
Work began first in Belgium, then in West Germany, and finally in
the Netherlands, all between 1983 and 1986. In 1983 engineers from the
Europe Division began traveling to Belgium to work with local officials
on the first GLCM site. Early in 1984 the division opened a resident office
in Florennes, and in June the Belgian government formally signed the
authorization for construction of the GLCM site in Florennes adjacent
to a Belgian Air Force base. Starting with a staff of three, the Florennes
Resident Office expanded over the next two years to thirteen people
nine engineers, two translators, a secretary, and a procurement clerk.79
The Florennes Resident Office first built prefabricated temporary living quarters, administrative offices, a dining hall, and shopping facilities
for Air Force personnel. In July 1985 a security fence went up around the
permanent GLCM site, and in August the first of the permanent construction began. In January 1987 EUD turned over to the 485th Tactical Missile
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Wing the first permanent building completed at the site, the recreation
center. Its opening provided the 1,000 personnel of the wing, already on
site in the temporary living quarters, with a snack bar, a library, a weight
room, a basketball court, and racquetball courts. By the end of 1987 the
resident office had completed about thirty facilities, including dormitories, the electrical distribution system, and other facilities directly related
to the missiles mission. EUD expected to award contracts for a commissary, a post exchange, a bank, a medical facility, and 600 off-base housing
units with a child care center and school. Diplomatic discussions between
the United States and the Soviet Union made the future of the Cruise missiles uncertain, prompting EUD to delay these awards.80
In the same period the GLCM work in Germany at Hahn Air Base
lagged, and it became clear that the Air Forces 38th Tactical Missile Wing
would not have the necessary facilities on schedule. To avoid disrupting
the mission of the missile wing, resident engineer Rod Markuten secured
permission to renovate an old aircraft hangar for the new GLCM system.
Markuten had to work with a hastily prepared design, but the temporary
construction began in March 1985 and was completed by September,
allowing the missile wing to meet its mission deadline. In the spring of
1986 the Society of American Military Engineers gave Markuten the 1985
Tudor award, its highest prize, for his work at Hahn Air Base.81
When GLCM work in West Germany continued to encounter delays,
EUD persuaded the government of the Federal Republic to let the division
issue contracts directly. With the special attention given to these GLCM
projects, the division overcame the delays, kept the program on track,
and continued to meet the Air Forces deadlines. As the end of the 1986
fiscal year approached, EUDs 1987 design program for GLCM was about
90 percent complete. The work in Belgium neared completion; the work in
the Netherlands was just beginning and programmed to last until 1991.82
(Map 29)
The Air Force chose to furnish the GLCMs from the start with adequate service and maintenance areas and with newly constructed or renovated barracks, all designed specifically for the support of the weapons
and the people who operated them. The units assigned to GLCM installations had family housing, schools, commissaries, and similar amenities
explicitly conceived and programmed by the Air Force. By contrast, for
the initial deployment of the Pershing II missilewhich fulfilled a comparable military mission, had the same lethal characteristics, and enjoyed
(or suffered from) the same political sensitivitythe Army made very
few special preparations. The missiles, which had mobile launchers very
similar to the GLCM, were simply deployed with existing military units.
There was, as General Smith recalled, a dramatic difference between the
security support and permanence of the one compared to the other.83
The first battery of nine Pershing II missiles had been flown into West
Germany and stationed in Mutlangen on 23 November 1983, just twentyfour hours after the West German Parliament had approved deployment.
In the next year a total of fifty-four missiles arrived in the country, most
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NETHERLANDS
1986
Northern Area Office Headquarters
Netherlands Resident Office and
U.S. Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missile Site
Pre-positioned Organizational
Materiel Storage (POMSS) Site
U.S. Air Force Base
0
0
50
100 Miles
100 Kilometers
50
Ter Apel
Steenwijk
Coevorden
Harde
AMSTERDAM
Almelo
Soesterberg Project Office
The Hague
Volkel
in e
Gilze-Rijen
Rh
W E S T
G E R M A N Y
Woensdrecht
Dsseldorf
B E L G I U M
Brunssum
Hoensbroek
BRUSSELS
eu
se R
Lige
Map 29
2/3/06 10:50:48 AM
GLCM sites in Western Europe, such as Florennes, Belgium, included

support and operational facilities.
stationed in southern Germany. To achieve the rapid deployment scheduled

by NATO in response to the threat of the Soviet SS20 missiles that were
already in place in Eastern Europe, the Army introduced the Pershing II
without extensive new design and with no construction of support facilities. EUD had very little involvement with their initial deployment, but the
divisions commitment of effort jumped dramatically after an accident in
1985. Three U.S. soldiers died and sixteen others were injured on 11 January
in a fire involving one of the Pershing II rocket propulsion units. The weapon, stationed in Heilbronn, north of Stuttgart on the Neckar River, had not
been armed with its nuclear warhead, but the fire was still the most serious
incident associated with the ballistic missiles.84
Investigators from the Office of the Secretary of the Army concluded
that the Armys own inadequate maintenance and support facilities had
contributed to the accident. In what General Smith characterized as a
blinding flash of the obvious, the Army sought to redress the situation
by upgrading the support facilities for the Pershing II. Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio,
area engineer in Stuttgart, the region in which most of the work for the
Pershing IIs took place, remembered that within weeks money just came
pouring in. For months thereafter EUD worked to design and construct
shelters to protect and cover the missiles and the troops who maintained
them.85
In December 1987 President Ronald Reagan and Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty. Both powers
326
2/3/06 10:50:49 AM

agreed to eliminate all ground-launched missiles with ranges between
300 and 3,500 milesthe Cruise and Pershing II missiles and the Soviet
SS20 missiles. The mutual removal of the weapons realized the goal
behind the original NATO decision to deploy the missiles. In mid-April
1991 USAREUR removed the last Pershing II launcher from Europe; five
weeks later commanders inactivated the 56th Field Artillery Command,
which had operated the Pershing missiles in West Germany. Like many at
EUD, John Blake felt proud that the divisions execution of the GLCM program for the Air Force and the upgrade of the Pershing II for the Army
convinced the Russians that they had better not try a military confrontation in Europe.86
While the Army focused attention on new weapons systems and on
upgrading operational and support facilities to improve morale and performance by the troops, it began to address the facilities in which the
soldiers and their families lived. Just as the Europe Division became heavily involved in building to improve quality in operational and support
facilities during the 1980s, it also extended its efforts to the facilities that
supported everyday life for American military personnel and their dependents. Construction for quality of life became a major enterprise for the
division in the 1980s and constitutes another important facet in the history of the Army engineers in Europe.
327
2/3/06 10:50:50 AM
2/3/06 10:50:50 AM
12
IMPROVING THE COMMUNITY
ENVIRONMENT
or three decades after 1945, budget planners and politicians in

Washington asserted that the U.S. military presence in Europe
was temporary and that no long-term investment in permanent
amenities for the soldiers and their families was either necessary
or justified. During the American involvement in Vietnam, military budgets neglected the maintenance and repair of facilities in Europe. Between
1969 and 1977 increases in overall military spending failed to keep pace
with the rate of inflation.1
With the change to an all-volunteer army in 1973, the quality of facilities became a significant component of military life. To a large extent, the
Armys decision to improve the quality of life for U.S. forces in Europe
grew out of self-interest. The characteristics of the soldiers serving in
Europe changed quickly. The new recruits were better educated than conscript recruits and had higher expectations and ambitions. A far greater
percentage of enlisted soldiers were married and had children. A growing
percentage of soldiers were women, and in some families both husband
and wife were in uniform. Single parents, especially, were concerned
about care for their children during the working day.2
To attract and retain the best recruits, the Army had to offer better facilities than the run-down, barely adequate facilities that housed the conscript
Army during the 1950s and 1960s. Despite programs such as Stem to Stern
and Modernization of United States Facilities (MOUSF), living facilities desperately needed improvement. The Army began to understand that it could
not retain the most qualified soldiers unless the soldiers and their families
could see some hope of change. An Army publication asserted:
If a soldier and family are forced to move into a cramped and
dilapidated apartment in a shabby, ill-kempt military housing unit,
and are then required to make do with inadequate heating and poor
electrical and plumbing systems, the soldier is going to be miserable,
and moraleand job motivationwill suffer.3
16O_Chap12_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:55:40 AM

In both the short and the long terms, the Army also suffers. The soldier performs poorly, the Army appears unattractive as a career option,
and the Army loses its investment in training during the soldiers initial
tour.
In the late 1970s the U.S. military in Europe launched a series of programs designed to improve the quality of life for its service personnel,
hoping that more comfortable living conditions would enhance morale
and improve the commitment and productivity of its soldiers in their
primary combat mission. Congress appropriated funds to improve and
modernize both family housing and troop quarters. Other facilities serving soldiers and their dependents also received new monies. The Army
and the Air Force expanded and improved medical and dental clinics,
schools, day care centers for children, and recreation facilities. All these
programs became a major part of the work of the Europe Division (EUD)
in the 1980s.
Family Housing
By the late 1970s the United States Army, Europe (USAREUR), administered 53,000 family housing units in Europe, with properties in Britain,
Belgium, the Netherlands, West Germany, Italy, and West Berlin. The
Army leased 9,000 of these from local owners and maintained the other
units as landlord for the soldiers who occupied them. Most of the housing units were in the Federal Republic and had been constructed with
German funds in the early 1950s. Although sound at the time of construction, they had had thirty years of high occupancy and turnovera new
family moved in every twenty-one months on averageand had suffered
from years of inadequate and underfunded maintenance. Over those
years the expectations of soldiers had risen, and occupants expressed
increasing frustration over the lack of amenities and the Spartan character
of the 1950s construction. The electrical systems, for example, could not
accommodate televisions, stereo systems, hair dryers, electric razors, and
the host of small kitchen appliances that had become commonplace.
Ninety-five percent of the housing in USAREUR had been built as
three-story structures with a center stairwell and two apartments on
each floor. Such stairwell apartments were home to 155,000 residents. The
design of the units created a high-density population; poor sound insulation and limited privacy compounded the problems inherent in integrating residents with diverse backgrounds and styles of life. Army Research
Institute studies comparing the residents of duplexes with residents of
stairwell apartments showed that the latter suffered from higher levels of
stress; more medical problems that required treatment at a hospital or dispensary; and a higher incidence of alcohol and drug abuse, marital problems, child abuse, and general dissatisfaction.4
Pressure to continue using these housing facilities remained high.
In 1981 USAREUR faced an immediate need for 5,000 additional housing units, and enlisted soldiers with families waited up to two years for
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Improving the Community Environment

appropriate housing, by which time their tours might end. This undersupply did not even take into account those soldiers who lived with their
families on the West German economy. The local housing market had a
shortage of about 1.5 million units, which made affordable, conveniently
located housing scarce and expensive for Americans. In the early 1980s a
rent of $800 a monthmore than twice the housing allowance most soldiers received for off-base livingwas not uncommon, often for family
quarters that Army inspectors judged to be substandard or even uninhabitable.5
Existing Housing Units

The Maintenance, Repair, and Improvement (MRI) program funded
by the Department of the Army helped alleviate some of the housing
problems. The program provided money to improve existing facilities;
and USAREUR allocated a part of these funds to renovate existing family housing units, specifically targeting repair and replacement of bathrooms, kitchens, windows, and utilities.6 Although the program was
initiated in 1977, the architectural and engineering pilot studies were
completed only in 1980. At that point, Headquarters, United States Army
Corps of Engineers (USACE), approved an MRI engineering and architectural design guide for USAREUR that incorporated references and
standards derived from the pilot
studies. This allowed USAREUR
to begin design work in 1981
on an MRI pilot project at the
Adlingerstrasse housing area in
Stuttgart.7
The MRI program enabled
USA R E U R t o ap pl y m o r e
resources to its existing backlog
of maintenance and repair for
family housing, but that backlog
still stood at $246 million in 1981.
USAREURs overall backlog for
all facilities other than housing
amounted to $1.28 billion, or 54
percent of the Armys worldwide
backlog.8 The backlog for troop
housing was even greater. An
article that appeared in February
1984 noted the troop-housing
backlog in June 1982 was worth
about $3.6 billion, an amount
Housing suffered from a backlog of delayed
21 times what the Army had repairs. This family housing unit in Giessen,
been allowed to spend for troop
Germany, shows signs of severe structural
housing in 1982. Faced with this
cracking.
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2/3/06 10:55:42 AM

backlog of repair work, in the absence of a clear indication of increasing support to reduce it, the commander in chief of USAREUR, General
Frederick J. Kroesen, decided to press Congress more directly for funds.9
In 1982 General Kroesen followed up his first special report to
Congress, which emphasized the need to fund facilities that supported
the deployment and day-to-day operations of the combat troops, with a
second report titled Family Housing Facilities in United States Army,
Europe. The report urged Congress to provide funds for the Army to
improve those facilities that enhanced the quality of life for the troops.10
In the report and in personal appearances before Congress, General
Kroesen argued forcefully that Congress should shift its attention to a new
set of priorities. Over the years congressional leaders had responded to the
argument for combat readiness that field commanders of front-line units
had presented: Because the Soviets may come across the border at any time,
I need money for training and weapons. General Kroesen transformed this
argument to his advantageand to catch the attention of the senatorsby
saying If someone told me that the Russians were coming New Years Day,
I would still say our biggest problem is family housing. Kroesens remark
stuck in the memory of his contemporaries, who recalled his statement
before Congress almost verbatim a decade later.11 More important, it kept
the pressure on Congress to provide additional funds.
In the 1982 report on family housing, Kroesen let the soldiers speak
for themselves, quoting extensively from interviews with enlisted personnel and officers.12 These residents of Army housing offered graphic and
detailed testimony concerning the deplorable circumstances in which
they lived.
Broken vapor seals made mold and mildew a constant problem. One
officers wife described her familys quarters:
My son jokes about his pet slime, but it is terrible, really. My
daughter hates sleeping near it and I dont blame her. You feel dirty
even after you have worked hard all day to clean. I air all the rooms
daily but now it is starting up there on the corner of the dining room
ceiling over the dish hutch. The family eats with it.
Some situations were dangerous as well as uncomfortable. Inch-thick
plaster that detached from ceilings because of moisture fell down in large
pieces. Showing her bathroom in which plaster had already fallen, one
sergeants wife lamented, I cant let my kids use [the bathtub] anymore.
What if the ceiling falls on their heads?
The only thing predictable about the heating systems was that
they would fail sometime during the year. Despite efforts made by the
Engineer Command under Stem to Stern and its boiler replacement
efforts, the heating units for most USAREUR family housing had never
been converted from the hand-fired coal boilers typical of the construction of the early 1950s. Residents put up with overheating on lower floors
and inadequate heating on upper floors. Both the supply and the distribu332
2/3/06 10:55:43 AM

tion of hot water were inadequate. Many water lines were nearly closed
by the scale deposits because of corrosion and Germanys naturally hard
water.
Shortages of personnel contributed to the backlog of maintenance and
repair. The additional money in the early 1980s was not accompanied by
an increase in personnel for the community-level engineering staffs. EUD
alleviated the burden at the local level by acting as design agent for much
of the new work. The assistant division engineer for the Directorate of
Engineering and Housing, a position EUD commander General George
K. Withers, Jr., established in January 1981, handled the divisions efforts.13
USAREUR also made adjustments to take account of the new volume of
work: The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, divided engineer
staff functions with the Installation Support Activity, Europe.14 In January
1983 the Department of the Army authorized USAREUR to establish a
Senior Executive Service position in the Office of the Deputy Chief of
Staff, Engineer, to manage the programs in facilities engineering and
housing.15
In 1982 the Department of the Army responded to the need for more
housing by approving an extension of the MRI program called the wholehouse concept, which allowed the complete renovation of entire housing units. The Army provided over $19 million for fiscal year 1983 to be
used for the military communities of Stuttgart (Adlingerstrasse, 72 units),
Frankfurt (Gibbs, Betts, and Atterbury housing areas, 494 units), and
Nuremberg (Pastoriusstrasse, 162 units). In February 1983 Headquarters,
USACE, funded an upgrade of laundry rooms throughout USAREUR by
shifting $9 million from the current year MRI program, thus delaying
construction of three-quarters of the dwelling units in Frankfurt.16
As the workload for maintenance, repair, and renovation through new
construction increased within USAREUR, the Europe Division aided the
communities in two ways. First, because the communities lacked personnel with sufficient technical experience, EUD assisted in the very early
stages to bring the concept design to the 35 percent level, making a project
eligible for inclusion in USAREURs budget request. Second, EUD acted as
the design and construction agent once Congress approved the concept
design in the Armys budget. Between 1983 and 1985 EUD completed
designs and began some construction under the MRI program for housing
in Stuttgart, Nuremberg, and Frankfurt. By 1985 the MRI program encompassed 1,250 family housing units at a cost of about $34 million.17
Initially, EUD processed MRI projects in its usual manner, beginning
in the Engineering Division with work on design. As the volume of work
increased and construction began, delays caused a bottleneck of design
for fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985. Because facilities were old, design
assumptions about the rehabilitation often did not match what contractors
found behind the walls. Many of the earliest designs required extensive
changes and redesign.18
In response to the growing program, the Engineering Division
increased its Facilities Support Section from nine people to thirty-six in
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2/3/06 10:55:43 AM
Family housing was renovated in communities throughout Germany,

including Nuremberg.
1982.19 To deal specifically with MRI projects, EUD formed special teams,
each consisting of a project manager from the Engineering Division, a
construction manager from the Construction Division, a representative
from the field office who knew the existing facilities and the local installation personnel, and engineers from the Technical Branch. Through the
team approach the division hoped to apply lessons learned from each
project and to maximize cooperation at every stage between the designers
and builders.20
EUDs team approach proved highly successful. The division managed design and construction for renovations involving the installation of
energy-efficient thermo-pane windows, additional insulation, new electrical wiring and plumbing, new kitchen cabinets and appliances, paint and
plaster, and, in some cases, replacement of entire sections of interior and
exterior walls and roofs. The greater efficiency of the units led to considerable savings in utility costs. By the end of fiscal year 1985, USAREUR had
reduced the backlog of maintenance and repair from the high in 1981 of
more than $1.25 billion to about $600 million.21
Factory-Built Housing
USAREUR also pressed Congress for money to build new off-post
housing because only slightly more than 25 percent of the military families eligible for and requesting on-post housing in Europe could be accom334
2/3/06 10:55:43 AM

modated.22 During earlier years new housing for U.S. troops and their
families had either been financed under the occupation or through the
Alternate Construction program; in both cases, the West German government paid the costs.
In 1983, for the first time, Congress authorized funds for the construction of new family housing in Europe with the stipulation that the housing be manufactured in the United States for on-site construction in West
Germany. The program for fiscal year 1984 called for 771 prefabricated
housing units, with construction to begin in Wildflecken, Bayreuth, and
Kitzingen. Quarters for two general officers were also authorized for
Vicenza, Italy.23
On 21 September 1984, EUD awarded a contract for the first factorybuilt housing. The contract called for 153 two-bedroom units to be manufactured in modules in the United States by Corlite Building Systems
of Weslaco, Texas, and delivered for final assembly and construction in
Wildflecken. This was to be the start of work on 18,000 dwelling units
constructed in twelve communities over the next four years. The contract for the housing in Wildflecken totaled $8.35 million, or $54,620 per
unit. Philipp Holzmann, A. G., of Frankfurt won the contract to place
the buildings on site; build roads, sewers, and playgrounds; and provide
landscaping.24
The housing design incorporated new technology to manufacture relatively lightweight panels made of fiberglass-reinforced gypsum bonded
to galvanized steel frames. Once assembled, the exterior of the panels
Modules manufactured in the United States were used to construct prefabricated

housing in Wildflecken, Germany.
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2/3/06 10:55:44 AM
Prototype of Prefabricated Housing on Site in Wildflecken, Germany
received a stucco coating. Designers worked closely with German officials

to ensure that the structures would fit well aesthetically with their surroundings. To demonstrate the quality and practicality of the product,
Corlite constructed a prototype of the Wildflecken housing units at its
plant in Texas that USAREUR officials and engineers from EUD inspected
in October 1985. Corlite shipped the panels and complete bathroom and
kitchen modules to Europe, where Holzmann constructed a second prototype on site in Wildflecken. Work on the prototype in Wildflecken began
in November 1985; Holzmann constructed a tarpaulin-covered shelter to
protect the structure from winter weather. Work then began on thirtyeight two-story buildings, each housing four two-bedroom apartments,
and on one freestanding single-family dwelling.25
The Holzmann Company encountered numerous problems with the
project. Because the module units were measured and manufactured
to standard American scale, Karen Lippert, EUDs project manager on
site, became an instructor to the German work crews, teaching them
how to use tape measures calibrated in feet and inches. The modular
design required many change orders. As the delays increased, the chief
of construction, John Blake, finally insisted on a face-to-face meeting
with Holzmanns chief executive officer to get the project on track. Once
Holzmanns chief executive became personally involved, the project
moved forward.26 Straightening out the project cost the company dearly.
Faced with financial and legal complications but eager to honor its commitments, Holzmann finally bought out the American provider, Corlite.
336
2/3/06 10:55:46 AM

Although they completed the contract, Holzmann chose not to bid again
on contracts for factory-built housing.27
Despite the problems, the first twenty-five buildings in Wildflecken,
containing 100 apartments, were ready for occupancy in January 1987.
Wiring and electrical outlets accommodated both 110- and 220-volt current, so that either German or American electrical appliances could be
used. Each unit contained built-in closets, a dishwasher, a clothes washer
and dryer, and a kitchen furnished with American equipment.28
As construction began in Wildflecken, EUD awarded contracts for
six other communities scheduled for factory-built family housing; by late
1986 site work was under way in Kitzingen, Bayreuth, Dexheim, Vilseck,
and Mainz in Germany and in Livorno, Italy, in preparation for assembly
of more housing units. Waiting to occupy these new facilities were 3,890
families eligible for military housing and living in substandard private
rental units.29
Construction began on 186 townhouses for noncommissioned officers
in the Mainz military community in September 1986. A new company,
the RADVA Corporation of Radford, Virginia, provided the modules to
the German consortium of Zueblin/Aegis. Like Corlite, RADVA built
a prototype for inspection at its plant before shipping the materials to
Germany. The townhouse designs included three- and four-bedroom
apartments as well as two-bedroom units. RADVA used expanded polystyrene bonded to galvanized steel frames in a patented process, creating
a structure that was stronger than conventional wood-frame construction
and provided excellent thermal insulation. The units had double-paned
thermal windows for added energy efficiency, hardwood floors in the living and dining rooms, and built-in hardwood cabinets and closets with
adjustable shelves. Each unit had a patio, a carport with a storage room,
and a laundry utility room furnished with a washer, dryer, and laundry
sink. The kitchen equipment and other features such as the wiring for
both European and American appliances were comparable to the units in
Wildflecken.30
At each of the subsequent communities that received factory-built
housing, EUD applied lessons learned from the previous project. At
Marshall Heights in Kitzingen, where 103 units went up in 1988, EUD
insisted that the contractor replace the softwood handrails used for stairwells in the homes in Mainz with hardwood rails for better durability.
Responding to suggestions by the occupants, the contractor installed two
peepholes in each entrance door, one at a childs eye level.31
Projects in the new communities included the earthwork, roads, and
landscaping. About 40 percent of the costs went into infrastructure built
to local German construction standardselectrical service, street lights,
plumbing and sewers, and district heating for the houses, all with underground conduits. The communities also received recreational and playground facilities. By the summer of 1988 EUD had awarded a total of $380
million in factory-built housing projects and had another $320 million still
under design, of which $75 million (23 percent) was for the Air Force.32
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2/3/06 10:55:47 AM
Family housing projects in Soesterberg, Netherlands, included landscaping.
In constructing factory-built housing in Germany, EUD engineers

became convinced that they could save time and money and reduce
maintenance difficulties by using more German products and techniques.
Some of the adaptations were easy, such as using German-style interlocking paving stones in carport driveways. But others required reinterpreting
the congressional mandate to have the units manufactured in the United
States. Scott Bearden, who took over as chief of the divisions housing
team in 1988, became an important catalyst for changing procedures to
facilitate construction. He learned that in four out of five projects released
for bid, German contractors had submitted proposals averaging 144 percent of the amounts authorized for construction. Bearden thought that if
contractors had more latitude to use local products for interior finishes,
cabinetry, and fixtures, they would bid more aggressively. He also contended that the program ought to present the companies with designs that
were 90 to 95 percent complete rather than only 35 percent complete. By
so doing EUD could avoid the cushionas much as Deutschmark (DM)
1 million ($569,000 at the prevailing exchange rate)that contractors had
been adding to their bids to cover the remaining costs of design.33
Beardens suggestions caught the attention of the deputy assistant secretary of defense for installations and logistics, Robert A. Stone, who gave
Bearden a chance to present his ideas at the U.S. European Command
Conference in February 1989. Stone approved Beardens proposal to allow
EUD more flexibility in accepting local fixtures, as long as the construction
stayed within the intent of the law that all feasible effort be made to use
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2/3/06 10:55:47 AM

American products. Bearden also won approval to modify the procedures so
that contracts would be awarded with 90 percent of the design complete.34
Beardens efforts earned him honors as EUD Engineer of the Year for
1988, and the changes brought the desired response from the contractorsmore competitive bids. By incorporating German fixtures, cabinets,
doors, and windows and eliminating the cost of shipping furnishings
from the United States, bidders could lower their contract estimates. The
change also contributed to lower maintenance costs, because items for
repair or replacement could be purchased locally.35
Attic Conversion
One innovative idea used in USAREUR to create new housing units
involved converting attic areas in multiple-apartment housing facilities
into small apartments. An idea advanced in 1984 by the director of engineering and housing in Gppingen, the plan called for renovating a standard stairwell apartment building and redesigning the space under the
roof to create two-bedroom apartments. These small apartments, 772933
square feet each, would be suitable for a family with one child under
five years of age. The work involved raising sections of the roof to add
headroom, but buildings retained their original footprint and much of
the original profile. The conversions began in 1987, and by the end of that
fiscal year EUD had awarded contracts for the creation of 260 attic apartments in seven different communities.36
Attics in existing apartment buildings, like this one in Aschaffenburg, Germany,

were converted into two-bedroom apartments.
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Each of the new apartments contained a clothes washer and dryer, a
convenience unavailable to occupants of the lower apartments, who used
a common basement laundry room. The attic apartments also had loggias,
inset balconies, that offered a measure of private access to the outdoors.
The loggias also represented an important safety feature: In the event of a
fire, they provided level space accessible to rescue equipment mounted on
fire trucks on the ground below. The additional amenities and the on-post
location served as inducements to soldiers and their families to accept the
small attic apartments. USAREUR calculated that by 1990 attic conversion
could add over 1,700 apartment units to the militarys housing inventory
in Germany at a cost of about $60,000 a unit.37
Attic conversions were awarded as an additional contract to MRI
renovations of entire buildings. Because the West German government
allowed the U.S. military to contract for maintenance work directly rather
than requiring indirect contracting, EUD intended to handle attic conversion the same way. The initial design for attic apartments anticipated
completely removing the roof, constructing a full wall under it, and then
replacing the roof. The German government objected that this really
represented building a new top story on each of the buildings and thus
constituted new construction, which required indirect contracting. To
avoid having to award separate contracts for the renovation of buildings
(direct) and the conversion of the attics (indirect), EUD redesigned the
attic plans. The new design raised the walls less than three feet, expanded
the existing dormers to provide more interior space, and kept the origi-
Although the roof line of this housing unit in Mannheim, Germany, was altered to
add apartments in the attic space, the footprint of the building remained the same.
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nal slope and general outline of the roof. With these modifications, the
German government agreed to consider the attic apartments as conversions rather than as new construction. All the attic conversion projects
were thus completed under direct contracting procedures except the work
in Bremerhaven, where EUD placed the contracts indirectly as a stimulus
to the depressed local economy.38
Despite all of this construction and special new programs such as the
government rental housing program that allowed landlords to contract
directly with the U.S. government, as late as 1989 USAREUR still reported
a shortage of over 8,000 housing units out of a total need for nearly 100,000
units.39
Barracks
Although family housing represented a major concern for USAREUR
in the 1980s, fully half the troops lived in barracks; the backlog on maintenance and repair of troop housing was substantial. Despite programs such
as Stem to Stern and MOUSF, many of the barracks still suffered from
deterioration due to lack of adequate maintenance over many years; they
remained in embarrassingly bad condition even into the 1980s. Leaking
roofs, faulty wiring, inadequate heating and plumbing, and overcrowding
were the normal conditions in barracks. Time magazine reported in July
1981 that American service personnel in Europe live and work in conditions that could cause riots in U.S. prisons.40
John Blake arrived at EUD as chief of construction about the time
this article appeared, and he voiced to a colleague his irritation about
the tendency of American journalists to exaggerate for dramatic effect. In
reply, the colleague brought Blake a thick folder of photographs he had
assembled. The pictures illustrated the claims in the article in Time. Blake
recounted:
The ground floor of this three-story barracks could not be used at
all; four inches of water were standing in the total ground floor. Only
half of the second floor could be used because only half of it had
[running] water. Only half of the third floor could be used because
only half of it had electricity. [Where] there were supposed to be
nine urinals, there were only two or three; the rest of them had been
broken off the wall.41
In barracks constructed in the 1950s, sixteen to twenty men slept in
a single large room and used a common bathroom with one shower, one
urinal, and one toilet for every twenty men. Committed to improving living conditions, USAREUR sought to provide the authorized minimum of
ninety square feet per enlisted soldier in four-person rooms in existing
facilities or in two-person rooms in new barracks. Each of the two- and
four-person rooms designed for the 1980s had adjacent toilet and bath;
two-person units shared these facilities with no more than one other
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2/3/06 10:55:51 AM
Construction of the barracks in Kaiserslautern, Germany, included two-person

rooms for unaccompanied personnel.
room.42 Through new construction and renovation the command set out to
assure structurally sound, weather-tight buildings with comfortable and
healthy heating and ventilation, as well as sufficient electrical wiring to
allow safe operation of modern appliances. Design and construction also
took into account the growing number of women soldiers in USAREUR,
either with accommodations on floors separate from the men or in separate areas at the ends of floors. Even the name used to designate the facilities changed, from bachelor enlisted quarters to unaccompanied enlisted
personnel housing (UEPH).43
With over $50 million available through USAREUR in 1984, EUD
awarded twelve contracts for housing construction for unaccompanied
personneltwo for modernization of existing barracks and ten for construction of new barracks. In the next two years contracts were awarded
for similar housing at twenty-eight sites, including five projects in Greece
and one in Turkey. The need was pressing: As late as December 1986,
100,000 USAREUR soldiers still lived in barracks classified as inadequate.44
In March 1986 a project valued at $1.38 million began in Karatas,
Turkey, about forty-five miles south of Adana, to provide a 71-person
three-story barracks with associated access roads, utilities, and other
support services. The construction contract went to Kolin Insaat in early
May. Five months later a contract modification added a new sewage disposal system and a separate, roofed trash and wash space. In October 1988
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construction started at Hahn Air Force Base on five UEPH units, ranging from 96- to 288-person buildings. The German contracting group of
Hochtief, A. G.; Wiemer und Trachte; and P. A. Budau worked on the barracks units for two years, completing the facilities in 1990.45 EUD supervised 100 similar barracks renovation projects for the Army and the Air
Force and had about thirty more in design by March 1989.46
Schools and Child Care Centers

The dependents of the military communities in West Germany needed schools and child care facilities as well as hospitals and clinics. The
Europe Division managed design and construction for the Department
of Defense dependent schools and for child care centers, presenting military communities with a succession of school buildings, additions, and
renovations. In October 1976 the Southwest Area Office (Kaiserslautern)
turned over to the 21st Support Command a new 80,000-square-foot
middle school facility for Patrick Henry Village in Heidelberg. The new
facilities contained a classroom building with cafeteria, two gymnasiums
with showers and locker rooms, and multipurpose rooms.47 Two new
schools opened in Wrzburg and one in Nuremberg in 1977; school projects continued in West Germany in Sembach, Ludwigsburg, Heilbronn,
Schweinfurt, Neu Ulm, Kitzingen, Augsburg, Stuttgart, Hohenfels, Hahn,
Bremerhaven, and Ramstein and in Italy in San Vito. By the summer of
1979 EUD had twenty-five school projects under construction or design
The Patch elementary and high school in Stuttgart, Germany, incorporated

a variety of materials and almost no right angles.
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and expected from $30 to $40 million a year for school construction beginning with fiscal year 1980.48
One of the projects completed in time for the opening of school in
1979 was the Alexander M. Patch Elementary and High School complex
in Stuttgart. This facility accommodated about 1,500 students in more
than seventy classrooms and had unusual design elements. Two buildings
occupied a nine-acre wooded plot of land donated by the West German
government and adjacent to U.S. European Command headquarters. The
design used brick, galvanized steel, stone, and concrete with a great deal
of glass; and the buildings were constructed with almost no right angles.
A waterfall, a small zoo, a barbecue area, and vegetable gardens surrounded the physical plant. The landscape encouraged the designers to make
one whole side of the gymnasium in glass, opening the room visually to
the woods. The gardens gave students an opportunity to plant fruits and
vegetables as a part of their educational experience. The zoo was designed
in harmony with a greenhouse and included three rabbit houses for children to learn the responsibilities associated with caring for animals. The
entire complex was designed and constructed in just over fifteen months
by a consortium that included the German-U.S. Architect Group and four
construction firmsKlee, Holzmann, Zueblin, and Wachterall from the
Stuttgart area. Construction cost about $6.5 million.49
To end overcrowding, EUD broke ground for a new middle school
in the Pattonville Housing Area in Ludwigsburg, near Stuttgart, on
4 September 1979. The company handling construction of this $6 million school was M. F. Wachter, one of the builders of the Patch schools.
Financial limits on the project mandated omitting the sports grounds
from the initial phase of the construction, and the gymnasium was erected only as an improved structural shell.50
Similar construction in other communities continued throughout the
1980s. By 1982 the expectation of funding for the school improvement program in USAREUR had risen to between $40 and $60 million a year. EUD
had twelve new school projects in West Germany programmed for fiscal
year 1983 and seven more for fiscal year 1984, including additions to the
elementary and high schools in Incirlik, Turkey.51 In 1985 EUD had fiftyeight active projects involving schools.52
One project from 1985 illustrates the critical deficiencies that threatened USAREUR schools with possible loss of accreditation. The elementary school in Wiesbaden held its special education classes in storage
rooms. A DM 1.8 million ($611,000) addition to the school, begun in
September 1985 and completed the following August, provided new space
for a library, a speech therapy room, an administrative office, and a supply storage room. All utilities were renovated in the same project, as were
the playground and the intercommunications and bell system. The prime
contractor, Fillibeck and Sons, also landscaped and repaved around the
school.53
Improvements at the Frankfurt American High School on the former I.
G. Farben property cost about $5.1 million and provided new laboratories
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for classes in chemistry, physics, biology, and industrial arts. The project
began in June 1986. Contractors completed renovations in the existing
building in 1987 and a new 22-room facility in 1988.54
Construction for the schools program suffered in the mid-1980s
because of the declining value of the dollar against European currencies. Many of the school construction projects authorized by Congress
remained unfinanced; in 19861987 the program had more than $108 million worth of deferred projects and at prevailing rates of exchange needed
almost $500 million to address the full needs of the schools.55
In fiscal year 1988 EUD awarded $62.6 million in contracts for
eighteen schools projectsnew buildings, additions, and renovationsin
Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Turkey.56 The elementary school
in Soesterberg, Netherlands, was one of these projects. Before the construction of the new $2.33 million elementary school, one building served
all students, mostly dependents of personnel of the Air Forces 32d Tactical
Fighter Squadron stationed at the Soesterberg Air Base. The elementary
school provided 53,750 square feet of new space, and an alteration to the
high school provided another 4,800 square feet. The project, handled indirectly through the Dutch governments construction office, engaged five
different contractors: a general contractor and one each for mechanical,
electrical, civil (paving and sewers), and landscape work. Although the
Dutch construction office coordinated the work, EUD provided oversight
of the multiple contractors. Construction began on the elementary school
in 1987, and the school was transferred to the users in February
1989.57
In 1988 EUD confronted a
new problem concerning work
for the schools in Europethe
need to mount an aggressive
asbestos abatement program. By
December preliminary assessments had identified twenty situations that required asbestos
abatement, many involving ongoing design contracts and indirect
construction projects. Because
OMA money funded the renovation and expansion projects, EUD
had to review concept and final
design, advertise projects, and
award contracts for the asbestos
abatement within the fiscal year.
Initial estimates forecast that
between 80 and 100 schools in
Contractors wore special protective
suits while removing asbestos from
the Netherlands, Belgium, West
school buildings in Europe.
Germany, and Turkey might
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need the work; additional testing established that asbestos problems were
more widespread. In Germany alone, construction materials containing
asbestos were found in 145 of 166 schools and offices and in 415 of 671
buildings tested. The divisions immediate concern was removal of asbestos-bearing materials that had become damaged and friable; the asbestos
abatement program in school construction and renovation occupied the
divisions attention for several years.58
School construction did not slacken because of the problems with
asbestos. Using preengineered, precast, reinforced concrete, EUD completed schools and school additions at a rapid pace through the end of the
decade. Early in 1990 work began on a new kindergarten at the elementary school in Baumholder. Contractors completed the elementary/junior
high school at Robinson Barracks in Stuttgart in the summer of 1990.
In September 1990 EUD held a ribbon-cutting and turnover ceremony
for a $5.4 million project at the junior high school at Kessler Field in
Schweinfurt. The new $9 million middle school at Leighton Barracks in
Wrzburg, begun in October 1988, celebrated its completion with a ceremony in October 1990.59
The Armys concern about facilities for school-age children paralleled
its growing concern for preschoolers. Child care always existed within
the military communities, but it had been handled informally, with no
direct Department of Defense responsibility. Officers wives often organized programs of day care.60 When Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy commanded the Engineer Command between 1967 and 1971, for instance, his
wife headed the board for the Frankfurt nursery for children of servicemen. Child care had been priced at 35 cents an hour, plus an additional
15 cents an hour for a second child, and she insisted on maintaining that
price throughout her four years as board president. New board members
coming from the United States and other military communities pointed
out that the cost of babysitting had risen to 75 cents an hour, but Mrs.
Kennedy argued that the Frankfurt nursery could provide the service
at its 35-cent rate and still break even. She was concerned because many
people using the service were working wives of enlisted men who were
having a hard time making ends meet.61
In the absence of any formal program, babysitting services, preschools, and child care centers sprang up according to need, finding space
in housing areas, chapels, and hospital wards. The engineers assisted,
but often unofficially; a post engineer might build or paint something
as an act of community goodwill. Col. Claude Roberts, who served with
the Training and Doctrine Command in the mid-1970s, recalled having
been laughed out of the Pentagon in 1976 when the command proposed
building a nursery.62
By late in the decade the Armys attitude changed and EUD had
design contracts for child care centers. Blink housing area in Bremerhaven
was scheduled to receive a new child care center that would take the
place of facilities located in a hospital ward. A child care center that EUD
designed for Katterbach Caserne in Ansbach allowed the existing cen346
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ter to move out of the chapel where it had operated. Such projects were
financed in the early 1980s by nonappropriated funds.63
As the Army began to address the well-being of its troops in the barracks, in family quarters, and in the schools, child care facilities came
under greater scrutiny. In the 1980s the Army began to see its role in
the matter of child care as minimizing the conflict between the responsibilities of soldiers as parents and the requirements of their mission.
Inspections of day care facilities revealed that many of them failed to meet
even rudimentary safety regulations or fire codes. USAREUR took on
more and more responsibility for the facilities, and EUD became increasingly involved in their design and construction.64
Safety in the child care facilities remained a major concern. When
engineers learned that paint used in two of the centers under construction in 1984 contained unacceptable levels of lead, the division alerted the
commander of the Installation Support Activity, Europe, and suggested
random testing of paints used in residential facilities to ensure compliance
with U.S. government specifications. The commander also initiated paint
sampling programs for those facilities where EUD had acted as construction agent, with priority given to facilities used by small children.65
By the mid-1980s USAREUR began to reinterpret its responsibility:
Child care meant not just providing babysitting services but furnishing
nutritious food and a certain amount of instruction. The Armys changing
attitude influenced its vocabulary: Child care and day care centers became
child development centers.66 By the end of the decade a Department of the
The changing role of child care led to the building of child development
centers during the 1980s, like this one in Bad Kreuznach, Germany.
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2/3/06 10:55:56 AM

Army spokesman described reliable, affordable child care as a readiness issue. USAREUR adopted the position that the knowledge that
ones child is receiving professional, concerned care in an adequate facility is perhaps the single most important factor in determining the individuals long-term job performance.67
When litigation in the United States focused attention on alleged
sexual abuse in child care centers, the centers in Europe received additional scrutiny. The rapidly changing standards created problems for
EUD, including cost increases and complications in administration and
execution of the contracts. Each time the standards for child development
centers changed in the United States, the centers in design or under construction through EUD had to be modified. This became a particularly
vexing problem in the late 1980s as the number of projects increased and
as tighter standards were applied.68
The child care center at Patrick Henry Village in Heidelberg was an
example of the delays that could develop. Although completed in January
1988, the facility could not be turned over to the community until August
because transparent observation panels had to be fitted to bathroom doors to
allow the staff to monitor activity in toilet stalls. At the same time, contractors
added an additional sink and a sprinkler system for fire protection.69
Some regulations proved redundant in Germany. For example,
the requirement to raise wall plug sockets to fifty-four inches off the
ground was designed to reduce the possibility that a child would
receive a shock by jamming something into the socket. In Germany,
however, all electrical outlets in classrooms had to be equipped with
ground-fault interrupters. Similarly, U.S. guidelines stipulated that
radiators, if present, should be covered. This provision prevented
injury from steam radiators, but German construction used only hot
water radiators that never achieved the same intensity of heat. If the
regulations addressing wall outlets and radiators were too specific,
others were too vague. One EUD engineer observed that the regulation that playground equipment should be appropriate for the childs
age wasnt helpful if you didnt have a playground specialist at every
office.70
Even late in the 1980s, USAREUR recognized that it was short of its
goal of alleviating soldiers concerns about their children and that many
of our child care facilities are widely held to be inadequate at best.71 As
a result, child development centers remained a focus of construction into
the 1990s. A $1.6 million center for 145 children opened at East Camp,
Grafenwhr, in April 1990. A center at Wetzel Barracks in Baumholder celebrated a grand opening on 11 July. The facility at Old Argonner Caserne
in Hanau opened on 14 September to serve 198 children. The Panzer
Housing Area in Bblingen near Stuttgart opened its center for 145 children late in 1990.72
EUD also supervised construction in the late 1980s of a growing number of youth activity centers for school-age dependent children from six
to nineteen years old. These centers provided space for dance, karate, and
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Youth activity centers in Germany included this facility in Wiesbaden.
other recreational classes; TV and teen lounge areas; stages for theater
productions; video game rooms; and gymnasiums for sporting events
such as gymnastics, volleyball, basketball, and public gatherings. All
facilities built in the late 1980s were fully equipped for access and use by
physically disabled persons.73
Medical Facilities
Like the family housing and the barracks, many of the medical facilities that served the U.S. Army in Europe dated from before the war or
from the period of rapid and austere construction in the early 1950s;
by the 1970s they needed repair and modernization. The hospital in
Nuremberg, for example, served the German military during World War
II. The facility in Landstuhl was built as a 1,000-bed U.S. Army emergency
field hospital in 1952. Beginning in the 1970s the Europe Division managed major renovations at both facilities.
The Nuremberg Army hospital provided medical support for sixty
thousand service personnel and dependents in northern Bavaria. During
the summer of 1975 EUD estimated the cost of renovation between $35
and $43 million. Design moved forward, and on 12 July 1978 contractors
broke ground on the planned 250-bed facility. The construction provided
an emergency clinic; a food service division; new facilities for radiology,
physical therapy, and pathology; a sixteen-bed intensive/coronary care
unit; a central materials section; an operating suite; and a nursery.74
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In Nuremberg the engineers adapted a facility designed and constructed in the 1930s to new specialized medical equipment. Oxygen had
to be readily available, as did steam for sterilization, and electrical capacity had to be adjusted to accommodate the new machines. When the U.S.
medical community insisted on 110-volt, 60-cycle equipment, designers
initially solved the problem of converting from the 220-volt net to the 110volt equipment by using several small step-down transformers. As the
hospital began to operate the new equipment, the users discovered that
these transformers delivered consistently higher voltages at less than full
load, exceeding the maximum that the medical equipment was designed
to handle and damaging the equipment. EUD returned to the American
company that had designed the electrical system, demanded a solution,
and insisted on greater involvement by the parent company in the designs
prepared by its German affiliate.75
Cost estimates for the renovations proved woefully inadequate.
Because the hospital remained open to care for patients throughout construction, designers used very little destructive testing to determine the
material composition of the walls and ceilings. When the construction
workers in Nuremberg found plaster bound to the ceiling with a woven
mesh of straw, a minor ceiling repair turned into a major job of replacing the entire ceiling with wire mesh and plaster.76
The Nuremberg hospital renovation project was fully under way by
1979 at a cost of over $31 million, making it the largest single construction project, measured in dollar value, undertaken to that date for the U.S.
Army in Europe. By 1981, when Blake arrived at EUD, change orders and
contract modifications had elevated the costs and delayed the work. He
gave the project his personal attention and brought the work back within
budget. Construction continued in Nuremberg throughout the 1980s.77
The U.S. military hospital in Landstuhl dated from the 1950s, but it too
needed renovation. The hospitals basic construction was sturdy enough,
even though it had been built with a life expectancy of only fifteen years,
but the design was outmoded. Built as an emergency-care field hospital
to handle up to one thousand casualties at a time, it evolved into a fullcare hospital for soldiers and their dependents. Additional facilities were
haphazardly patched together, much like Nuremberg, rather than added
according to any systematic plan. Late in the 1970s EUD began a comprehensive renovation of Landstuhl, starting with the dining hall. The work,
undertaken in 1979, increased food service to eighteen hundred meals a
day and incorporated tables and seating for wheelchair-bound patients.78
In 1980 a German project engineer from the Kaiserslautern Area
Office, Hartwig Braun, took over management of the renovation in
Landstuhl. Braun had worked on the construction of the hospital in
1952 in his first position with the U.S. Army engineers. He recalled the
American insistence that the construction be temporary, so he found a
certain irony in assuming responsibility almost thirty years later for managing a six-phase expansion and addition to the hospital to prepare it to
serve future generations of U.S. military personnel.79
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The original Landstuhl hospital had a long central hallway from which
six wings extended at right angles on each side of the axis. Converting
several patient wings at the center of the structure created a central core
that included operating amphitheaters, obstetrics/gynecological facilities,
and radiation laboratories. Contractors increased the electrical capacity
and added an emergency generator. This work in 1983 opened the way to
more extensive interior renovation through 1987. During all of this construction the Landstuhl hospital continued to provide medical services;
by the end of the decade it resumed full operation as a medical center.80
Brauns involvement with the Landstuhl hospital in the 1950s and
again in the 1980s illustrates the important role that German employees
played in the Europe Divisions work. Braun and scores of others provided continuity and stability, an intimate knowledge of German standards
and methods of construction, and an understanding of U.S. specifications
developed in years of experience in the field. They were particularly effective at the construction sites.
In the 1980s USAREUR programmed renovations for the 97th General
Hospital in Frankfurt, the Army hospital in Wrzburg, and the hospital
in Bremerhaven. In Augsburg a new $22 million addition was completed
in early 1989.
The 97th General Hospital in Frankfurt was built in 193839 for the
German Luftwaffe. Since taking control of the hospital in July 1945, the
U.S. military had kept it in constant use. Supplementary facilities and
wings were added in the 1950s. Patchwork repairs kept the hospital running during the 1960s and 1970s, but by 1982 the overall deficit of standard maintenance that plagued military facilities in Europe brought the
hospital to a crisis.81 Water, heat, and sewage lines, clogged with mineral
deposits from the local water, delivered only 20 percent of their intended
capacity. Valves within the system were not locatable, inoperable, or nonexistent where they were needed. The entire roof needed repair, and 15
percent of it had to be replaced completely.
The hospital had a staff of over one thousand people and a daily
average of more than two hundred overnight patients and nearly eight
hundred outpatients; the needs of the U.S. military community dictated
that staff work and patient treatment continue uninterrupted throughout
the renovations. In addition, the Germans insisted that construction at
Frankfurt General preserve the buildings architectural integrity and interior features such as wall murals and marble work. Exterior renovation
had to preserve historical and architectural features, including the marble
work and tiling on porches.82
EUD planned the construction in six phases over seven years, but
work continued for more than a decade. The construction program added
a new wing for the hospitals intensive care and coronary care units. All
utilities were replaced, including electrical wiring and plumbing. Interior
rooms were stripped to the frame and then refurbished. Contractors
restored doors that had original marble frames and replaced other doors
and windows; thermal-pane windows helped control interior tempera351
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Construction began in March 1987 on the addition to the Army hospital in

