BIRR Guidebook - The Way Forward (English)

The Way Forward
An Islamic Mentoring Guide to

Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation
BIRR Initiative Research Team
The Way Forward is an educational resource intended for youth, mentors, teachers and parents, as well as
various service providers such as schools, government departments, police and community organisations.
The Way Forward was produced by the BIRR Initiative Research Team and published by
Al Amanah College.
The Department of Immigration and Citizenship provides funding to organisations under the Nation
Action Plan community project funding program. The views expressed in this publication are those of
the BIRR Initiative Research Team engaged by Al Amanah College.
For any further information regarding this publication please contact the
BIRR Research Team Leader at [email protected]
ISBN 978-0-646-49483-8
Edition 1
June 2008
Australia
Page 2
AYAH1 2 OF SURAT2 AL-MAIDAH3 IN THE QURAN MEANS
COLLABORATE WITH ONE ANOTHER IN

BIRR (VIRTUE) AND TAQWA (PIETY),
AND DO NOT COLLABORATE IN
SIN AND AGGRESSION.
1
2
3
VERSE
A SURAT IS A COLLECTION OF QURANIC VERSES SUCH AS A CHAPTER
NAME OF THE SURAT
An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation
Page 3
Page 4
Contents
PREFACE .......................................................................................6
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................8
ACADEMIC ENDORSEMENTS ..................................................10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................13
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................15
DEFINITION OF TERMS.............................................................18
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ...................................................20
PARTS SUMMARY .......................................................................22
PART 1 Vulnerability Factors to Extremism ...............................23
PART 2 The Theology of Extremism ............................................37
PART 3 The Radicalisation Model ..............................................48
PART 4 Counter-Narratives to Extremism .................................57
PART 5 Preventing Radicalisation in Practice ...........................83
APPENDIX 1 .................................................................................97
APPENDIX 2 .................................................................................98
APPENDIX 3 .................................................................................103
APPENDIX 4 .................................................................................111
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to Building
Identityand
andResisting
ResistingRadicalisation
Radicalisation
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to Building
Identity
Page 5
Preface
he BIRR Initiative is a pilot community project established in south-west

Sydney. Initiated by Al Amanah College and funded by the Department of
Immigration and Citizenship, the project is a response to recommendations

proposed by the Muslim Community Reference Group (MCRG) and its subgroups
for consideration in the development and implementation of the Australian
Governments Nation Action Plan to Build on Social Cohesion, Harmony and
Security.
BIRR is the acronym for Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation. The
word birr, which was mentioned in the verse above, is also the Arabic word for
goodwill and virtue. Its choice as the name for this initiative symbolises the energy
channelled towards assisting at-risk Muslim youth to discover their identity in an
Australian context, and to enhance their capacity to build a positive Australian
Muslim identity.
With leadership development being the cornerstone of the BIRR Initiative, our
objective is to equip youth with the knowledge and skills as derived from
Islamic values and virtues necessary to resist negative influences and social
disengagement, such as extremist standpoints.
Counter-Radicalisation is a new area of government action and community
activity, which presents particular challenges and ongoing complexities. It
therefore warrants numerous innovative and exploratory approaches such as the
groundbreaking BIRR Initiative.
The BIRR Initiative establishes a model for the ongoing development of wholeof-community approaches to confronting extremism and the radicalisation
of young Muslim Australians. This is a very complex and sensitive field of
Page 6
Preface (cont.)
preventive intervention that considers the issues of religious identity, religious
extremism, terrorism and counter-terrorism, religious and ethnic discrimination
and marginalisation, social disadvantage, national citizenship and identity,
globalisation, politics and identity, and governmental concerns about security.
Given this level of complexity, the guidebook assists us all in navigating a path
through this complex issue. It will assist us in more clearly defining our shared
responsibilities in response to a multilayered and fluid problem.
The outcomes and lessons learned of the BIRR Initiative should be used as
inspiration for young mentors, community workers and organisations, religious
leaders and family members concerned about the vulnerability factors that lead
some Muslim youth towards a negative path of extremism and radicalisation in
the name of Islam. However, in utilising the research and approach articulated
by this book, one must recognise that the BIRR Initiative is the first of its kind
in Australia and its outcomes are based on the community consulted, which is in
south-west Sydney.
It is very clear that this preventive community work is far broader in its scope
than simply relying on security-driven measures alone. Given that we are forging
an innovative set of practices that transforms the Australian secular conceptions
of a preventive approach, it has to be emphasised that it is a work-in-progress.
It will continue to be refined by future evaluations for its exacting standards of
community consultation and networking for community leadership. It is perhaps
worth noting that this kind of initiative requires both a whole-of-community
strategy and a whole-of-government approach.
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to to
Building
Identity
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
Building
Identityand
andResisting
Radicalisation
Page 7
Acknowledgements
t is with great pride and honour that I embraced the opportunity to oversee the BIRR
Initiative Project and to guide its committed and qualified team. I am grateful to the
Project Team Leader Mr. Mustapha Kara-Ali for his dedication and commitment towards
ensuring the success of this pioneering community project as well as for the authoring of
this significant publication.
The BIRR Research Team comprised expert researchers in the field of Islamic Theology,
Social Science and Psychology. Dr Hersi Hilole, an academic in Theology, directed a
study group and helped bring together international and local academics and
analysts, who generously commented on draft chapters and contributed their own
firsthand observations. Ms Dominiek Coates, a counsellor and social researcher, who
has previously worked with vulnerable youth using narrative therapy, researched the
vulnerability factors related to extremism and ensured that relevant chapters
remained procedural and scientific. Dr Mark Kelly, from the University of Sydney,
provided tremendous editing support to validate the coherence of the documents
five parts.
Special thanks also go to the steering committee members for the critical role they
played in overseeing the review process of the project plans, policies and documentation.
Committee member Associate Professor Barbara Pamphilon from the School of Education
and Community Studies University of Canberra ensured that the project remained
focused on capacity building and youth empowerment as a way of undermining social
disintegration. Mr Andrew Singh from the Australian Institute of Police Management
helped in setting up the initial project framework and provided the project team
leader, Mr. Kara-Ali, with the opportunity to attend a management training course at
the institute and to deliver a critical presentation at an international policing conference.
My gratitude also goes to the third steering committee member, the Muslim Community
Radio 2mfm (92.1FM), for giving in-kind support by providing the volunteers associated
with the project on-air time to broadcast BIRR-related community messages.
Page 8
Page 8
Page 8
Acknowledgements (cont.)
The BIRR Research Team is indeed fortunate to have had worked in consultation with
a wide range of community leaders and organisations, and to work with a number of
passionate young community leaders and volunteers who generously contributed their
own time to ensure the success of the project activities. I commend these young
leaders and volunteers for their time and effort.
I am confident that this project has, to date, achieved its desired objectives and has
met community expectations. Undoubtedly, this significant publication is a great
contribution to the way forward for Australian Muslims.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge the Department of Immigration and
Citizenship for providing funding for this project.
Mr Mohamed El Dana
Project Executive Director
Principal of Al Amanah College
Page 9
Academic Endorsements
This guide is an exceptional publication that successfully understands and counters
radicalization. Based on extensive field research, it will serve as an exemplary study to
train counsellors and mentor Muslims exposed to the extremist narrative. Investing
in building an ideological counter weight to extremism is the key to future peace and
security. Today, theologians are as important as counter terrorism practitioners. The
guide is well researched, well written and well presented. As the head of a specialist
centre for the study of terrorism and political violence in Singapore, I work with
a range of governmental and non-governmental partners to counter radicalization
in our societies. To popularize the concept of countering radicalization, we are
working with partners in Jakarta and in Manila. At the invitation of the Iraqi and US
governments, we traveled to Iraq and helped the US Detainee Task Force to develop
a rehabilitation program in their detention centres. We congratulate the Australians
for having produced such an impressive counselling guide.
- Dr Rohan Gunaratna Ph.D. FRSA, Head of International Centre for Political
Violence and Terrorism Research, Singapore
This book makes an important contribution to the national debate on the processes
of radicalisation. In Australia, this subject has attracted a great deal of attention since
the Operation Pendennis arrests in Sydney and Melbourne in November 2006. It
is clear that Federal and State agencies are seeking greater insight into the specific
pathways towards radicalisation in this country and are looking to community groups
for ideas on appropriate counter-radicalisation policies. The book will make a useful
contribution to current policy debates. On the whole, the guidebook is well written.
The policy recommendations are sound and supported by the available evidence. The
case study on Ahmed is interesting and provides critical insights into the thinking and
sociological influences on young Muslim men in Australia. One of the BIRR reports
main strengths lies in its analysis of traditional Islamic theology and the way in which
extremists such as Abd Al-Wahhab, Sayyid Qutb and others have distorted Quranic
teachings. The key policy recommendation concerns the theological refutation of
extremism, through the development of a counter-narrative against extremism. This
is an important and critical step in providing greater resilience among the Australian
Page 10
Academic Endorsements (cont.)

Muslim community against the kind of radical extremism that has infected other
Western metropolitan centres such as London. A counter-narrative will only be
one (albeit an important) element in an overall strategy. I strongly support BIRRs
ongoing community outreach efforts and I commend the guidebook as an important
contribution to the debate.
- Dr Carl Ungerer, School of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Queensland
The BIRR Initiative is the first of its kind in Australia, establishing a model for the
ongoing development of whole-of-community approaches for confronting extremism
and the radicalisation of young Muslim Australians. The Guidebooks well-developed
use of theological counter-narratives to the narratives of extremists - in what
is usually in Australia a secular approach to preventive work - is an innovation in
mentoring programs that responds to the contingencies of the problem at hand.
Furthermore, the Guidebook maps out a pragmatic account of the radicalisation
process and of the responsibilities of different agencies, even though its emphasis
is on whole-of-community networks within the Australian Muslim community.It is
clear from the section on Research Methodology that the developmental work of the
Initiative has met good practice guidelines for gaining stakeholder input, including
the importance of active input from Muslim youth in Southwest Sydney. This seems
very important not only from the point of view of inclusiveness but also given the
programs emphasis on community-based responses, of which these young people
may eventually be enlisted into active citizenship. This practice guidebook is to be
commended for its seminal work and for the kind of active citizenship it seeks to
facilitate within Australian Muslim communities. It is very clear that this preventive
community work is far more far-reaching in its scope than simply relying on securitydriven measures. It is perhaps worth noting that this work not only requires a wholeof-community strategy but also a whole-of-government approach.
- Dr Craig Osmond, Lecturer in Criminology, School of Social Sciences, University
of Western Sydney
Page 11
Academic Endorsements (cont.)

The book is an excellent initiative and I particularly liked the narrative/counter
narrative approach which I thought was very effective, as was the use of Ahmed and
his struggle. The book will undoubtedly assist the community to counter extremism
and I commend the publication. The language used in the book is appropriate for
social workers, families, the media and the government. The information contained
in the book is first class. It is important that readers understand that the book was
written by members of the Muslim community, albeit funded by DIAC.
- Associate Professor Nick OBrien, Australian Graduate School of Policing,
Charles Sturt University
This document is a unique, carefully researched and constructed, contribution to the

aims of counter-radicalisation _ a new area of governmental action that necessarily
requires the collaboration of sympathetic community-based organisations. I find
much of its substance very sound and well put. On the whole, it makes a most useful
contribution to the wider analysis and understanding of extremism, and overall it
achieves its aims well. I would wish to commend the project and the authors of the
book for a bold and timely development. A great beginning has been made.
- Associate Professor Douglas Pratt, Dept of Philosophy and Religious Studies,
University of Waikato, NZ
Page 12
Executive Summary
he BIRR Initiative is a project funded by the Australian Federal Government and

by the Australian Muslim community. So far, it has conducted exploratory work
and research into the possibilities of working with at-risk Muslim youth in south-west
Sydney to protect them from the influence of the narratives and propaganda of extremist
groups. The initiative is designed to primarily target extremist groups operating within
the theological parameters of global extremist networks that claim the name of Islam.
This book is the outcome of this exploratory pilot work and constitutes the foundational
stone for the next phase of our work, which is the engagement with at-risk Muslim youth
in Australia to build on their strength in preventing their radicalisation.
Our aim is to provide a guide for use by people who will work under the auspices of the
BIRR Initiative with youth who are at-risk of radicalisation or who have been radicalised.
This will include young mentors, community workers, religious leaders and family
members.
We begin by explaining what vulnerability factors lead to radicalisation. We draw here
both on current academic research and our own research conducted among our target
group.
Research from these two sources gives us
a coherent picture of the factors that lead
to radicalisation. There is no one cause of
a movement to extreme postures, and no
common feature shared by all youth who are
radicalised. Rather, there are a number of risk
factors amongst youth-at-risk, which include a
perception of injustice, a sense of persecution,
a feeling of rejection by the general Australian
community and/or the Muslim community,
and confusion about how to reconcile being Muslim and being Australian. Our interim
findings indicate that these factors are not a shared trait amongst all Muslim youth in
Research from
these two sources
gives us a coherent
picture of the
factors that lead to
radicalisation...
Page 13
Executive Summary (cont.)

south-west Sydney.
Furthermore, the research indicates that these factors do not, by themselves, lead to
extremism. Rather, they are factors that make people, particularly youths at-risk whose
identities are still in formation, vulnerable to the intervention of extremists and extremist
propaganda.
Our BIRR strategy in combating this is twofold. Our primary approach is to counter
the extremists and their propaganda head-on with theological counter-narratives to
their narratives. This methodology is grounded within a counselling framework. These
counter-narratives serve to defuse the narratives of extremism, and collectively point
towards an alternative way to understand ones Muslim identity one which sees being
Muslim as a positive force in society and that encourages direct participation in Australian
community life.
This alternative understanding of Muslim identity is cemented by our second approach,
which is found in the direct contact with mentors and other Australian Muslim youth
in the setting through which we put forward our counter-narratives. This recognises the
powerful role played by peer groups in bringing youth into the path of extremism. So, our
overall approach simultaneously offers an alternative way for youths to understand their
Muslim identity positively, while also encouraging the formation of social networks with
other positively engaged Australian Muslims.
Page 14
Introduction
he time since 9/11 has been a period of intense reflection and mixed emotions
for Muslim minorities living in the West. In Australia this period has seen new
challenges and dangers emerge for the Muslim community, associated both with
Western misunderstanding of Islam in respect to Al-Qaedas terrorism and the active
misrepresentation of Islam by extremists endorsing terrorism.
In the last decade, with the advent of the internet, satellite TV channels and the
adoption of electronic distribution methods, extremist pamphleteers have been
able to spread their worldview. They have cashed in on identity crisis and religious
ignorance. Their prime targets have been the Muslim youth. Young Muslim people
growing up in Australia are affected by the tumultuous world situation in which
Western nations are explicitly at war with Al-Qaeda terrorists and their affiliates. This
has produced a fertile ground for extremist propaganda.
The words of the Australian Prime Minister embody the anxiety from the point of
view of the wider Australian community towards this problem. There are a number
of people in our community who are a danger to all of us, not many but some, and we
have an obligation to try and identify them, to neutralise them, to prevent them from
influencing others, particularly the young, the PM stated1.
Young Australian Muslims who were interviewed and spoken to in the BIRR Initiative
were themselves quick to point out their loathing of extremism-based militancy
driven by a global Al-Qaeda network claiming the name of their religion. They saw
extremism as a real threat in their community, to security and to the true image of
Islam. They are simply fed up with their religion being hijacked by fringe extremist
groups that receive much media attention.
The problem of extremism finds fertile ground in social and economic marginalisation,
but such marginalisation does not spawn extremism or terrorism by itself. Rather,
this extremism is a global ideology, motivated by political grievances and justified
1 Muslims Summit in Canberra, August 23, 2005. The summit was called by the Prime Minister, John
Howard, in the wake of the London bombings.
Page 15
Introduction (cont.)
by problematic misinterpretations of
Islam. Thus, the threat of extremism must
primarily be defeated by debunking the
narratives and ideologies that underpin it,
and channelling the grievances of Muslims
to constructive social, economic and
political activity to end their problems. The
BIRR Initiative is itself an example of an attempt by Australian Muslims to engage
constructively with the problems facing Muslims in this country, one which has a
fundamental aim to propagate a culture of constructive engagement among Muslim
Australians, particularly youth the most vulnerable and marginalised section of the
community.
... but such

marginalisation
does not by itself
spawn extremism ...
Effective intellectual and theological counter-narratives to extremism are a spiritual

