RESEARC.

HES

JN

Essays in Honour of

Professor Alex Wayman

Edited by

RAM KARAN

SHARMA

MOTILAL nANARSIDASS PUnLlSHERS

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~
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CONTENTS
Pr(fclC('
Em('ll('ou'.1" B/c.l"l"ill.I;'.1"
Biilgrtlphicll/

Skc!ch

nl,41I'.\" IVIZI'lllIlI/

VII
XI

xiii

xxiii

Bib/iograph.l'

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES

A. ~1ISCELLANEOUS

l. The List of th\: A.\"U1]lSkrt-tlharma

According to
Asaga

A1':DR BAREAU

2. The ~ven PrincipIesof thc Vajjian Republic:

Thcir Differl;nt Interpretation:)
HAJIME

NAKAMURA

3. A Difficult Beginning: Comments on an English

Translation of C.mdragomin's Desandstava
MICHAEL

HAHN

4. A Study of Aspectsof Rga N. H. SAMTANI

31
61

B. KARMA THEORY

5. PrincipIe of Life According to Bhavya

SHINJO

KAWASAKI

69

6. TJle Buddhist Doctrine of Karma

HARI SHANKAR PRASAD

83

7. A Critical Appraisal of Karmaphalaparik~aof

Nagarjuna T. R. SHARMA

97

C. DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

8. Thc Rclationship bctweenPatccasamllppda

and Dhttl AKIRA lfIRAKAWA
9. Dependent Origination: Its Elaboration in
Early Sarvastivadin Abhidharma Texts
COLLETT COx10.
Dependent Origination in Buddhist Tantra
(,OORGE R. ELDER

105

19

143

JAINA PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES

11. (Kevali)Bhuklil'icra of Bhavasena: Text and
Translaiion PADMAN}.8" S. JAINI

163

The

Buddhist Philosophical Researches

VI

12.

Earliest Portions ofDasavaikiilika-.\'lraM.A.

79

DHAKY

~rNDU PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCHES

13. Buddhist and Mimal11..aVi.:ws ,)n Lak~aQa
K. KUNJU~~I RAJA

195

14. Grammarians and Phil,~S,1ph.:rs

KAMAI.I:SWARIIHAnACHARYA
15. Kashmir Sai\'ism (KS) and th.: V.:danta of
Sai1kara RC. DWIVEDI
16. Siddhi-s in the Bhagavata PuraQa and in the
Yogaslltra-s of Patajali-A C'omparison
T. s. RUKM~~I
17. Languagl.~and Mct:lphor in Indian Stotra
Litcrature

R. K. SHARMA

8. Pittt/ V~rsus A.~l/i-An Ayurv.:dic P.;rspccti"c

BHA(j\\,\~ D.~SH
19. The Doctrinc of'Aham-Artha'
R.V. JOSHI

Co,i'rib/l'or~

227
241
247

2Rl

t,
PREFACE
It is preeminently fit for the scholarly world to bring out a
I::~'icitation volumc to honour Prof~ssor Alex Wayman. who has
distinguishcd himself by an outpouring of scholarly works on
Buddhisll1 for almost forty ycars; and who is now Professor of
Sanskrit. cll1l:ritus. Columbia University. Nl:w York.
r am proud of my association with Pr"fessor Wayrnan dating
back to 1957 as my distinguishcd satirthya whcn I join.:d the
Univcrsity of California. Berkeley, as a Fulbright studcnt. Thcre
\\'1.' both studil.'d undl.'r Professor Murray Barnson Emenl.'au, an
eminl.'111linguist. clas~icist and Indologist; and thcn were awardcd
our Ph.D.'s the same dat!: in 1959.
Prof. Wayman has h<cn al! along a sourc.: of inspirati,}n to
me. Hc identifies himsclf with his studies in an l'xclusive attention
always occupied \\'ith scholarly pursuits. finishing one thing, and
thinking of his next proj.:ct. I don'f remcmbcr if he ever talk~d
of-anything other than Indian Philosophy. Buddhism or gl:nI.'ra I
Indology.
.
Prof. Emcncau's kind blessings are found in print in this
volum~. Those of Prof. R.N. Dandekar and othcr distinguished
memb\:rs of the Felicitation Committee are also very much thcre:
"punas ca bhyo 'pi namo 'stu tebhyaJ,1".
I am gratcful to the Felicitation Committcc and Iso t thc
I-:arncd contributors for cnriching this volumc. It is divided into
thrl:e major sections: Buddhist. Jaina and Hindu Philosophical
Rescarchcs. In a way this is also the scupc of Profcs~or Wayman's

rescarchcs.
Undcr thc Buddhist rcsearchcs. the essay by Andr Barl'au.
U~illg the Vinaya in Chinesco dcfcnd~ Wayman's position th:lt
A~~lga bclongcd to t/lc Mahi~:isaka scct. Hajime Nakamllr:l
points out difTering \'ic\\'s. about the scvcn Vajji:ll1 Rl'public
principIes; it is nicc to havc this important setofparagraphs in
thc presl.'nt volum~. Michacl Hahn cl)nccrns himsl'lr with the
flIl10U~ Buddh.isl poet Candr:lgomil1 who might :ll~o be thc
gramm:lrian of th~lt n:lll1C hut h:lrdly the C:ll1dragomin \\'ho
cl)mmentl'd on Buddhist Tantr:ls. N.H. Samtani vig(lr,'u~ly
trClt~ the term ra~(/. Aflcr lhcse mi~ccll:lnC('U~article~ thl'rl.' arc

19

THE DOCTRINE OF 'AHAMARTHA'

R. v. JOSHI.De/hi

Tlle followers of Advaita and Vai~QavaVecianta categoricaUy

differ on this doctrine. The Advaitin explains 'aharo-artha' or
cI-sense'in five ways:
(i) that ego (aharl1kara)is 'I-sense'.
(ii) that consciousnessreftectedin c;)nscience.is 'I-sense'.
(iii) that consciousnessconditioned by conscience in the forro
of ego is 'I-sense'.
(iv) that the uniting eleroent of anmate and inaniroate (citacit-grantbi) is cl-sense'.It aroountsto that ego-consciousc
ness (ahaJi1kr:l-caitanya)modified by identical superimposition (tdtmya-adhysa)is cl-sense'.
(v) that pure consciousnessis not cl-sense'.
The Advaitin declares the ego of Sa1ilkhya as 'I-sense' but
rejectsthe SaIhkhya theory of creation. This stand is not logical.
Even if we acceptfor the sake of arguroent that the Advaitin
does not disagree with the SIhkhyatheory of creation, the ego
as propounded in non-dualism does differ froro the ego of
S1i1khya,becausethe ego in non-dualisro is diff~rent in each
individual 'Self' while the egu in Sa1ilkhyais not different in each
individual'Self'. The S~khya acceptsa threefold ego of the
nature of (i) a pure ego associated with goodnessand virtue
(sttvika) (ii) a dynamic ego with passion and pride (rjasika)
ar,d (iii) an ego as experiencedin ignorance and inertia (tamasika).l Nevertheless.the ego in Sarhkhyais not destroyed during
profound repose or dreamless sleepof an individual, otherwise
the ego of every individual will siroultaneously be destroyed.
Therefore, the ego ofSIhkhya and the ego of Vedanta are not
identical.
Thc Non-dualist a~pts cI-ness'(ahantva) in ego and not in
-In a l:lter pa..sageit appears that the author ugesthe word 'consciencc'
for the a,'tabkaraIJa (Ed.).

248

Buddhist Phi/osophica/Researcnes

'&If', otherwi~ on account of 'I-ness' thc pure 'Self' will bccome

qualificd (saviS\:~a)
and in that casethe attribute 'I-ness' will have
to be acccpted in 'Self'. When 'I-ness' is acccpted in 'Self'. al1
il1dividual 'Sclves' will be undcrstood as '1' (aham)because'Self' is onc without a second. Our normal exp~ricnce in life is
howcvcr different. We understand individual 'Sclf' by'This',
'That', 'You' and 'He' and nt in thc forro or''. The objl:ction
is Ul1tcl1ableso far as SaJilkhyais concernedbecauseil1 Salkhya
all 'Puru~a' are diff.:rcnt from eachother. 'Puru~' in SaJilkhya
is without any modification (nirvikara) but not without attributes
(11irdharmaka). As such therc is no defcct in Samkhya in
accepting '-ness' in 'self',2 while the Non-dualist acccpts'-ness'
in ego and not in 'sclf'.3
Let us first examinethc non-dualistic view that conscienceis
ego and ego is '-sensc', In non-dualism the sattvika part offive
clenlcnts as a result of ncscicncc, produces consciencedivided
nto (i) mil1d (manas). (ii) intellect (buddhi), (iii) ego (ahariJkar~)
and (iv) citta (mind stuff) , A close pcrusal of the theory of
crcatiot1 il1 Vedic and Paura~ic cosmology and thc thcory of
crcation in the Mok~dharma pan'a of the Santi parva of the
Mahabharata indicates that conscicnceof non-dualismand rnind
of the Upar:i~adsare equivalcnt terms,C Mind is considercd as
endc.wed with several functions such as volition (samkalpa).
dctcrmination (adhyavasaya). desire or fceling (abhimana).
thinking. contcmplation. faith and knowing.6
The PauraJ)icpoint of view that milld and sensesoriginate
from purc egotism associatcdwith goodnessand virtuc (sattvika
ahamkara) dces not agrce with the ncn-dualistic vil:w whcrein
mil1d originates from purc parts (sattvika aJilsa)of five elem{'nts.
Wc ccme across severalncn-dualistic Sanskrit texts saying that
thl: principIe of intelligu'.ce is the ego, or arl cgC'-clement
c,riginating from thc principIe of intelligcncc is the ego. The Nondualist maintains that the conscience, originating from five
elcmcnts. is ego.
The matcrialistic schccl of Carvaka maintains thc cxistl.:ncc
of 'I-scnsc' till "cath. whilc thc Advaita Vl:diinta maintal1sthat
'I-s<.nse'is d\.'stroYl:daI1dproduccd in cach slccp and awaking.
'I-sensc' is diff~rcnt day by day in eachil1dividual. By thl: time
onc and th~ samc 'I-scnsc' ccntinucs to cxist in an individual
'Self' in Carvaka systcm,thousands cf '-scnsc' are producl:d in

The Doclrine 01 'Ahaln-Artho'

249

2.notherindividual 'Sclf' in non-dualismo Therefore the Nondualist cannot maintain one and the same forro of 'Sclr till
liberation.
Th.~ Non-dualist solvcs this problcm stating that although the
ego, a product of nescicnce,is dcstroycd during profound rcpcse,
it conti:1uesto cxist in causalform.' The causalform ofthc ego,
obviously, could not ~ ncscicncebecauscnescienCe
could never
be the direct cause of conscience becauseNcn-dualist accepts
conscicnce as a product of fivc elements. This helps usto prove
that either ego or five elemcntscould be the causal forro of ego.
Nescicnceis certainly not the causalforro of ego.
The destruction of 'I-scnse' during profound repose creates
another difficulty. In casein non-dualism 'I-scnse'is destroyed
in eachprofound repose of an indi\idual 'Self' and a new '1sensc' is produced. the Non-dualist sheuld acceptthat all impressionsof our experience stored in sub-consciousmind are
also dcstroyed along with the destruction of the first 'I-sense'
and the awakenedman could not rcmcmber bis past experience
consideringhimself identical with the former 'I-sense'.
It may be argued that in the profound repose ego remains
merged in the causalnescienceand the ego-impression resides
on the support of nescience. In the awaking state this very
nesciencetransforms itsclf into consciencc and the impressions
remain in consciencc on the sUPPort of nescience. Thus the
newly created ego rccallsthe objects of experienceofth~ Corroer

ego.

