ARTICLE VI THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
a. Define legislative power
Basic concepts of the grant of legislative power:
1. it cannot pass irrepealable laws
2. principle of separation of powers
3. non-delegability of legislative powers
reason for principle that the legislature cannot pass irrepeablable laws
Separation of Powers
Read:
a. ANGARA VS. ELECTORAL COMMISSION, 63 Phil. 139
b. PLANAS VS. GIL, 67 Phil. 62
c. LUZON STEVEDORING VS. SSS, 34 SCRA 178
d. GARCIA VS. MACARAIG, 39 SCRA 106
e. Bondoc vs. HRET, Sept. 26, 1991
f. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106
b. Nature of legislative power
c. What are the limitations to the grant of legislative powers to the legislature?
d. Explain the doctrine of non-delegation power.
e. Permissive delegation of legislative power.
1) Sec. 23 (2) of Article VI (Emergency powers to the President in case of war or
other national emergency, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
Congress may provide, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a

declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by Resolution of Congress, such

powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
2) Sec. 28 (2) of Article VI. The Congress may by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may
impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program
of the government.
Other exceptions: traditional
3. Delegation to local governments
The reason behind this delegation is because the local government is deemed to know
better the needs of the people therein.
a. See Section 5 of Article X
b. Read:
aa. RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD, 39 Phil. 660
bb. PEOPLE VS. VERA, 65 Phil 56
A law delegating to the local government units the power to fund the salary of probation
officers in their area is unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection of the laws.
In areas where there is a probation officer because the local government unit appropriated
an amount for his salaries, convicts may avail of probation while in places where no
funds were set aside for probation officers, convicts therein could not apply for probation.
a.

Reason for the delegation

4) Delegation of Rule-making power to administrative bodies

5) Delegation to the People (Section 2, Art. XVII of the Constitution and Section 32,
Article VIThe Congress shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof
passed by the Congress of local legislative body after the registration of a petition
thereof signed by at least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which
every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters
thereof.
f. Delegation of rule-making power to administrative bodies.
1) What is the completeness test? The sufficiency of standard test?

Read: 1. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, 15 SCRA 569

During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions
hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the
province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council
shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if
its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios
may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act
of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the
voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality
or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Petitioner argues, accordingly:
If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities?
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed
executive orders are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any
political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any
of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of

any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or

more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines
in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction of
any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of the
Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department having
executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers
affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he
claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable, for said case involved, not the creation of a
new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory from an already existing municipality
(Cardona) to another municipality (Binagonan), likewise, existing at the time of and
prior to said transfer (See Govt of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality, of Binagonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) in consequence of the fixing and
definition, pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to
avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create municipal
corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
Although 1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to
fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential,
to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate and
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or
formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the
aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable
certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority.
Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but,
also and this is worse to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end
sought to be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of
powers and the system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very
foundation of our Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a

law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects above referred
to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact that, under the last clause of the first
sentence of Section 68, the President:
may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require.
At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned,
even if we assumed that the phrase as the public welfare may require, in said Section
68, qualifies all other clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil.
726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68 Phil. 328), this Court had upheld public welfare and
public interest, respectively, as sufficient standards for a valid delegation of the
authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in these cases as all judicial
pronouncements must be construed in relation to the specific facts and issues involved
therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding effect.
The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works,
with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to
issue rules and regulations to promote safe transit upon national roads and streets. Upon
the other hand, the Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under
Act No. 2581, to issue and cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative
securities. Both cases involved grants to administrative officers of powers related to the
exercise of their administrative functions, calling for the determination of questions of
fact.
2
1.

TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108 (Most representative)

US VS. ANG TANG HO, 43 Phil. 1

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled
An Act penalizing the monopoly and holding of, and speculation in, palay, rice, and corn
under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, and
authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of State, to issue the
necessary rules and regulations therefor, and making an appropriation for this purpose,
the material provisions of which are as follows:
Section 1. The Governor-General is hereby authorized, whenever, for any cause,
conditions arise resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate, with the consent of the Council of State, temporary rules and
emergency measures for carrying out the purpose of this Act, to wit:
(a) To prevent the monopoly and hoarding of, and speculation in, palay, rice or corn.
August 1, 1919, the Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which
rice should be sold.

August 8, 1919, a complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him
with the sale of rice at an excessive price as follows:
The undersigned accuses Ang Tang Ho of a violation of Executive Order No. 53 of the
Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of August, 1919, in relation with the
provisions of sections 1, 2 and 4 of Act No. 2868, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of August, 1919, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said Ang Tang Ho, voluntarily, illegally and criminally sold to Pedro Trinidad, one
ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80), which is a price greater than that fixed
by Executive Order No. 53 of the Governor-General of the Philippines, dated the 1st of
August, 1919, under the authority of section 1 of Act No. 2868. Contrary to law.
Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower
court erred in finding Executive Order No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in
finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and in imposing the sentence.
The official records show that the Act was to take effect on its approval; that it was
approved July 30, 1919; that the Governor-General issued his proclamation on the 1st of
August, 1919; and that the law was first published on the 13th of August, 1919; and that
the proclamation itself was first published on the 20th of August, 1919.
The question here involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. It will be
noted that section 1 authorizes the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council of
State, for any cause resulting in an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn, to
issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency measures for carrying out the
purposes of the Act. By its very terms, the promulgation of temporary rules and
emergency measures is left to the discretion of the Governor-General. The Legislature
does not undertake to specify or define under what conditions or for what reasons the
Governor-General shall issue the proclamation, but says that it may be issued for any
cause, and leaves the question as to what is any cause to the discretion of the
Governor-General. The Act also says: For any cause, conditions arise resulting in an
extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn. The Legislature does not specify or
define what is an extraordinary rise. That is also left to the discretion of the GovernorGeneral. The Act also says that the Governor-General, with the consent of the Council
of State, is authorized to issue and promulgate temporary rules and emergency
measures for carrying out the purposes of this Act. It does not specify or define what is a
temporary rule or an emergency measure, or how long such temporary rules or
emergency measures shall remain in force and effect, or when they shall take effect. That
is to say, the Legislature itself has not in any manner specified or defined any basis for
the order, but has left it to the sole judgement and discretion of the Governor-General to
say what is or what is not a cause, and what is or what is not an extraordinary rise in
the price of rice, and as to what is a temporary rule or an emergency measure for the
carrying out the purposes of the Act. Under this state of facts, if the law is valid and the

Governor-General issues a proclamation fixing the minimum price at which rice should
be sold, any dealer who, with or without notice, sells rice at a higher price, is a criminal.
There may not have been any cause, and the price may not have been extraordinary, and
there may not have been an emergency, but, if the Governor-General found the existence
of such facts and issued a proclamation, and rice is sold at any higher price, the seller
commits a crime.
By the organic law of the Philippine Islands and the Constitution of the United States all
powers are vested in the Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. It is the duty of the
Legislature to make the law; of the Executive to execute the law; and of the Judiciary to
construe the law. The Legislature has no authority to execute or construe the law, the
Executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the Judiciary has no power to
make or execute the law. Subject to the Constitution only, the power of each branch is
supreme within its own jurisdiction, and it is for the Judiciary only to say when any Act
of the Legislature is or is not constitutional. Assuming, without deciding, that the
Legislature itself has the power to fix the price at which rice is to be sold, can it delegate
that power to another, and, if so, was that power legally delegated by Act No. 2868? In
other words, does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the
Organic Law, all Legislative power is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred
upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated to the Governor-General, or any
one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislative power to enact any law. If Act no
2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the
Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the
Legislature itself created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the
other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some
legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is
vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative power, is
unconstitutional and void.
The act, in our judgment, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard
policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take
the place of all others, without the determination of the insurance commissioner in
respect to maters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be
delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use as an act in
conformity to which all fire insurance policies were required to be issued.
The result of all the cases on this subject is that a law must be complete, in all its terms
and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of the government, and nothing must
be left to the judgement of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so
that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left
to take effect in futuro, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or
event.
4. TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208

