EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 178831-32. April 1, 2009.]

JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NAPOLEON N.
CAMERO and RENALD F. VILLANDO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 179120. April 1, 2009.]
LOUIS C. BIRAOGO, petitioner, vs. HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines, and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 179132-33. April 1, 2009.]
OLIVIA P. PARAS, petitioner, vs. HON. PROSPERO NOGRALES, in his capacity as Speaker of
the House of Representatives; HON. ROBERTO NAZARENO, in his capacity as Secretary
General of the House of Representatives; HON. RHODORA SEVILLA, in her capacity as
Deputy Secretary General for Finance of the House of Representatives; THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG, respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 179240-41. April 1, 2009.]
RENALD F. VILLANDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOCELYN SY
LIMKAICHONG, respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J p:
Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest
the Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction. DACTSH
At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolution 1 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying
Jocelyn D. Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the
First District of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution 2 dated June 29, 2007,
affirming her disqualification; and (3) the COMELEC En Banc Resolution 3 dated August 16,
2007, resolving that all pending incidents relating to her qualifications should now be
determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). 2009jur
The facts are uncontroverted. On March 26, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC her
Certificate of Candidacy 4 (COC) for the position of Representative of the First District of
Negros Oriental. TaDCEc
In the following weeks, two (2) petitions for her disqualification were instituted before the
COMELEC by concerned citizens coming from her locality. On April 4, 2007, Napoleon
Camero, a registered voter of La Libertad, Negros Oriental, filed the petition for her
disqualification on the ground that she lacked the citizenship requirement of a Member of
the House of Representatives. The petition, which was docketed as SPA No. (PES) A07-006, 5
alleged that she is not a natural-born Filipino because her parents were Chinese citizens at
the time of her birth. On April 11, 2007, Renald F. Villando, also a registered voter of the
same locality, filed the second petition on the same ground of citizenship, docketed as SPA
(PES) No. A07-007. 6 He claimed that when Limkaichong was born, her parents were still

Chinese citizens as the proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never
attained finality due to procedural and substantial defects. Both petitions prayed for the
cancellation of Limkaichong's COC and for the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list
of qualified candidates for the Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
DTcASE
In her separate Answers 7 to the petitions, Limkaichong claimed that she is a natural-born
Filipino since she was born to a naturalized Filipino father and a natural-born Filipino mother,
who had reacquired her status as such due to her husband's naturalization. Thus, at the time
of her birth on November 9, 1959, nineteen (19) days had already passed after her father
took his Oath of Allegiance on October 21, 1959 and after he was issued a Certificate of
Naturalization on the same day. She contended that the COMELEC should dismiss the
petitions outright for lack of cause of action. Citing Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 8
she averred that a petition filed before an election, questioning the qualification of a
candidate, should be based on Section 78, 9 in relation to Section 74 10 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), 11 and not under Sections 68 12 and 74 thereof in relation to Section
1, 13 Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 14 and Section 5, 15 paragraph C (3.a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7800. 16 She also contended that the petitions were dismissible on
the ground that they were in the nature of a collateral attack on her and her father's
citizenships, in contravention of the well-established rule that attack on one's citizenship
may only be made through a direct action for its nullity. EcHTCD
The COMELEC consolidated the two (2) petitions and re-docketed them as SPA Nos. 07-247
17 and 07-248, 18 entitled IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO DISQUALIFY JOCELYN SY
LIMKAICHONG FROM HER CANDIDACY AS FIRST DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL (herein referred to as the disqualification cases), which remained pending on May
14, 2007, when the National and Local Elections were conducted.
After the casting, counting and canvassing of votes in the said elections, Limkaichong
emerged as the winner with 65,708 votes 19 or by a margin of 7,746 votes over another
congressional candidate, Olivia Paras 20 (Paras), who obtained 57,962.
On May 15, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene
and to Suspend the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong as Winning Candidate of the
First District of Negros Oriental. 21 IaTSED
In a Joint Resolution 22 dated May 17, 2007, the COMELEC Second Division granted the
petitions in the disqualification cases, disqualified Limkaichong as a candidate for
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental, directed the Provincial Supervisor of
the COMELEC to strike out her name from the list of eligible candidates, and for the
Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBOC) to suspend her proclamation. In disposing the cases,
the COMELEC Second Division made the following ratiocination:
On the substantial issue of whether respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is disqualified to run
for the congressional seat of the First District of Negros Oriental on the ground that she is
not a natural-born Filipino, we hold that she is so disqualified.
Petitioners have successfully discharged their burden of proof and has convincingly shown
with pieces of documentary evidence that Julio Ong Sy, father of herein respondent Jocelyn
Sy-Limkaichong, failed to acquire Filipino citizenship in the naturalization proceedings which
he underwent for the said purpose. ISCHET
An examination of the records of Special Case No. 1043 would reveal that the Office of the
Solicitor General was deprived of its participation in all the stages of the proceedings
therein, as required under Commonwealth Act No. 473 or the Revised Naturalization Law and
Republic Act No. 530, An Act Making Additional Provisions for Naturalization.

