Augustine on the Simplicity of God

Richard La Croix
The New Scholasticism 51, no. 4 (1977): 453-68

Almost all of the claims about the nature or essence of God that are made by
Augustine and other theists in the tradition of Judaeo-Christian monotheism have
been thought by one philosopher or another to be either puzzling or problematic at
the very least or paradoxical or downright self-contradictory at the very worst. For
example, the set of claims that God is omnibenevolent, that God is omniscient, that
God is omnipotent, and that evil exists, has been regarded by many philosophers as
problematic for the theist if not actually self-contradictory and the claim itself that
God is omnipotent has been regarded by many philosophers as paradoxical if not
actually self-contradictory. All of the claims about the nature or essence of God that
are shared by both Augustine and other traditional theists have at least two
features in common. First, all such claims are essential to the integrity of both
Augustines theology and the theology of orthodox theism. Second, each one of
these claims is intended to characterize God as absolutely different in some respect
from everything else. For example, the claim that God is the creator of everything,
that every item in the realm of reality is without exception either something that
belongs to the Divine nature or something that was made by the Divine nature, is
essential to Augustines theology as well as to the theology of orthodox theism and
that claim is intended to characterize God as absolutely distinguishable from every
other thing by virtue of the fact that He alone is an uncreated nature while every
other thing is without exception a created nature. As with almost every other claim
about the nature or essence of God, the claim that God is the uncreated creator of
everything has not been overlooked by the critics of traditional theism.
Perhaps one of the most puzzling claims about Gods nature or essence, and one
that has been for the most part ignored by the critics of orthodox theism, is the
claim that God is simple, that God is absolutely distinguishable from every other
thing by virtue of the fact that He alone is simple while every other nature is without
exception manifold. This claim is puzzling and the reason that the puzzle has been
almost entirely ignored by the critics of theism is that the claim is usually made by
the theist in a context which generates problems far more obvious than the ones
that are generated solely by the claim that God is simple. As it is in the works of
Augustine, the claim that God is simple is usually made by the theist in connection
with the claim that God is a trinity of persons. Given the mind-boggling problems
generated by the grosser claim that Gods nature is at once both simple and
tripartite, it is not at all surprising that a critic might overlook the more subtle
difficulties lurking behind the claim that God is simple in favor of sorting out the

entailments and problems involved in the claim that God is by nature a simple
trinity. Though the difficulties involved in the puzzle of Divine simplicity are more
subtle than the difficulties involved in the puzzle of the Divine trinity, the former
difficulties are no less problematic and no less important than the latter. What is
puzzling about the claim that God is simple is that it is not at all clear just what
there is about God that distinguishes Him from every other nature when He is said
to be simple and they are said to be manifold, and so it is not at all clear that there
is any explication or analysis of the distinction between what is simple and what is
manifold that would make it manifest that the distinction is indeed a coherent one.
It is not possible here to examine every available account of the doctrine of Divine
simplicity, but perhaps an examination of Augustines account will show us whether
or not he has contributed anything to the discussion of that doctrine that would
advance our understanding of the concept of Divine simplicity.
As far as I am able to determine, Chapter 10 of Book XI in The City of God is the
single most detailed account of the doctrine of Gods simplicity given by Augustine,
but in spite of the detail of the account Augustine provides there, that account is
none the less puzzling. For, in what would appear to be the most informative
statement of the concept of simplicity that occurs in this passage, Augustine tells us
that a nature is said to be simple on the grounds that it cannot lose any of the
properties it possesses; that is, there is no distinction to be made between what
that nature is and the properties that it has (my translation of propter hoe itaque
natura dicitur simplex, cui non sit aliquid habere quod vel posit amittere; vel aliud
sit habens, aliud quod habet). In order to lay out what is puzzling about this
statement of the concept of simplicity I shall construe the use of the word property
in this context in such a way that a thing, x, has the property of being P (the
property of being a P) if and only if the statement that x is P (that x is a P) is true. A
thing, x, will be said to have the property of being P at a given time t if and only if
the statement that x is P at t (that x is a P at t) is true. I shall also distinguish
between contingent properties and necessary properties. A property, P, will be said
to be a contingent property with respect to a thing, x, if and only if x can being to
possess P or cease to possess P. A property, P, will be said to be a necessary
property with respect to a thing, x, if and only if x possesses P and x cannot being to
possess P or cease to possess P, that is, if and only if x has P but P is not a
contingent property with respect to x. In other words, a property is contingent with
respect to something just in case it is possible that the thing have the property at
one time and fail to have it at another time, and a property is necessary with
respect to something just in case it is impossible that the thing have the property at
one time and fail to have it at another time. By this distinction the property of being
yellow is a contingent property of a yellow book because the property of being
yellow is a property that a book can begin to possess and cease to possess. On the
other hand, the property of being extended in space and time is a necessary
property of a yellow book because that property is one that a yellow book possesses
and it is one that a yellow book cannot being to possess or cease to possess.

