(Im) Politeness, Face and Perceptions of Rapport
(Im) Politeness, Face and Perceptions of Rapport
Abstract
This paper takes rapport (Spencer-Oatey 2000, 2002) as its central concern, since (im)politeness is typically associated in some way with harmonious/conflictual interpersonal relations. The paper discusses the factors that
influence peoples dynamic perceptions of rapport, and proposes that there
are three key elements: behavioral expectations, face sensitivities, and interactional wants. The paper explores the components of these three elements and uses authentic discourse data to illustrate how peoples judgments about rapport can be unpackaged in relation to these elements. The
approach enables us to gain a deeper understanding of the factors that
influence peoples dynamic judgments of rapport, which is essential if we
are to understand how and why problems of rapport occur.
Keywords: Face; politeness; rapport; values; identity; culture
1. Introduction
Linguists have been debating the nature of politeness for a very long
time and are still not agreed on exactly what it is. Some have explained it
in terms of face (e. g., Brown and Levinson 1987); others have proposed
politeness maxims to explain it (e. g., Leech 1983, Gu 1990); yet others
have taken a normative approach and argued either that it entails the
upholding of a conversational contract (e. g., Fraser 1990) or that it is
appropriate but marked behavior (e. g., Watts 2003, Locher 2004). Despite all of these differences, everyone seems to agree that it is associated
in some way with harmonious/conflictual interpersonal relations, which
Spencer-Oatey (2000, 2002) labels rapport management.
This paper takes rapport management as its central concern, and explores the factors that influence peoples dynamic perceptions of rapport.
It does not try to link linguistic structures with these perceptions, beJournal of Politeness Research 1 (2005), 95119
1612-5681/05/0010095
Walter de Gruyter
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cause as Fraser and Nolan (1981: 96) point out, no sentence is inherently polite or impolite. Nor does it describe how (im)politeness, face
and/or rapport are dynamically managed in interaction. Instead, it focuses on the bases of rapport management judgments, and proposes that
there are three key elements: behavioral expectations, face sensitivities,
and interactional wants. The paper unpackages the components of these
three elements, so that we can gain a deeper understanding of the factors
that influence peoples dynamic judgments. This is essential if we are to
understand how and why clashes or differing evaluations occur.
2. Rapport (Management)
Rapport refers to the relative harmony and smoothness of relations between people, and rapport management refers to the management (or
mismanagement) of relations between people.
As Spencer-Oatey (2000: 2930) points out, people can hold differing
types of rapport orientations towards each other. For example, they can
hold a rapport-enhancement orientation (a desire to strengthen or enhance harmonious relations between the interlocutors), a rapport-maintenance orientation (a desire to maintain or protect harmonious relations), a rapport-neglect orientation (a lack of concern or interest in the
quality of relations, perhaps because of a focus on self), or a rapportchallenge orientation (a desire to challenge or impair harmonious relations). Peoples motives for these various orientations can be various,
and of course, their orientations can change dynamically during the
course of an interaction or series of interactions.
I take the management of rapport, therefore, to include not only behavior that enhances or maintains smooth relations, but any kind of
behavior that has an impact on rapport, whether positive, negative, or
neutral.
As people interact with each other, they make dynamic judgments as
to whether their rapport has been enhanced, maintained or damaged.
These judgments (conscious or otherwise) are based to a large extent on
assessments of three key bases of rapport and their interrelationships:
behavioral expectations, face sensitivities and interactional wants. The
following sections unpackage these in turn.
3. Behavioral Expectations and (Im)Politeness
3.1 What is (Im)Politeness?
Brown and Levinson (1987), in their seminal work on politeness, propose that face is the key motivating force underlying it. They maintain
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to experience it. Prescribed behavior that is omitted, and proscribed behavior that is not avoided, is typically experienced as negatively
eventful (Goffman, 1967: 7). Behavior that is perceived in this way has
been labelled non-politic or impolite by Watts (2003) and rude by
Kasper (1990).
Permitted behavior is behavior that is allowed, but neither technically
prescribed nor proscribed. Some permitted behavior is not socially expected, but if it is socially desirable, it is perceived as positively
eventful when it occurs (labeled polite by Watts 2003, and Kasper
1990). On the other hand, if it is not particularly socially salient, it may
simply pass unnoticed (labelled politic by Watts 2003 and non-polite
by Kasper 1990). However, some permitted behavior is so common and
expected that it comes to be regarded as obligatory, and so if it is omitted, it may be regarded as impolite or rude.