xxx

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The documents presented by petitioners showed that the OSG was not furnished copies of
two material orders of the trial court in the said proceedings. One was the July 9, 1957 Order
granting his petition for naturalization and the other was the September 21, 1959 Order
declaring Julio Ong Sy as a Filipino citizen.
Moreover, from a perusal of the same page 171 of the OSG logbook, we have determined
that the OSG did not receive a notice for the hearing conducted by the trial court on July 9,
1959, prior to its issuance of the September 12, 1959 Order declaring Julio Ong Sy as a
Filipino citizen. cCSHET
As correctly pointed out by petitioners, this was fatal to the naturalization proceedings of
Julio Ong Sy, and prevented the same from gaining finality. The leading case in the matter is
Republic v. Hon. Gabriel V. Valero, 136 SCRA 617 (May 31, 1985), wherein the Supreme Court
declared:
And as though that was not enough, the hearing prior to the oathtaking of respondent Tan
was conducted without the required notice to the Solicitor General. It is true, as it appeared
later, that Fiscal Veluz, Jr. was authorized by the Solicitor General to represent the
Government in the hearing of the application for naturalization. That authority, however,
does not extend to Fiscal [Veluz's] right to appear for the State in the hearing preparatory to
the oathtaking. Private respondent Tan was therefore under legal obligation to serve copy of
his motion to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen upon the Solicitor
General which was not done.
Respondent argues that upon his taking of the Oath of Allegiance, Julio Ong Sy became a
Filipino citizen for all intents and purposes, with all the rights appurtenant thereto. cICHTD
This argument does not hold water, as was held by the Supreme Court in the same case of
Republic v. Valero, supra:
That private respondent Tan had already taken his oath of allegiance does not in any way
legalize the proceedings relative thereto which is pregnant with legal infirmities.
Compounding these irregularities is the fact that Tan was allowed to take his oath even
before the expiration of the thirty (30)-day period within which an appeal may be made thus
making the said oath not only highly improper but also illegal.
In the same case, the Supreme Court added:
To sustain the same would be to sanction a monstrosity known as citizenship by estoppel.
The grant of naturalization under such circumstances is illegal and cancellation thereof may
be had at any time. Neither estoppel nor res judicata may be set up as a bar from instituting
the necessary proceedings to nullify the certificate of naturalization so issued. cACEaI
Another glaring defect in the said proceedings was the fact that Julio Ong Sy took his Oath of
Allegiance on October 21, 1959, which was exactly thirty (30) days after his declaration as a
naturalized Filipino.
Even granting that the OSG was notified of the September 21, 1959 Order, this was still one
day short of the reglementary period required under Sections 11 and 12 of C.A. No. 473,
above-cited.
The thirty-day reglementary period is so required under the law so that the OSG could make
known his objections and to appeal from the order of the trial court declaring the petitioner a
naturalized Filipino citizen. This is also the reason why a copy of the petitioner's motion to
take his oath of allegiance has to be furnished to the OSG.

The respondent insists that naturalization proceedings are in rem and are binding on the
whole world. HEDaTA
She would have been correct had all the necessary parties to the case been informed of the
same. The OSG, being the counsel for the government, has to participate in all the
proceedings so that it could be bound by what has transpired therein. Lacking the
participation of this indispensable party to the same, the proceedings are null and void and,
hence, no rights could arise therefrom.
From all the foregoing, therefore, it could be seen that Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Filipino
citizenship through the naturalization proceedings in Special Case No. 1043. Thus, he was
only able to transmit to his offspring, Chinese citizenship.
Respondent Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong being the daughter of Julio Ong Sy, and having been
born on November 9, 1959, under the 1935 Philippine Constitution, is a Chinese national,
and is disqualified to run as First District Representative of Negros Oriental.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are GRANTED and Jocelyn D. Sy-Limkaichong is declared as
DISQUALIFIED from her candidacy for Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental.
SCEDAI
The Provincial Supervisor of the Commission on Elections of Negros Oriental is hereby
directed to strike out the name JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG from the list of eligible candidates
for the said position, and the concerned Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to hold
and/or suspend the proclamation of JOCELYN SY-LIMKAICHONG as winning candidate, if any,
until this decision has become final.
SO ORDERED. 23
The PBOC received the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division on the evening of
May 17, 2007, and accordingly suspended the proclamation of Limkaichong. 24
The following day, or on May 18, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 8062 25
adopting the policy-guidelines of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates
with pending disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong filed with the COMELEC a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Joint Resolution of May 17, 2007 and Urgent Motion to Lift the Order Suspending
Proclamation. 26 TcIHDa
On May 22, 2007, Limkaichong filed another motion for the lifting of the directive
suspending her proclamation, insisting that she should be proclaimed as the winner in the
congressional race pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 8062. 27 On same date, Villando,
one of the petitioners in the disqualification cases, filed an Urgent Manifestation Clarifying
COMELEC Resolution No. 8062 with Motion, 28 praying that the COMELEC should not lift the
suspension of Limkaichong's proclamation.
On May 25, 2007, the PBOC, in compliance with COMELEC Resolution No. 8062, reconvened
and proclaimed Limkaichong as the duly elected Member of the House of Representatives for
the First District of Negros Oriental. 29
Thereafter, or on May 30, 2007, Paras filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Nullify and/or
Annul the Proclamation of Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong as First District Representative of Negros
Oriental in relation to the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, 30
stating, among others, that Limkaichong's proclamation violated the earlier order of the
COMELEC Second Division suspending her proclamation. The petition, docketed as SPC No.

