R

EPUBLIC
A
CT
6735,
I
NITIATIVE AND
R
EFERENDUM
A
CT
R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments tothe Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and
Senate Bill No. 17. Theformer was prepared by the committee on Suffrage and Electoral
Reforms of Representatives onthe basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House
Bill No. 497, which dealt with theinitiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and
32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b)House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as withinitiative and referendum under
Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17solely, dealt with initiative
and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of localgovernment units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 andHouse Bill No.
21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by theSenate
and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.

Francisco Jr. vs. House of Representatives

FACTS:
The HR on its 12th Congress adopted a different rule on impeachment from that of the
11th Congress. On June 22, 2002, the HR adopted a resolution to investigate the
disbursement of funds of the JDF under Hilario Davide. In June 2, 2003, former
President Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide for
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.
The House Committee on Justice ruled that the impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form,"but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance. A day after dismissing the first impeachment complaint, a 2 nd complaint was
filed against Davide based on the investigation of fund disbursement of JDF under
Davide. Petitions were filed to declare the 2 nd impeachment unconstitutional for it
violates the provision that no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated twice against
the same official. Petitions also claim that the legislative inquiry into the administration
by the Chief Justice of the JDF infringes on the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary. Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene
and Comment, praying that "the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction of the Court over the issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that
the sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court to try
and decide impeachment cases, including the one where the Chief Justice is the
respondent, be recognized and upheld pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the
Constitution." In summary, petitioners plea for the SC to exercise the power of judicial
review to determine the validity of the second impeachment complaint.
ISSUE:
WON judicial review power extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings
HELD:
Power of judicial review is the power of the court to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. Judicial review is indeed an
integral component of the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with
the corollary principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves. Separation of powers is not absolute. The SC is the final
arbiter to determine if acts by the legislature and the executive is in violation of the
Constitution. Moreover, the power of judicial review is expressly stated in the
Constitution.
*2nd Impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is unconstitutional.

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS Digested

Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS GR 122156, 3 February 1997
WHETHER OR NOT THE COSNTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ARE SELF-EXECUTING
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization
program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares
of the Manila Hotel (MHC). In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two
bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong
Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner and
the execution of the necessary contracts, the Manila Prince Hotel matched the bid price
of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad in a letter to GSIS dated 28
September 1995. Manila Prince Hotel sent a managers check to the GSIS in a
subsequent letter, but which GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps
apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by GSIS and consummated with Renong
Berhad, Manila Prince Hotel came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section
10, are self-executing.
RULING:
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II
of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete
in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation,
or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing
if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the
constitution itself, so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of
its terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the

legislature for action. In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still
enact legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the right.
The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision
ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any
express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an
indication that it was not intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing
provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the
subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. Subsequent legislation however does
not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully
enforceable. As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been
generally drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved into
one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a
legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions
are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have
the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. In fine,
Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does
not require any legislation to put it in operation.

PEOPLE v. POMAR
November 3, 1924, G.R. No. L-22008, Johnson, J.
(Labor Standards: Police Power, basis of social legislation)
FACTS:
Julio Pomar is the manager and person in charge of La Flor de la Isabela, a
tobacco factory pertaining to La Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas, a
corporation duly authorized to transact business in the City of Manila. under his
employ is Macaria Fajardo, whom he granted vacation leave by reason of her
pregnancy. However, Pomar did not pay her the wages she is entitled to
corresponding to 30 days before and 30 days after her delivery and confinement.
Despite demands made by her, Pomar still refused to pay Fajardo.
The CFI found Pomar guilty of violating section 13 in connection with section 15
of Act No. 3071. POmar appealed questioning the constitutionality of the Act.
Said section 13 was enacted by the Legislature of the Philippine Islands in the
exercise of its supposed police power, with the praiseworthy purpose of
safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in factory, shop or place of
labor of any description, and of insuring to them, to a certain extent, reasonable
support for one month before and one month after their delivery.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act 3071 has been adopted in the reasonable and lawful exercise
of
the
police
power
of
the
state.
RULING:
The police power of the state is a growing and expanding power. As civilization
develops and public conscience becomes awakened, the police power may be
extended, as has been demonstrated in the growth of public sentiment with
reference to the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors. But that power
cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate
the express inhibition of the peoples law the constitution. If the people desire
to have the police power extended and applied to conditions and things
prohibited by the organic law, they must first amend that law.
It will also be noted from an examination of said section 13, that it takes no
account of contracts for the employment of women by the day nor by the piece.
The law is equally applicable to each case. It will hardly be contended that the
person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop or place of labor,
who employs women by the day or by the piece, could be compelled under the
law to pay for sixty days during which no services were rendered.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we are fully persuaded, under the facts and the
law, that the provisions of section 13, of Act No. 3071 of the Philippine
Legislature, are unconstitutional and void.
Therefore, the sentence of the lower court is hereby revoked, the complaint is
hereby dismissed.

People Vs. Pomar [46 Phil 126; G.R. No. L-22008; 3 Nov 1924]
Sunday, January 18, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory.
She was granted a vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced
on the 16th of July 1923. According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the
salary due her in violation of the provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal
complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of said Act against the manager of the tobacco
Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on the other hand, claims that the
facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further alleges that the
aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act No.
3071 provides that, Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory,
shop or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman
employed by it as laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before
and another thirty days after confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not
discharge such laborer without just cause, under the penalty of being required to pay to
her wages equivalent to the total of two months counting from the day of her discharge.
Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of any violation of section 13. The
latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its supposed Police Power with
the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers in "factory, shop or
place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain extent,
reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of
fifty pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case
was raised to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.

Issues: (1) Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional; (2) Whether
or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police
Power.

Held: The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for
being violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for

their affairs. It has been decided several times, that the right to contract about one's
affairs is a part of the liberty of the individual, protected by the "due process of law"
clause of the constitution. The contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions they may deem advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals
or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power
may encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the
preservation of the public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster
than the fundamental law of the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of
the constitution. The Police Power is subject to and is controlled by the paramount
authority of the constitution of the state, and will not be permitted to violate rights
secured or guaranteed by the latter.

LAMBINO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006(CARPIO, J.)

