People v.
Mojello, 425 SCRA 11 (2004)
posted in CONLAW2 cases
Facts
The victim was last seen with the appellant Bebot Mojello. On December 16,200 the body of
Lenlen Rayco was found lifeless, naked and bruised on the seashore. The medico-legal
report positively indicated that the victim was raped.
When apprehended by the police officers and was subjected to an investigation on 17
December 1996, the appellant admitted to the crime.
Six days after, on 23 December 1996, during custodial investigation, the appellant, assisted
by his counsel, executed an extrajudicial confession to the crime.
The appellant was charged of the crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.The accused
was arraigned and entered a not guilty plea. The lower court found him guilty. Hence, an
automatic review of the case was submitted to the Supreme Court.
Issues
WON the extrajudicial confession of the appellant was admissible
WON the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
Ruling
The decision of the lower court was affirmed and was modified. The accused was found
guilty of the crime of statutory rape.
Ratio Decidendi
The appellant avers that his extrajudicial confession, and admissions therein, should be
considered a fruit of a poisonous tree and being such, should be inadmissible as evidence
against him. The Court disagrees. The Court finds the extrajudicial confession in compliance
with the strict constitutional requirements of the right to counsel as enshrined in Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. The Court observed that
the confession itself expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such
rights
Further, the appellant claimed that his confession was induced by a threat against his life.
The Court took cognizance, however, of his failure to present evidence to prove such threat
and neither did he file any case against the person who threatened him nor did he report
such incident to his counsel. He also claimed that he did not understand the contents of the
confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan
dialect in his daily discourse.
The Court also noted that even if improper interrogation methods were used at the start, it
does not bar the possibility of having a valid confession by properly interrogating the
subject.
With regards to the second query, appellant alleges that the lower court erred in convicting
him of the crime of rape with homicide sentencing him of the death penalty despite of the
insufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove his guilt.
The Court sustained the appellants conviction on the crime of rape based on his admission
to the said crime, the medico-legal report and the witness testimony proving the corpus
delicti but held that there was no sufficient evidence to prove that the appellant killed the
victim or that the rape committed caused the death of the victim. Therefore, he cannot be
convicted of the said special complex crime as that would raise a reasonable doubt to his
guilt.
The Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime only that of statutory rape,
the victim being 11 years old, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 145566
March 9, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
DINDO "BEBOT" MOJELLO, appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On automatic review is a decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61,
finding appellant Dindo "Bebot" Mojello guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with
homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of death. 1
Appellant Dindo Mojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape with homicide in an
Information dated May 22, 1997, as follows:2
That on the 15th day of December 1996, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, at Sitio Kota,
Barangay Talisay, Municipality of Santa Fe, Province of Cebu, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, moved by lewd design and
by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously succeed in having carnal knowledge with Lenlen Rayco under twelve (12) years
of age and with mental deficiency, against her will and consent, and by reason and/or on the
occasion thereof, purposely to conceal the most brutal act and in pursuance of his criminal
design, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill, treacherously and employing personal violence, attack, assault and kill the
victim Lenlen Rayco, thereby inflicting upon the victim wounds on the different parts of her
body which caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Appellant was arraigned on July 24, 1997, entering a plea of "not guilty." Trial followed.
On January 21, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
From the facts found by the court a quo, it appears that on December 15, 1996, at or around 9:00
p.m., Rogelio Rayco was having some drinks with a group which included Roger Capacito and his
wife and the spouses Borah and Arsolin Illustrismo at the Capacito residence located at Barangay
Talisay, Sta. Fe, Cebu.3
Rogelio Rayco left the group to go home about an hour later. On his way home, he saw his niece,
Lenlen Rayco, with appellant Dindo Mojello, a nephew of Roger Capacito, walking together some
thirty meters away towards the direction of Sitio Kota.4 Since he was used to seeing them together
on other occasions, he did not find anything strange about this. He proceeded to his house. 5
On December 16, 1996, between 5:00 to 6:00 a.m., the Rayco family was informed that the body of
Lenlen was found at the seashore of Sitio Kota. Rogelio Rayco immediately proceeded to the site
and saw the lifeless, naked and bruised body of his niece. Rogelio was devastated by what he saw.
A remorse of conscience enveloped him for his failure to protect his niece. He even attempted to
take his own life several days after the incident.6
Appellant was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City.