As Watts (2003: 160) maintains, a social model of politeness needs to
offer ways in which we as researchers can show when and perhaps why
individual users of language in socio-communicative verbal interaction
classify utterances as polite, politic or impolite, and it must allow us to
account for why individuals agree or disagree on what is and what is
not (im)polite language. In other words, the bases of (im)politeness
judgments need too be unpacked, and so the next section focuses on this.
3.2 The Bases of (Im)Politeness Judgments
Behavioral expectations, and the (im)politeness judgments that derive
from them, have several interconnected bases, as shown in Figure 1.
Some expectations are based on contractual/legal agreements and
requirements, such as the provision of equal opportunities of employment, and the avoidance of discriminatory behavior. Other expectations
are based on role specifications, which can sometimes be explicit (such
as the duties specified in a job contract), but typically involve a very
large amount of implicit specifications.
Cost-benefit
Equity Principle
Contractual/legal
Agreements & Requirements
Interactional
Principles
Association Principle
Bases of Behavioural
Expectations
Explicit
Implicit
Empathy
Respectfulness
Role Specifications
Behavioural Conventions,
Norms & Protocols
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Very frequently, behavioral expectations are based on behavioral conventions, norms and protocols. For example, work groups develop conventions for handling team meetings, such as whether there is an agenda
and if so, how strictly it is adhered to, and whether people can sit where
they like or whether they sit according to status or role. These conventions are normative rather than black-letter duties (Moghaddam et al.
2000: 282), but nevertheless they can often develop prescriptive and
proscriptive overtones which then influence expectations about behavioral responsibilities, and trigger (im)politeness judgments. Closely related to communicative conventions are social protocols and rituals
formulaic and/or ritualistic behaviors that play, for example, a social
indexing function or show consideration for face. For instance, there
may be ritual phrases or behavior that are expected when people meet
each other, when people are about to start eating a meal, or when they
are celebrating a particular event.
Conventions and protocols are typically contextually based, and vary
according to a range of contextual variables such as the type of communicative activity, the nature of the communicative setting (macro and
micro), and the nature of the participant relations (e. g., hierarchical or
equal). Moreover, these conventions exist across a range of domains,
including the following identified by Spencer-Oatey (2000: 1920):
the illocutionary domain (the performance of speech acts such as apologies, requests, and compliments)
the discourse domain (the discourse content and structure of an interchange, including topic choice and the organisation and sequencing
of information)
the participation domain (the procedural aspects of an interchange,
such as turn-taking [overlaps and inter-turn pauses, turn-taking rights
and obligations], the inclusion/exclusion of people present, and the
use/non-use of listener responses [verbal and non-verbal])
the stylistic domain (the stylistic aspects of an interchange, such as
choice of tone (for example, serious or joking), choice of genre-appropriate lexis and syntax, and choice of genre-appropriate terms of address or use of honorifics)
the non-verbal domain (the non-verbal aspects of an interchange, such
as gestures and other body movements, eye contact, and proxemics)
Behavioral expectations can also result from interactional principles. Interactional principles are similar in many respects to conversational
maxims (Leech 1983, Gu 1990), except that they are more closely associated with values and/or beliefs, are scalar in nature and are very contextually dependent (cf. Spencer-Oatey and Jiang 2003). I propose that
there are two superordinate principles: the equity principle and the association principle. These two principles complement each other, and can
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for himself, and propose that it consists of two related aspects, negative
face and positive face. In their model, negative face is a persons want
to be unimpeded by others, the desire to be free to act as s/he chooses
and not be imposed upon; and positive face is a persons want to be
appreciated and approved of by selected others, in terms of personality,
desires, behavior, values, and so on. In other words, negative face represents a desire for autonomy, and positive face represents a desire for approval.
Many linguists have challenged Brown and Levinsons (1987) conceptualization of face. For example, Matsumoto (1988), Ide (1989) and Mao
(1994) all refer to the importance of social identity as a concept in
Japanese and Chinese societies. Matsumoto (1988: 405), for instance,
argues as follows:
What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but the position in relation to the others in the group and his/
her acceptance by those others. Loss of face is associated with the
perception by others that one has not comprehended and acknowledged the structure and hierarchy of the group. ... A Japanese generally must understand where s/he stands in relation to other members
of the group or society, and must acknowledge his/her dependence on
the others. Acknowledgement and maintenance of the relative position
of others, rather than preservation of an individuals proper territory,
governs all social interaction.
