AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M.

JAVIER for himself and as General

President, ATTY. JOSE UR. CARBONELL, ET.AL.(petitioners) vs. CIR and ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ (respondent) GR No. L-23467 March
27, 1968
FACTS:
Amalgamated Laborers Association won a case of unfair labor practice against Binalbagan Sugar
Central Company, Inc. (Biscom). Upon motion of the complainants, CIR sent the Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the backwages. Total
net backwages amounted to P79,755.22. Appeals were made against this decision. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (herein respondent),
in the same case, filed a Notice of Attorneys Lien over the amount to be awarded. He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for
the said case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court in Appeal, as chief counsel. He claimed that the
labourers have voluntarily agreed to give him as attorneys fees on contingent basis 25% of the award. He further averred that this is already
a discounted fee out of the plea of the unions president to reduce it from 30% for them to also satisfy Atty. Jose Ur Carbonell. Meanwhile, CIR
decided the appeals still in favour of the petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the cashier of
the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Fernandez. Atty. Carbonell and ALA appealed from the decision contending that 1) CIR is bereft of
jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys fees averring that a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys fees is not a labor
dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIRs authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which
CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said courts jurisdiction; 2) the award of 25% as attorneys fees to
Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is CIR bereft of jurisdiction over the claim for attorneys fees?
2. Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorneys fee?
RULING:
1. No. Court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction. In the absence of such express grant, and in the
absence of prohibitive legislation, it shall also be impliedly granted. In the case at bench, to direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court
as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, a situation abhorred by the rule. Since the court of Industrial Relations obviously had
the jurisdiction over the main cases, it likewise had jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as cl
aims for attorneys fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein.
2. Yes. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of 25% attorneys
fees reasonably compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. This must however be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and
respondent Atty. Fernandez. Afterall, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Though common effort is presumed, the rightful shares of
both must be ascertained. As such, the case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole determination of shares.
OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS:
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents should share in the attorneys fees. No division of fees for legal
services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service and responsibility. The union president is not the attorney for the
labourers. He may seek compensation only as union president.
A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit should be reasonable under all circumstances of
the case, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

G.R. No. L-23467

March 27, 1968
AMALGAMATED LABORERS' ASSOCIATION and/or FELISBERTO M. JAVIER for himself and as General President,
ATTY. JOSEUR. CARBONELL, ET AL., petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND ATTY. LEONARDO C. FERNANDEZ,
respondents.
Jose Ur. Carbonell for and in his own behalf as petitioner.
Leonardo C. Fernandez for and in his own behalf as respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
Controversy over attorneys' fees for legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu.
The background facts are as follows:
On May 30, 1956, Florentino Arceo and 47 others together with their union, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and/or Felisberto Javier,
general president of said union, lodged a complaint 1 in the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR), for unfair labor practices specified in Sec. 4(a) 1, 2, 3
and 4 of the Industrial Peace Act. Made respondents were their former employer, Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom), Rafael
Jalandoni, its president and general manager; Gonzalo Guillen, its chief engineer and general factory superintendent; and Fraternal Labor
Organization and/or Roberto Poli, its president.
Failing in their attempts to dismiss the complaint (motions to dismiss dated June 30, 1956 and July 6, 1956), 2 respondents Biscom, Jalandoni,
and Guillen, on July 9, 1957, answered and counterclaimed. Respondents Fraternal Labor Union and Poli also filed their answer dated July 12,
1957.
With the issues joined, the case on the merits was heard before a trial commissioner.
At the hearings, only ten of the forty-eight complainant laborers appeared and testified. Two of these ten were permanent (regular) employees
of respondent company; the remaining eight were seasonal workers. The regular employees were Arsenio Reyes and Fidel Magtubo. Seasonal
workers were Catalino Bangoy, Juan Fernandez, Jose Garlitos, Dionisio Pido, Santiago Talagtag, Dominador Tangente, Felimon Villaluna and
Brigido Casas.