The reasoningis fallacious. We mar agree that the sccond

ego mar recollect the objccts of experienceofthe first ego but
We cannot agree that both these (gos are identical. We do
experiencc the idcntity of the two egosof ycsterdayand today.
This proves that 'I-sense' is not dcstroyed during profound
reposc. Secondly. when in non-dualism ego of all individual
'&Ivcs' is destroycd in drcamless slecp and all imprcssions
rcmain in causalncscicnce,natural!y a qucstionariscshcw these
impressionsreacha particular individual ego of a 'Self' from this
causal nescience.To accept innumerable egos of innumerable
'&lvt:S' as an entirely neW creation trom one causalncscicncc
wiII crcatc anothcr difficulty. Imprcssions residing in a particular
egu n thc pre\ious dar would reach any ego the next morning,
travelling through nescienceduring dreamlesssleep. As a result~

250

Buddhist PhilosophicalResearche.s-

,X' should be able to rememberthe objects of the expe:ience 0("

,y' because when 'X' and ,yo are awakenedall neWegos are
similar beforc the multitudc of impressions residing in causal
nescienceand thcrc would bc no regulator to carry a certain
group of imprcssions to a particular ego where this group did
reside on the previous day.
The Non-dualist may argue that in spite of thc fact that
nescience is one, there is some partial differencein nescience.
Therefore, during dreamlesssleep. ego at the time of merging
itself in nescience,placesits own impressionsin a certain part 0("
nescience.The next morning these very impressions automatically reach that very ego when the sameego is produced from that
very part of nescicnce. To avoid this indirect process of merger
and production, thc Vai~J:tavaVedanta proposesthe identity 01:"
'I-sense' and 'Self' in lieu of presumed innumerable parts of
nescience. It is an easier [conreption] than the merger and
production of different egos in different parts of nesciencedue to
which the relevant centres carry the impressions to their own
receptacles.
It will not be correct to interpret the Upani~dic text: 'Then
the father is no father, mother is no mother, the worlds no
worlds and Gods no Gods'7in the senseof absolute negation 0("
extemal world during profound repose because in reality the
external world does continue to existo The closing of the eyes of
a pigeon towards an attacking cat does not negatethe existente
of cato What the Brhadra:zyaka
Upani,radexactly means in this
context is this that one becomes complctely unaware of the
external world in the state of profound repose. The negationis
just in the figurative sense. Likewise, all Sruti texts appearing
to interpret the merger of ego during profound reposeshould be
taken in the figurative sensethat therein ~go continues to existo
During awaking, one experienccs;'1 am fat'; '1 am aman'; '1 am
a woman'. Suchcxperiencedependson the intellcct arising from

ego.

The Satikara Bha~ya on the Brahmastra indicates that

intellcct has the minutcst size in the distinguishing property of
'Self'8 and this limiting adjunct relation of 'Self' and intellcct
having no beginning exists till liberation.' Intellect as a potential
exists in the states of profound reposeand deluge}O Conscienre,
a limiting adjunct of 'Self' is designatedby severalterms sucha~~

The Doctrine01 'Aham-ArtM

251

mind, intellect, ego and mind stuff.ll The testimony of the

Brahmastra Silkara-Bh$yapostulates that only that could be
accepted as a limiting adjunct of 'Sclf' which exists cven in
profound reposeand dcluge. It thercfore becomesthe demand
of propriety that such a limiting adjunct is acc.:ptcdas an object
of 'I.Intctlect' or the feeling of '1' (aham-buddhi) becausethis
fimiting adjunct is nothing else but nesciente. Consequently.
conscienteis 'I-sense'. The merger of ego during profound repose
is the secondarymeaning. In fact. onlythe operational function
of ego ceasesduring profound repose and not egoitself. The
negation is of functions such as votition, desire. feeling or
determination. This proves that the aca.ptanceofthe merger of
the distinguishing property of 'Self' during dreamlesssleepis
inconsistent with the viewpoint of the Silkara Bhya. Even ir
it be argued that all intellects in the forro ofthe distinguishing
property of 'Self' are not identirol with nesc;en~. We cannot
afford not to accept that atl conditioned intellects are ditferent
from each other and have no beginning at all. At the same time
the Non-dualist will be forced to acceptthe destructionofthese
conditioned intellects at the time of the deluge. The non~
dualistic view that the merger of the limiting adjunct of the
'Self' and the :1egationof 'I-sense' in the state ofprofound repose
does not hold good.
The untng element01 anmateand inanimate in notc/-sense'
Madhusdana Sarasvatihas explained in thc 16th century in
llis Advata-Sddhi that 'I-sense' means uniting the ele~nts of
animate and inanimate (cit-acit-granthi). This Sanskrit term has
been i:1terpretcd as an intricate knot. It rnakesone commit
errors after errors. The darkness cxtends. One thinks that he
knows many things, while he remains most ignorant of what he
is most assur~d of. The bondage and attraction of 'I-ncss' and
cMine-ness', and the rcpulsion of separatcnes3or otherncss,
hostility, very curiously make him restless. He hangsoscillat~ly
betw~cn thcm}2 The Sanskrit tcrm includes animate or consciousncss or the principIe of universal intelligencc by thc word
'cit' and inanimatc (conscience)by the word 'acit'. This very '1sensc' is known as ego whcn we hav~ the apprehensionof '1'. '1sensc' of the nature of cgo having the idea ofthe apprchension
of '1' or '1 ex:perience'is the substratum of 'Self' (cit). From the

252

BuddhistPhilosophical
Researcha

apprehension '1 am the performer', 'I-sense' appears as the

substratum of the state of being the peiformer (kartrttva) etc.
attributcs residing in conscience (acit). This should not be
understood as simple mutual relationship between animate and
inanimate but there exists mutual identical superimposition
(tadatmya-adhyasa) bctweenthe two. This very uniting element
of consciousness and conscience appearing identical due to
misapprehensionis known as 'I-sense'. Hence 'I-sense' and ego
are idcntical.13
This interpretation of 'I-sense' is questionable. One may
enquire what is exactly meant by 'uniting element'. Does it
represent the nature of animate and inanimate? Or, does it
represent the superiority of one over another? The second
question is what is the cause of the activity of '1' (pravrttinimitta). Neither consciousnessnor ego could be acceptedas the
causeof the activity of ,p becausewe do not find usage of the
word '1' in !bis sense. Our normal experienceis that everybody
usesthe word '1' keeping in mind 'I-ness' as the cause of the
activity of '1'. The meaning of the word '1' as either consciousness qualified by ego or ego qualified by consciousnessdoes not
appear appropriate becausein that casewe would be bound to
acceptthe relation of qualification and qualified (viSe~aQaviSe~yabhava sambandha). This sort of relation canoot be accepted
simply bccause there does not ex.istthe relation of differenceor
non-difference. In the former casethe consciousness
of difference
will continue to exist and an identical super-impositionwould be
an impossibility. In thc latter case it would be necessaryto
accept mutual super-imposition otherwise it would be going
against the non-dualistic school of Vedanta. Truly, byaccepting
the relation of qualification and qualified through thc relation
of non-difference the consciousnesscan manifestego but it must
not bc forgotten that an ego could never manifest consciousness
according to non-dualism wherein consciousness
is without any
attribute (nirdharmaka). One might insist that an ego would
appear to be associatedwith consciousnessbut in that caseone
would immediately diJferl"ntiate ego from consciousnessand
super-imposition would be impossible. Ifthe idt~aofthe Nondualist is to suggestthe appcaranceof consciousnessalong with
thc attribute 'I-scnsc' of the ego, the Non-duatist indirectly
agreesthat 'I-ness', the causeof the activity of '1', is a property

25'J

The Doctrine 01 .Aham-Artlta'

of the ego and in that case'You-sense'of an ego would not be
acceptablein non-dualism. It is noteworthy that the meaning of
an ego as 'You-sense'is also acceptedin non-dualism becauscit
is meant for anothcr (parartha). In fact, the ego accomplishes
the purpose of consciousness.One will not fail to note that the
attributt:s suchas 'the state of bcing tbe performer and enjoyer'
are admitted in an ego according to non-dualism and not in
undifferentiated consciousnessthrough an ego. It would therefore be againstthc non-dualistic view to hold that consciousness
appears along 'I-ness' of ego. Ego is not meant for a:1otherand
as such does not yield the idea of 'You-sense'. The idea of
identical super-imposition of ego and consciousnessis not
correct becausew~ all feel 'l. the sentient perform'. In such
experience ego appcars as the locos of consciousness
and superimposition of consciousnessremainsimpossible. The difference
between ego and consciousness
is obviously proved on the basis
of the relation of container and contained.
It would not be out of placeto examine the meaning of two
'aham' words. viz. (i) aham. indeclinable ending in 'm' (ii) aham.
declined from the noun 'asmat' or 'asmad' in nominative singular
ending in 't' or 'd', The primary senseof both these words has
been accepted by Madhusdana Sarasvatiin tbe Advaita-siddhi
as ego. Neither of the two denotes the sense of 'Self' in the
tradition of Advaita Vedanta. To determine the meaningwe
should take into account the authority of Sanskrit grammar.
The KJikti- Vrtti and the Padamajarron the aphorism of Pa~ini
'ahal Subhayor rus' (5.2.40)clearly indicate that one 'aham' is
an indeclinable representing the iitfiection of nouns (vibhakti
pratirpaka avyaya), while the second 'aham' is declined from
the noun 'asmad' by the substitute 'aha'. Both the words
apparently appearing as identical are not identicalso far as thcir
meaning is concerned." The indeclinable 'aham' denotes the
senseof ego. and the declined 'aham' the senseof 'Self'. To take
these two words as synonymswould meanto violate the roles of
PaJ:)inigrammar. The non-dualist view is not correct because
ego hasnowherc beenacceptedin the senseof the uniting elemcnt
of animate and inanimate.
I mar refer to the Skara Bhiiya that conscience.viz. mind.
intellcct, ego and ego stuff has four mentalfunctions: doubt,
right knowledge, slumber and remembrance respectively.u The

254

Buddhist PbilosophicalResearche"

evidenceshows that ego going with egotism or pride is one ofthe

f.,ur aspects of conscienoe. Ego cannot go with any other
r,;maining three functions. To acoeptthe identical senseof aIl the
above-mentionedf:Jur words would mcan that the word 'asmad'
could be used with any of th~ fur functions and ego could be
applicd to any ofthc fuur 011thc ground of the uniting element
(lf anmate and inanimatc. Since such is not the position, the
uniting elemcnt of animatc and inanimate cannot be acoepted as
the meaning of 'I-s.:nse'. To claborate it further we m:ty t:!ke an
example of the statem(;nt,1 am fat, thcre is an apprehensionof
the egoistic feeling of 'Self' on the inanimate substratumsuchas
body but Wedo not have any idea of gross ego. Therefore the
meaning of ego and the meaning of 1hcdeclined'Aham' word is
not one and the same. The indeclinable caham' always remains
in the same forro, whilc the declincd 'aham' hasthis forro only
in nominative singular. In accusativeand genitive. the forros of
casmad'are 'maro' and cmaCla'respectively. There is no proofto
-est~blishthe identical meaningofthe two caham'words. On the
ot"er hand, Wehaveauthority of Sanskritgrammarand dictionary
regarding the meaning of the indeclinable 'aham' in the sense of
ego or egotism and the declined caham', cmam' and 'mama'
denote an altogether different senseand that senseis 'Self'. The
nan-dualistic view of the uniting elementof anmateand inanimate as 'I-sense' is not correct on the ground that aIl statements
such as '1, the sentient, pedorro the action and enjoy' prove an
existenceof consciousnessin 'I-sense'.
Existence01' I-sense' in Su$upti
The Sanskrit word Su~upti denotes the senseof profound
reposeor dreamlesssleep.It has beenexplained by Sakaracarya
as spiritual ignorance}8 It has already been observed !hat
according to non-dualism 'I-sense' is ditrerent from 'Self', Now,
let me remind that 'I-sense'afilie nature of '1' does exist in the
states of awaking and dream but doesnot exist in the statesof
profound reposeand liberation. while the eternal 'Self' exists in
all thesc three states. This is the contention of the Non-dWtlisto
The Non-dualist argues that had tht're been 'I-seme' during
profound rcpose. one would have had the idea of '1'0 SinceWe
never have thc idea of '1' during profound repose. there is non.existence of 'I-seme'o Likewise. had 'I-sense'beenexistentin thc