With this understanding of the concepts of property, contingent property, and

necessary property it might reasonable be supposed that Augustines account of
what constitutes a simple nature is to be understood as the claim that a thing, x, is
simple if and only if x does not have any contingent properties, for Augustine claims
that a nature is simple by virtue of the fact that it cannot lose any of the properties
that it possesses. But on this understanding of Augustines account of the concept
of simplicity it seems quite plain that God is not simple because the statement that
God was rejected by Augustine in 371 is true while the statement that God was
rejected by Augustine in 387 is false. So God had a property at one time (the
property of being rejected by Augustine) that He did not have at another time and it
is quite apparent that God has an indefinitely large number of such properties. This
obvious fact alone makes Augustines account of the concept of simplicity puzzling
for he himself acknowledges that God has such properties. In Chapter 16 of Book V
in the De Trinitate Augustine says that there was a time at which God began to
possess the property of being the Lord of the people of Israel for if God had this
property from eternity then we would be compelled to admit that the people of
Israel have existed from eternity. So, under the present understanding of
Augustines account of simplicity God is not simple and God is not in fact
distinguishable from every other thing by virtue of the fact that He alone has no
contingent properties, for God also has contingent properties.
However, it might be that this understanding of Augustines account of simplicity is
incorrect. Perhaps when he says that a simple nature cannot lose any of the
properties it possesses, he does not mean that it has no contingent properties.
Instead he may mean that a simple nature is the kind of thing that need not have
any contingent properties, even though it might have some as a matter of fact,
while a manifold nature on the other hand is the kind of thing that must have
contingent properties. It may be that Augustine thinks that God is absolutely
distinguishable from every other thing by virtue of the fact that He alone need not
have any contingent properties while every other nature must without exception
have contingent properties. So it may be that Augustines account of what
constitutes a simple nature is to be understood as the claim that a thing, x, is
simple if and only if it is possible for x not to possess any contingent properties. On
this understanding of the doctrine of simplicity, God would be absolutely unique by
virtue of the fact that He is the only thing that could exist with all and only
necessary properties. All other things would without exception be distinct from God
by virtue of the fact that they can exist only if they have contingent properties.
But this second explanation of Augustines account of simplicity is no better than
the first one. A doctrine quite clearly essential to Augustines theology and to the
theology of orthodox theism is the doctrine that being omniscient is a property that
God has necessarily, that is, that omniscient is not a property that God can have at
one time and not have at another time. On Augustines view and one the view of all
traditional theists, God has the property of being omniscient and the property of