5. FREE TELEPHONE WORKERS UNION, 108 SCRA 757 (Affecting

National interest)
6. PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ, December 18, 1989
Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon
the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard,
the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing
power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of
the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been
held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this
standard may be implied.
It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent
NTC and the manner required by the statute for the lawful exercise thereof.
Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among
others, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service
communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and regulations
in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546,
respondent NTC should be guided by the requirements of public safety, public interest
and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities in
communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which
provides for the creation of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications with
control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the national
economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems
contemplated therein should be maintained at reasonable rates.
II.
On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural
due process because it was issued motu proprio, without notice to petitioner and without
the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an initial
evaluation, which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity
to present its side before the order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the
rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service could have been
shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in
the rate fixing-power of NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasilegislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof results in a
violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by
administrative bodies is quasi-judicial rather than quasi-legislative: that where the
function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required,

but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved
is adjudicatory. Nonetheless, they insist that under the facts obtaining the order in
question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to
respondent NTCs legislative function but because the assailed order is merely
interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing proceedings on petitioners application
for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source
of data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the
rates charged.
We find merit in petitioners contention.
In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, we made a categorical
classification as to when the rate-filing power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
and when it is legislative, thus:
Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such
rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the
Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it
is predicated upon the finding of fact-based upon a report submitted by the General
Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested
capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine
the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof
and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn
therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent
performed a function partaking of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which
demands previous notice and hearing.
This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the
Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. to wit:
It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is
legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer,
Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: If the nature of the
administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are
not necessary. The validity of a rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights
of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to the same rules
which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) It
is said in 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and
453: Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an administrative
proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved.
In so far as generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative
proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are not essential to
the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of
executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body
acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular and immediate rather

than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the
action is entitled to notice and hearing.
The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication. Foremost is the fact that said order pertains
exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact,
although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates
charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioners financial statements-without
affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was
offered nor were the attending contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted
respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not farfetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-avis the viability of its business requirements. The rates it charges result from an
exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies attendant to a
public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to
lend greater credence to petitioners ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates
would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service to the public
considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the
financial outlay involved. Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to
cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which respondent NTC based its
questioned order.
At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the
questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists
that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to
the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of
merit.
g. May rules and regulations promulgated by administrative bodies/agencies have the
force of law? penal law? In order to be considered as one with the force and effect of a
penal law, what conditions must concur? See U.S. vs. GRIMMAUD, 220 U.S. 506 (1911)
or the 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION a reviewer Primer by FR. JOAQUIN
BERNAS, 1987 edition.
5. PEO. VS. ROSENTHAL, 68 Phil. 328
6. US VS. BARRIAS, 11 Phil. 327
7. VILLEGAS VS. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO, 86 SCRA 270
h. Delegation to the people. See Section 2(1) of Art. XVII.
i. Classify the membership of the legislative department. Differentiate their
qualifications, elections/selections and as to the participation of the Commission on
Appointments in order to validate their membership.

j. Manner of election and selection

1) Read again TUPAS VS. OPLE, 137 SCRA 108
2.
Sections 2. The Senate shall be composed of twenty-four Senators who
shall be elected at large by the qualified voters of the Philippines, as may be
provided for by law.
3.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least 35 years of age, able to
read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
2 years immediately preceding the day of the election.
4.
Section 4. The term of office of the Senators shall be six years and shall
commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th day of June next
following their election.
No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Qualifications, term of office, etc., of a senator or member of the House of
Representatives.
2.
Sections 5. [1] The House of representatives shall be composed of not more
than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
[2] The party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list. For three (3) consecutive terms
after the ratification of this Constitution, of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women youth, and
such other sectors, as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
[3] Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least one hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative.
[4] Within 3 years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on standards provided in this
section

Section 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is

a natural born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least 25
years of age, able to read and write, and except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Read:
1.
ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO CRUZ, 357 SCRA 545
Rep. Act No. 2630
Sec. 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine Citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United states, acquired US citizenship, MAY REACQUIRE
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY TAKING AN OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES AND REGISTERING THE SAME WITH THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRY IN THE PLACE WHERE HE RESIDES OR LAST
RESIDED IN THE PHILIPPINES. The said Oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.
2.

Section 2, Article IV, 1987 Philippine Constitution

Section 2. Natural born citizens are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform an act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who
elect Philippine Citizenship in accordance with par. 3* , Section 1 shall be deemed
natural born citizens.
OCAMPO VS. HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and MARIO CRESPO, a.k.a.
MARK JIMENEZ, June 15, 2004
Who takes the place of the winning candidate as a Member of the House of
Representatives who was disqualified after he was proclaimed as such?
Facts:
The petitioner and Mark Jimenez were candidates for Congressman of the 6th District of
manila for the May 14, 2001 elections. Mark Jimenez won over the petitioner with
32,097 votes as against petitioners 31,329 votes.
3.
Petitioner filed an electoral protest before the HRET based on the following
grounds: 1] misreading of ballots; 2] falsification of election returns; 3]substitution of
election returns; 4] use of marked, spurious fake and stray ballots; and 5] presence of
ballots written by one or two persons.

4.
On March 6, 2003, the HRET issued its Decision in the case of ABANTE, ET
AL. VS. MARI CRESPO, a.k.a. MARK JIMENEZ, et al., declaring Mark Jimenez
ineligible for the Office of Representative of Sixth District of Manila for lack of
residence in the District. Mark Jimenez filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied.
As a result of said disqualification of Jimenez, the petitioner claimed that all the votes
cast for the former should not be counted and since he garnered the second highest
number of votes, he should be declared winner in the May 14, 2001 elections and be
proclaimed the duly elected Congressman of the 6th District of manila.
Issues:
Are the votes of Mark Jimenez stray votes and should not be counted?
Whether the petitioner as second places should be proclaimed winner since the winner
was disqualified?
Held:
1.
There must be a final judgment disqualifying a candidate in order that the votes
of a disqualified candidate can be considered stray. This final judgment must be
rendered BEFORE THE ELECTION. This was the ruling in the case of CODILLA VS.
DE VENECIA. Hence, when a candidate has not been disqualified by final judgment
during the election day he was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared
stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty
resides. The reason behind this is that the people voted for him bona fide and in the
honest belief that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they would
entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
2.
The subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes does not entitle the second placer to be declared the winner. The said principle
was laid down as early as 1912 and reiterated in the cases of LABO VS. COMELEC,
ABELLA VS. COMELEC and DOMINO VS. COMELEC.
Section 7. The members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term
of 3 years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the 30th
day of June next following their election.
No member of the House of Representative shall serve for a period of more
than 3 consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular election of the Senators and
the Members of the House of Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of
May.
a. On the manner of nomination and appointment of
Hose of Representatives.

Sectoral representatives to the

Read: 1. Exec. Order No. 198, June 18, 1987

2.. DELES VS. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS,

September 4, 1989

b. On gerrymandering
Read: CENIZA vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 763
4. Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of Representatives, a
special election may be called to fill such vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but
the Senator or Member of the House of representatives thus elected shall serve only the
unexpired term.
Read: 1. LOZADA vs. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337
COMELEC cannot call a special election (for the legislative districts whose
Congressmen resigned or died while in office) without a law passed by Congress
appropriating funds for the said purpose.
2. RA 6645-RE: Filling up of Congress Vacancy, December 28, 1987
5. Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
shall be determined by law. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of
representatives approving such increase.
a. How much is the present salary of the members of Congress? P204,000.00
[P17,000.00 per month] as per Section 17, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. The
Presidents salary is P300,000.00 per annum, while the VP, Speaker, Senate President
and Chief Justice is P240,000.00 per annum. The Chairman of the Constitutional
Commissions salary is P204,000.00 and the members, P180,000.00 per annum.
b. Read:
1.
Section 17, Article 18) (P300,000.00 for the President; P240,000.00 for VP,
Senate President; Speaker; Chief Justice; P204,000.00 for Senators, Representatives,
Chairmen of CC; P180,000.00 for members of the Constitutional Commissions)

2.

PHILCONSA VS. JIMENEZ, 15 SCRA 479;

3.

