GONZALO VILLANUEVA (represented by his heirs), petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES FROILAN
and LEONILA BRANOCO, respondents. G.R. No. 172804 January 24, 2011 Second
Division Carpio,

FACTS: Gonzalo Villanueva, represented by his heirs, sued Spouses Branoco to

recover a parcel of land. The former claimed ownership over the property thru
purchase from Vere, who in turn, bought the property from Rodrigo. Gonzalo
declared the property in his name for tax purposes soon after acquiring it. In their
answer, the Spouses Baranoco similarly claimed ownership over the property thru
purchase from Rodriguez, who in turn, acquired the property from Rodrigo byway of
donation. The Spouses entered the property and paid taxes afterwards. The trial
court ruled in favor of Gonzalo and declared him owner of the property, and ordered
the Spouses Branoco to surrender possession to Gonzalo. The trial court rejected
Spouses Branocos claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a donation mortis
causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to Vere. Thus, by
the time Rodriguez sold the property to the Spouses, she had no title to transfer. On
appeal, the CA granted the Spouses appeal and set aside the trial court's ruling. It
held that the deed of donation is one of inter vivos. In his petition, Gonzalo seeks
the reinstatement of the trial court's ruling. Alternatively, petitioner claims
ownership over the Property through acquisitive prescription, having allegedly
occupied it for more than 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract between Rodrigo and Rodriguez is a donation or
a devise?
RULING; It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez
under aperfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein
Donee predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling their revocability of the passage
of title to Rodriguez's estate, waiving Rodrigo's right to reclaim title. This transfer of
title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguez's acceptance of the
disposition which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its execution
on 3May 1965. Rodrigo's acceptance of the transfer underscores its essence as a
gift in presenti not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need acceptance by the
recipient.
Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the Property, she could have
easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that "the donor, may transfer,
sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties here donated x x x" or used
words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly waived title over the Property in
case Rodriguez predeceases her.
Second

. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the Property,
evident from Rodriguez's undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the produce of the
land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime."

Thus, the Deed's stipulation that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez]
upon my demise," taking into account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to
Rodrigo's beneficial title. Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the
Property, it was unnecessary for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it.
Third
. The existence of consideration other than the donor's death, such as the donor's
love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while also true
of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x [inter
vivos ] transfers."
Thus, theCA committed no error in giving weight to Rodrigo's statement of "love
and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as consideration for the gift, to underscore
its finding.
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigo's post-donation transfer of the Property to
Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in
interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at
naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid
mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels
against licensing such practice. Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked
title over the Property to Rodriguez in1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the
donation nor dispose of the said property in favor of another."

Thus, Rodrigo's post-donation sale of the Property vested no title to Vere. As Vere's
successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired no better right than him. On the other
hand, respondents bought the Property from Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latter's
title which they may invoke against all adverse claimants, including petitioner

G.R. No. 172804

January 24, 2011

GONZALO VILLANUEVA, represented by his heirs, Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES FROILAN and LEONILA BRANOCO, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Court of Appeals
dismissing a suit to recover a realty.
The Facts
Petitioner Gonzalo Villanueva (petitioner), here represented by his heirs, 3 sued
respondents, spouses Froilan and Leonila Branoco (respondents), in the Regional
Trial Court of Naval, Biliran (trial court) to recover a 3,492 square-meter parcel of
land in Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte (Property) and collect damages. Petitioner
claimed ownership over the Property through purchase in July 1971 from Casimiro
Vere (Vere), who, in turn, bought the Property from Alvegia Rodrigo (Rodrigo) in
August 1970. Petitioner declared the Property in his name for tax purposes soon
after acquiring it.
In their Answer, respondents similarly claimed ownership over the Property through
purchase in July 1983 from Eufracia Rodriguez (Rodriguez) to whom Rodrigo donated
the Property in May 1965. The two-page deed of donation (Deed), signed at the
bottom by the parties and two witnesses, reads in full:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, ALVEGIA RODRIGO, Filipino, of legal age, widow of the late Juan Arcillas, a
resident of Barrio Bool, municipality of Culaba, subprovince of Biliran, Leyte del
Norte, Philippines, hereby depose and say:

That as we live[d] together as husband and wife with Juan Arcillas, we begot
children, namely: LUCIO, VICENTA, SEGUNDINA, and ADELAIDA, all surnamed
ARCILLAS, and by reason of poverty which I suffered while our children were still
young; and because my husband Juan Arcillas aware as he was with our destitution
separated us [sic] and left for Cebu; and from then on never cared what happened
to his family; and because of that one EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, one of my nieces who
also suffered with our poverty, obedient as she was to all the works in our house,
and because of the love and affection which I feel [for] her, I have one parcel of land
located at Sitio Amambajag, Culaba, Leyte bearing Tax Decl. No. 1878 declared in
the name of Alvegia Rodrigo, I give (devise) said land in favor of EUFRACIA
RODRIGUEZ, her heirs, successors, and assigns together with all the improvements
existing thereon, which parcel of land is more or less described and bounded as
follows:
1. Bounded North by Amambajag River; East, Benito Picao; South, Teofilo Uyvico;
and West, by Public land; 2. It has an area of 3,492 square meters more or less; 3. It
is planted to coconuts now bearing fruits; 4. Having an assessed value of P240.00;
5. It is now in the possession of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962 in the
concept of an owner, but the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her
upon my demise.
That I FURTHER DECLARE, and I reiterate that the land above described, I already
devise in favor of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ since May 21, 1962, her heirs, assigns, and
that if the herein Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
That I EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ, hereby accept the land above described from Inay
Alvegia Rodrigo and I am much grateful to her and praying further for a longer life;
however, I will give one half (1/2) of the produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her
lifetime.4
Respondents entered the Property in 1983 and paid taxes afterwards.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled for petitioner, declared him owner of the Property, and ordered
respondents to surrender possession to petitioner, and to pay damages, the value of
the Propertys produce since 1982 until petitioners repossession and the costs. 5 The
trial court rejected respondents claim of ownership after treating the Deed as a
donation mortis causa which Rodrigo effectively cancelled by selling the Property to
Vere in 1970.6 Thus, by the time Rodriguez sold the Property to respondents in
1983, she had no title to transfer.

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), imputing error in the trial
courts interpretation of the Deed as a testamentary disposition instead of an inter
vivos donation, passing title to Rodriguez upon its execution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA granted respondents appeal and set aside the trial courts ruling. While
conceding that the "language of the [Deed is] x x x confusing and which could
admit of possible different interpretations," 7 the CA found the following factors
pivotal to its reading of the Deed as donation inter vivos: (1) Rodriguez had been in
possession of the Property as owner since 21 May 1962, subject to the delivery of
part of the produce to Apoy Alve; (2) the Deeds consideration was not Rodrigos
death but her "love and affection" for Rodriguez, considering the services the latter
rendered; (3) Rodrigo waived dominion over the Property in case Rodriguez
predeceases her, implying its inclusion in Rodriguezs estate; and (4) Rodriguez
accepted the donation in the Deed itself, an act necessary to effectuate
donations inter vivos, not devises.8 Accordingly, the CA upheld the sale between
Rodriguez and respondents, and, conversely found the sale between Rodrigo and
petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Vere, void for Rodrigos lack of title.
In this petition, petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the trial courts ruling.
Alternatively, petitioner claims ownership over the Property through acquisitive
prescription, having allegedly occupied it for more than 10 years. 9
Respondents see no reversible error in the CAs ruling and pray for its affirmance.
The Issue
The threshold question is whether petitioners title over the Property is superior to
respondents. The resolution of this issue rests, in turn, on whether the contract
between the parties predecessors-in-interest, Rodrigo and Rodriguez, was a
donation or a devise. If the former, respondents hold superior title, having bought
the Property from Rodriguez. If the latter, petitioner prevails, having obtained title
from Rodrigo under a deed of sale the execution of which impliedly revoked the
earlier devise to Rodriguez.
The Ruling of the Court
We find respondents title superior, and thus, affirm the CA.
Naked Title Passed from Rodrigo to Rodriguez Under a Perfected Donation