The Doctrine 01 .A/zam-Artha'

255

~tate of liberation. ignorance would continue to existo Therc is

of course no possibility of ignorance in liberntion. Thcrefore.
non-ex.istent'I-sense'. in the states of profound repose and
liberation. is not the internal 'SeIf'. Consciousness
existing in
both thesestatesis considercdas 'Self' in Advaita Vedanta.
It has beenmade clear that according to Advaita Vedanta '1Sense'is of the nature of ,}' i.e. the uniting cl~mentof anirnate
and inanimate. The concept includes thc sentient 'Sclf' as the
insentient conscienceof thc naturc of ego. There is mutual
identical super-irnpositionbetwcenconscicnce and ego. During
tht: apprehension of -1'onc has the idea of ego as identical with
consciousnessand of consciousnessas identical with ego. This
vcry uniting elernent of mutual idcnticaJ super-imposition
betw('enconsciousncssand ego is acceptedas 'I-sense'in Advaita
Vedanta. It is noteworthy in this connection that in non-dualism
the super-imposition of ego on consciousness
is directo It is only
after this supcr-imposition that the attributes such as perform~I
and enjoy\:r existing in conscienceofthc nature of ego become
imposed. NevertheJess.
this superimposition of ego on consciousnesshas no limiting adjunct while the super-imposition of the
~ttributes on consciousness
is limited by the adjuncts. Sinceego
by its very nature ex.istsin thc states of awaking and dream. we
expericnce ,}' but in thc state of profound reposeit existsin the
form of causal nescienceand therefore we do not experience
its existence. In the state of liberation. nescience.the material
causeof the ego, is destroyedand the ego ceasesto exist either
by its own forro or by causalformo Thus in liberation thereis no
possibility of existenceof the ego at alI.
The Visis~dvaita school of Ramanuja maintains that 'I-sense'
is 'Self'. Elo is not included in 'I-sense'. 'Self' without ego is
-I-sensc'. 'I-sensc'exists in the states of profound repose and
liberation. In case 'I-scnse' is non-ex.istcnt during profound
repose, Ramanujist argucs, onc would be forced to accepttwo
different 'I-sense' viz. (i) 'I-sensc', existing in thc awaking and
dream stateson the previous day (ii) 'I-scnse' existing in awakening arter sfeep. Ths woufd amount to that the second 'I-sense'
wou\d

not be ab\c to

reD1.cmbcr the objects experienced by tbe

first 'I-sensc'. This is our normal experiencethat he who experi-

ences certaiDthings iD 1ifc [Cmel11~lS

tbemin tbefutU1C,
js
~n absolutc impossibility that the first 'I-sense' expericncesand

256

Buddhist Philosophical Researcher

the second remembers. Otherwise, the expeenceof ,X' would

be remembered by 'Y'. lt is thereforc more reasonableto accept
only one 'l-sense'. We notice the common experienceas follows:
1, who performed certain actions, am now performingthis action'.
This recollection supports the idcntical characteristicsof thc tWo
'I-sense'. One and the same 'I-scnse' exists in the dormant
condition during profound sleep and continues to exist during
sleepand after sleep.17
It may be questioned that if an 'I-sense' exists during profound
repose, why do we not experienceit and why does it not become
as object of OUTexpcrience. Since it is ncverexperiencedduring
profound repose,it would be more appropriate to acceptits nonexistence. The simple logic is that happiness, unhappiness and
'l-sense' manifest by the way of experience only so long they
existo It is self-contradictory to maintain that they exist but do
not becomethe object of our experience. The view of Ramanuja
school finds strong support ofNaiyayika who declaresthat 'SeIf'
ofthe nature of 'I-s~me' remains unmanifest in dreamIcsssleep.
There is no such rule that all existing objectsmust become the
object of our per~ption. There are severalsuchobjects which
exist and are not perceived. 'l-sense' can also exist remaining
unmanifest. The argument that by nature 'lnse' should manifest so long it existsis untenable because according to Advaita
Vedanta too 'l-sense' exists in the most subtle form and remains
unmanifest. In Cactowhereverthere is some function of internat
or external senses,we exp~rience'l-sense'. Ir it is argued that the
first individual 'I-sense'is the substratum of the 'l-ness' of the
sccond individual 'I-sense' and therefore the secondindividual.
'1' understhndsthe '1' of the first individuat. then the subtle furm
could also be acceptedas the substratum of 'I-ness'. This would
be an additional proof for the existente of 'l-sense' during
profound repose.
The outstanding proof of the existence of 'I-sense' during
profound repose is recollection. For instance, ORerecollects: '1,
who pcrformed 3uchand such actions yesterday, am now awakened after sound stcep'. This experience attests the identity of
yesterday's and today's individual 'l-scnse' and its existente
during profound repose. Truly, there is no experienceduring the
statc of profound reposebecausethe attributive consciousnessis~

The Doclr;ne o/ .Aham-Arlha'

2st

258

Buddhist Phi/O.foplca/ResearcMI

nescienceco\!ld neither become the locus of impressionsother\\'ise it will be the knower. Therefore, the only plausible proposition is that of Vai~ava Vedanta that the 'I-sense' existsduring
profound repose. Both the logicians and the followers of thc
qualified non-dualistic school of Vedanta (Ramanuja) maintain
tbis view. The only difference between thesetwo philosophical
traditions is that when the logician (Naiyayika) does not acce~
!he manifestation of the 'I-sense' during dreamless profound
sleep but simply recognisesits existence; the followers of !he
qualified non-dualism accept both the existen~ as weUas!he
manifestation of 'I-sense' during profound repose.
Existenceof'/-sense' in the state of /iberation
1 now pro~ed to examine whetber -I-sens~'existsin the state
of liberation. It mar be kept in mind that the school of Advaita
VedAnta total!y rejectstbe existen~ of 'Inse' in liberation. The
ViSi~.tadvaitaschool of VedAnta,however,maintainsthe existen~
as well as the manifestation of -I-sense' in the state of liberatioD
cn !he basis of the authority of the Sruti texts:
(a) '1 shall obtain it after my transition from this world.'18
(b) 'Like unto the moon which escapesfrom the mouth of
RAhu,1 shall purify myself, my body, and, becomefree
(by the aid of meditation) verily, attain-the uncreated
Brahmaloka.'l'
The above cited quotations denote an intensive desire of onc
who is desirous of liberation. The quoted text proves that liberation is definitely related to 'I-sense' of one who desiresliberation.
The main purport of the text is that we are all an object of enjoye
ment of the 'SupremeSelf' as an object of enjoyment.1o
The Taittiya Upani$ad further states:
(i) 'R.asamhyevayaIh labdhva nandi bhavati' (for any one
obtaining tastebecomesde1ighted). 11.7.1.
(ii) 'E$a hyeva anadayati' (for it is He (the SupremeSelf) that
fills with bliss). Ibid.
The textual Jiuthority supports that blissful SupremeSelfalone
bestowsbliss and one attains bliss by realising Supreme Self ot
the nature of sentimcnt(Rasa).
A large number of suchUpani~dic texts teachelus that in the
state of liberation one doesattain the inexhaustiblebliss and that

The Doctrine 01 ..4Mm-.4rtha'

2S9

one should not leave any stone Untumedto get cid of the bC'ndagc
of a/l the three miseries of the mundane world. It is only with
this goal in mind that one adopts the listening, (;;)gnitive and
repcatedmeditation etc. as meansof realisation. Noteworthy is
the fact that Non-dualist does also agrecto the cessationof aU
the miseries and the attainment of unsurpassed bliss of the
cSuprt:meSelf' in the state of liberation. liad suchbliss beennot
malfestin liberation, its attaining had little sense.But in case
such bliss becomesmanifestto a liberated 'Self', he must experi..
enceasfollows:'lamenjoyingthebliss'. 'Iam endowedwith bliss'.
It may be argued that to acceptthe 'I-sense' and its manife~tation in the state of liberation would amount to acceptthe 'Selr
as ignorant and transmigratory in the state of liberation. on the
simple logic that so long as there is the 'I-sense'.the 'Self' is
ignorant and transmigratory. Therefore. it would be more
appropriate to a~pt. the Non-dualist says.ego as 'I-sense' which
<loes not exist in liberation. Here an objection can be raiJed
againstthe Non-dualist view which maintains the existen~ and
manifestation of 'Cognition-Self' (sari1vid Atman) in thc stateof
liberation as that would likewise IDeantbe coexisten~ of ignoran~ and transmigration in liberation if cognition continuesto
existoThe follow::rs of non-duasm however advocate that only
the incongruous manifestation of a 'cognition-SeIf' is pervaded
by ignoran~, and onIy in the state of transmigration doesincongruous manifestation existo Hence. there is ignorance only in
transmigration. I may mention, in this connection. that both the
existen~ and the manifestation of an 'I-sense' in liberation are
not pervaded by ignorante and transmigration. It is only an inrongruous manifestation opposedto the real nature of cI-sense'
which becomespervaded by ignorance and transmigration. In
Cacto
the false nature is not manifest in beration. Only the real
nature in the forro of 'I-sense' becomesmalfest.
The contention of Advaita Vedanta. that 'I-acose' is ego and
that it ceasesto exist in the state of liberation. while the 'attributeless Selr of the nature of consciounesscontinues to exist, does
not hold good. It would be more rational to admit 'I-sense'a.
'self' and its existcncein liberation rather than accepting'I-sen~'
as ego and negating its existence in liberation. Otherwiseno
sensible person would adopt to the austere meansin order to
attain liberation because the moment he understandsthat he is