07-211, was dismissed by the COMELEC First Division, 31 ratiocinating that the
disqualification cases were not yet final when Limkaichong was proclaimed. Accordingly, her
proclamation which was valid or legal, effectively divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
over the cases. The COMELEC First Division explained its ruling in this wise: DHSaCA
The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that
there shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As the disqualification
cases involving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration by the en banc, the
underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the Resolution: to respect the will of the
Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the winning congressional
candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)
Dissatisfied, Paras moved for the reconsideration of the above Resolution. 32
Meanwhile, in a Resolution 33 dated June 29, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc, in an equally
divided vote of 3:3, denied Limkaichong's motion for reconsideration of the Joint Resolution
of the COMELEC Second Division in the disqualification cases. The pertinent portions of the
Resolution denying her motion reads: aESICD
Anent the issue of jurisdiction, We rule that the Commission has jurisdiction to rule on
Respondent Limkaichong's Motion for Reconsideration notwithstanding her proclamation as
it is only this Commission, and not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET),
which has jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by
a division or en banc. As stated by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Codilla v. De
Venecia, G.R. No. 150605, December 10, 2002, respondent herself seasonably challenged
the validity of the resolution of the Second Division in her motion for reconsideration. Hence,
the issue of respondent's disqualification was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Comelec En Banc to resolve, and HRET cannot assume jurisdiction on the matter, to wit:
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the petitioner in
his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Comelec En Banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.
cASTED
In Puzon v. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has
been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction
over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could not have
been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC
pronouncements themselves." This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review
resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
Finally, in disposing the Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for
Reconsideration filed by intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the
winning candidate for First District Representative, suffice it to say that in the same case of
Codilla v. De Venecia, supra, the Supreme Court held, thus: SECIcT
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine
that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the people's choice is
the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect.
When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving him the highest

number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his
place. In Domino v. COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz.:
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically
assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first
among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate,
the conditions would have substantially changed. aIcDCT
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The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election
fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to
the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of
the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors
have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and
repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the
electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect
officials of their choice. 2009jur
All told, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of this Commission (Second
Division) in its Joint Resolution promulgated on May 17, 2007. CTHaSD
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration of Respondent
Jocelyn Sy-Limkaichong is hereby DENIED.
The Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with Partial Motion for Reconsideration filed
by Intervenor Olivia P. Paras praying that she be proclaimed as the winning candidate for the
First District Representative of Negros Oriental is hereby denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 34
On July 3, 2007, Limkaichong filed in the disqualification cases against her a Manifestation
and Motion for Clarification and/or To Declare the Petitions as Dismissed in Accordance with
Section 6, Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 35 She contended that, with her
proclamation, her having taken her oath of office and her assumption of the position, the
COMELEC was divested of jurisdiction to hear the disqualification cases. She further
contended that, following Section 6, 36 Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the
disqualification cases would have to be reheard, and if on rehearing, no decision would be
reached, the action or proceedings should be dismissed, because the COMELEC En Banc was
equally divided in opinion when it resolved her motion for reconsideration. EScIAa
On an even date, Paras wrote the House of Representatives informing it of the COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 upholding the Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division dated May 17, 2007, which disqualified Limkaichong as a congressional candidate.
37
In the interim, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Jose de Venecia, Jr. (De
Venecia) allowed Limkaichong to officially assume the office as a Member of the House of
Representatives on July 23, 2007, as shown in the Journal of the House of Representatives.
38