Wrzburg, Germany.
tures. The development of new medical equipment and procedures during the project led to redesign of some aspects of the construction. By
mid-1988 work on the Frankfurt hospital had grown to a $58 million
project, using Military Construction, Army (MCA), and Operations and
Maintenance, Army (OMA), funds.83
Similar work on the hospital in Wrzburg was conceived in 1984 as a
renovation/repair project to modify the existing building. When the Army
learned, however, that the old building could not meet the certification
standards for the U.S. Joint Commission for Accreditation of Hospitals,
plans changed to construction of a new six-story building that would be
linked with the old one by a passageway. The EUD team reviewing the
design found twelve hundred objectionable items in the original design
and rejected it. Karl Schaffner, an engineer in the Wrzburg Area Office
chairing the team, was a native German who emigrated to Chicago in
the 1950s and returned to work at EUD as an American citizen. Schaffner
described the original design as a total mess. It lacked standard elements of military hospital construction and detailed specifications concerning sterile installations and the purging of oxygen, nitrogen, and
other gasses from the tube and pipe system. Designers overlooked the
need for training to operate and maintain specialized equipment. The
second submission was not much better. After the second rejection, the
Europe Division commander, Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, personally called
the president of the design firm to emphasize the divisions dissatisfac352
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Front Lobby of the Hospital in Bremerhaven, Germany, in September 1988
tion. Rays intervention brought the desired results. After 4,820 comments,
the division accepted the third design package.84
With a satisfactory design in hand, EUD let the construction contract
for $49.4 million, the largest direct contract that the division awarded to
that date. Construction began in March 1987. The contractor, a joint venture of Philipp Holzmann, Dyckerhoff-Widmann, and Wayss-Freytag,
won an award under the value-engineering program for suggesting
an alternate treatment of the surgical gas columns that saved almost
$30,000 in the construction. In addition to the recognition, the joint venture received a cash return of more than $16,000 for the innovation. The
contractor transferred the addition to the hospital administration in late
September 1990.85
Contractors completed a comprehensive six-phase renovation at
Bremerhaven hospital in 1989 at a cost of $22 million. Designers incorporated original stained glass windows depicting vintage German airplanes,
battleships, blimps, and trains into the remodeled facility.86 Construction
plans to rearrange partitions in large rooms changed when the walls
turned out not to be wood but rather peat moss that had been cut in
bricks, dried, and then plastered over.87
Renovation of USAREUR hospitals in the 1980s was spurred by challenges to the facilities accreditation. By 1984 the U.S. Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Hospitals had revoked or denied accreditation to seven
hospitals. In the hospital construction program, the command sought to
correct the most blatant structural and mechanical defects and to provide
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up-to-date medical servicesmodern emergency treatment centers and
operating rooms, semiprivate patients rooms to replace the open-bay
wards, and support services that incorporated the most current technologies.88 Despite the construction program, USAREUR reported in 1988 that
there are many Army installations in Europe that sorely need updated
medical facilities if they are to adequately serve their communities.89
Community Support Projects

The Europe Division also supervised design and construction for
facilities to provide food, clothing, and recreational outlets for American
military personnel and their families. Commissaries and specialized facilities such as bakeries provided food; post exchanges for the Army and base
exchanges for the Air Force offered clothing, necessities, and amenities such
as appliances, tools, toys, and day-to-day supplies. The wide range of the
construction projects included movie theaters; libraries with audiovisual
centers; bookstores; officers and enlisted personnel clubs; gymnasiums;
bowling alleys; courts for tennis, racquetball, and basketball; physical fitness centers; swimming pools; rod and gun clubs; outdoor obstacle courses;
playing and sports fields; and roller-skating rinks. In addition, EUD supervised construction of chapels to support the spiritual life of the community.
The money for these facilities came from a variety of sources, primarily nonappropriated funds generated as the profits from activities run
Community support facilities for U.S. troops, such as the NCO club in
Gppingen, Germany, under construction in 1985, remained a consistent
part of the divisions workload.
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Table 12
Europe Division Design Accomplishments
Fiscal Years 1980 and 1984
Program
Precent of Total Budget

Fiscal Year 1980
Fiscal Year 1984
61
41.7
13
23.2
Modernization of U.S. Forces
Operation and Maintenance,

Army, family housing, and other
*5.9
Nonappropriated funds
1.8
*Operation and Maintenance, Army, only.
by the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES), which paid a fee
to the Armed Services, or from the profits of the Stars and Stripes bookstores. In certain circumstances community support facilities received
funding from the MCA or the Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF,
often referred to as MCP), budgets, and even occasionally from the OMA
budget. The West German government also provided funds under the
Alternate Construction program.90
The percentage of any annual budget that went to these community
facilities remained small. In projections for fiscal year 1976, less than 0.5
percent of the dollar value of EUD design effort went into projects supported by nonappropriated funds. By contrast, EUD projected over 80
percent of the dollar value of its design effort to go for MCA, MCAF, and
MOUSF. The Construction Division showed the same pattern in its projections for fiscal year 1976: 25.9 percent for MCA, 20.5 percent for MCAF,
42.6 percent for MOUSF, and only 2.7 percent for nonappropriated funds
and OMA combined.91
The effort to supply communities with facilities that enhanced the
quality of life for soldiers and their families increased dramatically in
the mid-1980s, but even in fiscal year 1984a high point for programs
devoted to projects such as schools, commissaries, post exchanges, day
care centers, clubsneither in design nor construction did this part of
EUD workload reach 9 percent.92 The design work for fiscal years 1980
and 1984 indicate that even as the tempo of work for recreational or community support programs increased during the 1980s, the design work
accomplished on these projects remained a small part of the divisions
overall budget, even if one assumes that some of the design work charged
under MCA or MCAF went to such programs.93 (Table 12) Between fiscal
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years 1984 and 1987, work on projects involving nonappropriated funds
increased from 1.8 percent to about 3.5 percent of the EUD workload.94
Though still small in relation to EUDs overall commitment of funds, the
money expended on upgrading facilities to serve soldiers and their families had enormous potential for improving morale.
Commissaries and Post Exchanges

In 1969 AAFES entered into an agreement with the Office of the Chief
of Engineers (OCE) to have Corps districts provide supervision and
inspection of AAFES construction. In August 1977 AAFES Europe and
EUD signed a similar protocol. The first two projects under this arrangement were shopping centers in Ramstein and Vogelweh, scheduled for
award in 1978. The two parties anticipated one or two shopping centers
a year. Within the year, projects began for new or enlarged post and base
exchanges in Mannheim, Karlsruhe, Spangdahlem, and Hahn.95 Even
before this agreement, EUD had been overseeing the construction of a
modern post exchange at Perlacher Forest Caserne in Munich, financed by
the West German government under the Alternate Construction program.
Between 1976 and 1978 the Alternate Construction program funded $8
million of completed community service construction where EUD provided technical review of the design and the construction. The program
included an addition and an automobile service station in Augsburg, a
rod and gun club, and facilities in Wildflecken and Karlsruhe.96
In May 1976 EUD accepted the task of supervising a commissary project in Iran, completed in 19771978 at a cost of $5.6 million. This was part
of a much larger project that included a theater, an administrative building, and an Army Post Office facility. Work continued until the political
upheaval of the 1979 revolution in Iran.97
In Europe EUD continued to supervise work on commissaries and
post exchanges. In 1979 AAFES requested designs for new facilities in
Schweinfurt and preliminary planning for a $4 million exchange in
Stuttgart and an $8 million consolidated bakery in Grnstadt. AAFES
plans also called for two additional base exchanges near Kaiserslautern
and commissaries in Erlangen, Hanau, and Kitzingen.98 In 1985 Louis
Berger International prepared designs for a new commissary and additions to the post exchange at Smith Barracks in Baumholder and for the
modernization of the exchange facilities in Frankfurt and Babenhausen.99
In September 1985 EUD awarded a contract for the first completely
new building to house a main post exchange store outside the United
States. The contract went to Wilhelm Druecker for a facility in Heilbronn
valued at over $3 million. The decision to build a new facility rather than
renovate a building designed for other use represented a new policy in
keeping with the Armys growing concern with the quality of life available to soldiers and their dependents.100 The same policy led to the construction between November 1986 and February 1991 of ten commissaries
and to the expansion and renovation of more than a score of others. In fis356
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Construction of this exchange mall in Nuremberg, Germany, was completed in 1988.
cal years 1989 to 1991, EUD programmed twelve post exchanges that used
technology such as the electronic scanner checkout system introduced at
the commissary in Hanau in 1986. The new facilities generally replaced
commissaries housed in much older buildings: The Hanau commissary
had operated from a building constructed in 1938 as a training area for
horses, and the commissary in Wrzburgs Leighton Barracks had operated from an aircraft hangar built in 1936. New construction afforded more
modern and energy-efficient refrigeration, heating, and cooling systems,
leading to economies in operation and maintenance. The added facilities
also increased the space for shopping; the new commissary in Garlstedt
provided an air-conditioned sales area six times the size of the previous
commissary, itself hardly a decade old. To accommodate increased traffic,
parking areas were resurfaced and furnished with designated spaces for
disabled drivers.101
Sports and Recreational Facilities

Recreational facilities offered another avenue to enhance the quality of
life for soldiers of the modern volunteer Army. Living standards for U.S.
soldiers had seriously declined because of the erosion in the early 1970s of
the value of the dollar in comparison with the Deutschmark. As a result,
soldiers found the cost of living mounting each year and outstripping
their pay. Because they could not afford to leave the military community
to seek recreation and entertainment, on-post facilities became increas357
2/3/06 10:56:05 AM

ingly important. When troops found gymnasiums, theaters, and clubs run
down and overcrowdedwhere they existed at allmorale suffered.102
In fiscal year 1974 the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington
launched a major effort to replace standard drawings used since the 1960s
for outdoor sports facilities. The Corps issued sixteen new standard drawings containing layouts and construction details for twenty-one different
sports fields and courts. As the drawings were distributed, EUD began
preparing a technical manual on outdoor sports facilities.103
Gymnasium projects had long been a part of engineer activity in
Europe; almost forty gymnasiums were erected in the 1950s.104 In the
1960s and early 1970s the Engineer Command erected gymnasiums too,
but these were under inflatable bubbles with an asphalt base covered with
rubberized flooring. The construction had not always gone well. After a
windstorm blew away the $10,000 inflatable cover being installed over
the gymnasium at a Frankfurt school in 1972, ENGCOMs commander,
Brig. Gen. Carroll LeTellier, learned that the troops installing the structure
had failed to tighten the bolts on the anchor lines attached to the concrete.
LeTellier lamented, A 15-minute job left undone will now cost us about a
weeks construction time.105
EUD built gymnasiums throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, including one at the Sigonella Naval Air Base in Italy, but for the most part
athletic facilities were patched and expanded haphazardly on a year-byyear basis.106 Funding was uncertain. In December 1981 Congress deleted
funds for gyms from the construction program, thereby disrupting the
Gymnasiums, like this one in Stuttgart, Germany, helped to improve morale of

U.S. troops stationed overseas.
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The Frankfurt Area Office managed the construction of this modern bowling
facility in Hanau, Germany.
EUD schedule for awarding contracts in the subsequent months.107 In 1982

gymnasiums figured in the plans for five sites in Turkey, and a separate
contract was let in June 1983 for an addition and renovations to the gymnasium at the Ankara Air Station.108
In the mid-1980s USAREUR began to use money more systematically under programs aimed to enhance morale, welfare, and recreation.
Bowling alleys gained renewed support. Between 1983 and 1988 the
Frankfurt Area Office supervised construction of 100 bowling lanes at
five locations. The bowling facility at Wolfgang Caserne in Hanau included automatic pin-setting equipment and automated scoring monitors
manufactured by the AMF Company. It also featured a roof design that
allowed an unsupported span of 165 feet under a dome 44 feet high, placing the facility at the very forefront of the state of the engineering arts.
Similar facilities went up in Bamberg, Baumholder, Dexheim, Kitzingen,
Schweinfurt, and Vilseck between 1988 and 1990, incorporating equipment for automated pin-setting and electronic scoring.109
Racquetball courts became a major part of the sports and recreation
program in the 1980s with the introduction of a project to build thirtythree courts throughout Europe, including Turkey. EUD wrestled with
many frustrations managing the construction of these courts. USAREUR
had ordered a large shipment of prefabricated racquetball court equipment from the United States and stored it at various places around
Europe. Given the task of gathering the materials and erecting the courts,
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EUD recovered mostly broken and weather-damaged pieces and discovered that much of the material was lost.110
Recreation centers became more prominent in the divisions construction program as the military recognized the contribution of fitness activities to morale. In December 1985 EUD turned over to the 1st
Infantry Division (Forward) at Gppingen a multipurpose recreation
facility that included an outdoor recreation center, a bowling alley, a
game room with video games, a sports shop, a rod and gun facility,
locker rooms, and a snack bar and bar area. The outdoor recreation center rented skis and boots, bicycles, and tents and other camping gear. A
few months later the U.S. Air Force took over a new physical training
center in Incirlik, Turkey. At a cost of $1.1 million, the facility provided
13,749 square feet of space for basketball, exercise rooms and equipment,
separate saunas and locker facilities for men and women, and administrative space.111
A similar multipurpose recreation center at the Carl Schurz Caserne
in Bremerhaven reopened in late 1988 after extensive renovation of a
preWorld War II aircraft hangar. The contractors replaced all electrical,
heating, and plumbing systems; remodeled stage and seating space in
the theater; repartitioned the interior space; replaced metal siding with
masonry; changed all windows and doors to energy-efficient products;
remodeled the bowling alleys and gymnasium facilities; and created
entrance vestibules. When completed, the center also featured a snack bar,
a food shop, arts and crafts shops, a travel agency, a billiards hall, and a
music studio.112
Chapels
Just as the Armys far-reaching effort to improve the community life
at military bases in Europe sought to provide modern shopping facilities
and leisure-time activities, it also encompassed chapels for religious worship. Building and renovating chapels had been a part of the engineer
responsibility in Europe since the 1940s. In the early 1950s the Army engineers built or renovated about 250 chapels for the military communities
in Germany. These chapels were based on standard designs drawn up
by Army engineers at European Command (later USAREUR) headquarters. In 19731974 OCE issued a new set of standard designs for chapels.
Planned for a capacity of 200300 persons, the design was simple, flexible,
and appropriate for multidenominational use.113
In the 1970s EUD built chapels that served as centers for social services as well as religious observances. The chapel at Katterbach Caserne
near Ansbach, for instance, housed the child care center until EUD built
a new child care facility in the community.114 In 1983 the Wrzburg Area
Office completed work on a chapel for Wildflecken; this chapel also had
classrooms.115
EUDs services included interior design and planning for use of
space in the chapel. In the early 1980s Sherry Sizemore served as an inte360
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In the 1980s the division abandoned stock designs and built more custom chapels,
like this one completed in 1987 in Cakmakli, Turkey.
rior designer on a new chapel at the Army base in Cakmakli, Turkey.

Her responsibility was to select all the material, from the stained glass
windows to light fixtures and the designing of furnishings. The task
required special creativity because the Turkish government insisted that
all furnishings and decorative items be purchased in Turkey. In 1987 the
Southern European Task Forces design office received a design award for
this project; contractors completed the chapel the following year.116 In that
same year the division also finished a chapel for the Air Force community
at Hahn Air Base. A larger facility than the chapel in Cakmakli, it used
construction materials such as slate shingling on the roof, an oak ceiling,
oak cabinetry, and marble floors.117
Chapels, recreational facilities, and shopping centers all figured as
part of efforts intensified in the 1980s and extended into the 1990s to
provide U.S. military personnel in Europe with a satisfying community
environment. With increased funding in the first half of the decade, the
military commanders had the resources to improve and expand facilities that supported the morale, recreational needs, and welfare of the
soldiers and airmen to a degree beyond anything achieved in earlier
years. Still, the expenditures for such amenities never amounted to more
than 5 percent of the annual budget for military construction programs
in Europe.
The momentum from funding for community improvements sustained EUDs construction activities into the late 1980s. Many of the divi361
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sion personnel expected the intense pace of construction to continue into
the next decade. Budget pressures in the United States, already evident
in the mid-1980s, worked against that. A totally unanticipated geopolitical revolution at the end of the decade completely changed the divisions
future.
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13
EUROPE TRANSFORMED
19881991
etween 1981 and 1988 the U.S. military spent more than $3 billion on construction in Europe and more than $100 million in
master planning programs among the forty-two United States
Army, Europe (USAREUR), communities. This effort, made
necessary by new weapons systems and several decades of inadequate
funding for maintenance, was spurred by a special report to Congress
submitted by the commander in chief of USAREUR, General Frederick
J. Kroesen, in 1981. The construction projects of the 1980s encompassed
operational and training facilities; maintenance, storage, and supply
facilities; barracks, dining halls, family housing units, and child care
centers; hospitals and medical and dental clinics; sports fields and
recreation facilities; and the heating, cooling, electrical, and sewer
infrastructure.1
By 1988 USAREUR administered about 34,000 buildings located at more than 820 sites in countries from the Baltic Sea to the
Mediterranean. The building and maintenance program of the 1980s
brought about vast improvements in the living and working conditions of U.S. military personnel stationed in Europe. American leaders
in Europe anticipated that similar work would continue well into the
1990s. The USAREUR commanders special report to Congress for 1988
noted in its conclusion:
For every soldier who sleeps in comfortable barracks or every
family that lives in decent housing, others continue to live in
crowded, unsightly, and unacceptable buildings. For every soldier
who maintains a weapon or vehicle in a safe, well-lit, properlyequipped workshop, many others must still attempt to perform the
most intricate and exacting maintenance tasks outside, exposed to
the elements, or inside dilapidated, unsafe, and totally inadequate
converted horse stables. We must be allowed to continue what we
have begun.2
17P_Chap13_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 10:57:09 AM

The construction projects dedicated to improving the quality of life
for soldiers in the 1980s brought to the Europe Division (EUD) of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) years of intense activity and organizational growth. Following the rapid turnover of division commanders
in the mid-1980s, Brig. Gen. James W. Bill Rays three-year tenure gave
the divisions employees a sense of stability and motivation to achieve
excellence. As spring turned to summer in 1988, the staff learned that
Ray would be promoted and reassigned to Headquarters, USAREUR, in
Heidelberg as deputy chief of staff, engineer. The Europe Division was
functioning smoothly, and morale was high. In Rays final monthly column in the Corps Line, he reminded the division to expect a future full
of change.3 Neither he nor anyone else had any idea how much change
the next three years would bring.
EUDs new commander had his own agenda for the division. His
efforts to reorient the division became swept up in currents of change
that brought a veritable revolution to the politics of Europe. That revolution challenged the Europe Divisions existence and forced cancellation
of much of its construction. The dramatic developments in East-West relations that provoked a restructuring of Europe overwhelmed efforts to
bring modest changes to the Europe Division that General Rays successor
launched in 1988.
Prelude to Change
Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell arrived as division engineer and commander of the Europe Division on 18 July 1988, having served most
recently as commander of the Ohio River Division. He had previously
commanded the 2d Engineer Group in Yong San, Korea; led engineer
units in Okinawa, Thailand, and Vietnam from 1965 to 1968; and commanded the 43d Engineer Group at Fort Benning, Georgia. From 1961
to 1964 Harrell had been a platoon leader and company commander
in an engineer battalion at Nelligen Barracks in West Germany. Born
in Selma, Alabama, and a graduate of Tuskegee Institute, Harrell
was one of the few African American general officers in the Corps of
Engineers.4
At his first staff meeting, General Harrell praised EUDs reputation
and assured division personnel that he would not be making changes
for changes sake.5 He emphasized the divisions connectedness to the
military commands. He liked to visit EUDs customers in the military
communities, welcomed opportunities to mix with the soldiers, and often
went to training exercises in the field.6 General Harrell also expressed his
dissatisfaction that as EUD commander he commanded only the executive staff. He was concerned that not all the area engineers were military
officers and that they reported to the chief of construction rather than to
him directly.7 (Chart 14)
Several of General Harrells actions in the early months of his tour
prompted the staff to suspect that he had come with a charge to get
364
2/3/06 10:57:10 AM
2/3/06 10:57:10 AM
Planning
Branch
Technical
Engineering
Branch
Foundations
and Materials
Branch


Stuttgart, Germany
Special
Assistants
General
Engineering
Branch

Nuremberg, Germany
Heidelberg Area Office

Camp Darby, Italy
Information
Management
Office
Host Nations
Contractraing
Branch
Acquisition
Branch
Policy and
COmpliance
Branch
Contracting
Division
Wrzburg Area Office

Wrzburg, Germany

Frankfurt, Germany
Supervision and
Inspection
Branch
Construction
Management
Branch
Office
Engineering
Branch
Construction
Division
Public Affairs Office
Audit Office
Safety and
Occupational
Health
Human Resources Office
Office of Council
Project
Management
Branch
Engineering
Division
Resource
Management
Office
Special
Assistants

Executive Office
Chart 14: Organization of the Europe Division, February 1989
The U.S.Engineer Group

Area Office
Incirlik, Turkey

Mobilization
Planning Office
Logistics
Management
Office
Boards and
Committees

the division more in tune with
the rules and procedures of
Headquarters, USACE. One of the
divisions deputies characterized
the impetus as directed to get
things back in line, [so that EUD
would] act more like a division
under USACE instead of a lone
wolf.8 Staff members were disappointed that he did not embrace
EQM (EUD Quality Management),
the Total Quality Management
program General Ray had initiated. In an early policy letter to the
staff, Harrell reminded employees
to use government quarters on
division travel whenever possible,
to be sure that each of our many
customers recognize EUD as
a prudent and reliable steward of
General Harrell
the nations resources.9 A subsequent policy letter mandated that
the Logistics Management Office
make no travel arrangements for commercial flights to the United States
without first attempting to book travel through the less expensive Military
Air Command.10 In February 1989 General Harrell reported to the chief of
engineers, Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, Jr., that the division had established a
formal command inspection program to assess the divisions compliance
with regulations, the effectiveness of established procedures and management practices, and the adequacy of internal controls.11
Emphasizing Affirmative Action

Affirmative action and equal employment opportunity (EEO) were
of particular concern to General Harrell, and he repeatedly expressed his
commitment to extending opportunities for minorities and women in the
Army, in the Corps, and at EUD.12 In 1988 the division had few women or
African Americans in any grade higher than a GS12 and no Germans or
third-country nationals in supervisory positions.13 In forums with women
employees, through his commanders suggestion box, and in general conversation, Harrell raised the issue of affirmative action and questioned
appointments and promotions. He met with groups such as Federally
Employed Women, Women in Science and Engineering, and Supervisors
Equal Opportunity Liaison, and he encouraged all personnel to talk with
him about their concerns.14
Affirmative action efforts in the Europe Division dated to the establishment of the division, but the first full-time equal employment officer,
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2/3/06 10:57:11 AM
Europe Transformed, 19881991

Joanne Jodie Close, did not arrive until mid-1984. Close had the full
support of the Europe Division commander, Brig. Gen. Scott B. Smith,
and attended senior staff meetings, participated in recruitment and
personnel actions, and traveled to area offices.15 When her employment
contract came up for extension, the division advertised the position and
selected Laverne Love, an African American woman with more than
twenty years of experience in the federal government, including several
years in the Ohio River Division. Love arrived in Frankfurt in early May
1989.16
General Harrells concerns about improving employment opportunities extended to German and third-country national employees.
Although these workers had held supervisory positions such as branch
chief in the Engineer Command, regulations kept them out of such positions after the Corps established EUD in 1974, a situation which rankled
many of them.17 During his tour as division engineer, Brig. Gen. Drake
Wilson had advocated dual recruitment, by which selected higher-grade
and managerial positions would be open to all employees, regardless of
nationality; in 1980 the division promoted three German engineers to
C10 positions (equivalent to GS13).18 Subsequent commanders emphasized recruiting American civilians as the workforce grew. Although the
Works Council chairman, Hasso Damm, reported in 1987 that General
Ray supported dual recruitment, a year later Damm stated flatly, The
program has died.19 General Harrell, informed by Damm of ongoing frustration on the part of German employees, saw this as an issue
of affirmative action. On 31 March 1989, he circulated a policy letter
endorsing dual recruitment: In those instances where high grade positions (GS11 and C7 and above) can be filled by a member of either
workforce, I want selecting officials to conduct dual recruitment.20
During the next year the division advertised almost ninety positions for
dual recruitment.21
In the spring of 1989 General Harrell had another opportunity to
underscore his commitment to affirmative action. A selection committee forwarded five names to him with a recommendation for the position
as chief of the Information Management Office, a GM15 slot. Skeptical
that the committee had applied affirmative action guidelines, Harrell
reviewed all the candidates, the selection criteria, and the selection procedure. He then selected Virginia Conway, another of the top three candidates. Conway had a strong technical background, extensive management
experience, and experience working in Europe; she arrived in Frankfurt
on 2 August 1989.22
When the new affirmative action officer, Laverne Love, took up her
duties at EUD, she found numerous EEO complaints that had never
received action. She set out to resolve the complaints, institute adherence
to the law, and raise the visibility of her office. To reinforce Loves efforts,
and in light of his experience with the selection of Conway, General
Harrell issued a policy letter that addressed both equal employment
opportunity and prevention of sexual harassment. In the 28 August 1989
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2/3/06 10:57:12 AM

letter, Harrell pledged that EUD would establish and implement a division-wide Affirmative Employment Plan which will be integrated into
every element of our staffing process.23
Currents of Change
In July 1988, at the time that General Harrell arrived, the Europe
Division was a busy and vigorous organization. Construction placement
in 1987 had been $527 million and was expected to top $557 million in fiscal year 1988. Scores of designs were on drawing boards; personnel numbered more than 1,150; and morale was high. At an open staff meeting in
mid-October, the new commander predicted that construction and project
design and contract awards would continue at similar levels:
What can we expect from this next fiscal year that has just begun?
Our bottom line expectations are to award between $650 and $700
million in contracts. We anticipate placing about $530 million in
construction this year. So for both construction and project design
and contract award, the numbers should be similar to what we experienced this year. This solid foundation for our programs should
extend over the next several years.24
Despite EUDs vigorous program, changes were occurring in the
environment in which the division operated. In early 1987 General Ray
had identified four factors that, he said, put EUD on notice as an organization. First, the Gramm-Rudman amendment to the 1986 federal budget mandated a reduction in the budget deficit. Second, reductions in
the value of the dollar meant reduced buying power in Europe. Third, a
directive from President Ronald Reagan ordered that all federal agencies
become 20 percent more productive by 1992. Fourth, new Department of
Defense regulations allowed installations to choose where they would
obtain design and construction management services. General Ray
responded to these pressures with a multiphase effort to make the division a more efficient, more productive, and more attractive organization
by improving service to customers and increasing customer satisfaction.25
Rays efforts did nothing to stem the tide of events in the United States
and abroad that portended change so profound that EUD would not be
able to adjust simply by making the organization operate more efficiently.
In December 1987 President Reagan and Premier Mikhail Gorbachev
signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the first genuine
disarmament treaty of the nuclear era.26 The treaty provided that the
United States withdraw the Pershing II and Cruise missiles that EUD was
installing. The budget Congress passed for fiscal year 1989 (beginning 1
October 1988) included only $78 billion for the Army, a total that forced
the service to reduce the number of both military personnel and civilian
employees.27 In December 1988, in a speech before the United Nations,
Gorbachev reinforced the impetus for change by announcing that the
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Soviet Union would begin unilateral demobilization of 500,000 Red Army
troops and 10,000 tanks.28
In February 1989, a few weeks after Gorbachevs announcement on
demobilization, EUDs executive staff held a three-day conference to
assess the divisions future and the implications of these changes. General
Harrell reviewed the changing geopolitical environment. He noted that
the division had more than $100 million in projects not yet approved by
the German government because of environmental concerns. At the same
time, American and Soviet diplomats were pursuing negotiations on conventional forces that might produce a drastic reduction in the number of
U.S. forces in Europe. Finally, Harrell gave his own assessment that, given
the substantial improvements in facilities since his tour in the early 1960s,
there were no large projects left to pursue.29 In total, EUDs leaders had to
look carefully at the division if the organization were to remain viable.
One prospective change in the division emanated from Corps headquarters: The chief of engineers, General Hatch, was committed to implementing lifecycle project management, a management approach the
Armys civilian leadership favored.30 The concept of using a single project
manager to follow a project from cradle-to-grave had been discussed
in EUD for several years. In a letter of 11 February 1983 to the chief of
engineers, Lt. Gen. Joseph K. Bratton, the Europe Division commander,
Brig. Gen. George K. Withers, Jr., had noted that the lack of coordination between the Engineering Division and the Construction Division
resulted in delays and reduced efficiency. Withers acknowledged that an
organizational change might be necessary, but he was not at the moment
ready to embrace the Project Management Division Concept.31 A panel
on construction quality convened by headquarters in 1983 reported that
the problems of passing projects from the Engineering Division to the
Construction Division at EUD were similar to those experienced elsewhere in the Corps, though perhaps a little bit more intense.32 The organizational study conducted by the Engineer Studies Center in April 1985
pointed out the duplication of project managers, funds management,
and technical engineering elements in the Engineering and Construction
Divisions.33
In January 1987 EUD addressed the issue of project management
directly when senior managers devised an organizational plan to carry
the division to 1992. The plan acknowledged implicitly the persistent difficulty in the turnover of a project from design to construction, a cause of
dissatisfaction among both employees and customers for years.34 The plan
called for a major reorganization of EUD, creating the position of chief
of program management, and adopting cradle-to-grave project management.35 A task force chaired by the deputy division engineer prepared a
concept paper with a new organizational structure. General Ray, however,
chose not to reorganize because he wanted EQM firmly established before
undertaking a structural change that would disrupt the design and construction program.36 In contrast, General Harrell appeared eager to reorganize to implement life-cycle project management.37
369
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In the summer of 1989 General Harrell obtained a copy of the 1987
concept paper on the reorganization.38 In October he assembled a staff task
force and named his deputies, Cols. John Moravec and Daniel Waldo, Jr.,
as cochairs.39 In November the task force proposed a Program and Project
Management Directorate comprised of project managers from the existing Engineering and Construction Divisions, as well as an Engineering
and Construction Directorate that would include the supervision and
inspection function from the Construction Division and the Technical
Engineering Branch from the Engineering Division. The reorganization would create a Contracting Directorate in which contract specialists
would handle all contracting negotiations. Only preselection and selection
of architect-engineers for direct design would remain in the Engineering
Division. The plan redistributed some other functions and changed the
name of divisions to directorates and of branches to divisions.
General Harrell requested approval for the reorganization from
Headquarters, USACE. He asked Joe G. Higgs to head the Program and
Project Management Directorate and John Blake to head the Engineering
and Construction Directorate.40 Work groups began developing a detailed
table of distribution and allowances (TDA) to assign personnel spaces to
the new structure. A Corps-wide directive from General Hatch, issued
21 December 1989, mandated maintaining separate Engineering and
Construction Divisions; and EUD staff learned informally that the senior
civilians in Washington opposed their plan.41
Political Revolution in Europe

While General Harrell and the EUD staff planned the reorganization
of the division, revolution swept over the political landscape of Europe.
Remarkable for its limited bloodshed, the turn of events was the most profound and far-reaching evolution on the continent since the end of World
War II.
In December 1988 Premier Gorbachev pledged unilateral demobilization. On 25 April 1989, he announced that the Soviet Union would
begin removing 1,000 Red Army tanks from Hungary.42 On 2 May the
Hungarian government began to dismantle the barbed-wire fencing and
other barriers along its border with Austria. Removing these obstacles in
effect opened the border between East and West for the first time since
the Berlin Wall went up in 1961. East Germans, who had a right to citizenship in West Germany under the terms of the constitution of the Federal
Republic, could suddenly move through Czechoslovakia and Hungary to
Austria and into West Germany.
In July, in an appearance at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg,
France, Gorbachev indicated that he was prepared to go even farther with
arms reduction if the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) would cooperate. He also signaled that the Soviet Union would
not intervene to stop the political ferment in Hungary and Poland. The
next day, at the annual meeting of the Warsaw Pact nations, Gorbachev
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called for independent solutions of national problems within the
Eastern Bloc.
As the summer of 1989 advanced, a trickleand then a torrentof
East Germans began to emigrate to West Germany. On 19 August more
than 900 East German vacationers in Hungary succeeded in fleeing
into Austria during a picnic held near the Austro-Hungarian border. On
10 September the Hungarian government announced that it would no
longer keep East German citizens from traveling through Hungary to
Austria.43 The East German government responded by rescinding travel
rights to Hungary for its citizens. Within the next thirty-six hours 10,500
East Germans fled into Austria. Other East Germans sought asylum
in West German missions in Eastern Bloc countries. On 30 September
the 5,500 East Germans who sought asylum on the grounds of the West
German embassy in Prague, Czechoslovakia, received permission from
the East German regime to pass into the Federal Republic. By 2 October
over 30,000 had fled to the West from Hungary.
During the first week in October, East German citizens demonstrated
in East Berlin, Dresden, and Leipzig against their Communist-controlled
government. The security police attacked the demonstrators and broke up
the crowds, but the effect was only temporary. On 10 October a crowd of
50,000 East Germans took to the streets in Leipzig. On 11 October the East
German Politburo met and announced its willingness to discuss reforms.
The demonstrations continued: 100,000 protestors marched in Leipzig on
16 October, while another 30,000 marched in Dresden. On 18 October the
East German Politburo announced the retirement of Erich Honecker and
named Egon Krenz, chief of security police, as his successor. The demonstrations increased. On 23 October more than 200,000 people marched
in Leipzig; three days later 100,000 protested in Dresden. Similar crowds
appeared again in Leipzig on 30 October.
Between 2 and 9 November 1989, over 50,000 East Germans fled to the
West. On 9 November, faced with massive defections it could not contain
and street protests it dared not suppress, the East German government
announced that it would grant immediate exit visas to all who requested
them and opened all border points with West Germany, even the Berlin
Wall. On that night, television images beamed around the world showed
young Germans dancing and drinking on the top of the Berlin Wall that
had symbolized since 1961 the partition of Germany and Europe between
the Communist East and the democratic West.
The Iron Curtain had been irrevocably breached. Within weeks
the Communist parties lost control in Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Rumania. Through all these changes, the Soviet Union refrained from intervening to maintain control of
Eastern Europe. The postwar order had shattered abruptly.
Had the Cold War also ended? For American policymakers and for
U.S. forces in Europe this became the key question. Was the Soviet Army
still a menace? Surely, Eastern Europe experienced a revolution that no
one had anticipated, but its very unexpectedness opened endless pos371
2/3/06 10:57:13 AM

sibilities for speculation about what the coming months and years might
bring. The Warsaw Pact had virtually dissolved by the end of 1989, but the
Soviet Army still maintained substantial forces in East Germany. If Soviet
forces withdrew, what would be the fate of U.S. and other NATO forces?
The answers to these monumental questions would condition every decision made within the U.S. Army, Europe, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe
after November 1989. Meanwhile, because no one could answer any of
these questions, EUD operations continued.
EUD and the European Revolution

At the end of September 1989, with political turmoil in Europe evident but the outcome unclear, EUD had authorizations for 1,031 positions
and staff on board numbered 1,011. This represented a reduction of about
10 percent from the authorized level of 1,151 the year before. The budget
for fiscal year 1990, which projected a slight reduction in military construction in Europe, would produce income for EUD sufficient to support
941 positions. This meant that the division needed to reexamine its field
organization (Map 30) and reduce its workforce by 70 positions before
30 September 1990. The division expected to accomplish the reduction by
attrition, that is, by not filling vacancies. In his Commanders Comment
column in the October 1989 issue of the Corps Line, General Harrell
wrote: Maybe weve seen the last $500 million-plus construction year, I
dont know. However, if our program is indeed on the downside, Im still
expecting a soft landing that projects a gradual rather than precipitous
decline in our workload.44
Before the Corps Line printed this column the Berlin Wall opened.
During November and December 1989 the leadership of the Europe
Division made plans to implement the reorganization to lifecycle project
management (not yet approved by USACE), to initiate cost-savings measures, and to reduce the number of staff.45
In December Harrell spoke of a transitional period at EUD and the
challenges of the new year.46 In the January 1990 Corps Line, he wrote:
There are momentous changes in the East that many of us would
never have guessed were possible. The ramifications are uncertain
and the immediate future is still a little hazy as the military experts
and political leaders determine in what direction we are going. I
would be off base if I said that those decisions wont affect us. Time
will tell. It may be some years down the road or not at all.47
At a meeting of all staff on 11 January 1990, Harrell quoted Napoleon,
who in 1802 during a brief respite in the wars that surrounded the
French Revolution had announced, Peace has been declared. Harrell
affirmed that EUDs mission of managing construction in Europe
remained unchanged. He also reminded staff that the divisions funds
came from fees charged for work performed and early projections indi372
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SWEDEN
FIELD ORGANIZATION
NORTHERN EUROPE
1989

Project Office
0
50
50
100
150 Miles
150 Kilometers
100
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
IS
NETHERLANDS
WEST
GERMANY
AMSTERDAM
BERLIN
Hannover
The Hague
EAST
GERMANY
NORTHERN AREA
Mnchen-Gladbach
Leipzig
Teveren
FRANKFURT
AREA
B E L G I U M
Erfurt
WRZBURG AREA
Fulda
Giessen
Hahn
Bitburg
Frankfurt
Bad Kreuznach
LUXEMBOURG
Reims
Wildflecken
Schweinfurt
Aschaffenburg
Bamberg
Grafenwhr
Wrzburg
Kaiserslautern
Vilseck
Baumholder
KAISERSLAUTERN
AREA
Landstuhl
Heidelberg
Nuremberg
NUREMBERG
AREA
Karlsruhe
BRUSSELS
Hoensbroek
Stuttgart
HEIDELBERG
AREA
Dijon
Augsburg
STUTTGART
AREA
Zrich
LIECHTENSTEIN
A U S T R I A
Map 30
cated that the division did not have the resources to support 941 positions. Harrell acknowledged that a formal reduction in force (RIF) for
American civilian employees might be required if indeed the declared
peace held.48
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Manpower Reduction
The division could not reduce the workforce of German and thirdcountry employees in the same way that it could deal with American
civilians. Tariff agreements between the Federal Republic and USAREUR
governed all aspects of their employment, and the Termination Protection
Law regulated any reduction in force.49 The Works Council, elected
under the authority of the tariff agreements, existed to ensure that EUD
observed all applicable laws and regulations. The council and management cooperated for the benefit of employees, and management consulted
with the council, particularly with the chairman, Hasso Damm.50 Harrell
respected Damm both personally and professionally and included him in
many meetings on the proposed reorganization and possible reductions.51
Damm, who had worked for the U.S. Army in military construction
since 1956, sensed that the organization was shrinking even before the
Berlin Wall was breached. In August 1989 he projected that the German
and third-country workforce would have to be reduced from the 1988
level of 325 to around 250. Following his intuition, he encouraged employees to take any opportunity that arose outside the Europe Division; by
October 1989 the number of local national employees had fallen to 289.52
On 11 January 1990, as Harrell briefed EUD personnel, Secretary of
Defense Richard B. Cheney announced a hiring freeze throughout the
Department of Defense. This freeze complicated the divisions efforts
to reduce staff by attrition, because people who wanted to return to the
United States could not be hired by any agency in the Department of
Defense.
Because of the hiring freeze, General Harrell accelerated the tempo of
management action within EUD. The division sharply curtailed training
and temporary duty, eliminated overtime, froze purchases of dataprocessing equipment, and terminated nonessential temporary employees.53 The
Office of Human Resources began working with USAREURs Civilian
Personnel Office (CPO) to develop placement and furlough programs.
Managers were asked to propose early retirement for employees, to
encourage American employees to return to their jobs in stateside districts, to freeze hiring, and to encourage job sharing. They were also told
to consult counsels office, the EEO Office, and the Works Council before
taking any action. To keep employees informed about fast-paced developments, the division instituted a one-page temporary employee newsletter scheduled for release twice a month; the first issue appeared on 26
January 1990.54
On 24 January 1990, Secretary Cheney announced a moratorium on
new construction under the budget for Military Construction, Army,
in light of pending changes in troop strength and possible closure of
military bases. The freeze was to continue until 30 April. Initially, it was
unclear what effect, if any, the three-month moratorium would have on
EUDs plan to reorganize, on its budget, or on the projection of positions
EUD could afford for the next fiscal year. In retrospect, Harrell described
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the impact of the freeze on the divisions workload as like sticking a pin
in a balloon.55
In early February, in an effort to help the division reduce manpower,
Harrell requested permission from Headquarters, USACE, for three
actions: (1) conduct a RIF of 100 American employees from federal service; (2) furlough American civilians for two days per month from March
until the end of the fiscal year (or to implement a continuous furlough of
not more than thirty days per person); and (3) offer early retirement to an
estimated forty American employees. Harrell argued for these actions by
saying, It seems totally inconsistent that we tell this loyal and committed
group of employees that their reward for successfully achieving U.S. and
free world objectives is a RIF notice.56
A formal reduction in force affecting civil service employees is a complex personnel action governed by law and regulation. For any RIF involving more than fifty people, EUD needed approval from both USACE and
the Department of the Army. According to the agreement signed in 1974
between USAREUR and the chief of engineers, the division had to work
through USAREURs CPO in Frankfurt to conduct a RIF.57
To encourage voluntary departures among the German and thirdcountry national employees, Hasso Damm favored offering a buyout
option. This involved a cash settlement that would support the worker
from early retirement to the date when the German social security system would begin payments; the buyout was a common practice in the
Germany economy. General Harrell accepted Damms proposal that the
Europe Division conduct a buyout using the authority of a relatively
recent special USAREUR initiative that gave individual commanders discretion to decide issues up to Deutschmark 50,000 in labor cases (about
$30,000).58 In February 1990 Damm and others began advising the employees nearing retirement age of the buyout option. In line with prior settlements awarded by the German labor court in Frankfurt, EUD offered the
German and third-country employees one-half month of salary per year
of employment. The division chose not to put the offer in writing because
of the legal implications of such an offer for future settlements. The commander reserved the right to deny any specific request to leave. About
twenty-two people took this option before USAREUR stopped the program in June 1990, fearing a precedent should the entire European command face a RIF.59
To calculate the divisions income, the Resource Management Office
tried to project workload for the coming fiscal year. After the Department
of Defense announced the moratorium on military construction on
24 January, the major commands and agencies such as the Army and Air
Force Exchange Service and the Troop Support Agency began reviewing
their construction projects, particularly in Europe. EUD customers canceled projects with increasing frequency.
As projections of workload and income decreased, the number of
people that the division could support for the year beginning 1 October
1990 also declined. On 11 January Harrell reported 941 as the EUD target
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2/3/06 10:57:14 AM

number for employees. A month later, when the meeting was reported in
the Corps Line, the writer inserted a parenthetical addition: (At last word,
EUD officials estimated a year-end manpower strength of 865.)60 At the
staff meeting on 1 March, Harrell emphasized that the decline in work
for EUD was not a temporary situation and projected 857 staff positions
for the division.61 By 31 March the number of personnel in the division
had dropped to 959, but the number that managers thought EUD could
support in the coming fiscal year had fallen to 689. This meant a further
reduction of 270 people in addition to the 52 employees who had recently
left. Managers trying to cope with the changing numbers began to feel
that long-term planning is one week.62
While the Resource Management Office tried to project workload,
income, and affordable staff strength for the coming fiscal year, the
divisions leaders argued over the allocation of positions in a new, smaller
structure that incorporated lifecycle project management.63 When division
chiefs argued why they could not reduce instead of submitting plans for
fewer positions, General Harrell reacted angrily. Thereafter, he personally
decided how many positions would be assigned to each division rather
than giving that task to the division chiefs.64
Reorganization Approved
In the last week of March 1990 the chief of engineers, General Hatch,
traveled to Frankfurt with a team from Headquarters, USACE, for Focus
90, a headquarters briefing on the themes of environment and partnerships.65 Just before the briefing, Hatch gave Harrell a memo approving
the reorganization that EUD had requested three months earlier.66 Harrell
targeted April to implement the new organizational structure. (Chart 15)
Some staff objected to the timing of the reorganization, but Harrell held
firm. He argued that General Hatch had mandated implementation of lifecycle project management and that the new organization would be more
efficient.67
The convergence of the reorganization and the need to reduce personnel complicated the divisions situation. Using the latest available figures
on affordable manpower, a new structure was built on an allocation of
689. In a memo to Hatch dated 5 April, General Harrell emphasized the
need to RIF American civilians to reduce staff to 689 by 1 October.68 To
conduct a RIF, however, EUD needed an approved organizational structure.69 Employees tried to determine whereor whethertheir positions
would be located in the new structure and how they would be affected in
a RIF action; but without an official, approved allocation, that was impossible.
On 12 April 1990, the Department of Defense lifted the internal part
of its worldwide hiring freeze, and eligible EUD employees could register
for priority placement into open positions within the department.70 At the
end of April Secretary Cheney extended the moratorium on new construction in Europe to 15 June, causing EUD customers to cancel more projects
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2/3/06 10:57:14 AM


Stuttgart, Germany
Special
Assistants
Program
Support Division
Project
Management
Division
Supervision and
Inspection Branch
Office
Engineering Branch
Construction
Management Branch
Directorate of
Engineering and
Construction
Public Affairs
Office
Directorate of
Human Resources
Wrzburg Area Office

Wrzburg, Germany

Nuremberg, Germany
Safety and
Occupational Health
Audit Office
Office of Council
Directorate of
Programs and
Project Management
Directorate
of Resource
Management
Directorate of
Information
Management
The U.S.Engineer Group

Area Office
Incirlik, Turkey

Security and Law

Enforcement Branch
Acquisition
Division
Host Nations
Contractraing
Division
Plans and
Operations Branch
Security Plans and

Operations Division
Directorate of
Logistics
Management
Boards and
Committees
Policy and
Compliance Division
Directorate of
Contracting