Requirements for Initiative Petition

Constitutional Amendment vs. Constitutional Revision

Tests to determine whether amendment or revision

FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
changethe 1987 Constitution and then filed a petition with COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite forratification under Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735. The proposed
changes under thepetition will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentaryform of government. COMELEC did not give it due course for
lack of an enabling lawgoverning initiative petitions to amend the Constitution, pursuant
to Santiago v. Comelecruling.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the proposed changes constitute an amendment or revision

Whether or not the initiative petition is sufficient compliance withthe

constitutional requirement on direct proposal by the people
RULING:
Initiative petition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art. XVII on direct proposal by peopleSec. 2, Art.
XVII...is the governing provision that allows a peoples initiative to proposeamendments
to the Constitution. While this provision does not expressly state that thepetition must
set forth the full text of the proposed amendments, the deliberations of theframers of our
Constitution clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt relevantAmerican
jurisprudence on peoples initiative; and (b) in particular, the people must first seethe full
text of the proposed amendments before they sign, and that the people must sign ona
petition containing such full text. The essence of amendments directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon apetition is that the entire proposal on its face is a
petition by the people. This means twoessential elements must be present.2 elements
of initiative1.First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal. No
agent orrepresentative can sign on their behalf.
2.
Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition. These essential elements are present only if the full text of the proposed
amendments isfirst shown to the people who express their assent by signing such
complete proposal in a petition. The full text of the proposed amendments may be either
written on the face of thepetition, or attached to it. If so attached, the petition must
stated the fact of suchattachment. This is an assurance that everyone of the several
millions of signatories to thepetition had seen the full textof the proposed amendments
before not after signing.Moreover, an initiative signer must be informed at the time
of signing of the nature andeffect of that which is proposed and failure to do so
is deceptive and misleading whichrenders the initiative void.In the case of the Lambino

Groups petition, theres not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text of

the proposedchanges in the signature sheet. Neither does the signature sheet statethat
the text of the proposed changes is attached to it. The signature sheet merely asks
aquestion whether the people approve a shift from the Bicameral-Presidential
to theUnicameral- Parliamentary system of government. The signature sheet does not
show to thepeople the draft of the proposed changes before they are asked to sign the
signature sheet. This omission is fatal.An initiative that gathers signatures from the
people without first showing to the peoplethe full text of the proposed amendments is
most likely a deception, and can operate as agigantic fraud on the people. Thats why
the Constitutionrequires that an initiative must bedirectly proposed by the people x x
x in a petition - meaning that the people must sign ona petition that contains the full
text of the proposed amendments. On so vital an issue asamending the nations
fundamental law, the writing of the text of the proposedamendments cannot be hidden
from the people under a general or special power of attorney to unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals. Theinitiativeviolates Section2, Article XVII of the Constitutiondisallowing revision
throughinitiativesArticle XVII of the Constitution speaks of three modes of amending the
Constitution. The firstmode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote of all
its Members. The second mode isthrough a constitutional convention. The third mode is
through a peoples initiative.Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and second
modes, applies to any amendmentto, or revision of, this Constitution. In contrast,
Section 2 of Article XVII, referring to thethird mode, applies only to amendments to this
Constitution. This distinction wasintentional as shown by the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission. Apeoplesinitiative to change the Constitution applies only
to an amendment of theConstitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a
constitutional convention canpropose both amendments and revisions to the
Constitution.Does the Lambino Groups initiative constitute a revision of the Constitution? Yes. By
any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to
aUnicameral-Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the Office of the President
andthe abolition of one chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision, not a
mereamendment. Amendment vs. RevisionCourts have long recognized the distinction
between an amendment and a revision of aconstitution. Revision broadly implies a
change that alters a basic principle in theconstitution, like altering the principle
of separation of powers or the system of checks-and-balances. There is also revision
if the change alters the substantial entirety of theconstitution, as when the change
affects substantial provisions of the constitution. On theother hand, amendment broadly
refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes withoutaltering the basic principle
involved. Revision generally affects several provisions of theconstitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific provision being amended.Where the
proposed change applies only to a specific provision of the Constitution withoutaffecting
any other section or article, the change may generally be considered anamendment and
not a revision. For example, a change reducing the voting age from 18years to 15 years
is an amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change reducing Filipinoownership of
mass media companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment and not arevision. Also, a
change requiring a college degree as an additional qualification for electionto the
Presidency is an amendment and not a revision. The changes in these examples do not
entail any modification of sections or articles of theConstitution other than the specific

provision being amended. These changes do not alsoaffect the structure of government
or the system of checks-and-balances among or withinthe three branches.However,
there can be no fixed rule on whether a change is an amendment or a revision.
Achange in a single word of one sentence of the Constitution may be a revision and not
anamendment. For example, the substitution of the word republican with monarchic
ortheocratic in Section 1, Article II of the Constitution radically overhauls the entire
structureof government and the fundamental ideological basis of the Constitution. Thus,
each specificchange will have to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions,as well as how it affects the structure ofgovernment, the
carefully crafted system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying ideological basis of
the existing Constitution.Since a revision of a constitution affects basic principles, or
several provisions of aconstitution, a deliberative body with recorded proceedings is
best suited to undertake arevision. A revision requires harmonizing not only several
provisions, but also the alteredprinciples with those that remain unaltered. Thus,
constitutions normally authorizedeliberative bodies like constituent assemblies
or constitutional conventions to undertakerevisions. On the other hand, constitutions
allow peoples initiatives, which do not have fixedand identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only amendmentsand not revisions. Tests to
determine whether amendment or revisionIn California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to theconstitution just like in our Constitution, courts have
developed a two-part test: thequantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative
test asks whether the proposedchange is so extensive in its provisions as to change
directly the substantial entirety of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of
numerous existing provisions. The courtexamines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of thechange. The qualitative test inquires
into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in theconstitution. The main inquiry
is whether the change will accomplish such far reachingchanges in the nature of our
basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision. Whetherthere is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of inquiry. Thus, achange in the nature of
[the] basic governmental plan includes change in its fundamentalframework or the
fundamental powers of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basicgovernmental
plan also includes changes that jeopardize the traditional form of governmentand the
system of check and balances.Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the
Lambino Groups initiative is a revisionand not merely an amendment. Quantitatively,
the Lambino Groups proposed changesoverhaul two articles - Article VI on the
Legislature and Article VII on the Executive -affecting a total of 105 provisions in
the entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposedchanges alter substantially the basic
plan of government, from presidential toparliamentary, and from a bicameral to
a unicameral legislature.A change in the structure of government is a revisionA change
in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when the threegreat
co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are reduced into two. This
alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift from the present BicameralPresidential system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of the
Constitution.Merging the legislative and executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government. The abolition alone of the Office of the President as the locus
of ExecutivePower alters the separation of powers and thus constitutes a revision of the

Constitution.Likewise, the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress alters the system
of checks-and-balances within the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution. The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference between amendment and
revision is onlyone of procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group posits that when
a deliberative bodydrafts and proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called revisionsbecause members of the deliberative body work full-time
on the changes. The samesubstantive changes, when proposed through an initiative,
are called amendments becausethe changes are made by ordinary people who do not
make an occupation, profession, orvocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however,
ruled that the express intent of the framersand the plain language of the Constitution
contradict the Lambino Groups theory. Wherethe intent of the framers and the language
of the Constitution are clear and plainly stated,courts do not deviate from
such categorical intent and language.

DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)

Facts:
P r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A t t y. J e s u s D e l f i n , p r e s i d e n t o f P e o p l e s I n
i t i a t i v e f o r R e f o r m s , Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a
petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of elective officials, through
Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article XVII,Sec. 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which provides for the right of the people to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the
notice of hearing and thereafter set the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator
Roco, the IBP, Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law
Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenorsoppositors. Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground
that one which is cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein
Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpinfiled this civil action
for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and
theDelfin petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The
constitutional provision on p e o p l e s i n i t i a t i v e t o a m e n d t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n c a n
o n l y b e i m p l e m e n t e d b y l a w t o b e p a s s e d b y Congress. No such law has
been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution,
not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a revision;
therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The Supreme Court granted
the Motions for Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision. (2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.(3) Whether
the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.

Held:
S e c . 2 , A r t X V I I o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n i s n o t s e l f e x e c u t o r y, t h u s , w i t h o u
t i m p l e m e n t i n g legislation the same cannot operate. Although the Constitution has
recognized or granted the right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
provide for its implementation. The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which
prescribes rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
thatw h a t h a s b e e n d e l e g a t e d , c a n n o t b e d e l e g a t e d ( p o t e s t a s d e l e g a t a
n o n d e l e g a r i p o t e s t ) . T h e delegation of the power to the COMELEC being
invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right to peoples initiative. T h e l i f t i n g o f t h e t e r m l i m i t s w a s
h e l d t o b e t h a t o f a r e v i s i o n , a s i t w o u l d a f f e c t o t h e r provisions of the
Constitution such as the synchronization of elections, the constitutional guarantee of
equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibiting political
dynasties. A revision cannot be done by initiative. However, considering the Courts
decision in the above Issue, the issueof whether or not the petition is a revision
or amendment has become academic

GONZALES vs COMELEC, G.R. No. L-28196, November 9, 1967FACTS:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed resolutions No. 1, 2 and 3

i.e. to increase the seats of the Lower House from 120 to 180; to convoke a ConstitutionalConvention
of 1971; and to amend the Constitution (Section 16, Article VI) so they can becomedelegates
themselves to the Convention.Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, on June 17, 1967,became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the amendments to the
Constitution proposed in theaforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by
the people, at thegeneral elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.Two cases were
filed against this act of Congress: One an is original action for prohibition, withpreliminary
injunction by Ramon A. Gonzales, in L-28196, a Filipino citizen, a taxpayer, and a voter.He claims to
have instituted case L-28196 as a class unit, for and in behalf of all citizens, taxpayers,and voters
similarly situated. Another one is by PHILCONSA, in L-28224, a corporation dulyorganized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, and a civic, non-profit and non-partisanorganization the
objective of which is to uphold the rule of law in the Philippines and to defend itsConstitution against
erosions or onslaughts from whatever source.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly

violates theConstitution?May Constitutional Amendments Be Submitted for Ratification in a General

Election?
HELD:
The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress

acting as a constituent assembly

violatesthe Constitution essentially justiciable, not political, and, hence, subject

to judicial review.In the cases at bar, notwithstanding that the R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 have been
approved by a vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives votingseparately, said resolutions are null and void because Members of Congress,
which approved theproposed amendments, as well as the resolution calling a convention to propose
amendments, are,at best,
de facto
Congressmen (based upon Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution, noapportionment has been made
been made by Congress within three (3) years since 1960.Thereafter, the Congress of the Philippines
and/or the election of its Members became illegal; thatCongress and its Members, likewise, became a
de facto
Congress and/or
de facto
congressmen);However, As a consequence, the title of a
de facto
officer cannot be assailed collaterally

PABLITO V. SANIDAD vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:
Republic Act No. 6766 entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region was enacted into law, and pursuant to it, the City of
Baguio and the provinces comprising the Cordillera Autonomous Region, shall take part
in a plebiscite for theratification of the Organic Act. COMELEC promulgated Resolution
No. 2167 to govern theconduct of the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region.Petitioner filed a petition, assailing the constitutionality of
Section 19 of said resolution becauseit violates the constitutional guarantees of the
freedom of expression and of the press enshrinedin the Constitution. Section 19
provides that during the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personalityshall use his
column or radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite
issues.COMELEC maintains that the questioned provision of COMELEC Resolution No.
2167 doesnot violate the freedom of expression and of the press. Rather, it is a valid
implementation of the power of the COMELEC to supervise and regulate media during
election or plebiscite periods asenunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987
Constitution.
Issue:Whether or not Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.
Held:The Court held that Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is
unconstitutional.Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that what
was granted to the COMELECwas the power to supervise and regulate the use and
enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of
transportation or other public utilities, media of communicationor information to the end
that equal opportunity, time and space, and the right to reply, includingreasonable, equal
rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidatesare
ensured. However, it does not grant the COMELEC the power to supervise and regulate
theexercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods.While Section 19 of COMELEC Resolution 2167 does not absolutely
bar petitioner-columnistfrom expressing his views and or from campaigning for or
against the organic act because hemay do so through the COMELEC space and/or
COMELEC radio/television time, it is still arestriction on his choice of the forum where
he may express his view. This form of regulation istantamount to a restriction of
petitioner's freedom of expression for no justifiable reason.Therefore, Section 19 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2167 is unconstitutional.

Bondoc vs. Pineda Digested

Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth
District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members,
3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of
Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP).
Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura
received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly
helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting
LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their
functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence

from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of
party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a conscience vote
in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination and appreciation of
the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of Representatives
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution.
Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the
Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short
of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.