On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, he admitted that he was the perpetrator
of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial
interrogation. His confession was witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and
Manolo Landao. Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document were
read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. 7 Appellant's extrajudicial confession was sworn
before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan. 8 On
December 21, 1996, an autopsy was conducted on the victim's cadaver by Dr. Nestor Sator of the
Medico-Legal Branch of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Region VII.9
Dr. Sator testified that the swelling of the labia majora and hymenal lacerations positively indicate
that the victim was raped.10 He observed that froth in the lungs of the victim and contusions on her
neck show that she was strangled and died of asphyxia.11 He indicated the cause of death as cardiorespiratory arrest due to asphyxia by strangulation and physical injuries to the head and the trunk. 12
In this automatic review, appellant raises two issues: whether the extrajudicial confession executed
by appellant is admissible in evidence; and whether appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape with homicide.
We now resolve.
Appellant alleges that the lower court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged extrajudicial
confession which he executed on December 23, 1996. In his Brief, appellant avers that the
confession which he executed was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. 13 He argues
that he was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before the confession
was taken from him.14 Hence, his confession, and admissions made therein, should be deemed
inadmissible in evidence, under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
We are not convinced.
At the core of the instant case is the application of the law on custodial investigation enshrined in
Article III, Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
The above provision in the fundamental Charter embodies what jurisprudence has termed as
"Miranda rights" stemming from the landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, Miranda
v. Arizona.15 It has been the linchpin of the modern Bill of Rights, and the ultimate refuge of
individuals against the coercive power of the State.
The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to
remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the
right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being
questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he
so desires.
In the Philippines, the right to counsel espoused in the Miranda doctrine was based on the leading
case of People v. Galit16 and Morales, Jr. v. Enrile,17 rulings subsequently incorporated into the
present Constitution. The Mirandadoctrine under the 1987 Charter took on a modified form where
the right to counsel was specifically qualified to mean competent and independent counsel
preferably of the suspect's own choice. Waiver of the right to counsel likewise provided for stricter
requirements compared to its American counterpart; it must be done in writing, and in the presence
of counsel.
Verily, it may be observed that the Philippine law on custodial investigation has evolved to provide
for more stringent standards than what was originally laid out in Miranda v. Arizona. The purpose
of the constitutional limitations on police interrogation as the process shifts from the investigatory to
the accusatory seems to be to accord even the lowliest and most despicable criminal suspects a
measure of dignity and respect. The main focus is the suspect, and the underlying mission of
custodial investigation to elicit a confession.
The extrajudicial confession executed by appellant on December 23, 1996, applying Art. III, Sec. 12,
par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2 complies with the strict
constitutional requirements on the right to counsel. In other words, the extrajudicial confession of the
appellant is valid and therefore admissible in evidence.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was undoubtedly apprised of
his Miranda rights under the Constitution.18 The court a quo observed that the confession itself
expressly states that the investigating officers informed him of such rights. 19 As further proof of the
same, Atty. Isaias Giduquio testified that while he was attending a Sangguniang Bayan session, he
was requested by the Chief of Police of Sta. Fe to assist appellant.20Appellant manifested on record
his desire to have Atty. Giduquio as his counsel, with the latter categorically stating that before the
investigation was conducted and appellant's statement taken, he advised appellant of his
constitutional rights. Atty. Giduquio even told appellant to answer only the questions he understood
freely and not to do so if he was not sure of his answer.21 Atty. Giduquio represented appellant during
the initial stages of the trial of the present case.
Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of appellant within the contemplation of
the Constitution. No evidence was presented to negate his competence and independence in
representing appellant during the custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the
record that Atty. Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer
by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent
attorneys from handling the defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in
the hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the interrogation by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to protect his interest. 22
We ruled in People v. Continente23 that while the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under
custodial interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred lawyer is not
available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the suspect has the final choice as he may
reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is
deemed engaged by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter subscribes to the
veracity of the statement before the swearing officer.24
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never prevent an accused from
freely and voluntarily telling the truth. In People v. Dumalahay,25 this Court held:
The sworn confessions of the three accused show that they were properly apprised of their
right to remain silent and right to counsel, in accordance with the constitutional guarantee.
At 8:00 in the morning of the next day, the three accused proceeded to the office of Atty.
Rexel Pacuribot, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. All of the
three accused, still accompanied by Atty. Ubay-ubay, subscribed and swore to their
respective written confessions. Before administering the oaths, Atty. Pacuribot reminded the
three accused of their constitutional rights under the Miranda doctrine and verified that their
statements were voluntarily given. Atty. Pacuribot also translated the contents of each
confession in the Visayan dialect, to ensure that each accused understood the same before
signing it.
No ill-motive was imputed on these two lawyers to testify falsely against the accused. Their
participation in these cases merely involved the performance of their legal duties as officers
of the court. Accused-appellant Dumalahay's allegation to the contrary, being self-serving,
cannot prevail over the testimonies of these impartial and disinterested witnesses.