In other words, Matsumotos (1988) criticisms of Brown and Levinson
(1987) are twofold: that they have ignored the interpersonal or social
perspective on face, and that they have over-emphasized the notion of
individual freedom and autonomy.
In line with this, Mao (1994) suggests that two competing forces shape
our interactional behavior: the ideal social identity, and the ideal individual autonomy. The ideal social identity motivates members of a community to associate themselves with each other and to cultivate a sense
of homogeneity. The ideal individual autonomy, on the other hand, motivates members to preserve their freedom of action and to mark off
separate and almost inviolable space. Mao (1994) labels the preference
for one over the other relative face orientation, and points out that
his distinction corresponds to a large extent to that between independent
and interdependent construals of self (e. g., see Markus and Kitayama,
1991; Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998).
Similarly, Scollon and Scollon (1995: 36) distinguish between involvement face, which is concerned with the persons right and need to be
considered a normal, contributing, or supporting member of society,
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occupies in his [her] social network and the degree to which he [she]
is judged to have functioned adequately in that position as acceptably
in his [her] general conduct; the face extended to a person by others
is a function of the degree of congruence between judgments of his
[her] total condition in life, including his [her] actions as well as those
of people closely associated with him [her], and the social expectations
that others have placed upon him [her].
Ho (1976: 883) cited by Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994:50)
With respectability face, it makes sense to think of it in quantitative
terms, and ask how much [respectability] face does a person have? (Ho
1994: 275). This is because respectability face is a composite measure that
reflects the relative weights attributed to attributes such as the following:
biographical variables (e. g., age, sex), relational attributes (e. g., marriage ties), social status indicators (e. g., educational attainment, occupational status, wealth), formal title/position/rank, personal reputation
(moral or amoral) and integrity (Ho, 1994: 276). As Ho points out, different cultures attach varying degrees of importance to different attributes, so the bases of respectability face could be very different in different nations and social groups.
Identity face, on the other hand, is a situation-specific face sensitivity,
that is highly vulnerable. It corresponds fairly closely to Goffmans conception of face:
The term face may be defined as the positive social value a person
effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken
during a particular contact. Face is an image of self delineated in terms
of approved social attributes albeit an image that others may share,
as when a person makes a good showing for his profession or religion
by making a good showing for himself.
Goffman (1967: 5) (emphases added)
Key points in this definition of Goffmans are as follows:
Claims to (this type of) face reflect peoples social values
Claims to (this type of) face relate to specific social attributes
Claims to (this type of) face occur in specific social encounters/interactions
In addition, I take identity face to include claims to social group membership.
Since it is identity face rather than respectability face that is threatened
or enhanced in specific interactional encounters, the following section
focuses on identity face.
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Explanation
Illustrative Associated
Qualities
Power
Wealthy, authoritative,
high social status, dominant
Capable, ambitious, intelligent, successful
Achievement
Hedonism
Stimulation
Self-direction
Universalism
Benevolence
Tradition
Conformity
Security
Fun-loving, sensuous
Adventurous, stimulating, daring, enterprising
Independent, free, selfsufficient, unrestrained
Understanding, tolerant, appreciative, peaceloving, considerate
Loyal, helpful, honest,
forgiving, responsible,
caring
Humble, conservative,
traditional
Obedient, restrained,
self-disciplined, polite
Protective, nationalistic
may claim greater face for the self-aspects self-sufficient and independent, or alternatively for the self-aspects respectful and humble.
Moreover, people may claim face for multiple self-aspects simultaneously, and the details of their face claims (and associated sensitivities)
will always be very dependent on the dynamics of the specific interactional context.
4.3 Individual and Group Face
Up to now, it may have seemed as though claims to face are individually
based and relate to a persons personal qualities. However, face can be
a group-based phenomenon, and apply to any group that a person is a
member of and is concerned about. This can include small groups like
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ones family, and larger groups like ones ethnic group, religious group
or nationality group. Following Simon (2004: 49), I take group face
sensitivities to refer to the self-aspects of a persons identity that are
derived from membership in a collective or group, and not to refer to
the identity of a group as a sui generis entity.
As mentioned in section 4.1, psychologists (e. g., Markus and Kitayama 1991) distinguish between independent and interdependent self-construals. In terms of Schwartzs (1992) value constructs, independent selfconstruals are associated with the values self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and achievement, whilst interdependent self-construals are associated with universalism, benevolence, conformity and tradition.