We examine the juridical nature of the Deed whether it passed title to Rodriguez
upon its execution or is effective only upon Rodrigos death using principles
distilled from relevant jurisprudence. Post-mortem dispositions typically
(1) Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the
transferor; or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should
retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the property while alive;
(2) That before the [donors] death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for indirectly by
means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the properties
conveyed;
(3) That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee.10
Further
[4] [T]he specification in a deed of the causes whereby the act may be
revoked by the donor indicates that the donation is inter vivos, rather than a
disposition mortis causa[;]
[5] That the designation of the donation as mortis causa, or a provision in the
deed to the effect that the donation is "to take effect at the death of the
donor" are not controlling criteria; such statements are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real
intent of the transferor[;] [and]
(6) That in case of doubt, the conveyance should be deemed donation inter
vivos rather than mortis causa, in order to avoid uncertainty as to the
ownership of the property subject of the deed. 11
It is immediately apparent that Rodrigo passed naked title to Rodriguez under a
perfected donation inter vivos. First. Rodrigo stipulated that "if the herein Donee
predeceases me, the [Property] will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of x x x Rodriguez," signaling the irrevocability of the passage
of title to Rodriguezs estate, waiving Rodrigos right to reclaim title. This transfer of
title was perfected the moment Rodrigo learned of Rodriguezs acceptance of the
disposition12 which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on the day of its
execution on 3 May 1965. Rodrigos acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donations inter vivos need
acceptance by the recipient. 13 Indeed, had Rodrigo wished to retain full title over the
Property, she could have easily stipulated, as the testator did in another case, that
"the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties

here donated x x x"14 or used words to that effect. Instead, Rodrigo expressly
waived title over the Property in case Rodriguez predeceases her.
In a bid to diffuse the non-reversion stipulations damning effect on his case,
petitioner tries to profit from it, contending it is a fideicommissary substitution
clause.15 Petitioner assumes the fact he is laboring to prove. The question of the
Deeds juridical nature, whether it is a will or a donation, is the crux of the present
controversy. By treating the clause in question as mandating fideicommissary
substitution, a mode of testamentary disposition by which the first heir instituted is
entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the whole
or part of the inheritance, 16 petitioner assumes that the Deed is a will. Neither the
Deeds text nor the import of the contested clause supports petitioners theory.
Second. What Rodrigo reserved for herself was only the beneficial title to the
Property, evident from Rodriguezs undertaking to "give one [half] x x x of the
produce of the land to Apoy Alve during her lifetime." 17 Thus, the Deeds stipulation
that "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon my demise," taking into
account the non-reversion clause, could only refer to Rodrigos beneficial title. We
arrived at the same conclusion in Balaqui v. Dongso18 where, as here, the donor,
while "b[inding] herself to answer to the [donor] and her heirs x x x that none shall
question or disturb [the donees] right," also stipulated that the donation "does not
pass title to [the donee] during my lifetime; but when I die, [the donee] shall be the
true owner" of the donated parcels of land. In finding the disposition as a gift inter
vivos, the Court reasoned:
Taking the deed x x x as a whole, x x x x it is noted that in the same deed [the
donor] guaranteed to [the donee] and her heirs and successors, the right to said
property thus conferred. From the moment [the donor] guaranteed the right granted
by her to [the donee] to the two parcels of land by virtue of the deed of gift, she
surrendered such right; otherwise there would be no need to guarantee said right.
Therefore, when [the donor] used the words upon which the appellants base their
contention that the gift in question is a donation mortis causa [that the gift "does
not pass title during my lifetime; but when I die, she shall be the true owner of the
two aforementioned parcels"] the donor meant nothing else than that she
reserved of herself the possession and usufruct of said two parcels of land
until her death, at which time the donee would be able to dispose of them
freely.19 (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, if Rodrigo still retained full ownership over the Property, it was unnecessary
for her to reserve partial usufructuary right over it. 20
Third. The existence of consideration other than the donors death, such as the
donors love and affection to the donee and the services the latter rendered, while
also true of devises, nevertheless "corroborates the express irrevocability of x x x

