TITLE TWELVE: Crimes Against Civil Status of Persons

Manuel vs. People (G.R. No. 165842, November 29, 2005)

Facts:
This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, convicting
the petitioner for the crime of bigamy. Eduardo P. Manuel, herein petitioner, was first
married to Rubylus Gaa on July 18, 1975, who, according to the former, was
charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned and was never seen again by
him after his last visit. Manuel met Tina B. Gandalera in January 1996 when the
latter was only 21 years old. Three months after their meeting, the two got married
through a civil wedding in Baguio City without Gandaleras knowledge of Manuels
first marriage. In the course of their marriage, things got rocky and Gandalera
learned that Eduardo was in fact already married when he married him. She then
filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo Manuel. The latters defense being
that his declaration of single in his marriage contract with Gandalera was done
because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid and that he did
not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage
before marrying Tina. The Regional Trial Court ruled against him sentencing him of
imprisonment of from 6 years and 10 months to ten years, and an amount 0f P200,
000.00 for moral damages.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA where he alleged that he was not
criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the private complainant, he
did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. The CA ruled against the
petitioner but with modification on the RTCs decision. Imprisonment was from 2
years, months and 1 day to ten years. Pecuniary reward for moral damages was
affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
when it ruled that petitioners wife cannot be legally presumed dead under Article
390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial declaration of presumptive death as
provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error of law
when it affirmed the award of Php200,000.00 as moral damages as it has no basis
in fact and in law.
Held:
1. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The petitioner is presumed to have
acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a

prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent.
However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to
know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after
securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid
being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce
evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. Such judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who
contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later charged
with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
The court rules against the petitioner.
2. The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit
before, during and after his marriage with the private complainant were willful,
deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. The Court thus declares
that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert
the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare
of society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the
petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming moral damages. Considering the
attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for
moral damages to be just and reasonable.
Diego vs. Castillo (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1673, August 11, 2004)
Facts:

January 9, 1965: Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio,

Jr., both Filipinos, solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City.

February 15, 1978: Jorge filed a Decree of Divorce in Texas.

June 4, 1987: Crescencia Escoto using the name Lucena Escoto married
Manuel P. Diego before the Rev. Fr. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City.

The sister of Manuel P. Diego filed a criminal case of bigamy against Escoto

RTC: Acquittal since state failed to prove guilt beyond whisper of a doubt and
gave credence to the defense of the accused that she acted without any malicious
intent for believing in good faith that her marriage was already annulled by a
foreign judgment

An administrative case is filed against Judge Silverio Q. Castillo for Knowingly

rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal Code
Issue:

W/N Castillo should be liable against Article 204[7] of the Revised Penal
Code.
Held:
NO. Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is FINED P10,000 with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely

The law requires that

(a) the offender is a judge;
(b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision;
(c) the judgment is unjust;
(d) he knew that said judgment is unjust

even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, he still cannot be

administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose

As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity
are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous.

Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations

are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find
refuge.

error committed by respondent Judge being gross and patent, the same
constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature sufficient to warrant disciplinary action
People vs. Abunado (G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004)
Facts:
Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Bias on December 24, 1955. In 1966,
Salvador separated from Zenaida. On September 18, 1967, Salvador married
Narcisa Arcea. Several years later in 1988, Narcisa left the country to work in
Japan. On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida.
When Narcisa returned in 1992, she discovered that Salvador left their conjugal
home and now has an extramarital affair with a certain Fe Corazon Palto. Narcisa
also learned of Salvadors marriage to Zenaida in 1989. On January 19, 1995,
Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. That same year, on May 18,
1995, Narcisa filed a complaint for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador,
however, claimed he cannot be liable for bigamy since Narcisa has consented to his
marriage with Zenaida. Salvador moreover, argued that his petition for annulment

was a prejudicial question hence, proceedings in the bigamy case should first be
suspended to give way to the civil case for annulment.
Issue:
Whether or not the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial to the case.
Held:
Void marriages, as a rule, are ipso facto void. As an exception, however,
Article 40 of the Family Code considers a void marriage valid for purposes
remarriage until a judicial declaration of nullity is obtained before contracting a
subsequent marriage.
Under Article 40 of the family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous
marriage that is void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes
other than remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of
nullity. As the Court held in Cario v. Cario [226 SCRA 572]:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
Cario, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herselg, contradicts the
statement in her present ponencia that under the law, a marriage, even one which
is void or voidable shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. I believe the ruling in Cario is correct and should not be disturbed. As
Justice Jose C. Vitug explained in his recent textbook on Civil law (Volume I): The
phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like
void contracts, are inexistent for the very beginning. It is only by way of exception
that the family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage before a subsequent marriage is contracted.
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void
without need of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception
under existing law is Article 40 of the Family Code where marriage void ab initio is
deemed valid for purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration
of nullity before one can contract a subsequent marriage. Article 40 of the Family
Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage suffers from nullity

while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a judicial
declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage.
Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does not
suffer from any defect while the second is void.
Morigo vs. People (G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004)

Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts
for a while but after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters,
they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada
for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony.
Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment
since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio.
Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Issue:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage
with Barrete before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
Held:
Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no
actual marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer
instead they just merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need
to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second
marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.
Mercado vs. Tan (G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000)
Facts:
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment,
as follows:
"From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused
Dr. Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27,

1991 before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a
Marriage Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said
document, the status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the
time of the celebration of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a
married man, having been in lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage
ceremony solemnized on April 10, 1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV,
Cebu City per Marriage Certificate issued in connection therewith, which matrimony
was further blessed by Rev. Father Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites
at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu City. In the same manner, the civil marriage
between accused and complainant was confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29,
1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas, Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City.
Both marriages were consummated when out of the first consortium, Ma. Thelma
Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent Paul, Jr. was sired by accused
with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
"On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant
through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually resulted
[in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said accused, Dr.
Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated January 22, 1993.
"On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and in a Decision
dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado and Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva was declared null and void.
Issues:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to
convict petitioner.
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the
Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable
doubt.
Held:
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision "plainly makes a
subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first
spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annulable marriages."
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the
1950 Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family

Code, a new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the

previous marriage, as follows:
"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void."
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring
such marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the
earlier ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code
Revision Commitee has observed:
"[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial
declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the second
marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143 SCRA 499, Vda.
De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision changes the old rule that where
a marriage is illegal and void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary
to establish its validity (People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033)."
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been
cast aside by Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary
before one can contract a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that
one may be charged with and convicted of bigamy.
Garcia vs. CA (G.R. No. 119063 January 27, 1997)
Facts:
On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the (Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent
Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, Violation of C.A. No. 142,
as amended by R.A. No. 6085, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his
letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the
petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. After
appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of (Quezon City an information, dated 15 November
1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy allegedly committed as follows:
That on or before the 2nd day of February, 1957, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
previously united in lawful marriage with REYNALDO QUIROCA, and without the said
marriage having been dissolved, (or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings), did then

and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with JOSE
G. GARCIA, which marriage has [sic] discovered in 1989, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial
court's order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on
prescription.
Held:
Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several
trips abroad as enumerated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and
cites the second paragraph of Article 91 of the RPC, viz.: "the term of prescription
shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." We agree
with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence"
contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private
respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the
petitioner discovered the offense and. even if the aggregate number of days of
these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the
challenged decision of 13 February 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
14324 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.