Ikev2 Ipsec VPN Sequence Diagram
Ikev2 Ipsec VPN Sequence Diagram
Ikev2 Ipsec VPN Sequence Diagram
Responder
IKE performs mutual authentication between two parties and establishes an IKE security association (SA) that includes shared secret
information that can be used to efficiently establish SAs for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) or Authentication Header (AH) and a set of
cryptographic algorithms to be used by the SAs to protect the traffic that they carry.
An example of IKEv2 handshake and an IPSec tunnel transport is illustrated with the following sequence diagram. You can click on IKE
messages in the sequence diagram to see field level details.
The following sequence of Virtual Private Network (VPN) setup are covered:
(1) A ping triggers establishment of the IKEv2 security association. (2) An IPSec tunnel is setup with a Child Security Association setup
handshake. (3) The ping data gets transported over the IPSec tunnel.
This sequence diagram was generated with EventStudio System Designer (http://www.eventhelix.com/EventStudio/).
Configure IPSec VPN
The two endpoints of the VPN tunnel are configured in advance.
Configure Initiator VPN
Configure the VPN Tunnel
Addresses
Setup the IPSec policy
that defines the IP
address range and port
numbers for the IPSec
interaction
Configure Responder
VPN
Configure the VPN
Tunnel Addresses
Setup the IPSec policy
that defines the IP
address range and port
numbers for the IPSec
interaction
IKE SA Setup
This is the first exchange that establishes the IKE-SA and must complete before any
further exchanges can happen.
Four cryptographic algorithms are negotiated: an encryption algorithm, an integrity
protection algorithm, a Diffie-Hellman group, and a pseudo-random function (PRF). The
PRF is used for the construction of keying material for all of the cryptographic algorithms
used in both the IKE SA and the Child SAs.
Initiator
Responder
IKE_SA_INIT
ike
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Initiator IKE SPI,
SA: Encryption Algorithm (ENCR) = ENCR_3DES,
SA: Pseudo-random Function (PRF) = PRF_HMAC_MD5,
SA: Integrity Algorithm (INTEG) = AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96,
SA: Diffie-Hellman Group (D-H) SA = Alternate 1024-bit MODP group,
Key: DH Group # = Alternate 1024-bit MODP group key,
Nonce
Compare the Initiator's
cryptographic proposal with
available cryptographic
algorithms to make the final
selection.
Generate Responder IKE
SPI
IKE_SA_INIT
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IKE Security
Association
Initiator
IKE Security
Association
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Responder
IKE_AUTH
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IKE_AUTH
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Initiator IKE SPI,
Responder IKE SPI,
Authentication Method = Shared Key Message Integrity Code,
SA: Encryption Algorithm (ENCR) = ENCR _3DES,
SA: Integrity Algorithm (INTEG) = AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96,
SA: Protocol = ESP,
SA: SPI = Responder SPI,
TS Initiator: Type = TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE,
TS Initiator: Ports = 0 to 65535,
TS Initiator: Address Range = 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255,
TS Responder: Type = TS_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE,
TS Responder: Ports = 0 to 65535,
TS Responder: Address Range = 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255.255
Child Security
Association 1
ipsec
ipsec
ipsec
SPI = Responder SPI
ipsec
Initiator
IKE Security
Association
Child Security
Association 1
Responder
ipsec
ipsec
ipsec
ipsec
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INFORMATIONAL
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Initiator IKE SPI,
Responder IKE SPI
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Initiator
IKE Security
Association
Child Security
Association 1
Responder
The second pair of messages (IKE_AUTH) authenticate the previous messages, exchange
identities and certificates, and establish the first Child SA.
CREATE_CHILD_SA
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CREATE_CHILD_SA
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