Some people (e. g., Gudykunst et al. 1996) argue that different communicative situations lead to the salience of either an independent selfconstrual or an interdependent self-construal. However, the two can very
often be interconnected, as Anderson (2004: 208) explains when discussing adolescents use of mobile phones: They get a sense of affiliation
and belonging through using the same brand as their peer group and
shared knowledge about what the brand stands for, but at the same time
express individuality through choosing a particular model that is then
personally modified through ringtones, covers, glue-on jewellery or
logos. Similarly, when people participate in team sports such as football
or ice-hockey, they may want to display individual prowess through
scoring or saving a goal, and hence uphold or enhance their independent
self-construal; but at the same time, they may value a sense of belonging
and team camaraderie, which appeals to their interdependent self-construal.
5. Interactional Goals
Sometimes (but not always) people have specific interactional goals
when they interact with others, and when this is the case, these wants
can affect rapport management judgments. Peoples goals may be transactional and aim at achieving a concrete task, such as obtaining written approval for something, clinching a business deal, or finishing a
meeting on time. Alternatively, their goals may be relational, and aim
at effective relationship management, such as peace-making, promoting
friendship, currying favour or exerting control.
Very often, the two types of goals may be interconnected, because
achieving a transactional goal may depend on successfully managing the
relational goal. When this is the case, or when people want to achieve a
particular relational goal, then the management of rapport can be very
strategic (Kasper 1990). If this is noticed and judged to be too strategic,
such behavior is typically evaluated negatively. On the other hand, if a
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very attractive looking cashier went over to two of her cashier colleagues
and excitedly reported that a young man, who was a complete stranger,
had just been chatting with her at the check-out desk and had then
asked for her telephone number. All three verbally expressed shock at
the audacity of his request (which was a breach of social expectations
within that context). However, from the tone of their voices it was clear
that the girl was very flattered to be asked, and that the other two
plainer girls were disappointed that this had not happened to them.
In other words, the mans behavior breached social expectations and
hence could be judged as rude; on the other hand, it supported the cashiers desired claim to sexual attractiveness and thus enhanced her identity
face in this respect.
Often, though, peoples assessments of face-threat are partly based on
their behavioral expectations because this helps them evaluate whether
any face-threat is deliberate or not, and these can be quite personally
based. The following incident, which took place at a large linguistics
conference, illustrates this. A well-known applied linguist had given a
plenary talk, and afterwards a few people asked a few questions. Then
another well-known applied linguist stood up, and spoke for about five
minutes, stating in an authoritative tone why the plenary speakers talk
was completely flawed. There was some applause from the audience
when he sat down, and this was followed by an embarrassed silence. The
audience was clearly embarrassed on behalf of the plenary speaker, and
probably regarded the vehemence of the attack as inappropriate for that
context. However, after a moments pause, the plenary speaker simply
said, Dont worry. Im used to him behaving like this. From the challengers perspective, the primary interactional want in that context seems
to have been the frank critique of academic positions, and he may have
felt that this gave him the liberty to ignore face sensitivities and to push
the boundaries of behavioral expectations. Yet for most people, such an
attack, even in that context, would be highly face-threatening, undermining their claims to qualities such as competence and intelligence. For the
plenary speaker, it was probably also very face-threatening; however, his
sense of face-threat seems to have been ameliorated, at least partially,
by his knowledge of the individual concerned and the behavior he has
exhibited in the past.
7. Some Analyses
In this section, I use some more extended examples to illustrate how the
bases of rapport judgments can be unpackaged.
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Although this example is not fully authentic and the language has been
glossed into somewhat more natural English, it illustrates the repeated
invite-decline pattern that Gu (1990), Mao (1994) and others report.
As Gu (1990) and Chen (1996) point out, to cultural outsiders the
hosts repeated invitations (which often get stronger) can sound very
imposing, and the guests repeated declining behavior can sound ungrateful and/or indicate a lack of willingness to accept. However, in Chinese the hosts behavior typically conveys generosity and warmth, whilst
the guests response shows humility and self-restraint.
What then are the bases for these judgments? The starting point in
this example is the conventions for handling invitations. In Chinese, it
is conventionally expected that the host exhibits insistence, by wording
the invitation strongly and by repeating it several times, and that the
guest displays reluctance by declining the invitation several times. Although this pattern is not formally prescribed (i. e., it is permitted rather
than prescribed behavior), the pattern has become so common and expected in many parts of China that it has come to be regarded as socially
obligatory (although as Chen (1996: 196) points out, this may not apply
in all regions of China).