LIGOT VS. MATHAY, 56 SCRA 823

6. Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of representatives shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than 6 years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
a. Privilege from arrest
Read:

Martinez vs. Morfe, MARTINEZ VS. MORFE, 44 SCRA 22

b. Freedom of Speech and debate

Read:
1) OSMENA VS. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
2) JIMENEZ VS. CABANGBANG, 17 SCRA 876
7. Section 12. All members of the Senate and the House of Representatives shall,
upon assumption of office, make a full disclosure of their financial and business
interests. They shall notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which they are authors.
8. Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold
any other office or employment in the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations
or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Read:
1)

ADAZA vs. PACANA, 135 SCRA 431

After taking his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa (Congress) , he is deemed
to have resigned his position as Governor of Negros Oriental because as a legislator, he
is not allowed to hold any other office in the government.
2)

PUNZALAN vs. MENDOZA, 140 SCRA 153

A provincial governor who took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa as
appointed member for being a member of the Cabinet is allowed to return to his
former position as Governor if he resigns from the Batasan. This is so because he was

just an appointed member as distinguished from the Adaza Case. (Note: It appears
that an appointed member of the Batasan is placed in a better position than the elected
members)
3) Compare with Section 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Constitution
9. Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may
personally appear as counsel before any court of justice or before the Electoral
Tribunals, or quasi-judicial bodies and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or any franchise
or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation,
or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Read:
1) VILLEGAS vs. LEGASPI, 113 SCRA 39
2) PUYAT vs. DE GUZMAN, 113 SCRA 31
What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly. So a member of
Congress who is a stockholder of the corporation involved in a case is not allowed to
appear under the guise that he is appearing as such, not as counsel for the corporation.
10.
Sections 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the 4th Monday
of July for its regular season, unless a different date is fixed by law, and shall
continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine until 30 days
before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and
legal holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Section 16. [1] The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective members.
Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
[2] A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a
smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of
absent members in such manner, and under such penalties, as such House may
provide.
[3] Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its
members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of 2/3 of all its
members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
mot exceed sixty days.

NOTE: In the cases of:

1.

MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN; and

2.

REP. PAREDES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

-the Supreme Court held that a member of Congress may also be suspended by the
Sandiganbayan in accordance with Section 13 of RA 3019. This preventive suspension
applies to all public officials, including members of Congress. Otherwise, the same will
be considered class legislation if Senators and Congressmen who commit the same is
exempt from the preventive suspension imposed therein.
Other than the foregoing, a member of Congress can be suspended by the Congress itself.
[4] Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas
and nays on any question shall, at the request of one fifth of the members present, be
entered in the journal.
Each House shall also keep a record of its proceedings.
[Neither House during the sessions of the Congress, shall without the consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any place than that which the 2 Houses
shall be sitting.
Read:
1) AVELINO vs. CUENCO, 83 Phil. 17, Read also the motion for reconsideration dated
March 14, 1949
2) Disciplinary measures on erring members
Read: OSMENA vs. PENDATUN, 109 Phil. 863
3) Dual purpose for keeping a journal
4) Journal entry and enrolled bill theories; which is conclusive over the other?
Read:
U.S. vs. PONS, 34 Phil. 729
The journal prevails over extraneous evidence like accounts of newspaper journalists
and reporters as to what the proceedings all about.
b. MABANAG vs. LOPEZ VITO, 78 Phil. 1

CASCO PHIL. VS. GIMENEZ, 7 SCRA 347

The enrolled bill prevails over the journal. If the enrolled bill provides that it is urea
formaldehyde is the one exempt from tax, and not urea and formaldehyde which appears
in the journal which was really approved, the former prevails and only CURATIVE
LEGISLATION COULD CHANGE THE SAME, NOT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.
d. MORALES vs. SUBIDO, 27 Phil. 131
e. ASTORGA vs. VILLEGAS, 56 SCRA 714
(NOTE: The journal prevails over the enrolled bill on all matters required to be entered in
the journals, like yeas and nays on the final reading of a bill or on any question at the
request of 1/5 of the members present. )
5) Differentiate a regular from a special session.
11. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all election contests relating to
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. Each Electoral
tribunal shall be composed of 9 members, 3 of whom shall be justices of the
Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief justice, and the remaining six shall be
members of the Senate or House of Representatives as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein.
The senior justice in the Electoral tribunal shall be its Chairman.
See Sec. 2 (2) of Art. IX-C and last par. Sec. 4, Art. VII
Read:
1) LAZATIN VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 80007, January 25, 1988
2) FIRDAUSI ABBAS, ET AL. VS. THE SENATE ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL,October 27, 1988
3)ENRILE VS. COMELEC & SANCHEZ; ENRILE VS. COMELEC & RAZUL AND
SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC, Aug. 12, 1987, 153 SCRA 57
4. BONDOC VS. HRET, supra
11.
Section 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the
Senate President, as ex-oficio chairman, 12 senators and 12 members of the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The

chairman of the commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within 30 session days of the Congress
from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all the members.
Read:
1.

RAUL DAZA VS. LUIS SINGSON, December 21, 1989

If the changes in the political party affiliations of the members of Congress is substantial
so as to dramatically decrease the membership of one party while reducing the other, the
number of representatives of the different parties in the Commission on Appointments
may also be changed in proportion to their actual memberships. (NOTE: In Cunanan vs.
Tan, the membership of the Senators was only temporary so as not to result in the
change of membership in the Commission on Appointments)
2.

GUINGONA VS. GONZALES, October 20, 1992

Since 12 Senators are members of the Commission on Appointments, in addition to the

Senate President as the head thereof, every two (2) Senators are entitled to one (1)
representative in the Commission. Parties, however, are not allowed to round off their
members, I.e., 7 Senators are entitled to 3 representatives in the Commission on
Appointments, not 4 since 7/2 is only 3.5.
Further, there is nothing in the Constitution which requires that there must be 24
members of the Commission. If the different parties do not coalesce, then the possibility
that the total number of Senators in the CA is less than 12 is indeed a reality. (Example:
Lakas13 Senators; LDP11 Senators. In this case, Lakas is entitled to 6 members in
the CA (13/2= 6.5) while LBP would have 5 members (11/2= 5.5)
3. GUINGONA S. GONZALES, March 1, 1993 (Resolution of the Motion for
Reconsideration of the October 20, 1992 Decision)
To be discussed later together with Sec. 16, Art. VII.
12-a. Section 19. The electoral tribunals and the Commission on Appointments shall
be constituted within 30 days after the Senate and the House of Representatives
shall have been organized with the election of the President and the Speaker. The
Commission on Appointments shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at
the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members, to discharge such powers
and functions as are herein conferred upon it.
13. Sec. 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress shall be preserved
and be open to the public in accordance with law, and such books shall be audited
by the Commission on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each member.

14. Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
Read:

1) ARNAULT vs. NAZARENO, 87 Phil. 29

A witness who refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the
term of the members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to
violate the witness right to due process of law.
Power of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation; question hour
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, ET AL., VS. EXEC. SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 16977, April 20, 2006
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various
Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call
for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department,
bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National
Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations
to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29,
2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon
Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group
(hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and
other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations
dated September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of
the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the
AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig.
Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of
the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a public
hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled Bunye has Provided

Smoking Gun or has Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the
Presidential Election of May 2005; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada
delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the
World; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005
entitled Clear and Present Danger; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator
Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National
Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called Gloriagate Scandal; and (5) Senate
Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on
National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the WireTapping of the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP
Chief of Staff, General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter dated September 27, 2005,
requested for its postponement due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his]
utmost personal attention while some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending
to other urgent operational matters.
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita a letter[1] dated September 27, 2005 respectfully
request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to
which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited in order to
afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various
issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote[2] Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators
are unable to accede to [his request] as it was sent belatedly and [a]ll preparations
and arrangements as well as notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous]
week.
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter from the
President of the North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the
hearing on the NorthRail project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of
the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President of the Philippines issued E.O. 464, Ensuring
Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, which,
pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the
Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance
with Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional
provisions on the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all

heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic
Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge
confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office
and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the
President and the public officers covered by this executive order, including:
1.
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official
covered by this executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995;
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
2.
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of
national security should not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May
1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998).
3.
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of
treaties and executive agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
4.
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission
on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
5.
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
1.
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department
heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2.
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;

3.
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or
higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered
by the executive privilege;
4.
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security
Adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
5.