More importantly, the confessions are replete with details which could possibly be supplied
only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied. These factors are
clear indicia that the confessions were voluntarily given.
When the details narrated in an extrajudicial confession are such that they could not have
been concocted by one who did not take part in the acts narrated, where the claim of
maltreatment in the extraction of the confession is unsubstantiated and where abundant
evidence exists showing that the statement was voluntarily executed, the confession is
admissible against the declarant. There is greater reason for finding a confession to be
voluntary where it is corroborated by evidence aliunde which dovetails with the essential
facts contained in such confession.
The confessions dovetail in all their material respects. Each of the accused gave the same
detailed narration of the manner by which Layagon and Escalante were killed. This clearly
shows that their confessions could not have been contrived. Surely, the three accused could
not have given such identical accounts of their participation and culpability in the crime were
it not the truth.
Concededly, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's apprehension by the
police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2)
improper waiver of the right to counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
However, the December 23, 1996 custodial investigation which elicited the appellant's confession
should nevertheless be upheld for having complied with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1. Even though
improper interrogation methods were used at the outset, there is still a possibility of obtaining a
legally valid confession later on by properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and
circumstances than those which prevailed originally.26
The records of this case clearly reflect that the appellant freely, voluntarily and intelligently entered
into the extrajudicial confession in full compliance with the Miranda doctrine under Art. III, Sec. 12,
par. 1 of the Constitution in relation to Rep. Act No. 7438, Sec. 2. SPO2 Wilfredo Abello Giducos,
prior to conducting his investigation, explained to appellant his constitutional rights in the Visayan
dialect, notably Cebuano, a language known to the appellant, viz:27
PASIUNA (PRELIMINARY) : Ikaw karon Dindo Mojello ubos sa usa ka inbestigasyon diin
ikaw gituhon nga adunay kalabutan sa kamatayon ni LENLEN RAYCO ug nahitabong
paglugos kaniya. Ubos sa atong Batakang Balaod, ikaw adunay katungod sa pagpakahilom
ning maong inbesigasyon karon kanimo ug aduna usab ikaw ug katungod nga katabangan
ug usa ka abogado nga motabang karon kanimo ning maong inbestigasyon. Imo ba
nasabtan kining tanan? (DINDO MOJELLO, you are hereby reminded that you are under
investigation in which you were suspected about the death and raping of LENLEN RAYCO.
Under the Constitution you have the right to remain silent about this investigation on you now
and you have also the right to have counsel of your own choice to assist you in this
investigation now. Have you understood everything?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Human ikaw sayri sa imong katungod ubos sa atong Batakang
Balaod sa pagpakahilom, gusto ba nimo nga ipadayon nato kining inbestigasyon karon
kanimo? (After you have been apprised of your rights under our Constitution to remain silent,
do you want to proceed this investigation on you now?)
TUBAG (QUESTION) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Gusto ba usab nimo ug abogado nga makatabang kanimo ning
maong inbestigasyon? (Do you want counsel to assist you in this said investigation?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
APPEARANCE : Atty. Isaias Giduquio is appearing as counsel of the affiant.
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Ako usab ikaw pahinumdoman nga unsa man ang imo isulti
karon dinhi magamit pabor o batok kanimo sa Hukmanan, nasabtan ba nimo kining tanan
mo nga mga katungod nga walay naghulga, nagpugos o nagdagmal kanimo o nagsaad ba
ug ganti sa kaulihan? (You are also hereby reminded that all your statements now will be
used as evidence against or in your favor in any court of justice. Have you understood all
your rights with nobody coercing or forcing you, or mauling or promising a reward in the
end?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo (Yes.)
PANGUTANA (QUESTION) : Andam ka nga mohatag ug libre ug boluntaryo nga
pamahayag? (Are you now ready to give your free and voluntary statement?)
TUBAG (ANSWER) : Oo, sir. (Yes, sir.)
xxx
xxx
xxx
xxx
x x x.
(START OF CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION)
xxx
The trial court observed that as to the confession of appellant, he was fully apprised of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and his right to counsel, as contained in such
confession.28 Appellant was properly assisted by Atty. Isaias Giduquio. The extrajudicial confession
of appellant was subscribed and sworn to before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca, Municipal Judge of
Medellin-Daanbantayan and acting Judge of MCTC Sta. Fe-Bantayan and Madredijos. Judge Jaca
declared that he explained to the appellant the contents of the extrajudicial confession and asked if
he understood it. He subsequently acknowledged that when appellant subscribed to his statement,
Atty. Giduquio, witness Batobalonos and his Clerk of Court were present as well as other people. 29
The extrajudicial confession executed by the appellant followed the rigid requirements of the
Miranda doctrine; consequently, it is admissible as evidence. The lower court was correct in giving
credence to the extrajudicial confession of the appellant.