This pattern may not have developed by chance, though. Rather, it
partly reflects the interactional principles that are important in Chinese
society. For example, the hosts insistence on the guest accepting the
invitation illustrates the interactional principle of association (involvement), and contrasts with common western concerns about imposition
(an aspect of the interactional principle of equity) when giving invi-
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standing that any balance remaining at the end of the visit is given to
the visitors as pocket money.
A number of problematic instances occurred during the visit (for further details see Spencer-Oatey and Xing 2003; 2004), and two of them
are selected for analysis here. All names have been changed; text in italics
is translated from Chinese.
7.2.1 A Problem of Roles
When the visitors arrived, the Sales Manager for China (Tim) was away
on an overseas trip. He was due to arrive back on the Thursday, and so
the Chinese expected to meet him the next day (Friday). When there was
no sign of him by lunchtime, they started asking for his telephone
number, and this continued all over the weekend. In the follow-up interview on the Friday evening, they commented as follows:
Extract 1 (Interview)
Xu:
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The Chinese visitors believed that it was prescribed behavior for Tim,
the sales manager for China, to meet with them right after his return,
and were offended when he did not. They based their belief on their
interpretation of his role obligations towards them as old friends
that friends should put themselves out for each other. They also mentioned his task-based interactional wants (to do business successfully in
the Chinese market), and thought that this should have been an added
incentive.
Tim, on the other hand, did not feel it was socially or professionally
obligatory for him to meet them immediately after his return. In fact, he
had only met one of the delegation members once, and the others he
had never met. So to him, they were not old friends. He did not perceive, therefore, any role obligations towards them, and felt that his own
personal needs for rest and time with his family took priority. These
differing perceptions of role obligations are linked to the differing importance that Tim and the Chinese visitors attached to the interactional
principles of association and equity, and their interpretations of group
membership. Tim focused on his personal needs (benefits to himself) and
the needs of his family (involvement with a small social group); the Chinese visitors, on the other hand, focused on his obligations to old
friends (involvement with a larger, more diffuse social group) and believed that he should have sacrificed his personal needs for their sake
(i. e., downplayed the importance of personal benefit).
As a result of these differing interpretations, the Chinese visitors held
expectations of Tim that he was either unaware of or was not willing to
conform to. They became frustrated, annoyed and disappointed, and
made life very difficult for the British people accompanying them over
the weekend. Rapport between them had been damaged.
7.2.2 A Dispute over Money
On the last day of the delegation visit, a few hours before the Chinese
visitors were due to leave, the British company gave each of the visitors
an envelope containing pocket money the cash left over after the
costs of the visit had been deducted from the figure in the contract allocated to the visit. The visitors opened their envelopes, counted the
money, and then claimed that the amount was too little.
Extract 3 (Close-Out meeting)
Phil: Id just like to say its a great pleasure to have you come here.
Thank you very much for coming. Id just like to make a presentation to each of you for [company name].
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Xu: How much is the airfare? Ask them to show us the list of costs
Int: [no interpretation]
Sajid: To get a rough idea (???) we (???) that we have to pay you (???)
Sun: All we want is a list.
Int: [no interpretation]
[Note: (???) unintelligible speech]
Shortly after this, the contract was brought in for them all to study, and
attempts were made to list the expenses. However, the argument over
the money continued for another 2 hours and 26 minutes. During this
time, they disagreed with each other over whether the sum identified in
the contract applied to one delegation visit or to two, and hence how
much was allocated for each person in this visit. In addition, the Chinese
claimed that the formal dinners (at which British staff were present)
should not have been counted as an expense, because that would mean
that they were paying for the British to enjoy themselves. At times, emotions ran high.
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Positively
eventful
Expectancy Reactions
(Own & Other)
Neutral (unnoticed)
Negatively
eventful
Achieving
No impact
Wants Condition
(Own & Other)
Hindering
Gained face
In face
Threatened face
Bases of
Dynamic Perceptions of Rapport
(Enhanced ----- Maintained ---- Damaged)
Face Condition
(Own & Other)
Joy
Contentment/pleasure
Pride
Surprise
Emotional
Reactions
(Own & Other)
Surprise/amazement
Irritation/annoyance
Anger
Frustration
Disgust/disapproval
Lost face
Sadness
Disappointment/
displeasure
Shame/guilt
Embarrassment/insult/humiliation
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