260

Buddhist Phi/osophica/Researche.i

identical with that ego which will discontinue who would like to
negate one's own cxistence. So long as the Non-dualist accepts
the existence of a subtlc ego in liberation, one mar adopt the
means in order to liberate oneself, but when the complete negation of an 'I-scnsc' in th~ state of liberation is acceptcd,who
would give an ear to the scriptures blowing the trumpets of
libcration.'l
It mar ~ advocated by thc 'Non-dualist' at this stagethat the
'I-sense' of the naturc of ego docs not distinguish betwcen
'cognition-Self' and itself. It misapprehendsitself as non-diffcrent
from 'cognition-Self'. The answeris not satisfactory bccaUsethe
'I-sensc' of th~ nature of ego regards itself as non-diff~rent from
the 'cognition-Self' o~ account of misapprehension. Then it
certainly understands the rcality of its existencein the state of
liberation. As such it should further believe in discontinuation
of cognition in liberation, i.e. the cognition with which it earlicr
felt its own identity. To say that by misapprehendingtbe existence uf 'I-sense' of the nature of ego one would bclieve onc's own
existente in liberation is not logical. The simple reasonis that he
who ~lieves his cxistence in liberation by misapprehensionhas
not in reality understood the real nature of liberation. Besides,
in non-dualism the complete destruction of nescienteand ego is
the concept of liberation. Non-dualist arguesthat one activates
onesl:lf to the means of liberation on the misapprehensionof the
idea of the continuance of 'I-scnsc' in liberation but in fact in bis
view 'I-sense' is destroycd as soon as the knowledge of nondualism appears. This would remind us of an analogy of a person dcsirous to attain fi:lal liberation of the nature of bliss
suddcnly finding rus head cut into pieces.Therefore, this type of
libcration of the nature of the destruction of ego could ncver
be acceptedas the goal of life."
Thc Non-dualist further postu!atcs that being afflicted by the
threcfold miscries of the mundane world to which all mortals
are subject. the individual 'Self' might considerthat so long as
there exists the senseof 'I-ness', it is impossibleto get cid of the
miseri~s,23
and thcrcforc one must destroy oncself, i.e. with destruction of .I-sense'. Thus considering one's own destruction
onc would adopt the means of liberation and the d~struction of
'I-3ensc' thus desirable.
Th~ above view is rejectedon the basisof the following Sruti

--The Doctrine 01' Aham-Artha'

261

texts which declare that the knower of the 'SuprcmeSelf' bccomes

'Supreme Self' and that the liberated Sclf knows al! knowable.
The Upani$adic evidence proves the existenceof 'I-sense'as of
the nature of knower. The textual passagesin supportare as
follows:
l. 'One passesbcyond dcath only aftcr realising Him. Thcrc is
no other way to escapefrom the circle of birth and death.'2&
2. 'Whoever knows the 'Suprcme Brahman becomes cven
Brahman.'25
3. 'That man who knows this confronts not death nor discase
nor does he meet with pain or sUffering. He observesev~ry.
thing, and attains everything in every way'
Truly the
knower of 'Self' becomes'Self'.21
The abov~ cited Sruti tcxt clearly declares that the direct
knowledge of the Supreme Self is the best means to attain
immortality.1n case'I-sense'is destroyedin the stateof liberation
as acceptedin non-dualism, the direct knowledgeofthe Supreme
.Self will becomethe cauSeof death becausethe knowerego will
perish. This will contradict the Sruti tradition. To avoid this
inconsistencyit is better to acccpt that the 'I-sense'exists in the
state of liberation.
Furthermore in non-dualism the 'attributeless cognition' is
regarded as the 'Self' and that io the statesof knowing aod
thinking etc., attributes do not exist in 'attributeless cognition'.
In addition to this, the 'Self' is regarded as eternally libcratcd.
This is a self-contradictory view because in the absenceof the
states of the knowing and thinking etc. attributes, the 'SeIP
could not listento thc scriptures or contcmplate opon 'Supr~me
Self'; and so why would the etcrnally libcrated attributclcss
cognition-Self desire lib.::ratioo at aIl. One may argue that in
the states of knowing and thinking, ctc. attributes are supcrimposcd on the eternaIly liberated attributeless cognition-Self,
and therefore one becomes desirous of libcration considcring
oncself unhappy due to misapprehensionand likewise bccomcs
a listcncr and thinker when there is super-impositionofthe states
of knowing and thinking.
1 am inclined to mention that in the above discussionthe
standpoint of non-dualism is perhaps not correctly represcntcd.
lo reality in oon-dualism superimposition is a function (vftt;r

262

Buddllist Pi/osopica/Researclle;

an attribute of conscience.Therefore, consciencemay be deemed

a listener. tbinker, happyor unhappy and not the 'Self' of the
nature of knower. It is not possibleto prove that a 'SeIf' of the
nature of cognition is entitled to liberation. It would be further
incorrect to say tbat the knower 'I-sense' activates the 'cognition
Self' to liberatioll on the simple ground that an 'I-sense'would not
adopt any meansof liberation as that would amount to its own
destruction. and that such an activity of an 'I-sense' would be
comparedto the activity of a pencn who is desirousto cut off bis
own head in order to savethe life of bis belovedwife from death
and who has beendeclared hopelessby the medicalexperts. Similarly, evenifthe cSelf' is liberated, the non-existent 'I-sense' in
the state of liberation would not get any reward of bis activity. It
mostotherefore, be admitted that the 'I-sense' does exist in the
tate of liberation and only then could tbcre be somepossibility
of the right to liberation.
In order to justify the non-dualiatic point of Yiewit is generally
explained that acx:ordingto non-dualism oonscienceis four fold.
The word '1' does not simply OJeanconscienceof the nature of
ego but it stands for the consciousnessoonditioned by conscience.
Therefore, consciousness
conditioned by consaenceis 'I-sense'(i.c.
antal,1kar~vacchinnacaitanya is aham-artha). In the state of
liberation in spite of thc destructionof!he attributive conscience
or ego, the consciousnesscontinues to existo As suchthere is
no inconsistency in non-dualism and with the desire'1 would
like to be liberated' tfs very consciousness conditioned by
conscienceactivates the means of liberation suchas listening to
the religious discoursesand reading the religious scriptures. The
reasoning of the Non-dualist doesnot remain good at the examination on the to\tchstone of the following argumentoOne may
enquire who males efforts for liberation with sucha pre-desire.
i.e. 'I-the bound, would like to be liberated by suchand sucb
actions'. Is it conscienceor consciousness?In the former caseit
would be a frunless effort so far as conscienoeis concemed
because consciente would itself be destroyed irl the state of
liberation. In the latter casethe consciousnesscannot be regard.
ed as the locus of activity since it is considcredas attributeless in
the tradition of Advaita Vednta.
Tbe Non-dua1ist further makesan attempt to support bis point
of view on the foUowing tbree argu~nts:

:~:

Tlie Doctrine 01 .ham-Artlkl'

263

There js superimpositionof the locus of tbc actiYity and

consen~-idcntity on consciousness.
Ego.
by superimpong jts identity on consciousness.
(b)
regardsjtself as th substratumof activity.
Ego. on account of jts identical superimpositionon the
(c)
'attributeless consciousness'regards consciousness
as the
'substratum of fue activity' -is erroneousknowledgo;:.
Tbe
object oftbis errolJeQusknowledge is consciousoess.
To
be such an object is tbe bondage of consciousness.and in
the state of liberation the conscious~ss be<-.omes
libera.
ted from fue activity of the fa1seknowledge.The bondago
and liberation in connection witb consciousoessare not
inconsistent.

(a)

AII theseargumentscan beeasily ret\1ted:

(a)

According to the non-dualism superimpositionis a function of consciente.Naturally its substratum will be conscie~ and not consaousness.Therefore. it would not be
correct to maintain consciousnessas thc locus of tM
!
activity.
-The
lubstratum of bondaseis ego and not conJCOUIQCSI.
(b)
,~ As such bondagecannot be establishedin ooosciousoess.

(c)

Simply on account of tbe objectivity or !he falseknow.

ledge. it would be incorrect to aC<:eptbondagein conso
ciousness. TWs is ~rtained
by an illustration of our
normal experiencein daily Iife.Forinstance, when pcoplc
regard 'Mahatma GandW' as a very kind-hearted and
noble persono he would not becomecruel due to falsity
of experienoeor somewrong information about him. An
atheist does not believe in the existente of God. but God
does not become non-existent for a believer orthodox
simply by this (non.belief). 1f a blind personcannotseethe
light of SUD,this is not the fault of SUD.It is the visionary
defect of an eJe. Likewise, it is true tbat on accountof
ego the 'attributeless consciousness'is regardedas the
locus of the activity but there could not be any defectin
the consciousnesson account of erroneous knowledgeor
falseunderstanding.In the absenceof any defectobondage
in consciousnes5remains out of questionand all etrorts
towardaliberation would be entirely useless.

:""
1

"
t

. ';'

:-

264

Buddlist Phi/oaophicalResearcliei

In ibis context the point of view of SaIi1khya philosophy

appears to be more reasonable. According to the Simkhya
systemthe SeIf (Puru~) is unattached. pOTe consciousness
and
the permanentchangeless.Bondageand liberation are in r~lation
with causal matter (Prakrti). Both remain out of question~sofar
as pure consciousness
is concemed. The outlook ()f SaIhkhyais
justified by the rcasoning that mattcr is bound and that intellect
exists in the stak of bondage by its very nature and in the state
ofliberation in the causalform.17B::>ndagemeansa falsc unification of consciousnes~
with matter. and liberation meansit dissociation in Sarilkbya. To acccpt bondageand liberation in consciousnessis not a very sound proposition becausein non-dualism
consciousnessis regardedas 'attributeless'. Neitber bondagenor
liberation could exist in the ego because tbe ego has no causal
form in the stateof liberation.
Testimony01tlre Upani"ads
1 naw examineth testimony of the Chandogya and the Ka!ha
Upani~ads aJongwiththe Bh8~yasof Salikaracrya and Rimanujacarya on the concept of 'I-sense-SeIf' theory. Taking into
consideration the 'Science of Unconditioned Supreme Self'
(Bhma-Vidya)t8as propoundedin the ChandogyaUpani~ad. the
Non-dualist establishesa difference betwetn the 'Iose' and the
{Self' and a non-differencebetweenthe 'I-sense' and the ego. The
scielice has been explained in three stages in the Chandogya
Upani~d:

1.
2.

3.

From 'sa cva adhastat 7.25.1' to 'sa c;:vaidaI sarvam',

dcclaring the, unconditioned SuprcmeSelf' as all pcrvading.
From 'atha atai:t ahari1karadesa};l'.to 'aham eva edaI
sarvam' anncuncing the 'I-sense' of the nature of egoas
all pervading. lt is on tls evidc~cethat identity of 'I-sense'
and ego has been interpreted by the followers of nondualismo
From 'atha atai:t AtmadeSai:t'to 'Atvaiva adhastat' to
tmaiva idaJh sarvam7.25.2.stating'Self' as all pcrvading.