being omniscient is not a property that God can fail to possess. However, on this
second understanding of Augustines account of the concept of simplicity the
doctrine that God is simple turns out to be logically incompatible with the doctrine
that omniscience is a necessary property of God, and it is fairly easy to see why. The
statement that there are dinosaurs is obviously a contingent statement; that is,
although the statement is false it might very well have been true. On the same
grounds the statement that there are no dinosaurs is also a contingent statement,
although it is true it might very well have been false. So the property of knowing
that there are dinosaurs and the property of knowing that there are no dinosaurs
are both contingent properties with respect to every individual. This is so because
which one of these two properties an individual happens to have depends on which
one of two distinct contingent state of affairs happens to obtain, for it depends on
whether or not there happen to be any dinosaurs. If there are dinosaurs then one
can have the property of knowing that there are dinosaurs, but no one can have the
property of knowing that there are no dinosaurs; and if there are no dinosaurs then
one can have the property of knowing that there are no dinosaurs, but no one can
have the property of knowing that there are dinosaurs. So if there are dinosaurs and
God has the property of being omniscient then God has the contingent property of
knowing that there are dinosaurs, and if there are no dinosaurs and God has the
property of being omniscient then God has the contingent property of knowing that
there are no dinosaurs.
Now, since it is necessarily true that either there are dinosaurs or there are no
dinosaurs and since omniscience is a necessary property of God, it is necessary that
God has either the property of knowing that there are dinosaurs or the property of
knowing that there are no dinosaurs. And since both of these properties are
contingent properties with respect to God it follows that God necessarily has one or
the other of two contingent properties. In other words, it cannot at any time be true
of God that He has neither the one nor the other of these two contingent properties
and so it is a necessary property of God that He have at least one contingent
property, if the property of being omniscient is one of His necessary properties. On
this understanding of Augustines account of the concept of simplicity, God cannot
have both the property of being simple and the property of being necessarily
omniscient as well, as so the second understanding of Augustines account of
simplicity fares no better than the first one. If God has the property of being
necessarily omniscient, then God is not simple and God is not distinguishable from
every other thing by virtue of the fact that He alone need not have any contingent
properties while every other nature must without exception have contingent
properties, for God like everything else must also have contingent properties. 1

The statement that God might not have had any contingent properties itself seems a bit
paradoxical for it suggests that it is only contingent that God has any contingent properties
and hence, that God would have at least one contingent property even if He had no
contingent properties.

So far there does not seem to be any explication of Augustines account of the
concept of simplicity which would make it possible to describe a difference that
actually exists between God and every other thing. Yet Augustine seems to think
there is a real difference between God and every other thing and that his account of
the concept of simplicity makes it possible to describe the difference which actually
exists between them by saying God cannot lose any of the properties that He
possesses while every other thing can lose some of the properties that it possesses.
If Augustine is correct in his account of the concept of simplicity and if that account
makes it possible for us to describe a difference which really exists between God
and every other thing, then his account of the concept of simplicity and the
distinction it makes possible cannot be explicated solely in terms of whether or not
God and every other thing have contingent properties because the discussion up to
this point has shown that God like every other thing has contingent properties and
that God like every other thing must have contingent properties. If Augustine is
correct and if his account of simplicity and the distinction made possible by it can
be explicated by reference to contingent properties even though they cannot be
explicated solely in terms of whether or not God and every other thing has
contingent properties, then the difference between God and every other thing must
be a difference between the kind of properties that are contingent for God and the
kind of properties that are contingent for every other thing.
Augustine seems to be suggesting something very much like this in Chapter 16 of
Book V in the De Trinitate. There he says that although the property of being the
Lord of the people of Israel is a contingent property with respect to God its being
contingent does not pose any problems for the doctrine that God is unchangeable.
No problems arise for that doctrine because the property of being the Lord of the
people of Israel is, as he puts it, relative and when God begins to have that property
nothing happens to His nature by which He may be changed. 2 Augustine explains
this claim by saying that the property of being a friend to someone is also a
contingent property that is relative, but when a person begins to have this property
something happens to his will by which a change occurs in his nature. What
happens is that the person also begins to have the property of being a loving
person. So when a person begins to have the relative contingent property of being a
friend to someone he also begins to have a second and distinct contingent property
that is not relative, namely, the property of being a loving person. On the other
hand, when that which we call money begins to have or ceases to have the
relative contingent property of being a price for something, it does not undergo any
change because it does not thereby begin to have or cease to have some further
contingent property. Likewise, when God begins to have the relative contingent
property of being the Lord of the people of Israel there is no change in His nature
because He does not begin to possess or cease to possess some additional
contingent property. So that which we call money remains the same when it begins
2