Despite Limkaichong's repeated pleas for the resolution of her manifestation and motion for
clarification, 39 the COMELEC did not resolve the same. Hence, on August 1, 2007, she filed
with this Court a Petition for Certiorari 40 under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure docketed as G.R. Nos. 178831-32 praying for the annulment of the
May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division and the June 29, 2007
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in the disqualification cases for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. She averred that since she was
already proclaimed on May 25, 2007 as Representative of the First District of Negros
Oriental, had assumed office on June 30, 2007, and had started to perform her duties and
functions as such, the COMELEC had lost its jurisdiction and it is now the HRET which has
jurisdiction over any issue involving her qualifications for the said office. acCTIS
On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong's manifestation and
motion for clarification, 41 with the following disquisition:
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June
30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of
Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all
pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the
House of Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. aTEScI
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)
On August 24, 2007, Louis Biraogo (Biraogo), as a citizen and a taxpayer, filed with the Court
a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order 42 under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed
as G.R. No. 179120, seeking to enjoin and permanently prohibit: (a) De Venecia from
allowing Limkaichong to sit in the House of Representatives and participate in all its official
activities; and (b) Limkaichong from holding office as its Member. 43
Meanwhile, on August 28, 2007, Paras has instituted before the Court a Petition for Quo
Warranto, Prohibition and Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction 44 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179132-33, seeking, among others, the ouster of
Limkaichong from the House of Representatives on account of her disqualification and for
the holding of special elections to fill the vacancy created by such. 45 TEAICc
On even date, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution 46 denying Villando's
motion to suspend the proclamation of Limkaichong, which denial was affirmed by the
COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution 47 dated February 1, 2008.
On September 5, 2008, Villando also filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order 48 under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, docketed as G.R. Nos. 179240-41, contending, among
others, that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in issuing the August 16,
2007 Resolution 49 because it still acted on Limchaikong's manifestation and motion for
clarification, notwithstanding that the same was not set for hearing and considering that its
June 29, 2007 Resolution had already become final and executory. cIaCTS
As the four (4) petitions are interrelated, the Court resolved to consolidate them in its
Resolutions dated September 4 and 11, 2007.

The Court heard the parties in oral argument on August 26, 2008, during which the following
issues were tackled:
1.
Whether the proclamation of Limkaichong by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Negros Oriental is valid;
2.
Whether said proclamation divested the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to
resolve the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship;
3.
Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal shall assume jurisdiction, in
lieu of the COMELEC, over the issue of Limkaichong's citizenship; EITcaH
4.
Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled
that Limkaichong is disqualified from running as a Member of the House of Representatives
on the ground that she is not a natural-born citizen;
5.

Whether the COMELEC disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory; and,

6.
Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.
On same day, the Court required the parties to simultaneously file within twenty (20) days
their respective memoranda, after which the petitions shall be deemed submitted for
resolution, with or without the memoranda.
Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides for the qualification of a
Member of the House of Representatives, thus: SETaHC
Section 6.
No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five
years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
When Limkaichong filed her COC, she stated therein that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. It was not true, according to the petitioners in the disqualification cases, because her
father remained a Chinese citizen at the time of her birth. The COMELEC Second Division has
sided with Camero and Villando, and disqualified Limkaichong to run as a congressional
candidate in the First District of Negros Oriental for having failed to comply with the
citizenship requirement. Accordingly, her proclamation was ordered suspended
notwithstanding that she obtained the highest number of votes during the elections.
Nonetheless, she was proclaimed by the PBOC pursuant to the policy guidelines of COMELEC
En Banc Resolution No. 8062, and she has since assumed her position and performed her
functions as a Member of the House of Representatives. DEIHAa
I
Whether Limkaichong's proclamation was valid.
The proclamation of Limkaichong was valid. The COMELEC Second Division rendered its Joint
Resolution dated May 17, 2007. On May 20, 2007, Limkaichong timely filed with the
COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration as well as for the lifting of the incorporated
directive suspending her proclamation. The filing of the motion for reconsideration
effectively suspended the execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution. 50 Since the
execution of the May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution was suspended, there was no impediment to
the valid proclamation of Limkaichong as the winner. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Period for Filing Motions for Reconsideration. A motion to reconsider a decision,
resolution, order or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the
promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution for
implementation of the decision, resolution, order and ruling. aCSDIc
In G.R. Nos. 179132-33, Paras, however, maintained that Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen
who was disqualified to run as a congressional candidate by way of a final judgment of the
COMELEC. With that, her proclamation was questionable and the same was done in open
defiance of the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division. She
also stressed that Limkaichong's proclamation was procedurally defective, it appearing that
one of the PBOC members was not present on May 25, 2007, and that it took place in a
restaurant and not at the provincial capitol. Finally, she argued that Limkaichong's
proclamation was void in accordance with the Court's pronouncement in the case of Codilla
v. De Venecia. 51
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Comment on the petition of Paras,
expressing its support for the position taken by the latter.
A perusal of the arguments advanced by Paras and the OSG does not sway the Court to rule
against the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation. No less than the COMELEC First Division
has sustained the validity of her proclamation when it dismissed, by way of a Resolution
dated June 29, 2007, the petition filed by Paras to nullify the proclamation. Not only that.
The COMELEC First Division has also adopted Limkaichong's argument that following her
valid proclamation, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over the disqualification cases has ceased
and that the same should be threshed out in the proper proceedings filed before the HRET.
Notably, the dismissal of Paras' petition was affirmed by the COMELEC in its Omnibus Order
dated January 28, 2008. AcSIDE
In addition, the validity of Limkaichong's proclamation is in accordance with COMELEC En
Banc Resolution No. 8062. The disqualification cases filed against her remained pending as a
result of her timely motion for reconsideration. Villando (in G.R. Nos. 179240-41), however,
maintained that Resolution No. 8062 is invalid; hence, it could not be used as basis to
validate Limkaichong's proclamation. He argued that it must be published since it is a
"policy-guideline" in the exercise of the COMELEC's rule-making power. As such, it cannot
supersede the Joint Resolution of the Second Division which was rendered pursuant to the
COMELEC's quasi-judicial power.
His argument is specious. Resolution No. 8062 is not only a policy-guideline. It is also an
administrative interpretation of the two (2) provisions of the 1987 Constitution, namely: (i)
Section 17, 52 Article VI (ii); Section 2 (2), 53 Article IX-C; Section 6 54 of R.A. 6646; and
Sections 241 55 and 243, 56 Article XX of the OEC. As such, it does not have to comply with
the due process requirement. The term "administrative" connotes or pertains to
"administration, especially management, as by managing or conducting, directing or
superintending, the execution, application, or conduct of persons or things." It does not
entail an opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision
or resolution thereon. 57 This is to be distinguished from "quasi-judicial function", a term
which applies, among others, to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or
bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature. 58 HIAEcT
Resolution No. 8062 is a valid exercise of the COMELEC's constitutionally mandated power to
promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the conduct of the elections. 59 In adopting
such policy-guidelines for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the COMELEC had
in mind the objective of upholding the sovereign will of the people and in the interest of
justice and fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose disqualification cases are still

