MBF Group Asgnment
MBF Group Asgnment
MBF Group Asgnment
Group members:
Gohar Ali Meer
13130020
Hamza Shamshad
13130021
Esha Humayon
11108229
Group Assignment:
01
Submitted to:
Prof. Qasim Nasim Mir
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subprime mortgages carried low interest rates in the early years that ballooned to double-digit
rates in later years. Some included prepayment penalties that made it prohibitively expensive to
refinance. These features were easy to miss for first-time home buyers, many of them
unsophisticated in such matters, who were beguiled by the prospect that, no matter what their
income or their ability to make a down payment, they could own a home.
Mortgage lenders did not merely hold the loans, content to receive a monthly
check from the mortgage holder. Frequently they sold these loans to a bank or to Fannie Mae or
Freddie Mac, two government-chartered institutions created to buy up mortgages and provide
mortgage lenders with more money to lend. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac might then sell the
mortgages to investment banks that would bundle them with hundreds or thousands of others into
a mortgage-backed security that would provide an income stream comprising the sum of all of
the monthly mortgage payments. Then the security would be sliced into perhaps 1,000 smaller
pieces that would be sold to investors, often misidentified as low-risk investments.
As long as housing prices kept rising, everyone profited. Mortgage holders with
inadequate sources of regular income could borrow against their rising home equity. The
agencies that rank securities according to their safety (which are paid by the issuers of those
securities, not by the buyers) generally rated mortgage-backed securities relatively safethey
were not. When the housing bubble burst, more and more mortgage holders defaulted on their
loans. At the end of September, about 3% of home loans were in the foreclosure process, an
increase of 76% in just a year. Another 7% of homeowners with a mortgage were at least one
month past due on their payments, up from 5.6% a year earlier. By 2008 the mild slump in
housing prices that had begun in 2006 had become a free fall in some places. Many other
Congressmen also have demanded an audit of the FED and this has been partially done. It was
discovered that over a trillion dollars was given to banks, many of them foreign, in the aftermath
of the Financial Crisis of 2008.
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homeowners to make their mortgage payments, poor judgment by the borrower and/or the lender,
speculation and overbuilding during the boom period, risky mortgage products, high personal
and corporate debt levels, complex financial innovations that distributed and perhaps concealed
default risks, central bank policies, and government regulation (or alternatively lack thereof). In
its 15 November 2008 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World
Economy, leaders of the Group of 20 cited the following causes:
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged
stability earlier this decade, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. At the same time, weak
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex and opaque
financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to create vulnerabilities in the
system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in some advanced countries, did not
adequately appreciate and address the risks building up in financial markets, keep pace with
financial innovation, or take into account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory
actions.
Financial institutions from around the world have recognized subprime-related losses and
write-downs exceeding U.S. $501 billion as of August 2008. Profits at the 8,533 U.S. banks
insured by the FDIC declined from $35.2 billion to $646 million (89%) during the fourth
quarter of 2007 versus the prior year, due to soaring loan defaults and provisions for loan
losses. It was the worst bank and thrift quarterly performance since 1990. For all of 2007,
these banks earned approximately $100 billion, down 31% from a record profit of $145
billion in 2006. Profits declined from $35.6 billion to $19.3 billion during the first quarter of
2008 versus the prior year, a decline of 46%.
The financial sector began to feel the consequences of this crisis in February 2007
with the $10.5 billion write-down of HSBC, which was the first major CDO or MBO related
loss to be reported. During 2007, at least 100 mortgage companies either shut down,
suspended operations or were sold. Top management has not escaped unscathed, as the CEOs
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of Merrill Lynch and Citigroup were forced to resign within a week of each other. [124] various
institutions followed up with merger deals.
The subprime crisis had a series of other economic effects. Housing price declines left
consumers with less wealth, which placed downward pressure on consumption. Certain
minority groups received a higher proportion of subprime loans and experienced a
disproportional level of foreclosures. Home related crimes including arson increased. Job losses
in the financial sector were significant, with over 65,400 jobs lost in the United States as of
September 2008.