The main argument of the Non-dualist againstthe 'I-scnse-sclf'

theory is that if 'I-scnse'and 'Self' were identical the instruction
of an ego (aham artha adeSa)alon would be sufficienttia the
prcsent contexto The instruction of a 'Self' (AtmadeSa) beaTS

"':i1~

,o

"\

'.e

"":

DoctrJe01 'Aam-Art1la'

265

testimony to the fact that an cI-sense'and a 'Self' are not

identical.
, Let us carefully examine this Upanj~djc evidence. It is clear
from the study of the ChandogyaUpani~d that the 'unconditioned SupremeSclf', 'I-sense' and 'Self' all three haveindepen~
dently been spoken of as all pervading. It would tbereforc be not
correct to consider thcm different; or else on tik: basisoftbe
sameUpani~adic testimony and samelogic the 'unconditioned
SupremeSelf' and the 'Self' would also ~ regarded as different.
while even in non-dualism they are both regardedas identical in
essence.lfthe identity of the 'unconditioned SupremcSelf' and
cSelf'is acceptedin spite of their separately being .-,inted out in
the text, the identity of 'I-sense' and 'Self' could not be denied.
A comparison of the SatikaraBha$yaand the Raminu ja Bhi$ya
on the Chindogya Upani~ad quoted above clarifiesa number of
points.
below
a brief
romparative
bha~yas1forpresent
the ready
reference
ofthe
readers. study of the .two
The Salikara Bhi~ya interprets the passagein question as
follows: 'Verily that extends below. jt extends from above. it
extends from berund, it extends from before. it extends from
south, it extends from nrth,-of a ti uth it is all this.'.
Salikaracarya clcarly statesin bis bha~yaibat the 'DDconditioned Supreme Self' is meant by tbe word 'That', therefore,one
might be confused that the 'Self' is different from the 'unconditioncd Supreme Self'.30 To avoid this confusionthe Chandogya
Upani~ad imparts the instruction of ego defined as egoisticallyin
the foIlowing way: 'Verily 1 cxtend from below, lextend from
above,11cxtend
extend from
from n()rth,-of
bebind, 1 extend
1 extend from
south,
a truthfrom
1 ambefore,
aIl trus'.S1
.
Thc purport of the Salikara-bha~ya is very clear that the
teaching of thc instructivo of ego is mcant to prove the identity
'of the 'pcrccivcr individual Self' and the 'unconditiox:d Suprcme
Sclf'. Onc should not thercforc confuscthis instruction of ego to
prove thc identity of thc 'unconditioncd SupremeSelf' and the
multitude ofthe body, mind, scnsesand vital airs asan ordinary
man takes this multitude as '1', and tht:rtupon for want of discrimination regards the multitude as' I-Stnse'.To avoid tbis con~
fusion thc Chandogya Upani~ad finally imparts the instruction
of 'Sclf' defincd as psychicaIly: 'Verily, the 'Self' eXiends from
below, the Self extends from above, the &If extendsfrom behind.

266

ButMbist Philosoplcal Researche.t

the Self extendsfrom before, the Self extends from south, (he
Self extends from north,-of a truth the Self is all this.oa
The final instruction obviously covers the pure and eterna. .
'Self'. The study of the Sai1kara-bbi$ya reveals that the 'unconditioned Self' (Bhman) indirectly described as 'That', tbc
'perceiver individual Self' or 'I-sense' drectly described as '1'.
and the 'Self' directly describedas 'Self' alI are one and the same.
It is just to avoid any misunderstandingthat the descriptionis.
threeCold.In no way can a differenoobetween 'I-sense'and 'Sel~
be proved by an impartal r~view of the Chandogya testimony.
In the beginning of all these instructions we read, 'It extends.
below', '1 extend below', and 'The Self extendsbelow'. Had tM
'unconditioned Self', 'I-sense' and 'Self' beendifferent, the alIpervasiveness of the three could not be rightly justified. The
reasoning, that the separate instruction is to establisba diff~ren~ betweentbe 'I-sense' and tbe 'Self', is incongruousto the
spirit of the Salikara-bhi$ya.
As:cording to the Rimanuja-bbi$ya tbe 'uncooditioned
Supreme Self' is omniscient, and alI the sentientand insentient
objects of the universeexist in the Corm oC the inner Self. OM
should meditate upon the 'unconditioned Supreme Inner Sew
through the feeling of '1', (aham buddhi), .e. '1 am everywhere'.
By meditating on the Supreme Self in tbis form of one's own
individual inner Self through tbe feeling of '1', one distinctly
realises the difference betw~n individual Self and the Supreme
Self. The idea is elaborated by an illustration. When we say
'The jar is blue', We do not distinguish blue quality (rom the
substance. The instructit>n of 'I-sense-ego' is thus to makean
aspirant realize the separate existence of the 'Supreme Sel~
within himself. We should not fcrget that ego stands here for
fue feeling of '1' and the tnstruction oCego meansto denote that
one should meditate upon the 'unconditioned Supreme Sel~
through the feeling of '1'. The Sanskrit word 'ahari1kara'ref~rred
to in tbis context is derived from tbe root yKr to do precededby
by the noun 'aham' with the suffix 'gha' in the senseof abstract
idea, meaningthe production oC'I-idea' known as ego.as
It mar be recalled that the feeling of '1' is produ~d only in
relation to the individua! Self. It is never produ~d in relation to
the 'Supreme Self' because the "Supreme Self' does nt become
the object of the Ceelingof '1'. The testimony oCthe Chndogya

The Doctrinl': 01 .Aham-.41t1la'

267

Upani$8d discusscd above is .oonclusive proof that the word

'aham' (1), dcnoting individual Self, stands for the individual
in~r Self. It is only through the individual inner Selfthat the
Suprcme Inner Self beco~s realised. The 'Supreme Self' is thus
the inner self of the individual self, and the 'Supreme Self' is
meditated opon through tbe feengof 'r becauseHe is the inner
self of the individual Self. The instruction of the 'Sclf' is therefore meantto establishthat the 'Supreme Self' is the inner Self
ofthe individual Self, and that He becomes related through the
feeling of '1' alone. In this way according to Ramanujathere is
complete identification among the 'unconditioned SupremeSelf',
'I-seose'and 'Self' and that aU thcsethrec stand for one and thc
aamc Ultimate Reality.
Th~ Katha Upani~ad statesthat 'Our senseshave been created
by God with a tendencyto move outward. It is for this reason
tbPotmaRlooks outside himself rather than inside. Rarely a wise
man, who is desirous of immortal lile, loob to bis inner Self
with bis eye turncd inwardst.N Thc Ka~haUpanifad tesrifics that
the realisation of the individual inner Self is the only meansto
attain libcration. This ineansis indirect wbile the realisation of
the Supreme Self is the direct meansof liberation.
Dr. s. Radhakrishnan has rightly concludedin the Principal
Upani$ads(London, 1933,pp. 93-94).'There does not seemto be
any suggestionthat the individual egos are unreal. They aU ex.ist
through the Self and have no reality apart from it. The insistence
on the unity of the SupremeSelf as the consrituent reality of the
world and of the individual soulsdoes not Desatethe empirical
reality ofilie latter.'
Meaning o/ Pratyak-tmaraand Parok.tman
It would be most hclpful to understandthe doctrine of 'ahamartha' as identical with 'Sclf' ifwe interpret t~se two technical
terms of Vedantapllosophy. Both theseterms havebeenused by
the followers of Advaita and Vai~oavaVednta alike. To begio
with. let me fecal! that Pratyak-Atman stands for Jiva-Atmao
(individual Self) when we a~pt the compouod 'karmadharayaO,
wlle the sameword stand! for Paramitmao (SupremeSclf of
!he individual Self) if a 'tatPUCU$8
ocompound is accepted.Etber
compound interprets the word 'Pratyak' in the seoseof !he 'self'.
Therefore.!he 'pratyaktvao proveatbat 'Sclc' is 'I-sense..

Buddhist Philosop1liCi!1Researc/re"

268

Pral )'IIk mcansdirected inwards. It stands for the individual

inncr ,St 11"',Parak mcansdirected outwards or towards the outer
world (IIN (he senses). Pratyak is self-luminous and Parak is
illuminctl hy another, The Senseof Pratyak is obviouslyoppoSed
to thaf nI' Parak. In Advaita, cognition is regardcd as sclfluminnUN, Therefore. 'Self' (lf the nature of cognition is Pratyak
Atmnn, Itllrak is explaincd as 'param prakaSakatayaacati',
'signirylllP It as 'paraprakasa', i.e. which is luminousbya30ther.
On thc h,,"ili of this interpretation the Non-dualist again makes
an attcmrl (o denythe identity of '-scnsc' and 'Self'. It is therefore c~NCnljl,1
to re-examinethe meaningoftheSetwo terms along
the trndltlcm ofVai~oava Vedanta.
Thc NIII,-dualistic int~rpretation is rejected on the following
groundll:
1, Prll()'lIk would now be bracketed with pain, pleasure and
dCNlrc becausethey are also self-luminous, so long they
CXINI,

2~ C(,~"ilion is regardedas a characteristic of 'I-Sense'. As

au~lI. cognition is a 'dharma' (artribute or specialcharacIcrif'li'-" mark) and ,'I-Sense'is a 'dharmin' (where the
II,x'Cilll characteristic or properties of having the nature
rc"J~). According to fue above interpretation cognition is
(lcpcl,J~nt. Thercfore only the independent'I-Sense'would
Ix: 'l' gl1rded as the individual 'inner Self' and not the
dcpa:IIJ~ntcognition.
3. l'llc Nllyayika and t.he Vaise~ika totally reject any sclflum""us entity. According to thcm 'Self' (Atman) is
kn"W" as 'inner Self' (pratyak-Atman). Neitherofthcse
~i~ll~r"~hools of logicof Indian philosophy consider 'Self'
I~""II'.luminous.

Thc 1,1.1.
,. Vti~l;1ava
tradition intcrprets in the following way:
(a) PrI' y"k literally means going backwards or dirccted
inwarJfI (pllllfpam acati). It denotesthe 'Self' existing inside the
body, m/l/l. i:tteUect, ego and senSesand controlling them
togethcr. Nt.'edlcssto say that all schoolsof Vedanta ref~r to
'Self' hy 1111"
I~rm 'Pratyak-Atman'. Every human bcing has the
mcnt1,1 p,,/"t.,,'plionof '1' which denotcs'Self' and nothing elSe.
Thc ohjt.:11111'IhisshinesofitSelf,i.e.illuminates itself and trus
very IJhjt'l;1 i~ known as the 'SeIf'..8 Furthcrmore, in casethe

The Doctrine 01 .Aham-Artllat

269.

'I-sense'is different from cSelf', Self' will not be accepted as

'Pratyak' becauseit is onIy on account of Sclf arrogating thought
that 'Pratyak' is distinguishedfrom parak',"
(b) park' litcraUy m~ansdirected towards the outer world as
thc senses.Any object, thcrefore, which attains another (\r is
attained by another or illumines another is understoodas 'Parak'
(Param aitca prapnoti. parenopadiyate parasmai prakasate).
Parak is therefore that which exists for another. AU the objects
of thc universe suchas jar etc. exist for cl-sense'-Self'because
their ultimate result goesto 'l-sense-Self'. HenceParak.18
Pratyagartha is obviously different from Paragratha and
Prayagartha and '1' are identical, ojiva' is known as individual
'Self' or 'tman' when conditioned by a body, known as cons,-,iousness
when it be::omesa substratum of knowledge, and as
Pratyak when there is feeling of '1' due to attributive consciouso
ncss(dharmabhtita jana).89An individual inner Self marked as
'A' is not consideredas Pratyak foranother individual inner Self
marked as 'B' because cA' is not experienoedas '1' by 'B'.
Therefore Pratyak is an ob~ct of the feeling of '1'. This feeling
of 01'is not different from 'I-sense'.
This thesis of Vai~~avismis Cully supported by th.. Vaise~ika
school of Indian philosophy.'O The Vaise~ikaStitras of Ka~ada
clearly indicate that the apprehensionof Ceelingof '1' is related
to one's own individual inner 'S~lf' and that 01'is neVerconsidercd
as the 'Self' of another individual being. We comprehend the
idea oC '1' as reIated to ote's own 'Self'. Ifthe body was 'Self'
and the object of'l-appr~hension' was body, the body ofanother
bcing would also have beenapprehendedas '1'. Such is not our
expericncein lile. Therefore,the objeCtof our '14pprehension' is
something different Cromthe body and that is 'Self'. ol-apprehension' is always in connectionwith one's own individual 'Self'.
The nature ofthe individual inner 'Self' is an object of o~'s own
perception but the nature of the 'Self' of another being is only an
object ofinferential knowledge, The distinction among different
individual 'Selv~s' is thus obvious.
A comparative study of the commentary of akara Misra,
the gloss of Jayanrayal;1aand the bha~ya of Chandrakantaon
the above ref~rred Vaise~ika Stitras of KaQda makes it quite
clear that since thc intuitional apprehension'1' arisesin respect
of one's own 'Self' .and sinceit does not exis~in respect of other