pending at the time of the elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes from
the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their proclamation shall be without prejudice to
the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. Whereas, in this case,
the COMELEC Second Division having failed to act on the disqualification cases against
Limkaichong until after the conduct of the elections, with her obtaining the highest number
of votes from the electorate, her proclamation was properly effected by the PBOC pursuant
to Resolution No. 8062. CaTSEA
The Court has held in the case of Planas v. COMELEC, 60 that at the time of the proclamation
of Defensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division
Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final. As such, his
proclamation was valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained qualified.
Limkaichong's situation is no different from that of Defensor, the former having been
disqualified by a Division Resolution on the basis of her not being a natural-born Filipino
citizen. When she was proclaimed by the PBOC, she was the winner during the elections for
obtaining the highest number of votes, and at that time, the Division Resolution disqualifying
her has not yet became final as a result of the motion for reconsideration. IaESCH
II
Whether, upon Limkaichong's proclamation, the HRET, instead of the COMELEC, should
assume jurisdiction over the disqualification cases.
In her petition (G.R. Nos. 178831-32), Limkaichong argued that her proclamation on May 25,
2007 by the PBOC divested the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over all issues relating to her
qualifications, and that jurisdiction now lies with the HRET.
Biraogo, on the other hand, believed otherwise. He argued (in G.R. No. 179120) that the
issue concerning Limkaichong's disqualification is still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC En Banc to resolve because when Limkaichong was proclaimed on May 25, 2007,
the matter was still pending resolution before the COMELEC En Banc.
We do not agree. The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election,
returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. 61 It follows then
that the proclamation of a winning candidate divests the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over
matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation. The party questioning his
qualification should now present his case in a proper proceeding before the HRET, the
constitutionally mandated tribunal to hear and decide a case involving a Member of the
House of Representatives with respect to the latter's election, returns and qualifications. The
use of the word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution and in Section 250 62 of
the OEC underscores the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to its members. 63 aCSDIc
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17.
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
its Chairman.

Corollary thereto is Rule 14 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, as amended, which states:
EaHATD
RULE 14.
Jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
The COMELEC En Banc, in its Resolution dated August 16, 2007, had given paramount
consideration to the two (2) aforementioned provisions when it stated that:
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June
30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of
Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all
pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the
House of Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. SaIACT
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
Worth citing also is the ratiocination of the COMELEC First Division when it dismissed the
petition of Paras seeking the nullity of Limkaichong's proclamation, thus:
The present situation is similar not to the factual circumstances of Codilla, which Paras
invokes, but rather to that in Planas which adheres to the general rule giving jurisdiction to
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. As at the time of Limkaichong's
proclamation, her disqualification was not yet final, her proclamation was valid or legal. This
Commission no longer has jurisdiction over the case. This, notwithstanding the Second
Division's directive suspending Limkaichong's proclamation. THaDAE
The Commission has made its intention in issuing Resolution No. 8062 very clear in that
there shall be no suspension of proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases, involving, among others, issues of citizenship. As the disqualification
cases involving Limkaichong were still pending reconsideration by the En Banc, the
underlying policy which gave rise to the issuance of the resolution: to respect the will of the
Filipino electorate, applies to the suspension of proclamation of the winning Congressional
candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners (in G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) steadfastly maintained that
Limkaichong's proclamation was tainted with irregularity, which will effectively prevent the
HRET from acquiring jurisdiction. TASCEc
The fact that the proclamation of the winning candidate, as in this case, was alleged to have
been tainted with irregularity does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. 64 The Court has
shed light on this in the case of Vinzons-Chato, 65 to the effect that: 2009jur
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been proclaimed
and taken his oath of office as a Member of the House of Representatives (Thirteenth
Congress); hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it had already lost jurisdiction over
petitioner Chato's petition. The issues raised by petitioner Chato essentially relate to the
canvassing of returns and alleged invalidity of respondent Unico's proclamation. These are
matters that are best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the HRET.