Frankfurt, Germany
Value
Engineering
Office
EEO Office

Executive Office
Chart 15: Organization of the Europe Division, May 1990

and further reducing anticipated income for the division. On 15 May, five
weeks after he requested it, General Harrell received authorization to
implement a RIF of U.S. civilian employees.71 Approval had been slow in
coming. The threat of widespread elimination of Corps positions in the
United States had produced political pressures, and the Army commands
had to seek permission from the Secretary of the Army for any RIF that
involved more than fifty people.72
The announcement that EUD would conduct a formal reduction in
force increased uncertainty and anxiety among the staff. U.S. laws and
regulations governing a RIF had been developed in the 1940s. Although
revised over the years to increase the protection for employees with good
performance appraisals, no revisions had been made to take into consideration any aspect of EEO programs; only veterans received preferential
treatment. Because RIF rules stated that the last hired would be released
first, the impact was especially hard on minorities and women. No one
had any experience implementing a RIF on as large a scale as EUD needed, nor had one been implemented outside the United States.73
To prepare for the RIF at the Europe Division, Michael Vajda from
the Frankfurt Civilian Personnel Office worked closely with the chief
of human resources, Irv Scherman, EEO Officer Laverne Love, General
Harrell, and Colonel Waldo.74 They set up briefings, seminars, and counseling sessions for staff to explain the procedures and to inform them of
their rights.75 Notices were mailed to 162 EUD employees on 10 July; 84
persons were told they would be separated as of 22 September and the
rest were offered reassignment at the same or lower grades. The division
abolished a total of 128 jobs.76
This RIF did not include the German and third-country employees. By
attrition the number of these employees had dropped from 289 in October
1989 to 272 on 28 February 1990.77 It was clear that deeper cuts would be
required, and on 22 March General Harrell asked the commander in chief
of USAREUR, General Crosbie E. Saint, for authority to reduce the number
of German and third-country employees. On advice from Hasso Damm,
Harrell also requested a formal determination from the commander in
chief that the action was based on military necessity, that is, troop relocation or withdrawal.78
In early April Damm called USAREUR for clarification of the termination process.79 German law provides that the employer can terminate for
operational reasons but he must weigh the employees social factors,
including position, grade, age, health, financial obligation (indebtedness),
and distance to travel for a new position.80 A termination of significant
impact (that is, a large reduction in force) requires that the German Labor
Office be notified. Damm pressed for concurrence by USAREUR that
termination would be for military necessity. USAREUR agreed, and the
German Federal Ministry of Finance concurred. Under these conditions
the Tariff Agreement for Social Security could cover the terminations.81
Signed by USAREUR in 1971, this agreement provided that, for employees over forty years of age who had been employed more than ten years,
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2/3/06 10:57:15 AM

the Federal Republic would pay the difference between the salary of the
terminated position and any other employment for which the employee
received less money.82
The EUD Works Council had to approve the proposed termination
of each employee. If the Works Council disapproved, the division commander could refer the case to the USAREUR Works Council, which
would review the case and decide whether to approve the termination.83
The agreements and laws did not set forth procedures for implementing
a major termination, and USAREUR did not move quickly to establish
them.84
Seeking Relief
The moratorium on new construction in Europe that Secretary Cheney
imposed in January 1990 and extended to 15 June was a temporary emergency measure to meet the changing strategic situation as the Soviet system in Eastern Europe collapsed. By summer it was clear that the Soviet
Union was collapsing internally as well. On 21 June Cheney recommended that Congress take more permanent action and cancel sixty-eight military construction projects and withdraw more than $327 million in funds
already appropriated to pay for them. Congress agreed to cancel sixty-five
of the sixty-eight projects.85
Although the Europe Division had a $491 million construction program in fiscal year 1990, the cancellation of funding for proposed projects
further clouded EUDs future; General Harrell sought budgetary relief.86
The division had built a staff to support the military mission in Europe; it
was not just an EUD problem that the mission had changed and projects
were canceled. He wanted the Army and the Department of Defense to
recognize it as our problem. Specifically, he wanted the agencies that
canceled projects to share the cost with EUD by making payments from
funds already appropriated. This type of paymentin effect a penalty
payment for breaking the contractis accepted practice in the private sector when a project is canceled. Harrells argument did not win support
in Washington; only one of EUDs customers, the Community Family
Support Center, agreed to fund a phase-out of construction contracts for
projects they terminated.87
The division engineer also pressed Headquarters, USACE, to allow
him to develop a budget using projected income from all sources and
fixed costs to calculate the number of positions the division could afford.
Customarily, Corps headquarters allocates personnel positions to each
division from a computer model that calculates personnel needs based on
projected design and construction placement. Harrell argued with John
Wallace, chief of resource management in headquarters, that EUD did not
fit the USACE model because the computer program did not include all
the divisions customers. He also objected to the practice of subtracting 15
percent from the models allocation because EUD used indirect contracting. Harrell had argued before the financial crunch for a change in EUD
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allocation of personnel positions; in the spring of 1990 he finally received
approval for his budget.88
The division sought to cut costs in several ways. In August 1990 the
division vacated leased office space in the Dornbusch area of Frankfurt.
Without funds for a moving van, employees literally moved their own
things in private vehicles.89 The division also gave up the lease on the
warehouse and offices in the Frankfurt suburb of Bonames. The Frankfurt
Area Office planned to move into the Phillips Building (division headquarters) as space became available.
EUDs budget situation worsened as customers canceled projects.
On 17 July 1990, one week after RIF notices were mailed, EUD had 848
employees on staff with a projection of 710 as of 30 September. Despite
the self-imposed budget restraints and the RIF, it was apparent that the
division would be $7.4 million short by the end of the fiscal year and that
it could not support even 689 positions in the coming year. Discussions
continued between division and headquarters staff about probable income
and the number of affordable personnel for the coming year. The division
recalculated the number of positions it could afford as 535.90
In late July a team from headquarters led by the deputy chief of engineers, Maj. Gen. Richard S. Kem, met with division leaders in Frankfurt.
The Europe Division briefing for that visit included a review of recent
events, decisions, and actions; detailed projections of income for the coming year; the divisions plan to reduce staff to 535; and an explanation of
why EUD was running a deficit.91 General Kem and John Wallace agreed
to provide supplemental funding of $7.342 million to cover the deficit in
the current fiscal year.92 EUD and headquarters agreed that headquarters
would fund a wedge: the cost of the difference between the number
of people on staff at the beginning of fiscal year 1991 and the number
thought to be affordable for the whole year, based on workload.93
Working from the agreements reached during these meetings, Harrell
distributed a memo, dated 24 July 1990, to division leaders with a timetable of actions, dates for completion, and assigned responsibility.94 To
speed the reduction in personnel, on 6 August Harrell instituted a no
extension policy for U.S. civilian employees; the next day he officially
asked Corps headquarters for authority to conduct a second RIF.95 Even
without clarification of procedures from USAREUR, EUD also made plans
to proceed with a termination of German and third-country employees,
pending Works Council approval of an overall organization of 535.96
Despite the agreements Harrell thought he had reached during
General Kems July visit, communiqus from headquarters staff in
the following weeks questioned, challenged, or contradicted EUD
plans. Harrell was particularly disturbed to receive drastically revised
projections of affordable EUD manpower for fiscal years 1991 and
1992: 330 and 200, respectively. His letter of 13 August to the chief of
engineers, General Hatch, questioned the revised manpower projections, requested clarification on the number of positions at EUD that
headquarters would fund, and noted that the staffing levels of 330 and
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2/3/06 10:57:15 AM

200 would not support either a general officer or two Senior Executive
Service (SES) positions.97
In another effort to plan the future for the Europe Division, General
Harrell suggested a merger between EUD and the Corps Middle East/
Africa Projects Office (MEAPO), a district-level element of the South
Atlantic Division. From headquarters in Winchester, Virginia, MEAPO
managed U.S. military construction throughout the Middle East and
in Africa. Harrell thought that the missions of EUD and MEAPO were
compatible and that consolidation would produce more efficient organizations. General Hatch approved a small task force with people from
both organizations to consider this suggestion. Maj. Gen. John Sobke,
commander of the South Atlantic Division, proposed an alternate plan:
Consolidate EUD and MEAPO under his organization.98
The pressures on the Europe Division increased. General Hatch
imposed a hiring freeze for all military-funded positions in the Corps
of Engineers as of 20 August, making it more difficult for employees in
Europe to return to Corps positions in the States.99 At a staff meeting on
29 August, General Harrell announced that Headquarters, USACE, had
ordered the division to reduce its staff strength to match its budget by
1 October 1991. In line with that requirement and the projection of $247
million in construction placement for fiscal year 1991, the division would
have to develop a structure for 330410 people.100
Harrell also reported on the possibility of the merger of EUD and
MEAPO, but events in the Middle East had already intervened. On
2 August Iraq invaded Kuwait. Kuwaits neighbor, Saudi Arabia, the
United States, and the NATO allies feared an invasion of Saudi Arabia.
Backed by a United Nations Security Council resolution, on 7 August the
United States and its allies launched Operation DESERT SHIELD. Worldwide
military attention shifted from the political changes in Europe to the liberation of Kuwait and the protection of Saudi Arabia.101
Steps toward Stability

During September and into October discussions continued between
headquarters and EUD over how to project the divisions income for fiscal
year 1991, how to calculate the affordable workforce, and how much in supplemental funding EUD would require. The Resource Management Office
in Frankfurt sent to headquarters briefings and plans for matching the workforce to budget by 1 October 1991; headquarters sent back counterproposals.102
On 10 August Maj. Gen. C. Ernest Edgar III replaced General Kem as deputy
chief of engineers, altering the working relationship established at the July
meeting in Frankfurt. A message from General Edgar on 5 October informed
General Harrell that his plans to draw down the division represented too
slow a ramp. EUD should be prepared to issue a second round of RIF notices
by 15 November. A faster reduction in staff would of course reduce the
wedge funding that USACE would have to provide.103 Harrell found the message troubling, and his response to Edgar concluded:
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These are the procedures (rules) I thought we had agreed to. We
cant manage both ways (manage to budget and end strength). If
the rules have changed or there are understandings different than
explained, please advise. We will do as you direct. However, if
allowed to manage as described above, we can accomplish the drawdown with less pain.104
The USACE outplacement program, Defense Department priority
placement, voluntary departures, and the first RIF of U.S. civilians had
some success. As of 30 September 1990, EUD manpower had dropped to
663; by 10 October the workforce numbered 625.105 Using income projections acceptable to headquarters, Harrell proposed an organization of 218
as of 1 October 1991. At this point EUD would match workforce to budget for the first time since October 1989, just before the fall of the Berlin
Wall.106 Achieving the 218 level required a second RIF of U.S. civilians
and a reduction in the number of German and third-country employees.
Harrell proposed to go to a 50:50 ratio between the two categories of
employees, a change from the ratio of 70:30 (Americans to Germans) that
had prevailed only a year earlier.107 Without any information to the contrary, Harrell planned for a stand-alone division.108
In late October General Harrell, Hasso Damm, and the EUD human
resources director, Irv Scherman, went to Washington. Harrell presented plans for the organization of 218 with the 50:50 ratio of American
and German employees, a more gradual timeline for the reductions in
force, and agreement that headquarters would pay his divisions excess
labor costs for 1990 and provide the wedge funding needed for 1991. He
received the approvals and support he sought.109 The proposed organization did not include either a general officer or an SES position.
Scherman and Damm pressed USAREUR on the issue of cutting
local national employees. USAREUR assigned responsibility to its CPO
in Frankfurt, but this office had jurisdiction only over a very limited
geographic area in Germany and not over employees in the area, resident, and project offices. Because each personnel office operated independently within a designated geographic area, it was not clear how
the Frankfurt office alone could implement the RIF. In the face of this
impasse, Scherman suggested that EUD try to bring together all the offices involved.
While Scherman and Damm were working with USAREUR to figure
out how to terminate the local nationals, other managers within EUD
were working to identify positions to cut. The experience of Virginia
Conway as chief of the Information Management Office (IMO) typified
the challenge that managers faced. When Conway arrived in August 1989,
she found a staff of 59 and plans to increase to 70. Within weeks she was
told to cut her budget and eliminate 11 positions. She handled that cut by
not extending the employment contracts of Department of Army civilians up for renewal. In the plan for the first RIF in the spring of 1990,
Conway had a target of 36 staff; the office had 37 on board, and Conway
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2/3/06 10:57:15 AM

made a case for keeping the additional person. Then 2 people left voluntarily. When she had to cut staff to 22 people, she drew a line through her
own name on the organizational chart because the smaller office did not
require a GM15 manager. The organization plan for 218 people assigned
only 11 positions to IMO, and 5 would be German employees.110
People throughout the organization who could see that their positions would be cut made plans. Anticipating his own departure, General
Harrell designated his deputy, Colonel Waldo, as commander. Waldo had
been intimately involved in planning for the reorganization, preparing
briefings, and pulling elements of the staff together on personnel reduction. As deputy commander, he had an overview of the organization and
the trust of the people. Harrell worked closely with him on the transition.111 Several division chiefs departed, and others started looking for
new positions. In early November 1990 Joe Higgs, chief of engineering,
received an offer to become chief of engineering and planning in the Ohio
River Division; John Blake, chief of construction, became chief of construction in the South Atlantic Division.112
Outside EUD, decisions were made that affected the organization. Days before the freeze on construction projects was to expire on
15 November 1990, Secretary of Defense Cheney extended it; no contracts
financed by military construction appropriations could be awarded
before 16 April 1991.113 On 3 December 1990, General Hatch announced
that EUD and MEAPO would be assigned to the South Atlantic Division.
Within weeks headquarters announced that the Europe Division would
become the Europe District, reporting to a new operating division, the
Transatlantic Division, with headquarters in Winchester, Virginia. The
Kuwaiti Emergency Recovery Office and other Corps offices in the Middle
East would also be under the Transatlantic Division, which would report
to the South Atlantic Division.114
In mid-December a team made up of Ken Griggs of the South Atlantic
Division, A. O. Ollie Werner of MEAPO, and Louis Brettschneider of
EUD began meeting with division chiefs in Frankfurt to discuss the transition. Their tasks included defining the districts workload and preparing
a revised structure without positions devoted to division-level management tasks.115 The Europe District would be activated on 1 March 1991
with Colonel Waldo as district commander.116
It was not until 2021 January 1991, one year after Cheney imposed
the freeze of military construction in Europe, that Scherman, Damm, and
staff from the EUD Human Resources Office and from USAREUR met in
Garmisch, Germany, with officials from almost twenty civilian personnel
offices to plan the reduction in force of non-American employees. Using
information from EUD, the group identified specific employees whose
positions would be abolished and calculated their dates of notification.
By German law the terminations had to take effect at the end of a fiscal quarter (31 March, 30 June, 30 September, or 31 December). Employees
with less than 5 years service had to be notified 6 weeks before the end
of the quarter. After 5 years of employment, employees received notice
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3 months before the end of the quarter; after 8 years, 4 months notice; and
after 10 years, 5 months. The maximum notification was 6 months. It was
finally clear that the earliest termination notices, for the local nationals
employed less than 5 years, would go out 15 Februarythat is, six weeks
before the end of March. Most of the employees to be terminated had been
employed more than 12 years; their terminations could not take effect
until the end of September 1991.117
Changes in the Field

Planning was done in division headquarters in Frankfurt, but it was
in the field offices that employees felt the cessation of projects and the
falloff of the workload. From the time of the moratorium on military construction, area engineers frankly warned employees about the uncertain
employment situation; many employees did not wait to receive formal
notices. Construction managers in the Corps moved with the work; they
expected to pick up and leave when a construction project was complete.
Geopolitical events had a particular impact on the Stuttgart Area
Office, the primary point of support for USAREURs VII Corps. In June
1990 Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio, the area engineer, projected that his staff would
be reduced from its current level of over 40 to 18 or 20 by the beginning of
the new fiscal year on 1 October. He also projected that Stuttgart would
absorb the Wrzburg Area Office when the area engineer there, Lt. Col.
Leslie Rose, retired in November 1990.118
In July 1990 Lt. Col. Douglas Lamothe succeeded Colio in Stuttgart. A
number of big projects had been scheduled for the Stuttgart area, but the
moratorium shelved or canceled most of them. Iraqs invasion of Kuwait
and the launch of Operation DESERT SHIELD in August changed the situation entirely. Most of VII Corps moved to the deserts of Saudi Arabia, and
construction in the Stuttgart area came to a standstill. Within six months
we went from having a robust construction program, keeping almost 50
people in the area office going, to having no construction program at all,
and we were down to 8 people by January 1, 1991.119
On 1 December 1990, the Northern Area Office closed and the division
transferred personnel and property to the Hoensbroek Project Office. Two
weeks later the Wrzburg Area Office closed and personnel and property
went to the Wrzburg Resident Office.120 Within weeks the Stuttgart Area
Office also closed.
The construction moratorium affected the Frankfurt Area Office
less severely, and Frankfurt took over responsibility for the Hoensbroek
Project Office. In the spring of 1991 the twelve employees of the Frankfurt
Area Officedown from thirty-fivemoved into the Phillips Building.121
The construction program of the Nuremberg Area Office declined, but
not drastically, and Nuremberg took over responsibility for projects from
both the Wrzburg and the Stuttgart Area Offices. (See Map 31.) The U.S.
Engineer Group office in Turkey remained open, although at a reduced
staff level; the Greece Resident Office closed.
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The Impact on Morale
A recitation of falling numbers in the workforce and the rapid succession of unprecedented events cannot convey the sense of confusion,
uncertainty, and sadness that many of the staff at the Europe Division,
particularly in Frankfurt, experienced during this period. The suddenness
of the events contributed to the dismay of even experienced managers like
Virginia Conway:
Normally, when you are closing out something, whether it is a
project or an office, it is a planned process with a date and you are
able to plan all the steps to happen. You are able to prepare people. You have time to organize and close out those activities that
you need to do and you have a sense of accomplishment. When
something like this happens, it is like everything gets thrown to the
wind.122
Individuals reacted differently. Some decided quickly to leave the
organization voluntarily. Others left only when all other options had been
exhausted. EEO Officer Laverne Love counseled employees before and
during the RIFs. She recalled:
There were people who sat in here with the door closed and cried,
who went through every kind of emotional state that you can believe.
It was a bad time. The RIF and the reorganization smashed into
each other like an explosion. It was just unbelievable, so depressing for the employees. People hated to come to work. Everybody had
a cold. Stress brings on all sorts of physical ailments.123
Long-time employees who were virtually untouchable in the reductions were not immune to the stress. Louis Brettschneider had been in
Europe since 1956 and had experienced many organizational changes
and fluctuations in workload, but he called the drawdown in 19901991
a confusing period and most trying.124 Hasso Damm, an employee
of the U.S. Army since 1956, had seen many organizational changes and
numerous colleagues come and go. When asked about the drawdown, he
said: This was really the sad part for all of those who are still here. One
day you talk to somebody in the hallway and the next day he wasnt
there anymore. He left. It was impossible to keep up with people who
left.125
The transition created an emotional roller coaster for Debra Dale, a
landscape architect. She received three RIF letters and bumped her best
employee but kept a position at EUD, although her husband lost his.
Months later she admitted that she was still stumbling.126 It was a peculiar irony that the end of the Cold War and the prospect of a more peaceful Europe brought so much dislocation and pain to the people working
in the Europe Division.
385
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FIELD ORGANIZATION
NORTHERN EUROPE
1991
Project Office
0
50
100
50
150 Miles
150 Kilometers
100
Hamburg
Bremerhaven
Bremen
UNITED
KINGDOM
AMSTERDAM
The Hague
Hannover
Soesterberg
NETHERLANDS
in
eR
Rh
G
N
Kassel
BRUSSELS
Teveren
Hoensbroek
Erfurt
se
Meu
Giessen
B E L G I U M
Frankfurt
Fulda
Wildflecken
Bitburg
Schweinfurt
Hahn
Aschaffenburg
LUXEMBOURG
Wrzburg
Baumholder
Reims
Ma
r
PARIS
Kaiserslautern
Heidelberg
ne
Bamberg
Nuremberg
Metz
Karlsruhe
S eine
Stuttgart
Da n u b e R
E
Augsburg
Lo
ire
Dijon
In
Map 31
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K
S
UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLICS
Stettin
de
Warthe
rR
WARSAW
BERLIN
Ode
lb
rR
Leipzig
Breslau
Dresden
PRAGUE
amberg
Grafenwhr
Vilseck
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a nub e R
Isa
rR
Da n u b e R
VIENNA
Munich
BUDAPEST
A
H
Innsbruck
2/3/06 10:57:17 AM
The Europe District

By the end of February 1991, fifteen months after the Berlin Wall was
breached, the construction mission in Europe had been transformed. The
Corps of Engineers continued to manage contract construction for the U.S.
military but for a much smaller force. The organization that handled the
engineering responsibilities, now the Europe District, was less than half
the size of the Europe Division at its maximum. Through attrition and a
formal reduction in force applied to American employees, the number of
personnel had been reduced to 462; plans called for reducing the workforce to fewer than 300 by 1 October. A major reorganization had put lifecycle project management in place. Scores of projects had been canceled.
The division realigned field operations and cut the number of area offices
in halffrom six to three. During these fifteen months the divisions leaders struggled to manage rapid change and employees struggled to adjust
to the personal impact of world events.
In a simple, thirty-minute ceremony on 1 March in a large room at the
Abrams Complex in Frankfurt, Maj. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell cased the colors
of the Europe Division and Maj. Gen. John F. Sobke, commander of the
South Atlantic Division, accepted responsibility for the Europe District.
Sobke then passed the command of the district to Col. Daniel Waldo, Jr.127
In his final column in the February issue of Corps Line, General Harrell
wrote:
EUD workers may have had to leave, but they never had to quit.
EUD can be proud of the legacy of service and quality design and
construction it leaves behind. It is a fine record. When we case the
colors of the Division for the last time, we can do so with our heads
held high and with a spirit of celebration for the job well done.128
A year later Harrell reflected on the changes in Europe that he had
experienced. In 1961, as a young officer in a construction battalion, he had
lived and worked in sparse and difficult conditions; in 1988 he had toured
new barracks, maintenance facilities, and recreation areas constructed by
the Army engineers. A lieutenant in Germany when the Berlin Wall went
up, he was a general officer in Germany when it came down in 1989. He
emphasized: We won the Cold War. Weve accomplished our mission,
and so we ought to celebrate that.129
The broad mission of the engineers, to support U.S. forces in Europe,
had not changed; but as its Cold War adversary collapsed, the focus
of American military strategy in Europe blurred. The Army Corps of
Engineers had established the Europe Division in 1974 to respond to new
challenges, new programs, and growing demands. Now, for the first time
since the late 1940s, Army engineers faced the challenge of doing less
rather than more.
388
2/3/06 10:57:17 AM
EPILOGUE
hen World War II ended in 1945, Europe lay in ruins;

Germany was a conquered enemy; and the United States,
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union were uneasy allies.
Within a decade, Germany became an ally with the United
States, Britain, and France. In the following decades Western Europe, in
alliance with the United States, created and maintained a credible defense
against Soviet expansion. By 1991 the Warsaw Pact of Eastern European
countries dominated by the Soviet Union had collapsed, Germany was
reunified, and the Cold War had ended, essentially eliminating the threat
of a Soviet invasion into Western Europe. The rationale for stationing
American forces in Europe largely disappeared.
From 1945 to 1990 the United States invested more than $5 billion in
military construction in Europe, from Norway in the north to Turkey in
the east, in support of U.S. forces. This figure does not reflect the changing value of the dollar, and it does not include the German contribution to
the support of American forces.1 It appears unlikely that the United States
will ever again maintain as significant a military presence in Europe. This
study of nearly half a century of military construction in Europe serves to
record both the achievements of the past and some key lessons learned.
Appreciating Sovereignty
Time and again the United States confronted the reality that in
peacetime the U.S. military operates overseas with allies who are sovereign. France, having been battered severely by war, jealously guarded
her sovereignty. Despite having joined NATO in 1949, the French were
unwilling to cede control over U.S. military construction on their soil in
the 1950s. Germany, defeated in World War II and occupied in the 1940s,
resumed its sovereign status when the new government was established.
Not unexpectedly, the Germans asserted increasing control over military
construction within their borders. In 1988 Allan Aaron, division counsel
at the Europe Division in Frankfurt, articulated the American position in
Europe:
We are guests. Sometimes we are guests of necessity. Sometimes
we are honored guests. Sometimes the honored guest gets to be a little
bit stale. And sometimes the necessity that brought the guest in the first
place goes away. We have to be sensitive to these political nuances.
We are dealing with a sovereign. We dont have rightswe have privileges.2
18Q_Epilogue_Final.indd 1
2/3/06 11:06:17 AM

One manifestation of sovereignty is indirect contracting. Personnel
in the Department of Defense, in the Department of the Army, and at
Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, were slow to grasp the
impact of indirect contracting. Over five decades, international agreements rather than standard Corps of Engineers procedures increasingly
came to govern contracting for U.S. military construction. From the 1950s
to the 1980s Army engineers in Europe had to explain indirect contracting
to first-time visitors from Washington. Even at the end of the 1980s, indirect contracting remained the aspect of command in the Europe Division
for which the incoming commander felt least prepared.3
Indirect contracting increased the cost of design and construction,
because monitoring required more time and more personnel. There were
other cost factors over which Army engineers in Europe could exert
no control, including the higher costs of benefits for local national and
third-country employees and the need to employ negotiators and translators. Sometimes congressional mandates, such as the requirement to
use expensive and inefficient American coal in German boilers, further
increased construction costs overseas.
Recognizing Cultural Differences

Differences in culture and business practices between Americans and
Europeans strained relationships, led to administrative errors, and created conflicts. Interpersonal and interagency misunderstandings resulted
from strictures prohibiting U.S. government personnel from accepting
gifts. In most European countries and in other parts of the world, it is an
accepted practice for contractors to present holiday gifts to clients and
business associates. Contractors were insulted when American colleagues
returned their gifts. The Richtfest is a traditional party that Germans hold
to celebrate completion of the skeleton of a building, but Americans were
told that they could not partake in the food and drink that the contractor
provided to honor the workers. In Turkey, construction workers balked
when The United States Engineer Group assigned a woman as project
engineer. Environmental laws in Germany had an impact on both design
and construction, as well as on military training. The examples of clashing cultural values are numerous, and they point to the need for sensitivity, understanding, and respect for others customs.
An Absence of Scandal
Considering the billions of dollars spent on construction, executed
through thousands of contracts with hundreds of companies over the
course of forty-five years, the documentary records contain few incidents
of fraud or abuse, particularly after the mid-1950s when contract construction was centralized and the German political structure and economy
stabilized. There were instances of misconductirregular procurements,
overcharges and substitution of inferior materials by contractors, and fil390
2/3/06 11:06:18 AM
Epilogue
ing of improper travel vouchers by employeesbut the irregularities were
minor when weighed against the number of projects and the total amount
of money spent.
Continuity amid Change

The Army engineers in Europe supported the Army and the Air
Force in the face of political changes in the United States and in Europe
and through shifts in U.S. military strategy. They continued to work as
the demand for engineering services fluctuated and as organizational
structures changed. They adjusted to external events and pressures, from
Soviet saber-rattling to new weapons systems, changing construction
standards, and budgetary restraints emanating from the U.S. Congress.
Despite numerous changes from 1945 to 1991, there was continuity.
Many of the places that were the focus of engineer activity in the late
1940s continued as focal points of engineer effort through five decades;
names such as Grafenwhr, Hohenfels, Heidelberg, and Rhine-Main Air
Base, recur year after year in the records of engineer activities. American
civilians such as Lou Brettschneider, William Camblor, and Herb Wooten
and local workers including Hasso Damm provided continuity. Their
careers mirrored and were shaped by the evolving mission of the U.S.
forces in Europe.
The Legacy
The Army engineers who managed and executed U.S. military construction in Europe after World War II were asked to carry out their mission in difficult circumstances, where time was short, money was inadequate (except for a few years in the mid-1980s), and personnel were scarce.
Military and civilian, Americans and local nationals, the Army engineers
demonstrated commitment and an awareness that their efforts contributed to a larger cause. Individually and collectively, they saw themselves
as a part of the Atlantic alliances common defense; they knew that they
were on the potential firing line in the Cold War.
What is the legacy of almost five decades of the American military
presence in Europe, particularly in Germanyformer enemy, then ally?
The bricks and mortar of renovation and new construction is one legacy of
Army engineer activity. Entire installations have been turned over toor
returned tothe governments of the countries in which they were located. French families in a housing development outside Orleans, France,
appreciate the floors that are warmed by the conduit ducts for the district
heating system. Refugees from Eastern Europe enjoy housing in Germany
that was constructed for American military families.
Another legacy of the U.S. military presence is manifest in the lives of
German nationals like Helga Preuss Butschan and Hartwig Braun. Helga
was eighteen years old in the spring of 1945 when she fled East Prussia
with her father, mother, brother, sister, and grandmother. When the fam391
2/3/06 11:06:18 AM

ily arrived at Osterholz-Scharmbeck near Bremen, they were sent to a
refugee camp. She recalled:
It was hard for us at first. Nothing to eat. My father didnt have a job;
nobody had a job so we had to live from what the government gave
us. In 1946 I started working for the Americans because we got a meal
there. I only ate part of it and the rest I brought home. It was my
intention [to work] only for a few months.4
In fact, she worked for the U.S. Army in Europe almost continuously until
she retired in 1987.
Hartwig Braun was a student in a military boarding school for Aryan
elite during World War II. Near the end of the war seventeen-year-old
Braun was sent to the Russian front, where he became a prisoner of war.
He escaped back to Germany but was held for three years as a prisoner of
war in the French zone. As a prisoner he began training as a mason; after
his release he completed an engineering degree and worked briefly for
a German construction company. In February 1952 he accepted a job as
project engineer with the U.S. Army at Ramstein Air Base. Interviewed at
the Europe Divisions Kaiserslautern Area Office in June 1990, he contemplated his approaching retirement after almost forty years with the U.S.
Army in Europe:
When I go out I can say it was nice from the first moment to the
last with real hard work in between. Work I was not even asked to
do I did because I was happy to do it. That is what I call a worked life,
with foreign people like former war enemies, then growing together
and later on friends to a point where I can say I worked better for the
American people than I would have worked for my own house at home.
Because they gave me so much by being friendly, by being open and
telling their needsand human relations were developed.5
Listening to Hartwig Braun, Helga Butschan, or scores of others
describe their personal experiences as employees of the U.S. Army in
Germany makes clear anecdotally the profound professional and emotional impact of the American military presence.
In October 1990 Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, the last commander of the
Europe Division, presided over a tree-planting ceremony. The ceremony
took place at the rear of the Phillips Building on the grounds of the I.G.
Farben property in Frankfurt, Germany, from which Army engineers had
operated since July 1945. The occasion was the dedication of an employee
patio, but General Harrell asserted that the tree represented a great deal
more than one construction project. The plaque at the base of the tree read:
This tree was planted to commemorate the dedicated work of the
military and civilian personnelAmerican, German, and third-country nationalsof the U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD). May
392
2/3/06 11:06:18 AM
Epilogue
it grow and flourish in an era of peace their devoted efforts have helped
make possible.6
A few years after this ceremony, the United States returned the former
I.G. Farben property to the city of Frankfurt, which converted it into a
university campus. In the early years of the twenty-first century the former Phillips Building sat empty, abandoned, and surrounded by weeds,
an ironic tribute to the success of the Army engineers. The generation of
Helga Butschan and Hartwig Braun is passing. The investment of time,
money, and energy contributed by the Army engineersmilitary, civilian,
and local nationalremains as part of the legacy of the peaceful triumph
of Western democracy that helped sustain more than a half-century of
peace in Europe. This story is worth remembering.
393
2/3/06 11:06:18 AM
2/3/06 11:06:19 AM
NOTES
19R_EndNotes.indd 1
2/3/06 11:06:45 AM
19R_EndNotes.indd 2
2/3/06 11:06:46 AM
Part I Introduction
1
Alfred M. Beck et al., The Corps of Engineers: The War against Germany (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1985), offers a comprehensive history of
engineer activities during the war. Lewis A. Pick, Expanded Role of Engineers, Military
Engineer 41 (July/August 1949): 271; Annual Historical Review, 1 July 197530 September
1976, Office of the Chief of Engineers, Gen Files, Box 8, File 4 (hereafter cited as Gen
Files 84), Research Collections, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Alexandria, Va. (hereafter cited as OH HQUSACE). Statistics from Beck, The
Corps of Engineers: The War against Germany, p. 565.
2
Eugene Reybold, Engineers in World War II: A Tribute, p. 10, Unpubl Ms, 1945, OH
HQUSACE. A copy of this typescript, dated 30 September 1945, is located in Engineering
Society Library, New York, N.Y.
3
Ltr, Cecil R. Moore to Karl C. Dod, 18 February 1974, commenting on an early
draft of Overseas Military Operations of the Corps of Engineers, 19451970, Unpubl
Ms [1973?], Military Files, XI, Box 3, File 3 (hereafter cited as Mil Files XI33), OH
HQUSACE.
Chapter 1
1
See Walter Laqueur, Europe Since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe (New York: Penguin
Books, 1982), pp. 1520, for this and subsequent paragraphs describing Europe in 1945.
See also Alfred Grosser, Germany in Our Time, A Political History of the Postwar Years (New
York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), p. 35, and Earl F. Ziemke, The U.S. Army in the Occupation
of Germany, 19441946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1975), pp.
35153.
2
A. J. Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany: From Bismarck to Brandt (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1973), p. 466.
3
Final Report of the Chief Engineer, European Theater of Operations, 19421945, 2 vols.
(Paris: Herve et Fils, n.d.), I: 26465.
4
Karl C. Dod, Overseas Military Operations of the Corps of Engineers, 19451970
(hereafter cited as Dod Ms), 1: 4, 6, Mil Files, XI11, OH HQUSACE.
5
Ibid., 1: 3032, 26468, 320.
6
Oliver J. Frederiksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 19451953
(Historical Division, Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), p. 12.
7
Billy A. Arthur, Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe, Heidelberg Herald Post,
19 Nov 82.
8
Reorganization of Tactical Forces, VE-Day to 1 Jan 1949 (Historical Division,
European Command, 1950) (hereafter cited as Reorganization of Tactical Forces), p. 7, a
59page typescript in Mil Files, XII265/1, OH HQUSACE; Campbell Barracks: The Story of a
Caserne (Heidelberg: Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, Military History Office, 1987), p. 13.
9
Cir GCT/322.01 (Theater), 26 May 45, and Cir AG 322 GCTAGO, 21 Jul 45,
National Archives (NA), Record Group (RG) 332, European Theater of Operations, (ETO),
Hist Div, Admin History Rpts 1942January 1946, Box 73.
10
Interv, John T. Greenwood with Brig. Gen. Paul D. Berrigan (USA, Ret.), 15, 17, 19
Nov 80, San Francisco, Calif., pp. 279, 285, 253, OH HQUSACE.
11
Report of Operations of the Theater Chief Engineer, 1 January31 March 1946, p.
4, NA, RG 338, Historical Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts JanSep 46, Box
2761.
19R_EndNotes.indd 3
2/3/06 11:06:46 AM

Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 54. For a definition of general construction, see
p. 318; for other categories of construction, see p. 265. See also Dod Ms, 1: 3.
13
Dod Ms, 1: 3, 9; Bernard W. Poirier, The Forward Edge: An Overview of the
Army Engineers in Europe, 1945 to 1980, p. 17, Iroquois Research Institute, 1980, OH
HQUSACE.
14
Report on the Operations of the Chief Engineer, 1 January31 March 1947, p. 5,
NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
15
Reorganization of Tactical Forces, pp. 3031; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, pp. 2931.
16
The Third Year of the Occupation, Occupation Forces in Europe Series, vol. 5
(Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European Command), 34: 27, typescript
at U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.; Frederiksen, American
Military Occupation, pp. 2932, 41; Report on the Operations of the Chief Engineer, 1
January31 March 1947, pp. 15, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly
Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
17
On Austria, see Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 2932.
18
H. S. Miller, American Engineers in Austria, Military Engineer 46 (May/June 1954):
17779; Dod Ms, 1: 6, 38.
19
The USFA Engineers, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jul 51, includes this
retrospective information. See the files of clippings in the Stars and Stripes Library,
Darmstadt, Germany; Miller, American Engineers in Austria, pp. 17779.
20
Final Report of the Chief Engineer, II: app. 1M; almost the identical organization as
of July 1946 is given in the typescript report The Second Year of the Occupation, Occupation
Forces in Europe Series, vol. 4 (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, European
Command), 31: 51. The Fiscal Division had been added by July 1946 and Real Estate had
been subsumed under the Construction Division.
21
Second Year of the Occupation, vol. 4, 31: 65.
22
Ibid.
23
Report 1 January31 March 1946, pp. 23, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts JanuarySeptember 46, Box 2761.
24
See the list of sixteen elements of the Basic Administrative Plan assigned as the
responsibility of the theater chief engineer in Report 1 July30 September 1946, pp.
35, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
25
Report, 1 October31 December 1946, p. 12, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
26
Ibid.
27
Annual Report of the Chief Engineer, 1 January31 December 1949, comp.
Capt. James F. Holly and Diana M. Newcomb, p. 23, NA, RG 338, European Command
(EUCOM), Engr Div, Annual Historical Report 1949, Box 2765 (hereafter cited as EED
AHR 1949).
28
Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 36869; Harold W. Brown, The Physical Plant:
Procurement, Construction and Maintenance (Frankfurt: Chief Historian, European
Command, 1947), typescript, p. 30.
29
Brown, The Physical Plant, p. 30.
30
Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 144; Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, p. 285. See
also Poirier, The Forward Edge, p. 12, citing a Tele Interv with John R. Hardin, 14 Dec 79.
31
Final Report of the Chief Engineer, I: 368.
32
Reorganization of Tactical Forces, p. 11.
33
Unless otherwise noted, the figures and the information on the labor forces in this
and the next two paragraphs are derived from the quarterly reports for 1946, NA, RG 338,
Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Boxes 152, 152A, 2761, 2763.
12
398
19R_EndNotes.indd 4
2/3/06 11:06:46 AM
Notes
See also NA, RG 332, Hist Div, Program Files, United States Forces European
Theater (USFET) Engr Sec, Quarterly Rpts, Box 340.
36
Dod Ms, 1: 19. Report 1 January31 March 1946, pp. 15, 2223, 38; Report 1
July30 September 1946, p. 23, 34; Report 1 October31 December 1946, p. 8; Report
1 January31 March 1947, p. 5; and Report 1 April30 June 1947, p. 4. All in NA,
RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts, Box 152 for the first three, Box
152A for the last.
37
Reorganization of Tactical Forces, p. 11; for the figures concerning civilians
employed by the engineers, see the quarterly reports for 1947, NA, RG 338, Hist Div,
Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts, Boxes 152 and 152A.
38
The numbers on troops, POWs, and civilians serving with the engineers are
extrapolated from the quarterly reports for 1947, as in the note above. Because the
numbers are scattered throughout the several reports, it is very difficult to tell if they are
complete or comparable from quarter to quarter, thus they should be read as orders of
magnitude rather than as exact statistics.
39
Bruce H. Siemon and Roland E. Wagberg, The Employment of Local Nationals by the
U.S. Army in Europe, 19451966 (Heidelberg: Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, Military History Branch, 1968), pp. 4647, 5253.
40
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Garden City: Doubleday & Company,
1950), p. 430.
41
42
Ziemke, U S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 19441946, pp. 4446. Under this
point system, the magic number for demobilization was 85 for men and 44 for women.
The figures for American military personnel in the European Theater and for the rate of
redeployment come from Hearing before Members of U.S. House of Representatives, 11
June 1945, NA, RG 332, Eng Sec, Opns and Project Rpts, 1945, 83, pp. 3233, 39.
43
See Hearings before Members of U.S. House of Representatives, 11 June 1945, pp.
3744, for the description of the redeployment camps.
44
HQ Communications Zone (COMZ) Command and General Staff Conference
[minutes], 21 May 45, NA, RG 332, Admin Rpts 1942January 1946, Box 101, File 461
continued, pp. 67, for the information on railroad equipment and trucking needs. For
target production figures, see Activities of the Production Division, Office of the Chief
Engineer, 3 Jul 45, for the week ending 30 June, p. 2, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs,
Bulletins, and Rpts, 19431945, Box 1, File 4. For a mention of the problems with other
commands, see minutes for the meeting of 13 August 1945 in the same series.
45
The problem of lumber and crating arose for discussion at COMZ staff meetings in
May, June, and July 1945. See the appropriate minutes, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs,
Bulletins, and Rpts, 19431945, Box 1, File 4.
46
For the relevant discussions, see Command and General Staff Conference minutes
for 5 June, 1 July, and 15 December 1945, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, Bulletins, and
Rpts, 19431945, Box 1, File 4.
47
The three quotations, in order, are from Weekly Report of Activities 21 May
1945, p. 1, NA, RG 332, ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, Bulletins, and Rpts, 19431945, Box 1, File 4;
Command and Staff Conference minutes dtd 19 Jun 45, p. 15, RG 332, Admin Rpts, 1942
January 1946, Box 101, File 461continued; and Tele Interv with Moore, 14 Dec 79, cited in
Poirier, The Forward Edge, p. 8.
48
49
Notes on Command and Staff Conference, 29 June 1945, pp. 8, 11, NA, RG 332,
ETO, Hist Div, Admin Hist Rpts, 1942January 1946, Box 101, File 461continued.
50
34
35
399
19R_EndNotes.indd 5
2/3/06 11:06:46 AM

Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 119.
53
Ryder, Twentieth-Century Germany, p. 467. The current dollar value is derived using
tables and a formula proposed by James C. Cooper and Karl Borden, The Interpretation
of Wages and Prices in Public Historical Displays, Public Historian 19 (Spring 1997): 929.
54
Flemings comments are in his response (undated) to Karl C. Dods letter of 18
Oct 73, in which Dod asks for comments on his manuscript, in Mil Files, XI33, OH
HQUSACE.
55
See the tabulation of military, civilian, and POW labor given in Final Report of the
Chief Engineer, II: ann. 39.
56
57
Ibid.
58
Advance Section Engineer Report on German Coal Mine Operation, 21 Jun 45,
NA, RG 332, ETO, Records of Hist Div, Admin Hist Rpts, ETO Administrative File
1942Jan 1946, Box 2, File 8, Advance Section, General; quote from p. 3 of a seven-page
summary.
59
Ibid., quote from p. 2.
60
Floyd D. Gibson, Railway Electrification in Germany, Military Engineer 41
(JulyAugust 1949): 28889; see also The First Year of the Occupation, Occupation Forces
in Europe Series, vol. 3 (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief Historian, EUCOM), 14:
10102, See also German Railway Operations under the United States Army, 8 May31
December 1945, Hist Div, HQ USFET, Frankfurt, Dec 45, p. 6, CMH.
61
Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, pp. 244, 254, 259, 260, 262, OH HQUSACE.
Berrigan headed the Construction Division of the Office of the Chief Engineer for the
European Theater.
62
Reports on Activities, 28 May 45, covering the week 2127 May 45, NA, RG 332,
ETO, Engr Sec, Cirs, Bulletins, and Rpts, 1943l945, Box 1, File 4.
63
Notes on Command and Staff Conference, 29 June 1945, p. 8, and Notes 27
July 1945, p. 8, NA, RG 332, ETO, Hist Div, Admin Hist Rpts, 1942January 1946, Box 101,
File 461continued. See also Dod Ms, 1: 10.
64
Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, p. 255. See also Poirier, The Forward Edge, pp.
1213, quoting his Tele Interv with Berrigan, 14 Dec 79. Report 1 April30 June 1946,
p. 40, NA, RG 332, Hist Div, Program Files, USFET Engr Sec, Quarterly Rpts, Box 340.
51
52
Chapter 2
The First Year of the Occupation, vol. 3, 14: 99100; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, p. 120.
3
Report 1 January31 March 1946, pp. 2527, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program
Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts JanSep 46, Box 2761. See also subsequent quarterly reports
in Box 152; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 122; Second Year of the Occupation,
vol. 4, 31: 64.
4
Ziemke, U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany, 19441946, p. 351.
5
Harold W. Brown, The Physical Plant: Procurement, Construction and Maintenance,
Occupation Forces in Europe Series (Frankfurt: Office of the Chief Historian, 1947),
typescript, p. 47.
6
Min, Command and General Staff Conference, HQ [Paris] TSFET, 16 Nov 45, p. 9,
NA, RG 332, Admin Rpts 1942January 1946, Box 101, File 461continued.
7
Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973, Mil Files, XI33, OH HQUSACE.
1
2
400
19R_EndNotes.indd 6
2/3/06 11:06:46 AM
Notes
Status of Theater Construction Program, presentation by Col. Robert J. Fleming,
Engr, Notes of G4 Semi-Weekly Staff Conference, 5 Nov 46, Mil Files, XII115, OH
HQUSACE (hereafter cited as Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46). Fleming was chief of construction
in the Office of the Chief Engineer, USFET, at the time. See also Report 1 October31
December 1946, pp. 23, 27, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts
19461947, Box 152; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 12223.
9
Interv, Greenwood with Berrigan, p. 279.
10
Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 1.
11
Ibid.
12
For this and the following paragraph, see Frederiksen, American Military Occupation,
pp. 12223; Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 1.
13
A Special Study of Operation Vittles, published by Aviation Operations Magazine
(New York: Conover Mast, 1949), pp. 5657; Dod Ms, 1: 11, 23; Second Year of the Occupation,
vol. 4, 31: 65.
14
See the references in the preceding note and in addition, Report 1 January31
March 1946, pp. 2324, Quarterly Rpts JanSep 46, Box 2761; Report 1 July30
September 1946, p. 24, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152. Both in NA, RG 338, Hist Div,
Program Files Engr Div.
15
Dod Ms, 1: 1516.
16
Special Study of Operation Vittles, p. 58; Dod Ms, 1: 1516.
17
Report 1 January31 March 1947, p. 21, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
18
Dod Ms, 3: 34.
19
Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 3. The quarterly reports from this period also testify to a
chronic shortage of critical supplies.
20
21
Report 1 April30 June 1947, p. 1, 18, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr
Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A.
22
Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46, p. 2; Report 1 January31 March 1947, p. 20, NA, RG
338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
23
24
See the comments on procurement in the General Summary (Irregular
Procurement, p. 5) of Report 1 October31 December 1946, NA, RG 338, Hist Div,
Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152. See also Fleming Rpt, 5 Nov 46.
25
Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973. The quotes used in describing his settling of
scores come from this handwritten letter.
26
Ibid.; again, the quoted passage is from Flemings letter.
27
The Peace Dividend: Myth and Reality, Time (12 February 1990): 26.
28
Report 1 January31 March 1948, p. 16, and Report 1 July30 September
1948, p. 13, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950,
Box 152A; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 50, 163.
29
Report 1 July30 September 1946, p. 23, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
30
Report 1 October31 December 1947, p. 12, and similar report for 1 January31
March 1948, p. 15, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins
19471950, Box 152A. The quote is from the latter.
31
For a comment on this decision, see Berrigans comments to Poirier cited in The
Forward Edge, p. 12.
32
The phrase is from Report 1 October31 December 1947, p. 13, NA, RG 338, Hist
Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A, but it reappears in
almost identical form in every subsequent quarterly report.
8
401
19R_EndNotes.indd 7
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Hearing before Members of U.S. House of Representatives, Jun. 11, 1945, p. 47, NA,
RG 332, Engr Sec, Opns and Project Rpts 1945, Box 8, File 3 of 13; Interv, Greenwood with
Berrigan, pp. 244, 259, 260, 262.
34
See Final Report of the Chief Engineer, II: app. 20A for a map of Engineer Supply
Installations in the European Theater, May 8, 1945; the rest of the information in this
paragraph is drawn from Report 1 January31 March 1946, p. 20, NA, RG 338, Hist
Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts JanSep 46, Box 2761.
35
EED AHR 1949, p. 24, See also Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.
36
Report 1 July30 September 1946, p. 36, in NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
37
See Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.
38
Report 1 July30 September 1946, pp. 3637; Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.
39
Report 1 October31 December 1946, p. 24; and corresponding report for 1
January31 March 1947, p. 16, both in NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div,
Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
40
Report 1 January31 March 1947, pp. 1621, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program
Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
41
Ibid., and corresponding report for 1 April30 June 1947, p. 14, NA, RG 338, Hist Div,
Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A.
42
Report 1 January31 March 1947, pp. 1621.
43
Ibid., and corresponding report for 1 April30 June 1947, p. 14.
44
Report 1 October31 December 1946, p. 20, and Report 1 April30 June
1947, p. 14.
45
Report 1 January31 March 1948, p. 11, and corresponding report for 1 July30
September 1948, p. 10, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins
19471950, Box 152A.
46
Report 1 April30 June 1948, pp. 1011, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A.
47
Report 1 October31 December 1948, p. 11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
48
Report 1 January31 March 1949, p. 11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
49
Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973.
50
For information on the rebuild program, see the quarterly reports starting with
1 April30 June 1947 and continuing thereafter through 1949, NA, RG 338, Hist Div,
Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19471950, Box 152A, and EED AHR 1949.
51
Interv, authors with H. Jace Greene, 1 Jun 90, Lige, Belgium, pp. 1011. All
interviews conducted by the authors and cited herein are deposited in OH HQUSACE.
52
EED AHR 1949.
53
The description is from Ltr, Fleming to Dod, October 1973; for confirming evidence,
see also the discussion of the demoralization of the Army in Reorganization of Tactical
Forces, VE-Day to 1 Jan 1949 (Historical Division, EUCOM, 1950, hereafter cited as
Reorganization of Tactical Forces), particularly pp. 45, 78, 2021, Mil Files, XII26
5/1, OH HQUSACE.
54
55
On the reforms, see ibid., pp. 2024; on Huebners personal assertion of control, see
56
57
58
Ibid., pp. 32, 41; Billy A. Arthur, Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe,
Heidelberg Herald Post, 19 Nov 82, and Campbell Barracks, p. 3.
33
402
19R_EndNotes.indd 8
2/3/06 11:06:47 AM
Notes
Campbell Barracks, p. 13n.
61
62
Report 1 October31 December 1946, p. 7, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152, and Second Year of the Occupation, vol. 4, 31:
51.
63
64
Report 1 January31 March 1947, pp. 4, 1920, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program
Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152.
65
McCutchen is quoted in Dod Ms, 3: 11. The figures on projects reviewed and
rejected come from the quarterly Report 1 January31 March 1947, p. 20, and
corresponding reports for 1 April30 June 1947, p. 18, and for 1 July30 September 1947, p.
19, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Quarterly Rpts 19461947, Box 152 (first
quarter), and Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A (second and third quarters).
66
Report 1 April30 June 1948, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div,
Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A.
67
The description of the post engineer training teams is from Report 1 July30
September 1947, p. 3.
68
Second Year of the Occupation, vol. 4, 31: 57; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation,
p. 173; Report 1 July30 September 1947, p. 8; EED AHR 1949.
69
Reorganization of Tactical Forces, pp. 2227; Report 1 April30 June 1948,
p. 22, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box
152A; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 17274.
70
Reorganization of Tactical Forces, pp. 2731; Report 1 April30 June 1948, p. 15.
71
72
Campbell Barracks, pp. 34; Arthur, Tracing the Roots of the U.S. Army Europe,
p. 6.
73
Report 1 April30 June 1948, p. 15, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr
Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A.
74
Interv, authors with Stanley Sikirica, 29 Aug 90, Frankfurt, pp. 29.
75
Ibid.
76
Information in this section is from William C. Baldwin, Engineers and the Berlin
Airlift, 1948, OH HQUSACE, current files.
77
The label for the Rhine-Main air base comes from Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary,
a pamphlet prepared by Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, xeroxed portions of
which are in the Europe Divisions Record Holding Area (EUD-RHA) in Frankfurt. The
statistics on hours worked are in Report 1 July30 September 1948, p. 16, NA, RG 338,
Hist Div, Program Files Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A.
78
Herbert J. Gall, Flugplatz Tempelhof, Military Engineer 52 (July/August 1960):
28990.
79
Ibid.
80
Completion Report, OAF Field R95, Tempelhof, Berlin, Germany, 10 Sep 45, p. 4,
HQ, 852d Engineer Aviation Battalion, printed by Deutscher Verlag (Berlin/Tempelhof:
Sep 1945), Mil Files, XII118, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Norman G.
Delbridge, Jr. (USA, Ret.), 14 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 1718.
81
Ltr, General Lucius Clay to Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, 20 August 1948, Mil Files,
XII113, OH HQUSACE.
82
Baldwin, Engineers and the Berlin Airlift, 1948, p. 5, and Dod Ms, 3: 30, 31;
Report 1 October31 December 1948, p. 18, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files Engr
Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A. See also Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp.
1418, for his description of runway construction.
59
60
403
19R_EndNotes.indd 9
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Report 1 July30 September 1948, p. 11, NA, RG 338, Hist Div, Program Files
Engr Div, Rpts, Ltrs, Bulletins 19471950, Box 152A; Dod Ms, 3: 29, 35; Gall, Flugplatz
Tempelhof, p. 290.
84
Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 56, 1824, 7477.
85
Report 1 July30 September 1948, p. 11; Dod Ms, 3: 29, 35; Gall, Flugplatz
Tempelhof, p. 290.
86
Report 1 October31 December 1948, p. 14.
87
Gall, Flugplatz Tempelhof, p. 290; the information on the lives sacrificed comes
from Andr Fontaine, History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War,
19171950 (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 365.
88
Memo, Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer to Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Bailey, 4 Aug 48, sub:
Airlift Support of Vienna, Mil Files, XII272, OH HQUSACE.
89
Dod Ms, 16: 37.
90
Miller, American Engineers in Austria, pp. 17779; Dod Ms, 3: 19.
91
Dod Ms, 16: 3742.
92
On displaced persons in Austria, see Ltr, Hubert S. Miller to Karl C. Dod, 24
August 1976, citing a report dated June 1949 in Millers possession, Mil Files, XII273,
OH HQUSACE. More generally, see William L. Starnes, Jr., The Renovation of the
Bindermichl Apartments, typed Rpt dtd Apr 50, Mil Files, XII273, OH HQUSACE. The
information on this project comes from Starnes report unless otherwise indicated.
93
Ltr, Miller to Dod, 24 August 1976.
94
Dod Ms, 16: 4042; H. S. Miller, Special Engineer Report, 22 Jun 52, p. 2, Mil Files,
XII271, OH HQUSACE; Miller, American Engineers in Austria, pp. 17779.
95
EED AHR 1949, p. 23.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid., pp. 2324.
98
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 164; Interv, authors with Stuart
Wagman, 11 Jan 94, Alexandria, Va., pp. 1014.
99
100
See ibid., p. 58.
101
EED AHR 1949, pp. 3234.
102
Ibid., p. 61.
103
Ibid., p. 56.
104
Ibid., p. 5657.
105
Headquarters, European Command, Annual Narrative Report, 1 January31
December 1950 (Karlsruhe: Historical Division, EUCOM, [1951]), pp. 2728 (hereafter
cited as EUCOM Annual Report 1950.
83
Part II Introduction
1
Truman R. Strobridge, History of the United States European Command (Stuttgart:
History Office, Headquarters, USEUCOM, 1989), pp. 19.
2
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 15561; D. J. Hickman, The United
States Army in Europe, 19531963 (USAREUR Operations Division Historical Section,
1964), p. 150, typescript Rpt held at CMH.
Chapter 3
1
William R. Keylor, The Twentieth-Century World, An International History (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 290; see also Annual Narrative Report, U.S.
404
19R_EndNotes.indd 10
2/3/06 11:06:47 AM
Notes
Army EUCOM, 1 January31 December 1950 (Karlsruhe: Historical Division, European
Command, [1951]), hereafter cited as EUCOM Annual Report 1950, p. 9; Frederiksen,
American Military Occupation, p. 198.
2
Campbell Barracks, p. 15; G. Tays, The U.S. Army Construction Program in Germany,
19501953, typed Ms (Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, 1955), p. 11 (hereafter cited as
Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053), CMH archives.
3
EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 3436; Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany,
19501953, pp. 1112.
4
EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 3437. The EUCOM and USAREUR staffs were
manned by the same personnel, so that separating the functions or actions of each was
difficult. See Annual Narrative Report, HQ, U.S. Army, Europe, 1 January31 December
1950 (Karlsruhe: Historical Division, European Command, [1951]), pp. 412 (hereafter
USAREUR Annual Report 1950), for a sketch of the history of USAREUR as a command
entity. See also Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 150, 198.
5
6
Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053, p. 9; Dod Ms, 16: 59.
7
Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053, pp. 1920.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid., pp. 1920, 4750.
10
Ibid., p. 9.
11
Ibid., pp. 9, 4850; Historical Division, HQ USAREUR, The U.S. Army Deutsche
Mark Construction Program, 19531957, prepared by David A. Lane, James J. Borror, and
George W. Tays ([Heidelberg]: 1958), pp. 910 (hereafter cited as U.S. Army Deutsche
Mark Construction Program, 19531957). Both these sources discuss the various
agreements that regulated Deutschmark construction between 1950 and 1957.
12
Wiesbaden Housing Project Opens First of 400 Units and City Offers To Build
Housing for Yanks, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Oct 49 and 12 Feb 50, respectively.
13
USAREUR Annual Report 1950, pp. 10607.
14
Kasernes Taken Over for Troops, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 7 Oct 50.
15
On the lines of command, see USAREUR Annual Report 1950, p. 28; Tays, U.S.
Army Construction Germany, 195053, pp. 21, 2526, 46; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, p. 165.
16
Quote from Ltr, Maj. Gen. S. D. Sturgis, Jr., to Lt. Gen. Lewis A. Pick, 3 April
1952, Folder 210, Personal Papers of Lt. Gen. Samuel Davis Sturgis, Jr., 18971964,
Chief of Engineers, Jan 53Mar 56 (hereafter Sturgis Papers), OH HQUSACE. Sturgis
contemporary observations concerning the relationships among Teale, Noce, and Tulley
are echoed in Interv, authors with General Andrew P. OMeara (USA, Ret.), 18 Jan 91,
Arlington, Va., pp. 2728, 3234, 36. OMeara served as chief of logistics planning on the
EUCOM staff in Heidelberg during this time.
17
Interv, authors with OMeara; Ltr, David H. Tulley to Karl C. Dod, 21 July 1974, Mil
Files, XI33, OH HQUSACE.
18
Ltr, Tulley to Dod, 21 July 1974.
19
USAREUR Annual Report 1950, p. 28; Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany,
195053, pp. 21, 2526, 46; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 165.
20
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 165; Tays, U.S. Army Construction
Germany, 195053, pp. 6773.
21
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid. Tays refers to the construction as cinder block, but it was more likely the
German equivalent, Bimsstein, or pumice stone, according to Louis Brettschneider, EUDs
expert in technical engineering.
405
2/3/06 11:06:48 AM

Ibid., pp. 5960; U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp.
4344; Billet Project Nears Finish in Grafenwhr, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 20
Sep 52. The article reviews previous construction at the site.
25
26
Ltr, Tulley to Dod, 21 July 1974.
27
U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp. 4344; chart 2,
p. 61.
28
Ibid., pp. 4043.
29
Ibid.
30
Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053, p. 85; Frederiksen, American
Military Occupation, p. 181, says late 1950 but appears to be in error.
31
Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053, p. 8692.
32
Information on these projects at Grafenwhr, Hohenfels, Wildflecken, and
Baumholder is drawn from ibid., pp. 9092.
33
Ibid., pp. 9092.
34
Ibid., p. 92; U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp.
4748.
35
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 165 66; Tays, U.S. Army
Construction Germany, 195053, pp. 8182.
36
EUCOM Plans Enclave To Cope with Housing, Stars and Stripes, European
Edition, 22 Jul 49.
37
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 169; USAREUR Annual Report 1950,
pp. 10708.
38
39
40
41
Ibid., pp. 8183.
42
Engineer Aid for 1953 to German City: Projects in 53 Put at $500,000 by
USAREUR, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 8 Jan 54.
43
See E. P. Hanifan, The Army Lends a Helping Hand, Military Engineer 43 (July/
August 1951): 279, for the details of this story. Stars and Stripes issues for the 1950s carry
dozens of similar stories.
44
Interv, authors with Robert Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt.
45
First Game Ball Tossed from Copter, Stars and Stripes, 16 Jun 53.
46
The documentation concerning the memorial to Mattson, including a copy of the
speech, is in the Generallandesarchiv Karlsruhe, Germany.
47
Alexander Rudhart, Twentieth Century Europe (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1986), p. 288.
48
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 15051.
49
Maj. Gen. Bernard L. Robinson, Base Development in Joint Logistic Planning,
presentation to Industrial College of the Armed Forces, [22 Apr 54], pp. 1617, Mil Files,
XII38, OH HQUSACE.
50
Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, pp. 169, 170, 199; Hickman, The United
States Army in Europe, 19531963, p. 151; America Digs in on the Rhine, Picture Post,
15 Nov 52, pp. 13ff, Mil Files, XII268; Ltr, Col. George E. Pickett to Lt. Col. A. M.
Eschbach, 27 June 1953 (letter of commendation for Eschbachs personnel file), Mil Files,
XII279; A. M. Eschbach, Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zones, 138-page
typed report prepared as a student project at the Engineer School at Fort Belvoir, [1953
or 1954], Mil Files, XII278, Last three OH HQUSACE.
51
America Digs in on the Rhine, p. 14.
24
406
2/3/06 11:06:48 AM
Notes
Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; Col. Eugene B. Ely, Deputy Commander,
Western Area Command, Report on Construction, 18 Dec 53, prepared for
CINCUSAREUR, Mil Files, XII279, OH HQUSACE; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, p. 15661.
53
Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; A. M. Eschbach, Construction in Germany,
U.S. and French Zones, p. 1.
54
Report on Construction, 18 Dec 53; America Digs in on the Rhine, p. 14.
55
Report on Construction, 18 Dec 53.
56
Eschbach, Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zone, p. 19.
57
Ibid., p. 9.
58
Ibid., pp. 1213, 18; Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953.
59
Eschbach, Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zone, pp. 2026.
60
Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; Eschbach, Construction in Germany, U.S.
and French Zone, pp. 10304.
61
Eschbach, Construction in Germany, U.S. and French Zone, pp. 10304.
62
Ibid., p. 1; Ltr, Pickett to Eschbach, 27 June 1953; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, p. 170.
63
This section is based on Lewis W. McBride, A Brief History of The U.S. Engineer
Group (TUSEG), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Ankara, Turkey, 19501954, [1965],
pp. 12, typed Ms, EUD Record Holding Area (RHA), Frankfurt/Bonames, Box M22.
McBride was chief of the engineering-Construction Division of TUSEG.
64
David H. Tulley, The Military Construction Program, Military Engineer 46
(November/December 1954): 40405; Frederiksen, American Military Occupation, p. 50.
65
H.S. Miller, Special Engineer Report, 22 Jun 52, p. 5, Mil Files, XII271, OH
HQUSACE; Dod Ms, 16: 4041, 4445. See also Miller, American Engineers in Austria,
Military Engineer 46 (May/June 1954): 17779.
66
Tulley, Military Construction Program, pp. 40405.
67
The information is derived from two annual historical reports, one covering
EUCOM, the other covering USAREURwhich for much of 1950 was an operational
command: EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 11819; USAREUR Annual Report 1950,
pp. 6063, both in Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe, History Office, Heidelberg. See
also Tulley, Military Construction Program, p. 405; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, p. 150.
68
James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,
Historical Report, 15 January 195331 July 1957 (hereafter cited as Arrigona and
Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency), p. 76, Mil Files, XII302, OH
HQUSACE.
69
Dod Ms, 17: 2, 3, 78.
70
Report of Operations of Engineer Section, Headquarters, 7966th EUCOM
Detachment, Office of the Engineer, 28 May 51, covering 1950 (hereafter Report of
Engineer Section 1950), Mil Files, XII276, OH HQUSACE; USAREUR Annual Report
1950, pp. 6061.
71
Dod Ms, 3: 4546.
72
Ibid., pp. 44, 48.
73
EUCOM Annual Report 1950, pp. 3436, 63.
74
COMZ Completes 2d Year of Manning Vital Supply Line, Stars and Stripes,
European Edition, 8 Nov 52.
75
Were All Fouled Up in France, Saturday Evening Post, 11 Apr 53, p. 96; Report of
Engineer Section 1950; Robinson, Base Development in Joint Logistic Planning, p. 17;
Captieux Depot Lives Down Early Reputation To become One of Com Zs [sic] Most
Modern Bases, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Apr 53.
52
407
2/3/06 11:06:48 AM

For this and the preceding paragraph, see Yanks Wage War on Mud To Set Up
Captieux Depot, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 10 May 52, File COMZ 1952, and
Building Sights [sic] of the 83d Engineers, fifteen-page newsletter printed June 1952 by
the 83d Engineer Construction Battalion (Bordeaux: Imprimerie Delmas, 1952), p. 11, in
file US Army Engineers 19471954, both in Stars and Stripes Library, Darmstadt; and
Were All Fouled Up in France, p. 96.
77
Were All Fouled Up in France.
78
For the list and this quotation, see Factors Bearing on Construction Programs in
France, 1 Feb 51 (document provided to Dod by Col. Hubert Klemp (USA, Ret.), former
staff engineer for the brigade responsible for constructing the LOC across France) Mil
Files, XII276, OH HQUSACE.
79
Ibid.
80
Dod Ms, 17: 17.
81
Ibid., pp. 16, 21; Engineers Beat Schedule on Com Z Tent Project, Stars and Stripes,
European Edition, 27 Sep [52].
82
Tulley, Military Construction Program, pp. 40708.
83
Memos and Letters on LOC, 195052, Mil Files, XII277, OH HQUSACE; Dod Ms,
17: 14.
84
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 27ff.
85
Dod Ms, 17: 2021.
86
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, p. 76.
87
Memo, Frank Pace, Jr., for the Secretary of Defense, 25 Nov 52, sub: Problems of
Military Construction in France, Sturgis Papers, Folder 218, OH HQUSACE.
88
For a discussion of the construction of American military air bases in the
Mediterranean basin, see Robert P. Grathwol and Donita M. Moorhus, Sand, Bricks, and
Marble: U.S. Military Construction in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa
during the Cold War, Unpubl Ms, 1998, OH HQUSACE.
89
Tulley, Military Construction Program, pp. 40708; Frederiksen, American Military
Occupation, p. 169; Dod Ms, 17: 3, 10, 28.
90
Building Sights of the 83rd Engineers, p. 14.
91
Ibid., pp. 1213.
92
93
Tulley, Military Construction Program, pp. 40708; Were All Fouled Up in
France, p. 99; Dod Ms, 17: 12, 15, 16; Com Z Hq at Orleans Directs Huge Supply Setup in
France, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 3 May 52.
94
On the background to the creation of Joint Construction Agency (JCA), see Arrigona
and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency.
95
Ltr, Maj. Gen. S. D. Sturgis, Jr., to Maj. Gen. A. Bradshaw, Jr., 12 May 1952, Folder 212,
and Ltr, Sturgis to Brig. Gen. G. E. Textor, 10 June 1952, Folder 211, both in Sturgis Papers,
OH HQUSACE. The Sturgis papers contain good information on the problems COMZ
faced in 1952.
76
Chapter 4
U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, p. 5759.
Ibid., p. 59.
3
4
USAREUR Speeds Housing Program, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 15 Sep
53; U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp. 14, 2930.
5
1
2
408
2/3/06 11:06:48 AM
Notes
Ibid., p. 32.
Locomotives Solve Housing Project Heating Problem, Stars and Stripes, European
Edition, 25 Aug 54; History of Construction of Central Heating Plant in Kornwestheim,
paper in the private collection of H. J. Greene; Interv, authors with H. Jace Greene, 1 Jun
90, Liege, Belgium.
8
Figures are derived from information in U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction
Program, 19531957, pp. 3435, 58. Information in the following six paragraphs comes
from the same report, pp. 4061.
9
10
U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp. 5051.
11
Ibid., p. 51; Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053, pp. 14347.
12
U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, p. 58.
13
Ibid., pp. 4748.
14
James S. Arrigona and W. R. Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,
Historical Report, 15 Jan. 195331 Jul. 1957, pp. 1824, Mil Files, XII302, OH HQUSACE,
outlines the reorganizations that extended JCAs authority. See also Hickman, United
States Army in Europe, 19531963, pp. 6466.
15
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 58; Brief
History of JCA, three-page typescript, n.d. [but mid to late May 1955 from internal
evidence], no author, Mil Files, XII306, OH HQUSACE.
16
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 910.
17
Ibid., p. 53.
18
Ibid., p. 9. For the formation of other districts, see ibid., pp. 18, 2022, 24, 27. See also
Brief History of JCA.
19
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 9, 18, 2027, 37.
20
Ibid., p. 17273; see also R. B. Warren, Double Purpose Hospitals in France,
Military Engineer 52 (September/October 1960): 402
21
For a summary of each of the six agreements in question, see Arrigona and
Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 3032, and more generally on
the process of contracting, pp. 4047; see also Construction Lead Time in France, Staff
Study by the Command Construction Group, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Military
Construction, 1 Jun 54, pp. 23, Mil Files, XII306, OH HQUSACE.
22
A good, short description of the process, listing nine stages, exists in Brief History
of JCA, pp. 23.
23
Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 19531963, pp. 15455.
24
25
Arrigona and Karsteter list several such incidents in which funds were withdrawn
after JCA had made commitments to the French; see especially pp. 96, 16465, 239, 25052.
26
Ibid., pp. 28384.
27
Ibid., pp. 9496, 16465, and 253 for this and the subsequent paragraph. See also pp.
28788 and, on the freeze of late 1954, pp. 23941.
28
Ibid., p. 249.
29
Ibid., p. 253. To emphasize the point in the original, Robinson underlined the entire
paragraph from which the passage here is taken.
30
Brief History of JCA, p. 1; Construction Lead Time in France, Staff Study by the
Command Construction Group, Assistant Chief of Engineers for Military Construction, 1
Jun 54, p. 1, Mil Files, XII306, OH HQUSACE.
31
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, p. 362; for the
reasons, see Parts IV (pp. 158226) and V (pp. 227355).
32
Ibid., pp. 16667, 286 (on Dreux), 363, 373; dates for the work at Dreux are derived
from the citations rather than from the text.
6
7
409
2/3/06 11:06:49 AM

Ibid., pp. 28485, for both this and the preceding paragraph, including the quotation.
For this and the preceding two paragraphs, see ibid., pp. 25052; on lead time, see
pp. 36364, 373.
35
Ibid., p. 48.
36
Ibid., p. 231.
37
Dod Ms, 18: 26, Mil Files, XI23, OH HQUSACE.
38
39
Ibid., pp. 2729.
40
Ibid., pp. 32123.
41
Interv, authors with Edward Zawisza, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 12.
42
Interv, authors with Saul Fraint, 9 Jun 90, Vienna, Austria, pp. 1011.
43
Tulley, The Military Construction Program, Military Engineer 46 (November/
December 1954): 408.
44
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, figures from pp.
4857.
45
46
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 206, 213, and
the chart of the system of payments on p. 207.
47
Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 19531963, p. 157; Arrigona and Karsteter,
USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 20814.
48
49
50
Ibid., p. 240; Brief History of the JCA.
51
Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 19531963, p. 152.
52
53
On the construction of the pipeline, see Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint
Construction Agency, pp. 196203.
54
Ibid.; on the agreement with NATO, see Hickman, United States Army in Europe,
19531963, p. 156.
55
James E. Walsh, Engineers in the USAREUR Today, Military Engineer 50
(September/October 1958): 33133.
56
R. B. Warren, Double Purpose Hospitals in France, Military Engineer 52
(September/October 1960): 402; Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction
Agency, pp. 20406.
57
Memorandum on Hospital-Housing, unsigned and hand-dated about 14 Dec 52,
and Memo, Lt. Col. Arthur J. Fallen to CG, USAREUR Communications Zone, 25 Nov 52,
both in Sturgis Papers, Folder 218, OH HQUSACE.
58
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, p. 20405, 30708;
James S. Arrigona, Construction Progress in France, Military Engineer 50 (September/
October 1958): 334.
59
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 8993, 11012,
300301. Quote from p. 301.
60
Ibid., pp. 16869.
61
62
H. S. Miller, Special Engineer Report, HQ, U.S. Forces in Austria, Office of the
Engineer, U.S. Army, 22 Jun 52, pp. 35, Mil Files, XII271, OH HQUSACE; Interv,
authors with Fraint, pp. 112; Interv, authors with Adolph Faust, 11 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp.
24; Dod Ms, 16: 4041, 4445.
63
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 18, 47, 77;
Construction ProgressJCA, Mil Files, XII306, OH HQUSACE. Internal evidence
suggests that the latter document is from May or June 1955.
33
34
410
2/3/06 11:06:49 AM
Notes
Construction ProgressJCA.
66
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 2024, 118.
67
Ibid., pp. 11820.
68
Dod Ms, 20: 27; Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency,
p. 167, speaks of the 502 million dollar Army and Air Force program in France as of 1
October 1956.
69
Ltr, Sturgis to Nold, November 1955, and Nolds reply, 11 December 1955, both
in Sturgis Papers, Folder 307; Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction
Agency, pp. 381ff.
70
71
Dod Ms, 18: 5556.
72
Ibid., 18: 5758; Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 19531963, pp. 7274, 14041.
73
74
Dod Ms, 18: 58, citing Tulley to Sturgis; Ltr, Sturgis to Nold, November 1955, and
the quoted passage comes from Ltr, Nold to Sturgis, 11 December 1955, both in Sturgis
Papers, Folder 307; Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp.
38182.
75
Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM Joint Construction Agency, pp. 2024, 382.
76
Ibid., p. 383.
77
Dod Ms, 20: 29.
64
65
Chapter 5
U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp. 913. On the
concerns in France, see Chapter 3 of this study and Arrigona and Karsteter, USEUCOM
Joint Construction Agency, pp. 3033.
2
U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp. 913.
3
On the unique character of this aspect of operating in Europe, see Interv, authors
with Terry Trowbridge, 10 Dec 91, pp. 4043. See also, more generally, Interv, authors with
Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 26.
4
West German Governmental Infrastructure, 15 Jul 82, pp. 34, Europe Division,
Records Holding Area, Frankfurt/Bonames (hereafter EUD-RHA), Box M21.
5
Ibid., pp. 23; Materials for Gribble Visit, US ForcesFederal Republic of Germany
(US-FRG) Proposed Engineer-Construction Agreement (1975), 17 Mar 75, p. 1, EUDRHA, Misc Docs.
6
Briefing by Director USACAG, 13 Oct 61, pp. 1012.
7
Annual Historical Report, Headquarters, USAREUR, 1 Jul. 195630 Jun. 1957, pp.
28587, CMH (hereafter cited as USAREUR AHR, FY 1957; Brief History of JCA.
8
Siemon and Wagberg, Employment of Local Nationals, p. 85.
9
USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, pp. 28587; U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction
19531957, p. 9; USACAG Functional Manual [1960], p. 1, furnished by Reimer Delpin of
EUD; see also Memo, William E. Camblor for Col. LeTellier, 2 Aug 68, sub: Chronological
History of Construction Responsibilities in France and Germany, EUD-RHA, Box M24,
which gives a slightly different date for the change of name.
10
USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, pp. 28587; U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction
19531957, p. 9; Interv, authors with Greene, pp. 2021.
11
For the agreements themselves, see Ministerialblatt des Bundesministers der Finanzen,
7, no. 40 (1 December 1956): 895926; on Camblors role, see Interv, William C. Baldwin
and Paul K. Walker with William E. Camblor, 20, 28 May 87, Frankfurt, pp. 23, 3335, 58,
1
411
2/3/06 11:06:49 AM

and Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 24, as well as Intervs,
authors with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 56, and 9 Aug 89, pp. 24, 79, 1920,
2223. Camblors career is sketched in Corps Line, September 1987, and in an orientation
issue (undated) for 1988. Copies of Corps Line can be found in EUD-RHA or the EUD
Public Affairs Office. Issues cited in this book are at OH HQUSACE.
12
The account in this paragraph depends on information contained in the Baldwin
and Walker interview with Camblor, pp. 1213, 46, 58, and authors interview with Fraint,
pp. 1314. See also authors interviews with Washington and Prentiss.
13
USACAG Functional Manual, p. 24.
14
Biographical Sketch of John Tambornino, prepared on his retirement (late 1974),
provided by Louis Brettschneider, EUD.
15
On consolidation, see Intervs, authors with Greene, pp. 2021, and with Faust, pp.
1718; on reduction of personnel, see Siemon and Wagberg, The Employment of Local
Nationals, pp. 85ff.
16
Intervs, authors with Greene, pp. 1718, and with Fraint, pp. 1213, 2425.
17
Interv, authors with Paul Friesch, 22 Aug 89, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 27.
18
Interv, authors with Louis Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1011;
Hagana Veteran, Corps Line, October 1982. The assessment of Brettschneiders talents
derives from uniformly positive comments by other interviewees.
19
Works Council Chairman Pens Childrens Books, Corps Line, May 1989.
20
Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 14, 58; Interv, Paul K. Walker with
Hasso Damm, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, pp. 34, OH HQUSACE.
21
Interv, authors with Georgi Reitzel, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 19, 1819.
22
Siemon and Wagberg, The Employment of Local Nationals, pp. 4145, 91.
23
Ibid., p. 93.
24
Ibid., pp. 4346, 92.
25
Intervs, authors with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, p. 29, and with Greene, pp. 2829.
26
Briefing by Director USACAG, 13 Oct 61, for visit 922 Oct 61 by Lt. Gen. Walter
K. Wilson, Jr., to USAREUR, Mil Files, XII431, OH HQUSACE; Dod Ms, 20: 38.
27
USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, p. 269; USACAG Functional Manual, p. 2; Interv,
Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, p. 52; Interv, authors with Brettschneider, pp. 89.
28
Intervs, authors with Damm, pp. 45, and with Greene, pp. 4142.
29
USAREUR AHR, FY 1957, p. 267; Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, Office
of the Commanding General, ENGCOM, EUD-RHA, Box M22. The figure is
extrapolated from the bar graph used in the briefing to show annual construction
placement, 19571969.
30
Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 195363, p. 73.
31
The figures for 1958 through 1961 are those given by Camblor in his Briefing by
Director USACAG, 13 Oct 61, p. 9. More generally on USACAG, see Dod Ms, 20: 78, 38;
Hickman, United States Army in Europe, 195363, pp. 7374. Intervs, authors with Damm,
pp. 45, 5253; with Greene, pp. 3031; with Brettschneider, pp. 8889; with Friesch, pp.
812.
32
Briefing by Director USACAG, 13 Oct 61, p. 7. See also Welcome to the USAREUR
Engineers Conference, [1965], section on NATO Infrastructure, provided by Louis
Brettschneider.
33
See Briefing by Director USACAG, 13 Oct 61, and Welcome to the USAREUR
Engineers Conference.
34
For this definition, see note above and USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure
for OCE Inspection, 1426 Feb 1972, p. I4, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; also Stanley W.
Dziuban, NATO Tour of American Infrastructure, Military Engineer 53 (September/
October 1961): 34142.
412
2/3/06 11:06:49 AM
Notes
On the area needed, see Intervs, authors with Karl Greulich, 15 Jun 90, Frankfurt,
pp. 1920, and with Georgi Reitzel, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 1819.
36
Interv, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, p. 18; Intervs, authors with Friesch, pp.
1213, with Greulich, pp. 1013, and with Damm, pp. 45.
37
Intervs, authors with Friesch, p. 12, and with Greulich, pp. 1820; Dod Ms, 20: 38;
Joseph J. Corey, Jr., Soldiers and Builders, Military Engineer 67 (November/December
1975): 33132.
38
Dod Ms, 20: 38. Intervs, authors with Brettschneider, pp. 8889, with Fraint, pp. 30
31; with Arthur Textor, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 46. See also Hickman, United States Army
in Europe, 195363, pp. 7374; Interv, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, May 1987, p. 18.
39
Interv, authors with John L. Shadday, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, p. 4; Hickman, United
States Army in Europe, 195363, pp. 14749, 16970; Interv, Baldwin and Walker with
Camblor, May 87, p. 25; Pirmasens Depot Complex, 16 Oct 61, Briefing [for the visit of
Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson to USACAG], five-page typed report with chart and diagram,
Mil Files XII36, OH HQUSACE.
40
The description of the warehouse project is taken from Pirmasens Depot
Complex, 16 Oct 61. The timing of Wilsons visit to Germany is given in Dod Ms, ch. 20.
41
See Class V DepotVerdun, Alternate Solution, Warehouse, Multipurpose
20,000 Sq. Ft., a technical proposal submitted to USACAF on 2 June 1959 by Ammann
& Whitney, Architect-Engineers, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE. See also Intervs,
authors with Shadday, p. 4; with Friesch, p. 15; with Camblor, p. 25.
42
Construction Justification Data Sheet, 6 Nov 62, Mil Files, XII431, OH HQUSACE;
Class V DepotVerdun. See also Intervs, authors with Shadday, p. 4; with Friesch, p.
15; with Camblor, p. 25.
43
Interv, authors with Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan (USA, Ret.), 20 Nov 90, Arlington,
Va., pp. 612. The site was near Thionville in the region near Metz.
44
History of TUSEG, 19581965, provided by the TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik,
Turkey. Intervs, authors with Faust, pp. 7677; with Textor, pp. 24; with Friesch, pp.
1415; with Greulich, pp. 2829.
45
Wiesbaden Housing Project Opens First of 400 Units and City Offers To
Build Housing for Yanks, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 17 Oct 49 and 12 Feb 50,
respectively.
46
On Alternate Construction, see U.S. Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program,
19531957, pp. 3640, 55; Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities and Host Nation
Negotiations, p. IIIE131, Unpubl Ms, Real Estate Division, Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff, Engineer, Headquarters, USAREUR and Seventh Army, Sep 88, preface by J. L.
Fuentes, Chief, Real Estate Division.
47
Welcome to the USAREUR Engineers Conference, [1965], section on Alternate
Construction.
48
Ibid.; Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities.
49
The information on this operation is drawn primarily from Intervs, authors with
Brettschneider, pp. 78100, and with Fraint, pp. 2123.
50
Quote from Interv, authors with Fraint, pp. 2123.
51
Interv, authors with Brettschneider, pp. 8184.
52
Ibid., pp. 8485, and Intervs, authors with Fraint, pp. 2123, and with Camblor, 9
Aug 89, pp. 3941. Brettschneider recounts several other incidents of cooperation during
operations in Berlin.
53
Tele Intervs, authors with Col. Paavo Carlson (Ret.), 28 Sep 90; with Col. C. B.
Lyle, Jr. (Ret.), 26 Oct 90; with Col. John Driskill (Ret.), 5 Nov 90; with Brig. Gen. Gilbert
W. Kirby, Jr. (USA, Ret.), 9 Nov 90; with Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson (USA, Ret.), 29 Oct 90,
Alexandria, Va.
35
413
2/3/06 11:06:50 AM

Erwin N. Thompson, Pacific Ocean Engineers: History of the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers in the Pacific, 19051980 (Honolulu: Pacific Ocean Division, n.d.), ch. 6. See also
William C. Baldwin, Engineer Echelon-above-Corps Organization in the Pacific since
1941 (Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1990).
55
Office of the CG, ENGCOM, Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 1968, attached chart
of annual construction placement 1957 to 1969, and p. 11, EUD-RHA, Box M22.
56
See USACAG Organization and Functions Manual dtd 1 Jun 63, EUD-RHA, Box
H22.
57
Interv, authors with Col. Carlyle Charles (Ret.), 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 35.
58
See authors interviews with Fraint, Friesch, Brettschneider, and others.
59
This account emerges from authors interviews with people who served in
USACAG, USAREUR, or the Engineer Element during the early 1960s. They include
interviews with Maj. Gen. Robert P. Young (USA, Ret.), 30 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va., with
Wilson, and with Greulich; also, authors Tele Intervs with Lyle, with Carlson, with
Driskill, with Kirby, and with William B. Dawes, 26 Oct 90. In addition, see authors
interviews with others who served with USACAG between 1961 and 1964: Brettschneider,
Butschan, Charles, Faust, Fraint, Friesch, Damm, Greene, Rodehaver, and Shadday.
Camblor passed over his return to USAREUR in Heidelberg in his interviews with
Baldwin and Walker and with the authors. In comments on the manuscript addressed
to the authors in February 1991, Camblor explained his reasons for accepting General
Morris invitation to serve in Heidelberg as a special assistant. On the incorporation of
USARFEOF, see Memo, Camblor for Col. LeTellier, [2 Aug 68], sub: Chronological History
of Construction Responsibilities in France and Germany; Interv, authors with Charles,
pp. 35.
60
Memo, Camblor for Col. LeTellier; USAREUR Engineer Element Responsibilities,
29 Sep 66, Mil Files, XII431, OH HQUSACE.
54
Chapter 6
1
Interv, authors with General Andrew P. OMeara (USA, Ret.), 18 Jan 91, Arlington,
Va., pp. 112.
2
Study of Proposed Consolidation of Military Construction Activities in Europe, 19
Oct 65, HQ, U.S. Army Audit Agency, Washington National Records Center, Access no.
860008, Box 6, RC 10270355, File 20701.
3
Ibid. Quote from Ltr, Jack ONeill (Frankfurt) to William B. Dawes, 11 October [1965].
ONeill was serving in the Engineer Element in Frankfurt; Dawes had recently returned
from service in Frankfurt to a Corps of Engineers position in California. Dawes provided
the letter to the authors.
4
Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Robert P. Young (USA, Ret.), 30 Oct 90, Alexandria,
Va., for this and subsequent paragraphs. Also, Interv, Donita M. Moorhus with Maj.
Gen. Robert P. Young (USA, Ret.), 9 Oct 91, Arlington, Va. See also Intervs, authors with
Randolph S. Washington, 31 May 90, Chivres, Belgium, pp. 14, and with Zawisza, p. 2.
Concerning the creation of the Army Area Command, see Military Community Study
Project RED WHEEL, prepared by ODCSCOMPT, USAREUR, May 73, ann. B, pp. 45, OH
HQUSACE. Stoughtons first name was Tom, not Thomas.
5
Interv, Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 14.
6
Intervs, authors with OMeara, p. 23, and Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, p. 810.
7
Engineer Outfits Merging, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 21 Jun 67; William C.
Baldwin, Engineer Organization in Germany, 19451990, Future Army Peacetime Engineer
Operations in Europe (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center, 1991), pp. C8
414
2/3/06 11:06:50 AM
Notes
to C12; Col. Brian B. ONeill, History of Eng Com Traces Back to 44: Eng Coms Role
Duties Far, Wide, two-page article attached to memoranda dtd 8 Nov 77, 1 Dec 77, and
15 Dec 77 regarding history of EUD, EUD-RHA, Box P111. See also Study of Proposed
Consolidation of Military Construction Activities in Europe, 19 Oct 65, p. 7. As this study
indicates, some construction is performed by the Navy in selected locations.
8
9
Briefing for LTG [William F.] Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, Ofc of the CG, ENGCOM, p. 2,
EUD-RHA, Box M22.
10
Ibid., pp. 45.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid., pp. 5, 8.
14
Interv, Moorhus with Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 810. Williams completed his tour in
Europe at ENGCOM and left in the summer of 1967.
15
Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, pp. 45.
16
See interviews by authors with the individuals named in the text; see also
Organizational Charts for USACAG, 1960, EUD-RHA, Box P711; for ENGCOM, see
the chart in USAENGCOM Information Brochure, OCE Inspection, 1426 Feb. 1972
(hereafter cited as Information Brochure, 1972), EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. Also Intervs,
authors with Donovan, pp. 4142; with Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, 26 May 91,
Newark, N.J., p. 11; with Fraint, pp. 78. See also Memo, Kennedy to Brig. Gen. Kelley, 24
Jul 68, sub: Infrastructure Program, EUD-RHA, Box M111, which uses the term troubleshooter in referring to his special assistant, Camblor. Interviews with ENGCOM and EUD
commanders indicate that Camblor performed similar tasks for all of them.
17
Interv, authors with Friesch, pp. 1718.
18
Intervs, authors with Washington, p. 14; with Zawisza, p. 2; with Rodehaver, 31 Jan
90, pp. 3839. Interv, Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin with Robert Rodehaver, 24
Jun 87, Frankfurt, p. 6.
19
Civilian Personnel Management in U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe:
Survey Report Mar. 1973, p. 5, conducted by HQ USAREUR DSCPER CPD, EUD-RHA,
M111.
20
Comptroller of the Army, Program/Command Analysis of U.S. Army Europe, 30
Jun 71, pp. IIIA12 and 13, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9
Aug 89, pp. 1920.
21
During Kennedys tour, the 39th was inactivated and its battalions put under the
command of the 24th. Interv, authors with Kennedy, p. 24.
22
Intervs, authors with Kennedy, p. 16, and with Col. Claude Roberts, 12 Feb 91,
Washington, D.C., pp. 3536.
23
Frank U. Lahde, Construction Assistance in Germany, Military Engineer 59
(March/April 1967): 117. See also Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, p. 3; Intervs,
authors with Young, with Maj. Gen. Carroll LeTellier, 19 Nov 91, Arlington, Va., and with
Camblor, 9 Aug 89.
24
German Labor Service Celebrates 20th Anniversary, Sword and Castle, Oct 68.
25
William M. Kennedy, Civilian Labor Group, Germany, Military Engineer 59
(September/October 1967): 368. Intervs, authors with Kennedy, pp. 2223; with Young,
30 Oct 90; with Roberts, pp. 89; with LeTellier, pp. 4245; with Fraint, pp. 1921. Interv,
Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, p. 65.
26
Interv, authors with Roberts, pp. 68; Cargill, Shoulder to Shoulder, Military
Engineer 65 (November/December 1973): 414.
27
The description of the changes is most clearly delineated in Briefing for LTG
Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, pp. 1415; concerning the unpopularity of the changes with local
415
2/3/06 11:06:50 AM

commanders, see Interv, Lynn Alperin with Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Kennedy, 2324 Apr
84, Austin, Tex., pp. 345ff.
28
29
For this feature of ENGCOMs activity, see ibid., p. 26.
30
Ibid., pp. 1620.
31
Military Community Study Project RED WHEEL, ann. B, pp. 46.
32
Dod Ms, 20: 3334.
33
Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 31, and with Jacques
Bouchereau, 3 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 1213.
34
Ltr, Kennedy to Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, USAREUR Engineer, 21 October 1968,
EUD-RHA, Box M111.
35
Intervs, authors with Bouchereau, pp. 2527, 5657; with Fraint, pp. 2324; with
Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 5355. Building Miracle at Brussels School,
Army Times Europe, 27 Mar 68. Concerning title and sovereignty over the property, see
Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities and Host Nation Negotiations, p. F71.
36
William M. Kennedy III, A Joint Effort for a Joint Command, Military Engineer 61
(January/February 1969): 43.
37
Intervs, authors with John Shadday, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1318, and with Erwin
Grimm, 6 Jun 90, Nuremberg; Kennedy, Joint Effort for a Joint Command, p. 43; Military
Engineer 59 (September/October 1967): 368; New EUCOM Nerve Center Is Dedicated at
Stuttgart, Stars and Stripes, 8 Nov 68.
38
Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities. See also Dod Ms, 20: 3334.
39
40
See Daniel J. Nelson, A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany (Boulder, Colo.:
Westview Press, 1987), pp. 7882, 88, 98.
41
Ibid., pp. 14751.
42
Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, p. 10.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid., p. 11.
45
Interv, Greenwood with Penney, p. 27.
46
Intervs, authors with Kusiowski, pp. 3031, and with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp.
4446.
47
USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure, 1972, pp. I6 to I7, EUD-RHA, Misc
Docs.
48
Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities, pp. IA, IIIE131, VIC1. See
also Memo, Camblor for LeTellier, 2 Aug 68, sub: Chronological History of Construction
Responsibilities in France and Germany, EUD-RHA, Box M24.
49
Delpin, Fact Sheet, 1 Nov 73, sub: To Answer the Chief of Staffs Request for a
Description of Real Estate Acquisitions and Disposal Procedures and To Identify Major
Problems, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
50
US Army Engineer Command Europe, Command Operating Budget, FY 1974, Mar
73, prepared for Carroll LeTellier and signed by Col. John C. Bell, EUD-RHA, Box M17.
51
Interv, authors with OMeara, p. 17.
52
Youngs departure is dated from material in his scrapbook. Interv, Moorhus with
Young, 9 Oct 91, pp. 1213.
53
Kennedys arrival from his Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, p. 17; Interv,
authors with Kennedy, p. 13; Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 344. Kennedys promotion
is dated according to letters in EUD-RHA, Box M111.
54
Ltr, Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley to Kennedy, 27 Oct 67, Tab M, EUD-RHA, Misc Files;
also Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, p. 20, for Kennedys observation concerning
Polks remarks to him on his first day in Germany (17 October 1967).
416
2/3/06 11:06:50 AM
Notes
For this and the following paragraph, see Daniel E. McDonald, Briefing Remarks
for [Lt.] General [Walter K.] Wilsons Visit to Engineer Division, 7 Dec 64, and Ltr, Kelley
to Kennedy, 27 October 1967, Tab L, both in EUD-RHA, Misc Files.
56
Ltr, Kelley to Kennedy, 27 October 1967, Tabs L, M; Cargill, Shoulder to Shoulder,
Military Engineer 65 (November/December 1973): 414.
57
Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, pp. 2223, for this and the subsequent
paragraph. Kennedy gives the figure for boilers as 9,000 in this briefing. A figure of
10,087 is given for the date 1 July 1967 in Memo, Brig. Gen. Carroll LeTellier, 25 Apr 72,
sub: Summary of USAENGCOMEUR Briefing Data, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
58
Briefing for LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, p. 22.
59
Ltr, Kennedy to Polk, 4 March 1970, p. 2, referring to the meeting in September
1968, EUD-RHA, Box M111. Also, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, Living and
Working Conditions in the United States Army, Europe, Special Report to Congress of the
United States, 1 May 84, fig. 39.
60
Intervs, authors with Kennedy, pp. 67; with Zawisza, pp. 1418; with Washington,
pp. 1819. Ltr, Kennedy to Polk, 4 March 1970, p. 3, mentions the damage caused by
unskilled troops manning boilers. See also Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 361; Intervs,
John T. Greenwood with Lt. Gen. Howard W. Penney, Dec 80Dec 83, p. 26. Briefing for
LTG Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, pp. 2223.
61
Ltr, Kennedy to Maj. Gen. Charles C. Noble, 15 April 1970, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
62
ENGCOM Chronicle for Facilities Engineering Directorate, Jul 74, p. 7, EUD-RHA,
Box M14/6; Annual Historical Summary, HQ USAREUR and Seventh Army, 1 Jan31
Dec 72, p. 91, CMH. On the strength and influence of the coal lobby, see Interv, Donita M.
Moorhus with Allen M. Carton, 14 Mar 97, Potomac, Md., pp. 11319.
63
On budget cuts, see Ltr, Kennedy to Noble, 28 July 1969; on the congressional
moratorium that suspended the program, see Budget Execution Review, FY 1973,
signed by LeTellier, 15 Nov 72, EUD-RHA, Box M17. On the percentage completed, see
Summary of Questions and Answers Covered at the Breakfast for Honorable Robert F.
Froehlke Hosted by Commander, V Corps, on Tuesday, Feb. 13, 1973; for the number of
boilers replaced, see Ltr, LeTellier, 25 April 1972. Both in EUD-RHA, Box M111.
64
Summary of Questions and Answers, Feb. 13, 1973; Items Discussed at OENGR
Staff Meeting, Nov. 19, 1973, notes by Capt. Edward D. Hammond, Liaison Officer, EUDRHA, Box M17. Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 67. For a firsthand account of the
boiler conversion program in the early 1970s, see Interv, authors with Ken Wunsche, 19
Nov 93, Frankfurt, passim.
65
Briefing for Maj. Gen. Fred Clarkes Visit to Engineer Division, 9 Nov. 1964, p. 3,
EUD-RHA, Misc Files.
66
The figures on dollars per square foot come from Kennedys Briefing for LTG
Cassidy, 17 Jun 68, p. 34. Kennedy took the information from statistics maintained by
OCE.
67
See Intervs, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 351; Greenwood with Penney, pp. 2526;
authors with LeTellier, p. 18.
68
The information on the $5 million from OMeara is in Briefing for CINC, 26 Aug
66, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
69
Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, p. 352.
70
71
72
73
Ltr, Kennedy to Lt. Gen. Andrew J. Boyle, CG V Corps, 16 December 1968, EUDRHA, Box M111.
74
Ltrs, Kennedy to Noble, 12 May 1969, 21 April 1970, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
55
417
2/3/06 11:06:51 AM