270
'Self' jt js proper to regard ouc's OwDindividual inner 'Sdf"'.'
the primary referenoe. In casetbe primary referen~ were to tb' '.
body. the intuitional apprehension should have beenproduocd
by external sensesbecausethe body is not an object oc mental .
perception. The apprehension 'This js '1' is mental becauseit is
produced without the operation of external senses. The apprehension is neither inferential for want of logical reason. nor
verbally communicated for waut of authoritative texto It is
further noteworthy that jt refers to one's own individual 'Self'
and not to the 'Self' of another for the 'Self' of one man remains
beyond the sensesof another man.u
In the prima Cacle view an objection is raised by the Nondualist againstbis own point of view that rthe objects and their
relative peculiar characteristicsare supcrimposedon the individual
inner Self', the substratum. on the simple logic that the substratum is never acoepted as an object of knowledge. Unless OM
acquires the knowledge of substratum. the superimposition
remains out of question. It may thus beexpiained that it is only
after the knowledge of substratum that superimposition of silver
on the conch-shell is experien~.'1 The prima Cacle view is
rejected jn the Sai1kara-bM$Ya.whereinthe individual inner 'Self'
(Pratyak-Atman) is not accepted as an absolute non-object of
knowledge. Accordingiy the individual jODer'Self' does become
the object of intuitional appreheDSonof 'I'u. One does experience the idea of 'I-ness' in relation to the individuil inoer 'Self'.
In case'Self' was not an object of the apprehensioo of '1' and
was simply an object of the apprehensionof conscienoe.we would
have called the 'Self' as 'Thii' and not as '1' becauseconscience
being inanimate could only be designatedby 'This' or 'That..
A study ofthe Skara-bha~yashOWIthat Pratyagartha and
Paragartha are two entirely dift'erent philosophical notions.
Pratyagartha den:Jtesthe idea o '1-De.>S'
going towards the
knower, while Pargarthais always.n object of the apprehension
of 'This' or 'That'. There is no objectivity of 'I..apprehension' in
relation to 'Pratyak-Atman' and it is further to be kept in mind
that the objectivity of 'l-appreheDsion' is always relatcd to the
objectivity of peroeption. Therefore. Pratyak-Atman is definitely
an object of 'l-apprd1ension'. To make it more comprehensive
it is stated that we do acquire!he knowledge of substratumwhich
is none else but Pratyak-Atman and ~
should be no hindrance

The Doctrine o/. Aham-Artha'

2n

in acceptingthe superimposition of thc objects and their special

characteristic mark.'i in Pratyak-tman. Tbe SaIikara-B~y..
on a claseperusal, makes it clear that even Sankaricarya has
.<fistinguishedParAgartha from Pratyagartha on the basis of '1intellect'. This attests that tbe idea of 'I-ness' is identical with
(he idea ofindividual inner 'Selr (i.e. Pratyak-tman).
Let us carefully examine the above-mentionedview of the non.<fualismthat not pure consciousnessbut consciousness
conditioned by conscienteis the object of 'I-apprehension'. Suift,ceto &ay
that conscience as a limiting adjunct is an object of 'This-apprchension'. As such in tbe consciousnesswhich is distinguished by
the limiting adjunct, the 'I-apprehension' automaticanysteps in.
H 'Self' is not acxeptedes an obje~ of 'I-.apprehenson',the '1apprehension' would have no .cope at all (nirvi~ya). It is need.
Jessto say that the objectivity of 'I-apprehension' is not ~pt.ableeveuto Non-dualist. h is tbl:refore a demand of propriety
that the 'Self' o the nature of coDIdousnessshouJdbe accepted
as an object of 'I-apprcbeosion' which i. not difl'erent from the
idea of 'I-ness'.
We have aIready sCenthat tbere i. so~ basic differen~
between Non-dualist and Vai~va poinu ofTiews. Tbe Non.<fualistmaintains tbat the idea of 'Sclf' exista in' 1-aplX'ehenaion'
.and it is onJy due to this fa~ that the 'Sclf' is ~gnised &1
perceptible. but tbe Non-dualiJt is not preparedto acceptthat iD
tbis 'I-apprehension' exists an imposition of'I-oess' of conscien~.
Suffi~ to enquire that when the Non-dualist acc;epts~ idea of
'Selr in 'I-apprehension', why not accept the 'Selr as thc '16ense'instead of travelng thrOUgh thc imposition of 'I-sense'
on 'Sclf'. Our experie~ be<:omesquite normal just by accepting
the identity of 'I-Seose'and 'Self'. Moreover, in the case of the
imposition such as the crystal and the red ftower, the red~u or
the ftower is reftected on the crystal. The ftower appears red
apart from the crystal and the crystal appearsred in the closc
proximity ofthe ftower. It therefore becomesa~ptable that thc
redness of the tlower is retlected on the crystal. Suchis not thc
condition between 'I-sense' of coDJCenceand 'Self' because
conscience ~ver appears as '1' apart from 'Self'. Hence the
identity oftbe 'Iose' and the 'Self'.
In case the 'I-sense' residesin the 'Self' as an attribute of ego,
an aspe~ o consciousnessas generalJyac~pted by Non-dualiat.

...,...
~J

272

Buddhist Philosophical Researches

one may question what is thc locus of 'I-ness' in relatil)n to God

(Isvara) as describcd in thc Upani$adic tradition." 'I-sensc'
could ~rtain1y be 3cceptcdas an attribute of conscienceand ego
whcn God is conceiv~d as consciousn.::ssconditioned by
conscien~ or as consciousno:ss
conditioncd byan ego; but it is a
known fact that in Advaita Vcdanta G:Jd is regardedas cons.
ciousncssconditioned by Mayl.4 It may be kept in mind that
thcre is no idea of 'I-ncss' in thC state of Maya. Truly, ego
remains non-existentprior to godly suprem~ det~rmination such
as '1 wish to be many' and ego is produ~d only after the creation
of !he principIe or intclligen~ (mahat), the first evolution
according to Sarl1khyaphilosophy..'
We are now lcft with no other aIternativ~ but to accept that
cl-ness' in G':Jd is not to bc imposed from outsidc but that it
beIongsto God from within. This cnables us to maintain that
ego, a m'Jdification of causalmatter (Prakrti) is not 'I-sense'but
'~If' is 'I-seosc'. B.:sides, 'I-intellect' is God as evidenced by
th,~ Upan~adic tradition..7 This v~ry knowledgeis regardedas
the righ knowl~dg~ b.~causcmisapprehension of any sort is
impossiblc in omrtiscient God. Therefore, cl-ness'as described
in God could not be an imposed one. By acceptingan imposition
ofth.~ 'I-ness' on G()d, one indirectly accepts the existenre of
misapprehension in God. On account of the non-existenceof
ego at thc time of godly supremedetermination and on account
of the non-existenceof ego in God, the apparent 'I-ness' in God
has got to be ac~pted as belonging to the misapprehensionof

God.
1 should further elucidate the Advaita point ofview. The Non..
dualist explains that in the intuitional apprehension of '1' tbe
unitcd ego and consciousnessappearas the basis of the mutual
identicaI su~rimpositin. 1 have already explained in detail the
notion of the uniting elem~ntof anmate and inanimate accepted
as the 'I-sensc' in non-dua1ism.Now it would be interestingto
examirtethe Crvaka point of view in this rcgard. It is a wellknown fact that all the six orthodox systemof Indian philosophy
refute thc 'body-S~lf' concept of Carvaka and al! of them un.~
animousIy agrce that body is neither 'I-sense' nor consciousness..
Thercforc, it is not very scholarly to declare the body as 'Self".
.Jnthe falsc identification of 'Self' with thc body, as the Carvaka
maintains, he has to accept'I-intellect' in the body and thereiD.

---o
~J
, I

:!
TheDoctrine o/ 'Aham-Artha'

273

appcarsthe idcntification of a body with the ego and consciousncss. The 'Self' of the natur~ of consciousnessappears idcntical
with thc body duc to falsc knowledge.
The Non-dualist attacks against the Carvaka on the ground
that first and foremostWcshould not forgct that th~ '&If' of the
nat~rl':of consciousncss
ap~ars as ," du~ to false identity with
c:Jnscience.Therefo re, this ver)' ," gctting idcntical with the
body appearsas" am handsome',"am ugly', '1 am fat', '1 am
of dark complexion'. This kind of apprehension is known as
false idcntification with the body. To cradicate this Wr\.)ngnotion,
thc Non-dualist has first to establishdiffer~nce bctween "-sense'
and the body and then has to r...m.Jvethc misapprehensi':Jn
of
non-differencebetw.:enego and consciousnessand finally has to
establish non-identity of 'Self' and ego.
It has already bcen observed that 'I-sense' does not meanthe
uniting clement of animate and inanimate but it is 'Self' itself.
The false idcntification with the body is not very different from
the misapprehensionof non-differcnce bctween 'I-sense' and
'non-Self' (anatrnan): No misapprehensioncan logically be established at the root of thc false identification with the body as
indircctly advocatedby the Non-dualist in thc form of misapprehensionbetweenconsciousness
and ego. Furthermorc, the celebratcd writer of thc ~~asiddhi accepts the objcct illuminating
knowledge as objectless or having no scope and without any
substratum. He declaresthat this v.:ry knowledge is the principal
characteristic of the 'Self'. The object illuminating knowledge
appearsas an attribute of 'I-s;:nse'on the basis of the apprehension, '1 know'. The differencebetween'I-sense'and knowledgeas
characteristic (dharma)and as that which possessthe characteristic (dharmin) is obvious.The misapprehensionuf non-diff~renoe
bctwccn'attributclcss Self' and 'I-sense'is an impossibility.
1 havc alrer.dy mentioned that the Non-dualist interprcts the
word 'aham' (1) as conscicnce when there is falsc idcntification
with the ego and superimposition of the ego as consciousness
conditoned by conscicncc whcn thcrc is false idcntification with
thc body. This involv.:sa dcfl:ct, b~causcther.: is only one meaning of'I-s.:;nse'and that m~aningis '&If'.
Upavar,\'aand Vediintadesika

Upavar~a. a pre-Sakara author of several writings on

274

Bllddhist Philosophical Rescarches

Mimamsa philosophy and bis followers acceptcomplete identity

of 'I-sense' and 'Sclr. They clcarly propound that the 'Self' is an
objcct of. I-appr.:hension'. Jayanta Bha!!a (9th ccntury), one of
thc most celebrated logicians of the old school of Hindu logic
clearly refers to the tradition of Upavar~a in rus Nyaya-majari,
and of the followers of Upavar~a who directly realiscd thc 'Self'
as an object of the fecling of 'I-apprehension'. Sorncscholars
hold that this Upavar~a was nuneelse but Baudhayana.We are
still not in a position to acccpt this view for want of valid evidencc. In my opinion trus Upavar~awas the younger brother of
Var~a,the teacherof PaI.\ini, the most celebratedIndian grammanan. Evidcntly by the time of JayantaBha!!a the tradition of
Upavar~a occupicd a prominent place in ancient Ind:an philosoprucal thought. JayantaBha!!a clearly statesthat Upavar~aand
rus followers ofthe Prva Mimamsa accept complete identification of' I-scnse'and 'Self'.48
The 'l-sensc-Self' theory has a support in the course of the long
history of Indian philosophy. It has been supported by the
Carvaka, Bauddha,. Naiyayika, Vaise~ika,Prva Mimamsaka
and Vai~QavaAcryas with specialreferenceto Ramanuja school
of Vednta. The eviocnces from Ymuncarya and VedantaDesika produce ample testimony in favour ofthis theory.
Yamunacarya maintains that it is proved beyond doubt by
logic and verbal tt~stimony that 'Self' and 'I-sense'are identical
and that the 'Self' is knower.48The two statements '1 know' and
'1 do not know' indicate the existence of knowledge and ignorance in 'I-cognition' in relation to the differenceof time. This is
our normal experiencethat by the rise of a particular knowledge
in 'I-cognition' the previous ignorance is dispelled. The 'Self'
misapprehendsitsclf as body in the apprehension,'1 am fat', '1
am weak'. This is certainly nesciencein the form of false apprehension with thc body. Nescienceis possible only when \Ve
accept 'I-ncss' and 'knowerness' Gatrttva) in the 'Self'. In the
abscnceof 'I-ncss' and 'knowcrness'in the 'Sclr tae falsc identification with the body remainsan impossibility. Hence knower
Self-'I-sense'.so
In fine, I put forward thc conclusive cvidcnccfrom Vedantadesika, the well-known grcat Guru (mahdesika)who has fully
supported the 'I-sense-Sclf' theory on the basisofthe following

arguments:

3.
2.
4.