Augustine, The Trinity, trans. By Stephen McKenna, The Fathers of the Church (Washington,
D.C., 1963), p. 196

to have or ceases to have the relative contingent property of being a price for
something, and God remains exactly the same when He begins to have or ceases to
have the relative contingent property of being the Lord of the people of Israel, but a
person does not remain the same when he begins to have or ceases to have the
relative contingent property of being a friend to someone, because he also begins
to have or ceases to have the nonrelative contingent property of being a loving
person as a result.
If my understanding of Augustine is correct he is making the two crucial distinctions
in this passage and in other passages in Book V of the De Trinitate as well. First, he
is making a distinction between relative property and nonrelative properties.
Second, he is making a distinction between beginning to have or ceasing to have
relative properties and beginning to have or ceasing to have nonrelative properties;
that is, he is making a distinction between relative contingent properties and
nonrelative contingent properties. By employing these distinctions he also
explicates what he means by saying that a change occurs in something. On
Augustines view change in a subject does not consist of its beginning to have or
ceasing to havea relative property; instead change in a subject consists in its
beginning to have or ceasing to have a nonrelative property. So for Augustine a
nature changes if and only if it begins to have or ceases to have some nonrelative
property. On the basis of this explication of change a thing can be said to be subject
to change or capable of change if it can begin to possess or cease to possess a
property that is nonrelative; that is, a thing is subject to change if it has nonrelative
properties that are also contingent. Augustines main point in this passage appears
to be that God is not subject to or capable of change and the fact that He has the
property of being the Lord of the people of Israel at one time and not at another
time does not falsify the claim that He is absolutely unchangeable. That fact does
not falsify that claim because the contingent property of being the Lord of the
people of Israel is a relative property and the fact that God has it at one time and
not at another time does not entail that He has any nonrelative properties that He
can have at one time and not at another time; that is, it does not entail that God
has any nonrelative properties that are also contingent. On the other hand, a finite
person is subject to change, and the fact that such a person can have the property
of being a friend to someone at one time, and not at another time, does falsify the
claim that the person is unchangeable. That fact falsifies that claim because while
the contingent property of being a friend to someone is also a relative property the
fact that the person can have it at one time and not at another time does not entail
that he has a nonrelative property that he can have at one time and not at another
time; that is, it entails that he has a nonrelative property that is also contingent. So
Augustines view appears to be that God is unchangeable by virtue of the fact that
He does not have any nonrelative properties that are contingent and that every
other thing is changeable by virtue of the fact that it has nonrelative properties that
are contingent.

Perhaps we are now making some progress in our attempt to achieve a clear
understanding of Augustines account of the concept of simplicity. For in The City of
God, in the same chapter (XI, 10) that contains the account of the concept of
simplicity which we are now considering, Augustine also says that God is simple and
therefore unchangeable and that every other thing is not simple and therefore not
unchangeable. This claim makes it apparent that Augustine holds the view that a
thing is simple if and only if it is unchangeable. So, since a thing is unchangeable on
his view if and only if it cannot begin to have or cease to have any of its nonrelative
properties, it might very well be that when Augustine says that a simple nature
cannot lose any of the properties that it possesses he means that a simple nature
cannot lose any of the properties that it possesses he means that a simple nature
cannot lose any of its nonrelative properties. Given his view that a thing is simple if
and only if it is unchangeable, it might reasonably be supposed that Augustines
account of the concept of simplicity is to be understood as the claim that a thing, x,
is simple if and only if x does not have any nonrelative properties that are
contingent (or if and only if all of the contingent properties possessed by x are
relative). On this understanding of Augustines account of the concept of simplicity
God would presumably be absolutely distinguishable from every other thing by
virtue of the fact that He alone does not have any nonrelative properties that are
contingent while every other thing does without exception have nonrelative
properties that are contingent.
But this third understanding of Augustines account of the concept of simplicity does
not appear to be a great deal clearer than the first two. For while it may be possible
to get a vague intuitive idea of what Augustine has in mind when he talks about the
difference between relative properties and nonrelative properties, he does not
provide any explicit formulation of that distinction which would make it possible to
decide for any given property whatsoever whether it is a relative property or a
nonrelative property, and so it is not unexceptionally clear just exactly what the
difference is that is supposed to obtain between relative properties and nonrelative
properties. Nevertheless, even though Augustine does not provide any explicit
statement of the difference he believes to obtain between relative properties and
nonrelative properties, it may be possible to construct a coherent and acceptable
formulation of that distinction from what he does say about it.
In Chapter 8 of Book V in the De Trinitate Augustine says we should hold fast above
all to the principle that whatever in that divine and exalted sublimity is said in
reference to Himself is said according to the substance, but what is said in reference
to something does not refer to a substance but to a relationship. 3 Here it seems
that Augustine is talking about nonrelative predication on the one hand and relative
predication on the other. What he appears to be saying is that whenever we talk
about God either we are saying something about the way He stands in relation to
Himself or we are saying something about the way He stands in relation to
3