Such other officers as may be determined by the President.

SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public

officials enumerated in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress to ensure the observance of the
principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect
for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the
early history of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of
government may keep certain information confidential in pursuit of the public interest.
Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in only one magistrate, a distinguished
delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: Decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent
degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished.
Considering that no member of the executive department would want to appear in the
above Senate investigations in aid of legislation by virtue of Proc. No. 464, the
petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the same unconstitutional because the
President abused her powers in issuing Executive Order No. 464.
I S S U E S:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they
implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
H E L D:
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment
of whether the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are
present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is
subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to
challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very
lis mota of the case.[3]
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v.
Ongpin[4] and Valmonte v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,[5] respondents assert
that to be considered a proper party, one must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of
E.O. 464.[6]
The Supreme Court, however, held that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the
petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other
regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,[7] this
Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact
that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
I
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI
of the Constitution which reads:
SECTION 21.
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v.
Nazareno,[8] a case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already
recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who
was considered a leading witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the
Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of the senators on an important
point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates
power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with

process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.

A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has
shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.[9] . . . (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may
be deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is coextensive with the power to legislate.[10] The matters which may be a proper subject of
legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows
that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation.
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it
would be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive
officials who are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, with process to enforce it, is grounded
on the necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by
executive officials on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on
that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the
power to compel the disclosure thereof.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,[11] the inquiry itself
might not properly be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of
Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible
way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its
invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible
needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its
invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part
of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative
power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the
Senate or Houses duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the
constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of
procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the
guarantees in the Bill of Rights.

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory
in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other,
should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically
relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to
conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of
Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.[12]
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only
to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of
separation of powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature,
it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to
exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the
reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution
and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as
limited in its application to appearances of department heads in the question hour is
therefore CONSTITUTIONAL.
It is different insofar as Sections 2 and 3 are concerned. Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all
the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all
senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all
senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated

in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP,
and the National Security Adviser), are covered by the executive privilege.
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the
President. Given the title of Section 2 Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive
Privilege , it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by
the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage
under executive privilege.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive
privilege may be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain
information in the possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even
against Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover
Presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet
meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential.
This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A
frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and
pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making
of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not the
situation in the instant case.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus
invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and
certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement
that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of
each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
2
E.O 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on
matters of public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the
production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.
These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public,
however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in
such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed
to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are
thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to
their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means
allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples
will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is
informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in
the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can
such bear fruit.[14] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures
power of inquiry.
3
The implementation of Proc. 464 before it was published in the Official Gazette as
illegal. Due process thus requires that the people should have been apprised of this
issuance before it was implemented. This is clear from the doctrine laid down in the case
of TANADA VS. TUVERA.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED.
Sections 2(b) and 3 of
Executive Order No. 464 (series of 2005), Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the
Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under
the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, are declared VOID.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Nov. 20, 1991
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee
from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirtysix (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in
aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a purely
private transaction which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.

The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. 1Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not,
therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted
provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure and that the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. It follows
then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the
right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against ones self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in
Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such
inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection
with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante
alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a
member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or
committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in its judgment requires
an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or
nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or resolution under which such an
inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a
statement which was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr.
Ricardo Baby Lopa of having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies. As a
consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988
categorically denying that he had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies; that
former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview
by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by
him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a takeover on his (Lopas) part of
FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13
September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said

Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a Member of the Senate of the
Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enriles) charges that he (Lopa)
had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are baseless and malicious. Thus, in
his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really
in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of
Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts
rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo
Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it
was held :
The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process.
That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our
social, economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad as is this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited.
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor
General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of
Congress. Investigations conducted solely for the personal aggrandizement of the
investigators or to punish those investigated are indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since congress may
only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate,
it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the
other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the
Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the
Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the
Executive.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative
investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous
to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in
Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right
against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of
suit
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be
compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidence before it,
it is only because we hold that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if

pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of powers between the

legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
Investigation in aid of legislation; Executive Privilege
ROMULO L. NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL
DEFENSE AND SECURITY, G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. (En Banc)
THE FACTS:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the
supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in
the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to
be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. In connection with this NBN Project,
various Resolutions were introduced in the Senat
At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of
three (3) pending bills in the Senate.
Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among
those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and
October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming he
was out of town during the other dates.
In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several
high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the
approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially
approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but, on March 29, 2007, the NEDA
acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be financed through
a loan from the Chinese Government.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11)
hours. He disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN
Project. He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on
what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or
not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,[15][6] (b) whether or not she directed
him to prioritize it,[16][7] and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.[17][8]

Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner,

requiring him to appear and testify on November 20, 2007.
However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita
requested respondent Committees to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground
of executive privilege. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to
appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it
will be recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE /
NBN project, including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September
2007.
Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for
time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate
v. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).
Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege
on the following questions, to wit:
a)

Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?

b)

Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?

c)
Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being
told about the alleged bribe?
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations
and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered
executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R.
133250, July 9, 2002).
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary
Neri accordingly.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus,
on November 22, 2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain
why he should not be cited in contempt. The Letter reads:
Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National

Defense and Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt
under Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon).
The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.
On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it
was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining
questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege, thus:
It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with
the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours
stay during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the
questions that were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive
privilege, and which was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15
November 2007. In good faith, after that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what
remained were only the three questions, where the Executive Secretary claimed executive
privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be dispensed with.
In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R.
Bautista, stating, among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the
order of the President; and (2) his conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate
and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery
scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of
petitioners request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify
so that he may adequately prepare for the hearing.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari
assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without
responding to his request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify,
they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt of respondent
Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-AtArms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order states:
ORDER
For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday, September 18,
2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday,
November 20, 2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and
received by him, which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed,
impeded and obstructed the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for
failure to explain satisfactorily why he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29
November 2007), herein attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of

this (sic) Committees and ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he will appear and give his testimony.
The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and make
a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.[18][9] He
insisted that he has not shown any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and
arrest. He emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, however, respondent
Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He also
mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him,
this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter
through the issuance of declaration of contempt and arrest.
In view of respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on
February 1, 2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt
Order.
On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order
(a) enjoining
respondent Committees from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the
parties to observe the status quo prevailing prior to the issuance of the assailed order,
and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.
Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and contempt
Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are candid
discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions. According to him,
these discussions dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high
government officials on the countrys diplomatic relations and economic and
military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders
in the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is upon the
order of the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita[19][10] and
United States v. Reynolds.[20][11] Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing
communications made to him in official confidence under Section 7[21][12] of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, and Section 24[22][13] (e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that
(1) petitioners
testimony is material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation; (2)
there is no valid justification for petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no
abuse of their authority to order petitioners arrest; and (4) petitioner has not come to
court with clean hands.
I S S U E S:

1.
What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by
the principle of executive privilege?
1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege,
by order of the President, to cover
(i) conversations of the President in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China?
1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his
conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said
conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government
officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1
[2006])?
1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of
the Constitution:
Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving

public interest)

Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)
Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)
and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?
2.

What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3.
Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest
of petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?
H E L D:
At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:
First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?
There is merit in the petition.

