Simex International Vs CA - G.R. No. 88013
Simex International Vs CA - G.R. No. 88013
Simex International Vs CA - G.R. No. 88013
CRUZ, J.:
We are concerned in this case with the question of damages, specifically moral and exemplary damages. The
negligence of the private respondent has already been established. All we have to ascertain is whether the
petitioner is entitled to the said damages and, if so, in what amounts.
The parties agree on the basic facts. The petitioner is a private corporation engaged in the exportation of food
products. It buys these products from various local suppliers and then sells them abroad, particularly in the United
States, Canada and the Middle East. Most of its exports are purchased by the petitioner on credit.
The petitioner was a depositor of the respondent bank and maintained a checking account in its branch at Romulo
Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City. On May 25, 1981, the petitioner deposited to its account in the said bank the amount
of P100,000.00, thus increasing its balance as of that date to P190,380.74. 1 Subsequently, the petitioner issued
several checks against its deposit but was suprised to learn later that they had been dishonored for insufficient funds.
As a consequence, the California Manufacturing Corporation sent on June 9, 1981, a letter of demand to the
petitioner, threatening prosecution if the dishonored check issued to it was not made good. It also withheld delivery
of the order made by the petitioner. Similar letters were sent to the petitioner by the Malabon Long Life Trading, on
June 15, 1981, and by the G. and U. Enterprises, on June 10, 1981. Malabon also canceled the petitioner's credit
line and demanded that future payments be made by it in cash or certified check. Meantime, action on the pending
orders of the petitioner with the other suppliers whose checks were dishonored was also deferred.
The petitioner complained to the respondent bank on June 10, 1981. 3 Investigation disclosed that the sum of
P100,000.00 deposited by the petitioner on May 25, 1981, had not been credited to it. The error was rectified on June 17,
1981, and the dishonored checks were paid after they were re-deposited. 4
In its letter dated June 20, 1981, the petitioner demanded reparation from the respondent bank for its "gross and
wanton negligence." This demand was not met. The petitioner then filed a complaint in the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal claiming from the private respondent moral damages in the sum of P1,000,000.00 and exemplary
damages in the sum of P500,000.00, plus 25% attorney's fees, and costs.
After trial, Judge Johnico G. Serquinia rendered judgment holding that moral and exemplary damages were not
called for under the circumstances. However, observing that the plaintiff's right had been violated, he ordered the
defendant to pay nominal damages in the amount of P20,000.00 plus P5,000.00 attorney's fees and costs. 5 This
decision was affirmed in toto by the respondent court. 6
The respondent court found with the trial court that the private respondent was guilty of negligence but agreed that
the petitioner was nevertheless not entitled to moral damages. It said:
The essential ingredient of moral damages is proof of bad faith (De Aparicio vs. Parogurga, 150 SCRA
280). Indeed, there was the omission by the defendant-appellee bank to credit appellant's deposit of
P100,000.00 on May 25, 1981. But the bank rectified its records. It credited the said amount in favor of
plaintiff-appellant in less than a month. The dishonored checks were eventually paid. These
circumstances negate any imputation or insinuation of malicious, fraudulent, wanton and gross bad
faith and negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant.
It is this ruling that is faulted in the petition now before us.
This Court has carefully examined the facts of this case and finds that it cannot share some of the conclusions of the
lower courts. It seems to us that the negligence of the private respondent had been brushed off rather lightly as if it
were a minor infraction requiring no more than a slap on the wrist. We feel it is not enough to say that the private
respondent rectified its records and credited the deposit in less than a month as if this were sufficient repentance.
The error should not have been committed in the first place. The respondent bank has not even explained why it
was committed at all. It is true that the dishonored checks were, as the Court of Appeals put it, "eventually" paid.
However, this took almost a month when, properly, the checks should have been paid immediately upon
presentment.
As the Court sees it, the initial carelessness of the respondent bank, aggravated by the lack of promptitude in
repairing its error, justifies the grant of moral damages. This rather lackadaisical attitude toward the complaining
depositor constituted the gross negligence, if not wanton bad faith, that the respondent court said had not been
established by the petitioner.
We also note that while stressing the rectification made by the respondent bank, the decision practically ignored the
prejudice suffered by the petitioner. This was simply glossed over if not, indeed, disbelieved. The fact is that the
petitioner's credit line was canceled and its orders were not acted upon pending receipt of actual payment by the
suppliers. Its business declined. Its reputation was tarnished. Its standing was reduced in the business community.
All this was due to the fault of the respondent bank which was undeniably remiss in its duty to the petitioner.
Article 2205 of the Civil Code provides that actual or compensatory damages may be received "(2) for injury to the
plaintiff s business standing or commercial credit." There is no question that the petitioner did sustain actual injury
as a result of the dishonored checks and that the existence of the loss having been established "absolute certainty
as to its amount is not required." 7 Such injury should bolster all the more the demand of the petitioner for moral damages
and justifies the examination by this Court of the validity and reasonableness of the said claim.
