CASE STUDY

Fire at Formosa Plastics Corporation:

Evaluating Process Hazards
2006-01-I-TX

Formosa Plastics Corporation

Point Comfort, Texas
October 6, 2005

Key Issues:
Hazard Reviews
Flame Resistant Clothing
Use of Current Standards

Introduction
This case study describes a fire
and series of explosions in an
olefins production unit located in
Point Comfort, Texas. Sixteen
employees were injured, one
seriously. A shelter-in-place
order was issued for the Point
Comfort community, and the
local elementary school was
evacuated. The fire burned for 5
days. CSB makes
recommendations to Formosa
Plastics Corporation; Kellogg,
Brown, and Root; and the Center
for Chemical Process Safety.

INSIDE . . .
Incident Description
Formosa Operations
Incident Analysis
Process Hazards Analysis
Lessons Learned
Recommendations
References
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

1.0 Incident Description

This case study examines a hydrocarbon
release and subsequent fire and explosions
that occurred in the Olefins II unit at the
Formosa Plastics Corporation, USA,
(Formosa) Point Comfort, TX, complex.1
At about 3:05 PM on October 6, 2005, a
trailer being towed by a forklift snagged and
pulled a small drain valve out of a strainer in
a liquid propylene system. Escaping

propylene rapidly vaporized, forming a large

flammable vapor cloud.
Operators immediately began to shut the
plant down and attempt to isolate the leak.
They tried to reach and close manual valves
that could stop the release; however, the
advancing vapor cloud forced them to
retreat. At the same time, control room
operators shut off pumps, closed control
valves, and vented equipment to the flare
stack to direct flammable gases away from
the fire.
At about 3:07 PM, the vapor ignited,
creating an explosion.2 The explosion
knocked down several and burned two (one
seriously) operators exiting the unit. Flames
from the fire reached more than 500 feet in
the air (Figure 1).
Because of the size of the fire, Formosa
initiated a site-wide evacuation. Fourteen
workers sustained minor injuries including
scrapes and smoke inhalation. The
extensive damage shut down Olefins II unit
for 5 months.
1 The

CSB previously investigated an unrelated

incident at Formosa Plastics Corporation Illiopolis,
Illinois which killed five and injured three.
2 The explosion could be characterized as an
unconfined low-speed deflagration

Picture courtesy of Bill Harvey

Figure 1. Point Comfort fire.

1.1 Plant Emergency Response

Formosas Point Comfort complex has a
large trained and equipped Emergency
Response Team (ERT) that includes 120
members and two fire trucks. On the day of
the incident, two of the off-shift crews were
on site for training; as a result, 90 trained
emergency responders were immediately
available. Firefighters from the surrounding
communities also supplemented the
Formosa ERT by providing and staffing a
fire fighter health monitoring station.
The Formosa emergency response strategy
was to prevent the fire from spreading to
other units and to isolate fuel sources where
possible. Ultimately, the fires burned for
five days and about seven million gallons of
water were used to cool vessels and contain
the fire.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

1.2 Community Response

Within minutes of the initial explosion, local
officials ordered a shelter-in-place for the
Point Comfort community and closed
Highway 35 that runs adjacent to the
Formosa complex and through Point
Comfort (Figure 2). Students and staff at
the Point Comfort Elementary School
evacuated to Port Lavaca, about five miles
away. Local officials rescinded these
measures by 9:00 PM that night.
The Red Cross assisted employees and
contractors at the Port Lavaca Community
Center. More than 20 local residents sought
medical evaluation at local hospitals, but
none were admitted.
Figure 2. View of the Damaged Plant
from Highway 35.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

2.0 Formosa Operations

Formosa manufactures plastic resins and
petrochemicals at four wholly owned
chemical manufacturing subsidiaries in
Delaware City, DE; Illiopolis, IL; Baton
Rouge, LA; and Point Comfort, TX.

2.1 Point Comfort, TX,

Complex
The Point Comfort complex, the largest
Formosa facility in the United States, began
operations in 1983. The complex employs
1400 full-time workers and 400 contractors
and covers 1,800 acres. The fire and
explosions occurred in the Olefins II unit,
one of 17 units at the complex (Figure 3).
Picture courtesy of Formosa
Figure 3. Formosa Point Comfort complex.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

2.2 Olefins II Unit Operation

The Point Comfort Olefins3 II unit uses
furnaces to convert either naphtha,4 or
natural gas derived feedstock, into a
hydrocarbon mixture containing:
Methane
Ethane
Ethylene
Propane
Propylene

 Various higher hydrocarbons.