force that can inspire Muslim youth away from subscribing to extremist tendencies
and groups. It serves as an antidote to the single extremist narrative.
In this book, we examine the key factors that have caused and sustained extremism,
as well as the main doctrinal tenets of extremism. The book is a contribution to the
ongoing struggle taking place inside the Muslim community, in which the extremists
are making claims for legitimacy, authenticity and moral high ground. This struggle
of global significance is an ideas battle for hearts and minds.
Our aim is to root out the means by which extremist groups operate in our community.
We do this by giving the community a counter-narrative with theological refutations
based on the mainstream Muslim perspective, supported by practical radicalisationresisting strategies. This is designed to protect Australian Muslims against extremism
and especially its vulnerable youth who are the extremists prime targets. This
scheme should over time eradicate extremism from the community. Of course, the
success of this mission depends on the dedication of adequate resources by various
stakeholders.
Page 16
Introduction (cont.)
In developing the book, we were motivated by the collective duty of protecting the
image of Islam from those who cause havoc and ruin its good name. The book is a
foundational work for preserving the message and wisdoms of Islam as the critical
process of generational handover takes place between the first generation Muslim
migrants and those Australian-raised children for whose identity Islam is a primary
factor.
The religiosity that dominates the life of many Muslim youth cannot be eliminated
and nor should it be. Instead, it has to be steered through education in the right
direction, away from misinterpretations and extremism in the name of Islam. The
moral and spiritual compass that develops from correct understanding of Islam will
then aid them to be better engaged members of society, acting as a positive force. This
will help to ease the anxieties of the wider Australian community towards Australian
Muslims, contributing towards the national project of building on social coexistence,
peace and security.
Page 17
Definition of Terms
istorically, the Muslim world has known extremist sects, groups and factions
many like Al-Qaeda that have claimed to draw upon the resources of Islam to
sanction their views and actions. This form of extremism, known in Islamic discourse
as at-tatarruf1 or al-ghuluww, can be understood and defined from an Islamic
reference point, which consists of Muslim scholarly positions based on traditional
and well established Islamic standards of morality, belief and practice. This is known
in Islamic discourse as al-i`tidal (moderation).
It was said: The moderate path is described in the Quran in Ayah 143 in Surat
Al-Baqarah, which means: Indeed, Allah has made the Muslim ummah (nation of
Islam) a middle just nation. Those claiming the name of Islam, who do not follow
the Quranic true path based on its normative standards as determined by the ijma`
(Muslim scholarly consensus), are not moderates, but extremists. In fact, Islam is an
ideal practice and a path of moderation that does not admit or sanction extremism.
The basis and thrust of our strategy in this book is to counter the phenomenon of
extremism claiming the name of Islam. This is through recourse to ideals that are of
the Religions essence and heart.
Extremism
Extremism claiming the name of Islam is defined from an Islamic
reference point as the beliefs, utterances and actions that do not conform
to the Muslim scholarly positions of established Islamic practice
or standards. In the BIRR Initiative, we respond to the subsection of
extremism that was founded by the authors and ideologues of Al-Qaeda
and its network of affiliates.
1 Refer to Appendix 4 System of Transliteration for how this document writes Arabic letters with
English characters
Page 18
Definition of Terms (cont.)
Radicalisation
Radicalisation in the BIRR Initiative is defined as the process of
adopting, promoting or acting upon extremist beliefs. It is the process
that indoctrinates a vulnerable individual and then activates them
from a latent extremist mind-state to an overt extremist actionstate. Radicalisation is subdivided into three distinct phases: (1)
indoctrination, (2) activation and (3) terrorism (the three phases are
described further in Part 3).
Page 19
Research Methodology
he strategies and research presented in this book are developed from a twofold
research methodology that includes:
Research conducted with the projects target community of south-west

Sydney1; and
Academic research and analysis.
First, empirical data and anecdotal evidence

were collected from the contribution of a
diverse group of young Muslims and their
leaders, totalling about 210 participants.
The data collection process was based on 7
focus groups and sessions involving about
160 youth participants (some including
parents) and over 50 interviews conducted
with Muslim youth leaders, parents, Imams and community leaders in south-west
Sydney.
... a diverse group

of young Muslims
and their leaders
totalling about 210
participants.
The 7 focus groups were conducted at the BIRR Initiative office to include a wide
cross-section of Australian Muslims from within south-west Sydney, ranging from
high school students to university students, youth in the workforce to unemployed
youth and school dropouts. In total, around 160 young people participated, both
young females and males ranging in age from 15 to 26 years. The groups also
included youth from migrant Muslim backgrounds as well as some converts to Islam.
There was a broad representation of ethnic communities, including Middle-Eastern
backgrounds as well as some Africans and South-Asians. Furthermore, about 50
meetings were held at various community locations with leaders and parents from
the Muslim community of south-west Sydney. This involved focused discussion, and
an opportunity to engage in a collaborative community process.
1 For a profile of the Muslim community of south-west Sydney, please refer to Appendix 1 Target
Community South-west Sydney.
Page 20
Research Methodology (cont.)

Information, anecdotes and perceptions were collated around the theme of extremism
and factors that lead to it. The questions the facilitators asked were based on the
consultation framework attached to this document in Appendix 2 Stakeholder
Consultation Framework & Questionnaires. The framework includes a set of questions
for Muslim youth, another for youth leaders and teachers, one for parents, and a last
set for leaders from mosques, schools and the general community. These questions
were formulated to help us assess whether or not and how such community sectors
and basic institutions within the Muslim community of south-west Sydney (families,
mosques, educational youth centres and schools) contribute to, or neutralise, the
spread of extremism in the community. South-west Sydney where the focus group
members and community leaders live include a diversity of suburbs ranging from
Lakemba to Belmore, Auburn, Granville, Bankstown, Liverpool and as far west as
Campbelltown.
Further, the academic research included a literature review on the issue of Muslim
youth identity and radicalisation, as well as an analysis of extremist discourse from
publicly available literature including pamphlets, websites and books. Local and
international academics from Yemen, Malaysia, New Zealand, United States and
England were also consulted.
The analysed data assisted the development of a strategy to work with Muslim
community groups and leaders to tackle extremism claiming the name of Islam,
and to enlist their support in assisting the Initiative to implement some of its initial
findings. This strategy will also form an opportunity for future discussion on this
critical theme. This requires collective community action.
Page 21
Parts Summary
The book is in five parts. In Part 1, we examine what makes Muslim youth
vulnerable to the ideology of extremism. In Part 2, we analyse the origins
and the theological framework of the ideology to try to understand it. In
Part 3, we analyse the Radicalisation Model used for recruiting vulnerable
youth. In Part 4, we offer a point-by-point refutation of that ideology,
producing counter-narratives to the claims made by extremists, for use in
mentoring young people influenced by extremism. In Part 5, we outline the
framework for preventing extremism, indicating the various directions in
which we are seeking to put our knowledge into practice. This is intended to
influence our youth, as well as the entire society of which they are a part.
Page 22
(cont.)
Page 23
Part 1
The vulnerability factors are broad sociopolitical preconditions for a climate
that is conducive to extremism, and which serves as the playground from
which extremists recruit. Through the use of focus groups, consultations
and general engagement with youth, we have surveyed the demands for
action that the community itself the youth and the leadership has voiced
and the inadequacies they themselves have identified in this regard.
Page 24
Part 1 (cont.)
Quick Points
n this section, we are not providing a complete snapshot of the rich and varied
lives of Muslim youth in Sydney. That would be a book in itself. Rather, we focus
on the weaknesses and the vulnerabilities facing Muslim youth on the streets of
south-west Sydney, as seen by the project team; although we also point to some of
the strengths in the community that may be channelled into capacity-building and
the prevention of extremism.
1. Among sections of second-generation Muslim youths living in south-west

Sydney, there are feelings of victimisation, low self-esteem, discrimination and
frustration. These feelings consistently showed in the focus groups and interviews
conducted, albeit only from some participants.
2. Some factors contributing to the above are: (a) perceived injustices of government
policies; (b) a public debate in which Muslims are sometimes maligned in the
media; (c) a sense of disenfranchisement and alienation due to a community
inter-generational divide; and (d) a community leadership crisis, especially when
it comes to the representation of the Muslim community in public.
3. It was observed that those with low self-esteem, those who are uncertain as
to how to behave with non-Muslims and those who have unresolved questions
about their place in society are more vulnerable to extremism. They did not exhibit
much investment in society, as they are not socially engaged. They are receptive
to narratives that seemingly give them a sense of belonging, whether extremist
narratives or narratives that explain their place in Australian society.
4. Some community leaders lack of awareness and proactivity adds to the
disillusionment of Muslim youth. There is a perception among some youth that
many organisations are pedestrian and ineffective, and that youth lack a voice and
a stake in political and civic institutions. The majority of the younger generation
Page 25
Part 1 (cont.)
aspires to better, more representative and more effective community leadership.

5. There is a sense among some disengaged Muslim youth that acceptance by society
is increasingly premised on assimilation and the assumption that they should lose
their Muslim identity. This sense of perceived exclusion and discrimination is of
particular relevance in the face of the challenges posed by radicalisation.
6. Many of the discussions during focus groups, and also as gathered through informal
discussions and phone conversations, focused on the need for a youth-oriented
resource in the form of an anti-extremism counter-narrative to help describe the
terrain within which radicalisation operates.
7. Muslim youth in south-west Sydney have many untold positive stories and personal
accounts, which means that the community has a great deposit of anecdotes and case
studies that could contribute to a guide for driving the positive transition of youth
at-risk of radicalisation.
8. A benevolent tendency is prevalent amongst Muslim youth to be charitable towards
troubled youth. As a result, it would be easy to find mentors and role models to guide
youth at-risk in discovering self-worth, personal value and inner strength.
This leads us to the following questions: Who is at risk of radicalisation? Who is

vulnerable to the lure of extremists? Is it those gullible who are easily brainwashed?
Or perhaps those who suffer from mental illness or personality disorders, or who are
criminals or psychopaths? Three decades of research indicates this is not the case. No
profile or personality of what makes a typical terrorist has as yet been identified. If
personality and mental illness are not main contributing factors to joining extremist
groups and ideologies, what is?
Page 26
Part 1 (cont.)
Case Study [Ahmed]
1. Lets consider the case of young Ahmed. He is in some ways a typical Muslim
Australian youth, but he is one of the unfortunate ones who, through a combination
of negative circumstances, becomes highly vulnerable to extremism:
This case is one typical profile for a youth who is vulnerable to extremism. But in fact
there is no one profile for such a youth. Signs of vulnerability have been detected among
both tertiary trained, middle-class young people and those who are unemployed and
disadvantaged. The case of young Ahmed has been depicted to serve as an illustration
for the book.
hmed is a 20-year-old LebaneseAustralian

Muslim
whose
parents moved to Australia five
years before he was born. Since their
arrival in Australia, his parents have
experienced difficulties finding work
and have relied heavily on support
provided by the wider Muslim
community and by the federal
governments social security service.
As a result of their cultural isolation,
Ahmeds parents have hardly learned
English.
As a child, Ahmed was eager to fit
into mainstream society in order
to be accepted by his non-Muslim
peers. With his obvious Middle
Eastern name and appearance and his
ethnic background, he nonetheless

comfortably proclaimed himself to
be an Australian. But as a result of his
desire to be accepted by his peers, he
adopted different behaviour at school
to that at home. As Ahmed matured
and experienced discrimination
and prejudice, his feelings started
changing. In recent years, Ahmed has
started questioning who he really is.
A couple of months before the end of
Year 12, Ahmed left school and has
since held a number of temporary jobs.
However, maintaining a job has been
challenging and Ahmed is currently
unemployed. Ahmed believes he
is treated unfairly by prospective
employers and sees his opportunities
Page 27
Part 1 (cont.)
for advancement as limited. He feels

disillusioned with the options and
opportunities available to him.
Overall, the last few years have been
very challenging for Ahmed. Since
leaving school, he has experienced
one struggle after another. Looking
for work and experiencing constant
rejection by potential employers,
worrying about his and his familys
future, the building and failing
of new relationships, his parents
increasing frailty and dependence
on his linguistic support, even the
current political climate, have all
forced Ahmed to grow up rapidly. All
the recent changes and subsequent
uncertainty, for Ahmed individually
and for the wider Muslim community,
weigh heavily on young Ahmed.
Over the past few months, he has
started wishing his world would be
simple, black and white. He feels
impatient to move away from all the
uncertainty and hopes for his life to
take a clear meaningful direction. He
wants clarity and answers to his many
questions: Who am I? What do I
want? What am I doing? etc.
Page 28
Ahmed feels pressure from sections

of the wider community to assimilate
and lose his Muslim identity. Ahmeds
commitment to Islam (like for other
Australian Muslim youth) is very
important to him. But his childhood
attempt to be accepted as Australian,
and his earlier double life at home
and at school, have become a source
of shame and guilt for him. As he now
fears it is unworkable to embrace his
Australianness and his Muslimness
at the same time, he is feeling less
and less Australian. He believes
that, considering the current, postSeptember 11th climate, he needs to
be more politically responsive. He
is worried by all the injustice and
humiliation experienced by Muslims
in Australia and overseas. He wonders
if its not his role to fight for his
people, then whose role is it? Some
of Ahmeds peers believe it is indeed
Ahmeds role as a Muslim youth to
fight the government and the people
who voted for it.
The more he thinks about this issue,
the less he sees an alternative. As he
will never truly be accepted as an
Part 1 (cont.)
Australian and as he cannot give up

Islam, he starts withdrawing from
society. Despite Ahmeds efforts to
integrate and associate with nonMuslims, the apparent disregard
for his religion has given him little
choice but to limit his friendships and
associations to his own immediate
circle. Ahmed is tired of this
uncertainty and wants to belong, to be
accepted and understood. He is tired
of swinging between different views,
and craves clarity and certainty.
During this challenging time, Ahmed
does not know who to turn to. As there
is a language barrier, he is finding it
increasingly difficult to communicate

with his parents.
It is now clearer than ever that
Ahmed is struggling and showing
signs of an identity crisis. He decides
to start a search. He wants to learn
more about Islam. He has many
unanswered questions in his mind
issues of morality, religious practice
and matters of halal (permissible)
and haram (impermissible). Ahmed
feels he has a few options including
turning to Google for answers, picking
up some books from the bookstore or
asking his friend Ali..
2. Does Ahmeds story sound familiar? Does Ahmed remind you of a friend, a
colleague or a relative?
Our research with Muslim youth from south-west Sydney indicates that Ahmed
is not alone. In line with Ahmeds experiences, some Muslim youth reported that
they experience feelings of humiliation from racists. These feelings, in turn, lead to
depression, a sense of fear, vulnerability, anger and exclusion that may be exploited by
extremists. Some of the youth feel they are not accepted as Australians and, as a result,
are vulnerable to rigid extreme ideologies. Like Ahmed, these young people reported
difficulties in discussing their concerns with parents and expressed uncertainty over
who to turn to in the community for quality advice. They are uncertain about the
availability and location of the safe centres or community groups. Furthermore,
Page 29
Part 1 (cont.)
similarly to Ahmed, they reported many unanswered questions about life in general
and Islam in particular. Many questions related to morality and a desire to find clear
answers about the nature of good and bad, right and wrong.
Also in line with Ahmeds experience, our research identified a number of needs and
desires experienced by south-west Sydney Muslim youth. Many initially reported
a lack of access to reliable information, and identified peers and friends as main
sources of information. A shortage of adequate support for issues such as identity
development, discrimination, employment and belonging seemed to be a great
concern. Many believe they have limited employment and training opportunities.
Furthermore, they experience a double exclusion: from their immediate community
structures, as well as from the Anglo-Australian community.
3. Reflecting on Ahmeds story, what choices do you think Ahmed is likely to

