EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-59234. September 30, 1982.]

TAXICAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA, INC., FELICISIMO
CABIGAO and ACE TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION , petitioners,
vs. THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION and THE DIRECTOR OF
THE BUREAU OF LAND TRANSPORTATION, respondents.

Mariano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Petitioners who are taxicab operators assail the constitutionality of Memorandum
Circular No. 77-42 issued by the Board of Transportation (BOT) providing for the
phasing out and replacement of old and dilapidated taxicabs; as well as
Implementing Circular No. 52 issued pursuant thereto by the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) instructing personnel of the BLT within the National Capital
Region to implement the said BOT Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out
of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners allege that the questioned Circulars did not aord them procedural and
substantive due process, equal protection of the law, and protection against
arbitrary and unreasonable classication and standard. Among others, they question
the issuance of the Circulars without rst calling them to a conference or requiring
them to submit position papers or other documents enforceability thereof only in
Metro Manila; and their being applicable only to taxicabs and not to other
transportation services.
The Supreme Court held that there was no denial of due process since calling the
taxicab operators or persons who may be aected by the questioned Circulars to a
conference or requiring them to submit position papers or other documents is only
one of the options open to the BOT which is given wide discretionary authority
under P.D. No. 101; and xing a six- year ceiling for a car to be operated as taxicab
is a reasonable standard adopted to apply to all vehicles aected uniformly, fairly,
and justly. The Court also ruled that neither has the equal protection clause been
violated by initially enforcing the Circulars only in Metro Manila since it is of
common knowledge that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are
subjected to heavier trac pressure and more constant use, thus making for a
substantial distinction; nor by non-application of the Circulars to other
transportation services because the said Circulars satisfy the criteria required under
the equal protection clause, which is the uniform operation by legal means so that
all persons under identical or similar circumstances would be accorded the same
treatment both in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed.

SYLLABUS
1.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LAWS; MEMORANDUM
CIRCULAR PROVIDING FOR PHASING-OUT AND REPLACEMENT OF OLD AND
DILAPIDATED TAXICABS; ISSUANCE NOT VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS; CALLING
TAXICAB OPERATORS TO CONFERENCE OR REQUIRING SUBMISSION OF POSITION
PAPERS OR DOCUMENTS, ONLY ONE OF OPTIONS GIVEN TO BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION IN FORMULATING POLICIES. It is clear from the provision of
Section 2 of P.D. 101 aforequoted, that the leeway accorded the Board gives it a
wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the formulation
of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should rst call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from
operators or persons who maybe aected, this being only one of the options open to
the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority. Petitioners cannot justiably
claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural due process. Neither can
they state with certainty that public respondents had not availed of other sources of
inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars. Operators of public conveyances are
not the only primary sources of the data and information that may be desired by the
BOT.
2.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PUBLIC HEARING, NOT A DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither
violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and
Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307(1972); "Previous notice and hearing as elements of
due process, are constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property
rights, as well as of liberty, when its limitations or loss takes place in consequence of
a judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, generally dependent upon a past act or even
which has to be established or ascertained. It is nor essential to the validity of
general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or
persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise.''
3.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SIX-YEAR CEILING FOR CARS TO OPERATE AS TAXICAB,
MEETS DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT FOR SUPPLYING REASONABLE STANDARD.
Petitioners farther take the position that xing the ceiling at six (6) years is
arbitrary and oppressive because of roadworthiness of taxicabs depends upon their
kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore, their
actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of
registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it
can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and
evens graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all
vehicles aected uniformly, fairly , and justly, The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have
fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained.
4.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ISSUANCE NOT VIOLATIVE OF EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;
ENFORCING CIRCULAR INITIALLY IN METRO MANILA ONLY. At the outset it
should be pointed out that implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned

in Memorandum Circular No. 77-42. The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular
initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other
places, are subjected to heavier trac pressure and more constant use. This is of
common knowledge. Considering that trac conditions are not the same in every
city, a substantial distinction exist so that infringement of the equal protection
clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
5.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. As enunciated
in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the overriding
consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the dangers posed
by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police power, can
prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and
welfare of society. (Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 48 [1970]. It may also regulate property
rights. (Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City, 60 SCRA 267 [1974]. In the language of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". (The Constitution
of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.)
6.
ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NONE APPLICATION TO OTHER TRANSPORTATION SERVICES.
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things
or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classication of the object or
subject of the law provided classication is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real dierences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12;
Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 [1972]; Anucension vs. National Labor
Union, 80 SCRA 350 [1977] citing Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59
SCRA 54 [1974] & Basa vs. Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros
Trabajadores de Filipinas, 61 SCRA 93 [1974]). What is required under the equal
protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in
privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed. (Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37
SCRA 420 [1971]). The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
7.
ID., ID., DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY REQUIRES CLEAR AND
CATEGORICAL INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHT. Evident then is the conclusion that the
questioned Circulars do not suer from any constitutional inrmity. To declare a law
unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear, categorical
and undeniable.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J :
p

This Petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order" led by the Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila,
Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace Transportation, seeks to declare the nullity of
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, dated October 10, 1977, of the Board of
Transportation, and Memorandum Circular No. 52, dated August 16, 1980, of the
Bureau of Land Transportation.
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation
composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certicates of Public
Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to any other place in
Luzon accessible to vehicular trac. Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and
Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of TOMMI, each being an operator and
grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:

Transportation

(BOT)

issued

SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of

Old and Dilapidated Taxis
"WHEREAS, it is the policy of the government to insure that only safe and
comfortable units are used as public conveyances;
WHEREAS, the riding public, particularly in Metro-Manila, has, time and again,
complained against, and condemned, the continued operation of old and
dilapidated taxis;
WHEREAS, in order that the commuting public may be assured of comfort,
convenience, and safety, a program of phasing out of old and dilapidated
taxis should be adopted;
WHEREAS, after studies and inquiries made by the Board of Transportation,
the latter believes that in six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only
covered the cost of his taxis, but has made reasonable prot for his
investments;
NOW, THEREFORE, pursuant to this policy, the Board hereby declares that
no car beyond six years shall be operated as taxi, and in implementation of
the same hereby promulgates the following rules and regulations:
1.
As of December 31, 1977, all taxis of Model 1971 and earlier are
ordered withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be
registered and operated as taxis. In the registration of cards for 1978, only
taxis of Model 1972 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed
for operation;
2.
As of December 31, 1978, all taxis of Model 1972 are ordered
withdrawn from public service and thereafter may no longer be registered

and operated as taxis. In the registration of cars for 1979, only taxis of
Model 1973 and later shall be accepted for registration and allowed for
operation; and every year thereafter, there shall be a six-year lifetime of taxi,
to wit:
1980 Model 1974
1981 Model 1975, etc.
All taxis of earlier models than those provided above are hereby ordered
withdrawn from public service as of the last day of registration of each
particular year and their respective plates shall be surrendered directly to
the Board of Transportation for subsequent turnover to the Land
Transportation Commission.
For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules herein
shall immediately be eective in Metro-Manila. Its implementation outside
Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been implemented
in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by the Board." 1

Pursuant to the above BOT circular, respondent Director of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular No. 52, dated August 15, 1980,
instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all
within the National Capitol Region, to implement said Circular, and formulating a
schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as
public conveyances. To quote said Circular:
"Pursuant to BOT Memo Circular No. 77-42, taxi units with year
models over six (6) years old are now banned from operating as public
utilities in Metro Manila. As such the units involved should be considered
as automatically dropped as public utilities and, therefore, do not require
any further dropping order from the BOT.
"Henceforth, taxi units within the National Capitol Region having
year models over 6 years old shall be refused registration. The following
schedule of phase-out is herewith prescribed for the guidance of all
concerned:
"Year Model
1974
1975
1976
1977
etc.

Automatic Phase-Out Year

1980
1981
1982
1983
etc.

Strict compliance here is desired." 2

In accordance therewith, cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year

1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of model 1973, in 1980; and those of
model 1974, in 1981.

On January 27, 1981, petitioners led a Petition with the BOT, docketed as Case No.
80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its implementation; to allow the
registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974,
as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time
of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
On February 16, 1981, petitioners led before the BOT a "Manifestation and Urgent
Motion", praying for an early hearing of their petition. The case was heard on
February 20, 1981. Petitioners presented testimonial and documentary evidence,
oered the same, and manifested that they would submit additional documentary
proofs. Said proofs were submitted on March 27, 1981 attached to petitioners'
pleading entitled, "Manifestation, Presentation of Additional Evidence and
Submission of the Case for Resolution." 3
On November 28, 1981, petitioners led before the same Board a "Manifestation
and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition" praying that the case be
resolved or decided not later than December 10, 1981 to enable them, in case of
denial, to avail of whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection
of their interests before their 1975 model cabs are phased-out on January 1, 1982.
Petitioners, through its President, allegedly made personal follow-ups of the case,
but was later informed that the records of the case could not be located.
On December 29, 1981, the present Petition was instituted wherein the following
queries were posed for consideration by this Court:
"A.
Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars
in accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners' constitutional right to procedural due process?
B.
Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to.
(1)

Equal protection of the law;

(2)

Substantive due process; and

(3)
Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classication and
standard?