We agree that moral damages are not awarded to penalize the defendant but to compensate the plaintiff for the
injuries he may have suffered. 8 In the case at bar, the petitioner is seeking such damages for the prejudice sustained by it
as a result of the private respondent's fault. The respondent court said that the claimed losses are purely speculative and are
not supported by substantial evidence, but if failed to consider that the amount of such losses need not be established with
exactitude precisely because of their nature. Moral damages are not susceptible of pecuniary estimation. Article 2216 of the
Civil Code specifically provides that "no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages may be adjudicated." That is why the determination of the amount to be awarded (except
liquidated damages) is left to the sound discretion of the court, according to "the circumstances of each case."
From every viewpoint except that of the petitioner's, its claim of moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00 is
nothing short of preposterous. Its business certainly is not that big, or its name that prestigious, to sustain such an
extravagant pretense. Moreover, a corporation is not as a rule entitled to moral damages because, not being a
natural person, it cannot experience physical suffering or such sentiments as wounded feelings, serious anxiety,
mental anguish and moral shock. The only exception to this rule is where the corporation has a good reputation that
is debased, resulting in its social humiliation. 9
We shall recognize that the petitioner did suffer injury because of the private respondent's negligence that caused
the dishonor of the checks issued by it. The immediate consequence was that its prestige was impaired because of
the bouncing checks and confidence in it as a reliable debtor was diminished. The private respondent makes much
of the one instance when the petitioner was sued in a collection case, but that did not prove that it did not have a
good reputation that could not be marred, more so since that case was ultimately settled. 10 It does not appear that,
as the private respondent would portray it, the petitioner is an unsavory and disreputable entity that has no good name to
protect.
Considering all this, we feel that the award of nominal damages in the sum of P20,000.00 was not the proper relief
to which the petitioner was entitled. Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, "nominal damages are adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him." As we have found that the
petitioner has indeed incurred loss through the fault of the private respondent, the proper remedy is the award to it
of moral damages, which we impose, in our discretion, in the same amount of P20,000.00.
Now for the exemplary damages.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are the following:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
Art. 2232. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the defendant
acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner.
The banking system is an indispensable institution in the modern world and plays a vital role in the economic life of
every civilized nation. Whether as mere passive entities for the safekeeping and saving of money or as active
instruments of business and commerce, banks have become an ubiquitous presence among the people, who have
come to regard them with respect and even gratitude and, most of all, confidence. Thus, even the humble wageearner has not hesitated to entrust his life's savings to the bank of his choice, knowing that they will be safe in its
custody and will even earn some interest for him. The ordinary person, with equal faith, usually maintains a modest
checking account for security and convenience in the settling of his monthly bills and the payment of ordinary
expenses. As for business entities like the petitioner, the bank is a trusted and active associate that can help in the
running of their affairs, not only in the form of loans when needed but more often in the conduct of their day-to-day
transactions like the issuance or encashment of checks.
In every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity, whether such account
consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every single transaction accurately, down
to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be done if the account is to reflect at any given time the
amount of money the depositor can dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to
whomever he directs. A blunder on the part of the bank, such as the dishonor of a check without good reason, can
cause the depositor not a little embarrassment if not also financial loss and perhaps even civil and criminal litigation.
The point is that as a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is
under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. In the case at bar, it is obvious that the respondent bank was remiss in that duty and
violated that relationship. What is especially deplorable is that, having been informed of its error in not crediting the
deposit in question to the petitioner, the respondent bank did not immediately correct it but did so only one week
later or twenty-three days after the deposit was made. It bears repeating that the record does not contain any
satisfactory explanation of why the error was made in the first place and why it was not corrected immediately after
its discovery. Such ineptness comes under the concept of the wanton manner contemplated in the Civil Code that
calls for the imposition of exemplary damages.
After deliberating on this particular matter, the Court, in the exercise of its discretion, hereby imposes upon the
respondent bank exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, "by way of example or correction for the public
good," in the words of the law. It is expected that this ruling will serve as a warning and deterrent against the
repetition of the ineptness and indefference that has been displayed here, lest the confidence of the public in the
banking system be further impaired.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED and the private respondent is ordered to pay the
petitioner, in lieu of nominal damages, moral damages in the amount of P20,000.00, and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,000.00 plus the original award of attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Gancayco, Grino-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 4.
2 Exhibits 1-a to 1-h.
3 Rollo, p. 6.
4 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
5 Id., p. 24.
6 Victor, J., with Ejercito and Pe, JJ., concuring.
7 Cerrano v. Tan Chuco, 38 Phil 392.
8 Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Reyes, 145 SCRA 713; San Andres v. Court of
Appeals, 116 SCRA 81.
9 Mambulao Lumber Co. v. Philippine National Bank, 22 SCRA 359.
10 Rollo, pp. 38-41.
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