On cross-examination, appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to
execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the person who
threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further claimed that he did not understand
the contents of the confession which was read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses
the Visayan dialect in his daily discourse.
In People v. Pia,30 we held that "where appellants did not present evidence of compulsion or duress
or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to officers who administered the oaths;
where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged maltreatment;
where there appears no marks of violence on their bodies and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors
indicating voluntariness of confessions." The failure of the appellant to complain to the swearing
officer or to file charges against the persons who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the
chances to do so, manifests voluntariness in the execution of his confessions. 31 To hold otherwise is
to facilitate the retraction of his statements at the mere allegation of threat, torture, coercion,
intimidation or inducement, without any proof whatsoever. People v. Enanoria further declared that
another indicium of voluntariness is the disclosure of details in the confession which could have
been known only to the declarant.32
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with duress, compulsion or
coercion by substantiating his claim with independent evidence other than his own self-serving
claims that the admissions in his affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. 33 Bare assertions will
certainly not suffice to overturn the presumption.34
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether the defendant's will was
overborne at the time he confessed.35 In cases where the Miranda warnings have been given, the
test of voluntariness should be subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of
the confession.
Accordingly, the presumption of voluntariness of appellant's confession remains unrebutted by his
failure to present independent evidence that the same was coerced.
It cannot be gainsaid that the constitutional duty of law enforcement officers is to ensure that a
suspect has been properly apprised of his Miranda rights, including the right to counsel. It is in the
paramount public interest that the foundation of an effective administration of criminal justice relies
on the faithful adherence to the Miranda doctrine. Compliance with Art. III, Sec. 12, par. 1 by police
authorities is central to the criminal justice system; Miranda rights must in every case be respected,
without exception.
Thus, the confession, having strictly complied with the constitutional requirements under Art. III, Sec.
12, par. 1, is deemed admissible in evidence against appellant. It follows that the admission of
culpability made therein is admissible. It is therefore not "fruit of the poisonous tree" since the tree
itself is not poisonous.
Appellant also alleges that the lower court gravely erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, thereby sentencing him to suffer the death penalty despite
the glaring insufficiency of circumstantial evidence against him. In his Brief, he argues that the
evidence against him is insufficient to warrant his conviction of rape with homicide.
The categorical admission of the appellant to the crime of rape, coupled with the corpus delicti as
established by the Medico-Legal Report and the testimony of Rogelio Rayco, leads us to no other
conclusion than that of appellant's guilt for the rape of Lenlen Rayco on December 15, 1996. It
passes the test of moral certainty and must therefore be sustained.
However, the records do not adequately show that appellant admitted to killing the victim. Neither is
the circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish that by reason or on the occasion of the rape a
homicide was committed by the appellant. The lack of physical evidence further precludes us from
connecting the slaying of the victim to her sexual assault, given the quantum of proof required by law
for conviction. No estimated time of death was given, which is essential in making a connection with
the appellant's story that he went home after a night of drinking. The time when he and the victim
were headed towards the seashore at or about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m. of December 15, 1996 until the
time when the victim's lifeless body was found at or about 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1996 had a
time variance of between six to seven hours. Although the circumstances may point to the appellant
as the most likely perpetrator of the homicide, the same do not constitute an unbroken chain of
events which would lead us to a reasonable conclusion that appellant was guilty of killing the victim.
In other words, there are gaps in the reconstruction of facts and inferences surrounding the death of
Lenlen. Appellant only admitted to boxing the victim when she shouted, then hurriedly ran away. The
cause of death of Lenlen was cardio-respiratory attack due to asphyxiation and physical injuries; she
was strangled to death and left on the seashore as manifested by the frothing in her lungs. No
physical, scientific or DNA evidence was presented to pinpoint appellant as the person who killed the
victim. Fingerprints, if available, would have determined who committed the homicide. Thus,
appellant cannot be convicted of rape with homicide considering the insufficiency of evidence which
thereby created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt for the said special complex crime.
Appellant should instead be held liable only for the crime of statutory rape, the victim Lenlen Rayco
being then eleven years old. The sexual assault was necessarily included in the special complex
crime charged in the Information dated May 22, 1997.
The trial court should have awarded damages to the heirs of the victim. Civil indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 is awarded upon the finding of the fact of rape. 36 Moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 may likewise be given to the heirs of the victim without need of proof in accordance with
current jurisprudence.37
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bogo, Cebu,
Branch 61 in Criminal Case No. B-00224 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Dindo
Mojello is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of statutory rape and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Lenlen
Rayco, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