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita[23][18] becomes

imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative and
oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and 22, respectively,
of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall
provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover
matters related thereto. When the security of the state or the public interest so requires
and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to
each other, they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress.
Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to
elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains
to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function.[24][19] Simply stated, while both powers allow
Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.
This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory
process. Unlike in Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive
officials under Section 22. The Courts pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita[25][20] is clear:
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of
the President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of
their performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the
separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance.
Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of
legislation under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in
Arnault.
I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive
Privilege

We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.
The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based
on the proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change.[26][21] Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the compulsory process to enforce it.
But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done
in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the
rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted
is through a valid claim of executive privilege.[27][22] This directs us to the consideration
of the question is there a recognized claim of executive privilege despite the
revocation of E.O. 464?
A-

There is a Recognized Claim

of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way
diminish our concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has
Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike the United States which has further accorded the
concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of Information Act[28][23] and the
Federal Advisory Committee Act,[29][24] the Philippines has retained its constitutional
origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent
of these is the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional
substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard, it is worthy to note that Executive
Ermitas Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of executive
privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,[30][25] and Chavez v. PEA.[31][26] There
was never a mention of E.O. 464.
While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,[32][27] have comprehensively discussed the
concept of executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of
the clamor for this Court to clearly define the communications covered by executive
privilege.
The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.[33][28] In United States v. Nixon,[34][29] the U.S. Court
recognized a great public interest in preserving the confidentiality of conversations
that take place in the Presidents performance of his official duties. It thus
considered presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently, the
presumption is founded on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality.
The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and
to provide the President and
those who assist him with freedom to explore

alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a

way many would be unwilling to express except privately.
In In Re: Sealed Case,[35][30] the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there
are two (2) kinds of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications
privilege and, the other is the deliberative process privilege. The former pertains to
communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decisionmaking and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and
deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and
policies are formulated.
Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential
communications privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the
deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of executive officials. The first is
rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and the Presidents unique
constitutional role;
the second on common law privilege. Unlike the
deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to
documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as
pre-deliberative ones[36][31] As a consequence, congressional or judicial negation of the
presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial
of the deliberative process privilege.
Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications
privilege, In Re: Sealed Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has
operational proximity to direct presidential decision-making. Thus, the privilege is
meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of presidential authority,
involving what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable Presidential
power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the
power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other
public officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.[37][32]
Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez
v. PCGG[38][38], this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public
disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security
matters. In Chavez v. PEA,[39][39] there is also a recognition of the confidentiality of
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is
fully discussed.
As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly
recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed
by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations.
Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief,[40][40]
appointing,[41][41] pardoning,[42][42] and diplomatic[43][43] powers. Consistent with the

doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy
greater confidentiality than others.
The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow
provide the elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1)
The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.
2)
The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must
be in operational proximity with the President.
3)
The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought
likely contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.[44][44]
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege
on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under
conversation and correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in
her executive and policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to
be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege
and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of
the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.[45][45]
Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under
the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a
member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.
United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing
against other interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not
absolutely protected by the Constitution. The U.S. Court held:

[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of highlevel communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential
privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.
The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,[46][46] where it was held
that presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption
can be overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to
conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political
branches of the government in the manner that preserves the essential functions of each
Branch.[47][47] Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3)
questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than
Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the oversight
function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is difficult to
draw the line between an inquiry in aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of
oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will depend on the content of the
questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.
Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against
a possible disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in
United States v. Nixon[48][48] that demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending
criminal trial outweighs the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality.
However, the present cases distinction with the Nixon case is very evident. In Nixon,
there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is
the demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that
the information be disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to
limit the scope of its decision. It stressed that it is not concerned here with the
balance between the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality x x x and
congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon, the information here is
elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v.
Ermita stressed that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on
the ground invoked but, also, on the procedural setting or the context in which the
claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not interpose any claim of need
to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present case,
Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of
presidential communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decisionmaking process and diplomatic secrets.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern.[49][50] We might have agreed with such contention if
petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to
them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours.

Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of
Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as
may be provided by
law. Some of these laws are Section 7
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,[50]
[51]
Article 229[51][52] of the
Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)[52][53] of
R.A. No. 3019, and
Section 24(e)[53][54] of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. These are in addition to what our body of jurisprudence classifies as
confidential[54][55] and what our Constitution considers as belonging to the larger concept
of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality
of certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such
kind.
More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain
information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public
information. The former cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the
peoples right to information. The distinction between such rights is laid down in Senate
v. Ermita:
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information
which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of
public concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents
pursuant to his right to information does not have the same obligatory force as a
subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong
only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does
not follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of
inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.
The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their
exercise of power a right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because
when they discharge their power, they do so as public officials and members of
Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with and should
give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to

delicate interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of

careful review by numerous decided cases.
B-

The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked

We now proceed to the issue whether the claim is properly invoked by the President.
Jurisprudence teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal
claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the department which has control over the
matter.[55][56] A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a precise and
certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.[56][57]
The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the
requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that
this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as
refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. Obviously,
he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance. In
Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds
relied upon by Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave
respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested information could be classified
as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made
whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is
not even intended to be comprehensive.[57][58] The following statement of grounds
satisfies the requirement:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Peoples Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of
these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita, [58][59] the Congress must not require the
executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure
of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a
coordinate and co-equal department.
II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the
Contempt Order
It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter
dated November 22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions

were the three (3) questions he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. In addition
thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that his non-appearance was upon the
order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations with President
Arroyo are covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an
expression of his willingness to testify again, provided he be furnished in advance
copies of the questions. Without responding to his request for advance list of questions,
respondent Committees issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in contempt
of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the
Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, informing respondent
Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.
Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
Order in view of five (5) reasons:
First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt
Order suffers from constitutional infirmity.
Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in
Senate v. Ermita that the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry, along with the usual indication of the subject of
inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof. Compliance with this
requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of
the express language of Section 22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated
demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance list of questions.
Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, 2008
proceeding reveals that only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee was present during the deliberation. [59][61] Section 18 of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:
The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any
witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to
testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.
Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee.
Apparently, members who did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to
sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the
contempt Order dated January 30, 2008.
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry
be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure. We quote the OSGs
explanation:

The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every
Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held
every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the
Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set
of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and
precipitate. It must be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon
the claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly
dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously issued the Order citing
him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.
A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested
several times his readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer
the three (3) questions because he was ordered by the President to claim executive
privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the claim of executive
privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily
dismissing his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly, respondent Committees
actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for being arbitrary and for denying
petitioner due process of law. The same quality afflicted their conduct when they (a)
disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging that he had filed the present
petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance list
of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to
be covered by executive privilege.
Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or vindication.[60]
[63]
Respondent Committees should have exercised the same restraint, after all petitioner
is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of
government.
In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have
been avoided if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant
with the doctrine of separation of powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal
branch of the government.
In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the fundamental
constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where the
Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive implements it.
They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their
respective spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent
unwarranted exercise of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve these

constitutional principles at all times to keep the political branches of government

within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and prerogatives,
even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of
our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.
The respondents-Committees were therefore stopped from calling the petitioner and ask
the three(3) questions mentioned above in connection with his conversations with the
President being covered by the executive privilege rule.
Power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation; Right to Privacy; Public
disclosure of government transactions; right to information on matters of public concern;
right against self-incrimination;
CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA
704
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate
Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[61][4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation
on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard
J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners,
inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on
Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No.
455.[62][6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[63]
[7]
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of
E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services
issued an Order[64][13] directing Major General Jose Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-AtArms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for contempt of the
Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of
the Committees members.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested
Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and
brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, this petition.
I S S U E:
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether
Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue
hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners that their
refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified.
Ranged against it is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent
Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of
legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus: No member or staff of the
Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.
The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before
it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,[65][15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[66]
[16]
In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in
the power to legislate.
In Arnault, the Supreme Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it
recognized that the power of inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function, thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite

information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who
possess it.
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of inquiry, provisions on such
power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.
[67][18]
Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12.
What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American
jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[68][19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of
Congress, but also of any of its committee. This is significant because it constitutes a
direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the
mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative
function are also available to the committees.[69][20]
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident
in Senate v. Ermita,[70][21] where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is
broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced
the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject
for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry
is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the
Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry,
being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as
well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.[71][22] It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.[72][23] PCGG belongs to this class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the
Constitution stating that: Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with
certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so
delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in
behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the
officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the

office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not
their rulers.[73][24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of
public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and nonaccountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,[74][25] Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion
barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed
against the PCGG and its Commissioners.
He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is
important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less
upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of
Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the
PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the
discharge of the task contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a)
would, in my submission, be open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a)
would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of
the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and
a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987
Constitution. x x x.
x x

x x

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member

of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such
members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[75][26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been
frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
2)
NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE VS. SANGGUNIANG
PANGLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE CITY, G.R. No. 72492, Nov. 5, 1987, 155 SCRA
421
Petitioners contend that the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is bereft
of the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, nor the power to order
the arrest of witnesses who fail to obey its subpoena. It is further argued that assuming
the power to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses to be lodged in said body,
it cannot be exercised in the investigation of matters affecting the terms and conditions of
the franchise granted to NORECO II which are beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod.