On November 13, 1962, CIR, thru Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez, rendered judgment, which provides, inter alia, that the two regular
employees (Reyes and Magtubo) be reinstated "to their former positions, without loss of seniority and other benefits which should have accrued to
them had they not been illegally dismissed, with full back wages from the time of their said dismissals up to the time of their actual reinstatements,
minus what they have earned elsewhere in the meantime" and that the eight seasonal workers "be readmitted to their positions as seasonal workers
of respondent company (Biscom), with back wages as seasonal workers from the time they were not rehired at the start of the 1955-1956 milling
season on October 1, 1955 up to the time they are actually reinstated, less the amount earned elsewhere during the period of their lay-off."
Respondents Biscom, Jalandoni and Guillen appealed direct to this Court. 3 On March 28, 1963, this Court dismissed the appeal, without
costs. Ground: Petitioners therein did not seek reconsideration of CIR's decision of November 13, 1962. The judgment became final.
Upon the ten complainants' motion to name an official computer to determine the actual money due them, CIR, on June 4, 1963, directed the
Chief Examiner of its Examining Division to go to the premises of Biscom and compute the back wages due the ten complainants.
On August 9, 1963, the Chief Examiner reported that the total net back wages due the ten complainants were P79,755.22. Biscom and the
complainants moved for reconsideration: Biscom on August 17, 1963; complainants on September 24, 1963.
In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez (a respondent herein) filed on July 15, 1963 in the same case CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu a
"Notice of Attorney's Lien." He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the laborers in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu "since the
inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court on appeal, as chief counsel thereof"; that he "had actually rendered legal
services to the laborers who are subject of this present litigation [CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu] since the year 1956, more or less"; that the laborers
"have voluntarily agreed to give [him], representing his attorney's fees on contingent basis such amounts equivalent to 25% thereof which agreement
is evidenced by a Note"; and that the 25% attorney's fee so contracted is "reasonable and proper taking into consideration the length of services he
rendered and the nature of the work actually performed by him."
On September 25, 1963, Atty. Fernandez filed an "Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien," which in part reads:
3. That the laborers, subject of this present litigation, sometime on February 3, 1956, had initially voluntarily agreed to give Undersigned Counsel
herein, representing his Attorney's fees on contingent basis, such amounts as equivalent to Thirty Per Cent (30%) of whatever money claims that
may be adjudicated by this Honorable Court, copy of said Agreement, in the local Visayan dialect and a translation of the same in the English
language are hereto attached as annexes "A" "A-1" hereof;
4. That subsequently thereafter, when the above-entitled Case was already decided in their favor, Arsenio Reyes, in behalf of his co-laborers who are
also Complainants in this Case begged from the Undersigned Counsel herein that he reduce his attorney's fees to Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) only
for the reason that they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%) although the latter's
actual services rendered was so insignificant thereof;
5. That because of the pleadings of said Arsenio Reyes, who is the President of said Union, the Undersigned Counsel herein finally agreed and
consented that his attorney's fees be reduced to only Twenty-Five Per Cent (25%) instead of Thirty Per Cent (30%) as originally agreed upon in
1956.
On October 7, 1963, Atty. Jose Ur. Carbonell (a petitioner herein) filed in court a document labelled "Discharge" informing CIR of the
discharge, release and dismissal thru a union board resolution (attached thereto as Annex A thereof) of Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez as one of
the lawyers of the complainants in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, effective February 28, 1963.

On October 14, 1963, Atty. Fernandez replied. He averred that the grounds for his discharge specified in the board resolution were "malicious
and motivated by greed and ungratefulness" and that the unjustifiable discharge did not affect the already stipulated contract for attorneys' fees.