make? What would your recommendations be?
Ahmed is vulnerable to radicalisation, but not yet radicalised. Left to himself, he
may continue to feel alienated, he might turn to crime, or he may eventually find
a rewarding job, start a family, or the many other involvements that naturally end
youthful disillusionment. After all, it is quite normal for any young person to have
trouble finding a job that suits them or to question their place in society. What
happens in Ahmeds life will in a large part be affected by the influences to which
he is exposed. With the right family and community support, he can be shown and
helped to take the opportunities that do exist to find a happy and meaningful life as a
Muslim in Australia. If he is influenced by the theology and teachings of an extremist
group, however, he may turn away from the opportunities that exist in Australian
society and become alienated from it, and indeed even possibly dangerous to himself
and the community.
Page 30
Part 1 (cont.)
4. Lets first look at Ahmeds story more closely. In your opinion, which factors
in Ahmeds situation may contribute to Ahmeds vulnerability to extremism?
We have identified three main themes here, which recur for others experiencing
vulnerabilities. They are (a) psychological identity, (b) belonging and alienation
and (c) disadvantage and discrimination.
4a. Vulnerability Factor: Psychological identity
Psychological identity refers to who someone is and what their values, attitudes, and
beliefs are. The forming of identity for Muslim youth typically occurs during adolescence
or young adulthood, and is tumultuous and emotionally challenging. This theme deals
with the inner vulnerabilities, which includes a lack of knowledge about Islam.
i.) Ahmed is going through a time of rapid change and uncertainty and feels overwhelmed
by the number of choices and decisions he needs to make. As a result, he wishes for his
world to be simple, black and white. He wants clarity and certainty. In short, Ahmed
experiences low tolerance for ambiguity. During no other time in life do we assume so
much increase in responsibility in so short a time span than during adolescence. This
can be overwhelming. When feeling overwhelmed, joining an extremist group can
be attractive to some, because such groups claim to offer clarity and solutions to lifes
problems. Consequently, the unrealistic and oversimplified nature of most extremist
ideologies is sometimes seemingly attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by
complexities and stress in navigating their world.
ii.) Ahmed feels overwhelmed by the questions many Muslim adolescents face: Who am
I? What do I want? What am I doing? etc. He hopes for his life to take a clear direction
and is searching for a place in society. As the adherence to ideologies affects selfdefinition, this search for identity may draw some youth to extremist groups. There
is a risk for Ahmed to impulsively commit to any ideology and values before having
adequately considered empowering perspectives and alternatives. Ahmeds desperate
Page 31
Part 1 (cont.)
quest for personal meaning may push him to adopt roles hastily.
iii.) Ahmed feels disillusioned with life as he experiences a lack of opportunities that
makes him question the adequacy of the perspective that has steered his life thus far.
Those most vulnerable to being recruited into extremist groups are young people
who are at a time in their life when they are looking to the future with the hope of
engaging in meaningful behaviour, but perceive their opportunities for advancement
to be nonexistent or minimal. People who feel dissatisfied with life may be more
vulnerable to different perspectives and viewpoints. As a result, during this time
of vulnerability, Ahmed may be more susceptible to the influence of unscrupulous
leaders and extremists.
iv.) Ahmed experiences a sense of guilt over his childhood double life at school and
at home. Our research with Muslims has identified religion as an important factor
by which they describe themselves as well as their family. In line with Ahmeds
experience, research shows that many second-generation Muslims attempted to
visibly avoid aspects of their Muslim identity as children so as to fit into mainstream
society. As these young Muslims matured and learned more about Islam, maintaining
their religious identity became increasingly central to their lives, and they became
more likely to reject former aspects of their identity. In short, it appears possible for
second-generation Muslims to appear assimilated during childhood and seemingly
take on some practices and norms of their peers so as to fit in. During adolescence,
a strong resistance to this previous process may be experienced. Again, during the
earlier time of identity-confusion, adolescents may be more vulnerable to being
attracted to extreme and rigid beliefs.
v.) Ahmed now fears it is unworkable to embrace his Australianness and his Muslimness
at the same time and is feeling less and less Australian. A shortage of the right Muslim
religious leaders and mentors in Australia may contribute to the sense of hopelessness
that some young Muslims may experience. Young Muslims living at cultural crossroads,
Page 32
Part 1 (cont.)
like Ahmed, often experience a sense of guilt. This guilt may lead some to be vulnerable
to the most extreme misinterpretations of Islam. As case studies show, one can have
strong Muslim identity and also have sizeable ties to non-contradictory aspects of
the dominant culture. The pressure Ahmed feels to exclusively choose between being
Australian or Muslim is in fact unfounded. Studies with young Muslims in the United
Kingdom, where mass Muslim immigration occurred earlier than it has in Australia,
show that most young Muslims are quite comfortable with their multiple identities.
A problem, however, arises when young Muslims are externally pressured to belong
exclusively to one group or the other.
vi.) Ahmed lacks knowledge about Islam. He wants to learn, and feels he has a few
options including turning to Google for answers, picking up some books from the
bookstore or asking his friend. In the age of mass media and the internet, many Muslim
youths learning about Islam is informal and unstructured from browsing websites
and reading books, rather than being based on traditional teachings in a mosque or
a formal class with a trustworthy teacher. The effective teaching of Islam to young
Australian Muslims provides a framework for their identity in an Australian society.
In the absence of such a framework, youth resort to alternative methods to learn about
their religion. This includes the internet, with the detrimental effect of providing
opportunities for the propagation of extremist ideology. The vulnerability here is with
the lack of knowledge about Islam, which could lead a young person to be deceived
by extremist teachings and become radicalised. The young persons inquisitive nature,
coupled with ignorance, can shed more light on how the radicalisation process
recruits, and why it could be a quick process.
4b. Vulnerability Factor: Belonging and alienation

i.) Ahmed is socially isolated and only associates with a few like-minded friends. The
political climate after September 11th, and the increasingly negative portrayal of Islam
following the attack, caused some Muslims to withdraw from society and to sever
Page 33
Part 1 (cont.)
their ties with the wider community. Consequently, a number of younger Muslims
are becoming more alienated from the Australian societies in which they live by
retreating into their own immediate communities. This lack of interaction with those
outside their own immediate community can have a negative impact on how they
see themselves and how they are seen by others. Alienation and social exclusion can
lead to various consequences: apathy, gangs, drugs, extremist groups etc. Many are
recruited into bad groups, or join one after a friend gets involved and pressures his/
her peers.
ii.) Ahmed feels a desire to belong. A need to belong or a yearning for a sense of
belonging, connectedness and affiliation motivates youth to join groups. Furthermore,
it is possible for an individual to define his or her identity through such group
membership such that ones personal identity is merged with a group identity. As may
be true for Ahmed, membership in an extremist group provides a sense of perceived
identity or belonging for those people whose underlying sense of identity is flawed.
Ahmeds impatience to answer identity-related questions and his great need to belong
may make him vulnerable to extremist groups and ideologies. These groups may
provide a sense of family that offers a claimed shelter from the surrounding world.
iii.) Ahmed and his parents have a language barrier. His parents have hardly learned
English and, as a result, he is finding it increasingly difficult to communicate with them.
Intergenerational gaps between parents and children may be another vulnerability
factor. Young Australian Muslims may not be able to speak the only language their
parents speak at home. This could hamper effective communication and hence limit
the parenting role in passing down imperative values and cultural reference points.
In Muslim homes, it is also understood that parents play a great role in passing
down to their children traditional Islamic knowledge, the absence of which (due to
communication barriers or otherwise) may be exploited by extremist groups who
hide under the guise of care and humbleness to recruit into their networks and groups.
Page 34
Part 1 (cont.)
iv.) Ahmed is worried about all the injustice and humiliation experienced by the Muslim
community, both overseas and in Australia. Muslims are influenced by foreign events
as a sense of injustice and humiliation appears to animate many Australian Muslims.
Furthermore, the Islamic concept of the ummah (global community) (i.e. the pain
and suffering that is experienced by one part of the body is shared and felt by the
other parts) provides an empathetic emotional connection to the plight of weaker
Muslims. The empathy with the ummah and the difficult world situation is central to
understanding the levels of frustration felt by many young Muslims in Australia and
in the West in general.
4c. Vulnerability Factor: Disadvantage and discrimination

i.) Ahmed has certainly grown up in a disadvantaged family. Since their arrival in
Australia, his parents have experienced difficulties finding work, and have relied
heavily on community support and on the governments social security service. There
is a misconception that poverty and lack of opportunity are automatic drivers into
radicalisation. In fact, individuals from comfortable backgrounds have controlled the
upper echelons of extremist networks since their inception. While poverty could be
a factor in recruitment into these groups, it certainly has not driven their ideological
core. Indeed, from recent experience in Europe, it is likely for middle-class, tertiary
trained and apparently well-integrated people to lead a path of radicalisation in their
own communities.
ii.) Ahmeds family is from Lebanon, experiences unemployment and cultural and
linguistic isolation. This is not uncommon amongst many ethnic migrants who are
economically disadvantaged, poorly integrated, experience linguistic isolation and
tend to cluster in closed communities. The consequent sense of marginality could
be a point of vulnerability to extremism in Australia. The history of long-term
unemployment among Lebanese and Turkish immigrants in Muslim-concentrated
suburbs, as is the case with other emerging communities, has made them the focus
Page 35
Part 1 (cont.)
of various research reports and specially tailored employment programs. It has
undeservedly also given their communities a bad name as being unwilling to work,
thereby negatively affecting some perceptions of Muslim identity. The result is that
the public image of an Australian Muslim is associated with being socially marginal.
Growing up in Australia, Australian Muslim youth can then take this to be part of
their identity a besieged mentality.
iii.) Ahmed experiences discrimination based on his name, his appearance and his Islamic
religion. As noted previously, religion is a primary marker of identity for Muslims.
Consequently, Ahmeds experiences of discrimination on the grounds of his Islamic
religion may also add to a sense of alienation and isolation. Again, this isolation may
increase Ahmeds vulnerability to radicalisation. It is believed that discrimination,
racism and the clash with police can sometimes result in social alienation and antisocial behaviour among some young Muslims.
We have established in Part 1 the main vulnerability themes leading to radicalisation

namely identity, belonging, alienation, discrimination and disadvantage. In the following
section you will gain an understanding of the origins and the theological framework of
extremism, before going on to consider the preventative frameworks and action plan.
Page 36
Page 37
Part 2
As noted in the introduction, the BIRR Initiative is an Australian
community project responding from a true Islamic perspective to the
extremist beliefs that are doing damage to both the image of Islam and
to social coexistence. These beliefs that are driven by a global extremist
network of affiliates have been set out by the theology of Al-Qaeda. The
initiative deals with this network, its ideologues, its theology and its
radicalisation processes.
Page 38
Part 2 (cont.)
1. What is the general framework for countering extremism and radicalisation?
In order to understand the theological precepts to the radicalisation process, we need
to explore the terrain around the extremist movement of Al-Qaeda and its network of
affiliates. The first implication from this is a result of the infusion of extremist ideology
with radicalisation and its terrorist manifestation. Such an extremist religious imprint
on radicalisation means that at the heart of any Counter-Radicalisation response is a
religious battle between established Islamic standards and extremism.
Throughout the ages, extremists have always been a minority group in society, without
much control over the general Muslim population. But when popular knowledge
declined, and many scholars abandoned their theological roles of refuting extremism
and the leaders refrained from responding to the threat posed by such elements,
internal dissension and rifts grew stronger until the many groups and sects caused a
damaging state of affairs.
Challenging and refuting the theology and narratives of radicalisation is the key
behind any radicalisation-prevention strategy.
2. What is the theological framework that drives the global network of affiliates
associated with Al-Qaeda? Which particular authors are characteristic of this
movement and its ideologies?
As noted in Part 1, ignorance in traditional Islamic teachings is a critical vulnerability
factor leading to extremism amongst at-risk youth. This vulnerability factor is a
primary cause for their inability to differentiate between literature that cites Islamic
scholars and that which cites unauthentic writers tarred with profanation and
historical controversies. It is a huge risk for youth to view Al-Qaedas doctrines and
theological precepts as authentic Islamic principles. As a protective measure, it is
important to caution young people against authors identified by the theology of AlQaeda and its affiliates.
Page 39
Part 2 (cont.)
In our analysis, it would be safe to assume that the authors distinctive of the theology
of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates would be frequently cited as authorities in texts by AlQaeda ideologues, contradicting mainstream Islamic books.
As a result, and in order to measure the frequency of citations made by known extremist
ideologues, we followed a study conducted by the US Military Academy-Combating
Terrorism Center (USMA-CTC) in a publication titled Militant Ideology Atlas1.
The study uses a technique called citation analysis, which is frequently employed in
the social sciences as an objective way to determine influence among authors (Google
uses a similar technique to rank pages for its search engine). Consequently, the study
identifies the most frequently cited authors among Al-Qaedas ideologues. Naturally,
some of these cited authors are respected by mainstream scholars and are not unique
to Al-Qaeda. However, here we are only interested in those that are characteristic
of it, and that have thus shaped its theology. These authors were divided into two
groups: medieval and modern.
According to the study, Ibn Taymiyah/ Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 729 AH2, 1328 AD) is the
medieval author most influential on the Al-Qaeda movement. The edicts issued by
this 13/14th century AD author are the ones cited by far the most frequently in the
numerous Al-Qaeda texts analysed.
Ibn Taymiyah has single-handedly drafted the modus operandi and the religious
operational framework that Al-Qaeda has adopted since their inception late in the
20th Century.
From a historical perspective, back in his time, Ibn Taymiyah clashed with members
of the jurisprudence from the Islamic union of the various Islamic schools of
thought, who collectively issued an edict against him. They declared his theology
and interpretative procedures as contradicting established Islamic standards. Ibn
1 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/atlas/Atlas-ResearchCompendium.pdf
2 After Hijrah immigration of Prophet Muhammad from Makkah to Al-Madinah
Page 40
Part 2 (cont.)
Taymiyah was incarcerated by the courts for his theological heresies, which posed a
further military threat in justifying unsanctioned violent clashes. He ultimately died
in prison.
The Ibn Taymiyah chapter of history gives evidence to the unholiness of the theological
foundations of Al-Qaeda and a strong assurance to the non-Muslim community
that the extremism that drives the Al-Qaeda network of affiliates is unsanctioned by
Islamic scholarly standards.
Furthermore, the study found that the modern authors most influential on the
extremists are generally the followers of the eighteenth-century author Muhammad
Ibn Àbd Al-Wahhab (d. 1206 AH, 1791 AD). In fact, Ibn Àbd Al-Wahhab
institutionalised the edicts of Ibn Taymiyah four centuries later. This creed came
to be known as Wahhabism. From its inception, Wahhabism outrageously attacked
many standard Islamic beliefs and values. Prof Khaled Abu El Fadel wrote that
the Wahhabi rebellions of the 19th and 20th centuries were very bloody because
they indiscriminately slaughtered and terrorised neighboring Muslims.3 It is no
coincidence that Wahhabism has theologically given birth to a generation of AlQaeda ideologues.
The point here, demonstrated by this citation analysis, is that Al-Qaeda has not been
inspired by traditional Islamic teachings, rather by the creed that Ibn Taymiyah and
Ibn Àbd Al-Wahhab drafted. It was only by primarily quoting this creed that AlQaeda ideologues and mentors have claimed legitimacy to their propaganda and
narratives.
In addition to the above two authors, according to the same citation analysis, the other
popular modern author whom the global extremist movement cites is Sayyid Qutb/
Qutob (d. 1966 AD), the founder of the so-called Al-Jamaà Al-Islamiya (JI) faction
3 Prof Khaled Abu El Fadel in an article titled Islam and the Theology of Power, Middle East Report
No. 221 (Winter 2001) pp 28-33.
Page 41
Part 2 (cont.)
of the Egyptian extremist movement called Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin or in English
named as the Muslim Brotherhood. In his political manifesto titled Milestones Along
the Road, Sayyid Qutb declared all Arab governments and their people to be in a
state of jahiliyyah, which he described as a state of group blasphemy. By that, Qutb
made takfir4 against all Muslims who did not subscribe to his doctrine. He declared
them as apostates, rendering their blood, wealth and honour as legitimate targets.
Furthermore, anecdotal reports and our study of extremist outlets in Australia has
clearly indicated that these two strands of Wahhabism and Al-Ikhwan (with its faction
called Al-Jamaà Al-Islamiya) act as a breeding ground for radicalisation into the
wider extremist movement, as they are a first point of contact for vulnerable youth.
Similarly, Hizbut-Tahrir/Hizb at-Tahrir5 is the third general strand that enlists
vulnerable youth into the initial pools of radicalisation. Hizbut-Tahrirs propaganda,
which is not accompanied by a traditional Islamic teaching program, does not warn
its adherents of the risk associated with the theology of Al-Qaeda and the authors
who are identified by this theology. This issue results in a propaganda overlap with
Al-Qaeda and a fusion between its members and the members of the other two
aforementioned strands. Together these three strands feed the initial pools of youth
at high risk of radicalisation. Hizbut-Tahrir recruits into these pools, despite claiming
that it does not publicly advocate terrorism. The difference between Al-Qaeda and
Hizbut-Tahrir is continuous, rather than discrete. Usually, Hizbut-Tahrir members
are dominated by feelings of ideological affinity with their brothers from the other
two aforementioned strands, hence ideologically warming up members by serving as
a feeder-group for radicalisation.
4 Takfir is to declare someone as a blasphemer.