Ibid, page 185.

something other than Himself. Perhaps what Augustine wants us to notice here is
that in a statement of nonrelative predication about God the statement does not
refer to any being other than God while in a statement of relative predication about
God the statement refers not only to God but also to another being distinct from
God. If this is what Augustine has in mind then he may want to suggest the more
general claim that a property is relative with respect to a subject just in case the
predication statement (i.e., the statement that the subject has the property) refers
to a being not identical to the subject. On this account the property of being the
Lord of the people of Israel would be a relative property with respect to God
because the statement that God has the property of being the Lord of the people of
Israel does refer to beings not identical to God and the property of being omniscient
would be a nonrelative property with respect to God because the statement that
God has the property of being omniscient does not refer to a being not identical to
God. So far this present suggestion looks quite promising for from an intuitive point
of view we would expect these two properties to turn out to be relative and
nonrelative respectively. If this is indeed what Augustine wants to suggest in this
passage from Chapter 8 then it would seem that his distinction between relative
properties and nonrelative properties can be formulated by saying that for any
property, P, and for anything, x,
(1) P is relative with respect to x if and only if x has P is a statement that
refers to a being not identical to x,
adding, of course, that a property is nonrelative with respect to a subject just in
case the subject has the property but the property is not relative with respect to the
subject.
However, (1) will not do as an acceptable formulation of the distinction between
relative properties and nonrelative properties. Consider the property of being
omniscient and the entity worshipped by Augustine. By (1) the property of being
omniscient is a relative property with respect to the entity worshipped by Augustine
because the statement the entity worshipped by Augustine has the property of
being omniscient does refer to a being not identical to the entity worshipped by
Augustine. That statement refers to Augustine, who is quite clearly not identical to
the entity worshipped by Augustine. All the available evidence indicates that the
entity worshipped by Augustine is God so by (1) the property of being omniscient is
a relative property with respect to God because it is a relative property with respect
to the entity worshipped by Augustine. But it has already been shown that by (1)
the property of being omniscient is a nonrelative property with respect to God and
so it turns out that (1) entails that the property of being omniscient is both a
relative property and a nonrelative property with respect to God; that is, it turns out
that (1) entails a contradiction. Because any statement is incoherent if it entails a
contradiction, (1) is not an acceptable formulation of the distinction between
relative properties and nonrelative properties and so it must be rejected.

Perhaps, though, it is possible to construct a formulation of Augustines distinction

which is not subject to the difficult that was found for (1). The problem with (1)
arose because it is possible to denote the subject of a statement by using a
definition description that refers to a being not identical to the subject of the
statement. But it is not the subject of a statement that ascribes the possession of a
property to the subject of the statement; rather it is the predicate of a statement
that ascribes the possession of a property to the subject of the statement. So
perhaps Augustine would suggest that it is the predicate of a statement that
determines whether or not a property is relative. He might want to suggest that if
the predicate of a statement refers to a being not identical to the subject of the
statement then the property ascribed in that predicate is a relative property,
whereas if the predicate of a statement does not refer to a being not identical to the
subject of the statement then the property ascribed in that predicate is a
nonrelative property. If this or something like it is what Augustine had in mind then
it is possible to replace (1) with
(2) P is relative with respect to x if and only if x has P is a statement
containing a predicate that refers to a being not identical to x.
Given (2), the property of being omniscient is now a nonrelative property for both
God and the entity worshipped by Augustine, for the predicate has the property of
being omniscient is a predicate that does not refer to a being not identical to God
nor does it refer to a being not identical to the entity worshipped by Augustine. So
(2) appears to escape the problem that prevents the adoption of (1).
Even so, (2) is not acceptable either, because it is subject to a different but similar
difficulty. Consider the property I am thinking of and suppose that I am thinking of
the property of being omniscient. Quite clearly it is true that God has the property I
am thinking of if and only if it is true that He has the property of being omniscient.
So if God does have the property of being omniscient as Augustine would have us
believe, then God has the property I am thinking of. But since the predicate has the
property I am thinking of is a predicate that does not refer to a being not identical
to God, it follows from (2) that the property I am thinking of is a relative property
with respect to God; and since the property I am thinking of is the property of being
omniscient, then the property of being omniscient is a relative property with respect
to God. However, it has already been shown that by (2) the property of being
omniscient is a nonrelative property with respect to God and so it turns out that (2)
entails that the property of being omniscient is both a relative property and a
nonrelative property with respect to God; that is, it turns out that (2) entails a
contradiction. The result is that (2) is also incoherent and must be rejected as an
acceptable formulation of the distinction between relative properties and
nonrelative properties.
The problem with (2) is quite clearly an analogue of the problem with (1). The
difficulty which arose for (1) was that it is possible to denote the subject of a