On March 19, 1964, CIR Judge Arsenio I. Martinez resolved Biscom's and complainants' motions for resonsideration objecting to the Chief
Examiner's Report and also respondent Fernandez' Amended Notice of Attorney's Lien. Judge Martinez' order reads in part:
(b) Respondent company is further directed to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the Cashier of this Court, as
attorney's fees;
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(d) The amount representing attorney's fees to be deposited by the respondent company is hereby awarded and granted to Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez, and he may collect the same from the Cashier of the Court upon the finality of this order, subject to existing auditing procedures; ....
Biscom complied with the order of deposit. 4
On April 10, 1964, Atty. Carbonell moved to reconsider the March 19, 1964 order with respect to the award of attorneys' fees. Amongst his
grounds are that CIR has no jurisdiction to determine the matter in question, and that the award of 25% as attorneys' fees to Atty. Fernandez is
excessive, unfair and illegal. This motion was denied on April 28, 1964 by CIR en banc.
On June 9, 1964, a motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 1964 resolution was filed by Atty. Carbonell. This was amplified by a similar
motion filed on June 11, 1964.
On June 25, 1964, two things happened: First. CIR en banc denied the motion of June 11, 1964. Second. On Atty. Fernandez' motion, Judge
Martinez authorized the Cashier of the court to disburse to Fernandez the amount of P19,938.81 representing attorneys' fees and deducting
therefrom all legal fees incident to such deposit.
Petitioners herein, Atty. Carbonell, Amalgamated Laborers' Association, and the ten employees, appealed from the June 25, 1964 resolution of
CIR, direct to this Court.
1. Petitioners press upon this Court the view that CIR is bereft of authority to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorneys' fees. Their
reasons: (1) a dispute arising from contracts for attorneys' fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR's
authority; and (2) to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the
special and limited nature of said court's jurisdiction.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
The present controversy over attorneys' fees is but an epilogue or a tail-end feature of the main case, CIR No. 70-ULP-Cebu, which
undoubtedly is within CIR's jurisdiction. And, it has been held that "once the Court of Industrial Relations has acquired jurisdiction over a case under
the law of its creation, it retains that jurisdiction until the case is completely decided, including all the incidents related thereto." 5 Expressive of the
rule on this point is this
4. It is well settled that:
A grant of jurisdiction implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its
judgments and mandates, even though the court may thus be called upon to decide matters which would not be within its cognizance as original
causes of action.
While a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of
prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it (In re Stinger's Estate, 201 P. 693), and, subject to
existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction, and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. So demands, matters, or
questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the
court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the Court may thus be, called on to
consider and decide matters, which as original causes of action, would not be within its cognizance (Bartholomew vs. Shipe, 251 S.W. 1031), (21
C.J.S. pp. 136-138.)
Thus, in Gomez vs. North Camarines Lumber Co., L-11945, August 18, 1958, and Serrano vs. Serrano, L-19562, May 23, 1964, we held that
the court having jurisdiction over the main cause of action, may grant the relief incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise, be outside its
competence. 6
To direct that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, 7 a situation
abhorred by the rules. Thus it is, that usually the application to fix the attorneys' fees is made before the court which renders the judgment. 8 And, it
has been observed that "[a]n approved procedure, where a charging lien has attached to a judgment or where money has been paid into court, is for
the attorney to file an intervening petition and have the amount and extent of his lien judicially determined." 9 Appropriately to be recalled at this
point, is the recent ruling in Martinez vs. Union de Maquinistas, 1967A Phild. 142, 144, January 30, 1967, where, speaking thru Mr. Justice Arsenio P.
Dizon, explicit pronouncement was made by this Court that: "We are of the opinion that since the Court of Industrial Relations obviously had
jurisdiction over the main cases, ... it likewise had full jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney's
fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein." 10
2. The parties herein join hands in one point - the ten (10) successful complainants in C.I.R Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu should pay as attorneys'
fees 30% of the amount adjudicated by the court in the latter's favor (P79,755.22).
They are at odds, however, on how to split the fees.