Many renters became innocent victims, often evicted from their homes without
notice due to foreclosure of their landlords property. In October 2008, Tom Dart, the elected
Sheriff of Cook County, Illinois, criticized mortgage companies for their actions, and
announced that he was suspending all foreclosure evictions.
The sudden lack of credit also caused a slump in car sales. Ford sales in October 2008 were
down 33.8% from a year ago, General Motors sales were down 15.6%, and Toyota sales had
declined 32.3%. One in five car dealerships are expected to close in fall of 2008.
Countries in Asia are increasingly worried about what is happening in the West. A
number of nations urged the US to provide meaningful assurances and bailout packages for
the US economy, as that would have a knock-on effect of reassuring foreign investors and
helping ease concerns in other parts of the world. Many believe Asia was sufficiently decoupled from the Western financial systems, but this crisis has shown that this is not the case,
at least not yet. Many Asian countries have seen their stock markets suffer and currency
values going on a downward trend.
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As many nations in the region are seeing rapid growth and wealth creation, there is
enormous investment in Western countries, and therefore, a lot of exposure to problems, too.
In addition, there is increased foreign investment, mostly from the West in Asia. Asian
products and services are also global, and a slowdown in wealthy countries means increased
chances of a slowdown in Asia and the risk of job losses. Asia has not had a subprime
mortgage crisis like many nations in the West, but the increasingly inter-connected world
means there are always knock-on effects.
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back most of its money. The taxpayers in these other poor countries picked up the tab for the
financial markets mistakes. This time, it is American taxpayers who are being asked to pick
up the tab. And thats the difference. For all the rhetoric about democracy and good
governance, the citizens in those countries didnt really get a chance to vote on the bail-outs
In environmental economics, there is a basic concept called the polluter pays
principle. It is a matter of fairness, but also of efficiency. Wall Street has polluted our
economy with toxic mortgages. It should now pay for the cleanup.
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corporate holding companies, and simply let the holding companies and all other failed
institutions go bankrupt and default on their credit default swaps. The nationalized banks could
then go back to making loans as they did in the old days, having real human beings make creditgranting decisions. In addition, nationalized banks could choose to take controlling equity
positions in borrowing companies in default on their loans and effectively nationalize them in
order to enable them to continue to operate (and maintain some production and employment) if
they have some chance of recovery. The cost of this policy to taxpayers might be rather small,
especially since most of the losses on the defaulting credit default swaps would then either be
offsetting or be incurred by investors like hedge funds. In addition, given that the current massive
rescue operations dont seem to be successful in averting an economic downturn, it is unclear the
need to rescue many of the failed financial institutions.
Mortgage crisis:
The real estate and mortgage crisis itself could possibly be resolved by allowing
defaulting mortgagors to refinance with shared appreciation mortgages (SAMs) that would lower
their payments in return for the lending institution receiving a share in the future appreciation on
the home. The SAMs could possibly be standardized to both reduce legal costs and also
potentially create a secondary market for them in the form of SAM pools in which investors
seeking diversification into residential real estate might be interested. By replacing foreclosure
solutions with SAMs, fewer homes would be put on the market for sale, thereby reducing the
downward pressure on real estate prices.
Enhance profitability:
Another policy that might enhance profitability and help reverse the ongoing
economic decline would be to have cases of defaults on secured consumer loans (such as for
autos or homes) result in possible renegotiation of both the loan terms and the collateral in a
unique way. For instance, instead of repossessing cars of defaulting auto loan borrowers, a
cheaper car (or even clunker trade-ins) could be offered in exchange for the existing, more
valuable collateral, and the borrower would have lower (and potentially more manageable
payments as a result. The same could be done with respect to replacing foreclosures with trading
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defaulting mortgagors down to smaller houses with lower payments (and such programs could be
combined with SAM participation by the lender to further lower periodic payments).
Conclusion:
By analyzing the root causes of the financial crisis, it is possible to estimate the costs of
resolving that crisis utilizing current policies of bailing out investors who made poor investment
decisions. Although the cost of the bailout may be staggering, cheaper solutions appear to exist.
In any event, it would seem imperative that the financial managers of the future be better
educated in the art of credit analysis.
http://www.slideshare.net/valliappan1991/global-financial-crisis-2008
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