statement intended to be a statement of nonrelative predication by using a definite

description which refers to a being not identical to the subject of that statement.
The difficulty which arises for (2) is that it is possible to denote the predicate of a
statement intended to be a statement of nonrelative predication by using a definite
description which refers to a being not identical to the subject of that statement.
But while the problem with (2) is an analogue of the problem with (1), it is quite
plain that there is no way of escaping the problem with (2) that is an analogue of
the way of escaping the problem with (1). No way of this kind is open for escaping
the problem with (2) because the basic principle with which Augustine seems to be
operating here is the principle that a property is relative just in case a term
denoting the property occurs in a statement of predication and the statement in
some way refers to a being not identical to the subject of that statement. But
reference of this kind could be made in a statement of predication only by either the
subject of the statement or the predicate of the statement. So having formulated (2)
by eliminating the subject term of a statement of relative predication as the
allowable referring term in that statement, it is not now possible to place the same
restrictions on the predicate term of that statement as well, and thus the problem
that arises for (2) cannot be overcome by eliminating the predicate term as the
allowable referring term in a statement of relative predication. Even if (2) were to be
reformulated by eliminating the concept referring to or asserting something
about, it would still not be possible to produce a statement of the distinction
between relative properties and nonrelative properties that overcomes the problem
with (2). For, the statement that God has the property of being the Lord of the
people of Israel and the statement that God has the property I am thinking of, both
entail the existence of a being not identical to the subject of the statement; and if
the first statement can properly be said to assert something about a being not
identical to the subject of the statement (namely, that the people of Israel have the
property of being the subjects of God), then the second statement can properly be
said to assert something about a being not identical to the subject of the statement
(namely, that I have the property of thinking about a property of God). In short,
because there is no difference of a logical kind between the property I am thinking
of and the property of being the Lord of the people of Israel, it is not possible to
produce a formulation of the distinction between relative properties and nonrelative
properties that will escape the problem with (2) and so any formulation of that
distinction will be incoherent, as in (2).
The result is that Augustines distinction between relative properties and nonrelative
properties is incoherent. Consequently, his account of the concept of
unchangeableness is also incoherent, and if the third understanding of his account
of the concept of simplicity is correct then his account of the concept of simplicity is
incoherent as well. These accounts are incoherent because Augustines claim that a
nature is unchangeable and the third understanding of his claim that a nature is
simple are both defined in terms of the distinction between relative properties and
nonrelative properties. On the other hand, if the third understanding of Augustines

account of the concept of simplicity is not correct then there remains the puzzle of
wondering just exactly what he did mean by the claim that a simple nature cannot
lose any of the properties that it possesses, for he does not appear to have supplied
any further hints for understanding that claim. In any case, either Augustines
account of the concept of simplicity is incoherent like his account of the concept of
unchangeableness, or else Augustine has presented a puzzle without providing any
hints for finding a solution to the puzzle. 4

For a discussion related to some of the issues considered in this paper see Alvin Plantinga,
God and Other Minds (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 173-80; James
Tomberlin, Plantingas Puzzles About God and Other Minds, The Philosophical Forum 1, no.
3 (Spring 1969, New Series): 365:91 and Omniscience and Necessity: Putting HumptyDumpty Together Again, The Philosophical Forum 2, no. 1 (Fall 1970, New Series): 149-51;
and Richard La Croix, God Might Not Love Us, International Journal for Philosophy of
Religion 5, no. 3 (Fall 1974): 157-61.