Respondent Atty. Fernandez claims twenty-five per cent (25%) of the 30% attorneys' fees. He explains that upon the plea of Arsenio Reyes,
union president and one of the 10 successful complainants, he had to reduce his fees to 25% since "they have to share and satisfy also Atty. Jose
Ur. Carbonell in the equivalent amount of Five Per Cent (5%)." Atty. Fernandez exhibited a contract purportedly dated February 3, 1956 before the
48 employees have even filed their complaint in CIR. The stipulated fee is 30% of whatever amount the ten might recover. Strange enough, this
contract was signed only by 8 of the 10 winning claimants. What happened to the others? Why did not the union intervene in the signing of this
contract? Petitioners dispute said contract. They say that Atty. Fernandez required the ten to sign the contract only after the receipt of the decision.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contend that the verbal agreement entered into by the union and its officers thru its President Javier and said
two lawyers, Atty. Carbonell and Atty. Fernandez, is that the 30% attorneys' fees, shall be divided equally ("share and share alike") amongst Atty.
Carbonell, Atty. Fernandez and Felisberto Javier, the union president.
After hearing, CIR Associate Judge Arsenio I. Martinez awarded 25% attorneys' fees to respondent Atty. Fernandez. CIR noted that "the active
conduct and prosecution of the above-entitled case was done by Atty. Fernandez up to the appeal in the Supreme Court," and that petitioner Atty.
Carbonell manifested that "Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez was the counsel mainly responsible for the conduct of the case." It noted, too, that petitioner
Atty. Carbonell did not file any notice of Attorney's Lien.
3. We strike down the alleged oral agreement that the union president should share in the attorneys' fees. Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns
this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a
division of service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek compensation only as such president. An
agreement whereby a union president is allowed to share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.
4. A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit "should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to
its reasonableness." 11
Lately, we said: 12
The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is
unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction....
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Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive,
unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial
justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands that
courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor.
See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, L-12735, October 30, 1959. And it is not material that the present action is between the debtor and the creditor,
and not between attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to say
whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid. Bachrach v. Golingco, 39 Phil. 138.
In the instant case, the stipulated 30% attorneys' fee is excessive and unconscionable. With the exception of Arsenio Reyes who receives a
monthly salary of P175, the other successful complainants were mere wage earners paid a daily rate of P4.20 to P5.00. 13 Considering the long
period of time that they were illegally and arbitrarily deprived of their just pay, these laborers looked up to the favorable money judgment as a serum
to their pitiful economic malaise. A thirty per cent (30%) slice therefrom immensely dilutes the palliative ingredient of this judicial antidote.
The ten complainants involved herein are mere laborers. It is not far-fetched to assume that they have not reached an educational attainment
comparable to that of petitioner Carbonell or respondent Fernandez who, on the other hand, are lawyers. Because of the inequality of the situation
between laborers and lawyers, courts should go slow in awarding huge sums by way of attorneys' fees based solely on contracts. 14 For, as in the
present case, the real objective of the CIR judgment in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu is to benefit the complaint laborers who were unjustifiedly
dismissed from the service. While it is true that laborers should not be allowed to develop that atavistic proclivity to bite the hands that fed them, still
lawyers should not be permitted to get a lion's share of the benefits due by reason of a worker's labor. What is to be paid to the laborers is not
windfall but a product of the sweat of their brow. Contracts for legal services between laborer and attorney should then be zealously scrutinized to
the end that a fair share of the benefits be not denied the former.
5. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees reasonably
compensates the whole of the legal services rendered in CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu. This fee must be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and
respondent Atty. Fernandez. For, after all, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Respondent Atty. Fernandez cannot deny this fact. The
pleadings filed even at the early stages of the proceedings reveal the existence of an association between said attorneys. The pleadings were filed
under the name of "Fernandez & Carbonell." This imports a common effort of the two. It cannot be denied though that most of those pleadings up to
judgment were signed for Fernandez & Carbonell by respondent Fernandez.