Distillation columns5 then separate the
hydrocarbon mixture. Some of the
separated gases are liquefied and sent to
storage, while others are used as fuel for the
furnaces or recycled into the feedstock.
Relief valves protect the distillation
columns, heat exchangers, and other large
vessels in the unit from overpressure. These
valves discharge into a flare header system
where the hydrocarbon gases can be safely
burned.
3 An

olefin is unsaturated hydrocarbon, such as

ethylene, propylene, or butylene.
4 Naphtha is a highly volatile flammable liquid
distilled from crude oil.
5 A distillation column separates liquids based on
differences in their boiling points.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

3.0 Incident Analysis

3.1 Incident Sequence
The CSB used physical evidence, electronic
data, video recordings, and interviews to
establish the likely failure sequence. The
events are listed in the order in which they
are believed to have occurred, although an
exact timeline could not be established:
A worker driving a fork truck towing a
trailer under a pipe rack backed into an
opening between two columns to turn
around.
When the worker drove forward, the
trailer caught on a valve protruding from
a strainer in a propylene piping system.
The trailer pulled the valve and
associated pipe (Figure 4) out of the
strainer, leaving a 1.9-inch diameter
opening.6
Figure 4. Valve and pipe.
Pressurized liquid propylene (216 psig)
rapidly escaped through the opening and
6 The

valve was attached to a pipe that was threaded

into the strainer cover.

partially vaporized creating both a pool

of propylene liquid and a rapidly
expanding vapor cloud.
The fork truck driver and other
contractors saw the release and
evacuated.
An operator also heard and saw the

escaping propylene and immediately

notified the control room.
Control room operators saw the vapor
cloud on a closed circuit television and
began to shut down the unit.
Outside operators tried unsuccessfully to
reach and close manual valves that could
stop the release.
Outside operators turned on fixed fire
monitors.7
Control room operators shut off pumps
from the motor control center and closed
control valves to slow the leak.
The vapor cloud ignited.
Outside operators left the unit.
Control room operators declared a sitewide
emergency.
Control room operators smelled
propylene vapors and evacuated.
A large pool fire burned under the pipe
rack8 and the side of an elevated
structure that supported a number of
vessels, heat exchangers, and relief
valves.
7A

fire monitor is an unattended device that can

direct a spray of water on a fire.
8 The pipe rack supports piping, as well as instrument
and power cables to and from columns, vessels,
pumps, and valves in the unit.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

The Formosa ERT arrived and took

command of the incident response
(Figure 5).
Figure 5. Formosa ERT equipment.
About 30 minutes into the event, the side
of the elevated structure collapsed,
crimping emergency vent lines to the
flare header.
Crimped pipes and steel, softened from
fire exposure, led to multiple ruptures of
piping and equipment and the loss of
integrity of the flare header.
The Formosa ERT isolated fuel sources
where possible, and allowed small fires
to burn the uncontained hydrocarbons.
The fire was extinguished about five
days after the start of the incident.

3.2 Vehicle Impact Protection

The propylene piping involved in this
incident protruded into an open space, yet

had no impact protection (Figure 6).

Figure 6. Pipe and valve
arrangement.
Formosa has administrative safeguards for
vehicle operation in the unit, including a
plant-wide speed limit, a vehicle permitting
process, and a crane use procedure.
However, these safeguards do not
specifically address where vehicles may
operate within the unit.
The plant design drawings designate specific
access ways for vehicles; these are not
physically marked in the unit. The area
where the impact occurred was not a
designated access way but was large enough
for a vehicle to easily pass.
Guidance about protecting control stations,
pipelines, and other grade-level plant
equipment, although not specific, states that
protective measures should be in place to
prevent impact.
The ASME B31.3 Process Piping Code
states, Impact forces caused by external or
internal conditions shall be taken into
account in the design of piping.
Loss Prevention in the Process Industries
(Lees, 2001) states:
Incidents are numerous in which lift
trucks are driven into and damage
buildings and plant; including process
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

plant; pipe work is particularly at risk.

Particular attention should be paid to
plant layout with specific regard to
traffic and impact.
Every precaution should be taken to
prevent damage by vehicles, particularly
cranes and forklift trucks.
Safety in Process Plant Design (Wells,
1980) provides a safety checklist that
includes protection of equipment and pipe
work from vehicles.