[inter vivos] transfers."21 Thus, the CA committed no error in giving weight to

Rodrigos statement of "love and affection" for Rodriguez, her niece, as
consideration for the gift, to underscore its finding.
It will not do, therefore, for petitioner to cherry-pick stipulations from the Deed
tending to serve his cause (e.g. "the ownership shall be vested on [Rodriguez] upon
my demise" and "devise"). Dispositions bearing contradictory stipulations are
interpreted wholistically, to give effect to the donors intent. In no less than seven
cases featuring deeds of donations styled as "mortis causa" dispositions, the Court,
after going over the deeds, eventually considered the transfers inter
vivos,22 consistent with the principle that "the designation of the donation as mortis
causa, or a provision in the deed to the effect that the donation is to take effect at
the death of the donor are not controlling criteria [but] x x x are to be construed
together with the rest of the instrument, in order to give effect to the real intent of
the transferor."23 Indeed, doubts on the nature of dispositions are resolved to
favor inter vivostransfers "to avoid uncertainty as to the ownership of the property
subject of the deed."24
Nor can petitioner capitalize on Rodrigos post-donation transfer of the Property to
Vere as proof of her retention of ownership. If such were the barometer in
interpreting deeds of donation, not only will great legal uncertainty be visited on
gratuitous dispositions, this will give license to rogue property owners to set at
naught perfected transfers of titles, which, while founded on liberality, is a valid
mode of passing ownership. The interest of settled property dispositions counsels
against licensing such practice. 25
Accordingly, having irrevocably transferred naked title over the Property to
Rodriguez in 1965, Rodrigo "cannot afterwards revoke the donation nor dispose of
the said property in favor of another." 26 Thus, Rodrigos post-donation sale of the
Property vested no title to Vere. As Veres successor-in-interest, petitioner acquired
no better right than him. On the other hand, respondents bought the Property from
Rodriguez, thus acquiring the latters title which they may invoke against all
adverse claimants, including petitioner.
Petitioner Acquired No Title Over the Property
Alternatively, petitioner grounds his claim of ownership over the Property through
his and Veres combined possession of the Property for more than ten years,
counted from Veres purchase of the Property from Rodrigo in 1970 until petitioner
initiated his suit in the trial court in February 1986. 27 Petitioner anchors his
contention on an unfounded legal assumption. The ten year ordinary prescriptive
period to acquire title through possession of real property in the concept of an
owner requires uninterrupted possession coupled with just title and good
faith.28There is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the

property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of
ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.29 Good faith, on the other hand, consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom the possessor received the thing was the owner thereof,
and could transmit his ownership.30
Although Vere and petitioner arguably had just title having successively acquired
the Property through sale, neither was a good faith possessor. As Rodrigo herself
disclosed in the Deed, Rodriguez already occupied and possessed the Property "in
the concept of an owner" ("como tag-iya"31) since 21 May 1962, nearly three years
before Rodrigos donation in 3 May 1965 and seven years before Vere bought the
Property from Rodrigo. This admission against interest binds Rodrigo and all those
tracing title to the Property through her, including Vere and petitioner. Indeed,
petitioners insistent claim that Rodriguez occupied the Property only in 1982, when
she started paying taxes, finds no basis in the records. In short, when Vere bought
the Property from Rodrigo in 1970, Rodriguez was in possession of the Property, a
fact that prevented Vere from being a buyer in good faith.
Lacking good faith possession, petitioners only other recourse to maintain his claim
of ownership by prescription is to show open, continuous and adverse possession of
the Property for 30 years.32 Undeniably, petitioner is unable to meet this
requirement.1avvphil
Ancillary Matters Petitioner Raises Irrelevant
Petitioner brings to the Courts attention facts which, according to him, support his
theory that Rodrigo never passed ownership over the Property to Rodriguez,
namely, that Rodriguez registered the Deed and paid taxes on the Property only in
1982 and Rodriguez obtained from Vere in 1981 a waiver of the latters "right of
ownership" over the Property. None of these facts detract from our conclusion that
under the text of the Deed and based on the contemporaneous acts of Rodrigo and
Rodriguez, the latter, already in possession of the Property since 1962 as Rodrigo
admitted, obtained naked title over it upon the Deeds execution in 1965. Neither
registration nor tax payment is required to perfect donations. On the relevance of
the waiver agreement, suffice it to say that Vere had nothing to waive to Rodriguez,
having obtained no title from Rodrigo. Irrespective of Rodriguezs motivation in
obtaining the waiver, that document, legally a scrap of paper, added nothing to the
title Rodriguez obtained from Rodrigo under the Deed.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 6 June 2005
and the Resolution dated 5 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.