5 Hizbut-Tahrir are the followers of Taqiyyuddin an-Nabahaniy (d. 1977 AD).
Page 42
Part 2 (cont.)
3. What is the standpoint of the traditional Sunni theology on Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates?
The focus here is on traditional Sunni theology given that Al-Qaeda affiliated groups
claim to represent the Sunni community. To understand the standpoint of traditional
Sunni theology as a counter-force to the theology of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, we
can unravel the terrain around this movement, analysing its failure to gain a foothold
in certain societies. For example, looking at the writings of Abu Musàb Al-Suri6 and
Abu Baseer Al-Tartousi7 (two well known Al-Qaeda ideologues), we can see their
conclusion that Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have not been able to establish a stronghold
in Syria, due to the existence of the competing theological force of the traditional
Sunni establishment and its spiritual school of at-tasawwuf (Sufism). The ideologues
agree that the theological competition coming from their archenemies and doctrinal
competitors has prevented their ideology from dominating Syrian society.
It is worthy to note here that Al-Qaeda ideologues inspired by Ibn Taymiyah and Ibn
Àbd Al-Wahhab deceptively label themselves as Salafis in reference to the Salaf, the
righteous Muslims of the first three centuries AH.
At-tasawwuf (Sufism) in its true manifestations of Islamic spiritual tradition is an
integral and coherent part of the Islamic curriculum, founded upon the theology of
the two prominent traditional Sunni theologians Al-Ashàri (d. 324 AH, 936 AD)
and Al-Maturidi (d. 333 AH, 944 AD), and upon the four mainstream Islamic schools
of jurisprudence (madhhabs) initiated by Imam Abu-Hanifah (d. 150 AH, 767 AD),
Imam Malik (d. 179 AH, 795 AD), Imam ash-Shafiì (d. 204 AH, 820 AD) and Imam
Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d. 241 AH, 855 AD).
Furthermore, a letter from Al-Zawahiri (Al-Qaedas number two man) to AlZarqawi (Al Qaedas former number one man in Iraq) intercepted in 20058, before
6 From his book entitled: Observations on the Jihadi Experience in Syria, which is part of a larger
document entitled: The Islamic Jihadi Revolution in Syria.
7 He has written numerously on this topic including his book entitled: The reasons for the failure of
some Jihadi movements in reform.
8 www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/report/2005/zawahiri-zarqawi-letter_9jul2005.htm
Page 43
Part 2 (cont.)
Al-Zarqawis death, sheds more light on the resistance that the Al-Qaeda ideologues
feel is exhibited against their movement by the traditional Sunni establishment. In
this letter, Al-Zawahiri describes the theological contradictions that exist between
Al-Qaeda and the traditional Sunni scholars. Al-Qaeda, which claims to be Sunni
and which calls itself Salafi, declares traditional Sunni scholars (i.e. followers of AlAshàri and Al-Maturidi) to be heretics.
In the section entitled Striving for the Ulema [Muslim scholars], Al-Zawahiri
declares the theological parameters for the Al-Qaeda counter-movement by stating:
From the standpoint of not highlighting the doctrinal differences which the masses
do not understand, such as this one is Maturidi or this one is Ashàri, or this one is
Salafi Many of the most learned ulema of Islam such as al-Ìzz Bin Àbdul Salam
(d. 660 AH, 1262 AD), Al-Nawawi (d. 676 AH, 1278 AD), and Ibn Hajar (d. 852 AH,
1449 AD) were Ashàri And many of the most eminent military leaders, whom
the ummah resolved unanimously to praise such as Nur al-Din Bin Zanki (d. 569
AH, 1174 AD) and Salahul-Din al-Ayyubi [Saladin] (d. 589 AH, 1193 AD) were
Ashàri... Sayf al-Din Qatz, Rukn al-Din Baybars, al-Nasir Muhammad Bin-Qalawun
[leaders who fought against the Crusaders], and Muhammad al-Fatih [conqueror of
Constantinople], were Ashàri or Maturidi. They fell into heresies.
Al-Zawahiri inadvertently confesses to how he considers the creed of Al-Qaeda
(what he calls Salafi) to be on a collision course with the creed of most of the ummah
(i.e. Ashàri/Maturidi), whom he considers to be following theological heresies. This
again supports the approach of resisting Al-Qaedas creed with traditional Sunni
theology.
The role of Muslim scholars in weakening support for Al-Qaedas theology is also
shown in the writings of Abu Bakr Al-Naji. Najis work encapsulates the thinking
of Al-Qaedas High Command since the late 1990s. A publication titled Al-Qaidas
Playbook9 by USMA-CTC quotes Naji, from his book The Management of
Barbarism, as claiming that it would have been better to have killed Shaykh Àbdullah
9 http://www.ctc.usma.edu/Stealing%20Al-Qaidas%20Playbook%20--%20CTC.pdf
Page 44
Part 2 (cont.)
Al-Harari/Al-Harariy (known as Al-Habashi in reference to his native homeland, AlHabashah Ethiopia) early in his career than to have let him become the powerful
figure he is today. Naji then says that deviations like these and Shaykhs like these
(traditional Islamic scholars) must have the judgment of slaughter passed against
them at the very beginning of their authority, as there will be no fame for them, nor
knowledge of or news of them.
It is worth noting, given this fatwa on Shaykh Àbdullah Al-Harari, that Al-Qaeda
acted through their Lebanese offshoot, the so-called Usbat Al-Ansar (an Australianproscribed terrorist organisation), and in 1995 assassinated a prominent student
of Shaykh Àbdullah Al-Harari, Shaykh Nizar Halabi. Shaykh Nizar headed the
Lebanese-based Sunni organisation known as the Association of Islamic Charitable
Projects, whose members are the students of Shaykh Àbdullah Al-Harari known as
Al-Ahbash10 in reference to the Shaykhs native homeland, Al-Habashah.
4. Why are scholars from the traditional Sunni establishment, such as Shaykh
Àbdullah Al-Harari, targeted by Al-Qaedas ideologues?
The words of Naji (question 3 above) reflect the theological resistance that Shaykhs from
the traditional Sunni establishment pose against the global extremist movement.
Shaykh Àbdullah Al-Harari is a highly esteemed Islamic scholar. He is an authority
on Sunni Shafiì jurisprudence and has the title of Muhaddith11 (an authority on
Prophetic Hadith sayings). Shaykh Al-Harari has authored over 30 books on
traditional Sunni theology and jurisprudence, including his commentary on the
books of great historic scholars such as Imam Al-Ashàri, Imam ash-Shafiì, Imam
10 In Australia, the students of Shaykh Àbdullah Al-Harari established the Islamic Charity Projects
Association (ICPA).
11 Critical analysis of two books authoured by Sheikh Al-Harari was conducted at Al-Azhar University in Cairo. The books entitled As-Sirat Al-Mustaqim (The Straight Path) and Bughyat At-Talib (The
Quest of the Student of Obligatory Knowledge) have been perused by a committee of Professors at the
Azhars Faculty of Religious Jurisprudence and have been given the official seal of approval. Among
what the committee wrote was: The author Sheikh Àbdullah Al-Harari is distinguished by his knowledge and reference of authentic and credible sources in matters of belief and rulings.
Page 45
Part 2 (cont.)
at-Tahawi and many others.
The Shaykh is also famous for his work Al-Maqalat as-Sunniyyah (The Sunni Articles,
520 pages) in which he summarises the position of authorities from the traditional
Sunni establishment in his refutational work of Ibn Taymiyahs theology. He does
that by citing over 100 scholars. The book summarises in six lengthy articles how Ibn
Taymiyah has contradicted the basic precepts of Islam. Shaykh Àbdullah Al-Harari,
like other traditional Islamic scholars, strongly warns the Muslim populace and its
youth from following the creed of Ibn Taymiyah, and it is for this key message that
he and his kind from the traditional Sunni establishment are targeted by Al-Qaedas
ideologues.
5. How can we build a Counter-Narrative program to extremism based on the

standpoints and remarks of such extremist ideologues?
To combat the extremism and radicalisation of Al-Qaeda and its affiliate groups, the
Australian community should draw attention to precisely the things that its ideologues
want to conceal, and rally behind the traditional Islamic establishment, which AlQaeda tenaciously labels as heretical. In developing this Counter-Narrative program,
we need to use scholarly Sunni authorities to refute the extremists claims and assert
authority over them. This intellectual youth armament program against extremism
and radicalisation targets the theological roots by providing competing information
and messages that disrupt/interrupt the radicalisation process, its theology and its
narratives.
Furthermore, the program needs to be based upon a coherent approach with a
complete body of knowledge capable of holistically refuting extremism and its global
movement, thus providing an Islamic alternative for Muslim youth. The parameters of
this coherent counter-movement have been identified, as noted above, by the extremist
ideologues themselves. This positive counter-movement is the Sunni traditional
standpoint, which naturally has the support of mainstream Islamic communities, not
just in Australia but worldwide.
Page 46
Part 2 (cont.)
In Part 4 of this book, we use this analysis to present 16 counternarratives to the extremist propaganda and theology as part of the
action plan to build the resilience of the Muslim community and its
youth in countering the fragile narratives of the extremists. But before
we do that, let us first describe the Radicalisation Model and its three
phases. This will be useful in understanding the recruitment processes
and thus better informing the Counter-Radicalisation framework.
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to Building
Identity
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to Building
Identityand
andResisting
Radicalisation
Page 47
Page 48
Part 3 (cont.)
As defined earlier: Radicalisation in the BIRR Initiative is defined as the process of
adopting, promoting or acting upon extremist beliefs. It is the process that indoctrinates
a vulnerable individual and then activates them from a latent extremist mind-state to
an overt extremist action-state.
1. So how does someone who is going through a vulnerable time become
radicalised?
Social marginalisation and cultural and religious differences associated with being a
young Muslim Australian, as identified in Part 1, contribute to a general vulnerability
and atmosphere of susceptibility to radicalisation, rather than to radicalisation itself.
In line with the many vulnerability factors to extremism, first-hand reports and
personal accounts of Muslim youth living in south-west Sydney, identified the
following generalised pathway to radicalisation: whether they are underachievers
experiencing blocked opportunities, or are, alternatively, middle-class with tertiary
qualifications, young Australian Muslims could become at high risk of radicalisation,
if they start to associate with an extremist group.
The vulnerability factors to extremism, which are triggered in the radicalisation
process, generally strengthen to a dangerous level after some form of association with
an extremist group, whether virtually on the internet or with peers at a suburban
private house.
Association with an extremist group could be deliberate when the youth knows that
the group is extremist, or it could be undeliberate when the youth naively associates
with the extremist group. Both forms of extremist group association are direct highrisk factors linked to radicalisation. It should be noted here, however, that there is
no linear model of social vulnerability that is, social vulnerability factors do not
on their own trigger the radicalisation process without this prime catalyst of group
association.
Page 49
Part 3 (cont.)
Furthermore, irrespective of whether young Muslims experience disaffection and
exclusion first-hand or are in fact included in Western society but empathise with
the disaffection of other Muslims locally or abroad, it seems it is the political and
social dissatisfaction with Western policies that mainly drives Muslim youth towards
action. This, however, does not by itself translate into radicalisation. The passage to
radicalisation is contingent upon the type of ideological directives the youth receive.
This strongly influences whether their action leads them to a radicalised identity, or
whether they direct their energy and frustration towards social and political change
through a positively engaged identity.
Our overall mission is to provide the education and grounding that leads youth to the
latter and away from the former.
2. What is the Radicalisation Model? What are the phases of the radicalisation
process?
To further analyse the risk, it seems that a number of steps take place between being
vulnerable to radicalisation and becoming an active member of an extremist group.
Broadly, there are two stages one in which young people accept the extremist
doctrine (indoctrination), and a second, once they have accepted the doctrine, in
which they put it into practice (activation). There is a possible third stage, namely
terrorism, which has its own processes and initiators and which goes beyond the
activities of the second stage of radicalisation.
The Radicalisation Model described below fits the observations and the data collated by
the project researchers as described in the Research Methodology section.
Page 50
Part 3 (cont.)
Pool-1
Pool-2
Phase-1
Phase-2
Pool-3
Phase-3
Phase-1: Indoctrination. From vulnerability to indoctrination association with the group,

immersion in extremist doctrine. Covert phase-1 radicalisation forms pool-1. Propaganda
books, websites and talks are used for recruitment into pool-1. No clear emphasis on terrorism,
but terrorist ideologues are sympathised with, and Al-Qaeda theological authors promoted.
Civil society is needed to counter phase-1.
Phase-2: Activation. From indoctrination to activation carrying out the doctrines. Overt
phase-2 radicalisation forms pool-2. For recruitment into pool-2, intensive one-on-one sessions
are used with extremist mentors in person or on the internet. To counter phase-2, civil society is
needed with some involvement from government.
Phase-3: Terrorism. From activation to terrorism. Terrorist recruitment forms pool-3. For
recruitment into pool-3, i) terrorist operatives or agents are involved for a typical terrorist act; ii)
ring-leaders (alone) for self-styled operations. To counter phase-3, security agencies are needed
with some involvement from civil society.
Diagram 1: Radicalisation Model
Page 51
Part 3 (cont.)
The Radicalisation Model is composed of three phases:
Phase-1: Indoctrination
From vulnerability to indoctrination introduction to the group, immersion in extremist
doctrine
Phase-1 radicalisation is not a self-contained process that is triggered when the
vulnerability factors are present. No matter how numerous they were, the vulnerability
factors do not, by themselves, indoctrinate a vulnerable youth. Rather indoctrination
is the process of absorbing extremist theology, either by reading certain books or
websites, or by listening to certain preachers or mentors. It is this process that gives
the vulnerable youth a set of religious beliefs and a sense of belonging, which are
cornerstones to any further radicalisation.
Such at-risk youth undergoing indoctrination form pool-1 of the Radicalisation
Model. In this pool of at-risk youth, there is no clear support voiced for terrorism,
and the indoctrination process could even superficially condemn terrorism. But,
significantly enough, the indoctrination sympathises with extremist ideologues and
it promotes the authors discussed in Part 2 that are identified by the theology of
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In fact, these authors are supplied in the indoctrination
process as primary authorities and spiritual guides.
Within the three-phased Radicalisation Model, phase-1 begins by exposing the
vulnerable to the authors that are characteristic of the theology and creed of AlQaedas ideologues and affiliates (i.e., Ibn Taymiyah, Ibn Àbd Al-Wahhab, Sayyid
Qutb, etc.). In fact, these authors are a trademark of phase-1, as they constitute the
identifying factor or the ideological identity of this phase. The creed based on these
authors defines the bonds and the brotherhood relationships that form within this
phase.
The extremist preachers responsible for enlisting youngsters into this phase are
Page 52
Part 3 (cont.)
people with public profiles, and it is not a condition for recruitment that they publicly
condone terrorism. In fact, many of the public talks provided by these preachers do
not openly preach hate or openly incite violence.
In this phase, vulnerable youth start off imbibing the doctrine without undertaking
any other activity. It is a covert radicalisation phase of indoctrination involving various
propaganda tools. As propaganda, extremists use articles (and sometimes books)
that can be easily downloaded, printed off as flyers and circulated on the streets and
at certain mosques, or disseminated over the internet (via email or chat forums).
Extremists use such propaganda tools to build a popular base for themselves as they
play the victim, alleging that they are under the media and governments spotlight
due to their firm position in defence of Islam. This support is galvanised through
contacts made at businesses run by extremists or their sympathisers, such as cafs,
gyms and even tutoring companies. The social support base in which theyre involved
acts like a shielded layer making it more difficult for members to abandon its network
without seeing themselves as betraying close friends. This is known as the bunch of
guys recruitment, which emphasises a group identity through the adherence to an
ideological orientation (creed). Extremists exploit this form of recruitment, which
could otherwise be reversed for driving a positive orientation amongst vulnerable
youth.
From pool-1, indoctrinated youth may then become fully radicalised, as they further
explore the texts and literature with more specialised mentors within the network. It
is the access to these networks and the binding extremist doctrine and internal trust
that result in the high risk associated with the vulnerable youth of pool-1 making a
transition to pool-2, and thus getting closer to the core of the movement.
Pool-1 of the model, however, remains as a warm-up period that is very critical to the
identity formation and the indoctrination. It is unlikely to occur without a human or
a social dimension.
Page 53
Part 3 (cont.)
Phase-2: Activation
From indoctrination to activation carrying out the doctrines
Once they are in pool-1, at-risk youth can be further radicalised by non-preacher
mentors. It is this non-preacher layer of extremist mentors, who hardly have a public
profile, that issue certain edicts and act as the day-to-day point of contact for youth
in pool-1 networks (making the transition into pool-2). These mentors provide
further teachings based on the authors promoted through phase-1 recruitment the
aforementioned authors that are characteristic of the theology of Al-Qaeda and its
ideologues and affiliates. What the ideologues find in these raw texts is also found
by the local mentors, especially those second-generation youth who were trained
into the movement at specific overseas seminaries, and who can also speak the
young persons language. Because these mentors are not usually public figures, they
are more firebrand than the public-profiled extremist preachers, who have recently
adapted their public pronouncements around media cameras in order to avoid public
controversy. Those preachers have, as pointed out earlier, nevertheless continued to
act as instruments for radicalisation by continuously recruiting into pool-1, and by
maintaining the keys to the doorway of the extremist movement.
Publicly known extremist leaders see their responsibility as maintaining the
indoctrination process and enlisting new vulnerable youth to it. The non-public layer
of mentors, on the other hand, are the self-styled roaming mentors who are frustrated
by the hypocrisy of the public leaders, who incite others by promoting the extremist
theology, but who do not live by their own words. It is this rallying cry that these
extremist mentors use to convert extreme doctrine into action. These mentors, who
are seen by vulnerable youth as the hands-on figures, are main activators into pool-2
of the Radicalisation Model. To vulnerable youth they appear as if with an aura of
wisdom or expertise, deceiving the youth into thinking they have religious-political
dominance over them.
Page 54
Part 3 (cont.)
Self-radicalisation is also a means by which transition between phases takes place.
Self-radicalised individuals are not directly recruited by extremist mentors, but obtain
their extensive theological foundations directly from extremist books, websites and
private internet chat rooms. Virtual radicalisation is a new trend in which the role of
the intermediaries is less important in intensive absorption of extremist doctrines
via the electronic highway. It is an autonomous process of acquiring extremist
ideology.
Phase-3: Terrorism
From activation to terrorism
Phase-3 can be triggered by outsiders who come into a local community and recruit
from pool-2, or through the support of existing local figures who have travelled
overseas and received training at Al-Qaeda camps, or even by those who have received
training on the internet. The internet is replete with extremist websites that are further
radicalising a new generation of youth towards extremist activity sanctioned by the
theology of Al-Qaeda.
Pool-3 comprises fully radicalised individuals who are ready to carry out a terrorist
attack in support of Al-Qaeda and its network of affiliates.
Building and developing trust is a big factor in all of these phases, especially in relation
to a transition between phases where the credibility of the preacher, mentor or agent
is very critical to the vulnerable youth. This trust within the extremist networks is
built on the common creed that binds its members, namely the creed framed by the
theological parameters of Al-Qaedas ideologues (refer to Part 2).
3. How are pool-1 recruits of the Radicalisation Model classified?