3.3 Structural Steel Fire

Protection
During the fire, part of a structure
supporting the relief valves and emergency
piping to the flare header collapsed. The
collapse caused several pipes to crimp,
likely preventing flow through the pipes and

leading to the rupture of major equipment

and piping that added fuel to the fire.
Passive fire protection (fireproofing9) was
installed on only three of four support
column rows and the columns that supported
the pressure relief valves and emergency
vent piping had no fireproofing (Figure 7).
The bare steel columns bent over, while the
fireproofed columns remained straight.
9 The

fireproofing was a concrete coating applied

over the steel to insulate it from a fire and slow its
failure.

Figure 7. Fireproofed and bare steel

support columns.
Formosa contracted M. W. Kellogg
(Kellogg) to design the Olefins II unit in
1996. The Olefins II unit is an identical
copy of the Olefins I unit, which Formosa
contracted Kellogg for in late 1988. Olefins
I unit is a nearly identical copy of an
ethylene plant that Kellogg sold to another
company in the mid 1980s. American
Petroleum Institute (API) Publication 2218,
Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and
Petrochemical Processing Plants (July
1988) recommends that steel supporting
important piping such as relief and flare
lines be fireproofed. This API publication
was issued after Kellogg was contracted for
the earlier design; however, the designs sold
to Formosa were never updated to
incorporate this guidance.
Had the steel been fireproofed as API
recommends, the consequences of this
incident would likely have been less severe.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

3.4 Remote Equipment

Isolation
Figure 8 shows the general arrangement of
the piping and valves around the leak point.
The leak occurred between manual block
valves and a remotely operated control
valve. While a check valve and remotely
operated isolation valve downstream of the
leak prevented the backflow of propylene
from product storage, operators were unable
to reach the manual valves capable of
stopping the flow from the distillation
column. The operators were also unable to

reach the local control station to turn off the

pumps supplying propylene, although they
eventually turned off the pumps at the motor
control center located in the control room
building, slowing the rate of propylene
feeding the fire.
Had a remotely actuated valve been installed
upstream of the pumps, this incident would
likely have ended quickly, possibly even
before ignition occurred. Additionally, had
remote control of the pumps been possible
from the control room, the propylene flow
could have been quickly reduced, potentially
reducing the severity of the incident.
Plant designers specify where remote
operation of isolation valves and equipment
should be used. Kellogg, the designer of
Formosas Olefins II unit, specified
remotely actuated valves for raw material
supply and final product lines, but only local
manual valves pump controls for equipment
within the unit that contained large
hydrocarbon inventories.
Limited information is available in
consensus standards on the degree of
isolation designers should incorporate into
the design, guidance is available. Kletz
(1998) and Health & Safety Executive
(HSE) (1999) both recommend that large
vessels and columns with hazardous
inventories be equipped with a rapid
isolation capability.
Propylene product pumps
Y strainer and
drain valve
Remotely operated
control valve
To storage
Manual gate valve
Check valve
Y strainer
Leak point
C3 splitter

Figure 8. Propylene product flow.

Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

10

Had Formosa been able to isolate the major

hazard inventories in the unit as
recommended in industry guidance, the
consequences of this incident would likely
have been lessened.

3.5 Flame Resistant Clothing

Flame resistant clothing (FRC) can limit the
severity of burn injuries to workers in plants
where flash fires may result from

uncontained flammable liquids and gases.

Neither of the two operators burned in this
incident was wearing FRC. Had they been,
their injuries would likely have been less
severe.
The OSHA personal protective equipment
standard, 29 CFR 1910.132, requires
companies to complete a hazard assessment
to determine the protective equipment
appropriate for all of the workplace hazards.
This includes protective clothing, such as
FRC, when the hazards include the potential
for fires.
The National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) ( 2001) suggests considering the
following in determining FRC needs:
Proximity of the work to a potential
flash fire hazard;
Potential for a flammable release that
could result from a mechanical failure
such as a line breaking;
Potential for flammable vapors in the
work environment;
Presence of engineering controls
designed to reduce exposure to
flammable materials;
Accident history.
Formosa Point Comfort evaluated requiring
FRC following two incidents where static
electricity was suspected of igniting
hydrocarbon releases. Formosa decided to
require FRC for specific high-risk
assignments, but decided not to require FRC
for operators in the Olefins II unit except for
those involved in emergency response.10
10 Following

the October 6, 2005 incident OSHA

cited Formosa for not requiring FRC for workers in
the unit. Formosa has contested the citation.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

11

4.0 Process Hazard Analysis

Formosa performed a series of hazard
reviews including a hazard and operability
study (HAZOP); facility siting analysis; and
a pre-startup safety review (PSSR) prior to
the operation of the Olefins II unit. The
following sections describe how Formosa
addressed vehicle impact protection and
remote isolation in these reviews.