M
IRASOL
V
S
C
A
[351 SCRA 44; G.R. No. 128448; 1 Feb 2001]
Facts:
The Mirasols are sugarland owners and planters. Philippine National Bank (PNB)
financed theMirasols' sugar production venture FROM 1973-1975 under a crop loan
financing scheme. TheMirasols signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on
Standing Crops, and a Real EstateMortgage in favor of PNB. The Chattel Mortgage
empowered PNB to negotiate and sell thelatter's sugar and to apply the proceeds to the
payment of their obligations to it.President Marcos issued PD 579 in November, 1974
authorizing Philippine Exchange Co., Inc.(PHILEX) to purchase sugar allocated for
export and authorized PNB to finance PHILEX'spurchases. The decree directed that
whatever profit PHILEX might realize was to be remitted tothe government. Believing
that the proceeds were more than enough to pay their obligations,petitioners asked
PNB for an accounting of the proceeds which it ignored. Petitioners continuedto avail of
other loans from PNB and to make unfunded withdrawals from their accounts with
saidbank. PNB asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. As a
result,petitioners, conveyed to PNB real properties by way of
dacion en pago
still leaving an unpaidamount. PNB proceeded to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgaged
properties. PNB still had adeficiency claim.Petitioners continued to ask PNB to account
for the proceeds, insisting that said proceeds, ifproperly liquidated, could offset their
outstanding obligations. PNB remained adamant in itsstance that under P.D. No. 579,
there was nothing to account since under said law, all earningsfrom the export sales of
sugar pertained to the National Government.On August 9, 1979, the Mirasols filed a suit
for accounting, specific performance, and damagesagainst PNB.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional
without noticeto the Solicitor General where the parties have agreed to submit such
issue for the resolution ofthe Trial Court.Whether PD 579 and subsequent issuances
thereof are unconstitutional.Whether or not said PD is subject to judicial review.
Held:
It is settled that Regional Trial Courts have the authority and jurisdiction to consider
theconstitutionality of a statute, presidential decree, or executive order. The Constitution
vests thepower of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or
executiveagreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not
only in this Court,but in all Regional Trial Courts.The purpose of the mandatory notice in
Rule 64, Section 3 is to enable the Solicitor General todecide whether or not his
intervention in the action assailing the validity of a law or treaty isnecessary. To deny the
Solicitor General such notice would be tantamount to depriving him of hisday in court.
We must stress that, contrary to petitioners' stand, the mandatory notice requirementis

not limited to actions involving declaratory relief and similar remedies. The rule itself
providesthat such notice is required in "any action" and not just actions involving
declaratory relief. Wherethere is no ambiguity in the words used in the rule, there is no
room for construction. 15 In allactions assailing the validity of a statute, treaty,
presidential decree, order, or proclamation, noticeto the Solicitor General is
mandatory.Petitioners contend that P.D. No. 579 and its implementing issuances are
void for violating thedue process clause and the prohibition against the taking of private
property without justcompensation. Petitioners now ask this Court to exercise its power
of judicial review.Jurisprudence has laid down the following requisites for the exercise of
this power: First, theremust be before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise
of judicial review. Second, thequestion before the Court must be ripe for adjudication.
Third, the person challenging the validityof the act must have standing to challenge.
Fourth, the question of constitutionality must havebeen raised at the earliest opportunity,
and lastly, the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota
of the case

SANLAKAS
V
S
.
E
XECUTIVE
S
ECRETARY
[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]
Facts:
During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and enlisted
men ofthe AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known and unknown
leaders haveseized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the
corruption in the AFPand declared their withdrawal of support for the government,
demanding the resignation of thePresident, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue
of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4,the Philippines was declared under
the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and theofficers went back to their
barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both theProclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessationof the
State of Rebellion was issued.In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed:
(1) SANLAKAS AND PARTIDO NGMANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VIIof the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, andthat there is no factual basis for
such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. ExecutiveSecretary, et al,
petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the reportrequirement
under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a reportto
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that
thepresidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as
Congresshas not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v.
PresidentMacapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending
that there wasusurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution. (4)Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the declaration of a
state of rebellion "opens thedoor to the unconstitutional implementation of
warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring suit?
Held:
The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4
areconstitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. ThePresident in addition to its Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by

the Constitution executivepowers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armedforces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court mayexamine whether the power was exercised
within constitutional limits or in a manner constitutinggrave abuse of discretion, none of
the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported theirassertion that the President
acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention of thereport is of no merit as
there was no indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts orthat military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation ofthe
legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in declaring a
state ofrebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of
her ChiefExecutive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive
powers, vested on thePresident by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powerscontemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear
on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, sinceany person may be subject to this whether
there is rebellion or not as this is a crime punishableunder the Revised Penal Code,
and as long as a valid warrantless arrest is present.Legal standing or
locus standi
has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the casesuch that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental actthat is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"suchpersonal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness whichsharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficultconstitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners
Sanlakas and PM, and SJSOfficers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen.Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. Itsustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,
that the extent thepowers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof, since his officeconfers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution

J
OYA
V
S
.
PCGG
[225 SCRA 568; G.R. No. 96541; 24 Aug 1993]
Facts:
On 9 August 1990, Mateo A.T. Caparas, then Chairman of PCGG, wrote then President
CorazonC. Aquino, requesting her for authority to sign the proposed Consignment
Agreement betweenthe Republic of the Philippines through PCGG and Christie,
Manson and Woods International, Incconcerning the scheduled sale on 11 January
1991 of eighty-two) Old Masters Paintings andantique silverware seized from
Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to bepart of the ill-gotten
wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. On 14 August1990, then
President Aquino, through former Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,authorized
Chairman Caparas to sign the Consignment Agreement allowing Christie's of NewYork
to auction off the subject art pieces for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
On15 August 1990, PCGG, through Chairman Caparas, representing the Government
of theRepublic of the Philippines, signed the Consignment Agreement with Christie's of
New York.According to the agreement, PCGG shall consign to CHRISTIE'S for sale at
public auction theeighty-two Old Masters Paintings then found at the Metropolitan
Museum of Manila as well as thesilverware contained in seventy-one cartons in the
custody of the Central Bank of the Philippines,and such other property as may
subsequently be identified by PCGG and accepted byCHRISTIE'S to be subject to the
provisions of the agreement.On 26 October 1990, the Commission on Audit through
then Chairman Eufemio C. Domingosubmitted to President Aquino the audit findings
and observations of COA on the ConsignmentAgreement of 15 August 1990 to
the effect that: the authority of former PCGG Chairman Caparasto enter into the
Consignment Agreement was of doubtful legality; the contract was
highlydisadvantageous to the government; PCGG had a poor track record in asset
disposal by auction in the U.S.; and, the assets subject of auction were historical relics
and had cultural significance,hence, their disposal was prohibited by law.After the oral
arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, we issued immediately our
resolutiondenying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the scheduled
sale of the artworks onthe ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right
to a restraining order and thatproper parties had not been impleaded.On 11 January
1991, the sale at public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds
of$13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury.
Issue:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.Whether or not the Old Masters
Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase"cultural treasure of the
nation".Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion on
which can bedisposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and
Congress.Whether or not PCGG has complied with the due process clause and other
statutoryrequirements for the exportation and sale of the subject items.Whether or not
the petition has become moot and academic, and if so, whether the above Issuewarrant
resolution from this Court.
Held:
This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every
action mustbe prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and
that all persons havinginterest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief
demanded shall be joined asplaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review
only if the case is brought before it bya party who has the legal standing to raise the
constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing"means a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or willsustain direct injury as a
result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term"interest" is material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, asdistinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.
Moreover,the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a
desire to vindicate theconstitutional right of some third and related party.There are
certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on
legalstanding, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the
enforcement of a publicduty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the
Constitution, and when a taxpayerquestions the validity of a governmental act
authorizing the disbursement of public funds.Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit.
They lack basis in fact and in law. The ownership ofthese paintings legally belongs to
the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, althoughthe public has been
given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they wereplaced on
exhibit.The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however
should not beunderstood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has
automatically passed on thegovernment without complying with constitutional and
statutory requirements of due process
and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, an
yconstitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition
must beraised only by the proper parties the true owners thereof whose authority to
recover emanatesfrom their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the
Constitution. Having failed toshow that they are the legal owners of the artworks or that
the valued pieces have becomepublicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear
legal right whatsoever to question theiralleged unauthorized disposition.Neither can this
petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Obviously, petitioners are not challengingany
expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be
publicproperties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique
silverwarewere acquired from private sources and not with public money.

O
POSA
V
S
.
F
ACTORAN
,
J
R
.
[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]
Facts:
Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective
parents.Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic,non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of,
inter alia, engaging inconcerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
natural resources. The originaldefendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.,
then Secretary of the Department ofEnvironment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the newSecretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was
subsequently ordered upon proper motion by thepetitioners. The complaint was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs"are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, useand enjoyment
of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." Thesame
was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation
ofsaid resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court."On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion
to Dismiss thecomplaint based on two grounds, namely: the plaintiffs have no cause of
action against him and,the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which
properly pertains to the legislative orexecutive branches of Government. In their 12 July
1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitionersmaintain that, the complaint shows a clear
and unmistakable cause of action, the motion isdilatory and the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse ofdiscretion.On 18 July 1991,
respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion todismiss.
In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
causeof action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judgefurther ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in
the impairment of contractswhich is prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rulesof Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order
on the ground that therespondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the
action. Again, the parents ofthe plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but
have also joined the latter in this case.

A
GAN
J
R
.
V
S
. PIATCO
[402 SCRA 612; G.R. No. 155001; 5 May 2003]
Facts:
Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in the new
NAIAairport terminal, so they
formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the
government for the development of NAIA Intl. Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III). The NEDAapproved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders
were invited, and among the proposal Peoples AirCargo (Paircargo)
was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to
Paircargo,but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Because
of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl.Airport Terminals Co.
(PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreementin
1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov.
1998 it was amended inthe matters of pertaining to the definition
of the obligations given to the concessionaire,development of
facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of
contract. SinceMIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations
of NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contractwith several service
providers. The workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that theywould lose their
job, and the service
providers joined

them, filed a motion for intervention.Likewise several employees of

the MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A
group of congressmen filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared
in her speech that she will nothonor PIATCO contracts which the
Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.
Issue:
Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments
for beingcontrary to the constitution.
Held:
The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The
amendmentshave the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from the
contract bidded upon.The amendments present new terms and conditions which
provide financial benefit to PIATCOwhich may have the altered the technical and
financial parameters of other bidders had theyknow that such terms were available. The
1997 concession agreement, the amendments andsupplements thereto are set aside
for being null and void.The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the
concession agreement as theirlivelihood is to be taken away from them.

U
MALI
V
S
.
G
UINGONA
[305 SCRA 533; G.R. No. 131124; 21 Mar 1999]
Facts:
Osmundo Umali the petitioner was appointed Regional Director of the Bureau of
InternalRevenue by Pres Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 29,
1993 to March 15,1994 and Makati, March 16, 1994 to August 4, 1994. On August 1,
1994, President Ramosreceived a confidential memorandum against the petitioner for
alleged violations of internalrevenue laws, rules and regulations during his incumbency
as Regional Director, moreparticularly the following malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance. upon receipt of the saidconfidential memorandum, former President
authorized the issuance of an Order for thepreventive suspension of the petitioner and
immediately referred the Complaint against the latterto the Presidential Commission on
Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation.Petitioner was duly informed of the
charges against him. And was directed him to send in hisanswer, copies of his
Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three years (3), andPersonal Data
Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGCOffice. On
August 23, the petitioner filed his required answer. After evaluating the evidence
onrecord, the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding a prima
facie evidenceto support six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On
October 6, 1994, acting uponthe recommendation of the PCAGC, then President
Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152dismissing petitioner from the service, with
forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
Issue:
San Beda College of Law

AlabangConstitutional Law 2 Case Digests

Page 18Section 1C, SY 06
07
Whether or Not AO No. 152 violated petitioner's Right to Security of Tenure.Whether or
Not Petitioner was denied due process of lawWhether or Not the PCAGC is a validly
Constituted government agency and whether thepetitioner can raise the issue of
constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of thetrial courts
decision.Whether or Not the ombudsman's resolution dismissing the charges against

