SECOND DIVISION

HEIRS OF JUAN PANGANIBAN

G.R. No. 151235
& INES PANGANIBAN, namely:
ERLINDA B. PACURSA, ERNESTO
P. BACONGA, EVELYN BACONGA,
Present:
AMY B. BIHAG, SIEGFREDO
BACONGA, IMELDA B. PACALDO,
REBECCA B. LI, OFELIA B.
PUNO, J.,
OALIVAR, GEMMA BACONGA,
Chairman,
MARIE INES BACONGA, MELANIE
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
BACONGA, and ANITA FUENTES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
Petitioners,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
- versus Promulgated:

ANGELINA N. DAYRIT,
Respondent.

July 28, 2005

x----------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the partial
reversal of the Decision[1] and the Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) Second
Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 57148.

This case stemmed from a petition for cancellation of owners

duplicate copy of Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 7864 of the
Registry of Deeds of Misamis Oriental and recovery of damages filed
by the heirs of Juan and Ines Panganiban, more particularly
Erlinda B. Pacursa, Ernesto P. Baconga, Asito P. Baconga and Anita
B. Fuentes, against Angelina N. Dayrit, respondent herein, on 3
April 1992.[3] The petition was later amended to add the heirs of
Asito P. Baconga as petitioners upon the latters death and to
include a prayer for quieting of title over the property in dispute. [4]
The undisputed operative facts follow.
The property subject of controversy is a two thousand twentyfive (2,025)-square meter portion of a lot denominated as Lot
1436,situated at Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City. It constitutes
three-fourths (3/4) of Lot 1436, one of the three (3) lots covered by
OCT No. 7864, the other two being Lots 1441 and 1485. OCT No.
7864 was registered in the names of Juan Panganiban (Juan) and
Ines Panganiban (Ines), father and daughter respectively, on 17
April 1940.[5] Juan died sometime in June 1942[6] while Ines, his
only child, died in April 1944.[7]
In the amended complaint filed with the trial court, petitioners
alleged that they are the possessors and owners of Lot 1436 which
they inherited from the late Juan and Ines. They acknowledge that
Lot 1436 was the only remaining lot covered by OCT No. 7864, Lots
1485 and 1441 having been sold in 1949 to Galo Sabanal and Pablo
Dagbay respectively, by virtue of a deed denominated
as Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate Among Heirs and Sale.[8]
The owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 covering Lot 1436
had been lost but upon petition with the trial court in 1977 by
Erlinda B. Pacursa (Erlinda), one of the heirs of Ines and a

petitioner herein, the trial court granted the petition. [9] Accordingly,
the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an owners
duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to Erlinda. [10]
Petitioners further alleged that unknown to them, a certain
Cristobal Salcedo (Salcedo) asserted ownership over Lot 1436 and
believing that it was unregistered, sold a portion of it to respondent.
The latter subsequently discovered that what she had bought was
registered land. Unable to annotate the deed of sale at the back of
OCT No. 7864, respondent fraudulently filed a petition for issuance
of the owners copy of said title, docketed as Misc. Case No. 90-018
in March 1990. This petition of the respondent alleged that the copy
issued to Erlinda was lost in the fire that razed Lapasan, Cagayan
de Oro City in 1981. While the petition mentioned Erlinda as the
last one in possession of the alleged lost owners duplicate copy of
the title, she was not notified of the proceedings. [11]
The petition in Misc. Case No. 90-018 was subsequently
granted and the Register of Deeds of Misamis Oriental issued an
owners duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to respondent. [12] This
second duplicate certificate issued to respondent contained Entry
No. 160180, the annotation of a Notice of Adverse Claim filed by
Erlinda.[13] The Notice of Adverse Claim[14] dated 24 February 1992
alleged in part that Erlinda is one of the lawful heirs of Juan and
Ines, the registered owners of the property, and as such, she has a
legitimate claim thereto.

Petitioners further alleged that the newly issued owners

duplicate certificate of OCT No. 7864 to respondent was prejudicial
to their previously issued title which is still in existence. Thus, they

prayed among others that they be declared as the rightful owners of

the property in question and that the duplicate certificate of OCT
No. 7864 in their possession be deemed valid and subsisting. [15]
In her answer to the amended complaint, respondent denied
all the material allegations of the complaint and set up affirmative
and special defenses. She alleged that Lot 1436 was actually sold
sometime in 1947 by the petitioners themselves and their father,
Mauricio Baconga. The sale was purportedly covered by a Deed of
Definite Sale. Salcedo then came into ownership, possession and
enjoyment of the property in question.[16] On 14 February 1978,
Salcedo sold a portion of Lot 1436 with an area of two thousand
twenty- five (2,025) square meters, more or less, to respondent.
From then on, the property in question has been in her actual and
physical enjoyment, she added.[17]
Respondent further alleged that the complaint was barred by
the principles of estoppel and laches by virtue of the sales executed
by petitioners themselves and their father. The complaint, according
to her, also failed to include as defendants, the heirs of Salcedo who
are indispensable parties.[18]
On 10 August 1992, upon motion duly granted, respondent
filed a third-party complaint against the heirs of Salcedo alleging
that as such heirs, they carry the burden of warranting that their
predecessors in interest were the true, legal and rightful owners of
the property in question at the time of the sale. Hence, she prayed
therein that she be maintained in peaceful and legal ownership,
possession and enjoyment of the questioned property. [19]
Answering the third-party complaint, the heirs of Salcedo
effectively admitted the existence of the 1978 deed of sale in favor of
respondent by their parents and considered the sale as within the

