Today Is Friday, July 17, 2015

Today is Friday, July 17, 2015
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 82585 November 14, 1988
MAXIMO V. SOLIVEN, ANTONIO V. ROCES, FREDERICK K. AGCAOLI, and GODOFREDO L. MANZANAS,
petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35,
UNDERSECRETARY SILVESTRE BELLO III, of the Department of Justice, LUIS C. VICTOR, THE CITY FISCAL
OF MANILA and PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 82827 November 14, 1988
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court, at Manila, THE
HON. LUIS VICTOR, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SUPERINTENDENT OF THE
WESTERN POLICE DISTRICT, and THE MEMBERS OF THE PROCESS SERVING UNIT AT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
G.R. No. 83979 November 14, 1988.
LUIS D. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY CATALINO MACARAIG, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SEDFREY ORDOEZ,
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE SILVESTRE BELLO III, THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA JESUS F.
GUERRERO, and JUDGE RAMON P. MAKASIAR, Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of the Regional Trial Court,
at Manila, respondents.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for petitioners in G.R. No. 82585.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 82827 and 83979.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due
process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie
case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; (2) whether or not the
constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause; and (3) whether or
not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioners
through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.
Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary of Justice
denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining
the City Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Beltran was denied by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the
Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With these developments, petitioners'
contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the
preliminary investigation is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to
Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due
process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-affidavits before the
preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent be given the opportunity to
submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination nder oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the
1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently
convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself
of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable
cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court unanimously adopted Circular No. 12, setting down guidelines for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The procedure therein provided is reiterated and clarified in this resolution.
It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the
issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
cannot be sustained.
Anent the third issue, petitioner Beltran argues that "the reasons which necessitate presidential immunity from suit
impose a correlative disability to file suit." He contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by virtue of the President's
filing of her complaint-affidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under
the trial court's jurisdiction. This, continues Beltran, would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from
suit, as by testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
The rationale for the grant to the President of the privilege of immunity from suit is to assure the exercise of
Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that being the Chief Executive
of the Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
But this privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only by
the holder of the office; not by any other person in the President's behalf. Thus, an accused in a criminal case in
which the President is complainant cannot raise the presidential privilege as a defense to prevent the case from
proceeding against such accused.
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. Thus, if so
minded the President may shed the protection afforded by the privilege and submit to the court's jurisdiction. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is solely the President's prerogative. It is a decision that
cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person.
As regards the contention of petitioner Beltran that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged
character or the publication, the Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts and that such a defense is best left to the
trial court to appreciate after receiving the evidence of the parties.
As to petitioner Beltran's claim that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a "chilling effect" on press
freedom, the Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the point.
The petitions fail to establish that public respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as
to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
public respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order
to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the
Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur with the majority opinion insofar as it involves the three principal issues mentioned in its opening statement.
However, as to the more important issue on whether or not the prosecution of the libel case would produce a
"chilling effect" on press freedom, I beg to reserve my vote. I believe this is the more important issue in these
petitions and it should be resolved now rather that later.
Consistent with our decision in Salonga v. Cruz Pano (134 SCRA 438 [1985]), the Court should not hesitate to
quash a criminal prosecution in the interest of more enlightened and substantial justice where it is not alone the
criminal liability of an accused in a seemingly minor libel case which is involved but broader considerations of
governmental power versus a preferred freedom.
We have in these four petitions the unusual situation where the highest official of the Republic and one who enjoys
unprecedented public support asks for the prosecution of a newspaper columnist, the publisher and chairman of the
editorial board, the managing editor and the business manager in a not too indubitable a case for alleged libel.
I am fully in accord with an all out prosecution if the effect will be limited to punishing a newspaperman who, instead
of observing accuracy and fairness, engages in unwarranted personal attacks, irresponsible twisting of facts, of
malicious distortions of half-truths which tend to cause dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainant. However,
this case is not a simple prosecution for libel. We have as complainant a powerful and popular President who heads
the investigation and prosecution service and appoints members of appellate courts but who feels so terribly
maligned that she has taken the unorthodox step of going to court inspite of the invocations of freedom of the press
which would inevitably follow.
I believe that this Court should have acted on this issue now instead of leaving the matter to fiscals and defense
lawyers to argue before a trial judge.
There is always bound to be harassment inherent in any criminal prosecution. Where the harassment goes beyond
the usual difficulties encountered by any accused and results in an unwillingness of media to freely criticize
government or to question government handling of sensitive issues and public affairs, this Court and not a lower
tribunal should draw the demarcation line.
As early as March 8, 1918, the decision in United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that "(c)omplete liberty to
comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience." The Court pointed out that while defamation is not
authorized, criticism is to be expected and should be borne for the common good.
In People v. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887 [1922]), the Court stated:

Today Is Friday, July 17, 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Today Is Friday, July 17, 2015

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Today Is Friday, July 17, 2015

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Today is Friday, July 17, 2015

Republic of the Philippines

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

You might also like