Significantly, the allegation that respondent Unico's proclamation is null and void does not
divest the HRET of its jurisdiction:
. . . [I]n an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate
who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as congressman is raised, that issue
is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity
of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to
the people's mandate. EDSHcT
Further, for the Court to take cognizance of petitioner Chato's election protest against
respondent Unico would be to usurp the constitutionally mandated functions of the HRET.
In fine, any allegations as to the invalidity of the proclamation will not prevent the HRET
from assuming jurisdiction over all matters essential to a member's qualification to sit in the
House of Representatives.
The 1998 HRET Rules, as amended, provide for the manner of filing either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of Representatives, to
wit:
Rule 16.
Election protest. A verified petition contesting the election of any Member
of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten (10) days after
the proclamation of the winner. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant while the adverse party shall be known as the protestee. DACaTI
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 17.
Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the election
of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to
the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner
while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Rule 19.
Periods Non-Extendible. The ten-day period mentioned in Rules 16 and 17 is
jurisdictional and cannot be extended.
Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections,
the remedy of those who may assail one's eligibility/ineligibility/qualification/disqualification
is to file before the HRET a petition for an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto,
within the period provided by the HRET Rules. In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections, 66
we ruled that where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional
elections, the remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives. HTaIAC
The PBOC proclaimed Limkaichong as the winner on May 25, 2007. Thus, petitioners (in G.R.
Nos. 179120, 179132-33, and 179240-41) should have filed either an election protest or
petition for quo warranto within ten days from May 25, 2007. But they did not. In fact, to
date, no petition of protest or petition for quo warranto has been filed with the HRET. Verily,
the ten-day prescriptive period for initiating a contest against Limkaichong has long expired.
However, the said ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to
disqualification cases based on citizenship. Under the 1987 Constitution, Members of the
House of Representatives must be natural-born citizens not only at the time of their election
but during their entire tenure. Being a continuing requirement, one who assails a member's

citizenship or lack of it may still question the same at any time, the ten-day prescriptive
period notwithstanding. ScHADI
In Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 67 the Court held that:
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be dismissed
for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to prevent
Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office as governor because he is disqualified from
doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but
during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may
be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator were to marry a foreigner during her
term and by her act or omission acquires his nationality, would she have the right to remain
in office simply because the challenge to her title may not longer be made within ten days
from her proclamation? . . .
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by
the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people
as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule
requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to
serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country alone,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty to any other state. cSITDa
However, in assailing the citizenship of the father, the proper proceeding should be in
accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 which provides that:
Sec. 18.
Cancellation of Naturalization Certificate Issued. Upon motion made in the
proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial
fiscal, the competent judge may cancel the naturalization certificate issued and its
registration in the Civil Register:
1.
If it is shown that said naturalization certificate was obtained fraudulently or illegally;
caADSE
2.
If the person naturalized shall, within five years next following the issuance of said
naturalization certificate, return to his native country or to some foreign country and
establish his permanent residence there: Provided, That the fact of the person naturalized
remaining more than one year in his native country or the country of his former nationality,
or two years in any other foreign country, shall be considered as prima facie evidence of his
intention of taking up his permanent residence in the same:
3.

If the petition was made on an invalid declaration of intention;

4.
If it is shown that the minor children of the person naturalized failed to graduate from
a public or private high schools recognized by the Office of Private Education of the
Philippines, where Philippine history, government or civics are taught as part of the school
curriculum, through the fault of their parents either by neglecting to support them or by
transferring them to another school or schools. A certified copy of the decree canceling the
naturalization certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of Court of the Department of
Interior and the Bureau of Justice; aCSHDI

5.
If it is shown that the naturalized citizen has allowed himself to be used as a dummy
requiring Philippine citizenship as a requisite for the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right,
franchise or privilege. (Emphasis supplied)
As early as the case of Queto v. Catolico, 68 where the Court of First Instance judge motu
proprio and not in the proper denaturalization proceedings called to court various grantees
of certificates of naturalization (who had already taken their oaths of allegiance) and
cancelled their certificates of naturalization due to procedural infirmities, the Court held
that: TCHEDA
. . . It may be true that, as alleged by said respondents, that the proceedings for
naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the
point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities
must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such
procedure is the cancellation of the naturalization certificate. [Section 1(5), Commonwealth
Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore
quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or
his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must
come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its representatives designated
by statute, that may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in
the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized citizen's descendant. DTIcSH
III
Whether the COMELEC Second Division and the COMELEC En Banc correctly disqualified
Limkaichong on the ground that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In resolving the disqualification cases, the COMELEC Second Division relied on the entries in
the docket book of the OSG, 69 the only remaining record of the naturalization proceedings,
70 and ruled on the basis thereof that the naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy,
Limkaichong's father, in Special Case No. 1043, were null and void. The COMELEC Second
Division adopted Villando and Camero's arguments that the OSG was deprived of its
participation in the said case for it was not furnished copies of the following: (a) the July 9,
1957 Order of the Court of First Instance (CFI) granting the petition for naturalization; and (b)
the September 21, 1959 Order of the CFI declaring Julio Ong Sy a Filipino citizen. Thus, when
the latter took his oath of allegiance on October 21, 1959, it was exactly 30 days after his
declaration as a naturalized Filipino, or one day short of the reglementary period required
under Sections 11 and 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. Such defects were fatal to the
naturalization proceedings of Julio Ong Sy and prevented the same from gaining finality. The
COMELEC Second Division concluded that since Julio Ong Sy did not acquire Philippine
citizenship through the said naturalization proceedings, it follows that Limkaichong remains
a Chinese national and is disqualified to run as candidate and be elected as a Member of the
House of Representatives. IHEAcC
We cannot resolve the matter of Limkaichong's citizenship as the same should have been
challenged in appropriate proceedings as earlier stated.
IV
Whether the COMELEC's disqualification of Limkaichong is final and executory.
In resolving this issue, pertinent is the provision of Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure:

