PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES
Facts:
On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were
filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of
the PNP. In the late afternoon of August 6, 1992 and ending the late evening of the
following day in Sitio Pedrosa, Alijis, Bacolod City, acting upon the inducement of spouses
Dumancas, under the direction cooperation and undue influence, by P/Col. Torres, taking
advantage of his position as Station Commander of the PNP, with the direct participation
and cooperation of Abeto, other police officers, and civilian (police) agents also taking
advantage of their respective positions, Geroche, concurring and affirming in the said
criminal design, with the use of motor vehicle abduct, kidnap and detain RUFINO GARGAR,
JR. and DANILO LUMANGYAO, failing in their common purpose to extort money shot and kill
the victims, while being handcuffed and blindfolded then secretly bury the corpses in a
shallow grave for concealing the crime of murder and to prevent discovery. Each of the
accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Later, they filed their respective motions for
bail. Prosecution presented state witness Grandeza, the lone eyewitness. After his
testimony, the trial court granted bail in favor of only six of the accused.
Through this, the prosecution established that in response to the complaint of
spouses Dumancas, P/Col. Torres instructed his men to look for Gargar and Lumangyao
who were allegedly members of the group that had swindled the Dumancas spouses.
Police Officer Lamis, together with civilian agents arrested and abducted the two swindling
suspects. With Torres's order, the two suspects were brought to Dragon Lodge Motel and
were investigated by Police Inspector Abeto and Police Officers. They were then taken to
the Ceres Compound, where Dumancas identified Lumangyao as a member of the group
that had swindled her. Thereafter, the two suspects were transferred to D' Hacienda Motel,
then to Moonlit Inn, then to Casa Mel Lodge, and back to D' Hacienda Motel, where the two
were shot and killed. The team went to P/Col. Torres and reported that the killing had been
done. Trial court started to receive the evidence. Presentation of evidence by the other
accused was, suspended because of the motions of several accused. Despite opposition,
Judge voluntarily inhibited which were thereafter re-raffled to Branch 54.
Private prosecutors moved for the transmittal of the records of the cases to the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction. Which the State
Prosecutor adopted. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan does not have
jurisdiction over the subject cases because the informations do not state that the offenses
were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers. Prosecution moved to
reconsider but the trial court denied the motion. Upon motion of the prosecution,
respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49.
Prosecution, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the
cases to the Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
WON the RTC has Jurisdiction and not the sandigangbayan.
Held:
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the law in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent
legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until
the case is finally tertninated. In the instant case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired
jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases, as the informations were filed before the
Regional Trial Court.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or
felonies committed by public officers or employees it is not enough that the penalty
prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a
fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in
relation to their office. An offense may be considered as committed in relation to the office

if it cannot exist without the office, or if the office is a constituent element of the crime as
defined in the statute. Offense must be intimately connected with the office of the
offender, and that the offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in
the information.
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information, and not by the result of evidence after trial. The allegation of
taking advantage of his position" or "taking advantage of their respective positions"
incorporated in the informations is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the definition
of "offenses committed in relation to public office." Such was considered merely as an
allegation of an aggravating circumstance, and not as one that qualifies the crime as
having been committed in relation to public office. But the use or abuse of office does not
adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its
materiality arises, from the manner of the commission of the crime. Accordingly, for lack
of an allegation in the informations that the offenses were committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers or were intimately connected with the discharge of the
functions of the accused, the subject cases come within the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court and not of the Sandiganbayan.

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GREGORIO JIMENEZ, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
On or about November 20, 1918, in the city of Manila, said accused, being then the
motorman and person in charge of electric car No. 150, ran and operated said car along
Calle P. Burgos in the city, in a careless, negligent, and imprudent manner, giving it a
greater speed than traffic conditions permitted and without taking the proper precautions
in order to avoid accidents to life and damages to property, thereby causing his car to
strike and knock down a boy named Aurelio Ibaes, who as a result thereof lost his left
arm, and suffered the consequent injuries which will require medical assistance for a
period of more than thirty days and incapacitate him permanently for manual labor.
Brief for the appellant having been presented, Attorney-General asks in his motion
that the cause be dismissed in order that the accused may be tried by a competent court,
it being alleged that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
WON the CFI lack jurisdiction over the case charged in the information
Held:
In order to determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint
must be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not the court in which the
complaint is presented. If the facts set out in the complaint are sufficient to show that the
court in which the complaint is presented has jurisdiction, then the court has jurisdiction.
A careful examination of the information shows that the facts therein stated would
constitute, had malice been present, the crime of lesiones graves punished with a
correctional penalty, that is, with prision correccional. As alleged in the information there
was reckless imprudence which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium degree. It therefore results that the penalty which the law fixed upon the criminal
act complained of in the information cannot exceed four months of arresto mayor, and,
therefore, the Court of First Instance, had no original jurisdiction of the case by reason of
its subject-matter. The crime of lesiones graves committed with reckless imprudence does
not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, as it is punished with
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degree

JAIME HERNANDEZ, Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
DELFIN ALBANO, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

Facts:
Sometime in March, 1959, Congressman Delfin Albano sent to the city fiscal of
Manila two unsworn letters denouncing petitioner's interest in the Bicol Electric Co.,
University of Nueva Caceres University of the East, DMG Corporation, and Rural Bank of
Nueva Caceres. These gave rise to the docketing in the office of the city fiscal of five
separate cases charging him with the violation of Article 216 of the Revised Penal Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 626, and Republic Act No. 265. These charges were assigned for
investigation. At the initial hearing petitioner moved for the dismissal but the motion was

denied, and so were the two motions for reconsideration. Petitioner filed with the CFI of
Manila an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction against respondents to prohibit
them from conducting the preliminary investigation of the five charges. After due hearing,
trial court rendered decision upholding the authority of respondents fiscals to conduct the
preliminary investigation and it dismissed the petition. Thus this appeal.

Issue:
WON the fiscal could be restrained from proceeding with the investigation of the charges
against Hernandez

Held:
The city fiscal and his assistants, in the same manner as provincial fiscals, are
vested with the power and authority to investigate all charges of crimes and violations of
ordinances irrespective of whether the person who complains is the offended party or not.
Provisions do not require that a sworn written complaint be first filed before the city fiscal
in order that he may investigate the case complained of, except of course if the offense is
one which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, or is private in nature, or when it pertains to
those cases which need to be enforced by specified public officers. The charges involved in
these cases do not come within the two classes of offenses above-referred to, therefore
they do not need to be initiated by a sworn complaint in order that they may be
investigation by the city fiscal. Section 2465 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 537, provides that 'The Fiscal of the city shall cause
to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanours, and violations of ordinances, and
have the necessary information or complaints prepared or made against the persons
accused.'
Contention that the trial court erred in ruling that the complaint contemplated in
Section 2, Rule 106 is the one filed in court because it is the one prepared after the
preliminary investigation is conducted by the prosecuting official is untenable. This ruling
is but a sequel to our interpretation above set out to the effect that, with the exception of
the two cases already mentioned, a sworn written complaint is not necessary to be filed in
the office of the fiscal before he can start the required preliminary investigation
preparatory to the filing of a formal charge.
complaint' which must conform with the requirements of Section 2, Rule 106 is the
one filed in Court and not the one filed for purposes of preliminary investigation before the
City Fiscal is further clarified by the provision of Section 38-C of the Revised Charter of
Manila
Since the provision of law clearly shows that the preliminary investigation precedes
the filing of the complaint which is what is defined and mentioned in the Rules of Court,
the charge filed by respondent Congressman Albano which was not the result of the
preliminary investigation but started it need not conform to the definition of complaint in
the Rules of Court.