Ltr, Kennedy to Maj. Gen. Howard W. Penney, 21 March 1969, EUD-RHA, Box
M111.
76
LeTellier, Debriefing Rpt to CINC USAREUR, 14 Aug 73, EUD-RHA, Box M17.
77
The figures are taken from two sources: Ltr, Kennedy to Maj. Gen. E. H. Almquist,
CG, 8th Infantry Division, 2 April 1970, EUD-RHA, Box M111, and Fact Sheet, Subject:
Summary of Stem to Stern Program, 24 May 1971, prepared by Col. Shelton B. Biles, DCS
Contract Construction, EUDRHA, Misc Files. Each source uses a slightly different base
period for the figures.
78
79
Ltr, Kennedy to Collins, 28 June 1971, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
80
MFR, LeTellier, 25 Apr 72, sub: ENGCOM Briefing Data, EUD-RHA, M111; the
figures for the facilities engineering budget for 1968 to 1972 are derived from anniversary
addresses by Kennedy, 1 Nov 69, and LeTellier, 1 Nov 71, both in EUD-RHA, Box M111.
81
Glossary of Terms, Military Publications Pamphlet #31013, 25 May 76.
82
Interv, authors with Kennedy, p. 15; Interv, Carroll Purcell with Col. John C.
Mattina, 9 May 88, Oxnard, Calif., OH HQUSACE. See also the description of one of the
revetments that failed in MFR, Lt. Col. James M. Johnston, Executive Officer [ENGCOM],
6 May 70, sub: Visit to USAENGCOMEUR by CINCUSAREUR, p. 3, EUD-RHA, Box
M111.
83
For TAB VEE as a hot project in Washington, see MFR, sub: Meeting with Mr. E.
A. Rogner, OSD, Systems Analysis Team Frankfurt, Germany, 9 Aug 68, p. 4, where
the cited passage is a paraphrase of Rogners remarks; for figures for late 1968, see Ltr,
Kennedy to Brig. Gen. Roy S. Kelley, 25 November 1968, both in EUD-RHA, Box M1111;
for the February 1969 record, see USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure, 1972, p.
III9.
84
Ayling, Briefing, Air Force I G Team, TAB VEE Program, [Jan 1971], EUD-RHA,
Misc Docs; General Discussion of USAREUR DCSOPS Study (Project FENDER): An
Examination of the Mission, Organization, and Functions of the U.S. Army Engineer
Command, [Apr 72], EUD-RHA, Box M111.
85
Briefing, Air Force I G Team, TAB VEE Program, [Jan 71].
86
Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 1213. For additional evidence of problems
between the Air Force and ENGCOM, see Col. Niels H. Lund, USAF, Solicitation of Bids,
TAB VEE, 14 Jan 71; Memo, Col. Shelton B. Biles for Chief of Staff, 14 Jan 71, sub: Air
Force Letters Concerning TAB VEE Construction; MFR, Biles, 19 Jan 71, sub: Telephone
Call from Colonel Lund, Director, Engineering and Construction AEFRC, USAFE; MFR,
Biles, sub: General Polks Briefing by USAREUR Engineer on 20 Jan 71. All in EUD-RHA,
Misc Docs. See also Memo, William E. Camblor to Dept of the Air Force, Col. Steele,
17 Dec 71, sub: Time Losses and Added Costs on Projects Due to Air Force Delays in
Approval of Funding, which mentions fifteen case summaries as being sent; and Memo,
LeTellier to Col. Robert C. Thompson, DCSCivil Engineering, USAFE, 22 Feb 72, sub:
Approval and Funding of Changes to Air Force Construction Contracts. Both in EUDRHA, Misc Docs.
87
For the description of the fire in following paragraphs, see Intervs, authors with
Kennedy, pp. 911; with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 1990, pp. 3940, 4243; with Friesch,
pp. 6970; with Greene, p. 29; with Textor, pp. 3234; with Inge Kusiowski, 9 Aug 89,
Frankfurt, pp. 3031; with Fraint, pp. 2728. Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Hasso
Damm, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, pp. 3336; Ltr, Kennedy to CG, HQ V Corps, 26 May 1969;
Memo, Kennedy to CINC USAREUR, 27 Jan 69; Ltr, Kennedy to Col. Burke, 27 June 1969;
Ltr, Kennedy to CINC USAREUR, 5 January 1970; Ltr, Kennedy to Oberburgermeister
Prof. Dr. Willi Brundert, 16 May 1969. All in EUD-RHA, Box M111.
88
Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 911.
75
418
2/3/06 11:06:51 AM
Notes
Ibid., p. 11.
Interv, Martin Reuss with Brig. Gen. Charles C. Noble, 2223 Sep 81, OH HQUSACE.
91
Ltr, Kennedy to Kelley, 21 March 1968, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
92
MFR, Lt. Col. James M. Johnston, Exec. Officer [ENGCOM], 6 May 70, sub: Visit to
USAENGCOMEUR by CINCUSAREUR, p. 5, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
93
Interv, authors with Col. Daniel Waldo, Jr., 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 25;
USAENGCOMEUR, Budget Execution Review FY 1973, signed by LeTellier, EUD-RHA,
Box M17; Ammo Storage Improvement ProgramMCA, n.d., EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
94
Interv, authors with LeTellier, pp. 6, 18.
95
Ibid., pp. 19, 2123, 2829; Interv, authors with Kennedy, p. 12.
96
LeTelliers 5th Anniversary Msg, 1 Nov 71, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
97
Instructions for Engineer Command Long Range Plan Ad Hoc Committee, 13
Mar 72, signed by LeTellier; Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Long Range Plan
for the Engineer Command Europe, Jun. 15, 1972, ann. A, both in EUD-RHA, Box M24.
98
USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure 1972, pp. I4 to I6, III24, V2 to V6,
and VI2 to VI6, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
99
For the full list, see Memo, LeTellier to CINCUSAREUR and Seventh Army, 10 Apr
72, EUD-RHA, Box M111.
100
The dollar figures from 19671970 come from the ENGCOM Long Range Plan.
Other dollar figures come from USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure 1972, pp V2
to V5.
101
For a good summary treatment of the tension between commanders and ENGCOM,
see LeTellier, Debriefing Rpt to CINC USAREUR, 14 Aug 73, pp. 34, EUD-RHA, Box M
17. Interv, authors with LeTellier, pp. 3437.
102
Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities, pp. IIIE21ff.
103
Ibid.
104
USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure 1972, p. IV3.
105
Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities, pp. IIIE21ff.
106
Buxton, Comptroller, Decision Paper to Commanding General, 16 Aug 71, sub: DM
Revaluation, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
107
Interv, authors with Washington, pp. 4244.
108
Memo, LeTellier, 25 Apr 72; see also attachment to General Discussion of
USAREUR DCSOPS Study (Project FENDER), 10 Apr 72, p. 2, both in EUD-RHA, Box M
111, 6G. For slightly different figures, see USAENGCOMEUR, Information Brochure,
1972, p. III23.
109
Intervs, authors with Fraint, pp. 2627, and with LeTellier, pp. 5760.
110
Ltr, LeTellier to Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, 19 July 1973, EUD-RHA, Box M111; William
E. Camblor, Amplified Record of Engineering Experience, 9 Sep 77, Bouchereau Papers,
OH HQUSACE.
111
Overview of USAREUR Real Estate Activities, p. IIIE211. The slowdown in
work under MOUSF I is noted in Ltr, Donovan to Maj. Gen. D. A. Raymond, 25 Jan 74,
EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
112
Ltr, Kennedy to Brig. Gen. H. R. Aaron, V Corps, 21 July 1971, EUD-RHA,
Misc Docs Kennedys description in this letter parallels the description of remote site
construction given in an earlier document. The description in this and the following
paragraph is a composite of the two. The earlier document (see esp. p. 2) is MFR, Lt. Col.
James M. Johnston, 6 May 70, sub: Visit to USAENGCOMEUR by CINCUSAREUR, EUDRHA, Box M111.
113
The information concerning remote sites derives primarily from three documents:
Memo, LeTellier, 25 Apr 72, sub: Summary of USAENGCOMEUR Briefing Data, EUDRHA, Box M111; Ltr, LeTellier to Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, 19 July 1973; table of projects
89
90
419
2/3/06 11:06:51 AM

with notes entitled Border Camps, and dated as of 15 Nov. 1973, EUD-RHA, Misc
Docs.
114
MFR, Letellier, 9 Aug 68, sub: Meeting with Mr. E. A. Rogner, OSD, Systems
Analysis Team, EUD-RHA, M111.
115
ODCSCOMPT, USAREUR, Military Community Study Project RED WHEEL, May
73, ann. B, pp. 45, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with Kennedy, pp. 35.
116
USAREUR Area Support Service Activity Study, Subject: District Engineer
Reorganization, ENGCOM, 27 Jan 70, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Long Range Plan for the Engineer Command Europe, 15 Jun 72, p. 81.
117
Decision Paper, Brig. Gen. Hugh J. Bartley, DCSCOMPT, to Chief of Staff, 27 Apr 73,
sub: Review of the DCSOPS Engineer Command Study (FENDER II), EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
118
Interv, Martin A. Reuss with Maj. Gen. Francis P. Koisch, 56 Mar 90, San Antonio,
Tex., pp. 29, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with LeTellier, pp. 3942.
119
Review of the DCSOPS Engineer Command Study (FENDER II).
120
LeTellier Debrief Ltr to CINCUSAREUR, 14 August 1973, p. 3, provided to the
authors by LeTellier.
121
Interv, authors with Donovan, pp. 130.
122
Ltr, Donovan to Brig. Gen. Milton E. Key, Cdr., 56th Artillery Brigade, EUD-RHA,
Box M111.
123
DF, Col. James G. Campbell, 19 Mar 74, sub: Consolidation of Headquarters and
Area Support Elements, Tab J of Decision Paper to Chief of Staff [USAREUR] from
Project CHASE, OH HQUSACE (see also Tab A); Memo, Maj. Gen. Harold I. Hayward for
Commander in Chief, 22 Mar 74, sub: Project CHASE, OH HQUSACE, current files; Lt.
Col. John L. Buxton, EUD History, typescript Ms, n.d., EUD-RHA, Box P79 (hereafter
cited as Buxton History); Annual Report of Major Activities, HQ, U.S. Army Europe and
Seventh Army, 1 Jan. to 31 Dec. 1974, 7 Apr 76, pp. 1317, CMH (hereafter cited as Annual
Report USAREUR, 1974).
124
The U.S. Army Topographic Center had been put under Engineer Command in FY
1973.
125
Buxton History; Briefing Materials for Visit by Lt. Gen. William C. Gribble, 2325
Mar 75, Formation of EUD, Fact Sheet, 20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs (hereafter cited
as Materials for Gribble Visit, with reference to the particular document).
126
Buxton History; Annual Report USAREUR, 1974, pp. 1317.
127
Annual Report USAREUR, 1974, p. 17.
128
Materials for Gribble Visit, Personnel Status, 21 Mar 75, and Formation of EUD,
Fact Sheet, 20 Mar 1975.
129
For a firsthand commentary on this uncertainty, see Interv, authors with Reimer
Delpin, 9 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1314. For a description of the work carried out by the
team led by McNeely and the attitudes that prevailed in OCE, see Interv, Donita M.
Moorhus with David A. Spivey, 25 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va., pp. 3952, OH HQUSACE.
130
ESC Studies Center, EUD Organization Study, Apr 85, EUD-RHA, Box M18.
131
Interv, authors with Terry Trowbridge, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 1012.
Chapter 7
Interv, authors with Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan, 20 Nov 90, Arlington, Va., p. 40.
Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, Del.,
pp. 19.
3
Memorandum of Agreement between the Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe,
and the Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army, 1 Apr 74, EUD-RHA, P711.
1
2
420
2/3/06 11:06:51 AM
Notes
Buxton History; Briefing Materials for Gribble Visit, Formation of EUD, Fact Sheet,
20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
5
The agreements are in EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and Boxes M110 and M111.
6
Interv, authors with Prentiss, pp. 10, 1819, 56.
7
Min of Staff Mtg, 11 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, M111; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen.
Drake Wilson, 29 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va., pp. 1011. We have chosen to use Europe
Division; early documents use European Division.
8
Memo, Prentiss to HQDA (DAEN-EPA-U), 12 Sep 75, sub: Proposed Civilian
Manpower Reduction, p. 3, EUD-RHA, M112.
9
Annual Report USAREUR, 1974, pp. 24, 15, CMH.
10
Ibid.; Fact Sheet, Analysis of USAEDE Organization, 15 Aug 74, p. 5, EUD-RHA,
Misc Docs.
11
Analysis of USAEDE Organization, 15 Aug 74, p. 3.
12
Organizational Charts from 1 Aug 74, 1 Sep 74, 1 Dec 74, 1 Feb 75, 1 Jun 75, and 1
Aug 75, all provided by Reimer Delpin, EUD; Analysis of USAEDE Organization, 15
Aug 74, p. 3.
13
Interv, authors with James Wise, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 47.
14
Interv, authors with Dave Cox, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 1114.
15
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975, and Gribbles reply, 18 February 1975, EUDRHA, M112 and M19, GO Corresp, respectively; Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Roy
Brown, 25 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands, pp. 1618; see also an incomplete draft of
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974, EUD-RHA, M112.
16
EUD, Gen Orders Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13, 5 May 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; for the change
of name, see Staff Summary Sheet, 30 Apr 75, Organization of Area Offices, EUD-RHA,
P711.
17
Memo, Maj. Gen. Warren C. Moore, HQ TUSLOG (USAFE) to American Personnel,
7 Nov 77, sub: Background Information, provided by TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey.
18
Talking Paper, DAEN-ECM, [Robert] Hall, 15 May 75, sub: OSD Draft Audit Report
on Consolidation of EUD and MDD Headquarters, NA, RG 77, Access no. 860008, Box
6, RC 10270355(hereafter cited as Talking Paper, 15 May 75); Realignment Fact
Sheet: Transfer of Design and Construction in Italy, Greece, and Turkey to US Army
Engineer Division, Europe, n.d., but attached to a memo dtd 30 Sep 75, EUD-RHA, P79
(hereafter cited as Realignment Fact Sheet).
19
For a summary of the OSD position and OCEs counterarguments, see Talking
Paper, 15 May 75. See also OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report on Review of
Consolidation of Army Engineer Divisions in Europe, 28 Feb 75, p. 12 (hereafter cited as
OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report, 28 Feb 75, NA, RG 77, Access no. 860008, Box 6,
RC 10270355; and Realignment Fact Sheet.
20
Talking Paper, 15 May 75.
21
For information concerning the area offices of EUD, see Annual Rpt USAREUR,
1974, p. 2, and EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 1977, Bouchereau Papers, OH
HQUSACE.
22
Annual Historical Review, 1 Jul. 197530 Sept. 1976, p. 65, Office of the Chief of
Engineers (hereafter cited as OCE AHR, with appropriate dates), Gen Files, 84, OH
HQUSACE; Engineers Corner, EUD Information Bulletin, 1 Apr 76; see also MFR, 9 Jun
76, sub: MDD-EUD Milcon Transfer, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
23
Memo, Prentiss to HQDA (DAEN-EPA-U), 12 Sep 75, sub: Proposed Civilian
Manpower Reduction, pp. 13, EUD-RHA, M112; for the quotation, see Prentiss to
Gribble, 11 May 76, EUD-RHA, M17.
24
MFR, E. Scott Chronister, 17 Aug 84, sub: EUD Request for AssistanceUSAREUR
Request for Organizational Justification, based on documents and conversations with
4
421
2/3/06 11:06:52 AM

Fred McNeely and other OCE personnel involved in the transition, Civil Works Files,
I201, OH HQUSACE. Chronister was chief of the Organization and Studies Branch,
Management and Program Analysis Division, Directorate of Resource Management, in
OCE. See also Interv, authors with Frederick B. McNeely, 15 Feb 91, Arlington, Va.; Interv,
Moorhus with David A. Spivey, 25 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va., pp. 3964; and Ltr, ONeill
to Dawes, 11 October [1965], provided by William B. Dawes, archived with documents
related to this manuscript at OH HQUSACE.
25
Civilian Personnel Management in U.S. Army Engineer Command, Europe,
Survey Report, Mar 73, survey conducted by HQ, USAREUR DCSPER CPD, p. 3, EUDRHA, M111.
26
Interv, authors with Hasso Damm, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 1516. On
Tamborninos retirement, see Intervs, authors with Greene, pp. 4647, 5556, and with
Col. Edwin S. Townsley, 15 Feb 91, Alexandria, Va., p. 14. On Wheelers appointment, see
Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 1819, and with Ralph Wheeler, 12 Feb 91, Arlington,
Va., pp. 12; Interv, Moorhus with Spivey, p. 59.
27
For the quotations in the paragraph, see OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report, 28
Feb 75.
28
Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 78, 5961.
29
MFR, R. L. Rousseau, 18 Apr 79, sub: OAS Accomplishments, EUD-RHA, M112.
The document provides a two-page summary of the history of Office of Administrative
Services accomplishments under Rousseaus leadership beginning 6 November 1974.
30
Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 24.
31
Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 25, 44. See also Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb
90, passim.
32
The personal dislocation felt by employees is not reflected in official documents.
See Intervs, authors with Richard Birner, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 2022;with Louis
Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 3338; with Brown, pp. 4446; with Damm, 9
Aug 89, pp. 1417; with Reimer Delpin, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1314; with Saul Fraint, 9
Jun 90, Vienna, Austria, pp. 3336; with Karl Greulich, 15 Jun 90, Frankfurt, pp. 3132; with
Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp. 4147; with John Shadday, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 67, 14; with
Stanley Sikirica, 29 Jul 90, Frankfurt; with Washington, pp. 3637; with Ralph Wheeler, 12
Feb 91, Arlington, Va.; with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 25; with Zawisza, pp. 21, 2934.
33
Briefing, Dir, USACAG, for Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson, Jr., 13 Oct 61, Mil Files XII
431, OH HQUSACE.
34
Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 1516.
35
Interv, Paul K. Walker with Hasso Damm, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, pp. 1617.
36
On the persistence of the tension, see Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Norman G.
Delbridge, Jr., 14 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 4044.
37
Materials for Gribble Visit, Personnel Status, 21 Mar 75, and chart dated 1 Jan 75
among EUD charts and graphics for briefings; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 Oct 75, quarterly
report, and Gribbles reply, 8 Dec 75, both in EUD-RHA, M112.
38
Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 11 September 1975, EUD-RHA, M19. Memo, Prentiss to
HQDA (DAEN-EPA-U), 12 Sep 75, sub: Proposed Civilian Manpower Reduction, p. 2,
EUD-RHA, M112.
39
Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 8 December 1975, EUD-RHA, M112; for the suggestion
of temporary help, specifically for the Office of Administrative Services, see Command
Inspection, Aug 75, p. 18, EUD-RHA, M19.
40
Command Inspection, Aug 75, p. 14, and Prentiss reply of 11 Nov 75 to this Rpt, p.
1112, both in EUD-RHA, M19.
41
Interv, authors with Prentiss, pp. 1012, 4041, quotation from the latter pages; see
also Min of EUD Staff Mtg, 2 Sep 75, EUD-RHA, M111.
422
2/3/06 11:06:52 AM
Notes
Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 3031, and with Washington, pp. 3738.
A number of sources contribute to this account of the struggle over Greenes
retirement. See Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 12, 4044; with Cox, pp. 1011, 1719;
with Greene, pp. 4653; with McNeely, pp. 1516, 2123; with Townsley, pp. 2122; with
Washington, pp. 3334, 6364, 7778. See also Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976; Min of
Staff Mtg, 2 Sep 75.
44
Command Inspection, Aug 75, pp. 2, 4, 13.
45
On the problems of turnover, see ibid., pp. 1112, and Prentiss Memo of November
1975 responding to this Rpt, pp. 89, EUD-RHA, M19; see also Interv, authors with
Kathleen Johnson, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 68, and Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to
Employees during Mar. 1981, p. 3, provided by General Withers.
46
Finance and Accounting Systems, [n.d., probably between May and August 1975],
EUD-RHA, M19; EUD Organizational Charts, 1 Aug, 6 Sep 74, 1 Jun 75.
47
On the fourteen-column ledgers, see Interv, authors with Townsley, p. 20; see also
Interv, authors with Washington, pp. 3536, and with Johnson, pp. 1314; Annual Report
USAREUR, 1974, p. 122, chart 4.
48
Materials for Gribble Visit, Management Information Systems, 18 Mar 75, pp. 12;
Command Inspection, Aug 75, pp. 1112.
49
On Washingtons recruiting in the United States, see Intervs, authors with Johnson,
p. 5, and with Washington, pp. 5758; more generally, see Interv, authors with McNeely,
pp. 1015; EUD Briefing for Command Inspection [n.d., but a Delbridge briefing], EUDRHA, M19.
50
Draft functions manual, 6 Mar 74, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. See also Interv, authors
with Wheeler, pp. 39, 19, and Debriefing Rpt, Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan to CINC
USAREUR and Seventh Army, 22 Aug 74, p. 3, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
51
Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 39, 19; Donovan to CINC USAREUR and Seventh
Army, 22 Aug 74, p. 3; Msg, Maj. Gen. [D. A.] Raymond to Donovan, 19 Aug 74, EUDRHA, M111.
52
Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 35. See also a draft of Prentiss first Ltr to chief of
engineers [September/October 1974], p. 7, EUD-RHA, M112, and Fact Sheet, Analysis
of USAEDE Organization, 15 Aug 74, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
53
Peculiarities of the Europe Division, 29 Sep 82, in a briefing book for Maj. Gen.
Ames S. Albro, Jr., European Trip, 22 Oct 82, Mil Files XIV18a, OH HQUSACE; see also
the citations for the next several paragraphs, all of which bear on this issue of the Design
Branch.
54
Intervs, authors with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 4548, and 12 Dec 91, pp.
514.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Interv, Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin with Joe G. Higgs, May 87,
Frankfurt, pp. 15052.
58
Design Workload: Inhouse, Indirect, & Direct, graphics chart for briefings, EUDRHA, unmarked box of graphics and transparencies; Intervs, authors with Brettschneider,
26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 4748.
59
Analysis of USAEDE Organization, 15 Aug 74, p. 3; Intervs, authors with Wheeler,
pp. 311, 19, 2223; with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 3536; with Faust, pp. 4951;
with Shadday, pp. 67; with Prentiss, pp. 1718.
60
Intervs, authors with Wheeler, pp. 89; with Delbridge, pp. 5758; with Prentiss, pp.
1617. Delbridge Briefing on EUD, n.d. [late 1977?], Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE.
Organization charts for EUD provided by Reimer Delpin show that the Design Branch
existed in May 1976 but no longer existed in September.
42
43
423
2/3/06 11:06:52 AM

Quoted passages are from Ltr, Prentiss to Maj. Gen. B. C. Burnell, 13 February 1976,
which includes a copy of the original agreement, EUD-RHA, M19. See also Ltr, Prentiss
to Gribble, 10 October 1974.
62
Intervs, authors with Zawisza, pp. 3334; with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp. 4344; with
Prentiss, p. 10; with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, pp. 2829.
63
Interv, authors with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, p. 29.
64
Ibid.; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974.
65
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974.
66
Debriefing Report, [Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan] to Commander in Chief , US
Army, Europe, and Seventh Army, 22 Aug 74, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Ltr, Prentiss
to Burnell, 13 February 1976 with attachments, and handwritten notes, Problems To
Discuss w/ Gen. Morris, [August 1975], both in EUD-RHA, M19; Ltr, Prentiss to
Gribble, 10 October 1974.
67
Interv, authors with Wheeler, p. 19.
68
Briefing graphics, The European Division, The Cutting Edge of New Ideas! A Case
Study on FE Support, [1975], EUD-RHA, P711; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October
1974; Fact Sheet prepared for the visit of Gen Gribble, 2326 Mar 75, Support to Facilities
Engineers, 21 Mar 75, for this and the preceding paragraph, EUD-RHA, M17.
69
Interv, authors with Washington, pp. 8488, and with Prentiss, pp. 1922.
70
The quoted passages are from Interv, authors with Wheeler, pp. 1922. See also Min
of Staff Mtg, 7 Jan 75, p. 2, EUD-RHA, M111; OCE Comments on OSD Draft Report, 28
Feb 75, p. 5; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 14 July 1975, Quarterly Rpt, EUD-RHA, M112; EUD
Briefing [by Delbridge], n.d. [late 1977], pp. 1821, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE;
EUD Bulletin, January 1977, p. 1; EUD Facilities Support to USAREUR, FY 1976 1st
Quarter Briefing, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
71
For the quotations, see Command Inspection, Aug 75, p. 1112, 20, EUD-RHA,
M19.
72
Quoted passages are from Ltr, Prentiss to Maj. Gen. B. C. Burnell, 13 February 1976,
and the attachments thereto, respectively, EUD-RHA, M19. See also Problems To
Discuss w/ Gen. Morris, EUD-RHA, M19. General Morris headed the inspection team.
73
Intervs, authors with Washington, pp. 8488, and with Prentiss, pp. 1922.
74
In late 1975 the position formerly titled engineer, USAREUR and Seventh Army,
was redesignated deputy chief of staff, engineer, USAREUR. Quotations and material
for this paragraph are drawn from Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976, EUD-RHA,
M17.
75
Ltr, Prentiss to Burnell, 13 February 1976. See also Problems To Discuss w/Gen.
Morris; Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 4046.
76
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976.
77
Min of Staff Mtg, 11 May 76, pp. 12, EUD-RHA, M19.
78
Min of Staff Mtg, 25 May 76 [Delbridges first meeting], pp. 12, and similar
minutes, 7 Jun 76, p. 1, EUD-RHA, M19.
79
Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 4041.
80
Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Jun 76, p. 1, EUD-RHA, M19.
81
Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 5254, 6567.
82
Unmarked box of old bulletins and editions of Corps Line, EUD-RHA. Before
Kappas arrival, several issues of an EUD Information Bulletin had appeared. Kappa
dropped Information from the title and began renumbering issues with Volume 1,
Number 1, in November 1976.
83
Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 6568; see also minutes of staff meetings for 1976
and 1977, especially Gary Loews handwritten notes from the meetings. Loew was hired
by Prentiss as administrative assistant and continued under Delbridge. The notes are
61
424
2/3/06 11:06:52 AM
Notes
among a set of handwritten minutes to staff meetings that Loew recorded, in EUD-RHA,
M112. Also Interv, authors with Schempp, pp. 1825.
84
Interv, authors with Col. Carlyle Charles (Ret.), 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 2324.
85
Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 99102; the same rendition of the quotation
from Snow appears almost word for word in Gary Loews handwritten notes, EUD-RHA,
M112.
86
MFR, Delbridge, sub: Fund Accountability, 28 May 76, EUD-RHA, M19.
87
The description in this and the next several paragraphs is derived from the minutes
of the weekly staff meetings and from Intervs, authors with Charles, pp. 2325; with
Shadday, p. 11; with Delpin, pp. 1920; with Birner, pp. 1314; with Wheeler, pp. 3134;
with Brown, pp. 5758; with Trowbridge, pp. 1618; with Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio, 6 Jun 90,
Stuttgart, pp. 4851; with Jose Cruz, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex., pp. 4144.
88
The comments quoted are from Intervs, authors with Brown, pp. 5758, and
with Charles, pp. 2325; Interv, William C. Baldwin with Allan B. Aaron, 2122 Jun 88,
Frankfurt, p. 106. Delbridges retrospective assessment of the boards usefulness may be
found in his interview by authors, pp. 99102.
89
Min of Staff Mtg, 24 Jan 77 (not in Loews handwriting), EUD-RHA, M112.
90
For this and the following paragraph, see Ltr, Delbridge to All Employees, 20 June
1977, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, which traces the history of Delbridges efforts concerning
personnel.
91
Ibid. See also EUD Briefing by Delbridge, n.d. [late 1977], Bouchereau Papers, OH
HQUSACE.
92
Min (handwritten) of Staff Mtg, 21 Mar 77, point C, Garrett/McNeely Observations
on Trip, and 19 Apr 77, EUD-RHA, M112.
93
Min of Staff Mtg, 23 May 77, EUD-RHA, M112; Ltr, Delbridge to All Employees, 20
June 1977; Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 4952.
94
Hail to Our Chiefs, Corps Line, March 1978; Min of Staff Mtg, 3 Oct 77, EUD-RHA,
M112; Info Bulletin, EUD, 1 Nov 76; Interv, authors with Cruz, pp. 18.
95
Intervs, authors with Delbridge, pp. 4546, 5658, and with Joe G. Higgs, 23 Jan 90,
Frankfurt, p. 10, and 6 Jan 91, Cincinnati, Ohio, pp. 1115; Interv, Walker and Baldwin
with Higgs, pp. 111, 134.
96
The quoted phrases are respectively from Ltr, Burnell to Prentiss, 25 May 1976,
EUD-RHA, M19, and Ltr, Prentiss to Morris, 26 January 1977, Mil Files XII4112, OH
HQUSACE. Examples of Prentisss correspondence with Delbridge, Burnell, and Morris
may be found as follows: Ltrs, Prentiss to Delbridge, 1 June 1976, and to Burnell, 21 June
1976, both in Mil Files X 114112, OH HQUSACE, and Prentiss to Morris, 8 Nov 76, NA,
RG 77, Access. no. 860008, Box 6, RC 10270355.
97
In addition to the correspondence among Prentiss, Burnell, and Delbridge
mentioned in the preceding footnote, the description of this situation is derived from
comments in authors interviews with Delbridge, pp. 4952; with Charles, pp. 1819,
2427, 43; with Wheeler, pp. 3134; with Wilson, pp. 5558; with Prentiss, pp. 5355.
98
The quoted phrases in this paragraph and the passage in the next paragraph
concerning Delbridges position come from his lengthy letter of 4 November 1977,
USAREUR Suggested Changes in the Way EUD Does Business, EUD-RHA, M19. This
is a reply to Prentiss proposals, contained in Prentiss letter to Burnell, 8 September 1977,
referred to in Delbridges letter.
99
Interv, Frank N. Schubert with Lt. Gen. Ernest Graves (USA, Ret.), Mar, Apr 85,
Arlington, Va., pp. 114, 11718, 123, 185, OH HQUSACE.
100
101
Ibid.; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 13235, quotation from pp.
17778.
425
2/3/06 11:06:53 AM

Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78; Memo, Gary Loew, 25 May 78, sub:
In-Processing Procedures, EUD-RHA, Hist Files; Ltr, Delbridge to Brig. Gen. Richard M.
Connell, OCE, 9 December 1977, EUD-RHA, M19; Ltr, Brig. Gen. Drake Wilson to Lt.
Gen. John W. Morris, 2 October 1978, EUD-RHA, M112. For figures on staff strength,
see also Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1975, Quarterly Rpt Ltr, EUD-RHA, M112,
and EUD in Perspective, 197678, a spiral-bound survey of EUDs programs (no page
numbers) which the division put out in 1978.
103
Interv, authors with Delbridge, pp. 1, 3236, 3839.
104
Interv, authors with Herbert Wooten, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt/Bonames, pp. 37, 1314,
1619. The quotation is from p. 22.
105
The quotations are, respectively, from MFR, William E. Camblor, 29 Dec 75, sub:
Conference with Mediterranean Division (MDD) on Procedures in Italy, Turkey, and
Greece, p. 3, and Min of Staff Mtg, 27 Jan 76, both in EUD-RHA, Misc Docs. For the
paragraph in general, see also Arrivals and Departures, and MED Area, in EUD
Information Bulletin, 1 Mar, 1 Dec 76, respectively; Intervs, authors with Wooten, pp.
67, 1314, 1617, and with Delbridge, pp. 1, 3236, 3839.
106
107
Interv, authors with Wooten, p. 13; TUSEG History, 19651984, unpaginated,
provided by TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey.
108
Interv, authors with Cruz, pp. 4654.
109
Intervs, authors with Birner, pp. 1618; with Brown, pp. 5758; with Helga
Butschan, 16 Jun 90, Kriftel, Germany, pp. 4850; with Charles, pp. 25, 43; with Damm,
9 Aug 89, p. 17; with Delpin, pp. 1920; with Dodd Rufe, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, p. 29; with
Zoltan Varga, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany, p. 10.
102
Chapter 8
Delbridge Bids Farewell, Corps Line, July 1978.
[Press Release], n.d. [Aug 78], sub: Brig. Gen. Delbridge Reassigned, EUD-RHA,
unmarked box, on file with documents from this project at OH HQUSACE; Biography,
Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson, 29 Aug 80, OH HQUSACE. For a discussion of Wilsons positions in
19711973 with VII Corps and the 7th Engineer Brigade, of which he was assistant engineer,
see Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson, 9 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va., pp. 2932.
3
Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 11011; also Intervs, authors with Hasso Damm, 9
Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 18, 2324, and with Wilson. Staff Mtg notes, 1 Aug 78, EUD-RHA,
M111; Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 1928; Intervs, authors with Terry Trowbridge, 10
Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 1618, and with Jose Cruz, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex., pp. 4445.
4
For this and the next paragraph, see chart on Personnel Trends in the pamphlet
EUD in Perspective, 19761978, [1978 pamphlet, no page numbers]; Engineers Build
Up on Personnel, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78.
5
Min of Staff Mtg, 30 Oct 78, EUD-RHA, M111, comments by Tom Turner in
Personnel; Min of Staff Mtg, 12 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M112.
6
Interv, authors with Wilson, pp. 4849; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, 20,
21, 27 May 1987, pp. 13436; Min of Staff Mtg, 12 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M112.
7
Bruce H. Siemon and Roland E. Wagberg, Employment of Local Nationals, p. 9394;
8
Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 2829; Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 611.
9
Interv, authors with Wilson, pp. 4849; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp.
13436; Min of Staff Mtg, 12 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M112; Interv, authors with Damm, 12
Dec 91, pp. 910; Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 5052.
1
2
426
2/3/06 11:06:53 AM
Notes
Interv, Walker with Damm, pp. 3032.
EUD Program Review & Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 79, chart on personnel strength
for FY 79, with explanations, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and with EUD/Glasgow Documents,
OH HQUSACE.
12
Ltr, Wilson to Lt. Gen. Morris, 27 June 1979, sub: Status of Projects, with EUD/
Glasgow Docs at OH HQUSACE; Min of Staff Mtg, 14 Aug 79, EUD-RHA, M112; EUD
Program Review & Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 79, chart on personnel strength for FY 79;
EUD Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter, FY 80, chart on personnel strength, p.
21, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
13
Min of Staff Mtgs, 12, 20 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M112; Interv, authors with Joe G.
Higgs, 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, Ohio, pp. 8992.
14
Min of Staff Mtg, 13 Nov 78, EUD-RHA, M111.
15
Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study, Apr 85, p. 86, EUDRHA, M18.
16
Interv, authors with Wilson, pp. 1213.
17
Intervs, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, pp. 2021, and with Wilson, pp. 2125,
4144.
18
Discussion paper, R. Washington, Elimination of the Area Offices, 5 May 80,
EUD-RHA, M18. For this and subsequent paragraphs, see Intervs, authors with Dave
Cox, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 710, and with Cruz, pp. 3441.
19
For this and the next paragraph, see Disposition Form (DF), J. Bouchereau, 14
Jul 80, sub: Field and Construction Division Reorganization, Bouchereau Papers, OH
HQUSACE.
20
EUD Permanent Orders 51, 8 Sep 80, and 61, 9 Sep 80.
21
Interv, authors with Trowbridge, pp. 34.
22
Ibid.
23
Interv, authors with Wilson, p. 10.
24
Ibid.
25
Memo, A. Aaron, 28 Mar 80, EUD-RHA Misc Docs, see also similar documents in
M112; Phillips Memorial, Corps Line, June/July 1980.
26
Intervs, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 36; with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, p. 36;
with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, p. 7; with Trowbridge, pp. 2224; with Jakoba Schempp, 12 Dec
91, Frankfurt, pp. 3637, 4143.
27
Ltr, Wilson to American Battle Monuments Commission, 6 June 1980, EUD-RHA,
M112; Interv, authors with Wilson, p. 10.
28
Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. George K. Withers, Jr., 11 Feb 91, Washington, D.C.,
pp. 46, for this and the following paragraph.
29
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 28 January 1981, EUD-RHA, M21; Withers Command
Briefing to EUD Employees, Mar 81, and Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 13 May 1981, OH
HQUSACE; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 18486; Interv, authors with
Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 9496. The most complete description of this staff officers work is in
Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Douglas Lamothe, 3 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 27, 2526.
30
Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 1112, and with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 2526;
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 18486.
31
FY 82: Success & Smoother Sailing, Corps Line, October 1982; Interv, Walker and
Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 18486; Interv, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 9496.
32
Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 1112.
33
Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 2526.
34
SAME Announces Engineering Awards, Engineer Update, May 1982; Employees
Receive S.A.M.E. Awards, Corps Line, July 1982. The quoted passages are from the award
citation; Interv, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 3038. Higgs also received a Meritorious
10
11
427
2/3/06 11:06:53 AM

Civilian Service Award in 1983, the Presidential Meritorious Executive Rank Award in
1985, and the Presidential Distinguished Executive Award in 1988.
35
MFR, 16 Mar 81, sub: LTG Bratton Europe Visit, 112 Mar 81; see also Ltr, Withers to
Bratton, 28 January 1981, both in EUD-RHA, M21.
36
Withers to EUD Employees, Mar 81, p. 3, typescript copy provided by Withers.
37
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 13 May 1981, EUD-RHA, M21; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 17
September 1981, provided by Withers; Interv, authors with Kathleen Johnson, 10 Dec 91,
38
Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 13 May, 17 September 1981.
39
EUD CONUS Recruiting Team Report, [internal dating, MarJun 81], EUD-RHA,
M21.
40
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 17 September 1981.
41
Ibid.; Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 2932, and with Washington, pp. 3740,
7778; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 13 May 1981.
42
Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 1620, and with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt,
pp. 37, 85; Special Award, Corps Line, November 1981.
43
Ltrs, Withers to Lt. Gen. Bratton, 20 January, 3 May 1982; MFR, Seitz, 20 Apr 82, all
in EUD-RHA, M21.
44
Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 2 October 1978; Min of Staff Mtgs, 5, 26 Mar 79; Ltr, Wilson
to Morris, 27 June 1979, sub: Status of Projects, all in EUD-RHA, M112; DF, Col. R. E.
Abbott, 19 Apr 82, sub: New EUD Annex, EUD-RHA, M21; also More Space Coming
Up, Corps Line, August 1982.
45
Interv, authors with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, pp. 3032.
46
Ltr, Prentiss to Lt. Gen. Morris, 26 January 1977, sub: DCSENG USAREUR Quarterly
Report, p. 6.
47
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 14445; Interv, authors with Higgs, 23
Jan 90, pp. 3235.
48
Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 3536; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982, p. 2
49
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982, p. 2.
50
Corps Line, July 1982.
51
DF, Records Management Office (RMO), Walker, 1 Jul 82, sub: Establishment of
Planning Branch, Engineering Division, p. 2, EUD-RHA, M16.
52
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 121, 189; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen.
James van Loben Sels, 12 Apr 91, Fort Monroe, Va., pp. 6465.
53
The description of master planning services comes from U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Europe Division, Customer Handbook, 10 Nov 86 (draft), pp. 3839
(hereafter cited as Customer Handbook); see also Interv, authors with Debra Dale, 13
Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 47.
54
Intervs, authors with Dale, pp. 715, and with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 3536.
55
Customer Handbook, 10 Nov 86, pp. 3839; Comprehensive Planning Yields
Better Design, Corps Line, May 1986; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs,
pp. 14546; Ltrs, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February, 7 August 1989, EUD-RM (Records
Management).
56
Facilities, Services Receive Push, Engineer Update, December 1988.
57
Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 3235; Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 82;
Information Paper, Master Planning in USAREUR and EUD, 22 Oct 82, tab 22; Briefing
Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Mil Files XIV18a, OH HQUSACE;
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 14249.
58
Interv, authors with Blake, pp. 8688; see also Construction Placement History
Supports Mission, Quality of Life, Corps Line, September 1990.
59
Interv, authors with Cox, pp. 1921, 2628.
428
2/3/06 11:06:53 AM
Notes
Interv, authors with Richard Grimm, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 1013; Ltr,
Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982.
61
Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 4445.
62
Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 8993.
63
Memo, Maj. Gen. Warren C. Moore, HQ TUSLOG (USAFE), to US Personnel in Turkey,
7 Nov 77, sub: Background Information, provided by TUSEG Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey.
64
U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Military Construction Appropriations,
Hearings on Military Construction Appropriations for 1982, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 1981,
p. 551; TUSEG History, 19651984; Intervs, authors with Cruz, pp. 2129, and with Maj.
Gen. James W. Ray, 5 Feb 90, Heidelberg, pp. 3237.
65
The story of Rhoades efforts in Turkey in the following paragraphs can be found in
TUSEG History, 19651984; Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 68; Corps Line, July 1982.
66
TUSEG History, 19651984; Intervs, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 68, and with
Veronica Rovero, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 1718.
67
Interv, authors with Julia Pat Hensley, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 34.
68
Memo, Col. Cowles for the Commander [EUD], 8 Oct 81, sub: Trip Report, Turkey,
October 1981, p. 2, TUSEG Area Office Files.
69
Ibid., p. 1, including the quotation concerning work at Erzurum.
70
Ibid. p. 4.
71
TUSEG History, 19651984; Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 45.
72
TUSEG History, 19651984.
73
Intervs, authors with Ray, pp. 3237; with R. Grimm, pp. 3942; with Blake, 1, 6 Feb
90, pp. 6668.
74
Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 3942.
75
Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 66; with Rovero (from which the quotation in the
first sentence is taken), pp. 810, 1416; with R. Grimm, pp. 68; with Hensley, pp. 1213.
76
Employees Receive S.A.M.E. Awards, Corps Line, July 1982, p. 3; Ltr, Withers to
Bratton, 3 May 1982.
77
Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Scott B. Smith, 29 Apr, 2 May 91, Golden, Colo., pp.
128, 13233.
78
Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 4145, and with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 2627; Interv,
Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 11618. Aaron described the procedures as sloppy. See also
Interv, authors with Trowbridge, pp. 1819, 2425, 3032.
79
Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 2024.
80
Ibid., pp. 10506.
81
DF, 29 Apr 76, sub: Decentralization within EUD, EUD-RHA, M19; Intervs,
authors with Col. Carlyle Charles, 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 2830, and with Blake, 1, 6 Feb
90, pp. 47.
82
Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 10507, and with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 47.
83
84
Ibid., pp. 2024.
85
The quotations come respectively from Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 5658,
and with Richard Wisdom, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1920.
86
Interv, authors with Wisdom, pp. 1920.
87
For the first quotation, see Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 20 January 1982; for the second,
see Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 2 May 1982, both in EUD-RHA, M21. For additional
indications that all was not well, see Intervs, authors with Withers, pp. 5658; with
Wilson, pp. 1213, 58; with Smith, pp. 2024; with van Loben Sels, pp. 4549.
88
Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 2426; Ltrs, Smith to Bratton, 19 February 1984, and
Smith to Wells, 19 February 1984, both in Civil Works File I201, OH HQUSACE; see also
Plan for Design and Construction of USAFE Facilities, 29 Mar 85, EUD-RHA, M110.
60
429
2/3/06 11:06:54 AM

Memorandum of Agreement, attached to Ltr, Prentiss to Burnell, 13 February
1976, EUD-RHA, M19; William C. Baldwin, The Engineer Studies Center and Army
Analysis: A History of the U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center, 19431982 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 24551.
90
Ltr, Smith to Bratton, 19 February 1984; Interv, authors with Andrew Constantaras,
30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 3334.
91
92
MFR, 2 Apr 84, sub: Mobilization Planning for EUD [on a meeting conducted with
Smith on 30 Mar 84]; Fact Sheet [prepared by Lt. Col. Harvey T. Kaplan], 24 May 84,
Mobilization Planning and Exercises for EUD; Memorandum of Agreement draft, 17 Jul
84 [on Regional Wartime Construction Manager organization]. All in Civil Works Files,
I201, OH HQUSACE.
93
Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 5456; see also Interv, authors with Lt. Col.
John Carson, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 89.
94
95
Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 118, 119; Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89,
pp. 1820, 2627.
96
Interv, authors with Smith, p. 132.
97
Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 130.
98
On van Loben Sels, see particularly Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 2122,
and Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 119; see also Intervs, authors with Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio,
6 Jun 90, Stuttgart, pp. 33, 34; with Lt. Col. Grosvenor W. Fish, Jr., 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, p.
30; with Constantaras, pp. 3132; with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 3839; with Russell Minton,
18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex., pp. 1921; with Schempp, pp. 6163.
99
Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 3436, 7778.
100
Ibid., pp. 7274.
101
102
Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 7778; see also Intervs, authors with
Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 2730, and with Minton, pp. 3945.
103
Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study, Apr 85, p. 86, for the
two quoted passages, and pp. xiiixiv for the recommendations, EUD-RHA, M18.
104
DF from van Loben Sels, 12 Feb 85, EUD-RHA, M1101; Interv, authors with van
Loben Sels, p. 3741; Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 121.
105
WRSCC Memo, Don Spiegelmeyer to Ray Walker, 16 Aug 84, sub: EUD
Organization Study, EUD-RHA, M110.
106
Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], pp. 56, sec. 5.2e.
107
Ibid., p. 34; Materials for Gribble Visit, Management Information Systems, Fact
Sheet, 18 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Staff Mtg Notes, 23 Oct 78, pp. 2, 5, EUD-RHA,
M111.
108
Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], p. 34; Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Oct 75,
p. 4, EUD-RHA, M111; Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 2 October 1978; Min of Staff Mtg, 3 Apr 79,
EUD-RHA, M112.
109
Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 3944; Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 20 January, 3 May
1982, both in EUD-RHA, M211; Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], p. 11.
110
111
Information Systems Planning Study, EUD, [1985], p. 57.
112
Ibid., pp. 11, 31, 517.
113
114
Ibid., p. 21; Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp. 5862; Brig. Gen. Ray, Opening
Remarks to the Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 86, printout of speech furnished by the
EUD Executive Office, now with project materials at OH HQUSACE; EUD Will Have
89
430
2/3/06 11:06:54 AM
Notes
Information Management Division, Corps Line, February 1986; Interv, authors with
Minton, pp. 2834.
115
Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, p. 20.
116
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, 22, 27 May 87, Frankfurt,
pp. 1517, 6769.
117
Intervs, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, p. 30; with Minton, pp. 6061; with Dale, p.
54; with Constantaras, pp. 3132; with Carson, pp. 3536; with Schempp, pp. 6371; with
Col. Dan Waldo, 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 7172; with J. Dodd Rufe, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt,
p. 28.
118
Interv, authors with Minton, pp. 4959; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, p. 175.
119
Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 124; Interv, authors with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp.
5657; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 6769.
120
EUD will have Information Management Division, Corps Line, February 1986;
General Rays Remarks to Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 86; Interv, authors with
Minton, pp. 2834.
121
122
Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, p. 44; Assistant Commander Stresses
Communication with Customers, Corps Line, January 1987; Engineer Officials Discuss
Construction Snags in Germany, Corps Line, May 1986; Interv, authors with van Loben
Sels, pp. 4143.
123
General Rays Remarks to Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 86; Construction
Division Reorganization Is Effected, Corps Line, February 1987.
124
Memo, WRSCC to EUD, 16 Aug 84, EUD-RHA, M110.
125
Interv, authors with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 14. New Command Assignments in
Division Executive Office, Corps Line, August 1986.
126
General Rays Remarks to Local National Assembly, 19 Jun 88; Intervs, authors with
Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 4850; with Trowbridge, pp. 37; with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 34;
Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, pp. 12526.
127
Interv, authors with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 5759.
128
Interv, authors with Lamothe, pp. 35; Employees Urged To Contribute to Model
Division Program, Corps Line, November 1986.
129
Ltr, Van Loben Sels to Heiberg, 16 August 1985, EUD, RM; Employees Urged To
Contribute to Model Division Program; Operation Cleanup: Model Division Initiative
Program Gets New Emphasis, Corps Line, December 1987; Contracting Seminar: Europe
Division Instructs Community Staff Members, Corps Line, May 1988.
130
Intervs, authors with Minton, pp. 4549, and with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 1720;
Interv, Baldwin and Walker with Camblor, May 87, pp. 10506.
131
The quotations come respectively from Interv, authors with Minton, pp. 4549, and
Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 7071.
132
Intervs, Walker and Baldwin with Higgs, pp. 24142; with Camblor, p. 96; with Ray,
pp. 7071. Interv, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 7478.
133
Intervs, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, p. 1821, and with van Loben Sels, pp. 4143;
Dedication to Excellence Enhances Working Relationships, Corps Line, January 1986;
Interv, authors with James Wise, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 1214.
134
Europe Division Adopts 3M Total Quality Program, Corps Line, February 1987.
135
General Ray Command Briefing, 30 Sep 87, EUD, current files.
136
Commanders Comments: EQM Means Total Quality, Corps Line, October 1987.
137
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 8587.
138
Commanders Comments: EQM Means Total Quality.
139
Phase Two of EQM Process To Begin in New Year, Corps Line, January 1988;
James Thomasson, Jr., Chief of Project Management Branch, quoted in Division Staff
431
2/3/06 11:06:54 AM