Sec. 13.

Finality of Decisions or Resolutions. . . .

(b)
In Special Actions and Special Cases, a decision or resolution of the Commission en
banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless
restrained by the Supreme Court. DHAcET
In his Memorandum dated June 27, 2008, Biraogo stated that the Resolution of the COMELEC
En Banc in the disqualification cases became final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation and that the same was not restrained by this Court pursuant to Section 13 (b),
Rule 18 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He averred that since Limkaichong
received a copy of the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007 on July 3, 2007,
she had until July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a restraining order from the Court to
prevent the same from becoming final and executory. However, she did not do anything to
that effect. Biraogo also averred that Limkaichong is guilty of forum shopping; hence, her
petition must be dismissed by the Court.
Instead of asking the Court for what Biraogo opined as a restraining order, Limkaichong filed
with this Court, on August 1, 2007, her petition for certiorari assailing the said COMELEC En
Banc Resolution pursuant to Section 2, 71 Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, postulating that she had thirty (30) days from July 4, 2007 within which to file the
petition, or until August 3, 2007. She cited Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution,
which prescribes the power of this Court to review decisions of the COMELEC, 72 thus:
AICTcE
SEC. 7.Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by the
Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
In his Comment on the petition, Villando prayed for the outright dismissal of Limkaichong's
petition as (a) it was filed beyond the reglementary period; (b) Limkaichong engaged in
prohibited forum shopping; and (c) Limkaichong admitted that the issues raised have
become moot and academic. He also sought to declare Limkaichong in contempt of court for
forum shopping. SEIaHT
The COMELEC, through the OSG, also filed its Comment, praying for the denial of
Limkaichong's petition and its dismissal for being moot, contending that: (a) the COMELEC
En Banc Resolution dated August 16, 2007 has rendered the instant petition moot and
academic; and (b) Limkaichong knowingly and intentionally engaged in forum shopping. The
OSG argued that, without waiting for the resolution of her Motion for Clarification and two (2)
successive motions to resolve said motions which are pending before the COMELEC En Banc,
Limkaichong filed the present petition to question the Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 of
the COMELEC Second Division, which issues were pending before the COMELEC En Banc. Her
act of seeking relief from this Court while there were several other incidents pending before
the COMELEC, the final resolution in either one of which will amount to res judicata in the
other, clearly showed forum shopping on her part.
In her Reply to the above Comments, Limkaichong countered that she did not engage in
forum shopping, for had she waited for the COMELEC to rule on her manifestation and other
motions, it would have resulted in the expiration of the reglementary period for filing a
petition for certiorari before the Court. cDCSTA

