Paderanga vs.

Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28 August 1995]

Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur
Facts: On 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended information as a
coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog
City of which Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6 October 1986
with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had initially indicted for multiple murder 8 accused
suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter
Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and
Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was
apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have
remained at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was
implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated 6 October 1988, he was charged as a coaccused therein. As Paderanga was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein,
Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989 but which he later retracted on 20 June 1990,
implicated Paderanga as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then,
upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of 7
July 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of
Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989,
Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information
dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to the
Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc
decision promulgated on 19 April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him.
The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for Paderanga's
apprehension but, before it could be served on him, Paderanga through counsel, filed on 28 October
1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on 5 November
1992. Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5 November
1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As Paderanga was then confined at the
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that
they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he
considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial
court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they
were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon Constitutional Law II, 2005

further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further
presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992, the trial court
admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, 6 November 1992,
Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear
before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court
hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days later on
26 November 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated
29 March 1993. On 1 October 1993, or more than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari.
The resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled on 24
November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for review before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail,
and whether the trial court properly inquired into the nature of the prosecutors evidence to determine
whether or not it is strong to deny or grant the application of bail, respectively.
Held: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically
placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance
which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof
he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an
arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case
of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga,
through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the
hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance
to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of
the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon
him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of
the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a
kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by
then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed
on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail
with the trial court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to

his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or
evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities
since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.
Where the trial court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the
application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of
duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of
his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to
the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from
there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail
application. No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to
the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March
1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The lower court exhausted all
means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution.
Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution
and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that Paderanga could be
provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the
present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL P. PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said
petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, 1 had
initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the
alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and
their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried
and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large
up to the present. 2

In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As
herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind
the massacre of the Bucag family. 3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per
his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a
resolution of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as
a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6,
1992. Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in
G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.

Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In
an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the
second amended information against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set
the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to
State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the
private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded
to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for
the prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to
"acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the
person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines
and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the
custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in
accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus
Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and
that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. 6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5,
1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following
day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then,
managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in
the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also
personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order
dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon
elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus
were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled on November
24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail,
he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further
noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail
was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was
doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded
an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due
process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez
etc., et al., 9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred

on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the
custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction
by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and bring him within the custody of the law."

Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such
strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution,
by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to
oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution
bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process.
Finally, petitioner points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent
court after an unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this
case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his
appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction
and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's
provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the
judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a
case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12

The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former
pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail,
without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and
compliance with the requirements therefor. 13 Thus, inFeliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et
al., 14 where the petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding
without surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the
amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced
that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.

As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained,
or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices
of bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is
available to "all persons" 15 where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the
condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16

On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. 17in this light, the ruling, vis-avis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., 18 should be explained.

In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an
"Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time
confined in a hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a
major vehicular mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered

as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the
required trial and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-partemotion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a
cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of
her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that
"she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she
has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court" In
rejecting her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgentex
parte motion for bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually
posting a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction
over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the
same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial
authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which
attended the filing of his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the
law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as
prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be
exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to
quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.

It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known
to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not
personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General
Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the
hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the
specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served
upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in
a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him
under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the
submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account
of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And,
as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court,
petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they were surrendering custody of
petitioner to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental
Chapter. 20 In other words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the
manner of the former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority
and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or
strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the
application therefore be denied.

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees
shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as
amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature 21 and which, to
repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of
innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since
after trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. 22

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being
the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule,
upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter
of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in
accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes
a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, 24 is
required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution,
this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum. 26

Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before
the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. 27 If
the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a
consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing, the
petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the
same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or
recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are
insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31

In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process
when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who
is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who
received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly,
the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of
any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound

discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable
time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the
collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the
basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through
radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on
the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was expressly
withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue of
this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana entered their
appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case. 33 Hence, on the strength of
said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office,
through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5,
1992.

Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with
the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of
the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed
Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor
opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound
discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of
the case, was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a
quosought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission by
Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the
motion as early as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The
one assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know
about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief
to relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to
admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we are
submitting to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:

Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo,

would you like to formally enter your appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in
effect, at least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered
by this particular motion for resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. 34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional
State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing"
the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting
(the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any
clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this
it did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing
for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the
prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it was stressed that where the trial court has
reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not
justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the
interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to
determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State Prosecutor, Department

of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the
Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection
to the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing
and from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting
the bail application.

No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the
trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of
March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As
summarized in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince
itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the
omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and
the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could
be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up
to the present, petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence
within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same
day that the it was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to
the day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to
muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the
motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact
that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is
beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable
period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution
and the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The
Solicitor General submits that the delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred eightyfour (184) days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which
characterized the prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then,
the certiorari proceeding was initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the
merits of the case had ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution
lawyers, including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the
special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the three
months, 38 the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of time that had expired
from the commission of the acts complained to annul the same. 39

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,

promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as
said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said
judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of
the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Venue was later transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
per Administrative Matter No. 87-2-244; Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5.
2 Rollo, CA-G.R. SP No. 32233, 5-6.
3 Ibid., id., 6.
4 Ibid., id., 7.
5 Ibid., id., 22.
6 Ibid., id., 23.
7 Ibid., id., 23-25; Rollo. 9-11.
8 Ibid., id., 26-30; Rollo, 7-8, 56-58.
9 G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633.
10 Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 38.
11 Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., supra, Fn. 9.
12 Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, etc., et al., L-35612-14, June 27,
1973, 51 SCRA 369, citing Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., L-14657, July 31,
1961, 2 SCRA888 .
13 Aguirre, et al. vs. Belmonte, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237
SCRA 778.
14 Supra, Fn- 12.
15 De la Camara vs. Enage, etc., L-32951-2; September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.
16 Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira, et al., 75 Phil. 634 (1945); Manigbas, et al. vs.
Luna, etc., et al., 98 Phil. 466 (1956) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., supra.
17 Dinapol vs. Baldado, etc., A.M. No. RTJ-92-898, August 5, 1993, 225 SCRA 110.
18 Supra, Fn. 9.
19 Section 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court.
20 Rollo, 101-102.
21 People vs. Donato, etc., et al., G.R. No. 79269, June 5, 1991, 198 SCRA 130.

22 De la Camera vs. Enage, etc., supra, Fn. 15.

23 Sec. 7, Rule 114, as amended; see also Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., A.M. Mo. RTJ93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206.
24 Go vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 106087, April 7, 1993, 221 SCRA 397;
Aurilio, Jr. vs. Francisco, etc., et al., A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097, August 12, 1994, 235
SCRA 283.
25 Borinaga vs. Tamin, etc., supra, Fn. 23.
26 Section 8, Rule 114, as Amended.
27 People vs. Dacudao, etc., et al., G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA
489; Lardizabal vs. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA
640.
28 People vs. San Diego, etc., et al., L-29676, December 24, 1968, SCRA 523;
Carpio, etc., et al. vs. Malalang, etc., et al., G.R. No. 78162, April 19, 1991, 196
SCRA 41.
29 Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55 (1946); Beltran vs. Diaz, et al., 77 Phil 484
(1946).
30 People vs. Casingal, et al., G. R. No. 87173, March 29, 1995.
31 Baylon, etc. vs. Sison, A.M. No. 92-7-360-0, April 6, 1995.
32 Rollo, 69, 106, 115-116; Annex "A," Petitioners Reply.
33 Ibid., 105.
34 Ibid., 75-77.
35 Supra, Fn. 16.
36 Supra, Fn. 31.
37 A.M. No. RTJ-95-1286, March 2, 1995.
38 Caramol vs. National Labor Relation Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102973, August
24, 1993, 225 SCRA 582, citing Philec Worker's Union vs. Young, G.R. No. 101734,
January 22, 1992, Minute Resolution, First Division; Catalina Bermejo vs. National
Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 102713, January 20, 1992, Minute
Resolution, First Division.
39 Fernandez vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 106090,
February 28, 1994, 230 SCRA 460.