Respondents, for their part, claim that inherent in the legislative functions performed by
the respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod is the power to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation and with it, the power to punish for contempt in inquiries on matters within its
jurisdiction (Rollo, p. 46). It is also the position of the respondents that the contempt
power, if not expressly granted, is necessarily implied from the powers granted the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (Rollo, pp. 48-49). Furthermore, the respondents assert that an
inquiry into the installation or use of inefficient power lines and its effect on the power
consumption cost on the part of Dumaguete residents is well-within the jurisdiction of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and its committees.
1.
A line should be drawn between the powers of Congress as the repository of the
legislative power under the Constitution, and those that may be exercised by the
legislative bodies of local government unit, e.g. the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dumaguete which, as mere creatures of law, possess delegated legislative power. While
the Constitution does not expressly vest Congress with the power to punish non-members
for legislative contempt, the power has nevertheless been invoked by the legislative body
as a means of preserving its authority and dignity (Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29
[1950]); Amault v. Balagtas, 97 Phil. 358 [1955]), in the same way that courts wield an
inherent power to enforce their authority, preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity,
and ensure the effectiveness of the administration of justice. (Commissioner v. Cloribel,
127 Phil. 716, 723 [1967]; In re Kelly 35 Phil. 944 950 [1916], and other cases). The
exercise by Congress of this awesome power was questioned for the first time in the
leading case of Arnault v. Nazareno, (87 Phil. 29 [1950]) where this Court held that the
legislative body indeed possessed the contempt power.
But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26, L.ed., 377.)
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or
incidental to the exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the
knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and
compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the
principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the real of its
respective authority, it must have intended each departments authority to be full and
complete, independently of the others authority or power. And how could the authority
and power become complete if for every act of refusal every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the
appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the
affronts committed against its authority or dignity. . . (Arnault v. Balagtas, L-6749, July
30, 1955; 97 Phil. 358, 370 [1955]).
The aforequoted pronouncements in the two Arnault cases, supra, broke ground in what
was then an unexplored area of jurisprudence, and succeeded in supplying the raison d

etre of this power of Congress even in the absence of express constitutional grant.
Whether or not the reasons for upholding the existence of said power in Congress may be
applied mutatis mutandis to a questioned exercise of the power of contempt by the
respondent committee of a city council is the threshold issue in the present controversy.
3.
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of selfpreservation as that branch of the government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and punishes contempts thereof.
The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis, and local legislative
bodies cannot correctly claim to possess it for the same reasons that the national
legislature does. The power attaches not to the discharge of legislative functions per se
but to the character of the legislature as one of the three independent and coordinate
branches of government. The same thing cannot be said of local legislative bodies which
are creations of law.
4.
To begin with, there is no express provision either in the 1973 Constitution or in
the Local Government Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) granting local legislative bodies,
the power to subpoena witnesses and the power to punish non-members for contempt.
Absent a constitutional or legal provision for the exercise of these powers, the only
possible justification for the issuance of a subpoena and for the punishment of nonmembers for contumacious behaviour would be for said power to be deemed implied in
the statutory grant of delegated legislative power. But, the contempt power and the
subpoena power partake of a judicial nature. They cannot be implied in the grant of
legislative power. Neither can they exist as mere incidents of the performance of
legislative functions. To allow local legislative bodies or administrative agencies to
exercise these powers without express statutory basis would run afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
These cannot be presumed to exist in favor of the latter and must be considered as an
exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337 which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favor
of local autonomy. Since the existence of the contempt power in conjunction with the
subpoena power in any government body inevitably poses a potential derogation of
individual rights, i.e. compulsion of testimony and punishment for refusal to testify, the
law cannot be liberally construed to have impliedly granted such powers to local
legislative bodies. It cannot be lightly presumed that the sovereign people, the ultimate
source of all government powers, have reposed these powers in all government agencies.
The intention of the sovereign people, through their representatives in the legislature, to
share these unique and awesome powers with the local legislative bodies must therefore
clearly appear in pertinent legislation.
There being no provision in the Local Government Code explicitly granting local
legislative bodies, the power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for
contempt, the Sanggunian Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish the
petitioners Torres and Umbac for contempt. The Ad-Hoc Committee of said legislative
body has even less basis to claim that it can exercise these powers.

11.
Sections 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the
consent of the President, or upon the request of either House, as the Rules of each House
shall provide, appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their
departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the
Speaker of the HR at least 3 days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall
not be limited to written questions, but may not cover matter matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states
in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
12.
Section 23 [1] The Congress, by a vote of 2/3 of both Houses in a joint session
assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a
state of war.
[2] In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it
may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by a resolution of the Congress, such
powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
a. Note the limitations and restrictions for the delegation.
b. Note also that it could be withdrawn by mere resolution.
c. What is referred to by the phrase next adjournment?
d. Read:
1) ARANETA VS. DINGLASAN, 84 Phil. 369
the first emergency powers cases
2) RODRIGUEZ VS. GELLA, 92 Phil. 603
the second emergency powers cases.
3) Republic Act No. 6826, Dec.20, 1989 which grants emergency powers to
President Aquino.
13.
Sections 24. All appropriations, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase
of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively
in the House of representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
NOTE: In Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Supreme Court held that the E-VAT
Law is constitutional even if the same was the VERSION which came from the Senate,
not from the House of Representatives. This is so because the Senate is allowed to

propose amendments to bills which must exclusively originate from the House of
Representatives.
14.
Section 25 [1] The Congress may not increase the appropriation
recommended by the President for the operation of the government as specified in
the budget. The form, content, and manner of preparation of the budget shall be
prescribed by law.
[2 No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill
unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any provision
or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates.
[3] The procedure in approving appropriations for the Congress shall strictly
follow the procedure for approving appropriations for other departments and
agencies.
[4] A special appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is
intended, and shall be supported by funds actually available as certified by the
national treasurer, or to be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein.
[5] No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the house of
Representatives, the Chief justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the
constitutional commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
[6] Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be disbursed
only for the purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law.
[7] If, by the end of any fiscal year, the Congress shall have failed to pass the
general appropriations bill for the ensuing fiscal year, the general appropriations
law for the preceding year shall be deemed reenacted and shall remain in force and
effect until the general appropriations bill is passed by the Congress.
Read: DEMETRIA vs. ALBA, 148 SCRA 208
17.
Section 26. [1] Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
[2] No bill shall be passed unless it has passed 3 readings on separate days, and
printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its members 3 days
before its passage, except when the President certifies as to its necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading

of the bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be
taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
Read:
1) TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, 151 SCRA 208
2) DE LA CRUZ VS. PARAS, 123 SCRA 569
3) INSULAR LUMBER VS. CTA, 104 SCRA 710
4)

LIDASAN VS. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 496

The case questions the law entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the
Province of Lanao del Sur, but which includes barrios located in another province
Cotabato to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that No bill
which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill?
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios in two municipalities in the province of
Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the Office of the President, through
the Assistant Executive Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until clarified by correcting legislation.
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its own interpretation, declared
that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual
limitations upon legislative power. First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration,
under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be couched
in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the
import of the single subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be expressed in
the title of the bill. This constitutional requirement breathes the spirit of command.
Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress
the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case
of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790, only its title was read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives where the bill, being of
local application, originated.

Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and
discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud
upon the legislators.
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms
where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put
on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating
one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting
any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should be
considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to all
persons interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at the disputed statute. The
title An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur
8 projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the
creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the
adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase in the Province of Lanao del Sur, read without subtlety or contortion, makes the
title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged
purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly
from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of
Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province
different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of
Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and
province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill. These are the
pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
5) ALALAYAN VS. NAPOCOR, 24 SCRA 172
6)

CORDERO VS. CABATUANDO, 6 SCRA 418

7)

TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF ENERGY, November 5, 1997, 281 SCRA 333

18.
Section 27. [1] Every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he
shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the House where it
originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such consideration , 2/3 of all the members of such House shall
agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections , to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by 2/3 of all the
members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each
house shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for
or against shall be entered in its journal. The President shall communicate his veto
of any bill to the House where it originated within 30 days after the date of receipt
thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he signed it.
[2] The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items
to which he does not object.
1)

Read:

a. BENGZON VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, 62 Phil. 912

b. BOLINAO ELECTRONICS VS. VALENCIA, 11 SCRA 486
c. NEPTALI GONZALES VS. MACARAIG, November 19, 1990
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY 89] hereinafter), which
was vetoed by the President, reads:
SEC. 55.
Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended
Appropriations Disapproved and /or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation
recommended by the President in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article
VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in this Act
shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes
by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the
President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act.
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:
The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed,
this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the
President, but also that of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of
Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriation. A careful review of the legislative action on the budget as submitted

shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended by the
President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the
Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted consequence of this
provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even
in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation
of essential public services and infrastructure projects.
I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI
of the Constitution in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by
R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to use savings to augment any item of
appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government.
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of
the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY89), and subsequently of its counterpart
Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY90), is unconstitutional and
without effect.
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to
veto provisions of an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 FY 89) and Section 16 (FY90) are provisions
and not items and are, therefore, outside the scope of the item veto power of the
President.
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution reading, in full, as follows:
Sec. 27.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to
which he does not object.
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised
would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is
referred to as the item veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the
veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations
Bill. In other words, the power given the Executive to disapprove any item or items
in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and
to approve the remaining portion of the same item.

It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI,
Section 27 [2], supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned.
In other words, also eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a provision. The
vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the
power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated
to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va.
281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice
(299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared that an item of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation
bill.
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI,
Section 27 (2) of the 1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the
extent of the Presidents veto power as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution
has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces the basic
principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate
veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin,
S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill
shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto,
we are of the opinion that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not
provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec. 25
(2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general
appropriations bill unless it relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein.
Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to
which it relates.
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. The challenged provisions fall

short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed provisions do not relate to any particular or
distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by
Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made
to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by
petitioners themselves, i.e., the Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office
(Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although
labelled as provisions, are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as
items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep.
2d, 157-158).
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred
on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional
powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general
appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governors
constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation cannot be abridged by the
careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the
Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing
items of expenditure essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot
by location ot a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor it circumvent the
Governors veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law
measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of
appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of government in contravention of the
separation of powers doctrine We are no more willing to allow the legislature to use its
appropriation power to infringe on the Governors constitutional right to veto matters of
substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the
constitutional powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when
the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such
provisions must be treated as items for purposes of the Governors item veto power over
general appropriation bills.
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an
Appropriations Bill and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not
carry with it the power to strike them out, citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE
2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740, June
30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY89) and
Section 16 (FY90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power.
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to
specify how money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct items of
appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation Bills qualifications,
conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that
the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while

allowing the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was also
the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a condition in an Appropriations
Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed
invalid and without effect whatsoever.
The Power of augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY89) and Section 16 (FY90) because they
nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of
government to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by
Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Said provision reads:
Sec. 25.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations. (Emphasis ours).
If, indeed, the Legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the
Executive were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal
clear. A Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of
Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[l], supra). But Congress made
no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners argument that the veto is
ineffectual so that there is nothing to override (citing Bolinao) has lost force and
effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.
b.

BENGZON VS. DRILON, April 15, 1992

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act
is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is
clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make
adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the
judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional
mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it
in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints.
The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where
augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court
upheld the authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated
that:

There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted.
And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the
Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public
funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in
no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of
government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25.
(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations;
however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for
augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly
in consonance with the abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the
power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the Judiciarys appropriation, in
contravention of the constitutional provision on fiscal autonomy.
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued
pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have
been enacted by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v,
Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory
provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on retirement are founded on services
rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory prerequisite for
retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not,
thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of
which is to entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to
permit them to retire therefrom with relative security, not only those who have retained
their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re:
Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of
their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement,
(190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.

This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the
pension rates. Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to
afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing
that the lump sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest
monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances each Justice
was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated
October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired
Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate of
transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date
of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra).
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are
unduly favored is, again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in
the tens of thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified.
Justices retire at age 70 while military men retire at a much younger age some retired
Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are
made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the
equal protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service
where the reason for the retirement provision is not based on indubitable and
constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices whose retirement
pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of
protections given by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the
Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any
institution given the power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and
Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree of independence in the exercise of its
functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased
without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70
except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the administrative
supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice
unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is
under the Supreme Courts supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our
continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative
or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is
not only independent of, but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and
Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30, Article VI, Constitution).

Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices
of this Court and the ground that there should be no grant of distinct privileges or
preferential treatment to retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution
and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special protections for the
Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a
large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to
preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds,
raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already
leading private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: To lay with one hand the power of
the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored
individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . .
(Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are
unbecoming of an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter,
learned in the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L.
Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active
service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who represent the
government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before
these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these
Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as
engaging in robbery is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the
argument is unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that
the then quality of research in that institution has severely deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v.
Topeka but Citizens Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City
(20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the
validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of
building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve
their services. The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a municipality to
impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.

The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since
that ancient period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may
now be used for slum clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and
agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was
robbery in 1874 is now called social justice. There is nothing about retirement
benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or
encyclopedia which could not even spell loan correctly. Good lawyers are expected to
go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the
Judiciary requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with
the everyday living expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that old age
entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284,
July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their
intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer
has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life
to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best
concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and
length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is
done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the
approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he
did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be
effective, the government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of
their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as
illegal and unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are
declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly
release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject
pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to
be implemented as promulgated.
2) What is a pocket veto?
3) What are the three ways by which a bill becomes a law?
3.

PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ, 235 SCRA 506

What is the so-called executive impoundment?

It means that although an item of appropriation is not vetoed by the President, he

however refuses for whatever reason, to spend funds made possible by Congress. It is the
failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type. Proponents of impoundment
have invoked at least three (3) principal sources of authority of the President. [1]
authority to impound given to him by Congress, either expressly or impliedly; [2] the
executive power drawn from his power as Commander-in-chief; and [3] the Faithful
execution clause of the Constitution.
Note that in this case the SC held that the Countryside Development Fund (CDF) of
Congressmen and Senators is CONSTITUTIONAL because the same is set aside for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by said
Senators and Congressmen.
19.
Section 28. [1] The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The
Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
[2] The Congress, may by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts
within the framework of the national development program of the government.
[3] Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements,
actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational
purposes shall be exempt from taxation.
[4] No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid or employeddirectly
or indirectly for the benefit, use, or support of any sect, denomination, or system of
religionexcept when such preacher, priest is assigned to the AFP, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
All money collected on any tax for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and
paid out for such purpose only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds
of the Government.
Read:
1. Garcia vs. Executive Sec., 211 SCRA 219

1-a) PEPSI COLA VS. THE CITY OF BUTUAN, 24 SCRA 789

2) PROVINCE OF ABRA VS. HERNANDO, 107 SCRA 104
3) APOSTOLIC PREFECT OF BAGUIO VS. TREASURER, 71 Phil. 547
4) PASCUAL VS. SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS, 110 Phil. 331
4)

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ, 64 Phil. 201

5)