On Procedural and Substantive Due Process:

Presidential Decree No. 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power
"4.
To x just and reasonable standards, classication, regulations,
practices, measurements, or service to be furnished, imposed, observed,
and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles."

Section 2 of said Decree provides procedural guidelines for said agency to follow in

the exercise of its powers:

"Sec. 2.
Exercise of powers. In the exercise of the powers granted in
the preceding section, the Board shall proceed promptly along the method
of legislative inquiry.
Apart from its own investigation and studies, the Board, in its discretion,
may require the cooperation and assistance of the Bureau of
Transportation, the Philippine Constabulary, particularly the Highway Patrol
Group, the support agencies within the Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communications, or any other government oce or
agency that may be able to furnish useful information or data in the
formulation of the Board of any policy, plan or program in the
implementation of this Decree.
The Board may also call conferences, require the submission of position
papers or other documents, information, or data by operators or other
persons that may be aected by the implementation of this Decree, or
employ any other suitable means of inquiry. "

In support of their submission that they were denied procedural due process,
petitioners contend that they were not called upon to submit their position papers,
nor were they ever summoned to attend any conference prior to the issuance of the
questioned BOT Circular.
It is clear from the provision aforequoted, however, that the leeway accorded the
Board gives it a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in
the formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should
rst call a conference or require the submission of position papers or other
documents from operators or persons who may be aected, this being only one of
the options open to the Board, which is given wide discretionary authority.
Petitioners cannot justiably claim, therefore, that they were deprived of procedural
due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public respondents had not
availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars Operators
of public conveyances are not the only primary sources of the data and information
that may be desired by the BOT.
Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the Circulars is neither
violative of procedural due process. As held in Central Bank vs. Hon. Cloribel and
Banco Filipino, 44 SCRA 307 (1972):
"Previous notice and hearing as elements of due process, are
constitutionally required for the protection of life or vested property rights,
as well as of liberty, when its limitation or loss takes place in consequence of
a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding, generally dependent upon a past act or
event which has to be established or ascertained. It is not essential to the
validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct
of a class or persons or enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise."
(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners further take the position that xing the ceiling at six (6) years is
arbitrary and oppressive because the road-worthiness of taxicabs depends upon
their kind of maintenance and the use to which they are subjected, and, therefore,
their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at the time of
registration. As public respondents contend, however, it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it
can open the door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even
graft and corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles
aected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable
standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis have fully
depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They
are also generally dilapidated and no longer t for safe and comfortable service to
the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24
hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that standard of
reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due process has
been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law :

Petitioners alleged that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is
directed solely towards the taxi industry. At the outset it should be pointed out that
implementation outside Metro Manila is also envisioned in Memorandum Circular
No. 77-42. To repeat the pertinent portion:
"For an orderly implementation of this Memorandum Circular, the rules
herein shall immediately be eective in Metro Manila. Its implementation
outside Metro Manila shall be carried out only after the project has been
implemented in Metro Manila and only after the date has been determined by
the Board." 4

In fact, it is the understanding of the Court that implementation of the Circulars in

Cebu City is already being eected, with the BOT in the process of conducting
studies regarding the operation of taxicabs in other cities.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that
taxicabs in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier
trac pressure and more constant use. Thus is of common knowledge. Considering
that trac conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists
so that infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully
claimed.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police
power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,

safety and welfare of society. 5 It may also regulate property rights. 6 In the
language of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if
thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded". 7
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things
or persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classication of the object or
subject of the law provided classication is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real dierences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. 8 What is required under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar
circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed. 9 The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suer from any
constitutional inrmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of
constitutional right must be clear, categorical and undeniable. 10
WHEREFORE, the Writs prayed for are denied and this Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J ., Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
Plana, Escolin, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Teehankee and Aquino, JJ., in the result.
Footnotes
1.

Annex "A", pp. 26-27, Rollo.

2.

Annex "B", p. 28, ibid.

3.

Annex "D", pp. 38-53, ibid.

4.

p. 19, ibid.

5.

Edu vs. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481 (1970).

6.

Samson vs. Mayor of Bacolod City. 60 SCRA 267 (1974).

7.

The Constitution of the Philippines, Second Edition, p. 548.

8.

People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56; People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12; Central Bank vs. Cloribel
44 SCRA 307 (1972); Anucension vs. National Labor Union, 80 SCRA 350 (1977)
citing Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 (1974) & Basa vs.
Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de Filipinas. 61
SCRA 93 (1974).

9.
10.

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971).

Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1868).