personal and legal right of their parents and an act outside their
control.[20]
After due trial and consideration of the documentary and
testimonial evidence adduced by both parties, the trial court
rendered a decision against petitioners and in favor of respondent.
The dispositive portion of the decision provides:

WHEREFORE,
rendered:

premises

considered

judgment

is

hereby

1. DISMISSING plaintiffs complaint, for lack of merit and

cause of action;
2. DECLARING defendant as the true and real owner of the
lot in question;
3. DECLARING the owners duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7864 (plaintiffs Exh. A) null and void
same being obtained by plaintiffs when they were not owners
anymore of Lot 1436;
4. DECLARING the owners duplicate copy of Original
Certificate of Title No. 7864 obtained by defendant (Exh. 1) as
the one valid to be given like faith and credit as the one that was
lost and declared null and void; and
5. ORDERING the Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City
to issue a transfer certificate of title to Angela N. Dayrit, herein
defendant, for her 2,025 square meter portion of Lot 1436; to
Anita Baconga Fuentes for her 505 square meter portion of Lot
1436 and to Atty. Isabelo N. Pacursa or his heirs, he being
allegedly dead already, for his 170 square meter portion of Lot
1436 and after they shall have presented an approved subdivision
plan and an agreement to partition, to issue to each of them, their
respective transfer certificate of title with an area according to the
respective technical description corresponding to each of their
land.

Defendants counterclaim and third-party complaint are

hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[21]

The Regional Trial Court Decision was modified by the CA on

appeal by petitioners. The appellate court held that contrary to the
ruling of the trial court, the valid and subsisting duplicate
certificate of OCT No. 7864 was the one issued to Erlinda, not to
respondent, considering that respondent had failed to comply with
the mandatory jurisdictional requirements of law for the
reconstitution of title under Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 26. [22]
The CA invoked the doctrine that a trial court does not acquire
jurisdiction over a petition for the issuance of a new owners
duplicate certificate of title if the original is in fact not lost.
Citing Strait Times, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, [23] the CA held that the
reconstituted certificate is itself void once the existence of the
original is unquestionably demonstrated.[24]
Nonetheless, the CA affirmed in all other respects the ruling of
the trial court, including the critical holding that respondent was
the owner of the subject property. The decretal portion of the CAs
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to
applicable law and jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on
hand, judgment is hereby rendered granting partly the instant
appeal. Consequently, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED
so as to order the cancellation of the owners duplicate copy of
OCT No. 7864 issued to defendant Angelina Dayrit and
declaring the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864 (Exh.
A and sub-markings with SN No. 014439) to be still valid for

all intents and purposes and to be given like faith and credit
as the original. All other aspects areAFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[25] (Emphasis in the original.)

Petitioners now come before this Court seeking the partial

reversal of the decision rendered by the CA. They contend that the
CA erred in finding that the tax declarations and the alleged
adverse possession of respondent and her predecessor-in-interest
are conclusive proofs of their ownership of Lot 1436. They further
contend that the CA erred when it found them guilty of laches. [26]
However, it is apparent that in order that the petition may be
properly resolved, we must ascertain first, who between petitioners
and respondent is the rightful owner of the property in dispute and
second, whether petitioners right to recover the property is barred
by laches assuming they are the rightful owners thereof as they
claim.
The resolution of the foregoing issues hinges on the question
of which owners duplicate certificate of title is valid and subsisting,
the one in petitioners possession or the one issued to respondent.
What appears on the face of the title is controlling in questions of
ownership since the certificate of title is an absolute and
indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the
person whose name appears therein. [27]

The CA correctly ruled that the duplicate certificate of title in

petitioners possession is valid and subsisting. This Court had
already ruled in Serra Serra v. Court of Appeals[28] that if a certificate
of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of another

person, the reconstituted title is void and the court rendering the
decision has not acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance
of a new title.[29]Since the owners duplicate copy of OCT No. 7864
earlier issued to Erlinda is still in existence, the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction over respondents petition for reconstitution of
title. The duplicate certificate of title subsequently issued to
respondent is therefore void and of no effect.
The registered owners of OCT No. 7864 on the face of the valid
and subsisting duplicate certificate of title are still Juan and Ines,
petitioners predecessors in interest.[30] Per Section 46 of the Land
Registration Act, no title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. This rule taken in conjunction with the indefeasibility
of a Torrens title leads to the conclusion that the rightful owners of
the property in dispute are petitioners. They are indisputably the
heirs of the registered owners, both of whom are already dead.
These premises considered, it was error on the part of the trial
court to rule that respondent was the owner of the subject property
and for the CA to have affirmed such holding. We rule instead that
the successors-in-interest of Juan and Ines are the legal owners of
the subject property, namely petitioners herein.
Petitioners ownership of the property having been established,
the question now is whether they are entitled to its possession. On
this point, the Court rules in the negative. Petitioners are no longer
entitled to recover possession of the property by virtue of the
equitable defense of laches. Thus, petitioners argument that laches
is not applicable to them has no merit. By laches is meant:
the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence

could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or

omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. The defense of laches is
an equitable one and does not concern itself with the character
of the defendants title but only with whether or not by reason
of plaintiffs long inaction or inexcusable neglect, he should be
barred from asserting his claim at all, because to allow him to
do so would be inequitable and unjust to defendant.[31]

In our jurisdiction, it is an enshrined rule that even a

registered owner of property may be barred from recovering
possession of property by virtue of laches. [32] Thus, in the case
of Lola v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court held that petitioners
acquired title to the land owned by respondent by virtue of the
equitable principles of laches due to respondents failure to assert
her claims and ownership for thirty-two (32) years. In Miguel v.
Catalino,[34] this Court said that appellants passivity and inaction
for more than thirty-four (34) years (1928-1962) justifies the
defendant-appellee in setting up the equitable defense of laches in
his behalf. Likewise, in the case of Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia,
[35]
we stated that while the defendant may not be considered as
having acquired title by virtue of his and his predecessors long
continued possession for thirty-seven (37) years, the original
owners right to recover possession of the property and the title
thereto from the defendant has, by the latters long period of
possession and by patentees inaction and neglect, been converted
into a stale demand.[36]

In this case, both the lower court and the appellate court
found that contrary to respondents claim of possession, it was
Salcedo, respondents predecessor-in-interest who had been in
actual possession of the property. In fact, when the lower court
conducted an ocular inspection on the subject premises sometime
on 16 March 1993, the court-appointed Commissioner elicited from
the people residing near the subject property, more particularly
Celso Velez, Nieto Abecia and Paquito Nabe, that Salcedo was the
owner and the one in possession of the land until 1978 when
respondent became the possessor thereof. [37]
It was only in 1992 or forty-five (45) years from the time
Salcedo took possession of the property that petitioners made an
attempt to claim it as their own. Petitioners declared the property
for tax purposes, registered their adverse claim to respondents title,
and filed the instant case all in 1992. [38] These actuations of
petitioners point to the fact that for forty-five (45) years, they did
nothing to assert their right of ownership and possession over the
subject property.
Given the circumstances in the case at bar, the application of
the equitable defense of laches is more than justified.

Petitioners claim that prescription and adverse possession can

never militate against the right of a registered owner since a title,
once registered cannot be defeated even by adverse, open and
notorious possession.[39]
They are right in that regard. But their cause is defeated not
by prescription and adverse possession, but by laches.

This Court had occasion to distinguish laches from

prescription in the case of Heirs of Batiog Lacamen v. Heirs of
Laruan.[40] It was held therein that:
Laches has been defined as such neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as
will operate as a bar in equity. It is a delay in the assertion of a
right which works disadvantage to another because of the
inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations
of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which,
for the peace of society, ordains that relief will be denied to a
stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. It is
different from and applies independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is
concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of
time; laches is principally a question of inequity of permitting a
claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on some
change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches applies
in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is
based on a fixed time, laches is not.[41] (Footnotes are omitted.)

Thus, it is the effect of delay in asserting their right of

ownership over the property which militates against petitioners, not
merely the fact that they asserted their right to the property too late
in the day.
All the four (4) elements of laches prescribed by this Court in
the case of Go Chi Gun, et al. v. Co Cho, et al. [42] and reiterated in the
cases
of Mejia
de
Lucas
v.
Gamponia,[43] Miguel
v.
[44]
[45]
Catalino and Claverias v. Quingco are present in the case at bar,
to wit:

(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he

claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his
suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred.[46]

Petitioners inaction for forty-five (45) years reduced their right

to recover the subject property into a stale demand.
In Mejia,[47] the Court held in essence that the principle of
laches is one of estoppel because it prevents people who have slept
on their rights from prejudicing the rights of third parties who have
placed reliance on the inaction of the original patentee and his
successors in interest.[48] The following pronouncement in the case
of Claverias v. Quingco[49] is therefore apropos to the case at bar:
Courts cannot look with favor at parties who, by their
silence, delay and inaction, knowingly induce another to spend
time, effort and expense in cultivating the land, paying taxes and
making improvements thereon for 30 long years, only to spring
from ambush and claim title when the possessors efforts and the
rise of the land values offer an opportunity to make easy profit at
his expense.[50]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The challenged

decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it ruled

that the claim of petitioners is barred by laches. No pronouncement

as to costs.
SO ORDERED.