Works Long Hard Hours To Close Out the Books, Corps Line, December 1987; Daniel
Farrand, Wiesbaden Resident Office, Speaking Out, Corps Line, July 1988; Interv,
Walker and Baldwin with Rodehaver, p. 15; Staff in Reprographics, Reprographics:
The Art of Working at Art, Corps Line, August 1988; Intervs, authors with Louis
Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 6870; with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 1821;
with Dale, pp. 5354; with Minton, pp. 3839; with Trowbridge, pp. 3233; Total
Quality: New Management Process Stresses Customer Needs, Corps Line, September
1987.
140
Commanders Comments: Successful Organization Must Change with the
Environment, Corps Line, February 1988.
141
Divisions EQM Gains National Spotlight, November 1987; Total Quality
Management Process Debuts at Pentagon, February 1988; Corps Chief Addresses
Europe Division Staff, May 1988. All in Corps Line.
142
Commanders Comments, Corps Line, May 1988.
143
Corps Line photo, January 1986; Interv, authors with K. Johnson, 10 Dec 91, p. 6.
144
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Ray, pp. 7176.
Chapter 9
Interv, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, p. 63.
For the situation in 1977, see Delbridge Briefing, marked in longhand Sept.
78 revised briefing, with longhand additions, pp. 2, 3, 67, provided by Delbridge;
EUD Command Management Briefing, with attached note from Delbridge to the
Construction Division asking for comments, n.d., p. 3, Bouchereau Papers, OH
HQUSACE; No Work Shortage for EUD Engineers, in EUD Information Bulletin,
1 Dec 76. For the situation in 1987, see Command Briefing by J. W. Ray, 30 Sep 87, p. 4,
EUD computer files.
3
Delbridge, Sept. 78 Revised Briefing, pp. 2, 3, 67; [Delbridge], EUD Command
Management Briefing, p. 3; No Work Shortage for EUD Engineers; for 1986, see
Command Briefing, Brig. Gen. Harty Visit, 24 Jul 86, p. 3, EUD computer files.
4
[Delbridge], EUD Command Management Briefing, p. 3; Engineer Studies Center,
U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD): Organization Study, Apr 85, pp. 1415,
EUD-RHA, M18 (hereafter cited as ESC, USAEDE [EUD]: Organization Study).
5
Customer Handbook, pp. 67.
6
ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, 1985, p. 1113.
7
MFR, William Camblor, 29 Dec 75, sub: Conference with Mediterranean Division on
Procedures in Italy, Turkey, and Greece, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
8
Ltr, Smith to President, TEMET USA, Inc., 19 Dec 83, EUD-RHA, M16; Intervs,
authors at sites in Turkey, 20 Jun 90, pp. 4751; Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. James W.
Ray, 5 Feb 90, Heidelberg, p. 3840.
9
Interv, authors with Richard Grimm, 19 Jun 91, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 13.
10
Intervs, authors with Ray, p. 3840; with Julia Pat Hensley, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik,
Turkey, pp. 1920; with R. Grimm, pp. 13.
11
EUD Engineering Division, West German Governmental Infrastructure and Its
Relationship with Europe Division Construction Mission, 15 Jul 82, pp. 23, EUD-RHA,
M21; Materials for Gribble Visit, US ForcesFederal Republic of Germany (US-FRG)
Proposed Architect-Engineer-Construction Agreement (1975), 17 Mar 75, p. 1, EUDRHA, Misc Docs.
12
West German Governmental Infrastructure, pp. 34.
13
Ibid.
1
2
432
2/3/06 11:06:54 AM
Notes
Ibid.
Presentation of the Department of the Army Outstanding Civilian Service
Award to Dipl[om].-Ing[enieur]. Viktor Krupinski, Director, Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe,
Frankfurt, 26 Feb 76, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
16
Interv, Baldwin with Aaron, p. 97.
17
Ltr, Withers to Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., HQ USACE, n.d. [Sep 82?], for this and
the next several paragraphs, EUD-RHA, M21.
18
Intervs, authors with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 45, and with Terry Trowbridge, 10
Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 2530; Ltr, Withers to Albro [Sep 82?], for Withers quoted remarks;
Ltr, Withers to Albro, HQ USACE, 2 Oct 81, provided by Withers; ABG 75 Outlines
German Involvement in U.S. Projects, Corps Line, July 1986.
19
20
Ibid.
21
ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, ann. F, p. F5.
22
Customer Handbook, pp. 10, 1213.
23
See Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Robert Baldinger, 23 Aug 89, Hoensbroek,
Netherlands, p. 2531; see also Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, probably
prepared in summer 1976], pp. 1315, 1718, 2527, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and Users
Manual, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, 1 Apr 78, pp. 2527 (hereafter cited as
Users Manual).
24
Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 1315, 1718, 2527; Users
Manual, pp. 2325. The Users Manual parallels Delbridges briefing on process, but
contains more on other topics. For the 1980s, see Customer Handbook, p. 30.
25
Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 1718, 2527.
26
Ibid.
27
Ibid.
28
Customer Handbook, p. 14.
29
Ibid., pp. 1617; ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, pp. F5, F6.
30
31
Users Manual, pp. 3941.
32
Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 1718; Customer Handbook, p.
10; Interv, authors with Baldinger, p. 3233.
33
Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 1718.
34
Users Manual, p. 36; ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, p. 13.
35
On value engineering, see MFR, Jacques Bouchereau, 1 Nov 83, and draft Ltr,
30 September 1983, prepared by Fred Wissel for William Camblors signature, both in
Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Customer Handbook, pp. 4750; Interv, authors
with Dave Cox, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 48, and with Joe G. Higgs, 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati,
Ohio, pp. 6774. The discussion in subsequent paragraphs is drawn from these sources.
36
Customer Handbook, p. 48.
37
Intervs, authors with Ray, pp. 4648; with Col. John Moravec, 19 Jan 90, Frankfurt,
pp. 3335; with Lt. Col. C. Leslie Rose, 14 Jun 90, Wrzburg, pp. 2732.
38
Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], p. 12.
39
Historical Review, USAREUR, 19851986. Ltr, Prentiss to Morris, 26 January 1977,
Mil Files XII4112, OH HQUSACE.
40
Delbridge, incomplete draft for a briefing paper, prepared for delivery after October
1977, pp. 1821, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Materials for Gribble Visit, Fact
Sheet: Volume of Projects in Programs, 20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, M17.
41
Europe Division, EUD in Perspective, 19761978, section Construction
Execution, spiral-bound pamphlet, 1978, page bearing the subhead MCA Program
Execution, EUD, current files.
14
15
433
2/3/06 11:06:55 AM

Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 27 June 1979, sub: Status of Projects, Gen Files, Box 5931,
OH HQUSACE.
43
Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], p. 13.
44
Ltr, Prentiss to Morris, 26 January 1977.
45
Users Manual, p. 19; Briefing on EUDs Mission, [Delbridge, 1976], pp. 1112.
On U.S. Special Programs money, see Memo, Maj. Gen. Richard Groves to Prentiss, 5 Mar
75, sub: NATO Infrastructure: OFFSET, EUD-RHA, M19.
46
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 10102.
47
Interv, authors with Camblor, 11 Dec 91, pp. 1416.
48
The list of eligible categories comes from a pamphlet issued by NATO entitled
NATO Common Infrastructure.
49
LTG Bratton Europe Visit 112 Mar. 1981, p. 398.
50
ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, p. 15; West German Governmental
Infrastructure; and Interv, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 6870.
51
ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, p. 15; West German Governmental
Infrastructure; Interv, William C. Baldwin and Paul K. Walker with William E. Camblor,
20, 28 May 87, Frankfurt, p. 86.
52
EUD in Perspective, 197678.
53
In addition to EUD in Perspective 197678, see telex communiqu, 18 May 78,
sub: Support of Construction for USSA-I, Teheran, Iran, Conversation between General
Delbridge and Connell, Week of 8 May 78, Transatlantic Program Center Records Holding
Area, Hist Files, location E52, Winchester, Va.
54
ESC, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, p. 9.
55
Interv, authors with Rodehaver, 31 Jan 90, p. 3.
56
In general on this office, see History of the Northern Area Engineer Office (1975
1988), updated 1 Sep 88, typescript provided by the Northern Area Office.
57
EUD General Order 1, 7 Jan 76, Action to Organize Mediterranean Area Office
Effective 1 Feb 76, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
58
Ltrs, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976, and Prentiss to Burnell, 21 June 1976, both in
EUD-RHA, M17.
59
See Min of Staff Mtgs, 20 Apr, 4, 18 May, 7 Jun 76, EUD-RHA, M19; Annual
Report of Major Activities, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1 Jul. 197430 Jun. 1975, pp.
5455, and Annual Historical Review, 1 Jul. 197530 Sept. 1976, p. 37, both in Gen Files,
Box 8, File 1, OH HQUSACE; EUD in Perspective 197678, sections on Current Design
Programs: Iran and Construction Execution: Iran.
60
Med Area to Navy, Corps Line, September 1980; Memorandum of Agreement
between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command, 26 Jan 80, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Interv, Baldwin with Camblor,
pp. 8082.
61
The figures in Table 10 are for 1979 Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter FY
1979, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs, and for 1980 from
Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 1980, U.S. Army Engr Div, Europe,
EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
62
Program Review and Analysis, 4th Quarter FY 1979, U.S. Army Engineer
Division, Europe, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
63
Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Grosvenor Fish, Jr., 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, p. 12.
64
Memo, Col. Robert Baldinger to all Members of EUD-NO [Northern Area Office], 4
Jan 88, sub: FY 87 ReviewNorthern Area, p. 1, provided by the Northern Area Office.
65
History of the Northern Area Engineer Office (19751988); Periodic Rpt, Ray to
Heiberg, 27 Feb 86, EUD, RM, current files.
66
Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 3840.
42
434
2/3/06 11:06:55 AM
Notes
Ibid., pp. 3237; EUD Engr Div, briefing item for Withers, 22 Sep 82, sub: FY 84
MCAF Airbase Upgrade, various locations, Turkey, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Interv, authors
with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 6566.
68
Ltrs, Heiberg to Gen. Otis, CINCUSAREUR, 20 December 1984, EUD-RHA, M16,
and Ray to Heiberg, 15 August 1986; Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 4243; Interv, Baldwin
and Walker with Camblor, pp. 8081; Interv, William C. Baldwin and Paul Walker with
Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, 22, 27 May 87, Frankfurt, pp. 8284, Intervs at OH HQUSACE.
69
Greece Resident Office: Another Bad Day in Paradise, Corps Line, February
1988. The programs involved in the 1980s, the Long Range Security Program (LRSP) and
Weapons Access Denial System (WADS), are discussed in Chapter 10.
70
Interv, authors with R. Grimm, pp. 910.
71
Interv, authors with Hensley, pp. 1819.
72
Interv, authors with Veronica Rovero, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey, pp. 1617.
73
Interv, authors with Cox, pp. 4041.
74
Interv, authors with Rovero, pp. 2630.
67
Chapter 10
1
The information for this and the following paragraph comes from Debriefing Rpt,
Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan to CINC USAREUR and Seventh Army, 22 Aug 74, EUD-RHA,
Misc Docs; Draft Fact Sheet, prepared by Lt. Col. [George] Miller for Prentiss Signature, 31
Oct 74, EUD-RHA, M17. The final version of the Fact Sheet is dated 1 November and is
signed by Prentiss, EUD-RHA, Misc Files. See also Materials for Gribble Visit, Fact Sheet:
S&A MOUSF Funding, 17 Mar 75, and Fact Sheet: Formation of EUD, 20 Mar 75, both in
M17; Ltr, Maj. Gen. F. P. Koisch, [USAREUR] Engineer, to Ministerialdirektor Schmunk,
Abteilungsleiter U, Bundesmininsterium der Verteidigung, Bonn, 21 Jun 74, Misc Docs,
all in EUD-RHA; and Fact Sheet, Office Engineering Branch, 13 Mar 75, Supervision and
Administration, MOUSF Funding, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE.
2
Draft Fact Sheet prepared by Miller for Prentiss signature, 31 Oct 74.
3
Personnel Requirements for the MOUSF Program, n.d., attached to material filed
with MFR, Camblor, 17 Oct 74, sub: MOUSF, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; DF, USAREUR
Engineer [Maj. Gen. R. H. Groves] to Chief of Staff [USAREUR], 5 Mar 75, sub: MOUSF
Construction Surveillance, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE.
4
Annual Report, USAREUR, 1975, pp. 15456.
5
Compare Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974, to an incomplete draft marked
Lieutenant General William C. Gribble, Jr. Whole passages indicate that the latter is a
preliminary draft of the letter for 10 October 1974. The dated letter is in EUD-RHA, M1
12. See also Interv, Baldwin with Camblor, pp. 25, 6667, 86.
6
The quotation is from Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975, EUD-RHA, M112;
see also Ltr, Maj. Gen. William R. Kraft, Jr., to Div. Engr., 16 December 1974, ann. B to
Supplementary Agreement between the USAREUR Engineer and the Division Engineer,
USA Engineer Division, Europe (EUD) on the Modernization of US Facilities (MOUSF),
signed by R. H. Groves and Louis W. Prentiss, Jr., 23 Jul 75, EUD-RHA, M110.
7
DF, MOUSF Construction Surveillance; Supplementary Agreement between the
USAREUR Engineer and the Division Engineer, EUD, on MOUSF, 23 Jul 75.
8
Min of Staff Mtg, 21 Jan 76, EUD-RHA, M19.
9
Materials for Gribble Visit, Fact Sheet, Ofc Engr Br, 13 Mar 75, sub: Supervision and
Administration, MOUSF Funding, Bouchereau Papers.
10
Additional Remarks Keyed to Attachment to Fact Sheet, 23 Oct 74, sub: Duties of
MOUSF Project Officers US FRG Construction Agencies, EUD-RHA, M17.
435
2/3/06 11:06:55 AM

Ibid.
Ibid.
13
Untitled attachment to MFR by Camblor, 17 Oct 74, sub ConferenceMOUSF
Design Procedures, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
14
Memo, Delbridge to CINC USAREUR, 7 Jan 77, sub: Mechanical Kitchen Equipment
(MKE) MOUSF Renovation Projects, EUD-RHA, P711.
15
Annual Report, USAREUR, 1975, pp. 15456; USAREUR AHR, 1976, p. 155.
16
Memo, Maj. Gen. J. W. Morris, OCE, Deputy Chief of Engineers, to HQDA through
Div Engr, Europe, 26 Sep 75, sub: Command Inspection, U.S. Army Engineer Division,
Europe, 1822 August 1975, p. 5, EUD-RHA, M19.
17
Ibid.
18
Annual Report, USAREUR, 1975, pp. 15456; USAREUR AHR, 1976, p. 155.
19
USAREUR AHR, 1984, pp. 25354.
20
Typescript, Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981,
[Command Briefing], provided by Withers.
21
MFR, Louis J. Tinnerello, 3 Jul 74, sub: FY75 Physical Protection Program, VARLOC,
Min from Mtg in Mainz on Aircraft Shelter Program Held 21 Jun 74, p. 1, EUD-RHA, Misc
Docs (hereafter cited as MFR, 3 Jul 74, Mainz Mtg).
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid. See also Interv, authors with Louis Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 32.
24
MFR, 3 Jul 74, Mainz Mtg.
25
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1974, EUD-RHA, M112; Intervs, authors with
Brig. Gen. James Donovan, 20 Nov 90, Arlington, Va., pp. 5658, and with Maj. Gen. Louis
Prentiss, Jr., 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, Del., pp. 3436.
26
Intervs, authors with Prentiss, pp. 3435, and with Ralph Wheeler, 12 Feb 91,
Arlington, Va., pp. 1116.
27
See Memo, Camblor to Prentiss, 10 Dec 74, sub: Meeting with Brigadier General
Cortenraad, Director of Works, Ministry of Defense, Netherlands, 10001200 hrs, 12 Dec
74, EUD-RHA, M17.
28
Interv, authors with Wheeler, p. 1113; Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975,
EUD-RHA, M112; Memo, Camblor for Prentiss, 10 Dec 74; Materials for Gribble Visit,
Fact Sheet: Aircraft Shelter ProjectSpangdahlem Air Base, 13 Mar 75, EUD-RHA,
M17.
29
Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 18 February 1975, EUD-RHA, M19; Min of Staff Mtg, 9
Sep 75, EUD-RHA, M111.
30
Materials for Gribble Visit, Fact Sheet: Aircraft Shelter ProjectSpangdahlem Air
Base; Annual Report, [OCE], 1975, p. 41; MFR, Camblor, 12 Aug 75, sub: NetherlandsEUD Conference on Procedures for Execution of Gilze-Rijen and Soesterberg Aircraft
Shelter Projects, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Oct 75, p. 2,
EUD-RHA, M111.
31
Materials for Gribble Visit, Fact Sheet: Aircraft Protective Facilities, Lahr Air Base,
Germany, 20 Mar 75, EUD-RHA, M17; Ltrs, Prentiss to Gribble, 18 April, 14 July 1975,
EUD-RHA, M112.
32
Min of Staff Mtg, 22 Jul 75, EUD-RHA, M111.
33
Intervs, authors with Hasso Damm, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 32; with Col. Roy
Brown, 25 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands, pp. 2223, 3236, 8687; with Johann
Kersbergen, 24 Aug 89, Soesterberg, Netherlands, pp. 24.
34
Min of Staff Mtgs, 13, 21 Jan 75, and Msg, Brown to Col. N. Rhodes, sub: Contract
no. DACA 9075c0180, Airfield Shelters , both in EUD-RHA, M19.
35
For the progress of construction, see Min of Staff Mtgs, 18 May, 1 Jun 76, EUDRHA, M19; and EUD Information Bulletin, August, November, and December 1976;
11
12
436
2/3/06 11:06:55 AM
Notes
HistoryNorthern Area Office, EUD, May 1975Aug. 1978 [Aug 78], p. 1, EUD-RHA,
M112; EUD Bulletin, March 1977.
36
Intervs, authors with Brown, pp. 8387; with Kersbergen, pp. 24; with Wheeler, pp.
1116; with Prentiss, pp. 3436.
37
EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 1977, p. 10, Bouchereau Papers.
38
Annual Historical Summary, Office of the Chief of Engineers, 1 Jul. 197030 Jun.
1971, p. 35, Gen Files, 65, OH HQUSACE; Annual Report of Major Activities, Office of
the Chief of Engineers, 1 Jul. 197430 Jun. 1975 (hereafter cited as Annual Report, OCE,
1975), p. 46, Gen Files, Box 8, File 1, OH HQUSACE.
39
Fact Sheet, 20 Nov 75, sub: Transfer of Construction Responsibility South of the
Alps, p. 2, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
40
Min of Staff Mtg, 7 Jun 76, EUD-RHA, M19.
41
Min of Staff Mtgs, 7, 29 Jun 76, quotations from the latter, EUD-RHA, M19.
42
Ibid.; OCE AHR, 1976, pp. 89.
43
Delbridge, Incomplete Draft for a Briefing Paper Prepared for Delivery after
October 1977, (hereafter cited as Briefing, Delbridge, late 1977), p. 15, Bouchereau Papers,
OH HQUSACE.
44
See Europe Division, EUD in Perspective, 197678, n.d., sections on Current
Design Programs: Navy, and Construction Execution, EUD current files; Engineers
Build Up on Personnel, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78; Maturing from
Minor to Major, Corps Line, February 1979; Ltr, Wilson to Lt. Gen. Morris, 27 June 1979,
sub: Status of Projects, Gen Files, 5931, OH HQUSACE.
45
The figures used derive from two different sources that are not quite comparable
but that overlap for just two fiscal years, 1980 and 1981. The figures used for the 1970s
to 1981 come from Attachments to MFR, 16 Mar 81, sub: LTG J. K. Bratton Europe Visit,
112 Mar 81 (hereafter cited as Attachments, Bratton Visit). Attachments have no page
numbers, but the figures on MCA dollars come from a chart on what would be page 397,
Mil Files XIV1B2, OH HQUSACE. The figures for the 1980s come from USAREUR AHR,
1985 and 1986, p. 4.22.
46
Engineer Studies Center, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD):
Organization Study, Apr 85, p. 2, EUD-RHA, M18 (hereafter cited as ESC USAEDE
(EUD): Organization Study); EUD Briefing, Delbridge, late 1977, p. 18; Attachments,
Bratton Visit, p. 397.
47
Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during Mar. 1981.
48
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 115.
49
Information for this and the preceding paragraph is drawn from Upgrade &
Rehabilitation of Ammunition Storage Facilities (ASPs and PSPs), 16 Oct 73, copy
provided by Col. Claude Roberts; Brig. Gen. James C. Donovan, Cdr, USAENGCOMEUR,
to Brig. Gen. Paul M. Timmerberg, PM, HQ USAREUR & 7A, 16 Nov 73, sub: Site Criteria,
EUD-RHA, M111; Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 7330 Jun 74, pp. 3233; Interv, authors
with Carl E. Nelson, 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, pp. 4346.
50
[Fact Sheet], 20 Mar 75, sub: Improvements for the Reaction to the Terrorist Threat
to Nuclear Weapons (FY 76 MCA), EUD-RHA, M17.
51
Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. G. K. Withers, 12 Apr 91, Washington, D.C., pp. 12,
2728. Withers commanded the brigade at that time.
52
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 16771.
53
On Pastores provision of the report to the press and for general information, see
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 16771; on USAREURs earlier request
to prefinance, see Record by John L. Shadday, EUD, Chief, Army Section, of a telephone call
made to Lt. Col. Focht, OCE, sub: FY 76 MCA Project Security Improvements, SAS Sites,
31 Oct 74, and Memo, William E. Camblor to Chief, Engineer Division, 6 Dec 74, sub: FY
437
2/3/06 11:06:56 AM

76 MCA Project, Security Improvement, SAS SitesCoordination and Approval through
German and Other Host Nation Agencies, both in EUD-RHA, Misc Docs.
54
The figures on nuclear weapons are from Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces
in Germany, p. 164; for information on OCEs support, see OCE AHR, 1976, pp. 89, Gen
Files, Box 8, File 4, OH HQUSACE.
55
OCE AHR, 1976; [Fact Sheet], sub: Improvements for the Reaction to the Terrorist
Threat to Nuclear Weapons (FY 76 MCA).
56
Ltrs, Prentiss to Gribble, 17 January 1975, and Gribble to Prentiss, 18 February 1975,
EUD-RHA, M112 and M19, respectively.
57
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 18 April 1975, EUD-RHA, M112.
58
For Prentiss request that the staff find terms to differentiate, see Min of Staff Mtg,
29 Jul 75, EUD-RHA, M111; the imprecise use of terms emerges from looking at an array
of documents for the period.
59
EUD in Perspective, 197678, see page headed LRSP in section Current Design
Programs and page headed EUD Construction Execution, May 76 to Aug. 78, MCA
Program Execution, for the comparison of terms and amounts. In a letter to Lt. Gen.
John W. Morris, 26 January 1977, General Prentiss, by then DCSENG in Heidelberg, gives
slightly different numbers and a slightly different timetable.
60
EUD in Perspective, 197678, page headed LRSP; Briefing, Delbridge, late 1977,
p. 13; Delbridge Briefing, marked in longhand Sept. 78 revised briefing, with longhand
additions, p. 10, provided by Delbridge.
61
Information Paper, sub: Long Range Security Program, 29 Sep 82, tab 16, Briefing
Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Mil Files XIV18a, OH HQUSACE.
62
Report of Lessons Learned as Related to Design and Construction in EUD,
Oct 78, pp. 511, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs; Interv, authors with Wayne Lewis, 4 Jun 90,
Kaiserslautern, p. 9.
63
Interv, authors with Jose Cruz, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex., pp. 7073.
64
Wilsons comments are from Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. Drake Wilson, 29 Oct
90, Alexandria, Va., pp. 5154; see also Min of Staff Mtg, 15 Jan 79, EUD-RHA, M112;
Cruzs comment is from his interview with authors, 19 November 1991, p. 70.
65
For the information and the comment concerning the Dutch reaction, see Min of
Staff Mtg, 3 Apr 79, EUD-RHA, M112.
66
Min of Staff Mtg, 5 Feb 79, EUD-RHA, M112.
67
Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 27 June 1979, Gen Files, Box 5931, OH HQUSACE; Ltr, Withers
to Bratton, 28 Jan 81, p. 3, EUD-RHA, M21; Attachments, Bratton Visit, 16 Mar 81, n.p. [p.
407], Mil Files XIV132, OH HQUSACE. General Crizers name is Pat, not Patrick.
68
Interv, authors with Col. Daniel Waldo, Jr., 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 67; Brig.
Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981, p. 2, EUD-RHA, Misc Docs;
Attachments, Bratton Visit, 16 Mar 81, chart, [p. 432].
69
Attachments, Bratton Visit, 16 Mar 81.
70
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 185; Interv, authors with Wise,
1 Feb 90; Project Data and JustificationNATO Common Funded Infrastructure, n.d.
[1983?], p. 2, EUD-RHA, M110.
71
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 3 May 1982, EUD-RHA, M21; Project Data and
JustificationNATO Common Funded Infrastructure.
72
Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 1721; Project Data and Justification
NATO Common Funded Infrastructure.
73
For the first quotation, see Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 1721; for the
second, see Interv, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 2223.
74
Interv, authors with Maj. Gen. James W. van Loben Sels, 12 Apr 91, Fort Monroe, Va.,
pp. 5254.
438
2/3/06 11:06:56 AM
Notes
Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, p. 22.
Project Highlights in Kaiserslautern, Corps Line, August 1990.
77
Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981; see also
REFORGER, Military Engineer 67 (January/February 1975): 28, and Airlift Is Key to
Commuter Army, Military Engineer 68 (July/August 1976): 308.
78
Ibid., and Interv, Hendricks with Cooper, pp. 910.
79
Providing Quick-Reaction in Crisis, Corps Line, February 1979; Engineers,
Designers, Diplomats, in Engineer Update, July 1979; Ltr, Wilson to Morris, 27 June 1979,
Gen Files, Box 5931, OH HQUSACE.
80
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 17180; the MCA figures for
FY 1978 are from USAREUR AHRs, 1977, pp. 17276, and 1978, pp. 15860, quotation from
p. 159, both at CMH.
81
Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe and Seventh Army, Historical Review, Calendar
Years 19791980, p. 303, CMH; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing NATO Supported
Systems in EUD, 16 Mar 81, [p. 430].
82
Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981.
83
Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [6], periodical brochure without page numbers
printed by Louis Berger International, Inc., one of the contractors on POMCUS
construction.
84
Ibid.
85
Interv, authors with Arthur Textor, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1416; Prepositioned
Materials Kept in Readiness for Time of Need, Corps Line, September 1989.
86
Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [6].
87
Interv, authors with Textor, pp. 1416, describes the process of preparing equipment
for storage. For descriptions of the sites, see Prepositioned Materiel Storage Sites
Strengthen NATO Defense Capability, Corps Line, May 1986.
88
Prepositioned Materiel Storage Sites Strengthen NATO Defense Capability.
89
Ibid.; Prepositioned Materials Kept in Readiness for Time of Need.
90
Prepositioned Materiel Storage Sites Strengthen NATO Defense Capability.
91
For the 1987 figures, see Northern Area Briefing, as of 1 Aug. 1989, p. 23, Northern
Area Office Files.
75
76
Chapter 11
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 7882, 88, 98, 14751.
Ibid.
3
HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO: Stationing of the 2nd Armored Division (Forward)
in Northern Germany, May 1980. On the early discussions and deployment of Brigades 75
and 76, see pp. 17.
4
Ibid., p. 7; Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 156.
5
HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, p. 7.
6
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1975, Box M112; Min of EUD Staff Mtgs, 22
Oct, 18 Nov 75, Box M111; Ltr, Gribble to Prentiss, 8 December 1975, Box M112. All in
EUD-RHA.
7
Min of EUD Staff Mtgs, 21 Jan, 20 Apr 76, EUD-RHA, Box M19.
8
Min of EUD Staff Mtg, 27 Apr 76, EUD-RHA, Box M19.
9
See HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, passim, and Nelson, History of U.S. Military
Forces in Germany, pp. 15161.
10
The quotation is from HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, p. 53; on the bid
openings, see Construction News, in EUD Information Bulletin, 1 Nov 76, p. 7.
1
2
439
2/3/06 11:06:56 AM

HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 1213, 5456.
Ibid., pp. 11, 15, 23, 54.
13
Ibid., pp. 23, 5556.
14
Ibid., pp. 15, 27; Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 160; Interv,
authors with Prentiss, pp. 6568.
15
HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 15, 27; Interv, authors with Prentiss, pp.
6568.
16
HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 15, 27, 28.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid., pp. 1517, 2324; Europe Division, EUD in Perspective, 197678, n.d., see
sec. Construction Execution for a description of NORTHAG construction, EUD current
files; Corps Line, August 1978, p. 5.
19
HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 1517, 2324, 30, 42; Corps Line, August 1978,
p. 5. The figures for the value of the dollar are from Dollar Dip Means Slight Allowance
Increase, Corps Line, January 1988, which published a chart covering 19761987.
20
HQ, USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, pp. 1517.
21
Ibid., p. 30.
22
Ibid., p. 33.
23
Ltr, Delbridge to Director of Military Construction, OCE, 4 November 1977, EUDRHA, Box M19.
24
Maturing from Minor to Major, Corps Line, February 1979; HQ, USAREUR,
Strengthening NATO, pp. 17, 58.
25
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, pp. 14748, 17176, 17887; see also
William C. Baldwin, The Engineer Studies Center and Army Analysis: A History of the U.S.
Army Engineer Studies Center, 19431982 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1985), pp. 25657.
26
Building a City from the Ground Up: Vilseck To Get 5 New Battalions, Corps Line,
March 1989.
27
Ibid.; Brig. Gen. James W. Ray, Commentary: The Path to Excellence Is Through
Our People, Corps Line, December 1986; Ltr, Harrell to Lt. Gen. Henry J. Hatch, 7 August
1989, EUD, RM, current files; Vilseck Force Modernization Program, 14 Apr 88 [briefing
outline], EUD-RHA, current files.
28
Building a City from the Ground Up.
29
Ibid.
30
Quotations from Interv, authors with Lt. Col. Grosvenor W. Fish, 6 Dec 91,
Nuremberg, pp. 1011; see also Building a City from the Ground Up.
31
Building a City from the Ground Up; Weekly Staff Mtg Notes, Week Ending 7 Jul
89, EUD, RM, current files.
32
Quotations from Intervs, authors with John Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, pp. 7780,
and with Douglas Sommer, 11 Jun 90, Vilseck, pp. 1819.
33
Interv, authors with Withers, pp. 56, 2425.
34
Ibid.; see also Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 20 Jan 82, p. 3, in which he alludes to the same
incident, EUD-RHA, Box M21.
35
For this and the preceding paragraph, see Interv, authors with van Loben Sels, pp.
1622, 2527; Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan
83, cover letter signed by Williams, Mil Files XIV19, OH HQUSACE; see also Interv,
authors with Smith, pp. 5356; Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [45].
36
Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [45]; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing
NATO Supported Systems in EUD, 16 Mar 81, [p. 434]; Engineer Task Force Range
Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan 83, pp. 910.
37
Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan 83, p. 10.
11
12
440
2/3/06 11:06:56 AM
Notes
Ibid., p. 11; Graf 82 Project Going Strong, Corps Line, August 1982; Ltr, Withers to
Bratton, 20 January 1982, EUD-RHA, Box M21.
39
E. R. Heiberg III, Engineer Missions Support the Total Army, Military Engineer 77
(January/February 1985): 7; Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action
Report, 3 Jan 83, p. 23.
40
Engineer Task Force Range Upgrade Program, After Action Report, 3 Jan 83,
p. 2; Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 5356, and with van Loben Sels, pp. 1622; Berger
World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [45]; George B. Fink, Jr., Learning by Building The Movers,
Military Engineer 73 (September/October, 1981): 34042.
41
The quotation and description come from Interv, authors with Smith, pp. 5356.
42
Ltr, Smith to Maj. Gen. Richard M. Wells, 19 February 1984, pp. 45, Civil Works
Files I201, OH HQUSACE; Berger World 11, no. 2 (June 1981): [3].
43
44
Officials Conduct Testing at Grafenwoehr Prototype Range, Corps Line, January
1988.
45
Weekly Staff Mtg Notes, 24 Feb, 28 Apr 89, EUD, RM, current files; Wildflecken
To Get New Tank Range, Corps Line, June 1989; Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 7 August 1989;
Interv, authors with Konrad Lochner, 13 Jun 90, Wrzburg, pp. 1315; Interv, Walker and
Baldwin with Ray, pp. 8790.
46
EUD Project Helps Army To Modernize Training, Corps Line, December 1986.
47
Hohenfels Center To Enable Force-to-Force Maneuvers, Corps Line, December
1986.
48
Ibid.
49
Doing Business in Hohenfels, Corps Line, January 1990; Hohenfels Simulated
City Takes Corps Design Award, Corps Line, March 1990; Simulated City Takes
Award, Corps Line, May 1990; Interv, authors with Fish, 6 Dec 91, p. 16.
50
Operations Center Links Computers, Training Areas, Corps Line, August 1990;
Interv, authors with Fish, 6 Dec 91, pp. 1718; Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February 1989, EUD,
RM, current files.
51
Commander in Chief, USAREUR, Living and Working Conditions in United States
Army, Europe, 1 Feb 88, Special Report to Congress, p. 5.
52
Ibid., p. 8; on the implications of this for the overall deterioration of maintenance
and its increasing costs, see Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 168.
53
Maturing from Minor to Major; Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, pp. 17879.
54
For a general discussion and the quotation from Kroesens letter, see Historical
Review, USAREUR, 1981, pp. 189ff.
55
Ltr, Bratton to van Loben Sels, 12 September 1984, Civil Works Files I201, OH
HQUSACE.
56
57
Interv, authors with Carl E. Nelson, 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, pp. 112.
58
Interv, authors with Richard Birner, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 4143.
59
Commanders Staff Mtg, 20 Apr 82, p. 4, EUD-RHA, Box M12.
60
The first quotation is from Living and Working Conditions, pp. 1, 7; the second is
from Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 239.
61
Europe Division Tests Money-Saving Way To Lay Concrete, Corps Line, August
1986; New Challenge to Europe: Roller Compacted Concrete, Corps Line, February 1989.
62
Ltrs, Harrell to Hatch, 10 August 1988, 10 February, 7 August 1989, EUD, RM.
63
Information Paper, sub: PATRIOT Program Status, EUDED-MO, 6 Dec 84, EUDRHA, Box M16; Interv, authors with Andrew Constantaras, 30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp.
810; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing NATO Supported Systems in EUD, 16 Mar
81, [pp. 42627], charts on Patriot.
38
441
2/3/06 11:06:57 AM

Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 20 January 1982, p. 3, and 3 May 1982, p. 3, both in EUDRHA, Box M21; Attachments, Bratton Visit, table listing NATO Supported Systems in
EUD; Interv, authors with Georgi Reitzel, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 1920; Berger World 11,
no. 2 (June 1981): [6].
65
Information Paper, sub: PATRIOT Program Status.
66
Berger World 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): [2]; Interv, authors with Nelson, pp. 2931,
3642.
67
Patriot Facilities at Bitburg Upgrade Defense Capability, Corps Line, December
1989.
68
Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 7 August 1989, EUD, RM, current files.
69
Intervs, authors with Constantaras, pp. 810, and with Nelson, pp. 112; Army
Beefs up USAREUR Weapons Systems, Corps Line, December 1986.
70
NATO Infrastructure Program Remains Top Priority for Dedicated Division Staff,
Corps Line, April 1990; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Common Infrastructure,
1989, EUD Brussels Docs, OH HQUSACE.
71
William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World, An International History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 411; Northern Area Briefing, as of 1 Aug. 1989, pp.
2425, OH HQUSACE.
72
Nelson, History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany, p. 191; Keylor, Twentieth Century
World, pp. 41112.
73
Information Papers, sub: Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), 19 Oct
82, tab 13, and sub: Status of Air Force Program in Europe, 19 Oct 82, tab 14, both
in Briefing Book, Europe Trip, Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Mil Files XIV18a, OH
HQUSACE.
74
Intervs, authors with Smith, pp. 5763, and with Frank Montenberg, 23 Aug 89,
Hoensbruek, Netherlands, pp. 1415; Northern Area Briefing, as of 1 Aug. 1989, pp.
2324; MFR, Tom Harron, IOC [Initial Operational Capability] Beddown Requirements,
Creek PlanRamstein AB, Meeting of 19 Jul. 1983, 21 Jul 83, EUD-RHA, Box M110.
CREEK was the code word for GLCM work.
75
Min of Staff Mtg, 17 Oct 83, EUD-RHA, Box M110.
76
History of the Northern Area Engineer Office (19751988), updated 1 Sep 88,
OH HQUSACE; CREEK Program Management Office Activation Schedule and Status,
Week 5 Ending 18 Nov 83, five-page schedule of completed and projected activities and
developments, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; quotations from Ltr, Smith to Bratton,
19 February 1984, p. 3, Civil Works Files I201, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors with
Wayne Lewis, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 910.
77
Ltr, Smith to Bratton, 20 June 1984, Civil Works, I201, OH HQUSACE.
78
Engineer Studies Center, U.S. Army Engineer Division, Europe (EUD):
Organization Study, April 1985, p. 7, EUD-RHA, Box M18 (hereafter cited as USAEDE
(EUD): Organization Study).
79
Belgium Resident Office Tackles Multi-year Construction Program for U.S. Air
Force Tactical Wing, Corps Line, September 1986.
80
Ibid.; Florennes, Belgium: Building an Air Force from the Ground Up, Corps Line,
October 1987; Customer Feedback, Corps Line, February 1988; Northern Area Briefing,
as of Aug. 1, 1989, OH HQUSACE.
81
Resident Engineer Recognized for Superior Work on GLCM Project, Corps Line,
April 1986.
82
Briefing by General Ray Concerning Air Force Programs, 1986, and Ltr, Ray to
Heiberg, 15 August 1986, p. 2, both in EUD, RM current files; Netherlands Resident
Office, Northern Area Briefings, 1 Dec 87, OH HQUSACE.
83
64
442
2/3/06 11:06:57 AM
Notes
James Markham, 3 G.I.s Die at German Base When Missile Catches Fire, New York
Times, 12 Jan 85; U.S. Army, Contractors Investigate Pershing 2 First-state Propellant Fire
in Germany, Aviation Week and Space Technology (21 January 1985): 23.
85
Intervs, authors with Lt. Col. Lloyd Colio, 6 Jun 90, Stuttgart, pp. 311, and with
Smith, pp. 6265, 8898.
86
Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 2022; William Joe Webb et al., Department
of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Years 19901991 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army
Center of Military History, 1997), p. 19.
84
Chapter 12
Arming for the 80s, Time 118 (27 July 1981): 8, provides an excellent sketch of
defense establishment deficiencies and of the prospects of support for the 1980s.
2
Army, Europe, Special Report to the Congress of the United States, 1 Feb 88, Foreword,
p. 5.
3
Living and Working Conditions, 1988, Foreword, p. 5, quotation from p. 25;
Historical Review, USAREUR, 19851986, pp. 5.35, CMH.
4
Special Report, Family Housing Facilities in United States Army, Europe, pp.
515ff., as filed with Historical Review, USAREUR, 19821983.
5
Ibid.; Arming for the 80s, p. 14.
6
Historical Review, USAREUR, 19851986, p. 5.39.
7
Historical Review, USAREUR, 19821983, pp. 29495.
8
9
Steve Hara, Building Quality into Army Life, Soldiers (February 1984): 69.
10
For the second report and Kroesens championing of family housing, see Historical
Review, USAREUR, 19821983, p. 295.
11
Krosen, personal communication to Donita M. Moorhus, 7 Apr 00. Interv, authors
with Delbridge, pp. 6062; Interv, Charles Hendricks with Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. Cooper
(USA, Ret.), 23 May 91, p. 39. Both Cooper and Delbridge refer to Kroesens remark in
words that closely parallel his own.
12
Special Report, Family Housing Facilities, [1982]. Quotations in subsequent
paragraphs are from this source.
13
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 28 January 1981, Misc Docs, and 13 May 1981, Box M21,
both in EUD-RHA.
14
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, p. 1112; Briefing BookEuropean TripMaj.
Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., 22 Oct 82, tab 9, Restructuring the Director of Engineering
and Housing Organization in USAREUR, Mil Files XIV18a, OH HQUSACE; see also
William C. Baldwin, Engineer Organization in Germany, 19451990, Future Army
Peacetime Engineer Operations in Europe (Fort Belvoir, Va.: Engineer Studies Center, 1991),
pp. C17 to C18.
15
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 7.
16
Ibid., 19821983, pp. 29495.
17
Brig. Gen. G. K. Withers to EUD Employees during March 1981, OH HQUSACE.
Historical Reviews, USAREUR, 1984, p. 238; 19821983, pp. 29495; 19851986, p. 539.
18
Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 7274; see also Interv, authors with Joe G.
Higgs, 23 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 1315.
19
FY 82: Success and Smoother Sailing, Corps Line, October 1982.
20
The quotation is from Interv, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 7274; see also Interv,
authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 1315.
1
443
2/3/06 11:06:57 AM