We note that a break-up in the professional tie-up between Attorneys Fernandez and Carbonell began when petitioner Atty. Carbonell, on
November 26, 1962, complained to CIR that respondent Atty. Fernandez "failed to communicate with him nor to inform him about the incidents of this
case." He there requested that he be furnished "separately copies of the decision of the court and other pleadings and subsequent orders as well as
motions in connection with the case."
Subsequent pleadings filed in the case unmistakably show the widening rift in their professional relationship. Thus, on May 23, 1963, a "Motion
to Name and Authorize Official Computer" was filed with CIR. On the same day, a "Motion to Issue Writ of Execution" was also registered in the
same court. Although filed under the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez," these pleadings were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell.
On September 16, 1963, an "Opposition to respondent Biscom's Motion for Reconsideration" was filed by petitioner Atty. Carbonell. On
September 24, 1963, he filed a "Motion for Clarification" of the November 13, 1962 judgment of CIR regarding the basic pay of Arsenio Reyes and
Fidel Magtubo. On September 24, 1963, he also filed a "Motion to Reconsider Report of Chief Examiner." These, and other pleadings that were filed
later were signed solely by petitioner Atty. Carbonell, not in the name of "Carbonell & Fernandez." While it was correctly observed by CIR that a good
portion of the court battle was fought by respondent Atty. Fernandez, yet CIR cannot close its eyes to the legal services also rendered by Atty.
Carbonell. For, important and numerous, too, were his services. And, they are not negligible. The conclusion is inevitable that petitioner Atty.
Carbonell must have a share in the twenty-five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees awarded herein. As to how much, this is a function pertaining to CIR.
6. We note that CIR's cashier was authorized on June 25, 1964 to disburse to Atty. Leonardo C. Fernandez the sum of P19,938.81 which is
25% of the amount recovered. In the event payment actually was made, he should be required to return whatever is in excess of the amount to
which he is entitled in line with the opinion expressed herein. 15

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the award of twenty five per cent (25%) attorneys' fees solely to respondent Atty. Fernandez contained in
CIR's order of March 19, 1964 and affirmed by said court's en banc resolutions of April 28, 1964 and June 25, 1964, is hereby set aside; and the
case is hereby remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations with instructions to conduct a hearing on, and determine, the respective shares of
Attorney Leonardo C. Fernandez and Attorney Jose Ur. Carbonell in the amount of P19,938.81 herein awarded as attorneys' fees or both. No costs.
So ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1CIR Case No. 70-ULP-Cebu, "Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al., Complainants, vs. Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. et al., Respondents."
2See: CIR order dated June 25, 1957.
3L-20572, entitled "Binalbagan Sugar Central Co., Inc., et al., Petitioners, vs. Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al., Respondents." Notice of Appeal was filed below on December 3,
1962.
4See: Compliance filed by Biscom on April 7, 1964.
5Cebu Portland Cement Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 94 Phil. 509, 514, citing cases; emphasis supplied.
6Philippine Air Lines Employees' Association vs. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., L-18559, June 30, 1964; Emphasis supplied.
7Fabie vs. Inocencio, 84 Phil. 857, 860.
8Palanca vs. Pecson, 94 Phil. 419, 423. See also: Dahlke vs. Via, 51 Phil. 707, 711; Apo Workers Union vs. Castillo, L-7480, October 31, 1955; Olave vs. Canlas, L-12709, February 28,
1962; Cruz vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-18277, August 31, 1963.
97 Am. Tur. 2d, p. 215.
10Emphasis supplied.
11Canon 13, Code of Legal Ethics. See: Sec. 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
12Mambulao Lumber, Company vs. Philippine National Bank, L-22973, January 30, 1968.
13See: Appendix 2 of the Report of the Chief Examiner.
14Article 24 of the New Civil Code provides: "In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness tender age or other handicap, the court must be vigilant for his protection."
15Espere vs. Santos (Resolution), Adm. Case 151, April 30, 1955.