275

The Doctrine 01 .Aham-Artha'

)4~I!~~I:1fm
~ ~ ~

qi~

~~~~~~~

~n; I

~)~"I:"i

~ ",rwTf~fq'm~mWf""'~I~1m!
fq.'t)4.~."""",~.~..".n'i:)~f+i.~qq:~:

l.

11

'Self' (Atman) is the individual inner Self (Pratyak) and

non-Self is 'Parak'. The nature of individual inner 'Self' is
self-luminous. whi!e 'Parak' illumines another or illumines
for another. Pratyak is connected with the idea of '!' and
Parak to an object denoted by 'This' and 'That'. 'I-sense'
exists for itself and the objectsexist for the benefit of '1sense',There(ore. 'I-sense'is 'Self',
The 'Self' is regarded as eternal, animate and knower.bl
Our norma! experienceis as follows: '1 am the knower'.bS
This attests that wherever 'I-ness' and 'knowerness'exist,
the conscious'l-sense-Self'also exists.
The philosophical thinking maintains that the 'Self' experiencesthe miseriesof the mundaneworld and desiresto
attain liberation in order to gel rid of the cycle of birth
and death. Such an intensivedesireimpels 'Selft to follow
the means of libe-ration. The experienceof miseries,the
desire to get rid of them and the desireto enjoy the
inexhaustible hliss in the state of liberation could belong
to 'l-sensetalone.
Here are five questionsfrom the Vedic literature, Theyare
ascribed to liberated persons' the Supreme Self, and
personsdesirous of liberation. Vedantadesika attaches
primary importance to the authority of the Vedic testimony in support of the theorr of 'I-sense-Self'.
(a) '1 am food (Taittiriya Upani~ad 111.13.6).
Tbis is a
statementof a liberated persono
(b) '1 beca[f1cManu' (Brhadarar.tyakaUpani$ad 1.4.10).
A statementof Vamadevawho is regardedas a lib~rated personwhile alive.
(c) '1 enter in all in the form of lifc.'63 A statemcntof
SupremeSclf.
(d) 'I.go for refugeto all-Effulgent Sclf.'5( A statcm~ntof
one who is desirousof libcration.
(e) '1 was alone in the beginning' (thamekaJ:
prathama-

276
6.

Buddhisl PhilosophicalResearc1la
masam)Atharvaveda. Vedic testimony. AII the above
quoted citations testify identity of 'I-sense'and cSelf'.

5. We know by noWthat according to Advaita Vedantathe

grnssego is thc 'I-sense'and it is destroyed in the state of

profound repose. Our experienceis howeverdifferent. It
tclls us whenawaking from profound reposethat one slept
so long happily but did not know anything. Hence the
existence of 'I-sense' in profound repose. Only'l-scnse.
existent in profound reposecould be Self and nothing else.
According to non-dualisTI1.conseiencedoes exist in profound repose.In the casewhere conscienccis the 'I-sense',
one should have the apprehension'1 was non-existent
during profound repose'. Since suchis never our experience,it follows that 'I-sense'is 'Self'.
In the tradition of Advaita Vedanta. the 'Self' is regarded
as self-luminous (svayarilprakaSa)and eternal. As such,
the 'Self' continues to illumine and exist in profound
repose. In the case where the 'I-sense' is the 'Self' argues
the Non-dualist, the 'I-sense'should have beenexistentin
profound repose.Nevertheless,suchis not the casebccause
the 'Self' in profound repose does not remain aware of
'1'. Therefore. self-luminous 'Self' is not 'I-sense'.Besides,
awaking from profound reposeit telis us that one had no
awarenessevenof oneself. Such an experie1Ceestablishes
negation of 'I-sense' in the state of profound repose.The
non-existence of 'I-sense' and self-lurninous Self in the
state of profound reposearetwo entirely different concepts
-Vedanta and they are not identical. maintains the Nono

s"tlto

baS\-wof Advaita Vedanta does not hold good on the

\nnef .(1) The 'l-sense-Self' illumines itselfinthe
.-"efen\S.Uream. profound reposeand swoon,onthe
1\\}'
sense-~ Ofl;uch as oneness.the state of individual
accoun \ness\, (2) The illumination pcrtains to the
Ut1\1~PP
tne statt.'I-scnse'.Thus the sclf-luminous '1D\1f\t\g
'c of awaking, and dream on
.'edge. desirc. happinessand
'ss .(dhafma-bhta jana).
'Sclf' docs not illuminc

",'

Tltt DoctrJeo/ .Aham-Artha'

211

by attributive consciousnessbut by its own nature. The attributive consciousness,over-poweredby famas,bl:comescontracted

during profound repose.Truly, the 'I-st:nse-Self' beingcndowed
with the attributes oneness,the state of individual inner 'Self' and
concord illumines by its own nature during profound reposebut
does not rcmcmbcrthe various attributes of name, forro, varoa
and sr:lm:l such as a Brahmaoa. a SannY[lsinon the simplc
ground that the attributivl: consciousnessrl:mainshidden. The
meaning Qf the statement' 1 had no awarenesseven of myse!f' is
as follows: I had no similar awarcnessof myselfduring profound
reposc:lS1 always have during the state of awaking. As 1 understand mysclf as a br:ihmaOa,or as a sannyasinor a Professoror
an Ambassadorduring awaking on the basis of outer attributes.
1 had no memory of any suchattribute during profound repose.
In this way, the objection of the Non-dualist against the existence and illumination of 'I-sense'during profound repose and
againstthe ident:ty of 'I-scnse' and 'Sel[' is clea:-lyrejected.
I thercfore conclude that the 'I-sense' and the '$elf' are identi.
cal. The 'I-sense' is not the non-self as maintaincd by the Nondualist. The 'I-sense' "xists in the dreamless profound sleep.In
the statc of liberation, the 'I-sense', abandoning al! undesirable
wordly f orms, names,shapesand attributes exists in its pure forro
and as such'I-sense' is properly entitled to study the scriptures,
the best meansof liberation. The identity of' I-sense'and 'Self'
may thc:reforcbe t:!citily ac~pted.
References
l. Isvarak"I:ta, Sali1khya-Karika,25.

1. The Atman-Puru~a or Sli1khya is in reality 'Nirgul:ta'. This view of

5a1khya is c\i,lent from thc Mdhyarnakavatara VI, 121 quotcd in thc
Prasannapada cornmentary of Chandrakirti on Nfigarjuna's (Milla) MadhYilmakaka!"ik:i:cf. Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy ofBuddhism, London,

1955,p. :!!)3.

3. The problcm of Self and non-Self in Hindu and Buddhist tradition hil9
ncver Lcas.:d to inlCrest r~jearch~rs, cf. Guha Abhyankumar, 'Jivatman
in me Brahm3.~tra',Calcutta, 1921; Mrs. Rhys Davills, 'Thc Birth of Indi~n
Psychology and it, Development in Buddhism', London, 1936; Narahari,
H.G., 'Atman in pre-Upani~llic Vedic Literature', Madra9, 1944; Gonda, J,
'Notes on 8rahman', Utrccht, 1950; Lacombe, U. 'La Direl:tion Spirituelle
sell'n les traditil)n indienne",lians Direction spirituelle et Psychologie', (Etudes
Carmilitaric~) Bruge., 1951; Biardeau Madeline, 'La Ph.ilosophiede MaQQana

278

Buddhist Phi/osophicalResearches

Mi~ra
vue a partir
de laBhaflAcharya
Brahma-Siddhi,
Pars,1969;Pars,
L'Atman-Brahman"dans.
le
Buddhism
Ancien,
Kamaleswar,
1973.
.
4. SenguptaMima, 'Thc Evolution of the SIi1khya
Schoolof Thought'.
1959, Patna, pp. 70-80.
5. BrahmastJtra
2.4.12(ed)SivanandSaraswati,Risllikesh,1949,pp. 523-24.
6. Joshi Rasik Vihar, 'The Role of 1ndian Logic in the Ooctrneof Causa.
lit y', Melangesd'lndianisrnea la Memoire de Loui!i Renou,Pars,1965,pp.
4O3-OS.
7. BrhadaraQyakaUpani$adIV.3.22.
S. SailkaraBha$yaon the BrahmasQtra
11.2.29.(ed.)SaraswatiSatyananda,.
Varanasi,Samvat202S,pp. 50S-lO.
9, Ibid., 11.3.30.
10. Ibid., 11.3.31,p. 512.
11. Jbid., 11.3.32. 'Nityopalabdyanupalabdhiprasagai:t
anyataraniyamo
vanyatha..
12. Tripathi, ManassukharamaSuryarama, 'A Sketch of the Vedanta
Philosophy', Bombay, 1910,p. 140.
13. Lacombe,O. 'L' Absolu selonle Vedanta',Guenther,Pars, 1937,pp.
2S-35; op. cit. Trpathi Manassukharama,Suryarama,'Sai1kara Vedanta.
interprets the Vedantaunity by hannony betw=n Egotlsm and Altruism'.
pp. J26-32.
14. (a) La KaSika-Vrtti, (ed.)Yutaka Ojiharaet Louis Renou,Pars,196()..

67.
(b) Tattva-mukta-kalapaof Vedantadesika,
(Bha.vaprakASa
pp. 40-41)
Vol. 11. (ed.) S. Narasimhachar,Mysore, 1940.
1S. ManobuddhiraharhkaraScittam
karaQamantaram,
saMaYo niScaYogarvaJ:IsmaraQamvi$ayaimel
Sai1kara-BM$yaon BrahmasQtra,Op.Cit. Satyanand Saraswati.
p. 544.

16. avidyatmika hi bijaSaktii:tavyaktaSabdanirdesyA

ParamesvarasrayA
mAyamayimahasU$uptif:1
oSailkaraBM$ya on the Brahmastra(ed,) Sara;wati Satyanand.