Historical Review, USAREUR, 19851986, p. 5.35; Living and Working Conditions,
1988, p. 25. The dollar figures are based on an accounting exchange rate of 3.22
Deutschmarks to the dollar.
22
Living and Working Conditions, 1988, p. 30.
23
Historical Review, USAREUR, 19821983, pp. 27879, 28688.
24
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, pp. 25253, gives the American company
as Dimension Building Systems of Wildwood, Fla. Military Engineers and Business
Representatives Meet for Conference of All Europe SAME Posts, Corps Line, January
1986, identifies the builder as Corlite.
25
Military Conference of All Europe SAME Posts.
26
Lipperts comments from Wildflecken Project Engineer Challenged by Unique
Work, Corps Line, January 1986; Blakes comments from Interv, authors with Blake, 27
May 92, Fort Belvoir, Va.
27
Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 3031. See also Families Move into First
New Army Housing in Europe, Corps Line, February 1987.
28
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, pp. 234, 252; Living and Working Conditions,
1988, p. 31; Ltrs, van Loben Sels to Heiberg, 16 August 1985, and Ray to Heiberg, 27
February, 15 August 1986, EUD, RM Files; Historical Review, USAREUR, 19851986, p.
5.36; Families Move into First New Army Housing in Europe.
29
Ltr, Van Loben Sels to Heiberg, 16 August 1985; Living and Working Conditions,
1988, pp. 3031.
30
First Mainz Housing Unit Now Under Construction, October 1986; Family
Housing at Mainz Nears Completion, March 1987; People Spotlight, April 1988. All in
Corps Line.
31
New Family Housing Nears Completion In Kitzingen, Corps Line, July 1988.
32
Ibid.; Command Briefing, p. 4, 15 Jul 88, OH HQUSACE.
33
Tele Interv, authors with Scott Bearden, 27 May 92.
34
Family Housing Chief Named Engineer of Year, Corps Line, February 1990; Tele
Interv, authors with Scott Bearden, 27 May 92.
35
Family Housing Chief Named Engineer of Year.
36
Several articles in the Corps Line discuss attic conversions: Master Planning,
Increased Housing Addressed by Gen. Otis at Conference, November 1987; Division
Takes Installation Support Award, May 1988; Europe Raises Roof for New Apartment
Space, June 1988; and Corps Raising the Roof To Expand Housing and Attic
Conversions Help Ease Housing Shortages, both in September 1989.
37
Living and Working Conditions, 1988, p. 31, gives the estimate. John Blake
discusses the safety feature of the loggias in his interview with authors, 1, 6 Feb 90, p. 82.
38
Tele Interv, authors with Scott Bearden, 27 May 92.
39
New Rental Plan Offers Benefits to German Landlords, Corps Line, December
1989.
40
The quoted passage is from Arming for the 80s. The Time article is quoted in
41
Blakes comments are from Interv, authors with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 3742.
42
43
Living and Working Conditions, 1988, p. 18; Intervs, authors with Carl E. Nelson,
12 Jun 90, Vilseck, pp. 3032, and with Adolph Faust, 11 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 4243.
44
Historical Reviews, USAREUR, 1984, p. 235, and 1986, pp. 5.37 and 5.38 (the latter
for the list of sites); Living and Working Conditions, 1988, pp. 18, 25.
45
Building Up New Barracks, Corps Line, January 1990.
46
Remote Site: Managing Projects in Southern Turkey, December 1987, and New
Barracks at Fulda Improve Quality of Life, March 1989, both in Corps Line.
21
444
2/3/06 11:06:57 AM
Notes
Construction News, p. 7 of EUD Information Bulletin, 1 Nov 76.
EUD in Perspective, 197678, n.d., EUD Briefing for Command Inspection, 1977;
Engineers Build Up on Personnel, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 13 Aug 78;
Engineers, Designers, Diplomats, Engineer Update, July 1979.
49
Corps Completes Dream School in Stuttgart, Corps Line, August 1979; New
Schools Dedicated at EUCOM Patch Site, Stars and Stripes, European Edition, 5 Oct 79.
50
Pattonville Middleschool, Corps Line, October 1979.
51
MFR, A. E. Wanket, SPD Chief of Engineering, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel on
Construction QualityMED & EUD Visits [29 Oct10 Nov 1982], EUD-RHA, Box M16;
FY 81 Banner Year at EUD, Corps Line, November 1981.
52
Berger World 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): [4]; Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD):
Organization Study, Apr 85, EUD-RHA, Box M18.
53
Wiesbaden Youths Benefit from New School Additions, October 1986, and
Numerous, Diverse Projects Were Completed in Past Couple of Months, November
1986, both in Corps Line.
54
Project Profile: Upgrading a High School, Corps Line, December 1987.
55
56
Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February 1989, EUD, RM.
57
Elementary School Opens Its Doors at Soesterberg, March 1989, and Elementary
School Served Vital Need, August 1990, both in Corps Line.
58
EUD Weekly Staff Mtg Notes, 30 Dec 88, 6 Jan 89, EUD, current files.
59
See the following Corps Line articles: Report from the Field: Wuerzburg Area,
October 1989; Elementary School Renovation Starts in Baumholder, July 1990;
Robinson Barracks School Addition Nears Completion, March 1990; Junior High
School Opens at Schweinfurt, December 1990; Leighton Barracks Middle School To
Ease Student Overcrowding, November 1989; School Opens, November 1990.
60
Interv, authors with Faust, pp. 3741.
61
Interv, Alperin with Kennedy, pp. 38990, OH HQUSACE.
62
Interv, authors with Col. Claude Roberts (Ret.), 12 Feb 91, Washington, D.C., pp.
3334.
63
Engineers Announce 79 Construction Plans, Corps Line, February 1979; Engineer
Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD): Organization Study, April 1985, pp. 612.
64
Intervs, authors with Faust, pp. 3739, and with Sommer, 11 Jun 90, pp. 2021; see
also Army Officials Call Child Development Centers a High Priority, Corps Line, March
1989.
65
Ltr, Smith to Commander, Army Installation Support Activity, Europe, 30 January
1984, EUD-RHA, Box M16.
66
Child Development Centers Present Numerous Challenges, Corps Line, December
1988.
67
Department of the Army Comment from Army Official Calls Child Development
Centers a High Priority, Corps Line, March 1989.
68
See Intervs, authors with Fish, 11 Jun 90, pp. 2124; with Colio, pp. 1112, 2325;
with Sommer, pp. 2021; with Wayne Lewis, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 79; see also
Child Development Centers Present Numerous Challenges.
69
Child Development Centers Present Numerous Challenges.
70
Ibid.
71
See USAREURs position in Living and Working Conditions, 1988, p. 41.
72
See Corps Line articles: Child Center Opens at Graf, July 1990; Child Care: New
Center Offers Expanded Service, September 1990; Hanau Opens Child Center, October
1990; Completing a Child Center, September 1990; Report from the Field: Frankfurt
Area, November 1990.
47
48
445
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Interv, authors with Carl Nelson, 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, pp. 1324.
Memo, Maj. Gen. J. W. Morris to HQDA, sub: Command Inspection, U.S. Army
Engineer Division, Europe, 1822 Aug, 26 Sep 75, par. 6.a.(4), EUD-RHA, Box M19; Ltrs,
Prentiss to Gribble, 10 October 1975, and Gribble to Prentiss, 8 December 1975, both in
EUD-RHA, M112; OCE AHR, 1 Jul 7530 Sep 76, Gen Files, Box 8, File 4, OH HQUSACE;
Staff Mtgs 21 Jan, 27 Apr 76, both in EUD-RHA, Box M19; Regional News, Corps Line,
July 1978.
75
Lessons Learned, No. 815, Feb 82, Project: Nuernberg Hospital Improvements,
EUD-RHA, Box M21; Corps Renovates Old Nuernberg Hospital, Corps Line,
September 1979.
76
Intervs, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 1315, and 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, Ohio, pp.
8788.
77
Corps Renovates Old Nuernberg Hospital; MFR, 16 Mar 81, sub: Lt. Gen. J. K.
Bratton Europe Visit (112 Mar 81), Mil Files XIV1B2, OH HQUSACE; Interv, authors
with John Blake, 26 May 92, Fort Belvoir, Va., pp. 3738.
78
Corps Renovates Old Nuernberg Hospital.
79
Engineers, Designers, Diplomats, Engineer Update, July 1979; Interv, authors with
Hartwig Braun, 5 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 36, 3137, 4550, 6163.
80
Ltr, Smith to Wells, 19 February 1984, Civil Works Files I201, OH HQUSACE;
MFR, A. E. Wanket, 31 Jan 83, sub: Blue Ribbon Panel on Construction QualityMED &
EUD Visits, p. 2, EUD-RHA, Box M16.
81
Visit to ENGCOM by CINCUSAREUR, 6 May 70, and Ltr, Koisch to LeTellier,
June 1973 [day illegible], both in EUD-RHA, Box M111; 97th General: EUD Takes on
Tremendous Task To Renovate Vital Health Facility, Corps Line, October 1982; Staff Mtg,
5 Jan 75, EUD-RHA, Box M19; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers AHR, 1 Jul 7530 Sep 76,
pp. 2021.
82
97th General: EUD Takes on Tremendous Task To Renovate Vital Health Facility,
and Modern Yet History Preserved, both in Corps Line, October 1982.
83
Renovating a Hospital Down to the Bare Brick, Corps Line, March 1988.
84
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 253; Interv, authors with Karl Schaffner,
13 Jun 90, Wrzburg, pp. 2122; [EUD] Commanders Call, 27 Oct 86, EUD-RMO,
current files; Wuerzburg Engineer Named Division Hard Hat of Year, Corps Line,
May 1989.
85
Engineering Partnership, and Augsburg Hospital Dedication Held, November
1990; Contractor Given DM 28,000 for VE Change Proposal, May 1989; New Hospital
To Be Constructed at Wuerzburg, August 1986; Hospital Contract Awarded, October
1986; RichtfestHospital Project Is One-third Complete, April 1988. All in Corps Line.
86
Augsburg Community Gets a $22 Million Hospital Addition, February 1989;
Bremerhaven Hospital Renovation Improves Soldier, Family Member Quality of Life,
May 1989; Report from the Field: The U.S. Engineer Group, September 1989. All in
Corps Line. Interv, authors with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 8889; Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10
August 1988, EUD, RM.
87
Intervs, authors with Higgs, 23 Jan 90, pp. 1315, and 6 Jan 92, pp. 8788.
88
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1984, p. 25.
89
Living and Working Conditions, 1988, pp. 3436.
90
This summary is drawn from all the documents cited in notes 9193 for particular
projects.
91
The figures for design accomplishment are contained in Materials for Lt. Gen.
Gribble Visit of March 1975, Fact Sheet, Impact of Volume of Projects in Programs, 20
Mar 75, [Mr. Pinol]; see also Fact Sheet, Supervision and Administration Analysis, 17
Mar 75, both in EUD-RHA, Box N17.
73
74
446
2/3/06 11:06:58 AM
Notes
The figures for 1984 come from Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD)
Organization Study, April 1985, pp. 611, EUD-RHA, M1. Figures for 19801981 appear in
MFR, sub: Lieut. Gen. J. K. Bratton Europe Visit 112 Mar. 1981, 16 Mar 81, Attachments
(tab S), chart titled FY 80 Design Accomplishment, $442 Million Construction Value,
Mil Files XIV1B2, OH HQUSACE.
93
The figures for design accomplishment in 1980 are found in MFR, sub: Lieut. Gen.
J. K. Bratton Europe Visit 112 Mar. 1981, Attachments (tab S), chart titled FY 80 Design
Accomplishment, $442 Million Construction Value, Mil Files XIV1B2, OH HQUSACE.
Those for 1984 are in Engineer Studies Center, USAEDE (EUD) Organization Study, April
1985, pp. 611.
94
The NAF percentage for 1987 comes from F. W. Wied (CEEUD-RM-M, Talking
Paper on Overseas Stovepipe Organizations, 17 Oct 87, provided by W. J. Lynch, copy
with EUD documents at OH HQUSACE.
95
Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 7330 Jun 74, p. 60, Gen Files, Box 7, File 5, OH
HQUSACE; Memorandum of Understanding between the Army and Air Force Exchange
ServiceEurope (AAFES-EUR) and the United States Army Engineer Division, Europe
(USAEDE), signed by Brig. Gen. Delbridge for EUD, 5 Aug 77, and by Walter H. Weber
for AAFES, 16 Aug 77, EUD-RHA, unmarked box; EUD in Perspective, 197678, sec
titled Current Design Programs AAFES; EUD Briefing for Command Inspection,
1977, p. 8, Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE.
96
Information Bulletin, EUD, 1 Dec 76; EUD in Perspective, 197678, sec titled
Construction Execution.
97
On EUDs work in Iran, see EUD Staff Mtgs, 18 May, 7 Jun 76, EUD-RHA, Box M1
9; see also Maturing from Minor to Major, Corps Line, February 1979.
98
Maturing from Minor to Major.
99
Berger World 15, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 4.
100
Heilbronn Community Gets First All New PX Overseas, Corps Line, January
1986.
101
Troop Support: New Store Serves Vital Need, February 1991; New Commissary
Opened at Wolfgang Complex in Hanau, December 1986; Wuerzburgs Leighton
Barracks Get Fully Modern Commissary, September 1989; Expanded PX at Edward
Barracks To Offer Much More to Schweinfurt Residents, November 1989; Commissary
Opens at Garlstedt, August 1990. All in Corps Line.
102
103
Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 7330 Jun 74, p. 7.
104
Tays, U.S. Army Construction Germany, 195053, p. 138; Lane, Borror, Tays, U.S.
Army Deutsche Mark Construction Program, 19531957, pp. 5152.
105
Ltr, LeTellier to Col. Griffith, 30 March 1972; see also Status of Projects, 24 Sep 71.
Both in EUD-RHA, Box M111.
106
EUD Briefing by Delbridge, [after Oct 77], Bouchereau Papers, OH HQUSACE; HQ,
USAREUR, Strengthening NATO, p. 9.
107
Ltrs, Withers to Bratton, 20 January, 3 May 1982, OH HQUSACE.
108
European Trip Maj. Gen. Ames S. Albro, Jr., Briefing Book, 22 Oct 82, Mil Files XIV
18a, OH HQUSACE; TUSEG: Ankara History, June 1983 to date, [21 May 85], TUSEG
Area Office, Incirlik, Turkey.
109
Interv, authors with Fish, 11 Jun 90, pp. 2425. Corps Line articles Award
Winner, October 1982; quotation from Area Office Will Place 100 Bowling Lanes,
July 1988; New Bowling Center To Open in Wuerzburg Area [Kitzingen], April 1988;
and Bowling Center Opens [Dexheim], and Report from the Field [Schweinfurt],
both in June 1990. Interv, authors with Rudolf Stretz, 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 6,
1113.
92
447
2/3/06 11:06:58 AM

Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, p. 179; 1979 Construction Plans, Corps Line,
February 1979; on the confusion, see Ltr, John Blake to William C. Baldwin, 19 May 1992,
commenting on a draft of this manuscript.
111
Historical Review, USAREUR, 1981, p. 179. 1979 Construction Plans, February
1979; Stuttgart Area Office: Recreation Facility Active in Goeppingen, June 1988;
Customer Feedback, March 1988; all in Corps Line.
112
Rec Facility Renovation Completed in Bremerhaven, Corps Line, February
1989.
113
Annual Report, OCE, 1 Jul 7330 Jun 74, pp. 89.
114
Delbridge Briefing, 1978, p. 10. AF Section: Pleasing a Tough Customer, May 1979,
and 79 Construction Plans, February 1979, both in Corps Line.
115
Wrzburg Area Engineer Office, pp. 1213, prepared by the Area Office for
FOMIS Assistance Visit, 69 Jun 88, OH HQUSACE.
116
Interior Design: The Psychology of Architecture, March 1982, and Cakmakli
Projects Completed, March 1989, both in Corps Line.
117
Chapel Center Opens at Hahn Air Base, Corps Line, September 1988.
110
Chapter 13
Army, Europe, 1 Feb 88, Special Report to Congress, passim. Text of speech by Brig. Gen.
James W. Ray, 1 Jun 88, typescript copy supplied by EUD-RMO.
2
3
Commanders Comments: Good-bye to a Winning Team, Corps Line, June 1988.
For an explanation of the frogs role in EQM, see Chapter 8 of this book.
4
Harrell To Assume Division Command July 18, Corps Line, July 1988; Interv,
authors with Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell, 30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 35.
5
New Commander Meets EUD Staff, Corps Line, August 1988.
6
Intervs, authors with Col. Daniel Waldo, 31 Aug 89, Frankfurt, pp. 3637, and with
Jakoba Schempp, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 6971.
7
Intervs, authors with Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 5152; with Virginia Conway, 15 Nov 91,
Alexandria, Va., pp. 7071; with Col. John Moravec, 19 Jan 90, Frankfurt, pp. 3335, 3940,
and 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex., pp. 7072, 7985; with Hasso Damm, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp.
2224; with Fish, 11 Jun 90, p. 31; with Wise, 11 Dec 91, pp. 2021; with Harrell, 30 Aug 89,
pp. 4950; with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 5859; with Brettschneider, 26, 30 Jan 90, pp. 7072;
with Russell Minton, 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex., pp. 6870.
8
Intervs, authors with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 8183, 99104, and 4 Dec 91, pp. 2324.
9
Memo, Brig. Gen. Ernest J. Harrell to Distribution, 31 Oct 88, sub: Policy #4, Use of
Government Quarters When Performing TDY Travel, EUD-RM, current files.
10
Memos, Harrell to Distribution, 23 Nov 88, sub: Policy #6, Internal Reorganization,
and 30 Nov 88, sub: Policy #8, CONUS Travel, both in EUD-RM, current files.
11
Ltr, Harrell to Hatch, 10 February 1989, EUD-RMO.
12
Corps Line, May 1990.
13
Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Aug 89, pp. 6164, and 30 Jan 92, pp. 3335.
14
Intervs, authors with Dale, pp. 5458, and with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 3339.
15
Interv, authors with Terry Trowbridge, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 3336.
16
Intervs, authors with Minton, pp. 86, and with Laverne Love, 5 Dec 91, Frankfurt,
pp. 13.
17
Intervs, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 1112; with Prentiss, pp. 2426; with
Ursula Pfefferlein, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, pp. 1213; with Reimer Delpin, 29 Jan 90,
1
448
2/3/06 11:06:58 AM
Notes
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Damm, 21 Jun 88, pp. 6266; Three LN Employees
Promoted, Corps Line, February 1980.
19
Works Council Chairman Addresses EUD Local National Employees, Corps Line,
November 1987; Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Damm, 21 Jun 88, pp. 6266.
20
Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 31 Mar 89, sub: Policy Letter No. 18, Dual
Recruitment for High Grade Positions, EUD-DE (Ofc of Div Engr), current files.
21
Local Nationals: Employees Raise Questions on Key Issues, Corps Line, February
1990.
22
Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Aug 89, pp. 6164, and 30 Jan 92, pp. 3335; with
Conway, pp. 16; with Love, pp. 2324.
23
Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 28 Aug 89, sub: Policy Letter No. 23, Commanders
Policy Statement on Equal Employment Opportunity and Prevention of Sexual
Harassment, EUD-EO (Exec Ofc), current files.
24
Division Commander Raises Issues, Addresses Concerns, Corps Line, November
1988.
25
Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 1114, 3438; EUD Executives Devise Methods for
Improving Production and Responsiveness to Customers, Corps Line, February 1987.
26
Donna Miles, Goodbye Pershing II, Soldiers 46, no. 8 (August 1991): 4546; Daniel
Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, Who Won the Cold War? Foreign Policy 87 (Summer
1992): 128.
27
Armys 89 Budget Represents Negative Growth Say Officials, Corps Line, April
1988.
28
Jim Hoagland, Europes Destiny, Foreign Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990): 43.
29
Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 68.
30
Assistant Secretary Page Discusses Association with Corps, Engineer Update,
August 1989; Intervs, authors with Wise, 11 Dec 91, pp. 3036, and with Moravec, 19 Jan
90, pp. 3335; Headquarters Reorganization: Change Emphasizes Project Management,
Engineer Update, August 1989.
31
Ltr, Withers to Bratton, 11 February 1983, EUD-RHA, Box M21.
32
MFR, Wanket, 31 Jan 83, EUD-RHA, Box M16.
33
Engineer Studies Center, USADE (EUD): Organization Study, April 1985, p. 28.
34
Interv, Walker and Baldwin with Camblor, pp. 14749.
35
Concept Paper on Reorganization of EUD, 27 Feb 87, OH HQUSACE.
36
Interv, authors with Ray, pp. 1114, 4348.
37
Intervs, authors with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 4952, 7879; with Delpin, pp. 3738; with
Wise, 1 Feb 90, pp. 5354; with Moravec, 19 Jan 90, pp. 3335, 3940; with Ray, pp. 4648.
38
Interv, authors with Waldo, 31 Aug 89, pp. 4952.
39
The task force and its recommendations are discussed in Intervs, authors with
Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, pp. 1619; with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 1821; with Moravec, 19
Jan 90, pp. 30, 3940, and 18 Nov 91, pp. 14; with Ray Mellard, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp.
23; with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 90, pp. 98101.
40
Intervs, authors with Mellard, pp. 23; with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 1821; with
Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 14.
41
Intervs, authors with Mellard, pp. 23, 78, and with Blake, 1, 6 Feb 1990, pp. 9497.
42
Chronology 1989, ed. Peter Hayes, Foreign Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990): 230. Other events
mentioned in this paragraph may be verified in the same source.
43
In addition to Chronology 1989, cited above, see Jim Hoagland, Europes
Destiny, Foreign Affairs 69, no. 1 (1990): 40.
44
Commanders Comments, Corps Line, October 1989.
45
Interv, authors with Mellard, pp. 34.
46
Commanders Comments, Corps Line, December 1989.
18
449
2/3/06 11:06:59 AM

Ibid., January 1990.
Commanders Call Addresses Reorganization, Force Reduction, Corps Line,
February 1990.
49
Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 413, 25.
50
Interv, authors with Damm, 9 Aug 89, pp. 68; Siemon and Wagberg, Employment of
Local Nationals, pp. 9394.
51
The discussion of local nationals is drawn from Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30
Jan 92, pp. 5960; with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 23; with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 45; with
Trowbridge, pp. 1012.
52
Interv, authors with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 710, 2224.
53
Memo, Harrell to Staff, 17 Jan 90, EUD-EO, current files. Many of the documents
used to create this and following sections were gathered in close proximity to their
creation. Copies of these materials are on file, with other materials associated with the
EUD history, at OH HQUSACE.
54
Need To Know, 26 Jan20 Apr 90, OH HQUSACE and EUD-PAO, current files.
EUDs Need To Know was a temporary newsletter published irregularly (about twice
a month) beginning January 1990 during the height of the drawdown. The Public Affairs
and Human Resources Offices produced the newsletter to keep employees informed of
rapidly changing developments that affected their employment status.
55
Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, p. 10.
56
Msgs, Harrell to Commander, USACE, 7 Feb 90, EUD RMO, current files.
57
Civilian Personnel Servicing CINCUSAREUR/CIE Agreement, 6 May 74, EUDRHA, Box M110; Intervs, authors with Mellard, pp. 34, and with Conway, pp. 4045;
Second RIF Faces EUD, Corps Line, October 1990.
58
Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 1820.
59
Ibid., pp. 1820, contains the passage quoted; Intervs, authors with Konrad Lochner,
13 Jun 90, Wrzburg, pp. 1921, and with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 3033. Figures on LNs
who took the buyout option are from an RMO briefing, n.d., 21 Buy-Outs dropped on
Oct. 1, 1990, EUD-RMO, current files. In his interview on 30 January 1992, p. 30, Harrell
says that 22 or 23 were bought out.
60
Commanders Call Addresses Reorganization, Force Reduction, Corps Line,
February 1990.
61
Commander Addresses Hiring Freeze, Priority Placement, Corps Line, March
1990.
62
Quote from Ltr, Virginia Conway to authors, 16 April 1990.
63
Intervs, authors with Harrell, Conway, Wise, Mellard, Minton, Moravec, Blake,
Higgs, Dale, and Brettschneider.
64
Quotation from Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 2829, 1517.
65
Commanders Comments, Corps Line, April 1990.
66
Interv, authors with Mellard, pp. 67, 1012.
67
Intervs, authors with Minton, pp. 7275; with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 4044; with
Robert Rodehaver, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, p. 2; with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, p. 4; with Wise, 11
Dec 91, pp. 2123; with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 23; with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 1921.
68
Memo, Harrell to Commander, USACE, 5 Apr 90, EUD-EO, current files.
69
Intervs, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 23, and with Conway, pp. 4045.
70
DoD Hiring Freeze Lift Doesnt Void Outplacement Program, Corps Line, May 1990.
71
Commanders Comments and Reduction in Force Procedures Show Employees
Their Standing, both in Corps Line, June 1990.
72
Interv, Moorhus with Allen M. Carton, 14 Apr 97, Potomac, Md., p. 322.
73
Intervs, authors with Kathleen Johnson, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, pp. 36; with Dale, p.
65; with Love, pp. 1418. Reduction in Force Procedures Show Employees Their Standing.
47
48
450
2/3/06 11:06:59 AM
Notes
Interv, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 45.
Reduction in Force Procedures Show Employees Their Standing.
76
Briefing Chart dtd 13 Jul 90, EUD-RMO, current files.
77
Ltr, Anita L. Morsman to Donita M. Moorhus, 16 April 1990, original with EUD
documents at OH HQUSACE. Morsmans numbers came from the EUD Human Resources
Office.
78
Memo, Harrell to Commander, USACE, 22 Mar 90, sub: RIF at U.S. Army Engineer
Division, Europe (EUD), EUD-RMO, current files.
79
Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, pp. 413, 25.
80
Ibid., pp. 12.
81
Ibid., p. 3; Interv, authors with Damm, 1 Feb 90, pp. 1617.
82
83
Interv, authors with Trowbridge, pp. 1012.
84
85
Military Construction Prohibition Continues, HQ USACE Internal News Briefs,
26 Nov 90, HQ USACE, current files.
86
Commanders Comments: Despite Reduction, Freeze, Division Has Important
Mission, Corps Line, July 1990.
87
Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 90, pp. 812.
88
Ibid. Also, Facing Declining Projects, Budget Cuts: Good News Arrives for Europe
Members, Engineer Update, May 1990.
89
Interv, authors with Dale, pp. 2223.
90
Briefing dtd 13 Jul 90, EUD-RMO, current files; Interv, authors with Mellard, pp.
46, 1518.
91
Briefing, 17 Jun 90, updated to 17 Jul 90, EUD-RMO, current files.
92
MFR, CERM-ZA, 23 Jul 90, sub: Review of EUD FY90 and FY91 Budget, Manpower
and Workload; Memo, Harrell to Hatch, n.d. [early October 1990], both in EUD-RMO,
current files.
93
Intervs, authors with Johnson, 10 Dec 91, pp. 36; Memo, Harrell to Hatch, n.d.
[early October 1990], EUD-RMO, current files.
94
Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 24 Jul 90, sub: Tentative Authorizations/Budget
Guidance for FY91, EUD-RMO, current files.
95
Memo, Harrell to Hatch, 13 Aug 90, EUD-RMO, current files; Second RIF Faces
EUD, Corps Line, October 1990.
96
Memo, Harrell to Distribution, 24 Jul 90.
97
Memo, Harrell to Hatch, 13 Aug 90, EUD-RMO, current files.
98
Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 1213, 21, and with Mellard, pp. 1718.
99
Corps of Engineers Establishes a Partial Hiring Freeze, Corps Line, October
1990.
100
Commanders Call: Reduction, Merger Addressed, Corps Line, September 1990;
Commanders Comments, Corps Line, November 1990.
101
Commanders Call: Reduction, Merger Addressed. For more information on
DESERT SHIELD, see Frank N. Schubert and Theresa L. Kraus, eds., The Whirlwind War : The
United States Army in Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Army Center of Military History, 1994).
102
Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 2628; Briefing, n.d. [late October 1990],
EUD-RMO, current files.
103
DCG MSG, DTG 050005Z, October 1990, EUD-RMO, current files.
104
Msg, Harrell to Edgar, n.d. [mid-October 1990], EUD-RMO, current files.
105
Second RIF Faces EUD.
106
Ibid.
74
75
451
2/3/06 11:06:59 AM

Interv, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 56; Harrell Discusses Reductions with
Local National Workers, Corps Line, November 1990.
108
Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 1315; with Mellard, pp. 1520; with
Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 34, 79, 2426.
109
Commanders Comments: Agreements Allow for More Orderly Transition, Corps
Line, November 1990; Intervs, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 56, and with Mellard,
pp. 1516.
110
Interv, authors with Conway, pp. 3745.
111
Quotation from Interv, authors with Moravec, 18 Nov 91, pp. 1214; see also Intervs,
authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 91, pp. 1718, 2223, and with Minton, pp. 7577.
112
Intervs, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 2324; with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 79;
with Higgs, 6 Jan 92, pp. 5358; with Conway, pp. 4445.
113
Military Construction Prohibition Continues, HQ USACE Internal News Briefs,
26 Nov 90, EUD PAO, current files; Cheney Continues Temporary Prohibition on
Military Construction, Corps Line, December 1990.
114
Europe Division To Merge with MEAPO, Corps Line, December 1990.
115
Roles Shift as Europe Division Reorganizes, HQ USACE Internal News Briefs, 7
Jan 91; Interv, authors with Waldo, 4 Dec 91, pp. 67.
116
Corps of Engineers Europe District To Be Activated Mar. 1, Corps Line,
February 1991.
117
Interv, authors with Damm, 12 Dec 91, p. 14.
118
Interv, authors with Colio, pp. 2831.
119
Interv, authors with Lamothe, pp. 810.
120
Division Organizational Reassignments Mean Better Efficiency, Corps Line,
February 1991.
121
Interv, authors with Rodehaver, 10 Dec 91, pp. 1315.
122
Interv, authors with Conway, pp. 6768.
123
Interv, authors with Love, pp. 1416, 2829.
124
Interv, authors with Brettschneider, 12 Dec 91, pp. 1920.
125
126
Interv, authors with Dale, pp. 6567.
127
Interv, authors with Minton, pp. 9396.
128
Commanders Comments: Final Chapter on Division No End to Mission, Corps
Line, February 1991.
129
Interv, authors with Harrell, 30 Jan 92, pp. 3, 2829, 4344.
107
Epilogue
The $5 billion figure does not reflect the changing value of the dollar over those
forty-five years. Money spent in the 1940s must be multiplied by a rough factor of 6.25, in
the 1950s by 5.5, in the 1960s by 4.5, in the 1970s by 3, and in the 1980s by 1.5, to reflect the
value (buying power) of the dollar in 1994.
2
Interv, Paul K. Walker with Allan B. Aaron, Jun 88, Frankfurt, Germany, pp. 13841.
3
Briefing by Director, USACAG, 13 Oct 61, for visit by Lt. Gen. Walter K. Wilson, Jr.,
to USAREUR, 922 Oct 61, Mil Files XII431, OH HQUSACE. For similar reflections, see
Ltr, Prentiss to Gribble, 11 May 1976, EUD-RHA, Box M17; Interv, authors with Harrell,
30 Aug 89, pp. 2930.
4
Interv, authors with Butschan, pp. 2, 7.
5
Interv, authors with Hartwig Braun, 5 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, pp. 3637.
6
Dedication Marks Corps Contributions, Corps Line, December 1990.
1
452
2/3/06 11:06:59 AM
ACRONYMS
AAA
AAFES
AAF
ABG
ADA
AMPRS
ATC
ATS
ADSEC
Army Audit Agency

Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Army Air Forces
Auftragsbautengrundstze
Automated data processing
Automated Management Progress Reporting System
Air Transport Command
Austrian shilling
Advance Section (COMZ)
BOQ
Bachelor officers quarters
CINC
COEMIS
COMZ
CPO
Commander in chief
Corps of Engineers Management Information System
Communications Zone
Civilian Personnel Office
DAC
DBBV
DCSENG
DEH
DIN
DM
Department of the Army civilian

Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung
Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer
Directorate of Engineering and Housing
Deutsche Industrie-Normen
Deutschmark
EEO
ENGCOM
EQM
ESC
ETOUSA
EUCOM
EUD
Equal employment opportunity

Engineer Command
EUD Quality Management
Engineer Studies Center
European Theater of Operations, United States Army
European Command
Europe Division
GLCM
Ground Launched Cruise Missile
JAMMAT
Joint American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey
LRSP
Long Range Security Program
MCA
MCAF

20S_Acronym_Biblio.indd 1
2/3/06 11:07:21 AM

MCN
MEAPO
MOUSF
MOUT
MRI
Military Construction, Navy

Middle East/Africa Projects Office
Modernization of U.S. Facilities
Military operations in urban terrain
Maintenance, Repair, and Improvement
NATO
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCE
OMA
OMGUS
Office of the Chief of Engineers

Operations and Maintenance, Army
Office of Military Government United States
POL
POMCUS
POMSS
PW
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants

Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Configured to
Unit Sets
Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel Storage Site
Prisoner of war
RIF
Reduction in force
SAS
SETAF
SHAEF
Special Ammunition Storage

Southern European Task Force
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
TAB VEE
TQM
TSFET
TUSEG
Theater Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise

Total Quality Management
Theater Services Forces, European Theater
The United States Engineer Group
UEPH
USACAF
USACAG
USACE
USAEDE
USAFE
USAREUR
USEUCOM
USFA
USFET
Unaccompanied enlisted personnel housing

United States Construction Agency, France
United States Army Construction Agency, Germany
United States Army Corps of Engineers
United States Army Engineer Division, Europe
United States Air Forces in Europe
United States Army, Europe
United States European Command
United States Forces, Austria
United States Forces, European Theater
454
2/3/06 11:07:22 AM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Archival Materials
Most of the historical evidence for the study of the Europe Division
and its predecessors comes from primary documentation contained in
archival and records repositories in the United States and Europe. These
repositories are listed below with a description of their relevant holdings.
Descriptions relate to the repositories as they existed during the period of
intensive research, 1988 to 1991. As noted, some archives have been reorganized, moved, or closed.
Records Holding Area, Europe Division (EUD-RHA), Frankfurt/Bonames,
Germany
The records holding area that held EUDs documents contained about
2,000 records center boxes in 1988. In 1991 the records holding area closed
and the records were moved. A survey and a preliminary finding aid
prepared by James R. Arnold and Roberta Weiner, Inventory of Records
Materials Pertaining to the Europe Division and Predecessor Agencies
(available from the Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers), permitted the authors of this study to focus on the boxes that
appeared most relevant to the historical narrative.
National Archives (NA), Washington, D.C.
The archival holdings relating to the operations of the U.S. Army in
Europe contained in the collections of the National Archives are voluminous. The material from the National Archives concentrated particularly on
the period from the end of World War II to the formation of the Engineer
Command (1967), years poorly documented in the records in Frankfurt/
Bonames. When consulted, these documents were at Suitland, Maryland.
They have since been moved to the National Archives at College Park,
Maryland, and reorganized. The major holdings consulted included:
Record Group (RG) 332, Records of U.S. Theaters of War, World War II:
European Theater of Operations
Records of the Historical Division, Administrative Historical Reports,
1942January 1946
Engineering Section, Circulars, Bulletins and Reports, 1943l945
Engineering Section, Operations and Project Reports, 1945
2/3/06 11:07:22 AM

RG 338, Records of United States Army Commands, 1942 : European
Command (EUCOM)
Engineer Division
Historical Division, Program Files Engineer Division, Reports,
Letters, Bulletins 19471950
RG 338, Records of United States Army Commands 1942 : U.S. Forces,
European Theater (USFET)
Historical Division, Program Files Engineer Division, Quarterly
Reports JanuarySeptember 1946
Historical Division, Program Files Engineer Division, Quarterly
Reports 19461947
Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (OH
HQUSACE), Alexandria, Va.
The Office of History, located in Alexandria, Virginia, maintains
research facilities to support the work of its staff historians. It has a rich
supply of documentary material and historical papers prepared by Army
historians for limited circulation (so-called gray literature) that bears upon
the history of the Army engineers in Europe during and since World War
II. These materials can be found in the following research collections:
General Files
Civil Works Files
Military Files
In addition, the personal papers of Lt. Gen. Samuel D. Sturgis, Jr.,
Chief of Engineers from 1953 to 1956, were particularly useful on construction in France and regarding the creation of the Joint Construction
Agency in the early 1950s. Materials from the papers of Lt. Gen. Walter K.
Wilson, Jr., Chief of Engineers from 1961 to 1965, and from General Bruce
C. Clarke, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Europe, from 1960 to 1962,
also proved helpful.
The Office of History also has an extensive oral history collection that
contains many interviews relevant to this project. The interviews used are
listed in the Oral Histories section of this bibliography.
Office of History, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), Heidelberg,
Germany
The office has a limited amount of unclassified information and a
wealth of reports and gray literature that provide background and context for the work of the Army engineers in Europe. Especially valuable
are many of the studies completed in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s by staff
historians.
456
2/3/06 11:07:23 AM
Bibliography
U.S. Army Center of Military History (CMH), Washington, D.C.
The Center of Military History holds staff reports and historical studies similar to those held in the Office of History, USAREUR,
and the collections complement one another. CMH also has annual
reports and the detailed multivolume histories of the occupation
prepared by the European Commands Historical Division. They are
listed by year below in the Governmental Historical and Staff Studies
section.
Star and Stripes Library, Darmstadt, Germany
In addition to its own back files of the European Edition of the Stars
and Stripes newspaper that serves the local American military community,
the Stars and Stripes Library has materials in its collection that may exist
nowhere else in accessible form.
Other
Several repositories provided valuable primary documentation and
information.
Generallandesarchiv, Karlsruhe, Germany: The Generallandesarchiv
responded to an inquiry made of local German archives by providing the documentary information on the death and commemoration of Private Roy L. Mattson mentioned in Chapter 3.
Engineering Society Library, New York, N.Y.: This facility closed in
the mid-1990s.
Northern Area Office, Europe Division, Hoensbroek, Netherlands
TUSEG Area Office, Europe Division, Incirlik, Turkey
In addition, several individuals interviewed for this study provided
documents that they held personally.
Bouchereau, Jacques, private papers, comprising several boxes, which
were offered to the authors and are now included in the research
collections at the Office of History, HQ USACE, as the Bouchereau
Papers.
History of Construction of Central Heating Plant in Kornwestheim,
paper provided by H. Jace Greene.
LeTellier Debrief Letter to CINCUSAREUR, 14 August 1973, provided by Maj. Gen. Carroll LeTellier (USA, Ret.).
Kennedy, Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. (USA, Ret.), personal scrapbook.
ONeill, Jack (Frankfurt) to William B. Dawes, 11 October [1965], provided by Mr. Dawes.
Upgrade & Rehabilitation of Ammunition Storage Facilities (ASPs
and PSPs), 16 October 1973, provided by Col. Claude Roberts
(USA, Ret.).
USACAG Functional Manual, [1960], provided by Reimer Delpin.
457
2/3/06 11:07:23 AM

USACAG Organization and Functions Manual, 1 June 1963, provided by Reimer Delpin.
Welcome to the USAREUR Engineers Conference, n.d. [1965], provided by Louis Brettschneider.
Young, Maj. Gen. Robert P. (USA, Ret.), personal scrapbook.
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Berlin Airlift: A USAFE Summary. Headquarters, U.S. Air Forces in
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Brown, Harold W. The Physical Plant: Procurement, Construction and
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Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City: Doubleday &
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Fontaine, Andr. History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the
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German Railway Operations Under the United States Army, 8 May31
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Hayes, Peter. Chronology 1989. New York, Foreign Affairs, 1990.
Healey, Denis. The Time of My Life. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
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Keylor, William R. The Twentieth Century World, An International History.
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Laqueur, Walter. Europe Since Hitler: The Rebirth of Europe. New York:
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Nelson, Daniel J. A History of U.S. Military Forces in Germany. Boulder,
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Reybold, Eugene. Engineers in World War II: A Tribute. Unpublished
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EUCOM Plans Enclave To Cope with Housing. Stars and Stripes,
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New EUCOM Nerve Center Is Dedicated at Stuttgart. Stars and Stripes,
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2/3/06 11:07:24 AM
Bibliography
Oral History Interviews
Interviews Conducted by the Authors
Unless otherwise indicated, both authors participated in the following
interviews. All interviews were transcribed; both tapes and transcriptions
are deposited in the Oral History Holdings, Office of History, HQ USACE,
Alexandria, Virginia.
Baldinger, Lt. Col. Robert, 23 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands.
Bearden, Scott, by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 27 May 92.
Birner, Richard, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.
Blake, John, 1, 6 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany; 27 May 92, Fort Belvoir, Va.
Bouchereau, Jacques, 3 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.
Braun, Hartwig, 5 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
Brettschneider, Louis, 26, 30 Jan 90, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Brown, Col. Roy (USA, Ret.), 25 Aug 89, Hoensbroek, Netherlands.
Butschan, Helga, 16 Jun 90, Kriftel, Germany.
Camblor, William E., 9 Aug 89, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Carlson, Col. Paavo (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 28
Sep 90.
Carson, Lt. Col. John, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
Carton, Allen M., by Donita M. Moorhus, 14 Mar, 14 Apr 97, Potomac, Md.
Charles, Col. Carlyle (USA, Ret.), 31 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Colio, Lt. Col. Lloyd, 6 Jun 90, Stuttgart, Germany.
Constantaras, Andrew, 30 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.
Conway, Virginia, 15 Nov 91, Alexandria, Va.
Cox, Dave, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Cruz, Jose, 19 Nov 91, Hurst, Tex.
Dale, Debra, 13 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Damm, Hasso, 9 Aug 89, 1 Feb 90, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Dawes, William B., by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 26 Oct 90.
Delbridge, Maj. Gen. Norman G., Jr. (USA, Ret.), 14 Feb 91, Washington,
D.C.
Delpin, Reimer, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Donovan, Brig. Gen. James C. (USA, Ret.), 20 Nov 90, Arlington, Va.
Driskill, Col. John (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 5
Nov 90.
Faust, Adolph, 11 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.
Fish, Lt. Col. Grosvenor W., Jr., 11 Jun 90, 6 Dec 91, Nuremberg, Germany.
Fraint, Saul, 9 Jun 90, Vienna, Austria.
Friesch, Paul, 22 Aug 89, Brussels, Belgium.
Greene, H. Jace, 1 Jun 90, Liege, Belgium.
Greulich, Karl, 15 Jun 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Grimm, Erwin, 6 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.
Grimm, Richard, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey.
Hensley, Julia P., 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey.
463
2/3/06 11:07:24 AM

Higgs, Joe G., 23 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany; 6 Jan 92, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Johnson, Kathleen, 25 Jan 90, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Kennedy, Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. (USA, Ret.), 26 May 91, Newark, N.J.
Kersbergen, Johann, 24 Aug 89, Soesterberg, Netherlands.
Kirby, Brig. Gen. Gilbert W., Jr. (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P.
Grathwol, 9 Nov 90.
Kusiowski, Inge, 9 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.
Lamothe, Lt. Col. Douglas, 3 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
LeTellier, Maj. Gen. Carroll (USA, Ret.), 19 Nov 91, Arlington, Va.
Lewis, Wayne, 4 Jun 90, Kaiserslautern, Germany.
Lochner, Konrad, 13 Jun 90, Wrzburg, Germany.
Love, Laverne, 5 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Lyle, Col. C. B., Jr. (USA, Ret.), by Telephone with Robert P. Grathwol, 26
Oct 90.
McNeely, Frederick B., 15 Feb 91, Arlington, Va.
Mellard, Ray, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Minton, Russell, 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex.
Montenberg, Frank, 23 Aug 89, Hoensbruek, Netherlands.
Moravec, Col. John, 19 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany; 18 Nov 91, Dallas, Tex.
Nelson, Carl E., 12 Jun 90, Ansbach, Germany.
OMeara, Gen. Andrew P. (USA, Ret.), 18 Jan 91, Arlington, Va.
Pfefferlein, Ursula, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.
Prentiss, Maj. Gen. Louis W., Jr. (USA, Ret.), 14 Sep 90, Indian Beach, Del.
Ray, Maj. Gen. James W., 5 Feb 90, Heidelberg, Germany.
Reitzel, Georgi, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt, Germany.
Roberts, Col. Claude (USA, Ret.), 12 Feb 91, Washington, D.C.
Rodehaver, Robert, 31 Jan 90, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Rose, Lt. Col. C. Leslie, 14 Jun 90, Wrzburg, Germany.
Rovero, Veronica, 19 Jun 90, Incirlik, Turkey.
Rufe, J. Dodd, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Schaffner, Karl, 13 Jun 90, Wrzburg, Germany.
Schempp, Jakoba, 12 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Shadday, John, 25 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Sikirica, Stanley, 29 Aug 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Smith, Maj. Gen. Scott B. (USA, Ret.), 29 Apr, 2 May 91, Golden, Colo.
Sommer, Douglas, 11 Jun 90, Vilseck, Germany.
Spivey, David A., by Donita M. Moorhus, 25 Oct 96, Alexandria, Va.
Stretz, Rudolf, 11 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.
Textor, Arthur, 1 Feb 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Townsley, Col. Edwin S. (USA, Ret.), 15 Feb 91, Alexandria, Va.
Trowbridge, Terry, 10 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Van Loben Sels, Maj. Gen. James, 12 Apr 91, Fort Monroe, Va.
Varga, Zoltan, 12 Jun 90, Nuremberg, Germany.
Wagman, Stuart, 11 Jan 94, Alexandria, Va.
Waldo, Col. Daniel, Jr., 31 Aug 89, 4 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Washington, Randolph S., 31 May 90, Chivres, Belgium.
Wheeler, Ralph, 12 Feb 91, Arlington, Va.
464
2/3/06 11:07:24 AM
Bibliography
Wilson, Maj. Gen. Drake (USA, Ret.), 29 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va.
Wisdom, Richard, 29 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Wise, James, 1 Feb 90, 11 Dec 91, Frankfurt, Germany.
Withers, Maj. Gen. George K., Jr. (USA, Ret.), 11 Feb 91, Washington, D.C.
Wooten, Herbert, 8 Aug 89, Frankfurt/Bonames, Germany.
Young, Maj. Gen. Robert P. (USA, Ret.), 30 Oct 90, Alexandria, Va.; by
Donita M. Moorhus, 9 Oct 91, Arlington, Va.
Zawisza, Edward, 30 Jan 90, Frankfurt, Germany.
Interviews from the Oral History Holdings, Office of History, Headquarters, U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, Alexandria, Va.
Aaron, Allan B., by William C. Baldwin, 21, 22 Jun 88, Frankfurt,
Germany.
Berrigan, Brig. Gen. Paul D. (USA, Ret.), by John T. Greenwood, 15, 17, 19
Nov 80, San Francisco, Calif.
Camblor, William E., by William C. Baldwin and Paul K. Walker, 20, 28
May 87, Frankfurt, Germany.
Cooper, Lt. Gen. Kenneth B. (USA, Ret.), by Charles Hendricks, 23 May 91.
Damm, Hasso, by Paul K. Walker, 21 Jun 88, Frankfurt, Germany.
Graves, Lt. Gen. Ernest (USA, Ret.), by Frank N. Schubert, Mar, Apr 85,
Arlington, Va.
Higgs, Joe G., by Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin, May 87,
Frankfurt, Germany.
Kennedy, Brig. Gen. Kenneth W., by Lynn Alperin, 23, 24 Apr 84, Austin,
Tex.
Mattina, Col. John C., by Carroll Purcell, 9 May 88, Oxnard, Calif.
Noble, Brig. Gen. Charles C. (USA, Ret.), by Martin Reuss, 22, 23 Sep 81.
Penney, Lt. Gen. Howard W. (USA, Ret.), by John T. Greenwood, Dec
80Dec 83.
Ray, Brig. Gen. James W., by Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin, 22,
27 May 87, Frankfurt, Germany.
Rodehaver, Robert, by Paul K. Walker and William C. Baldwin, 24 Jun 87,
Frankfurt, Germany.
465
2/3/06 11:07:24 AM
2/3/06 11:07:25 AM
INDEX
AAA. See Army Audit Agency (AAA).
AAFES. See Army and Air Force Exchange
Service (AAFES).
Aaron, Allan B., 198, 211, 227, 231, 237, 389
Abrams M1 tank, 309, 313
Accreditation of schools, 344
Ad hoc civil affairs units, 8
ADSEC. See Advance Section, COMZ
(ADSEC).
Advanced Weapons Section, USACAG, 130
Advance Section, COMZ (ADSEC), 24
Affirmative action, 36668
Affirmative Employment Plan, 368
AH64 Apache attack helicopter, 309
Ahearn, Brig. Gen. Joseph Bud, 225, 229
Aircraft shelters, Air Force, 27580
atomic-resistant shelters, 275
doors, special design of, 27677
funding for, 27778
helicopter transport of liners, 279
liners, reshaping of, 27879
sites in Germany, 276
storm-drainage system for, 27778
Airfield reconstruction, 19451948
Army Air Forces (AAF), 3031
Berlin Airlift, 4547
civilian volunteers, 4647
heavy machinery requirements, 4647
Rhine-Main, 30, 45
Tempelhof, 30, 4546
Air Force as customer of EUD, 22526
Air Transport Command (ATC), 31
Albrecht, Brig. Gen. Frank M., 124
Alexander, Clifford L., 302
Alexander M. Patch Elementary and High
School, Stuttgart, Germany, 344
Allaman, Kristine, 217
Allied air bridge, 45
Allied Control Council, 9
Alternate Construction program, 67, 130,
132, 153, 164, 25556, 257, 335, 355, 356
Alternate Housing Program, 132
American products, for construction
kitchen equipment, 274
21T_Index(634).indd 1
American products, for construction

Continued
in prefabricated units, 338
American zone in Germany, 6567
Ammunition storage projects, 16263,
28297
conventional ammunition, 284
igloos, 282, 285
Long Range Security Program, 284
nuclear ammunition, 284
security on sites, 28284, 285, 286, 290,
292
Special Ammunition Storage, 284
Weapons Access Denial System, 292
Ammunition Upload program, 287
AMPRS. See Automated Management
Progress Reporting System (AMPRS).
Ankara Air Station gymnasium, 359
Apel, Hans, 305
A Priori program, 257
Arab-Israeli War, 157
Area offices of Europe Division
1st Support Brigade, 184, 259
V Corps, 184, 259
VII Corps, 184, 259
Augsburg Resident Office, 262
closings of, 19901991, 384
Frankfurt Area Office, 262
Germany, 25960
Greece Resident Office, 266, 384
Hoensbroek Project Office, 384
Kaiserslautern Area Office, 262
Mediterranean Area Office, 26060
Mediterranean Division, 186, 261
Mediterranean Division, Iran, 26061
Middle East Division, 186
Northern Area Office, 18486, 26365,
28081, 384
Nuremberg Area Office, 263
reorganization, 236
Rheinberg Resident Office, 265
Southern Area Office, 262
Southwest Area Office, 262
Stuttgart Area Office, 262, 384
2/3/06 11:14:08 AM

Area offices of Europe DivisionContinued
Wrzburg Area Office, 384
Wrzburg Resident Office, 384
Army and Air Force Exchange Service
(AAFES), 355, 356, 375
Army Air Forces (AAF), 16
Army Area Command, 138, 140, 147
Army Audit Agency (AAA), 140
Army communities in occupied Germany,
19451948
barracks rehabilitation, 2930
housing for dependents, 2930
pricing mechanisms for construction, 29
standards for housing, 2829
Army Communities of Excellence, 218
Army engineers in the U.S. zone, 1417
civil administration in Germany, 14, 19
construction costs, 19451948, 3132
construction demands, 19451948, 3132
infrastructure, maintenance of, 14, 19
Office of the Theater Chief Engineer,
1617
supporting soldiers, 2830
supporting the U.S. Army Air Forces
(AAF), 3031
troop command in Germany and Austria,
15
Army Research Institute studies, 330
Arrangements for Control of Germany, 9
Asbestos abatement program, 34546
ATC. See Air Transport Command (ATC).
Atomic-resistant aircraft shelters, 275, 276
Attic conversion in housing units, 33941
design of, 34041
direct contracting, 34041
Gppingen, Germany, 339
indirect contracting, 340
Auftragsbautengrundstze (ABG75), 246
Austria
and Berlin Blockade, 4751
housing reconstruction, Vienna, 4751
special treatment of by occupying
powers, 12
Austrian State Treaty of 1955, 115
Automated data processing (ADP), 230
Automated funds control system, 231
Automated Management Progress
Reporting System (AMPRS), 23032
Baader-Meinhof Gang, 282
Bachelor officers quarters (BOQ), 7172
Backlogs in construction, 113, 19899, 207,

