Jonathan Enrique Silva, A036 404 266 (BIA July 14, 2015)
Jonathan Enrique Silva, A036 404 266 (BIA July 14, 2015)
Jonathan Enrique Silva, A036 404 266 (BIA July 14, 2015)
Department of Justice
A 036-404-266
Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case.
Sincerely,
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Donna Carr
Chief Clerk
Enclosure
Panel Members:
Grant, Edward R.
Userteam: Docket
Date:
JUL J 4 2015
APPEAL
ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: Pro se
ON BEHALF OF DHS: Jeffrey T. Bubier
Senior Attorney
CHARGE:
Notice:
Sec. 237(a)(2)(E)(i), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(E)(i)] Convicted ofcrime of domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, child
neglect, or child abandonment
Sec. 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), I&N Act [8 U.S.C. 1227(a )(2)(A)(iii)] Convicted of aggravated felony
APPLICATION: Removability
The respondent, a native and citizen of Ecuador, has appealed from the April 20, 2015,
Immigration Judge's decision. We review questions of law, discretion, and judgment arising in
appeals from decisions oflmmigration Judges de novo, whereas we review findings offact in such
appeals under a "clearly erroneous" standard. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.l(d)(3). The record will be
remanded.
The respondent argues that he should have been provided counsel to assist him during his
removal proceedings. There is no right to free representation in immigration proceedings. Section
292 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1362, provides that every person in removal
proceedings "shall have the privilege of being represented (at no expense to the Government ) by
such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceedings, as he shall choose." The respondent was
provided a list of free legal service providers at the time he was served with the Notice to Appear
(Exh. I and attachment), and the Immigration Judge explained the right to counsel and advised the
respondent to hire an attorney ifhe wished to be represented (Tr. at 1-3, 9-10). The respondent's
proceedings were continued several times, and he had the right to secure counsel at any time during
the process. We therefore conclude that the respondent's right to counsel was not violated. See
Madrigal-Calvo, 21 I&N Dec. 323, 327-28 (BIA 1996).
Cite as: Jonathan Enrique Silva, A036 404 266 (BIA July 14, 2015)
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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
Finally, while the Immigration Judge sustained the charge under section 237(a)(2)(E)(i) of the
Act during the hearing (Tr. at 20), he did not make specific findings and conclusions on this charge
in the course of his oral decision. This should be done on remand.
ORDER: The record is remanded for further proceedings.
Cite as: Jonathan Enrique Silva, A036 404 266 (BIA July 14, 2015)
4
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However, we find it appropriate to remand the record to allow the Immigration Judge to analyze
more thoroughly whether the respondent's conviction for unlawful contact with a minor under 18 Pa.
Cons. Stat. 6318(a)(4) qualifies as a "sexual abuse of a minor" aggravated felony under section
237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U .S.C. l 227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In particular,
the Immigration Judge should identify more specifically which elements of the statute of conviction
match the definition of sexual abuse of a minor adopted in Matter ofRodriguez-Rodrigu,ez, 22 I&N
Dec. 991 (BIA 1999). See Cadapan v. Atty Gen. of United States, 749 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2014);
Stubbs v. Atty Gen. of United States, 452 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2006). He should also clarify whether
the statute of conviction is a categorical aggravated felony or divisible in light of Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013).
File: A036-404-266
April 1, 2015
In the Matter of
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IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS
CHARGE:
APPLICATIONS:
None.
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with a minor (obscene and other sexual materials and performances) in violation of Title
18, Pennsylvania Code, Section 6318A4. The Court held the case over until today to
In Matter of Rodriquez-Rodriquez, 22 l&N Dec. 991, 995 (BIA 1999), the Board
utilized the definition of "sexual abuse" expressing that the definition is not all
compassing in this regard. The basic component, however, is there must be some
sexual "contact" with a "minor." In Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144 (3rd Cir. 2004), the
Third Circuit requires a categorical approach for an aggravated felony unless the
statutory scheme requires a modified categorical approach, such asis where the
disjunctive phrasing of the statute invites inquiry into the specifics of the conviction. In
Stubbs v. Attorney General, 652 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2006), the Third Circuit reiterated the
record must support sexual contact with a child that isJ. a past act with a child.
Given the wide breadth of conduct encompassed within 18 U.S.C. Section
3508(a)(8), as the Board adopted in Matter of Rodriquez-Rodriquez, this Court is
persuaded that the respondent, convicted under the Pennsylvania statute at issue, has
necessarily engaged in an act within the definition of "sexual abuse of a minor" as
defined in the aggravated felony category in INA Section 101(a)(43)(A). While
respondent argues that he had no physical contact with the minor at issue, which the
Court has no reason to doubt, the term "sexually explicit conduct" which includes the
specific type of sexual acts absent in the present case, 18 U.S.C. Section 3508(a)(8),
also includes "other forms of sexual exploitation of children."
To this Court, at least, contacting the minor through electronic media with a
specific obscene intent through materials or performancesJ. falls within the ambit of
"child exploitation" and hence constitutes the sexual abuse of a minor and thus an
aggravated felony. Therefore, the following order is hereby entered:
A036-404-266
April 1, 2015
ORDER
The respondent is hereby ordered removed from the United States to Ecuador.
signature
A036-404-266
WALTER A. DURLING
Immigration Judge
April 1, 2015
/Isl/
Immigration Judge WALTER A. DURLING
A036-404-266
April 1, 2015