4.1 Vehicle Impact Protection

Formosa considered how to protect

equipment from vehicle impact damage in
both the facility siting analysis and the
PSSR. The PSSR, used to identify safety
issues prior to operating the Olefins II unit,
looked only at protecting emergency
equipment (such as firewater equipment).
The PSSR team verified that traffic
protection around emergency equipment had
been installed, but did not look at specific
process equipment.
During the facility siting analysis, the hazard
analysis team discussed what might occur if
a vehicle (e.g., fork truck, crane, man lift)
impacted process piping. While the
consequences of a truck impact were judged
as severe, the frequency of occurrence
was judged very low (i.e., not occurring
within 20 years), resulting in a low overall
risk rank.11 Because of the low risk ranking,
the team considered existing administrative
safeguards adequate and did not recommend
additional traffic protection.
11 The

risk ranking methodology Formosa used

considered both the potential consequences and likely
frequency of an event.

Figure 9. Protection of fire fighting

equipment.
The contrast between the physical protection
for firefighting equipment and the
administrative provisions for process piping
and other equipment is striking. Figure 9
shows the protection afforded firefighting
equipment, while Figure 10 shows the lack
of protection where the impact and release
occurred.
Figure 10. Vehicle impact point.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

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4.2 Remote Equipment

Isolation
Potential failure consequences greatly
increase with large inventories, equipment
congestion, and development near plants;
remotely operated isolation valves can
mitigate these consequences. Companies
should address isolation philosophy as part
of the hazard review process.
Formosa addressed isolating minor leaks in
the hazard analysis and verified that

operators could isolate minor leaks with

local valves. However, the written hazard
analysis did not consider a catastrophic loss
of containment within the unit, and did not
consider if local isolation valves would be
accessible or if remotely operated isolation
devices would be necessary.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

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5.0 Lessons Learned

5.1 Hazard Reviews
While Formosa conducted a preliminary
hazard analysis, a process hazard analysis, a
siting analysis, and a PSSR prior to
operating the Olefins II unit, these reviews
did not fully address protection of specific
process equipment from vehicle impact or
the use of remotely actuated valves to
control a catastrophic release.
When performing a hazard analysis, facility
siting analysis, or pre-startup safety review,
vehicle impact and remote isolation of
catastrophic releases should be investigated.

5.2 Flame resistant clothing

Formosa had prior incidents of flash fires
from hydrocarbon leaks and evaluated the
use of FRC. However, Formosa did not
require FRC for operators working within
the unit, even though the large flammable
liquid and gas inventory may put operators
at risk of injury from flash fires.
In process plants with large flammable
liquid and/or gas inventories, mechanical
failures can result in flash fires that
endanger workers. The use of FRC may
limit the severity of injury to employees who
work in plants with large inventories of
flammable gases and liquids.

5.3 Use of Current Standards

Kellogg sold the plant design used at
Formosa multiple times between the
mid-1980s and 2000. However, the design
was not updated to incorporate improved
recommended practices with respect to
fireproofing structural steel that supports
critical safety systems.
Evaluate the applicability and use of current
consensus safety standards when designing
and constructing a chemical or

petrochemical process plant. This should

include reviewing and updating earlier
designs used for new facilities.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

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6.0 Recommendations
6.1 Formosa Plastics USA
2006-01-I-TX-R1
Revise policies and procedures for process
hazard analysis and pre-startup safety
review to more fully evaluate vehicle impact
hazards, passive fire protection, and
catastrophic releases.
2006-01-I-TX-R2
Require flame resistant clothing for workers
in units at the Point Comfort complex where
there is a risk of flash fires.

6.2 Kellogg, Brown, and Root

2006-01-I-TX-R3
Communicate the findings and
recommendations of this report to all
companies that contracted with either M. W.
Kellogg or Kellogg, Brown, and Root
(KBR) for plant designs similar to the
Formosa Olefins II unit.
2006-01-I-TX-R4
Communicate the findings and
recommendations of this report to your
petrochemical process plant design
engineers. Emphasize the importance of
using current consensus safety standards
when designing and constructing
petrochemical process plants, including the
earlier designs reused for new facilities.
2006-01-I-TX-R5
Revise KBR petrochemical process plant
design procedures to ensure they address the
use of current safety standards for new
designs and earlier designs reused for new
facilities.

6.3 Center for Chemical

Process Safety (CCPS)
2006-01-I-TX-R6
Incorporate guidance for vehicular traffic
protection and remote equipment isolation
into the next revision of the Center for
Chemical Process Safetys Guidelines for
Hazard Evaluation Procedures.
Formosa Point Comfort Case Study June 2006

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7.0 References