4 Dolalas V Ombudsman

[G.R. No. 118808.
December 24, 1996]

JUDGE ANA MARIA I. DOLALAS, EVELYN K. OBIDO AND WILBERTO B.
CARRIEDO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN-MINDANAO and BENJAMIN VILLARANTE, JR., respondents.
RE S O LUTI ON
ROMERO, J.:
Under consideration is the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order dated January 16, 1995. Petitioners, Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn
K. Obido and Wilberto B. Carriedo - Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Clerk II, respectively
of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabasalan, Zamboanga del Sur, were charged
administratively by private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for miscarriage of justice,
dishonesty, gross neglect of duty, unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and for
failure to prosecute Criminal Case No. 5881 for an unreasonable length of time before public
respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
The letter-complaint addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated July 6,
1994 arose out of said criminal case of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent by a
police officer. Private respondent alleged that after submitting his counter-affidavit relative to the
said criminal case before petitioners court, there has been no pre-conference, arraignment or pretrial held or conducted by petitioner judge. Private respondent claimed that the said criminal case
was maliciously filed by one P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with petitioner judge in order to
discourage the former from instituting a criminal complaint against said police officers men for
abuse of authority and police brutality with physical injury.[1]
Private respondent also claimed that said criminal case filed against him has been
unnecessarily delayed in that P/Sgt. Salutillo and petitioner-judge totally failed to prosecute their
own malicious action within a reasonable length of time thus prejudicing the constitutional right
of the former to an impartial investigation and a fair and speedy trial. Said criminal case against
private respondent also held in abeyance his own complaint against the police officers allegedly
to his prejudice.[2]
On the basis of the letter-complaint filed by herein private respondent, Graft Investigation
Officer I Melinda Alconsel Dayanghirang of public respondent Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao directed petitioners to submit their respective counter-affidavits. Petitioners motion to
dismiss dated September 14, 1994 as well as their motion for reconsideration datedDecember 2,
1994 were denied by public respondent, hence the petition before this Court.
In this petition, petitioners pray that for the preservation of their rights pending this
proceeding, a preliminary injunction and/or restraining order be issued against the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao commanding said office to desist from further proceeding with the case
against the petitioners. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court in a resolution
dated May 23, 1995.
Petitioner was basically being charged with undue delay in the disposition of the said
criminal case filed before petitioners court. The issue posed, therefore, in this petition is whether
or not the Office of the Ombudsman may take cognizance of the complaint against petitioner for
purposes of investigation and possible prosecution in accordance with its mandate under Section
13 (1) and (2) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution [3] for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.[4]
Petitioner-judge contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into the alleged undue delay in the disposition of the case as said charge relates to a
judges performance of her official duties over which the Supreme Court has administrative
control and supervision, as mandated under Section 6, Rule VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
[5]
Public respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao, however, contends that referral to the Supreme
Court is not essential in this case as what will be investigated is not whether there was undue
delay in the disposition of a simple criminal case for five years, which it admits is administrative
in nature. It added that what is sought to be determined by the investigation is whether or not any
undue delay in the disposition of the alarms and scandals case resulted in injury to private
respondent through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and/or
undue advantage to any party, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The complaint against petitioner-judge before the
Office of the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is
being charged with having violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1[6] and Rule 3.05, Canon 3[7] of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying
the disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the
alarms and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in
the Rules of Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the
Code of Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is
mandated under Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume administrative
supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue
of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against
them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude
into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the
powers granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to
the specific mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme
Court over all courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of
the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is
DIRECTED to REFER the complaint filed by private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. to this
Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

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[G.R. No. 118808.

December 24, 1996]

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