The vulnerable youth in pool-1 are classified according to their level of commitment,
Page 55
Part 3 (cont.)
and their capacity. Their individual level of commitment determines whether they are
active or passive members. These latter members are the rank and file of extremist
groups and irrespective of their level of commitment, the bond that binds them into
the group is their common ideological orientation (creed).
The membership layer is classified into two categories based on the members level of
engagement:
The first category is the inarticulate youth, the underachievers with few or no
qualifications, who were radicalised through their complacency, lack of self-esteem
and confidence and their withdrawal from society. Those are not generally at-risk
of radicalisation autonomously, one at a time; but mainly in bunches. In addition,
they only play secondary roles in the group. General indicators of this category
(some of which are shared by category two) are incitement, unruliness, low culture,
disruptiveness, bad manners, excessive zeal, abrupt proclamations on issues of
religious law and disregard for Muslim scholars with contrary views, to name just a
few.
The second category generally comprises those with a tertiary training, capable of
individually engaging with the radicalisation process. In life, they generally exhibit
basic entrepreneurial skills. In pool-1, they usually occupy the roles of mentors
and secondary leaders, as well as public relations personnel, propagandists, website
designers and managers of the pool-1 rank and file. They have been indoctrinated
with extremist narratives, but they are generally more inclined to convert out of the
extremist path than are their category one counterparts. They would be the first target
of our Counter-Narrative effort (to be described in Part 4).
Extremists generally exhibit a common pattern of behaviour that has been explored in
Parts 2 and 3. However, the specific claims made by extremist groups do vary we try
to cover many of these claims in the following section, Part 4.
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Page 57
Part 4
In Part 4, we offer a point-by-point refutation of the extremist ideology,
producing counter-narratives to the narrative claims made by extremists
for use in mentoring young people at risk of being influenced by
extremism.
Page 58
Part 4 (cont.)
aving established in parts 2 and 3 the theological foundations

of the extremist narrative and its counter-narrative, as well
as the contours of the radicalisation process and its recruitment
methods, let us now return to young Ahmed. Ahmed has experienced
discrimination, alienation, an identity struggle and is currently
searching for answers.
During this time of vulnerability, Ahmed is approached by one of his
peers, Kamal, a university student who claims to have found answers
to all Ahmeds questions and concerns. Ahmed, it seems, was at a
critical crossroad, and he has not realised that he could fall prey to
an extremist group. Ahmed could set foot on a path that leads to a
radicalised identity.
This part describes what we might tell Ahmed to mentor him out of
his difficult situation, to put him on an alternative pathway towards
building a positively engaged identity. Ahmed has two potential
paths: a path to radicalisation the radicalisation narrative, and his
alternative the counter-narrative.
Below, we have summarised in two categories (Theology and Practice)
many of the narratives made by extremists which Ahmed, Kamal, or
someone similar, might go through, and what we would say to mentor
him or her. But before we discuss the extremist narratives and the
counter-narratives, let us first explain some general guidelines that
would help in mentoring someone who has become involved with
extremist narratives.
Page 59
(cont.)
A. Working with Extremist Narratives/Counselling Guidelines

A1. A Framework for Building Identity
Adolescence for young, at-risk Muslims involves forming a stable sense of identity
that is integrated with an effective positive stance on existential issues.
Muslim adolescents identity style is related to the religious domain. We have
identified three identity styles: informational, normative, and diffuse/avoidant.
Individuals using an information-oriented style deal with identity issues by
actively seeking out, processing and utilising identity-relevant information. In
other words, they will try to inform themselves about the consequences of their
choices and actions prior to making decisions.
Normative-oriented individuals focus on the normative expectations held by
significant others and reference groups. Normative-oriented individuals adhere
strictly to their current identity structures, into which they assimilate all identityrelevant information. They resist change.
Diffuse/avoidant-oriented individuals procrastinate about personal problems
and their identity.
Muslim adolescents who use an informational identity style tend to understand
some religious content in a comprehensive and interpretative way by thinking
about the backgrounds of rulings. Adolescents using the diffuse/avoidant identity
style take them without much thought/engagement, and adolescents who use a
normative identity style are simply more involved in their religious practice.
As there is growing evidence indicating it is possible to direct the identity
formation by means of intervention programs, this approach seems appropriate
Page 60
Part 4 (cont.)
for an intervention program with Muslim youth at risk of radicalisation. By

promoting an informational identity style, Muslim adolescents can be expected
to learn to deal with religious issues in a more comprehensive and interpretive
way. Processing religious content in a rigid way correlates with lack of moral
competence, and leads to prejudice dispositions such as totalitarianism, social
dominance, lack of empathy and closed-mindedness. Therefore, intervening in
the identity formation process by promoting and stimulating an informational
identity style may remove the societal problems that are associated with rigidity
and unruliness.
The journey to forging a distinctive Australian Muslim identity will not be easy.
Youth who are susceptible often have a strong sense of injustice and need to be
engaged in a cause to feel fulfilled. The aim is to utilise their energy in a positive
manner and channel it in a direction that is constructive for both themselves and
for society. Frustration has the inherent risk of exclusion, which is a negative and
destructive force on its practitioners and on society.
The values of Muslims, including strong family bonds, high levels of volunteering
and aid donations are a cornerstone to the Muslim identity we seek to forge.
So is the Muslim heritage of contributions to human progress, for instance in
mathematics, astronomy, architecture and medicine. All such values should be
asserted to give Muslim youth a framework for their identity in a Western society,
such as Australia.
A2. General Counselling Guidelines

When working with Muslim youth susceptible to extremism, it is important to
establish a channel for advice based on trust. A lenient but honest attitude is
fundamental to building this trust. A mentor, a teacher, a friend, or a parent who
wants to get through to a young Muslim should begin with building trust with that
Page 61
(cont.)
young person. It is important to be ready to advise and to answer questions. We

must understand the young persons past experiences, as a deep understanding of
the youngsters worldview can lead to an atmosphere where positive alternatives
(counter-narratives) can be presented and explored. This, in turn, can result in
positive change through the embracement of a counter-narrative.
In short, it is important to help those being indoctrinated by extremist groups to
reframe their views and reshape their perspectives towards healthy and balanced
narratives.
A number of strategies founded in counselling techniques may be useful when
working with Muslim youth at risk of radicalisation. Some examples include:
i.) Understanding the youths past experience: Mentors should endeavour to truly
understand the youths past experience without being influenced by their own
upbringing and by any personal filters that might bias their understanding.
ii.) Helping youth to define the challenges in their narratives: Encourage the youth
at risk to define the challenges in their own narratives and to name the associated
conflicts.
iii.) Engaging in a supported search for meaning: After providing the opportunity
for the youth at-risk to reconsider his/her past experiences, a constructive
channel of communication can be established to allow the mentor to provide
much needed support. Through active participation, the mentor can help the
young person to reconsider their stories, deriving new meanings in their lives.
Helping youth at-risk to reconstruct meaning can assist them in moving forward,
in discovering more positive perspectives and interpretations. Mentors can
challenge and guide youth at-risk to identify and acknowledge other narratives,
which they can eventually adopt as more empowering than the problem-saturated
narratives they had. This guided search for positive alternative interpretations
Page 62
Part 4 (cont.)
and new constructive meanings forms a relationship that centres on advice,

which could lead the youngster to new positive perspectives in an environment
of collaboration.
iv.) Helping youth recount personal stories of competence and strengths: In general,
at-risk youth focus on their challenges, inabilities and skills gaps. Instead of
reinforcing this, mentors can explore the youths positive stories of survival to
help them on a new path of mobilising themselves and their lives in a positive
direction.
v.) Affirming youths privilege to constructively reinvigorate their own lives and
co-construct positive alternative narratives: Mentors can help rebuild the youths
sense of self-worth, helping them to constructively reinvigorate their lives or to
develop positive alternative solutions.
vi.) Sharing mentor stories: The mentors use of cultural stories, parables, myths and
metaphors and other narrative forms can elicit the at-risk youths own forgotten
stories of healing and empowerment.
A3. Islamic Counselling Guidelines

The Islamic methodology for guidance relies upon the methods of reasoning
such as the use of wisdom (al-hikmah), fair exhortation (al-mawìdhah) and
argumentative reasoning (al-mujadalah) as is found in the Quranic Ayah 125 in
Surat An-Nahl, which means:
Call to the way of your Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and argue (reason)
with them in ways that are best and most gracious: for your Lord Knows best of the
one who strays from His1 way, and He Knows best of those who go aright.
1 The words He, His & Him when used in reference to God must not be understood to refer
to gender. God created males & females. Hence, He does not resemble His creations & they do
not resemble Him .
Page 63
(cont.)
Also Ayah 33 of Surat Fussilat means: Who [affirmative] speaks better than the one
who calls to Allah while they themselves do good.
The beauty of the Quran is manifested in presenting to mankind three means to
reasoning, and it does so in one verse. They are wisdom, fair exhortation and
argue (reason) with them in ways that are best. These three means are known to
logisticians as: proof , convincing through speech and argumentation.
B. Counter-Narratives against Extremism

Below is a list of sixteen extremist narratives and their counter-narratives in two main
categories.
Category 1 [Theology] (8 cases)
Category 2 [Practice] (8 cases)
Category 1 [Theology]
Narrative T1: Extremist groups claim that they represent true Islam and hence
promote themselves as such in public.
Counter-Narrative T1: Extremists use selective quotations from religious sources, and
sometimes outright fabrications, to give the impression that their ideology is true
Islam. They claim that normative and established views are the result of innovation
Page 64
Part 4 (cont.)
(bidàh), and that they are allegedly going back to the early period of the Salaf. In
making these allegations, extremists rely on a young Muslims ignorance of the Arabic
language and of the history and culture of Islam. Since most young Australian Muslims
are not able to read Classical Arabic well themselves, and may lack knowledge about
Islam, they are vulnerable to being misled as to the meaning of Quranic passages, for
example. They may know little of Islamic history and therefore are vulnerable to a
portrayal that downgrades the importance of Muslim scholarship upon the process of
transmission of Islamic knowledge and culture. In reality, as we shall see, many of the
doctrines propounded by the extremists are the real innovations. The idea that Islam
is something that does not require mastering the language for interpretation is itself
an innovation that denies the rich history of Islamic scholarship and civilisation.
Ahmed:
This view is the only correct way to understand Islam.
Mentor:
How do you know this is true? Have you studied the opinions of
Muslim scholars on this issue? Do you know if this view contradicts
what most Muslim scholars have always said? I hope you dont
think that the people telling you this are capable of understanding
the Quran better than great Muslim scholars are.
Narrative T2: Extremists tend to claim that they are implementing true jihad, and
hence promote themselves as the authentic carriers of the banner of Islam.
Counter-Narrative T2: Jihad as referenced in the Quran and in the Prophetic
traditions should not be automatically and solely taken to mean the concept of qital
(fighting) or harb (war). Al-jihad al-akbar (the greater jihad) for example, as described
by the Prophet in the transmitted traditions, means the inner struggle against evil
temptations and wrongdoing. While there is the possibility of a form of jihad that is
conducted by warfare, the conditions of this are more stringent than those applied
by the extremists, for example the killing of innocent children and the random
Page 65
(cont.)
blowing up of marketplaces are not sanctioned by the rules of jihad according to

Islamic tradition. Such acts are governed by group-driven ambitions, ego or perhaps
misguided intentions based on misinformation and misinterpretation of the sources
and traditions of Islam.
Ahmed:
I want to join a jihadi group.
Mentor:
Jihad is a noble concept. But some of the clashes that are being
fought today are not clear-cut clashes in the name of Islam that can
simply be called jihad as some do. Such conflicts are complicated
and historical, expressing not just Islam but all kinds of differences
between people, and in which the historical methods typically used
are condemned by Islam, such as the killing of women and children
and the practice of suicide.
You should moreover ask yourself what is more useful in the
current climate: to go fighting in a battle in a country where you
are exploited for complicated political ends by local forces you
do not understand and who do not apply true Islamic ethics, or
to concentrate on becoming a morally righteous person who can
educate and strengthen your own community, friends and family
here in Australia?
Narrative T3: Extremist groups are known for the practice of passing takfir against
Muslim scholars and leaders who challenge their authority.
Counter-Narrative T3: Declaring someone as a blasphemer or takfir is a process
governed by strict rules and regulations that have been laid out by mainstream Muslim
scholars. In Islam, it is not permissible to pass takfir on Muslim leaders or scholars
based on political or tactical differences when the rules that govern this process do
not apply. The charge of blasphemous disbelief is a serious charge summed up by the
Page 66
Part 4 (cont.)
Hadith related by Imam Al-Bukhari, which means:
If a [Muslim] man calls another man a kafir, it will apply to one of the two.
This means that anyone who falsely calls a Muslim a kafir (blasphemer) is himself
not a Muslim anymore. However, this is different from calling a person a blasphemer,
when they have in fact committed blasphemy by saying, by action, or by belief. As
usual in Islam, one has to exercise great caution in making accusations. Extremists,
however, are known for hastily passing such a judgement for mere disagreement.
Such behaviour aims to shut down debate against them, and hence to shut down
counter-argumentative scholarship, thus reducing Muslims to unthinking obedience,
completely against the intellectual spirit of Islam, which recognises the human faculty
for reason as a God-given gift to be exercised effectively, and as something that can
elevate Muslims to higher levels. Branding a person with opposing viewpoints as a
kafir without following the applicable religious rules weakens the Muslim community,
while strengthening the extremists hold on adherents by shutting out any questioning
of their extremist ideology.
Narrative T4: Extremists pass takfir against the Muslim masses outside their rank and
file, thereby sanctioning violence against them.
Counter-Narrative T4: In making this dangerous exclusivist claim, the extremists
have clearly misinterpreted the Quranic Ayah number 44 in Surat Al-Maidah, which
means:
Whosoever does not judge according to what Allah has sent down then those are the
kafirun.
The interpretation of this verse based on the authority of Ibn Àbbas, the Prophets
cousin, a great Companion and the Interpreter of the Quran, is related in the book AlMustadrak by Al-Hakim and authenticated by Al-Thahabi and also related in the book
Page 67
Part 4 (cont.)
The Religious Rulings on Women by Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal. This interpretation is
as follows: To merely not judge according to what Allah has sent down is not the
kufur which one might think of that separates from Islam. It is a kind of sin below the
state of apostasy.
To say otherwise i.e., to claim that merely not judging according to what Allah has
sent down is blasphemy is to work to divide the Muslim community, rather than to
unite it around the correct teachings. This is completely hypocritical for people who
absurdly claim to act in the name of the Muslim ummah. Again, this extremist practice
causes social destructuring within the Muslim community, which makes those youth
under their influence more vulnerable to further alienation and radicalisation. The
extremists then become the sole reference point to these young people in their control,
a strong factor in their brainwashing process.
Ahmed:
These so-called Muslims are kafirs.
Mentor:
Maybe there are some things in their interpretation which you

dont agree with, but that does not automatically qualify them to be
outside the fold of Islam. I invite you to verify your interpretation.
Are you sure you know Islam so much better than they do? It might
be the case that those you are talking to have made this claim, but
those outside your group have not; why do you hastily suppose that
the views of those you are talking to are right? You would have to
know both the majority of scholarly opinions and the beliefs of the
people you say are kafirs so well that you can be sure that the two
are in clear contradiction. Before that, you are advised not to pass
this judgement. Please remember the Hadith which means that he
who inexcusably calls a Muslim a kafir is himself a non-Muslim.
Imam Abu-Hanifah said in his book Al-Fiqh Al-Akbar:
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Part 4 (cont.)
We do not declare as a blasphemer any Muslim for a sin he or she has committed, even
if it were a major sin, as long as they dont challenge Islam on its impermissibility. We
also dont remove the label of true Belief from them for such a sin. A Muslim could be a
transgressor without being a blasphemer.
Narrative T5: Extremists claim that all those who govern with secular law or who are
governed by it are rendered as apostates for merely ruling by secular law. Extremists
call for abstention from any form of participation in Australian politics, and they pass
takfir against any Muslim who runs for parliament or any Muslim who attempts to
change the course of the election results by voting.
Counter-Narrative T5: Muslim scholars have clarified this matter by indicating that
it is not blasphemy to merely govern or be governed by secular law. In a country
like Australia, where the vast majority of people are not Muslim, shariàh (Muslim
religious ways) cannot be expected to be applied by non-Muslims. There have always
been Muslims who lived in countries that are not themselves Muslim and, except in
cases of interference in Muslims religious beliefs and practices, Muslims have avoided
breaching the laws of those countries in order not to inflict harm upon themselves.
But this does not mean that Muslims cannot argue for the correctness of Islamic
principles of jurisprudence in general society.
Australian Muslims who have an ideal for society and wish to influence the outcomes
of an Australian election through the ballot box are not prevented from doing so,
according to Muslim mainstream practice. Furthermore, Muslims can have a larger
influence upon society if they engage positively in Australian politics. Opting out of
the political process prevents Islamic perspectives from being taken into account in
the governance of Australia. Muslims should explain Islam to non-Muslims and this
explanation will clarify Islam in society the way of Islam has always been persuasion
through reason, which requires communication with non-Muslims, not separation
from them.
Page 69
Part 4 (cont.)
Ahmed:
Muslims should not vote in Australian elections. Islamic teaching