the petitioner is stillbasis for the petitioner's dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled
in AO No. 152
Held:
Petitioner maintains that as a career executive service officer, he can only be removed
for causeand under the Administrative Code of 1987, 6 loss of confidence is not one of
the legal causes orgrounds for removal. Consequently, his dismissal from office on the
ground of loss confidenceviolated his right to security of tenure, petitioner theorized.
After a careful study, we are of theirresistible conclusion that the Court of Appeals ruled
correctly on the first three Issue. To be sure,petitioner was not denied the right to due
process before the PCAGC. Records show that thepetitioner filed his answer and other
pleadings with respect to his alleged violation of internalrevenue laws and regulations,
and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body. It isthus decisively clear
that his protestation of non-observance of due process is devoid of anyfactual or legal
basis. Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts ashis
security of tenure. According to petitioner, as a Regional Director of Bureau of
InternalRevenue, he is CESO eligible entitled to security of tenure. However, petitioner's
claim of CESOeligibility is anemic of evidentiary support. It was incumbent upon him to
prove that he is a CESOeligible but unfortunately, he failed to adduce sufficient
evidence on the matter. His failure to doso is fatal. As regards the issue of
constitutionality of the PCAGC, it was only posed by petitionerin his motion for
reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It was certainly too lateto
raise for the first time at such late stage of the proceedings. As to last issue, It is worthy
to notethat in the case under consideration, the administrative action against the
petitioner was takenprior to the institution of the criminal case. The charges included in
Administrative Order No. 152were based on the results of investigation conducted by
the PCAGC and not on the criminalcharges before the Ombudsman. In sum, the petition
is dismissable on the ground that the Issueposited by the petitioner do not constitute a
valid legal basis for overturning the finding andconclusion arrived at by the Court of
Appeals. However, taking into account the antecedent factsand circumstances
aforementioned, the Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, has decided toconsider
the dismissal of the charges against petitioner before the Ombudsman, the succinct
andunmistakable manifestation by the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
that hisoffice is no longer interested in pursuing the case, and the position taken by the
Solicitor General,that there is no more basis for Administrative Order No. 152, as
effective and substantivesupervening events that cannot be overlooked.

I
N
R
E
C
UNANAN
[94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar thosecandidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions
for admission tothe bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of
their examination paperswere still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There arealso others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however,invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewedthe motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.972.
Issue:
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held
I
N
R
E
C
UNANAN
[94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]
Facts:
Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953.
In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the
bar thosecandidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75
percent.After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions
for admission tothe bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of
their examination paperswere still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. There arealso others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however,invoking the law in question. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewedthe motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No.972.
Issue:
Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.
Held

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those
candidates whosuffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate
preparation.In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarmentand reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the
profession and their supervision havebeen indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. We have said that in the judicial systemfrom which ours has been
derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement ofattorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.On this matter, there is certainly a
clear distinction between the functions of the judicial andlegislative departments of the
government.It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongsexclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the
matter is of permissivecharacter, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.

THE FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OFTHE STATE

THE POLICE POWER

A
GUSTIN
V
S
.
E
DU
[88 SCRA 195; G.R. No. L-49112; 2 Feb 1979]
Facts:
President Marcos issued the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which states that all owners,
users ordrivers shall have at all times one pair of early warning devise (EWD) in their
cars acquire from
any source depending on the owners choice. The Letter of Ins
truction was assailed by petitionerLeovillo Agustin to have violated the constitution
guarantee of due process against Hon Edu,Land Transportation Commissioner, Hon.
Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of national Defense, Hon.Juinio, Minister of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication and Hon. Aquino, Minister ofPublic Highways.
Because of such contentions, the Implementing Rules and Regulation wasordered to be
suspended for a period of 6 months. Petitioner alleges that EWD are not
necessarybecause vehicles already have hazard lights (blinking lights) that can be use
as a warning device.Also petitioner contest that the letter of instruction violates the
delegation of police power becauseit is deemed harsh, oppressive and unreasonable for
the motorists and those dealers of EWD willbecome instant millionaires because of such
law.
Issue:
Whether or not Petitioners contentions possess merit.
Held:
Petitioners contentions are without merit because the exercise of police power may
interfere with
personal liberty or property to ensure and promote the safety, health and prosperity of
the State.Also, such letter of instruction is intended to promote public safety and it is
indeed a rareoccurrence that such contention was alleged in a instruction with such
noble purpose. Petitioneralso failed to present the factual foundation that is necessary
to invalidate the said letter ofinstruction. In cases where there is absence in the factual
foundation, it should be presumed thatconstitutionality shall prevail. Pres. Marcos on the
other hand possesses vital statistics that
will justify the need for the implementation of this instruction. As signatory to the 1968 Vi
ennaConventions on Road Signs and Signals, our country must abide with the
standards given as
stated in our Constitution that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles
of

International Law as part of the law of the land. In the case at bar, the Vienna
Convention alsorequires the use of EWD. Vehicle owners are not obliged to buy an
EDW. They can personally
create a EWD provided that it is in accordance to the specifications provided by law.
Petitioners
allegation against the manufacturers of EDW being millionaires is deemed to be an
unfoundedspeculation. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed. The restraining order
regarding theimplementation of the Reflector Law is lifted making the said law
immediately executory.

I
CHONG
V
S
.
H
ERNANDEZ
[101 Phil 1117; G.R. No. L-7995; 31 May 1957]
Facts:
Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as
An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was passed.
The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned
byforeigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the
petitioner inthis case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty
of the Philippinestherefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity
between the Philippines and Chinawas violated according to him.
Issue:
Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power.
Held:
According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then
provided thatpolice power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or
a contract. The Courtalso provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and
actual danger to national economyposed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law
infringes upon the said treaty, the latter isalways subject to qualification or amendment
by a subsequent law and the same may nevercurtain or restrict the scope of the police
power of the state.

L
UTZ
V
S
.
A
RANETA
[98 Phil 148; G.R. No. L-7859; 22 Dec 1955]
Facts:
Walter Lutz, as the Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme
Ledesma,seeks to recover from J. Antonio Araneta, the Collector of Internal Revenue,
the sum of moneypaid by the estate as taxes, pursuant to the Sugar Adjustment
Act. Under Section 3 of said Act,taxes are levied on the owners or persons in control of
the lands devoted to the cultivation ofsugar cane. Furthermore, Section 6 states all the
collections made under said Act shall be for aidand support of the sugar industry
exclusively. Lutz contends that such purpose is not a matter ofpublic concern hence
making the tax levied for that cause unconstitutional and void. The Court ofFirst
Instance dismissed his petition, thus this appeal before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act ( Commonwealth Act
567) isunconstitutional.
Held:
The tax levied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is constitutional. The tax under said Act
is leviedwith a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of thethreatened sugar industry. Since sugar production is one of the great
industries of our nation, itspromotion, protection, and advancement, therefore redounds
greatly to the general welfare.Hence, said objectives of the Act is a public concern and
is therefore constitutional. It follows thatthe Legislature may determine within
reasonable bounds what is necessary for its protection andexpedient for its promotion. If
objectives and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason isseen why the state
may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment.
Taxation may be made with the implement of the states police power. In addition, it is
only
rational that the taxes be obtained from those that will directly benefit from it. Therefore,
the taxlevied under the Sugar Adjustment Act is held to be constitutional.