The May 17, 2007 Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying
Limkaichong and suspending her proclamation cannot yet be implemented considering that
she timely filed a motion for reconsideration. Thus, pursuant to Section 13 (c), Rule 18 and
Section 2 Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the Joint Resolution has not yet
attained finality for it to be implemented. 2009jur
Notably, the seeming impropriety of the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc dated June 29,
2007 has since been remedied by the promulgation of its Resolution dated August 16, 2007,
recognizing that it no longer has jurisdiction over the disqualification cases following the
valid proclamation of Limkaichong and her assumption of office as a Member of the House of
Representatives.
V
Whether the Speaker of the House of Representatives may be compelled to prohibit
Limkaichong from assuming her duties as a Member of the House of Representatives.
Biraogo's contention was that De Venecia 73 should be stopped from entering Limkaichong's
name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives because he has no power to
allow an alien to sit and continue to sit therein as it would amount to an unlawful exercise of
his legal authority. Moreover, Biraogo opposes Limkaichong's assumption of office in the
House of Representatives since she is not qualified to sit therein, being a Chinese citizen
and, thus, disqualified by virtue of a final and executory judgment of the COMELEC En Banc.
He relied on the COMELEC En Banc Resolution dated June 29, 2007, which affirmed the
COMELEC Second Division Joint Resolution dated May 17, 2007 disqualifying Limkaichong
from holding public office. He contended that the said Resolution dated June 29, 2007 is
already final and executory; hence, it should be respected pursuant to the principle of res
judicata. IaAScD
De Venecia, on the other hand, argued that he should not be faulted for honoring the
proclamation of Limkaichong, because it had the hallmarks of regularity, and he had no
power to exclude any Member of the House of Representatives motu proprio. In their
Comment on the petition, respondents De Venecia, et al., contended that the enrollment of a
Member in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives and his/her recognition as
such becomes the ministerial duty of the Secretary General and the House of
Representatives upon presentation by such Member of a valid Certificate of Proclamation
and Oath of Office. ECTIHa
Respondent Nograles, as De Venecia's substitute, filed a Memorandum dated July 16, 2008
stating that under the circumstances, the House of Representatives, and its officials, are
without recourse except to honor the validity of the proclamation of Limkaichong until the
same is canceled, revoked or nullified, and to continue to recognize her as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental until it is ordered by this Court, as it
was in Codilla, to recognize somebody else. He went on to state that after assumption by the
Member-elect, or having acquired a presumptively valid title to the office, the House of
Representatives cannot, motu proprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any recognition given to a
sitting Member or to "remove" his name from its roll, as such would amount to a removal of
such Member from his office without due process of law. Verily, it is only after a
determination by the appropriate tribunal (as in this case, the HRET), pursuant to a final and
executory order, that the Member does not have a right to the office (i.e., not being a duly
elected Member), that the House of Representatives is directed to exclude the said Member.
TDCAHE
Their contentions are meritorious. The unseating of a Member of the House of
Representatives should be exercised with great caution and after the proper proceedings for
the ouster has been validly completed. For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the

highest number of votes in the elections, and during the pendency of the proceedings
determining one's qualification or disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the
electorate in whom sovereignty resides. 74
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32 is GRANTED and the
Joint Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division dated May 17, 2007 in SPA Nos. 07-247 and
07-248 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. All the other petitions (G.R. Nos. 179120, 179132-33,
179240-41) are hereby DISMISSED. HaECDI
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Corona, Carpio Morales, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Nachura, Leonardo-de Castro and Brion, JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., is on leave.
Velasco, Jr., J., Pls. see dissenting opinion.
Separate Opinions
VELASCO, JR., J., dissenting:
With due respect to the ponente, I register my dissent in G.R. No. 178831-32:

ACDTcE

COMELEC, on May 7, 2001, issued a Resolution No. 4116 which reads:

This pertains to the finality of the decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or
division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a)

Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b)

Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c)

Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d)

Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

HSIADc

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or
resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES as it
is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1)
the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases
shall become final and executory after five (5) from * its promulgation unless restrained by
the Supreme Court.
The Commission En Banc Resolution affirming that of the Second Division was promulgated
on June 29, 2007. Petitioner received a copy of the resolution on July 3, 2007 and had until
July 8, 2007 within which to obtain a restraining order from this Court to prevent the assailed
resolution from attaining finality. Instead of filing a petition before this Court with a prayer
for a restraining order, Limkaichong opted to file a Manifestation and Motion for Clarification
before the COMELEC En Banc. This procedural lapse is fatal as her motion with the COMELEC
En Banc did not toll the running of the five (5)-day reglementary period. Thus, the June 29,
2007 COMELEC En Banc Resolution has become final and executory. CDAcIT
On the other hand, petitioner Limkaichong argues that the COMELEC was divested of
jurisdiction over the disqualification case when she was proclaimed by the Provincial Board

of Canvassers on May 25, 2007. She insists that jurisdiction is now exclusively vested in the
HRET under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. . . .
This posture will not also prevent the June 29, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc
from becoming final and executory. When petitioner received a copy of the assailed
resolution, she should have instituted an action before the HRET to challenge the legality of
the said resolution affirming her disqualification. CHDAaS
This, she failed to do.
On August 16, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc ruled on Limkaichong's manifestation and
motion for clarification, thus:
In view of the proclamation of Limkaichong and her subsequent assumption of office on June
30, 2007, this Commission rules that all pending incidents relating to the qualifications of
Limkaichong should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
in accordance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission resolved, as it hereby resolves, that all
pending incidents relating to the qualifications of Jocelyn S. Limkaichong as Member of the
House of Representatives should now be determined by the House of Representatives
Electoral tribunal. THaDEA
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis ours)
Despite the clear direction from the COMELEC En Banc, petitioner again failed to institute
the necessary action before the HRET to contest the June 29, 2007 Resolution within ten (10)
days from receipt of the August 16, 2007 COMELEC Resolution. Around seven (7) months
had lapsed from promulgation of the August 16, 2007 ruling of the COMELEC and petitioner
has not lifted a finger to challenge the June 29, 2007 COMELEC En Banc Resolution in
question. Plainly, said resolution has become final and executory.
I vote to DISMISS Limkaichong's petition in G.R. Nos. 178831-32.