tells us the right way to run society and this is not open to debate or
vote.
Mentor:
Its right that Islam guides our political principles as Muslims. But
Australia is a non-Muslim country, and we live here. If we are
concerned about the laws and system of the country in which we
live, we should allow ourselves the opportunity to change it. We
could participate in Australian politics and put forward the Islamic
viewpoint.
Narrative T6: Extremists claim that much Muslim scholarship amounts to innovation
(bidàh) and should be discarded, and that everything with no record of having been
practiced by the Prophet in person is against Islam.
Counter-Narrative T6: Muslim scholars over the centuries have said that innovation
can be of two types (good and bad) or several (obligatory, recommended, permissible,
disliked and prohibited). Some innovation is necessary, simply to deal with the
emergence of new things in the world. Other innovation, while not necessary, is
harmless because it does not contradict Islamic principles, just as different Muslim
societies can potentially have different customs, while being equally Islamic. Some
innovation can even strengthen Islam, as the Prophet himself, peace be upon him,
said in a Hadith related by Imam Muslim, which means:
He who innovates a good tradition in Islam shall have its reward and as much reward
as those who do it after him without deducting any of their rewards.
A narrow definition of innovation has made the proponents of extremism categorise
many Muslim scholars, activities, celebrations, habits, customs and ideas as taking a
Muslim outside the fold of Islam. They ban all new traditions regarding Islam not
distinguishing between concepts that are contradictory to Islamic principles and
Page 70
Part 4 (cont.)
others that are commendable and approved by Islam.
The followers of such a doctrine consider all that has been introduced anew regarding
religion as a deviation, heretical and reprehensible, with no differentiation between
what is in accord with Islam and what is not. But is what the second-generation
follower (successor) of the Prophet, Yahya bin Ya`mur, did, of introducing dots to
the written Arabic letters of the Holy Quran, a heretical introduction?! What if all
the Muslims reciting the Quran today benefit from the dotted copies?! Can we claim
that the Muslims are following a heresy?! Of course not! This innovation helps people
on the righteous way, even though it did not exist in the time of the Prophet himself,
peace be upon him. From this we can see that there are potential innovations to
strengthen the Islamic community that still have not been thought of yet, and that
this community is stronger if it remains open to new ideas, while of course being
careful to guard against true heresy. This is a more profound approach than just being
negative and excluding everything new.
Narrative T7: Extremists claim that they transmit the correct understanding of the
verses of the Quran.
Counter-Narrative T7: The issue of interpreting the Quran is foundational to
understanding Islam. The person who comprehensively interprets the Quran needs,
in some cases, to understand the context of events surrounding the revelation of
some of the verses. Furthermore, the process of tawil (an interpretive methodology
that is used in assigning meanings which conform to the Arabic language and the
rules of Islam) is also used when interpreting the Quran. This is used by scholars to
interpret the Attributes of Allah in accordance with the Arabic language and the rules
of Islam away from contradictory readings that render these Attributes as physical
and human-like. Ayah 11 in Surat Ash-Shura in the Quran means:
Nothing is like God in any way whatsoever.
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Part 4 (cont.)
Ayah 74 in Surat An-Nahl means:
Do not attribute to Allah the attributes of His creations.
Those extremists who preach anti-tawil lack the understanding to make the religious
and linguistic analysis that keeps them away from wrongly attributing God with a
physical hand or a face or wrongly claiming that He is a body that sits on the Throne
(ceiling of Paradise) or that He occupies a place. Such false interpretations liken God
to the creation (tashbih), which Islamically clashes with the above verses.
Hence, it is clear that interpreting the Quran is a thorough scholarly process. Without
this process, the extremist understanding of some verses from the Quran would be
rendered superficial and lacking the appropriate framework that keeps the Quran a
coherent book. There is contradiction and incoherence in the extremists readings of
the Quran. Furthermore, the process of following qualified Islamic scholars (taqlid)
in religious matters is what Muslims do, and have done since the early times of the
Salaf.
The extremists base their ideologies on unsanctioned concepts that are in effect a
misreading and a misinterpretation of the Muslim religion. The Quran, which for
Muslims is an unadulterated book from God, is written in Classical Arabic, and
knowledge of that language is required to correctly understand it. Knowledge of
modern Arabic dialects is not sufficient. Classical scholarship in Islam was conducted
by people living in times much closer to that of the early Arabs, and speaking a
language much closer to them. To disregard this scholarship is to discard a major tool
to understanding the Quran. It is much easier not to read mountains of books, but
it is incredibly arrogant to assume one can do better than thousands of scholars who
dedicated their lives over hundreds of years to interpreting the Quran.
Page 72
Ahmed:
This book Ive been reading is all true!
Mentor:
It may be linguistically correct and a glossy book, but before you judge
its content to be correct, you should also know what other scholars
Part 4 (cont.)
have to say about its topics. The best way to verify the concepts
mentioned in this book is to ask a Shaykh or an Imam trusted by
the community. Plus, its better to learn the personal obligatory
Islamic knowledge or what is called al-fard al-àyni before you
submerge yourself into any book that youve picked off the shelf. The
personal obligatory knowledge is a program established by Muslim
scholars to teach Muslim youth and others the basics of their faith.
These basics help you develop a religious balance (mizan sharì), by
which youre in a better place to judge books and websites.
A Hadith of the Prophet, peace be upon him, from the route of Ibn Ùmar has the
following meaning:
What I fear greatly for my nation is a man who mis-explains the Quran and takes it
out of context.
Narrative T8: Extremists say that the use of labels such as moderate or extremist is
in itself a Western conspiracy against Islam and Muslims.
Counter-Narrative T8: In fact this is a misconception the extremists have invented
and popularised, in order to deceive Muslims and in order to silence their own
opponents. Islam is a religion of moderation and Muslims are a middle-path people
as mentioned in the Quran in Ayah 143 in Surat Al-Baqarah, which means:
Indeed Allah has made the Muslim ummah a middle (just) nation.
To be middle-path is to be moderate. In fact, the Prophet, peace be upon him,
warned against al-ghuluww fiddin (extremism). When conducted in the name of
Islam, extremism gives Muslims a bad name, hence the need to work energetically to
eradicate its damaging influence from society.
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Part 4 (cont.)
Category 2 [Practice]
Narrative P1: Extremists claim that it is impermissible for Australian Muslims to
interact with non-Muslims, including Christians and Jews (known as the people of
the Book). They advocate segregation.
Counter-Narrative P1: Islam calls Australian Muslims to justice and mercy and
permits their collaboration with others to achieve the common good that benefits
humanity with all its members, whether Muslim or non-Muslim. Islam in Arabia
emerged through the Prophet in a world surrounded by people who were non-Muslim.
The Prophet, peace be upon him, had plenty of dealings with non-Muslims and Islam
has throughout its history mostly existed in countries where non-Muslims have been
present and where Muslims and non-Muslims lived together peacefully side by side.
The notion of refusing to deal with Australian non-Muslims is an innovation against
the traditions of Islam. The agenda of segregation is the agenda of the fringe antiIslamic movements that do exist within Australian society and worldwide.
Page 74
Ahmed:
Ive heard its impermissible to interact with non-Muslims.
Mentor:
You may not want to interact with non-Muslims, but the way of
Islam is not to refuse opportunities or to harm your prospects. If
dealing with non-Muslims will help you, then it is a good thing.
If it helps them too, then so much the better if it does not harm
Muslims, you should have nothing against the wellbeing of nonMuslims, and since Australian Muslims are part of Australian
society, the wellbeing of all Australians in some measure aids
Australian Muslims. You should certainly beware of corruption
when dealing with non-Muslims, but as long as a Muslim remains
true to their faith in their dealings with non-Muslims, this may bring
benefit to themselves and to their community, which is a good thing.
Part 4 (cont.)
Addressing Muslims, Ayah 8 in Surat Al-Mumtahanah in the Quran means:
Allah does not forbid you to deal justly and kindly with those who fought not against
you on account of religion nor drove you out of your homes.
Narrative P2: Extremists teach youth to confrontationally curse and vilify nonMuslims, their religions and ways, and they openly preach hate against ethnic groups
other than theirs.
Counter-Narrative P2: Islam prevents Australian Muslims from calling in the
community for the cursing and vilifying of non-Muslims and their religions, as this
clearly causes retaliatory vilification and cursing of Muslims and their religion thus
leading to community backlash. This disrupts social coexistence. Islam prevents
Australian Muslims from lying to, betraying or robbing people, including nonMuslims. It is against Islamic morals to do so.
Ahmed:
Anglo and Muslim people dont get along just look at Cronulla...
Mentor:
Its true there are occasional problems between Australian Muslim

and non-Muslim youth, but fighting with non-Muslims just makes
this worse. Living in a non-Muslim society, such a fight gives a poor
reputation to Muslims and increases problems faced by Muslims in
society. Islam requires Muslims to spread correct understanding of
Islam and to guard the wellbeing of the Muslim community. While
this does not mean that Muslims must accept ill-treatment, we
should, nevertheless, find ways for making things better by trying to
increase contacts with non-Muslims in a way that will lead to more
peaceful relations between communities. Cutting ourselves off from
other communities and publicly condemning their culture will not
make the lives of Muslims better.
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Part 4 (cont.)
Ayah 108 in Surat Al-Anàm in the Quran means:
Insult not those whom they worship other than Allah (God), so that they dont insult
Allah wrongfully without knowledge.
Narrative P3: Extremists justify the rape of a woman who has adorned herself in
public.
Counter-Narrative P3: It is impermissible, according to Islam, to rape a woman who
is seen showing off her body in public, and state that she deserves it. In Islam it is the
duty of the male to turn his eye in chastity away from uncovered women such is
the Quranic commandment. Rape is impermissible in Islam, a sign of terrible moral
weakness in the rapist, regardless of what temptation is placed before him.
Ahmed:
She was asking for it, showing off her body like that.
Mentor:
While Islam teaches that women should cover their bodies by

wearing the hijab, and not invite sexual attention, Islam also
teaches to men that they must avert their eyes from women and
control their lust. You cannot use the sin of a woman to justify the
sin of a man.
The Prophet, peace be upon him, said in a Hadith related by Imam Al-Bukhari and
others, which means:
There are seven [given that they have the right belief in Allah and His Messenger]
whom Allah will shade in the shade of the Throne (ceiling of Paradise) on the Day
when there is no other shade: 1- a just ruler; 2- a youth who grew up in the worship of
Allah the Almighty; 3- a man whose heart is attached to the mosques; 4- two men who
love each other for Allahs sake meeting for that and parting upon that; 5- a man who
is called by a woman of beauty and position [for illegal intercourse] but he says: I fear
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Part 4 (cont.)
Allah; 6- a man who gives in charity and hides it such that his left hand does not know
what his right hand gives in charity; 7- and a man who remembered Allah in private
and so his eyes shed tears.
Narrative P4: Extremists make it obligatory upon the females to wear a full chador,
prohibiting them from uncovering their faces and from Islamically covering their
bodies and hair with long shirt/skirt style clothing. Extremists make job opportunities
more difficult for women.
Counter-Narrative P4: There is no Islamic proof that could be produced which would
prevent females from wearing long shirt/skirt style clothing with a headscarf to
Islamically cover their bodies and hair. Hijab is an issue of covering and modesty and
not a statement to cut off females from the workplace or from society. Over Islamic
history and between different Islamic countries, there are great variations in dress,
while keeping to the prescribed Islamic principles of hijab and modesty.
Narrative P5: Extremists disallow females from attaining an education, working or any
other respectable activity outside her house with their claim that it is not Islamically
allowable.
Counter-Narrative P5: The claim that Islam disallows females from conducting
respectable activity outside her house is in fact not sanctioned by Islam, but only by
the unauthorised verdicts of some extremist leaders. It is not the Islamic tradition
itself, but only the cultural tradition recently prevalent in some parts of the world.
There is nothing in Islam itself that prevents women from going outside or from
working when they adhere to Islamic strictures and do not, for example, be alone in
an isolated place with a marriageable man (i.e. not a father, uncle, brother etc.) when
there is no third individual that would break that privacy (khalwah). Few jobs call
for women to break such rules. Moreover, the sexual harassment of women in the
workplace is illegal in Australia, and is defined in Australian law as relative to what a
Page 77
Part 4 (cont.)
woman is comfortable with, meaning that behaviour by men that is unacceptable to
Muslim women is not legally allowed, even if it is normal treatment for non-Muslim
women. This is not to say that women have to go out and work, but it does mean that
women who go out and work are not necessarily doing anything wrong, and nor are
their husbands or fathers when they agree for them to work.
A Hadith related by Imam Al-Bukhari and Muslim and narrated by Àishah states
what means:
Àishah, the Prophets wife, said: The Prophet, peace be upon him, used to pray the
Dawn Prayer, and some women were witnessed praying with the congregation (at the
Mosque).
Another Hadith related by Al-Hakim in his book Al-Mustadrak mentions what
means:
Al-Ahnaf Ibn Qays said: I heard the Hadith from the mouths of Abu Bakr, Ùmar,
Ùthman and Àli (male companions of the Prophet), and I did not hear it as pleasing
as I heard it from Àishah (the Prophets wife).
This Hadith further confirms the notion that it is permissible for woman in Islam to
interact with men as long as it is within the strictures of the religion.
Narrative P6: Extremists separate those youth under their influence from their Muslim
parents, partners and families with the claim that they are not true Muslims.
Counter-Narrative P6: To call for separation of Muslim youth from their Muslim
families is contrary to Islam itself. If you are practicing Islam more than your family,
and your family does not try to prevent you, there is no contradiction between your
duties to God and your duty to your family. The attempt to separate Muslim youth
from their Muslim families is an attempt to replace the family with the extremist
group.
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Part 4 (cont.)
Ayah 23 in Surat Al-Isra in the Quran means:
Your Lord has decreed that you worship none but Him, and that parents be treated
with virtue. If one of them or both of them attain old age in your life, say not to them a
word of disregard, nor shout at them but address them with virtuous words.
Ahmed:
My parents are not good Muslims. I dont want to listen to them.
Mentor:
You do not get to choose who your parents are; if they are not good
Muslims, that is sad, but it does not excuse you from your Islamic
duty towards your family. If your Muslim parents do not demand
you to do things contrary to Islam, then you are required to obey
them. Also keep in mind that your parents are likely to know more
than you about certain matters of relevance to you, being older
and more experienced, and also that they most probably have your
interests at heart, and would like the best outcomes for you. Anyone
who tells you to forsake your family does not have your best interests
at heart, and is not as good a person as they claim to be.
A Hadith related by At-Tirmidhiy states what means:

Some companions asked the Prophet, peace be upon him: What is a way of saving
oneself in the Hereafter? The Prophet responded: You maintain a relationship with the
one who severed the tie with you, you give to the one who deprived you, and you forgive
the one who wronged you.
Narrative P7: Extremists exploit every opportunity to appoint themselves as prayer
leaders and preachers at mosques and congregation halls in order to have direct
access to youth.
Counter-Narrative P7: Known extremists should not be permitted to act within such
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Part 4 (cont.)
leadership roles inside Islamic religious places, but they sometimes are. Even those
who are not known to be extremists may still be extremists and may preach false
doctrines and divisiveness, or they may not preach this openly, but still communicate
it privately. Rather than simply accepting this as part of the diversity of the community,
people should be critical of unorthodox views being propounded and willing to
take action to exclude people when it is obvious they are extremists and they have
not taken heed of advice. This is necessary to safeguard Muslims against heretical
extremists, and also to avoid negative media and other attention that is attracted by
extremist preachers, something that is also important, since we do not want Islam to
be falsely represented or hijacked.
Ahmed:
But [a local preacher] says this is true, and he is a preacher in the

mosque!
Mentor:
Just because someone is a preacher in the mosque doesnt mean

they have all the right answers. Some mosques do not necessarily
closely monitor people to make sure of their qualifications to preach.
You should ask whether this guy has any credentials: where has he
studied, for example, and whether that is a recognised mainstream
institution? You should also ask whether he has evidence from
scripture, Prophetic tradition and Islamic scholarship, because such
sources are far superior guides to Islam than your local preacher,
even if he is charismatic and seemingly well-presented. The value of
preachers is in their ability to transmit these sources to people.
The Prophet, peace be upon him, said in a Hadith related by Imam Muslim, which
means:
Allah does not judge your sincerity by your personal adornment or wealth, rather Allah
judges that by your hearts and deeds.
Page 80
Part 4 (cont.)
Narrative P8: Amongst Australian Muslim youth, extremists attempt to spread a
victim mentality and an exaggerated feeling of being discriminated against.
Counter-Narrative P8: There is no point in exaggerating the marginalisation of
Muslim youth as that weakens their resolve and strips them of their social capacity
to interact positively and find employment, for example. Rather, if and where there is
discrimination against Muslims, the only way to deal with this is to tackle it head-on
by engaging with the non-Muslim community, whereas segregating ourselves can only
increase misunderstandings and discrimination from the wider community. Indeed,
segregating ourselves is to surrender to anti-Muslim discrimination. Muslims are not
a majority in Australia, so such problems will not go away by ignoring them.
Ahmed:
I cant get a good job because I am a Muslim. There is no point

trying to succeed in Australian society because the Australians
wont allow Muslims to take important positions in society.
Mentor:
Its true that some Muslims may feel they have difficulties succeeding
in Australia. They may have lower levels of English than other
people, come from more disadvantaged backgrounds, and they
may not know the right people to get advice and help. Still, Muslims
who have sought an education and a good career can and have
obtained both of these in Australia. If you want these things,
you must strive for them. Giving up because you find it difficult
might be easier in the short term, but will not benefit you, your
community, or make you happier in the long run. By making the
effort to succeed in Australia, you put yourself in a position to help
and inspire other Muslims, and to show non-Muslim Australians
what Muslims are capable of. In the workplace, most people are
fundamentally concerned with what you can do for them and what
results you can achieve.
Page 81
Part 4 (cont.)
Given these counter-narratives, will Ahmed now follow a path of
radicalisation towards extremism? He has at least been given the keys
to the path that leads to an empowered alternative to extremism. We
will see in the next part, Part 5, how Ahmeds vulnerable situation
and that of others similar to his could be supported in a whole-ofcommunity approach. The next part will also put the counter-narratives
into practice through Counter-Radicalisation prevention strategies.
Page 82
Part 4 (cont.)
Page 83
Part 5
In Part 5, we outline the framework for a whole-of-community approach
to the prevention of radicalisation. We will seek to put our knowledge
into practice, bringing in not only the youth we wish to influence, but
also the whole society of which they are part.
Page 84
Part 5 (cont.)
n this, the final part of the book, having examined the background to radicalisation, and expounded our counter-narratives to it, we explore how our knowledge
and counter-narratives can be put into action through Counter-Radicalisation prevention strategies.
Our prevention strategies are informed by in-depth interviews and focus groups held
with Muslim leaders, parents and Muslim youth, as well as the identification of a
number of vulnerability factors as identified in Part 1, and the radicalisation and
recruitment processes of Part 3.
Our prevention strategies point in two opposite, but mutually necessary, directions:
exposing and excluding extremists on the one hand, and educating and helping those
vulnerable to extremism, or who may be rescued from extremism on the other, by
giving them an alternative theological framework and social support base.
As responsible parents, community leaders, teachers and youth workers in the Muslim community, we have to prevent youth from making the wrong choice by following
an extremist path. As a prevention strategy, corrupt leaders and information sources
should be kept away from the path of youth at-risk in order to restrict extremist
propaganda from penetrating youth circles. This goes hand-in-hand with the educational program set out in this book to prepare young people to think for themselves
and to resist social pressures by developing their inner strength. We are backing a
silent revolution by the majority of Muslims, including its youth, to marginalise the
extremist narratives of those who are abusing the Muslim faith, but who are currently
more vocal and who attract more media publicity.
In reaching Muslim youth, their parents, religious leaders, youth workers, teachers
and first-line workers play an extremely important part. Therefore, various parts of
this action plan focus on providing the support and knowledge some might need in
order to recognise the radicalisation phenomena at an early stage and deal with it
Page 85
Part 5 (cont.)
adequately. They can lead a discussion with young people and occasionally influence
their development patterns.
Muslim communities should work together in partnerships between the community,
the government and the business domain to provide support to a much-needed social project. The BIRR Initiative is such a partnership to build the capacity of a new
emerging community in south-west Sydney to counteract extremism, to respond to
the needs of its young people and to support its leaders to challenge and eradicate
extremism.
Next, we will outline the role of various areas used by the BIRR Initiative in a whole-ofcommunity approach to reach out to vulnerable youth and to the wider community in
which we all live.
Page 86
Part 5 (cont.)
B1. The role of mentoring and intervention
We need to guide those who are influenced by extremism by using an empowering narrative to counter the extremist narrative. As previously outlined, our primary tool is mentoring (or active intervention in some cases of youth who are already radicalised). During
mentoring, constructive dialogue can take place and an effective two-way communication process can follow. This should be performed by trained mentors who exhibit the
patience, wisdom and soft and friendly approach that facilitates a constructive dialogue.
Counselling and educational programs are to include services designed to help young
people develop more effective coping skills to manage life challenges, and education on
the different types of extremist groups they will encounter in the ideological marketplace. Camps will be used to remove young people from their usual environment and
peers who may be a negative influence, and get them into an environment where they are
attentive and responsive, to facilitate constructive dialogues and learning.
The core component of the BIRR Initiative is mentoring based on counter-narratives that
refute the extremist narrative. Youth at risk of radicalisation can thereby be protected
from that influence, while those already radicalised could be provided with an exit route
and a lifeline. Here, we use messages mixed with counselling techniques (as we saw in
Part 4) to mentor young Muslims away from the lures of extremism and radicalisation.
The BIRR Initiative provides this mentoring program as a resistive mechanism, to progressively immunise people and eventually the whole community, against an extremism
hijacking and claiming the name of Islam, by propagating normative Islamic narratives.
However, we recognise that this is merely the basic strategy. Success relies on our activation of other community structures, and the cooperation and help of such basic institutions as schools, family and mosques.
Although peer-mentoring for at-risk young Muslims has a relatively short history in a
Western context, there is a general framework, which the BIRR Initiative has adapted. The
BIRR guidelines include: (1) the integration of mentoring projects into a range of other
Page 87
Part 5 (cont.)
services; (2) the use of skilled project workers for effective project coordination, strong
organisational administration and infrastructure, including adequate financial resources;
(3) the articulation of a well-defined mission statement and operating principles; (4) the
establishment of strong referral networks for bringing clients/mentees into the program,
engaging young people voluntarily and providing needs-based support; (5) involving significant people in the young persons life, including caregivers; (6) the effective screening,
training and professional support of mentors, including the documentation of criteria of
eligibility; (7) the development of a program plan that has input from stakeholders; (8)
incorporation of a strategy for program evaluation and ongoing assessment; and (9) risk
management and confidentiality policies.1 2 3
Please refer to Appendix 3 Designing and Planning the BIRR Mentoring Program for a
detailed description of best-practice guidelines and ethical protocols for designing and planning a BIRR peer-mentoring program.
B2. The role of education and schools

As the form of extremism responded to by BIRR only exists if there is ignorance and misunderstanding of Islam, providing a normative understanding of the Religion through
well-trained Muslim religious teachers is a major immunisation against it.
This puts the responsibility of teaching Islam as a centrepiece for any prevention strategy
to tackle extremism; because once the sources that promote it are inhibited, it seems that
young Muslims understanding will then be communally shaped into something proactive and constructive in todays Australian society.
1 Australian Institute of Criminology (2006), Mentoring and crime prevention.

2 Du Bois, D et al. (2002), Effectiveness of mentoring programs for youth, American Journal of
Community Psychology, 30(1): 157-197.
3 National Crime Prevention (2003), Early intervention: Youth mentoring programs, Canberra,
Attorney-Generals Department.
Page 88
Part 5 (cont.)
More books explaining such things are needed in English, and BIRR endeavours to translate these and make them available. Young Muslim students should be supplied with clear
guidelines on how to identify religious books that are authentic and those that are not.
Guidelines about how to differentiate between varying sources would help the young
Muslim differentiate between legitimate and extremist sources. This will also allow him
to distinguish between delinquency and birr, and between a misleading mentor and a
genuine one.
As we have seen in the counter-narratives, ignorance of Islamic history and scholarly
positions, and ignorance of the Arabic language, make youth vulnerable to the misrepresentation of Islam. Positive programs of balanced Islamic education and Arabic language
education are a key foundation of BIRRs plan. While tertiary educated Muslim youth
also become radicalised, their education is usually unbalanced towards the secular, leaving a gap in their religious knowledge that can be filled by extremists. The primary venues
for better religious education include schools, mosques, and of course the family.
BIRR seeks to actively engage in the education system to provide education about Islam. BIRR will work with groups approved by the Department of Education and Training
(DET) to provide classes for Muslim students at NSW Government schools through what
is called Special Religious Education. This will serve as an extra conduit for teaching normative Islamic principles. It will also inform youth about BIRRs work where it is relevant
to them. Moreover, BIRR aims to run presentations, forums and assemblies in public and
private high schools to inform both Muslim and non-Muslim students about the basics
of Islam, and to introduce its own mission. Of course, BIRR would particularly target the
vulnerabilities of Muslim youth in such exercises, with empowering counter-narratives to
extremism. Some of the most at-risk are of course youth who are not at school, because
they have dropped out. BIRR will particularly focus on working with them.
In addition, BIRR seeks to work towards supporting an internationally recognised Australian centre that would articulate authoritatively on matters of Islamic edicts for Australian Muslims.
Page 89
Part 5 (cont.)
B3. The role of the family
Supportive guidance by Muslim families is vital for youth who are exploring their identity, while providing safe boundaries and alternatives to extremism. Parents have the first
and foremost role to play in protecting their children from extremism. It is the role of
the parent to ensure the moral development of their offspring; it must be emphasised to
parents that they cannot rely on the mosque to do this by itself. BIRR can help parents
by providing Islamic educational materials (pamphlets, booklets, brief books) to be used
in the home with children too young for BIRRs mentoring program. We recognise that
while South-Asian or second-generation Australian parents may be able to utilise BIRRsupplied materials in English, they may need to be made available in Arabic and maybe
some other languages for some parents.
It is important for parents to keep emphasising their childrens future by drawing from
the society they will live in. Migrant mothers and fathers should keep in mind that their
childrens futures are dependent on how well they adapt to their new country. Parents
should try and understand the new society so they can better advise their children. In order to be able to teach young people, parents themselves should also be educated. While
parents should consider their childrens behaviour within the framework of general society, this does not entail any decline in moral values, but rather an understanding of the
complexities of modern times, and that different approaches may be required to put these
values into practice in a different context.
It is also important to observe siblings relationships and their level of information sharing. Sibling relationships should be encouraged to prevent individualistic behavioural
patterns that may lead youth to making rash decisions. Within this process of a positive
sibling relationship, the chance of a youth making a significant personal decision without
first consulting with one of their siblings is reduced. Moreover, it is important for parents
to guard against the siblings collectively adopting a bad attitude.
Page 90
Part 5 (cont.)
Where problems arise, despite parents best efforts and due perhaps to inevitable differences of culture and language, contacting BIRR to get mentoring or intervention for
the children is desirable. To this end, the services of BIRR will be advertised to parents
through mosques, community associations and community media.
B4. The role of the Muslim community

Australian Muslim neighbourhoods and communities have a genuine responsibility in
preventing any form of extremism and terrorism. If the community is intolerant of such
things, they cannot take root in its midst. BIRR aims to work through the community,
building community support and establishing itself as a channel for concerned members
of the Australian Muslim community to reach out to vulnerable young people. It is a
project by and for the community itself, not something over and above it.
BIRR proposes to involve itself in community events, both to make contact with youth
in the community, and to bring the youth in its orbit into community life. BIRRs purpose in the community is essentially to advocate for the benefit of young Muslims. This
involves getting those young people involved in the community, so that the community
can know what young Muslims want and need. BIRR proposes to establish and support
alternative cultural and recreational facilities in the community to match those provided
by extremists. BIRR intends to establish its own gym and youth centre, as such places are
often used as centres for extremist ideology and also because youth have identified a need
in this area.
Research has pointed to the formation of fluid networks of peers in the radicalisation
process, which means that counter peer networks are needed in our effort to resist radicalisation. The BIRR Initiative plans to utilise the nature of these fluid networks by offering a peer support network within a positive engaged framework. Islam itself offers the
answers to the spiritual questions that the narrative of the extremists raises (as we have
seen in Part 4). The BIRR peer support network encapsulates the positive identity messages and starts with the BIRR-trained mentors to build up a whole layer of youth who
Page 91
Part 5 (cont.)
can encourage their peers to resist extremism. Through BIRR, young Muslims will meet
young Muslim peers who have embraced normative Islamic positions on critical issues.
We seek to provide alternatives, not only in terms of peer groups but also by providing
safe locations to replace those in which extremists recruit, including safe internet sites,
safe fitness centres, safe youth centres and safe schools, which provide the geographical
base for safe peer groups. This is about cleaning out existing locations of extremism,
forming partnerships with clean locations and also establishing new ones where we see
a need.
The peer support network will also extend to such things as sports clubs, scout groups,
university/TAFE (Technical and Further Education) student associations, school clubs,
professional groups, job-specific networks, leadership forums, etc.
BIRR has various materials for getting its message out to the community, already having established a website4 and produced a brochure outlining its mission and activities,
and now having produced this guidebook as a follow-up. As BIRR takes off as a project,
we can begin to engage more fully with community stakeholders such as schools and
mosques, which will constitute our primary contact points with youth in trouble. We can
also count on further advertising of our services via local community radio.
B5. The role of the wider community

In Australia, the need to tackle extremism has been raised to the national agenda. The
onus is on the Muslim community to take part in an alliance between Australian Muslims
and non-Muslims in order to work together to prevent any form of extremism that is
undermining social coexistence and security.
The suppression of extremists by police force alone is superficial and leaves behind the substantial part of the extremist group. After police action, the extremists influence in the community
4 http://www.birr.edu.au
Page 92
Part 5 (cont.)
can continue to grow as they use such an action as a rallying cry and a recruiting tool. It is
necessary, therefore, that willing Islamic institutions be involved as a main agent in rooting out
extremism, which forms the ideological base for those who go on to commit terrorist acts.
Muslim communities are an amalgam of intersecting and competing trends, subcultures
and groups. It is important that a partnership is forged from within such trends and
groups against Al-Qaeda and any group that orbits around it. Communities must take
on these affiliated extremist groups and refute their theology. Activating the soft power
of the community in tandem with the hard power of the state will have more impact in
preventing extremism in both the short and the long terms.
We intend to collate information on extremist activities, particularly on the internet,
via our own monitoring and via information provided from youths in contact with us
through the mentoring program. This information, depending on its level of security
concern, will then be made publicly available including to community leaders, the police, the Director of Public Prosecution and other relevant parties.
Furthermore, it is unfortunate but true that, at times, sections of the community have
played a role in exacerbating extremist conduct and behaviour by branding mainstream
young Muslims as extremists or terrorists. Consequently, it is important for the line between being a Muslim and being an extremist to be clearly drawn, understood and agreed
to by both the Muslim and the wider community.
It is now a frequent occurrence for certain outlets to misuse language when discussing
extremism and terrorism by labelling all they dislike as a threat or an obstacle to social
coexistence. BIRR proposes to contact and meet with such outlets directly to persuade
them to change their rhetoric, explaining that by labelling Muslim youths as terrorists or
extremists, we are inadvertently increasing the risk of converting the youth to extremist attitudes and behaviour. A person who is isolated and then branded as an extremist
without strong evidence may be traumatised and further pushed towards radicalisation.
Such a person may simply believe that he or she is isolated because of his good and moral
character and, as a result, may belligerently resist mainstream society. This could lead the
Page 93
Part 5 (cont.)
youth to drawing the following unfortunate conclusion: if what I am doing constitutes
extremism, then yes I am an extremist and a terrorist!
Civil institutions can do much for the BIRR Initiative, and so it is important for us to
liaise with them. For example, we would look to launch TAFE NSW training for mentors
in conjunction with this book (as a tailored program), and indeed would seek to recruit
potential mentors from those who already study or have studied at TAFE. We would liaise
with Centrelink and PAGES Providers of Australian Government Employment Services
to advertise our service to their clientele. We have already given presentations about the
BIRR Initiative at PAGES meetings and we aim to sign a service delivery community
agreement with other agencies. We seek endorsement for our activities from community
stakeholders wherever applicable, and try to develop all initiatives in consultation with
all concerned parties.
Page 94
Part 5 (cont.)
As with the Muslim community, BIRR is a part of civil society and is there
to work with it for communal benefit. So, in order to work with society
more broadly, BIRR will establish the Alliance against Extremism specifically
to engage with non-Muslim society and involve non-Muslims who wish to
support BIRRs mission statement.
Governments should support such endeavours that attempt to help activate a dormant and disadvantaged segment of society whose own passivity,
will exacerbate a negative culture unless this trend is addressed. Neglecting to do this will leave its trace on societies and generations to come.
Finally, the prime motivation behind authoring this book has been to declare the methodology and the contours of the struggle over the points of
mutual hostility between extremist currents, the Muslim community and
the broader public. Through these insights we aim to overcome what tarnishes the name of the Muslim community and its efforts in establishing
together with its neighbours, social coexistence, peace and security.
The BIRR Initiative is a unique opportunity that begins to draw the blueprint of the way forward for Australian Muslims with a positive vision for
Islam in Australia a vision that produces a localised Australian Muslim
culture based on traditional Islamic virtue (birr) interwoven with a local
Australian flavour.
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to Building
Identity
An Islamic
Mentoring
Guide
to Building
Identityand
andResisting
Radicalisation
Page 95
APPENDICES
Page 96
APPENDIX 1
TARGET COMMUNITY SOUTH-WEST SYDNEY
Profile of the Muslim Community of south-west Sydney (ABS 2006)
In the 2006 Census of Population and Housing 161,164 people in Sydney identified
themselves as being Muslim, representing 3.9% of people in Sydney. Of these, 81,530
lived in south-west Sydney, which includes the Local Government Areas of Bankstown,
Canterbury, Auburn, Liverpool and Fairfield.
Australias Muslim population is relatively young, with more than half below 25 years
of age. A third of Muslims are under 16 and the average age of Muslims is 26 years.
Muslim populations Local Government Area (LGA) South-west Sydney (SS)