Varanasi, Samvat 202S,pp. 2S7-SS.
17. 'Even in the state of dreamlesssleep,though thereis no consciousnes.!
of obj~ts. still the senseof '1' (ahamartha)p:rsists..
The Vedanta,Ghate, V.S., Poona,1960,p. 25.
IS. The Twelve Principal Upani$ads(Chandogya Upanipd (13.1)(ed.)
Mitra and Cowell, Vol. 111,p. 274.
19. Op. Cit., Ibid., p. 274.
20. cf. Mitra and Cowell, Taittiriya Upani$ad,3.30,pp. 231-32;Ranade.
R.O., A Constructive Survey of Upanisadic Philosophy,Bombay, 1967
p.257.
21. aharnartha-vin~Scen
mok$aityadhivasyati,
apasarpedasaumok$akatMprastavagandhataf:'
Sribha~yap. 67 (ed.) Annangaracharya,
Kanchipuram,1956.
22. 'ahamityeva hi tasya svarpam' Sri YamunacMrya's Siddhitraya
(Atmasiddhip. 39) (ed.)Ramanujacharya.
Madras,1972.
23. ".
the mundaneis itselfthe transmundane
and the transmundane

The Doctrine 01 '.4.ham-Artha'

279

it itselfthe rnundane."VenkataRamanan,NAgarjuna'sPhilosophyas Presented in the MabA-Praji-PAramitA-Sastl3,

Tokyo, 1966,p. 122.
24. Tameva viditvAtimrtyumeti nAnyaJ: panthAJ:vidY\te 'naya,ya!
SvetAsvataraUpa~
(ed.) Swami Tyagishvaranand, Madras, 1957, pp,

70-71.
25. Brahmavid Brahmaivabhavati/Mar:lc;1kya
Upani~d 3.2,9,
26. Cf. op. cit., Mitra and Cowell,(OtAndogyaUpani~d) Vol. 111,pp.
247-48.
27. SAri1khya-Krikiof Isvarakr$r:la62 and 63; cf. Mukerji, J.N., The
Theory of Rea/ity, Calcutta,1930,pp. ro.64, 97-98;SenguptaAnima, 'The
Evolution of the SAritkhyaSchoolof Thought',Patna,1959,pp. 49-51.
28. 'It is SanatkurnAra
whoteachesthedoctrineof BhQman.BhOmanis that
infinite happinesswhkh arisesby the vision of the divinity all around. A
Constructive Surveyof UpanishadicPhilosophy,Ranade,R.O., Bombay.
1968, p. 37.
29. ChAndogya
Upani$adVII.2S,l, op.cit.. TheTwelvePrincipalUpan~ds.
(ed.) RajendralalMitR and E.B. Cowdl, Madras,1932,Vol. 111,p. 245.
30. ChAndogya Upani~d. Sakaridl1rya-granthAvali,Delhi, 1964, pp.
296-97. As regardsdie 'neti neti prakriya. of Advaita Vedanla,Mrs. Rhys
Davids has observed,'this is as ir one wereto oomeabored askingfor the
~ptain and rejectingroatswainand poneras beins'not he' wereto go away
saying 'thereIs no captain', 'The Sel" : an over Iooked BuddhistSirtlilc.
JRAS, 1937,p. 260.
31. op. cit. Olndogya._pp.245-46;Cf. Tattva-muktikalpa' of VedntadeSika(BhAvaprakASa
pp. 230-31)(ed.)S. Narasimhachar.Mysore,Vol. 11.
1940.
32. op. cit., ChAndoya...p. 246.
33. ahari1karaQam
ahamk1l'ab.
34. Ka~haUpani$8d11.4.1;cf. Ranade. A Comtl1JCtiveSurveyof Upanisadic Philosophy, p. 247.
35. Finite Self (RamanujistIdea of Self) (ed.)Don Maharaj,Vrindaban.
1963,pp. 14-20.
36. 'svasmati praka.mrnnatvarOpam
pratyaktvam'. Sribhi$ya, SOtraprakAsikA,p. 94; op.cit. Finite Self,pp. 14-1~.
37. 'aharnarthona cxda.tmapratyak~
nAtmanAmbhavet,ahambudhy
parAgarthAt
pratyagarthohi bhidhyate!&ibha$ya,p. 67 (ed.)Annangaracarya.
Kancipurarn, 1956. "$a sdhanAnu$tfljnena
yadyaharnevana bhavi,yArni
ityavagacchet,apasarpedevasau
rnok$ai:athAprastAvAt;
tatacl.adhikirivirahAdevasarvamrnok$lSstram
aprarnt)am
sytllbid.. p. 71.
Cf. Yarnunacarya's
Siddhitraya(Atmasiddhi,p. 39)(ed.)Ramanujacharya.
Madras, 1972.
38. Tattavrnuktakalpaof VedntadeSika
(SarvArthasiddhi,
Anandadyini
and BhAvaprakASa
cornrnentaries
on ve~ Nos. 6 and 7 of Ihe Jivasara
chapter)(ed.)S. Narasimhachar,
Mysore,1940,Vol. 11,pp. 208-69.
39. S1riraka-mirnlnsA-bha$ya,
1.1.1 (R1rnnl!jagranthamaIA)
(ed.) Annangaracharya,Kanchipuram,1956,p. 67.
40. 'aharnili pratyaptmani bhAvA.tparatvabhAvatarthanlarapratyak$8b!

280

B"ddhist Philosophical Rcsearches

The Vai.Se$ikaStras of Ka~da, 111,2,14(ed.) Ba.~uB.D. and Sinha Nandlal,

All:lh:lbad, 1923.
41. Ibid., Ba~u ahd Sillha, rr. 12~-25.
42. J(,~hi, Rasik Vihari. \';liJity uf Krn)wlcdge in Indian Logic, Dr, V.
Ragha\:ln Felicitation Votumc, I)clhi, 1975, pp. 180-86.
-t~. 'na tavadayam ekantena avi$3yal), a~matrratitivi$ayatvat aparll5katvac.:a
pratyagiitmasiddhel:,,
Br:lhma~rltra Bha$ya (ed.) Mah:lm:lhopadhyaya Anlntakrishn3 Shastri,
B.'mbay, 19311.
4-t. 'Hc Ithe Surreme S('Iul).Icoired: Let me become many, let me beborn:
T:littiriY:l Upani$ad 11.6.2.
45. 'Jt.s intinitc~imal part bc..:ome~the Qualit!ed Brahman, through it~
assllCiation with the unrcal prillciplc 01' May: Trirathi, ,tanassukhram
Suryarama: 'A Sketch of thc Phil"~ophy ofVcdanta', Bombay, 1901,p. 73.
4(1. Salhkhya-karikii of Isvarakr$l)a, 22.
47. Chandogya Upani$3d, VI.3,2; 'Eighteen Principal Upanishads', (ed..)
Limaye V.P. and Vadekar R.D., Pouna, 1968,
4!!, 'Tatra pratyak$a-rTlatmanam Aupavar5&!:I Prapcdire,
aham-pratyayagamyattvat svayOthya api ke.:ana/
Nyayamajari uf Jayanta nha!!;!, (ed.) Madhvachaf)'a Adya, Varanasi,
1969, Vol. 11, p. 3.
49. ".. .one can say that the one accepts or denies Aunan as much as the
othcr, hoth the Madhyamaka :tnd the Advaita Vedanta dcny Atman as:t
separate su~tan.tial entity inhabiting the body of each individual, and both
acccpt Atm:ln in the senseof essential nature of the individual as well as of
all things..., atman brahman mcallS thcre is hardly any ditTcrencebet",.eenthc
t\\o." K. '.cnkat:t Ramanam, Nagarjun:!'s philo~ophy a~ prciCnted in Mah;lPr:tja-Paramitii-sii~tra, Rutland- Tokyo, 1966, p. 320.
50. AtaiJ pratyak~-siddhattval ukla-nyygamanvayl, avidyayogataSc;1U11a illatiihamiti bhasatc,' The Siddhilraya of Yamunacarya, (ed.) Ramanujacharya, Madras, IAtmasiddhi, pro 41-44), 1972.
51. "'edanta-desika \ery clcarly accepls in the Adhikara~as:iravali that the
indi\ idu;1 inner 'Selr, (PratYilk) is 'I-scnsc'. (Pratyar,niitmahamarthil!:lJ,
Adhikaral)as:lra\ali, p. 2.10 (ed.) ,\nnangaracharya, Kanchivaram, 1940; cf.
atohamarth('l jatai\ a pratyag;itmeti niS;itam', Sribha$ya, p. 67 (ed.) Op.Cit.,

1956.
52. 'He is ctcrnal 3mong the cternals and intelligent among all lhat arc
intclligcnt.' Svcliis\alara Upilni5:1d. Icd.) SwiJ1T\iTYilgishwaralland, M adra 'i,
1957 111.6.13)
.'3. 'cntcring tl1c~cobjccts in lhc tilrm of lifc (Sclf) 1 shall be manirc~t ;11
variUll'i llames anu forms.' ChangogYil Upani$-1d,VI.3.~.
5-t. '
~ccking li~cratiun 1 gu fur rcfugc to thc Elfulgcnt unc, ",hu lurn'i lh.:
undcrstanding ,'tman,'

Svela~\~tara Up;ni~ad, VI.I~.

CONTRIBUTORS
Prof. ANDRB'OAREAU\vho was born 1921 near Pars, retircd as
Profcssor of Study of Buddhism at the College de France. Hc
h.'1Spublishcd sevcral \\'orks and num\:rous articles and monograph!; on Indian Buddhism. cspccially on the Buddha's bl()graphy, the hist()ry :Ind doctrincs of thc ancient schools
of thc so-called Hinayana (L,.S' .\"ecte.S'bouddhiques du Petll
V hicu/c',etc.).
Prof. KAMALESWARBIIATTACHARYADocteur es Lettcrs (Pa..i~).
Directeur de Rcchcrchc (1 st class) at the Centre National de
la Rccherche Scicntifiquc, Pari!;. was formcrly
Vi!;iting
Profcssor, University
C'f Toronto (Canada), t'tc. Hc has
publishcd: Le.\" Re/i,~iollS brallmalliqrle.\" dalls l'anc;en CanlbodJ(('
(1961); Recherches sur ' ,'ocobulaire des ill.\"criptions ,\"anskrilt'.\"
du Ctllllbodge (1964; 2nd edn" 1991); L 'Atman-Brahlllon dall.f
le Bo,ddl,isl"e allciell (1973); Thc' Dialcctical J.{ ctl,0d vI
N.~rjmo (Vigrahavyavrtani) (1978; 3rd edn., 1990); Le
.S'iddlllltalak,raf.'aprakara~'a du Tottl'acintamaf.'i de Galgesa
av('c; Lc' Didhili dc' Ra,~lnmathaSirom(/~'i el la Tika de Jagadl.\~a
Torkala",kara (Jollrllal Asiatiqllc, 1977-), and numerous
articlcs on various topics of Indology, in French, English and
Sanskrit.
DR. BJIAGWANDASH is holder ofPost-graduate qualifications in
yurveda and Sanskrit, and Doctorate degree in Tibclan
Mcdicine. He was Deputy Adviscr in yurveda t thc Govt.
of India in the Ministry of Heal:h. In 1980,he took voluntary
rctircment from his Government job to pursuc his yurv~dic
practicc and carry out rcsearchcs in Ayurvcda and Tibctan
mcdicine on both of which hc has alrcady \vrittcn 45 books.
Prof. COLLETTCox i~ Associatc Profcssor in thc Dcparlmcnt ()f
Asian
Languagcs and Litcratllrc
.lt thc Univcrsity
"f
Washington.
Hcr ficld of rcscarch is Indian Buddhist
Abhidharma and her recent \vork includcs publicatitms (In
Buddhist cpistcmology,
rcligiou~ pr.lxi!;. sotcriology, and
hcrmlneutics. Shc is thc author of lJi.\'plllt'd DI,urmas: f."urly
B4ddhist Theor;es 011E.~istence.