21516, 272, 33134
Barnes, Col. Lynn C., 119
Barracks improvement, 34143
deterioration, 341
Hahn Air Force Base, Germany, 343
Karatas, Turkey, 342
women soldiers, 342
Basic Treaty, 177
Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical
Construction Working Group), 122,
154, 167, 246, 276
Bearden, Scott, 338
Beranek, Dwight, 209
Berlin Airlift, 4547, 54, 307
Berlin Blockade, 4447, 63, 114
Berlin Crisis of 1961, 13335
Berlin Wall, 133, 371, 372, 374, 388
Berrigan, Col. Paul D., 14, 34
Bindermichl apartment complex, Linz,
Austria, 4850, 114
Birner, Richard, 317
Bizonia (British-American zone of
occupation), Germany, 31, 43, 44
Black Hawk troop transport helicopter, 309
Black market in Germany, 2223
Blake, John, 21516, 218, 224, 234, 237, 241,
262, 268, 292, 293, 307, 309, 327, 336,
341, 350, 370, 383
Blanchard, Lt. Gen. George S., 182, 200
Blink housing area, Bremerhaven,
Germany, 346
Board review monthly event, EUD, 198
Bogdanow, Walt, 307
Boiler conversion program, Germany,
15557
Bolte, Lt. Gen. Charles L., 96
BOQ. See Bachelor officers quarters (BOQ).
Bosch, Robert, 44
Bouchereau, Jacques, 145, 149, 150, 162, 191,
280
Bradley armored personnel carrier, 309, 313
Brandt, Willy, 177
Bratton, Lt. Gen. Joseph K., 224, 225, 287,
290, 309, 320, 323, 369
Braun, Hartwig, 350, 39192
Bremen port, Germany, 21
Bremerhaven hospital, 35354
Bremerhaven seaway, Germany, 21
Brettschneider, Louis, 127, 134, 145, 193,
194, 383, 385, 391
468
2/3/06 11:14:09 AM
Index
Bridge reconstruction in Germany, 2526
Brigade 75 redeployment, 300, 301, 305
Brigade 76 redeployment, 300
Brown, Harold, 305
Brown, Lt. Col. Roy A., 186, 198, 279
Budget projections, 19911992, 37980, 381
Build-to-lease program, OsterholzScharmbeck, 305
Bulk Transfer of U.S. Army Property, 36
Bunge Corporation, 109
Bunker construction in Germany, 282
Burnell, Maj. Gen. Bates C., 195, 200, 281
Butschan, Helga Preuss, 39192
Buxton, Lt. Col. John L., 166, 184, 190
Buyout option, manpower reduction, 375
Cakmakli, Turkey, 361
Camblor, William E., 122, 12324, 128, 134,
135, 137, 145, 189, 190, 20809, 221,
233, 237, 266, 272, 276, 391
Camp Bussac, Bordeaux, France, 91
Camp Roeder, Austria, 114
Campbell Barracks, Heidelberg, Germany,
43
Cannon, Brig. Gen. Craig, 141
Captieux, France, 8889
Carl Schurz Caserne, Bremerhaven, 360
Carlson, Col. Paavo, 137
Carlucci, Frank, 239
Carrasco, Col. Valentine, 208
Carson, Lt. Col. M. R., 184
Carter, Jimmy, 206, 281
Central Army Group, 59
Changes of command, 196203, 22829
Chapels, 36062
designs of, 36061
funding, 36162
Hahn Air Base, Germany, 361
new and renovated, 36061
social service centers, 36061
in Turkey, 361
Charles, Col. Carlyle Chuck, 197, 199, 224
Cheney, Richard B., 374, 376, 379, 383
Child care, informal, 346
Child development centers, 34748
Chinon, France, 92
Chinon Engineer Depot project, 108
Chinook helicopter squadron, 279
Chlorination of water, Germany, 98
Civilian personnel. See Department of the
Army civilians (DACs).
Civilian Personnel Office, ENGCOM, 172

Civilian Personnel Office (CPO),
USAREUR, 374
Clarke, Lt. Gen. Frederick J., 155
Clay, General Lucius D., 38, 45, 46, 86, 307
Close, Joanne Jodie, 225, 367
Closings of area offices of Europe Division,
384
Coal-fired boilers in Germany, 15657
Coal-fired space heaters in Europe, 156
Coalmines, restoration of in Germany, 24
COEMIS. See Corps of Engineers
Management Information System
(COEMIS).
Cold War collapse, 388, 389
Cold War lines of communication and
supply
Air Force construction program, 9192
Bremerhaven, Germany, 84, 86
Communications Zone, 92, 11213
France, 8693, 11014
Livorno, Italy, 86
Merignac Air Force Base, France, 92
Colio, Lt. Col. Lloyd, 266, 326, 384
Collins, Lt. Gen. Arthur S., Jr., 160
Commodity Credit Corporation, 109
Common Infrastructure Program, 256
Communications Zone (COMZ), 89, 14,
21, 10708, 11213, 120, 14849, 168
Community Family Support Center, 379
Community support projects, 35462
chapels, 36062
commissaries and post exchanges,
35657
funding, 35456
recreational facilities, 35760
Compagnie Immobilire Marc Rainaut, 109
Comptrollers Office, EUD, 19192
COEMIS, 19192
personnel shortage, 191
tracking costs of projects, 19192
COMZ. See Communications Zone
(COMZ).
Conjunctive funding, 257
Connally, Lt. Col. John, 25
Connell, Brig. Gen. Richard M., 201
Conner, Tom, 195
Construction contracting, Turkey, 22122
Construction costs, Germany, 19451948, 33
Construction Division, EUD, 24950
Construction Division reorganization, 234
469
2/3/06 11:14:09 AM

Construction industry in Turkey,
strengthening of, 24445
Construction Management and
Engineering Associates (CMEA), 91,
108
Construction mission, 19881991, 36388
Construction personnel, Germany, 1719
civilians, 1819, 4647
displaced persons, 1819
prisoners of war, 1718
professionals, 18
soldiers, 19
Construction phase-out, 379
Contracting changes, EUD, 23437, 273
Contracting Directorate, 370
Contracting in France, 10206
Gnie, for military installations, 102, 107
Ponts et Chauses, for bridges and roads,
102
Service de lInfrastructure, with NATO,
104, 106
Contracting methods
ABG75, 246
combined direct and indirect, 243
Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement, 245
direct, 243, 246
Dollar Construction Contract, 245
Germany, 24547
indirect, 243, 245, 246
NATO Status of Forces Agreement, 245
Technical Working Group for
Construction, 246
training for contractors and workers, 245
Turkey, 24445
Contracts, extension to, 236
CONUS (Continental United States)
districts, 201
Conway, Virginia, 367, 382, 385
Cooper, Lt. Gen. Kenneth B., 200
Corlite Building Systems, Weslaco, Texas,
335, 336
Corps Line, 197, 238, 364, 376, 388
Corps of Engineers Management
Information System (COEMIS),
19192, 23032
Corps system in Europe, 188
Cost-cutting budget, 37980
Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France, 370
Cowles, Col. Philip, 221
Cox, Dave, 184, 268
Cradle-to-grave project management, 369

Crizer, Lt. Gen. Pat W., 287
Cruise missiles, 32127, 368
Cruz, Jose, 200, 202, 207, 209, 215, 220, 286
Culp, Col. Dennis, 234
Cultural differences, problems from, 390
Customer satisfaction in project planning,
247, 368
Customer service, EUD, 21718, 225, 23740
DACs. See Department of the Army
civilians (DACs).
Dale, Debra, 385
Damm, Hasso, 127, 146, 149, 207, 208, 227,
232, 279, 367, 374, 375, 378, 382, 385,
391
Davison, General Michael S., 171, 172
DBBV. See Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung
(DBBV).
de Gaulle, Charles, 148
Debco, Sgt. Joe, 47
Defense and Economic Cooperation
Agreement, 244
DEH. See Directorate of Engineering and
Housing (DEH).
Delbridge, Brig. Gen. Norman G., Jr., 47,
181, 19697, 198, 199, 200202, 205,
215, 224, 232, 280, 323
Demobilization in Europe, 36869
Department of Defense, 38
form 1391, 247
Productivity Month, 239
Department of the Army civilians (DACs),
108, 21516, 26669, 273
Dependent housing, 19501953, 7376
Deutschmark funding, 76
family units, 7475
requisitioned housing, 74
service-related civilians, 74
Dependent housing, 19531957, 96100
bachelor officers quarters (BOQ), 98
basic utilities, 9899
chapels, 100
health facilities, 99
heating sources, 97
new family housing units, 9698
schools, 99100
standard building specifications, 97
Design and construction process, 24769
area offices, 25869
construction, 24951
470
2/3/06 11:14:09 AM
Index
Design and construction processContinued
design, 24849
funding, host nation, 25556
funding, NATO, 25657
funding, U.S., 25355
planning, 24748
projects, 26266
supervision in the field, 26669
value engineering, 25153
workload, 25758, 26162
Design Branch, EUD, 19293
American design specifications, 19293
German design specifications, 193
Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung (DBBV), 67,
12123
Deutsche Industrie-Normen (DIN), 193
Deutschmark (DM) construction, 44, 51, 67,
9596, 99, 12123, 128, 132, 153, 165, 301
DIN. See Deutsche Industrie-Normen (DIN).
Direct contracting system, 243, 246, 34041
Directorate of Engineering and Housing
(DEH), 212, 247, 333
Directorate of Military Construction, OCE,
195
Directorates of Facilities Engineering,
regional, 194, 195
District heating system, Vilseck, Germany,
308
Doherty, Lt. Col. T. L., 184
Dollarbaukontrakt (Dollar Construction
Contract), 122, 124, 127, 245
Donges-Metz pipeline, 11112, 119
Donovan, Brig. Gen. James C., 132, 171,
181, 188, 272
Dual-basing plan, 300
Dual-purpose housing/hospital plan,
France, 11213
Dual recruitment, 367
Dyckerhoff-Widmann firm, 353
18th Engineer Brigade, 310
83d Engineer Construction Battalion, 89, 91
862d Engineer Aviation Battalion, 30
East Camp, Grafenwhr, Germany, 348
East German demonstrations, 1989, 371
East German Politburo, 371
Eddleman, General Clyde D., 132
Eddy, Lt. Gen. Manton S., 64
Edgar, Maj. Gen. C. Ernest, III, 381
EEO. See Equal employment opportunity
(EEO).
Efficiency management in engineer

activities, 3942
chief engineer, role of, 41
Engineer School, Murnau, 4142
nonmilitary personnel, 4142
post engineer training teams, 41
Eisenhower, General Dwight D., 8, 14, 19,
57
Electric rail system, Germany, 2425
Electronic radio network (troposcatter),
132
Emmons, Terry, 217
Engineer Command (ENGCOM), 1966
1974, 13973
ammunition storage projects, 16263
boiler conversion program, 15557
construction challenges, 16367
C2 (command and control) project,
Belgium, 151
engineer troops, 14647
facilities engineers, 14748
FRELOC, 14852, 155
headquarters fire, Frankfurt, 16162
labor service units, 147
military personnel, 14446
Modernization of U.S. Facilities, 16567
phaseout, 16873
REFORGER, 15253
school complex, Belgium, 15051
SHAPE headquarters, Belgium, 151
standardization of criteria, 148
Stem to Stern, 15860
structure and organization, 14148
troop reduction in Europe, 14853
workload and funding, 15363
Engineer Division, EUCOM, 6566
Construction Branch, 66
Operations Branch, 66
Engineer Element, 138
Engineer Field Service Center, 76
Engineering Division, EUD, 248
Engineering operations standardized,
5154
cost-accounting procedures, 52
Deutschmark, 51
German economy, 51
language barriers, 53
maintenance of utilities and equipment,
5254
Engineer School, Murnau, Germany, 4142
Engineer Studies Center, 234, 369
471
2/3/06 11:14:09 AM

Engineer Training Center, Epernay, France,
17
EQM. See EUD Quality Management
(EQM).
Equal Employment Opportunity Action
Plan, USAREUR, 19091
Equal employment opportunity (EEO),
36668, 378
Erzurum, Turkey, 221
ESC. See U.S. Army Engineer Studies
Center (ESC).
Eschbach, Lt. Col. A. M., 79, 80
ETOUSA. See European Theater of
Operations, United States Army
(ETOUSA).
EUCOM. See European Command
(EUCOM).
EUD Bulletin, 196
EUD Quality Management (EQM), 238,
366, 369
Europe District, 388
Europe Division, Corps of Engineers,
19741978, 181203
area offices, 18388
change of command, 196203
Comptrollers Office, 19192
Engineering Division, 195
facilities engineering operations, 19395
German employees, 173
in-house design, 19293
morale of staff, 18891
personnel and procedures, 18192
personnel shortages, 199201
Europe Division, Corps of Engineers,
19781988, 20540
and the Air Force, 22526
Construction Division, 209, 21820
construction in Turkey, 22023
Contract Administration Branch, 209
customer service, 21718
defense budget growth, 21214
Engineering Division, 21618
headquarters, 211
intergovernmental affairs, 237
organizational structure, 22737
Planning Branch, 218
quality management, 23740
recruitment of manpower, 21516
revising procedures and training, 22325
staff size and workload, 20611
Supervision and Inspection Branch, 209
Europe Division and European revolution,

37288
cost cutting, 37980
field office reductions, 384
hiring freeze, 376, 381
manpower reduction, 37476
mergers of offices, 381
morale, 385
moratorium on new construction, 1990,
374, 375, 376, 37980, 383
reduction in force, 37679, 38182, 383
reorganization, 36670, 37679
workload restructuring, 383
European Air Transport Service, 31
European Command (EUCOM), 33, 38, 41,
64
Engineer Division, 100
Engineer School, 52
European Exchange Service, 132
European Theater of Operations, United
States Army (ETOUSA), 14
Exceptional Civilian Award, 237
Exercise COMBINE, 92
Explosives Safety Board, Department of
Defense, 282
1st Infantry Division, 38
4th Armored Division, 132, 139
56th Field Artillery Command, 327
59th Ordnance Brigade, 16263, 282
485th Engineer Heavy Shop Company, 37
485th Tactical Missile Wing, 32324
473d Air Service Group, 30
Facilities Engineering Support Section, 194
Facilities Modernization Program, 316
Facilities Support Section, Engineering
Division, 333
Factory-built housing
bids from contractors, 339
funding, 33435, 337
infrastructure with, 33738
maintenance reduction, 338
for noncommissioned officers, 337
prefabricated units, 33536
prototype in Wildflecken, 33536
townhouse designs, 337
Family housing
backlog of maintenance, 33132
existing units, 33134
heating units, 33233
laundry rooms, 333
472
2/3/06 11:14:09 AM
Index
Family housingContinued
mold and mildew, 332
shortages of personnel, 333
team approach to renovation, 334
whole-house renovation, 33334
Faust, Adolph, 145
Faxon, E. M., 184
Federal Republic of Germany, 63, 95, 121,
299327
Federally Employed Women, 366
FENDER II, 16970
Ferris Barracks, Erlangen, Germany, 160
Field offices, structure of, 25960
Fillibeck and Sons, 344
Finanzbauamt (Office of Finance for
Construction), 154
First Berlin Crisis, 4447
Fish, Lt. Col. Grosvenor Bud, Jr., 268,
308
Fleming, Col. Robert, 23, 32, 34, 35, 36, 39
Florennes, Belgium, 323
Focus 90 briefing, 376
Ford, Brig. Gen. W. W., 106
Ford, Gerald, 300
Fort Hood, Texas, 303, 305
Forward stationing, 307
Fraint, Saul, 108, 126, 134, 145, 150, 166,
193
France, 19481953, 8693
Air Force construction program, 91
Captieux ordnance depot, 8889
funding for military construction, 91
storage of American supplies, 8889
tent housing for U.S. troops, 90
terrain difficulties, 89
U.S. supply line construction, 8693
France, 19531957, 10214
construction contracts, 10207
dependent housing, 10809
Joint Construction Agency, 10114
recruitment of construction personnel,
10708
streamlining construction procedures,
10607
surplus-commodity housing, 109
U.S. supply line construction, 11014
Frankfurt American High School, 34445
French Communist Party, 86
French Liaison Mission, 106
Friesch, Paul, 126
Fulda, Germany, 167
Funding for construction

host-nation, 25556
NATO, 25657
U.S., 25355
Funding for missile systems, Germany,
1961, 130
Funding special account, JCA, 10405
Garlstedt garrison, 300307
Armed Forces Network Television, 305
Brigade 75 redeployment, 300, 301
build-to-lease housing, 303, 305
design of buildings, 306
environmental impact of construction, 302
funding, 301, 305, 306
medical facilities, 306
multiuse facilities, 305
public relations planning, 30203
school construction, 306
Garrett, Lee, 199, 201
Gatow Airfield, Berlin, Germany, 46
General Accounting Office (GAO), 293
General Lucius D. Clay Caserne, Berlin,
Germany, 307
Georgi Reitzel firm, 320
German Democratic Republic, 63
German Federal Construction
Administration. See Deutsche
Bundesbauverwaltung (DBBV).
German Federal Ministry of Finance, 378
German Government Construction Agency.
See Deutsche Bundesbauverwaltung
(DBBV).
German Grand Service Cross, 237
German National Railroad, 97
German products, for construction, 338
German-U.S. Architect Group, 344
Gilze-Rijen, Netherlands, 276, 277, 279, 280
GLCM. See Ground Launched Cruise
Missile (GLCM) program.
Gorbachev, Mikhail, 326, 368, 370
Grafenwhr live-fire range, 31013
moving target systems, 311, 312
pop-up targets, 312
procurement of materials and
equipment, 311
soil analysis of, 31011
sound absorption design, 313
tank firing range, 311, 312
troop facilities, 311
473
2/3/06 11:14:10 AM

Gramm-Rudman amendment, 368
Graves, Maj. Gen. Ernest, 201
Graves Registration Command, 88
Greene, H. Jace, 37, 97, 126, 145, 191
Gribble, Lt. Gen. William C., Jr., 186, 190,
272, 284
Griggs, Ken, 383
Grigsby, E. M., 184
Grimm, Richard, 219, 268
Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM)
program, 264, 309, 32227
Groves, Maj. Gen. Richard H., 200
Gymnasium projects, 35859
Hahn Air Base, Germany, 324, 361
Hanau depot, 3438
displaced persons influx, 35
hardstands, 34
Heavy Equipment Storage Section, 37
influx of goods, 3435
redeployment, loss of personnel to, 35
Repair and Rebuild, 3738
subdepots, 3536
unloading backlog, 35
Hanau Engineer Depot, 53
Handy, General Thomas T., 64, 67
Hardin, Col. John R., 14
Hardstands, 34, 31819
Harrell, Brig. Gen. Ernest J., 36467, 369,
37576, 381, 382, 383, 388, 392
Harrington, Evan, 150
Hatch, Maj. Gen. Henry J., Jr., 213, 366, 369,
370, 376, 380
Haugen, John, 145
Hawk missile program, 130, 131
Hazen, Col. Donald E., 225, 322, 323
Heating sources for buildings in Germany,
97
Heiberg, Lt. Gen. E. R., III, 229, 239
Heidelberg, Germany, 4344
Heilbronn, Germany, 326
Helping Hand program, 7678
39th Engineer Group, 76
77th Engineer Construction Battalion,
76
Busenbach, Germany, 78
Engineer Field Service Center, 76
Weingarten, Germany, 7678
Wilhelmsfeld, Germany, 76
Hendrik Caserne, Netherlands, 297
Henson, Capt. Kent, 30809
Higgs, Joe G., 193, 200, 201, 202, 207, 208,

209, 21314, 216, 217, 220, 233, 237,
253, 370, 383
Hiring freeze, Department of Defense, 374,
376
Hochtief, A. G.; Wiener und Trachte; P. A.
Budau contracting group, 343
Hohenfels combat maneuver training
center, 31315
mock village site, 31415
opposition force for mock battle, 314
for street-to-street fighting, 31315
Holdover projects, EUD, after 1974, 27181
Air Force aircraft shelters, 27580
American products, regulations to use, 274
funding, 27273, 274
MOUSF construction, 27175
naval facilities, 28081
project officers, 273
remote sites, 27475
Sigonella Naval Base, Sicily, 28081
staffing difficulties, 27273
Honecker, Erich, 371
Hospital/housing construction, France,
11213
Hot projects in Germany, 19451948,
3132
Bad Nauheim, 32
Frankfurt, 31
Garmisch, 32
Hchst compound, 32
Rhine-Main Air Base, 31
Wiesbaden, 31
Housing Administration Trust, Vienna, 51
Housing reconstruction, Vienna, 4751
Huebner, Lt. Gen. Clarence R., 38, 39, 42
Humphrey, Gordon J., 316
Huntsville Division, Corps of Engineers, 155
I. G. Farben Company, 14, 35, 39, 161, 216,
344, 39293
IBM Information Systems Plan, 232
Igloo bunkers, 282, 285
Illesheim Caserne, Germany, 132
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, 220, 22223, 360
Indefinite delivery (open-ended) contracts,
236
Indirect contracting system, 12223, 190,
200, 243, 245, 246, 250, 273, 302, 340,
379, 390
474
2/3/06 11:14:10 AM
Index
Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
Fort McNair, Washington, D.C., 135
INF Treaty. See Intermediate Range Nuclear
Forces (INF) Treaty.
Information Management Office, EUD, 232,
233
Information processing systems, 229,
23032
Inspection of MOUSF construction, 273
Installation Support Activity, Europe, 333,
347
Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty, 179, 326, 368
International Refugee Organization, 48, 50,
67, 69
Iran commissary project, 356
Iron Curtain, fall of, 371
JAMMAT. See Joint American Military
Mission for Aid to Turkey (JAMMAT).
JCA. See Joint Construction Agency (JCA);
Joint Construction Agency (JCA),
France.
Jever, Germany, 276, 279, 280
Joint American Military Mission for Aid to
Turkey (JAMMAT), 8384
Joint Construction Agency (JCA), 95,
10120, 135
abolished, 119
Austria, 11415
France, 10114
Greece, 11516
Italy, 11415
Turkey, 11516
Joint Construction Agency (JCA), France,
10120
administrative procedures, 10207
central office, Boulogne-Billancourt, 102
dependent housing, 10809
line of communications, 11014
major tasks of, 10407
personnel recruitment, 10708
phaseout, 11620
Suez Canal Zone, 114, 118
Kaiserslautern ammunition dump, 283
Kappa, Shirley, 19697, 201
Kastle Keepers, 197
Katterbach Caserne, Ansbach, Germany,
346, 360
Kauffeisen, General, 106
Kelley, Brig. Gen. Roy S., 156

Kem, Maj. Gen. Richard S., 380, 381
Kennedy, John F., 133, 156
Kennedy, General Kenneth W., 155, 156,
157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 346
Kessler Field, Schweinfurt, Germany, 346
Keyes, Lt. Gen. Geoffrey, 4748
Khrushchev, Nikita, 133
Klee, Holzmann, Zueblin, Wachter
construction group, 344
Koisch, Maj. Gen. P. Frank, 17071
Kolin Insaat firm, 342
Kommandatura, 9
Korean War, 64, 66
Korman, Carl, 210
Kornwestheim apartment complex, 97
Krenz, Egon, 371
Kroesen, General Frederick J., 291, 316, 363
Krupinski, Viktor, 246
Kupec, Steve, 213
Kvam, Lt. Col. Kenneth W., 322, 323
Lahr Air Base, Baden-Wrttemberg,
Germany, 276, 277
Lamothe, Lt. Col. Douglas, 213, 384
Lnder, disbursing wages, 127
Landstuhl hospital, 35051
Leber, Georg, 302
Lee, Lt. Gen. John C. H., 8, 14
Leighton Barracks, Wrzburg, Germany,
346
LeMay, Lt. Gen. Curtis E., 46
Lemnitzer, General Lyman L., 150
LeTellier, Brig. Gen. Carroll N., 16364, 171,
358
Lewis, John, 198, 200
Lewis, Wayne, 268
Lifecycle project management, 369, 376, 388
Line of communications, France, 8693,
11014, 121
Lippert, Karen, 336
Lipscomb, Col. Thomas H., 83
Live-fire practice ranges, 31013
Livorno, Italy, 11415
Logistics Management Office, 233, 366
Long Range Security Program (LRSP), 163,
282, 28493
Louis Berger International, 166, 310, 320
Love, Laverne, 367, 378
LRSP. See Long Range Security Program
(LRSP).
475
2/3/06 11:14:10 AM

Lucas and Associates, Rome, Italy, 15859
Lustig, Brig. Gen. Sheldon J., 225
M. F. Wachter firm, 344
Macaulay, Thomas, 33
McCloy, John J., 66, 67
McCutchen, Col. Alan J., 41
Mace missile program, 130, 131
McGahey, Marshall, and McMillan firm, 166
McNamara, Robert, 134
McNarney, General Joseph T., 14, 32
McNeely, Frederick B., 173, 188, 199, 200, 201
McNutt, Brig. Gen. Charles, 124
Magruder, Maj. Gen. Carter B., 14
Maintenance, Repair, and Improvement
(MRI), 33134
Manpower projections, 19911992, 38081
Mansfield, Mike, 152
Markuten, Rod, 324
Marshall Heights, Kitzingen, Germany, 337
Marshall Plan, 44, 57
Master Planning Section, EUD, 21618
Mattson, Pvt. Roy L., 78
MCA. See Military Construction, Army
(MCA).
MCAF. See Military Construction, Air Force
(MCAF).
Measurement Information Data Acquisition
System, 230
Medical facilities in Germany for military
dependents, 306, 34954
97th General Hospital, Frankfurt, 35152
Bremerhaven, 353
cost estimates, 350
Landstuhl renovation, 35051
medical equipment, specialized, 350
Nuremberg Army hospital, 34950
value-engineering program, 353
Wrzburg Army hospital, 35253
Mediterranean Division, U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 119, 120, 186, 202, 26061
Mediterranean Theater, 35, 36
Meet and Mingle, 197
Mele, Michael, 237
Mentell, Lt. Col. Robert, 268
Merger of EUD and MEAPO, 381, 383
Merignac Air Force Base, Bordeaux, France,
92
Meritorious Civilian Service Award, 216, 237
Military Construction, Air Force (MCAF),
231, 247
Military Construction, Army (MCA), 150,

214, 247
Military operations in urban terrain
(MOUT), 31415
Miller, Col. Hubert S., 48, 5051
Mine workers, Germany, 24
Minorities in the Army, 366
Mock village training site, 31415
Modernization of U.S. Facilities (MOUSF),
16567, 27175, 299
Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard
Viscount, 7
Moore, Maj. Gen. Cecil R., 8, 14, 17, 19, 21,
27, 28, 34
Morale
in Europe Division, 19741976, 18891,
19699
among occupation forces, 3839
and reductions in force, 19901991, 385
Moratorium on military construction, 374,
375, 376, 379
Moravec, Col. John, 213, 234, 238, 370
Morris, Brig. Gen. Howard A., 23, 39, 135,
139, 140
Morris, Lt. Gen. John W., 199, 216, 254
MOUSF. See Modernization of U.S.
Facilities (MOUSF).
MOUT. See Military operations in urban
terrain (MOUT).
Moving target training ranges, 31112
MRI. See Maintenance, Repair, and
Improvement (MRI).
Mulford, Jim, 268
97th General Hospital, Frankfurt, 35152
National Training Center, Fort Irwin,
California, 314
NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
New programs, EUD, after 1977, 28197
ammunition storage facilities, 28293
pre-positioned materiel, 29397
New weaponry systems, Germany, 30927
Cruise missile program, 32127
Hohenfels combat maneuver training
center, 31315
live-fire training ranges, 31013
operational facilities upgrade, 31519
Patriot missile program, 31921
Pershing missile system, 32127
Newsletter, EUD, 19697
476
2/3/06 11:14:10 AM
Index
Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), Germany,
302
Nike air defense missile program, 130
Nissen, Tom, 277
Noce, Maj. Gen. Daniel, 68
Nold, Maj. Gen. George J., 102, 107, 111
North Atlantic Treaty, 57, 86
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), 57, 63, 121, 205, 244, 300, 370
allotments for construction, 25657
Common Infrastructure Program, 130,
153, 225
Recoupment Branch, 153
responsibilities of U.S. military under,
6465
Status of Forces Agreement, 122, 207, 245
Nuremberg Army hospital
medical equipment, specialized, 350
renovation, 34950
1057th Engineer Port Construction and
Repair Group, 25
Oberfinanzdirektion (State Financial Office),
Hanover, Germany, 301, 302, 303, 306
Occupying powers in Germany
organizing of, 912
responsibilities toward civilian society,
2122
special treatment of Austria, 12
U.S. Army as, 9
U.S. zone of occupation, 912
OCE. See Office of the Chief of Engineers
(OCE), Washington, D.C.
Oelberg, Lt. Col. Kermit, 186
Office of the Chief Engineer, Heidelberg,
5253
Office of the Chief of Engineers (OCE),
Washington, D.C., 106, 119, 182, 356
Office of the Chief of Engineers, USFET, 18,
19, 28, 30
Office of the Engineer, USAREUR, 172
Office of Human Resources, 374
Office of Military Government United
States (OMGUS), 15, 16, 26
Office of the Theater Chief Engineer, 25, 26
profile of activities, 1617
responsibilities of, 17
Oil-burning boilers, Germany, 157
Old Argonner Caserne, Hanau, Germany, 348
OMeara, General Andrew P., 13940, 155,
156, 158
OMA. See Operations and Maintenance,

Army (OMA).
OMGUS. See Office of Military Government
United States (OMGUS).
Operational facilities modernizing, 31519
Facilities Modernization Program, 316
funding, 316
hardstands, 31819
maintenance shops, 31617
roller-compacted concrete, 31819
Operation BAMBOO TREE, 13335
Operation DESERT SHIELD, 381
Operation FRELOC, 14852, 155
Operation New Neighbor, 303
Operation VITTLES, 45
Operations and Maintenance, Army
(OMA), 193, 213, 247
Opstal, Al, 297
Organizational control, EUD, 22326
Organizational structure, 19781988,
22930, 23337
Osterholz-Scharmbeck, Germany, 303
Ostpolitik, 177
OToole, Lt. Col. Robert, 213
Outdoor sport facilities, 358
Outplacement program, USACE, 382
Outstanding Civilian Service Award, 246
Panzer Housing Area, Bblingen, Germany,
348
Pastore, John, 283, 284
Patrick Henry Village, Heidelberg,
Germany, 343, 348
Patriot air defense missile, 309, 31921
funding, 320, 321
installations, 320
mounting, 320
troop facilities, 320
Patton Barracks, 43
Pattonville Housing Area, Ludwigsburg,
Germany, 344
Peacock, Earl, 140
Peckham, Brig. Gen. Howard L., 88
Perlacher Forest Caserne, Munich,
Germany, 356
Pershing II missile, 178, 309, 32127, 368
Air Force sites, 324
elimination of American and Russian
missiles, 32627
Florennes, Belgium, site, 323
Hahn Air Base site, 324
477
2/3/06 11:14:10 AM

Pershing II missileContinued
Heilbronn, Germany, site, 326
Personnel recruitment, JCA, France
essentiality review, 10708
professional engineers, 108
Personnel shortages, EUD, 199201, 21516
Phaseout of ENGCOM, 16873
Philipp Holzmann, A.G., 134, 335, 33637,
353
Phillips, Leonard L., 145, 211, 227
Phillips Building, 211, 269, 380, 384, 39293
Pick, Lt. Gen. Lewis A., 48, 92
Pickett, Col. George E., 79
Pipeline for petroleum products, France,
11112
Planning Branch, EUD, 217, 218
Political revolution in Europe, 1989, 37072
Berlin Wall opened, 371
demonstrations by East Germans, 371
East German emigration to Western
Europe, 371
Iron Curtain, fall of, 371
Red Army tanks removed from Hungary,
370
Warsaw Pact dissolution, 372
Polk, General James H., 155, 158, 162
POMCUS. See Pre-positioned
Organizational Materiel Configured
to Unit Sets (POMCUS).
POMSS. See Pre-positioned Organizational
Materiel Storage Sites (POMSS).
Pop-up target firing ranges, 31213
Post exchanges, 35657
Heilbronn, Germany, 35657
Iran, 35657
Leighton Barracks Wrzburg, Germany,
35657
Perlacher Forest Caserne, Munich,
Germany, 35657
Ramstein, Germany, 35657
Vogelweh, Germany, 35657
Powell, Lt. Col. Ray, 213
Prefabricated housing, Germany, 33439
Prefinanced funding, 257, 290
Prentiss, Brig. Gen. Louis W., Jr., 18183,
190, 194, 19596, 199, 200, 202, 205,
216, 230, 261, 268, 272, 284
Prentiss, Col. Louis W., Sr., 32
Pre-positioned ammunition storage, 29397
Arab-Israeli War of 1973, 293
maintenance of stored equipment, 29495
Pre-positioned ammunition storage

Continued
new construction, 297
REFORGER exercises, 293, 295, 297
removal of obsolete materiel, 294
Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel
Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS),
29394, 31516
Pre-positioned Organizational Materiel
Storage Sites (POMSS), 29597
Priority placement, Defense Department,
382
Prisoners of war, 1718
Procurement and Supply Division, EUD,
220
Program and Project Management
Directorate, 370
Programs and projects, EUD
holdover projects, 27181
new programs, 28197
Project CHASE, 172
Project FENDER, 168
Project Management Branch, Engineering
Division, 253
Project Management Division Concept, 369
Project officers, 273, 287
Project RED WHEEL, 171
Projects board, EUD, 19799
Quality management, 23740
RADVA Corporation of Radford, Virginia,
337
Ramstein Air Base, Germany, 161, 225, 277,
291, 356
Ray, Brig. Gen. James W. Bill, 205, 23233,
23739, 265, 352, 364, 368
Reagan, Ronald, 238, 281, 326, 368
Real Estate Division, ENGCOM, 15455
Reconfiguration of U.S. forces overseas,
3839
Recoupment Section, EUD, 257
Red Army tanks, removal from Hungary,
370
Redeployment of troops and materiel, 1945,
1926
communications and supply lines, 2123
holding camps, 2021
rebuilding the infrastructure, 2326
Reduction in force (RIF), 37576, 38081
buyout option, 375
478
2/3/06 11:14:10 AM
Index
Reduction in force (RIF)Continued
construction moratoriums, 384
field office closings, 384
German and third-country employees,
37475
hiring freeze, 374, 376, 381
morale, 385
moratorium on new construction, 374,
375, 376, 37980, 383
of non-American employees, 38384
outplacement program, USACE, 382
priority placement, Department of
Defense, 382
ratio between German and third-country
employees, 382
tariff agreements, 374
termination of local nationals, 382,
38384
of U.S. civilians, 382
workload decrease, 37576
Reduction of U.S. forces in Europe, 36869
REFORGER, 15253, 293, 295, 297, 299
Regulations for classroom design, 348
Rehabilitation of requisitioned property,
Heidelberg, 4344
Reichswerke Hermann Gring, 48
Reitzel, Georgi, 127
Remote site upgrading, 167
Repair and Rebuild, 3637
Repositioning of troops and materiel in
Germany, 299309
cost-sharing agreement, 300301
district heating system, 308
dual-basing plan, 300
funding, 30506
Garlstedt garrison, 300301
permanent structures required, 30107
public relations during construction,
30809
school construction, 307
Vilseck, 30709
Resource Management Office, EUD, 215,
376
REturn of FORces to GERmany. See
REFORGER.
Reviews in design phase of construction,
24849
Rheinau Coal Storage Point, 47
Rhenish Palatinate (Rheinpfalz), Germany,
7882
hospital construction, 8182
Rhenish Palatinate (Rheinpfalz), Germany

Continued
infrastructure weakness, 8082
Kaiserslautern, 81
Mangin Caserne, 81
Vogelweh, 81
Rhine River, clearing of, 1945, 2526
Rhoades, Capt. M. Stephen, 220, 221
RIF. See Reduction in force (RIF).
River clearing, Germany, 25
Roberts, Col. Claude, 346
Robinson, Maj. Gen. Bernard L., 102, 106
Robinson Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany, 346
Rodehaver, Robert, 78, 145, 268
Roller-compacted concrete, 31819
Rose, Lt. Col. Leslie, 384
Rousseau, R. L., 188
Rovero, Veronica, 269
7th Engineer Brigade, 141
77th Engineer Construction Battalion, 76
6970th LS/CLG, 14647, 157
7966th EUCOM Detachment, 88, 90
Safety in child care centers, 34748
Saint, General Crosbie E., 378
SAS. See Special Ammunition Storage
(SAS).
Saudi Arabia, 23233
Scandal, absence of, 39091
Schaffner, Karl, 352
Scherman, Irv, 378, 382
Schlesinger, James, 171, 300
Schmidt, Helmut, 178, 300
Schools and child care centers, 1980s,
34349
accreditation, loss of, 344
asbestos abatement, 34546
child care centers, 34648
design elements, unusual, 344
funding, 34445
preschools, 34648
youth activity centers, 34849
Schools for military dependents, Germany,
99100, 306
Schulman, Vic, 216
Security at ammunition sites, 28292
Sending States Construction Group, 237
Senior Executive Service, EUD, 209
Sense of the Senate Resolution, 152
SETAF. See Southern European Task Force
(SETAF).
479
2/3/06 11:14:11 AM

Seventh Army, 64
Shadday, John, 145, 151
SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).
SHAPE. See Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE).
Shingler, Brig. Gen. Don G., 39, 41, 52, 65,
86, 148
Shopping centers, military, 356
Siemens company, 134
Sigonella Naval Air Base, Sicily, 28081, 358
Sikirica, Sgt. Stanley, 44
Sizemore, Sherry, 36061
Smith, Col. Glen, 208
Smith, Brig. Gen. Scott Beecher, 205, 22326,
322, 323, 324, 326, 367
Smith Barracks, Baumholder, Germany,
31617
Snow, C. P., 198
Sobke, Maj. Gen. John, 381, 388
Society of American Military Engineers,
213, 223, 237, 324
Soesterberg, Netherlands, 276, 277, 345
Soldier communities, after 1970, 32962
barracks, 34143
characteristics of, 32930
community facilities, 35462
family housing, 33041
schools and child care centers, 34349
Sommer, Doug, 309
Southern European Task Force (SETAF), 115
Southwest Area Office, Kaiserslautern,
Germany, 343
Sovereign status of Germany, 389
Soviet Union, 44, 389
Spangdahlem, Germany, 276, 277
Special Ammunition Storage (SAS), 282,
284
Special Category Army, 31
Special security devices, 292
Sports and recreational facilities, 35760
Ankara Air Station, Turkey, 359
bowling, 359
Carl Schurz Caserne, Bremerhaven,
Germany, 360
1st Infantry Division (Forward),
Gppingen, Germany, 360
gymnasiums, 35859
Incirlik, Turkey, 360
multipurpose recreation centers, 360
Sports and recreational facilitiesContinued

outdoor facilities, 358
racquetball courts, 359
Sigonella Naval Air Base, Sicilly, 358
Wolfgang Caserne, Hanau, Germany, 359
Sports Club of Osterholz-Scharmbeck,
Germany, 303
Sputnik, 128, 133
SS20 missile, 178, 322, 32627
Starnes, Maj. William L., 48
Stars and Stripes bookstores, 355
Stem to Stern, 15860, 165, 166, 167, 168,
272, 332
Sterrebeek, Belgium, 150
Stone, Robert A., 239, 338
Storage igloos, 13132
Storage sites for atomic and chemical
weapons, 131
Stoughton, Maj. Gen. Tom R., 140, 141
Stradley igloo bunker design, 282, 285
Strauss, Franz Josef, 132
Streck, Col. Ed, 137
Sturgis, Lt. Gen. Samuel D., 92, 119
Sturman, Gary, 277
Suez Canal Zone, 114
Sullivan Barracks, Mannheim, Germany,
158
Supervisors Equal Opportunity Liaison,
366
Supplementary Agreement to the NATO
Status of Forces Agreement, 122
Supply line construction, France, 11014
Communications Zone, 113
Donges-Metz pipeline, 11112
funding of construction, 113
pipeline for petroleum products, 11112
Suez Canal Zone, 114
USAREUR, 11011
Supporting the Air Force, 3031, 8384, 220,
22526
Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 14
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe (SHAPE), 57, 88
Surplus-commodity housing, France, 109
Sverdrup, Maj. Gen. Leif, 223
Sverdrup Medal, 223
24th Engineer Group, 272, 283
38th Tactical Missile Wing, 324
480
2/3/06 11:14:11 AM
Index
39th Engineer Group, 76
291st Engineer Company, 78
3M Corporation, 238
TAB VEE. See Theater Air Base
Vulnerability Evaluation Exercise
(TAB VEE).
Tactical readiness training, 4243
Grafenwhr, Germany, 42
Vilseck Caserne, Germany, 43
Wildflecken, Germany, 43
Tambornino, John, 126, 145, 188, 189, 277
Tames, Lt. Col. Robert, 21213
Tank firing ranges, 311, 312
Tariff Agreement for Social Security, 1971,
37879
Tariff agreements governing employment,
374
TASCOM. See Theater Army Support
Command (TASCOM).
Teale, Col. Willis E., 65, 68
Team approach to housing renovations, 334
Teates, Maj. Brian W., Jr., 184
Technical Construction Working Group. See
Bautechnische Arbeitsgruppe (Technical
Construction Working Group).
Technical Engineering Branch, Civil
Section, 216
Technical Review Branch, EUD, 248
Tempelhof Airfield, Berlin, Germany, 4546
Termination of German employees, 378, 380
Termination Protection Law, 374
Terrorist activity, Germany, 282, 291
Theater Air Base Vulnerability Evaluation
Exercise (TAB VEE), 16061
Theater Army Support Command
(TASCOM), 149, 16872
Theater Services Forces, European Theater
(TSFET), 14, 15
Total Force Modernization, 307
Total Quality Management (TQM), 23840,
366
Townsley, Col. Edwin S., 172, 182, 191
TQM. See Total Quality Management
(TQM).
Train locomotives, used to heat buildings,
97
Transportation system, Germany,
rebuilding of, 2426
Troop base in Germany, 6465
Troop housing in Germany, 19501953,
6778
Troop housing in Germany, 19501953

Continued
Baumholder, 71
caserne rehabilitation, 6869
German contractors, 69
Grafenwhr, 70
tent camps, 6970
Troop Support Agency, 375
Troop training facilities, Germany, 1951
1953, 7273, 100
Troposcatter (electronic radio network),
132
Trowbridge, Terry, 210
Truman, Harry S., 45, 63, 84, 126
Truman Doctrine, 57, 83
TSFET. See Theater Services Forces,
European Theater (TSFET).
Tsingos, John, 277
Tulley, Brig. Gen. David H., 66, 119, 124
Turkey, 8384, 22023, 359, 361
Air Force infrastructure, 8384
communication difficulties, 8384
construction equipment problems, 84
Defense Economic Cooperative
Agreement, 220
Erzurum, 221
Incirlik Air Base, 220, 22223
Joint American Military Mission for Aid
to Turkey (JAMMAT), 8384
Joint Construction Agency, 83
Mutual Defense Assistance Program of
1949, 83
site upgrades, 22023
TUSAG. See United States Air Force Group,
The (TUSAG).
TUSEG. See United States Engineer Group,
The (TUSEG).
Twelfth Air Force, 65
Unaccompanied enlisted personnel
housing (UEPH), 342
Unified allied command, 64
Unilateral demobilization, 1988, 370
United States Air Force Group, The
(TUSAG), 83
United States Army, Europe (USAREUR),
38, 59, 96
United States Army Construction Agency,
France (USACAF), 109, 11920, 132
Japan (USACAJ), 135
481
2/3/06 11:14:11 AM

Korea (USACAK), 135
United States Army Engineer Division,
Europe (USAEDE), 173, 181203
United States Army Field Engineer Office,
France, 135
United States Engineer Group, The
(TUSEG), 8384, 220, 20203, 245
United States Forces, Austria (USFA), 15
United States Forces, European Theater
(USFET), 14, 15, 16, 18, 19
Urban combat training ranges, 31315
U.S. Air Force, 31
U.S. Air Forces, Europe, 90
U.S. Army Construction Agency, France,
109
U.S. Army Construction Agency, Germany
(USACAG), 12138, 189
Berlin Crisis, 1961, 13335
organization, 12328
phaseout, 13538
projects, 12833
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE),
364, 366
U.S. Army Engineer Studies Center (ESC),
229
U.S. Army Field Engineer Office, France,
120
U.S. Army Topographic Center, 172
U.S. Constabulary, 38, 43
U.S. European Command, 57
U.S. European Command Conference, 1989,
338
U.S. Ground and Service Forces, 38
U.S. Joint Commission for Accreditation of
Hospitals, 352, 353
USACAF. See United States Army
Construction Agency, France
(USACAF).
USACAG. See U.S. Army Construction
Agency, Germany (USACAG).
USACAJ. See United States Army
Construction Agency, Japan
(USACAJ).
USACAK. See United States Army
Construction Agency, Korea
(USACAK).
USACE. See U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE).
USAEDE. See United States Army Engineer
Division, Europe (USAEDE).
USAREUR. See United States Army, Europe

(USAREUR).
USFA. See United States Forces, Austria
(USFA).
USFET. See United States Forces, European
Theater (USFET).
Vajda, Michael, 378
Value engineering, 25153, 353
Value in place construction, 102
van Loben Sels, Maj. Gen. James W., 205,
22833, 29293
Vietnam War, 152, 153, 158
Vilseck, Germany, 30709
Vuono, General Carl E., 218
WADS. See Weapons Access Denial System
(WADS).
Waldo, Col. Daniel, Jr., 162, 282, 370, 378,
383, 388
Walker, Ray, 215, 216
Wallace, John, 379, 380
Walsh, Brig. Gen. Orville E., 102
Wang hardware-software system, 232
War Department, 20
War materiel, excess, 3338
Warsaw Pact, dissolution of, 372, 389
Wartime planning and mobilization, 226
Washington, Randolph S., 145, 166, 172,
190, 191, 215, 277
Waterways Experiment Station, Vicksburg,
Mississippi, 281
Watson, Theresa, 220
Wayss-Freytag firm, 353
Weapons Access Denial System (WADS), 292
Werner, A. O. Ollie, 383
West Berlin, establishment of, 133
Westmoreland, General William C., 160
Wetzel Barracks, Baumholder, Germany,
346, 348
Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Raymond A., 213, 277
Wheeler, Ralph, 188, 189, 192, 193, 198, 200
Wheeler Medal, 213
Whitaker, Col. Reginald, 46
Whole-house concept of renovation, 333
Wildflecken Training Area, 263, 284
for Abrams tanks, 313
for Bradley personnel carriers, 313
defilade firing, 313
Wilhelm Druecker firm, 356
Williams, Col. A. Darby, 145
482
2/3/06 11:14:11 AM
Index
Wilson, Brig. Gen. Drake, 20506, 208, 211,
215, 220, 254, 286, 367
Wisdom, Richard, 234
Wise, Jim, 184, 188, 292
Withers, Brig. Gen. George Kenyon Ken,
Jr., 205, 21113, 215, 216, 225, 231, 246,
287, 309, 318, 320, 333, 369
Women in the Army, 342, 36668
Women in management, 36668
Women in Science and Engineering, 366
Wooten, Herb, 202
Workload, EUD, 19781988
area offices, 25969
civilian personnel, 26669
field supervision of, 26669
Ground Launched Cruise Missile
program, 264
Workload, EUD, 19781988Continued

increases in, 25758
locations of, 25861, 26266
in Turkey, 26566
Workload efficiency, 19781988, 21822
Works Council, EUD, 207, 208, 374, 379
Works Council, USAREUR, 379
Works councils in industry, 127
Wright, Maj. Gen. Clifton D. Duke,
277
Wrzburg Army hospital, 35253
Young, Col. Mason J., 88, 148, 152, 155
Young, Col. Robert P. Pip, 140, 141
Zawisza, Edward, 108, 145
Zueblin/Aegis consortium, 337
483
2/3/06 11:14:11 AM
312-633 page 484.indd 1
2/3/06 2:23:19 PM

Building For Peace, Corps of Engineers 1945-91

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IN THE

BUILDING FOR PEACE

United States Army

U.S. Army in the Cold War

BUILDING FOR PEACE

Center of Military History

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

CMH Pub 4511

01Front page ii_soft cover withoi i

U.S. Army in the Cold War Series

U.S. Army Center of Military History

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

his book traces the activities of the American military engineers

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

2. From Occupation to Mutual Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

3. Defending the West, 19501953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4. Construction in the Mid-1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5. Managing Construction in Germany, 19561966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Engineer Command, 19661974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6. Engineer Command, 19661974 (Continued)

7. The Transition Period, 19741978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8. Decade of Consolidation and Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

8. Decade of Consolidation and Growth (Continued)

9. Managing Design and Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10. Programs and Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11. Supporting the Combat Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13. Europe Transformed, 19881991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Personnel Receiving European Command Support,

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

2. Workload of the U.S. Engineer Group, Turkey, 1955 and 1956 . . .

Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1. Converted Apartment in the Bindermichl Complex . . . . . . . . . . .

Zones of Occupation: Germany, August 1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

U.S. Army, Europe: Greece, 1981 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Brig. Gen. Norman G. Delbridge, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

Addition to Army Hospital under Construction in Wrzburg . . . . . .

Illustrations courtesy of the following: 81, Ingenieur- U Architekturbro

orld War II changed world politics in ways that few people

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

War Destruction in Munich

Army engineer organization at COMZ headquarters continued to provide

Organizing the Occupation

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

The area on the western edge of Berlin was transferred to

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

Army Engineers in the U.S. Zone

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

The Office of the Theater Chief Engineer

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

Priorities and Problems

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991

Redeployment of Troops and Materiel

Securing a New Line of Communications and Supply

Building for Peace: U.S. Army Engineers in Europe, 19451991