T
IO
V
S
.
V
IDEOGRAM
R
EGULATORY
B
OARD
[151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Facts:
The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely
affected by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating th
e Videogram Regulatory Board" with broadpowers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry.A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the
amended the NationalInternal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes.

There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback,
regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales tax."
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of
thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every
sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction
of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax
is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by
the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated
circulation ofvideograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any
technical improvementor variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of
movie houses and theaters. Suchunregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least fortypercent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the
collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusementand other taxes, thereby resulting in
substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually ingovernment

revenues.Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum

from rentals, salesand disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been
subjected to tax, therebydepriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in
taxes each year.The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of themovie industry.
Issue:
Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police
power.Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional .
Held:
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30%
tax is fora public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the
video industry,particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights,and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it
was also an objective of theDECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in
pronouncing PresidentialDecree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the
underlying objective of the DECREE isto protect the moribund movie industry, there is
no question that public welfare is at bottom of itsenactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of themoral fiber of the viewing
public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewedvideo tapes
containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses
ingovernment revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact
that theactivities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of
Mayor's permit andmunicipal license fees are required to engage in
business."WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

A
SSO
.
O
F
S
MALL
L
ANDOWNERS
V
S
.
S
EC
.
O
F
DAR
[175
SCRA
343;
G.R.
N
O
.
L-78742;
14
J
UL
1989]
Facts:
Several petitions are the root of the case:a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD
No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657.Subjects of the petition are a 9-hectare and 5
hectare Riceland worked by fourtenants. Tenants were declared full owners by EO 228
as qualified farmers under PD27. The pe
titioners now contend that President Aquino usurped the legislatures

power.
b.
A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental
against Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of
AgrarianReform Fund with initial fund of P50Billion.c. A petition by owners of land which
was placed by the DAR under the coverage ofOperation Land Transfer.d. A petition
invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn landsnot
exceeding seven hectares.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned EOs, PD, and RA were constitutional.
Held:
The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power
andeminent domain.The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO
228 and 229 was authorizedunder Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987
Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exerciseof Police Power and Eminent Domain.RA
6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes
necessary todeprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum
area allowed, there isdefinitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which
payment of just compensation isimperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere
limitation of the use of the land. What isrequired is the surrender of the title and the
physical possession of said excess and all beneficialrights accruing to the owner in
favour of the farmer.A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is
concurrence of the lawfulsubject and the method.Subject and purpose of the Agrarian
Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is themethod employed to
achieve it.

L
OZANO
V
S
.
M
ARTINEZ
[146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986]
Facts:
A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was
made,contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional.
Such motion wasdenied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the
Supreme Court for relief. TheSolicitor General, commented that it was premature for the
accused to elevate to the SupremeCourt the orders denying their motions to quash.
However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiableto intervene for the review of lower court's
denial of a motion to quash.
Issue:
Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of
the State.
Held:
The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to
theconstitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.The offense punished by BP
22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a checkthat is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligationwhich the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order.The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checksand putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by
society as inherently wrong,hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can beoutlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise ofits police power.

K
WONG
S
ING
V
S
.
C
ITY
O
F
M
ANILA
[41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Facts:
Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and
the sameinterest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also
questioned the validity ofenforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance
No. 532 requires that the receiptbe in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed
showing the kind and number of articlesdelivered by laundries and dyeing and cleaning
establishments. The permanent injunction wasdenied by the trial court. The appellants
claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of classlegislation; putting in mind that they are
Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates betweenpersons in similar circumstances;
and that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of propertyrights. They also contest that
the enforcement of the legislation is an act beyond the scope oftheir police power. In
view of the foregoing, this is an appeal with the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of
police powerWhether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation
that infringes property rights.
Held:
Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the
policepower. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532
is based on Section2444, paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 2744,authorizes the municipal board of the city of Manila, with the
approval of the mayor of the city:(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for
the following: xxxxxxxxxlaundries xxxx.(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem
necessary and proper for the sanitationand safety, the furtherance of the prosperity, and
the promotion of the morality,peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general
welfare of the city and itsinhabitants.The court held that the obvious purpose of
Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes betweenlaundrymen and their patrons and to
protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipherChinese characters from
being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manilaare more familiar
with Spanish and maybe English.)In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court

held that the ordinance invades nofundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege.
Under the guise of police regulation, anattempt is not made to violate personal property
rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatorynor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether theybelong to Americans,
Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and eachevery one of
them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection forthe
implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative
Code.Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation
affected by theordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in
Spanish or English, butmostly Arabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it
seems that the same burdens arecast upon the them. Yet, even if private rights of
person or property are subjected to restraint, andeven if loss will result to individuals
from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficientground for failing to uphold
the power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the policepower is the control
of private interests for the public welfare.Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is
affirmed, and the petition for a preliminaryinjunction is denied, with costs against the
appellants.

T
ABLARIN
V
S
.
G
UTIERREZ
[152 SCRA 730; G.R. No. 78164; 31 July 1987]
Facts:
The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the
Board ofMedical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing
Section 5 (a) and(f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52,
series of 1985, dated 23August 1985 and from requiring the taking and passing of the
NMAT as a condition for securingcertificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding
with accepting applications for taking theNMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. Thetrial court denied said petition on 20
April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered aspreviously
scheduled.Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946,
known as the "MedicalAct of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following
manner:"SECTION 1. Objectives.

This Act provides for and shall govern (a) thestandardization and regulation of medical
education; (b) the examination forregistration of physicians; and (c) the supervision,
control and regulation of thepractice of medicine in the Philippines."The statute, among
other things, created a Board of Medical Education. Its functions as specifiedin Section
5 of the statute include the
following:"(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into arecognized
college of
medicine;x x x(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical scho
oland keep a register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from saidapplicants
the amount of twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to theoperating fund of the
Boa
rd of Medical Education;
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical
schools:"Admission requirements.

The medical college may admit any student whohas not been convicted by any court of
competent jurisdiction of any offenseinvolving moral turpitude and who presents (a) a
record of completion of abachelor's degree in science or arts; (b) a certificate of
eligibility for entrance to amedical school from the Board of Medical Education; (c) a
certificate of goodmoral character issued by two former professors in the college of
liberal arts; and(d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall be construed to inhibit any
college ofmedicine from establishing, in addition to the preceding, other
entrancerequirements that

may be deemed admissible.

MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports anddated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the
National MedicalAdmission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a
certificate of eligibility foradmission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning
with the school year 1986-1987.
ThisOrder goes on to state that: "2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an inst
rumenttoward upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical
schools and itscalculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The
cutoff score for thesuccessful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be
determined every year by theBoard of Medical Education after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges.The NMAT rating of each applicant, together
with the other admission requirements as presentlycalled for under existing rules, shall
serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificateof eligibility for admission
into the medical colleges.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and MECS
Order No.52, s. 1985 are constitutional.
Held:
Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as acondition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutionalimposition.The police power, it is commonplace learning, is
the pervasive and non-waivable power andauthority of the sovereign to secure and
promote all the important interests and needs

in aword, the public order

of the general community. An important component of that public orderis the health and
physical safety and well being of the population, the securing of which no onecan deny
is a legitimate objective of governmental effort and regulation. Perhaps the only
issuethat needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable relation
between theprescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand,and the securing of the health and safety of the general
community, on the other hand. Thisquestion is perhaps most usefully approached by
recalling that the regulation of the practice ofmedicine in all its branches has long been
recognized as a reasonable method of protecting thehealth and safety of the
public.MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985 articulates the rationale of regulation of this type:
the improvementof the professional and technical quality of the graduates of medical
schools, by upgrading thequality of those admitted to the student body of the medical
schools. That upgrading is sought byselectivity in the process of admission, selectivity
consisting, among other things, of limitingadmission to those who exhibit in the required
degree the aptitude for medical studies andeventually for medical practice. The need to
maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, highstandards in our professional schools in
general, and medical schools in particular, in the currentstage of our social and
economic development, are widely known. We believe that thegovernment is entitled to
prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means for achieving itsstated objective

of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our] medical schools" and of"improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the country. We are entitled to hold that theNMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
thisarea. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the potentially
deadlyeffects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat our
bodies andminds for disease or trauma.WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is
DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trialcourt denying the petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs againstpetitioners.

C
ITY
G
OVERNMENT
O
F
Q
UEZON
C
ITY
V
S
.
E
RICTA
[122 SCRA 759; G.R. No. L-34915; 24 Jun 1983]
Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The
Establishment,Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or
Burial Ground Within TheJurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The
Violation Thereof" provides:Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemeteryshall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who
are paupers andhave been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their
death, to bedetermined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated
shallimmediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than
sixmonths from the date of approval of the application.For several years, the
aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven yearsafter the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request
theCity Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial
park lots inQuezon City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6%
space intended forpaupers burial.The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent
Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing thatSection 9 of the ordinance would be
enforced.Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory
relief, prohibition andmandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9
of the Ordinance in question.
Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City
Charter, theLocal Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.
Issue:
Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police
power.
Held:
Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power.
Section 9cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the
license fee, andregulate such other business, trades, and occupation as may be

established or practiced in theCity.Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due processof law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1,
Constitution). On the other hand, there are threeinherent powers of government by
which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1)police power, (2) eminent
domain, (3) taxation.The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec.
12, Rep. Act 537 that readsas follows:
To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred bythis act
and such as it shall deem necessary and proper to provide for the health
and safety, , and for the protection of property therein; and enforce obedience
thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may prescribe
under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.
The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate
does notinclude the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates
but also prohibitsthe operation of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13
of said ordinance,'Violation of the provision thereof is punishable with a fine and/or
imprisonment and that uponconviction thereof the permit to operate and maintain a
private cemetery shall be revoked or
cancelled. The confiscatory clause and the penal provision in effect deter one from
operating a
memorial park cemetery.Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of
promoting the public welfare byrestraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property'. It is usually exerted in order to merelyregulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright,it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.It seems to the
court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not amere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private
propertywithout due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village

[328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000]
Facts:
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner herein, is a Government
Agencytasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village
Association (BAVA),respondent herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to
open Neptune Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe andconvenient movement of persons and to regulate
the flow of traffic in Makati City. This waspursuant to MMDA law or Republic Act No.
7924. On the same day, the respondent wasappraised that the perimeter wall
separating the subdivision and Kalayaan Avenue would bedemolished.The respondent,
to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of the wall, filed apreliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Respondent claimed that the MMDA hadno
authority to do so and the lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner
appealedthe decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open
Neptune Street topublic traffic because it is an agent of the State that can practice
police power in the delivery ofbasic services in Metro Manila.
Issue:
Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant toits regulatory and police powers.
Held:
The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to exercise police power.
Police poweris primarily lodged in the National Legislature. However, police power may
be delegated togovernment units. Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a
political governmentunit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power because it
cannot be delegated to them.It is not a legislative unit of the government. Republic Act
No. 7924 does not empower the MMDAto enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of theinhabitants of Manila. There is no
syllable in the said act that grants MMDA police power.It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non
-governmental organizations and theprivate sector for the efficient and expeditious
delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitanarea.

T
ATEL
V
S
.
M
UNICIPALITY
O
F
V
IRAC
[207 SCRA 157; G.R. No. 40243; 11 Mar 1992]
Facts:
Petitioner Celestino Tatel owns a warehouse in barrio Sta. Elena, Municipality of
Virac.Complaints were received by the municipality concerning the disturbance caused
by the
operation of the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse. A committee was
then
appointed by the municipal council, and it noted from its investigation on the matter that
anaccidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner created a danger to the lives and
propertiesof the people in the neighborhood. Resolution No. 29 was then passed by the
Municipal councildeclaring said warehouse as a public nuisance within a purview of
Article 694 of the New Civil
Code. According to respondent municipal officials, petitioners warehouse was
constructed in
violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near ablock of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining
the necessary distance of200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives
and properties by accidental fire. Onthe other hand, petitioner contends that Ordinance
No. 13 is unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners warehouse is a nuisance within the meaning Article 694 of
the Civil
CodeWhether or not Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is
unconstitutionaland void.
Held:
The storage of abaca and copra in petitioners warehouse is a nuisance under the
provisions of
Article 694 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the
MunicipalCouncil of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is valid because it meets
the criteria for avalid municipal ordinance: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or
any statute, 2) must not beunfair or oppressive, 3) must not be partial or discriminatory,
4) must not prohibit but may regulatetrade, 5) must be general and consistent with
public policy, and 6) must not be unreasonable. Thepurpose of the said ordinance is to

avoid the loss of property and life in case of fire which is oneof the primordial obligation
of government. The lower court did not err in its decision.