LGA
Bankstown (C)
Canterbury (C)
Auburn (A)
Liverpool (C)
Fairfield (C)
Total SS
Muslim population
Total population
Muslims/Total
Muslims/Total
No.
No.
population
Muslims in SS
15.2
13.7
24.8
8.3
4.4
11.5
31.9
21.8
19.8
16.8
9.7
25,997
17,792
16,115
13,734
7,892
81,530
170,489
129,962
64,957
164,602
179,892
709,902
Page 97
APPENDIX 2
STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION FRAMEWORK &
QUESTIONNAIRES
The purpose of these questionnaires was to generate information that helped the research to
build a case study about the teaching of values and the prevention of extremism as related
to the education of Muslim youth in Australia. The interviews conducted took the form of
formal/informal discussions grouped in the following areas:
A. MOSQUE/SCHOOL LEADERS
A1. Mosque/School Context
i. Location of the establishment
ii. A brief history of the establishment
iii. Current congregation/enrolments number of members and other demographic
characteristics
iv. Recent achievements and future challenges regarding Muslim youth
A2. Muslim Youth Education
i. Does the mosque/school have a particular policy/philosophy in relation to the
teaching of true Muslim values and the prevention of extremism?
ii. How does this translate into practice within the community?
iii. How do you select your Imams/teachers?
iv. What factors currently foster/hinder the prevention of extremism in your
establishment?
v. What opportunities do the youth have to demonstrate the values they are
Page 98
APPENDIX 2 (cont.)
taught?
vi. How are community/parents involved in the teaching of the young people?
A3. Community And Resources
i. What resources do the Imams/teachers at your mosque/school use for their lessons
when teaching values and warning against extremism?
ii. What resources does the establishment use to promote the contribution of Islam
to Australian society?
iii. What resources are required but are not available at present to support the
teaching of values and the warning against extremist ideology?
A4. Teacher Training & Development
i. What, if any, spiritual/professional training and development have Imams/teachers
experienced in relation to teaching values to foster positive identities and to prevent
extremism?
ii. What additional spiritual/professional development is required to assist Imams/
teachers in their work in this area?
A5. Quality Educational Programs
i. What processes have been established to ensure the quality of education at
the establishment and the keeping out of unwanted elements from within your
environment?
ii. How does this establishment evaluate its educational program? What action does
the establishment take after completion of such an evaluation?
Page 99
APPENDIX 2 (cont.)
B. RELIGIOUS YOUTH LEADERS/TEACHERS
B1. Muslim Youth Education
i. What do you consider to be the centres greatest strengths in the education of
values and the prevention of extremism?
ii. How does your centre teach values and warn against extremism?
iii. What factors currently hinder/foster the prevention of extremism in your
centre?
iv. What opportunities do young people have to demonstrate the values they are
taught?
v. How are community/parents involved in the teaching of youngsters?
vi. In what ways does the centre promote the contribution of Islam to Australian
society? What is your role in that process?
B2. Community And Resources
i. What resources do you use for teaching values and preventing extremism?
ii. What resources does the centre use to promote the contribution of Islam to
Australian society?
iii. What resources are required but are not available at present to support the
teaching of values and the warning against extremist ideology?
iv. What links does the centre have with community leaders and how does this
influence the teaching of Muslim youth?
Page 100
APPENDIX 2 (cont.)
B3. Teacher Training & Development
i. What, if any, training and development have you experienced in relation to
teaching values and preventing extremism? How was this undertaken?
ii. What additional professional development is required to assist you in your work
in this area?
B4. Quality Programs
i. What processes have been established to ensure the quality of education at the
centre and the keeping out of unwanted elements from within the congregation?
ii. How does this centre evaluate its educational program? What action does the
centre take after completion of such evaluation?
C. MUSLIM YOUTHS
i. Could you describe what a typical day at your school, mosque or youth centre
looks like? (ice breaker).
ii. What activities have you participated in that teach about values such as peace,
justice and social coexistence?
iii. Why do you think these are important?
iv. Can you talk about ways that youth in this school or mosque demonstrate these
values in their daily lives?
v. Have you experienced teachers who promote hate and extremist attitudes? Did
you feel intimidated?
vi. How well do you think the education of true Muslim values helps you to
participate in broader Australian society?
An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation Page 101
APPENDIX 2 (cont.)
D. MUSLIM PARENTS
i. How do you ensure that your kids are taught religious education by trustworthy
sources?
ii. What do you consider to be the best aspects of your childs education that helps
them to engage in Australian society?
iii. In what ways do you think schools and mosques can promote social/community
relations and values of coexistence, justice and objectivity?
iv. How well do you think teaching in this school or mosque helps your children to
participate in broader Australian society?
v. What checks and balances do you have in place to ensure that your kids are not
being influenced by extremist books or leaders?
Page 102
APPENDIX 3
DESIGNING AND PLANNING THE BIRR MENTORING
PROGRAM
Peer-mentoring is a structured and trusting relationship that brings young people together
with caring individuals who offer guidance, support and encouragement aimed at developing
the competence and character of the mentee (youth-at-risk). Mentoring is an endeavour
that shapes a young persons aspirations and helps them realise their potential.
Muslim mentoring is not a new concept; it has its roots in the early Islamic periods, and
also in the Prophets wisdom and tradition. Throughout the centuries, mentoring provided
guidance and counsel to younger individuals, and it has occurred spontaneously as an
informal relationship to drive the young persons upward mobility and to provide a shoulder
to lean on when they need it.
A. IDENTIFY THE TYPES OF INDIVIDUALS YOU WILL RECRUIT AS

MENTORS
1. Who are the Mentors?
The target mentor community is that of Muslim males and females between the ages of 15
and 25 who are natural leaders able to mentor other youths. They will usually have some
kind of vocational training or tertiary education. The recruits will be religious Muslim
youths with some traditional Islamic understanding in order to appeal to others who are
undergoing a transition phase; discovering aspects of their Islamic faith.
2. Who are the Mentees?
Youth-at-risk are vulnerable to many of societys negative social undercurrents, including
radicalisation. Those most at risk are those who are disenfranchised and disconnected
from society, either through being unemployed or being caught up with the police. In
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
addition, such young people will lack a good grounding or understanding of true Islamic
values and virtues. They are at risk of being exploited by extremist groups. The mentees
are mostly identified through referrals from the community (mosques, organisations) as
well as from Centrelink and the police.
3. What Does a Mentor Do?
i.) Offers Muslim youth support and guidance, and assists mentees through a time of crisis
or clash of identities and help them overcome the alienation and disenfranchisement they
might experience in society.
ii.) Instils youth with a sense of self-esteem and pride as Australian Muslims.
iii.) Helps young people develop more effective coping skills to manage life challenges.
iv.) Helps shape a young persons aspirations, helps them accept their responsibilities and
realise their potential.
v.) Educates Muslim youths-at-risk about the reality of extremism and the political
propaganda extremists employ.
vi.) Communicates the goals of the program to outside groups in order to ensure
recruitment and retention of mentors and to increase public awareness and support for
the program.
4. Eligibility Guidelines for Mentors
i.) Between 15 and 25 years of age (and preferably located in south-west Sydney).
ii.) Vocational training or tertiary qualified (preferable).
iii.) Of ethnic backgrounds (Lebanese or other).
Page 104
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
iv.) Moderate Muslim with enough traditional Islamic understanding to appeal to youths
who are undergoing a religious transition. A good grounding in Islamic studies helps
counter extremist ideologies and religious misunderstanding.
v.) Good communication skills and ability to establish rapport, including the ability to
listen non-judgementally and ask questions to understand how the youngster sees the
world (an informed understanding increases the mentors ability to offer appropriate,
well-balanced counter-narratives).
vi.) Mentor screening and ongoing support and supervision will be provided.
B. MENTOR TRAINING
Training for mentors includes an education about the fallacies of extremism as being
an untrue representation of the Islamic ethical system and faith. This training section
will utilise the counter-narratives to extremism that were explored in Part 4 as a
primary resource tool. Further, as counselling communication is central to the process
of behavioural change, resources in counselling and communication skills, including
listening skills and mentoring skills, will also be made available. The training program
includes protocols for risk management concerning information that has a security
concern and which requires action.
Mentor training is divided into three areas:

1. Internal Mentor Training Program centred on extremism counter-narratives
2. TAFE NSW Mentor Training centred on counselling skills
3. Mentor Training Camps for building support networks
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
C. DETERMINE THE TYPE OF MENTORING THE PROGRAM WILL
OFFER
The program utilises the following two mentoring approaches:
1. Peer-mentoring
Peer-mentoring provides an opportunity for a caring young person to develop a guiding,
teaching relationship with a younger person. The mentoring program specifies activities
that are curriculum-based. For example, a university student might mentor a high school
student or engage in general skill-building activities. These youth mentors serve as
positive role models. They require ongoing support and close supervision. In a peermentoring relationship, the mentor and the mentee meet frequently over the course of
mentoring period.
2. E-mentoring (also known as online mentoring or telementoring)
E-mentoring connects a youth/adult with another. The pair communicates via the internet
at least once a week during the mentoring period. Pairs can arrange two or three face-toface meetings, one of which is a kick-off event. The mentor serves as a guide or advisor
for example, discussing religious issues, future education or career options. E-mentoring
can also serve as a bridge or a support tool for mentors and mentees in traditional oneto-one relationships.
D. DEFINE THE NATURE OF THE MENTORING SESSIONS

A core activity of the mentoring sessions is the development of relationships that will, in
turn, enable the pair to achieve other program goals.
Character, education and leadership development
Page 106
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
The BIRR mentoring model focuses primarily on building a relationship between a young
person and a caring peer who can serve as a role model and life coach. In this model, the
mentor and the mentee decide the types of activities they will share. They can spend time
together, talking or playing games, visiting others, and so on. Some of their activities
may be educational in nature (e.g. reading together). There are defined expectations
for improving the mentees awareness, and for acquiring new knowledge regarding the
counter-narratives and the extremism prevention strategies. This is best achieved through
the focus on building the relationship. It also gives mentors more flexibility to spend time
talking with their mentees about both educational and non-educational issues.
The sessions are to focus on helping youth accept their responsibilities and realise their
potential. They may take various forms, including tutoring, career exploration, life skills
development, game playing and going to sports, entertainment or cultural events.
E. DETERMINE WHAT THE PROGRAM WILL ACCOMPLISH AND

WHAT OUTCOMES WILL RESULT
1. Community capacity to resist extremism is enhanced.
2. Youth leaders have increased understanding of Islamic history, theology, culture,
values and can advocate and explain its value in shaping an Australian Muslim identity
and productive citizens.
3. Youth have a positive experience and perspective of their identity as Australian Muslims
based on self-esteem and pride.
4. Participants have gained skills.
5. Youth are empowered to use their relationships to carry positive messages through
grassroot networks.
6. Muslim youth attain higher levels of optimism, self-esteem and confidence and a sense
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
of direction/purpose is developed/enhanced.
7. Youth becomes less vulnerable/susceptible to extremist ideology/ideas.
8. Youth develop, and feel supported in, an Australian Muslim identity.
9. Participants are inspired to take positive steps in their lives.
10. Mentors guide the transitioning of youth-at-risk through practice helping them not
fall prey to misunderstandings and antisocial behaviour.
F. DETERMINE WHEN THE MENTORING WILL TAKE PLACE

E-mentoring can take place any time, peer-mentoring will be in times that suit both (e.g.
after school or on weekends), as well as through BIRR-related activities.
G. DECIDE WHERE THE MENTORING MATCHES WILL MEET

BIRR centre, local mosque, community setting and virtual community.
Mosques are productive places to develop mentoring programs. Mosques have a long
tradition of instilling social and spiritual values and moral strength. They are institutions
that can draw freely on the talents and time of committed volunteers. Community-based
mentoring may involve a level of risk management, because activities take place in the
community.
H. MENTOR SCREENING/SUPERVISION
There are two committees (Screening Committee and Supervision Committee) to help
coordinate the mentoring process.
Page 108
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
1. Screening Committee
The Screening Committee oversees the screening process for mentor selection. The process
is as follows: an interested youth contacts the project manager. The project manager
invites him or her to an interview at the office or on the phone, just to understand the
motives and the level of dedication. If they are deemed satisfactory by the project manager,
they are then allowed to join the next training sessions. After some level of training (to
be determined) he or she is then assessed by the committee. They are tested on their
understanding of the narratives, their rationale and the extremism prevention strategies.
If they are deemed satisfactory by consensus of the committee, the young person is then
a ready mentor who could be matched with a mentee.
2. Supervision Committee
The Supervision Committee establishes a Case Management Protocol (CMP) to ensure
that the program has regular contact with both mentors and mentees, and oversees their
relationship. For mentoring relationships in the program to flourish and endure, the
supervisors will need to be in touch with mentors and mentees on an ongoing basis. This
ensures that they can assess how well each relationship is progressing and offer guidance
and advice along the way. Regular contact between supervisors and mentors and mentees
can help avoid conflict, get relationships back on track and help the project accomplish
program goals.
I. WHAT MAKES A GOOD BIRR MENTOR?

Many people feel that being a mentor requires special skills, but mentors are simply people
who have the qualities of good role models.
1. Mentors listen. They maintain eye contact and give mentees their full attention.
2. Mentors guide. Mentors are there to help their mentees find life direction.
APPENDIX 3 (cont.)
3. Mentors are practical. They give insights about keeping on task and setting goals and
priorities.
4. Mentors educate. Mentors educate about life and their own careers.
5. Mentors provide insight. Mentors use their personal experience to help their mentees
avoid mistakes and learn from good decisions.
6. Mentors are accessible. Mentors are available as a resource and a sounding board.
7. Mentors criticise constructively. When necessary, mentors point out areas that need
improvement, always focusing on the mentees behaviour, not his/her character.
8. Mentors are supportive. No matter how painful the mentees experience, mentors
continue to encourage them to learn and improve.
9. Mentors are specific. Mentors give specific advice on what was done well or could be
corrected, what was achieved and the benefits of various actions.
10. Mentors care. Mentors care about their mentees progress and career planning, as well
as their personal development.
Page 110
APPENDIX 4
SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION
Writing the Arabic letters with English characters
Arabic
English
Arabic
English
Dh
Th
Gh
Kh
Dh
S
Sh
W
Y

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The Way Forward

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to

BIRR Initiative Research Team

AYAH1 2 OF SURAT2 AL-MAIDAH3 IN THE QURAN MEANS

COLLABORATE WITH ONE ANOTHER IN

he BIRR Initiative is a pilot community project established in south-west

Immigration and Citizenship, the project is a response to recommendations

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

Academic Endorsements (cont.)

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

Academic Endorsements (cont.)

This document is a unique, carefully researched and constructed, contribution to the

he BIRR Initiative is a project funded by the Australian Federal Government and

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

Executive Summary (cont.)

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

... but such

Effective intellectual and theological counter-narratives to extremism are a spiritual

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

Definition of Terms (cont.)

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

Research conducted with the projects target community of south-west

Academic research and analysis.

First, empirical data and anecdotal evidence

... a diverse group

Research Methodology (cont.)

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

1. Among sections of second-generation Muslim youths living in south-west

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

aspires to better, more representative and more effective community leadership.

This leads us to the following questions: Who is at risk of radicalisation? Who is

hmed is a 20-year-old LebaneseAustralian

ethnic background, he nonetheless

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

for advancement as limited. He feels

Ahmed feels pressure from sections

Australian and as he cannot give up

increasingly difficult to communicate

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

3. Reflecting on Ahmeds story, what choices do you think Ahmed is likely to

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

4b. Vulnerability Factor: Belonging and alienation

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

4c. Vulnerability Factor: Disadvantage and discrimination

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

We have established in Part 1 the main vulnerability themes leading to radicalisation

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

4 Takfir is to declare someone as a blasphemer.

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

5. How can we build a Counter-Narrative program to extremism based on the

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation

Phase-1: Indoctrination. From vulnerability to indoctrination association with the group,

Diagram 1: Radicalisation Model

An Islamic Mentoring Guide to Building Identity and Resisting Radicalisation