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

Respondent Dr. Francisco A. Perez was named outstanding Health Worker for 1980 by
the Ministry of Health on January 22, 1981. Being such an awardee, Dr. Perez was
granted by the Ministry of Health a two-step salary increase in accordance with the merit
increase program as enunciated in Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 562. Thereafter, the
Ministry of Health requested the Sangguniang Panglunsod of San Pablo City, which is
paying Dr. Perez salary in full to appropriate the amount corresponding to the merit
increase in its current budget. For lack of legal basis, the Bureau of Local Government
opposed the proposed merit increase because the provisions of LOI No. 562 apply only to
officials/employees in the national government, and consequently, awardee Dr. Perez was
not entitled thereto, since he is an employee of the local government as provided for in
the charter of San Pablo City. This prompted Dr. Perez to request the Ministry of Health
to make the corresponding allocation to issue a notice of salary adjustment effective
January 1, 1981. The Minister of Justice, upon a query made by the Ministry of Health, in
his Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, dated November 20, 1981, acknowledged that the
merit increase program applies only to the officials/employees of the national government
but declared Dr. Perez as one such official or employee and concluded that the Ministry
of Health should pay the merit increase to him. Relying on such opinion, the Ministry of
Health issued to respondent Dr. Perez on December 1, 1981 a notice of salary adjustment
which release of the amount was denied by the Office of the Budget and Management
which insisted that the awardee is an employee of the local or city government who is not
covered by the merit increase program. Dr. Perez made his appeal therefrom to the
Ministry of Health who forwarded it, recommending favorable action thereon to the
Office of the President of the Philippines. The latter referred the appeal to the Minister of
the Budget who affirmed his earlier decision of disallowing the merit increase and
reiterating the same reasons. A petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Budget
and Management to pay the merit increase was filed by Dr. Perez before the lower court
which granted the aforementioned favorable decision, subject matter of the present
petition for review on certiorari before Us by petitioners arguing that:
1.
The position of private respondent as the City Health Officer of San Pablo City is
embraced in Sec. 7 of Pres. Decree (P.D.) No. 1136 which states among other things that
the salary plan provided for in Sec. 8 of the same decree shall cover the City Officer,
among other officials, whose salary shall be paid out of city funds and therefore a local

government employee whose position does not appear in the list of national government
employees defined under another law (P.D. 985).
2.
The constitution provides that no money shag be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law. Since there is no such appropriation, the
Minister of the Budget cannot be compelled to release the amount for the payment of the
merit salary increase because such allocation entails the exercise of judgment and
discretion of the Minister of the Budget which cannot be controlled by mandamus.
3.
The decision declaring respondent Dr. Perez as an employee of the national
government would have far reaching effects such that all other city health officers and
local officials similarly situated would also be so entitled to an personal benefits given to
national employee. Dr. Perezs exemplary accomplishment which merited for him the
grant to a two-step increase must yield to the overriding economic consideration of
availability of funds which the government must set aside for the purpose.
We do not agree with the arguments set down by petitioners. Private respondent invites
Our attention to the City Charter of San Pablo City (CA #5201, Sec. 87, May 7, 1940)
more specifically, Art. IV thereof, which provides that the position of a City Health
Officer is not included among the heads of the regular departments of the city but
included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the direct
control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor as provided for in Art. XIV of the
same charter. Such principle is reiterated in the Decentralization Act of 1967 which
shows that the appointing authority is the Health Minister and not the local officials.
Petitioner Minister of the Budget admitted thru the testimony of its representative, Alice
S. Torres, chief of the Compensation and Position Classification and a specialist thereon
that the City Health Officer is under the administrative and technical supervision of the
Ministry of Health (p. 69, tsn, June 16, 1983, p. 72, Rollo). Be it noted that, Section 7 of
PD 1136 relied upon by petitioners provides that the basic salary of the City Health
Officer is paid from city funds. However, the last paragraph of the same Sec. 7, excludes
the city health officer from the classification of local government official as can be
gathered from the phrase except those occupied by (a) officials whose compensation
is fixed in the constitution, Presidential Decrees and other laws and (b) officials and
employees who are under the direct supervision and control of the National Government
or its agencies and who are paid wholly or partially from national funds.
Provincial and city health officers are all considered national government officials
irrespective of the source of funds of their salary because the preservation of health is a
national service. Also their positions are partially funded by the national government.
Some are receiving one-half of their salary from the national funds and the other one-half
from local funds.
We cannot likewise ignore the opinions of the Ministry of Justice cited by private
respondent to wit: 1) Opinion No. 26, Series of 1976 which categorically rules that
Officials and employees of provincial and city health offices render service as officials
and employees of the Bureau of Health (Ministry of Health) and they are for that reason

not local but national officials under the direct supervision and control of the Ministry of
Health; 2) Opinion No. 177, Series of 1981, which is specific and definitive that the
private respondent is a national government employee and the Ministry of Health should
pay the merit increase awarded to him. In this 1981 opinion, it was explained in detail
how the said funds corresponding to his merit increase could be legally disbursed
contrary to the unfounded speculations expressed by the petitioners.
Lastly, there is no basis in petitioners allegations that they cannot be compelled by
mandamus as the appropriation is not authorized by law and it is discretionary on the part
of the Ministry of the Budget whether or not to allocate. Respondent Dr. Perez has been
proven to be a national government official, hence covered by the merit promotion plan
of the government more particularly the Health Ministry wherein private respondent is its
lone beneficiary for the year 1980 in Region IV. It thus becomes the ministerial duty of
the Budget Minister to approve the request for allotment. Having failed to do so, he could
be compelled by mandamus.
20.
Section 30. No law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in the Constitution without its advice and concurrence.
TERESITA FABIAN VS. HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO, G.R. No. 129742,
September 16, 1998)
Regalado, J.
Section 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides:
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for Certiorari
within 10 days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or
denial of the Motion for Reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court
Issue:
Is Section 27 of RA 6770 constitutional?
Held:
Section 27 of RA 6770 is unconstitutional since it increases the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court without its advice and consent as provided under Section 30, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. As explained in FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS INC. VS.
CA, 237 SCRA 519, the aforesaid constitutional provision was intended to give the
Supreme Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate jurisdiction.
Otherwise, the enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court.

Appeal of cases decided by the Office of the Ombudsman covered by Section 27 of RA

6770 shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.
Read:

MANUEL ALBA VS. PEREZ, G.R. No. 65917, Sept. 24, 1987

21.
Sections 32. The Congress, shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of
initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
propose and enact laws or approve or reject any law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body after the registration of a petition therefore signed by at
least 10% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must
be represented by at least 3% of the registered voters thereof.
Read again RA 6735 & SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC & PIRMA
Reference:
Political Law Reviewer by Atty. Larry D. Gacayan
College of Law, University of the Cordilleras
Baguio City

* Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
[1]

Annex B, id. at 52.

[2]

Annex C, id. at 53.

[3] Francisco v. House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003, 415
SCRA 44, 133.
[4]

G.R. No. 67752, April 10, 1989, 171 SCRA 657.

[5]

G.R. No. 78716, September 22, 1987 (res).

[6]

Rollo (G.R. No. 169777), p. 117.

[7]

Supra note 39 at 136.

[8]

87 Phil. 29 (1950).

[9] Supra at 45, citing McGrain v. Daugherty 273 US 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L.Ed. 580,
50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).

[10]

Id. at 46.

[11] G.R. 89914, Nov. 20, 1991, 203 SCRA 767.

[12] Supra.
[13]

Supra note 82 at 189.

[14] G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.
[15][6] Transcript of the September 26, 2007 Hearing of the respondent Committees,
pp.91-92.
[16][7]

Id., pp. 114-115.

[17][8]

Id., pp. 276-277.

[18][9]

See Letter dated January 30, 2008.

[19][10] 488 SCRA 1 (2006).

[20][11] 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
[21][12] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information.
Public officials and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified
information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to
the public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[22][13] SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
cases. (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as
to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by disclosure.
[23][18]

Supra.

[24][19]

Ibid.

[25][20]

Ibid.

[26][21]

Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil 32 (1950)

[27][22]

Senate v. Ermita, p. 58.

[28][23]

5 U.S. C. 552

[29][24]
[30][25]

51 U.S. C. app.
433 Phil. 506 (2002).

[31][26]

G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998, (360 SCRA 132 ).

[32][27] Supra.
[33][28]
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege:
History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at p. 2.
[34][29]
[35][30]
[36][31]

418 U.S. 683.

In Re: Sealed Case No. 96-3124, June 17, 1997.
Id.

[37][32]
CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege:
History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments at pp. 18-19.
[38][38]
[39][39]

360 Phil. 133 (1998).

Supra.

[40][40]

Section 18, Article VII.

[41][41]

Section 16, Article VII.

[42][42]

Section 19, Article VII.

[43][43]

Section 20 and 21, Article VII.

[44][44] CRS Report for Congress, Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History,
Law Practice and Recent Developments, supra..

[45][45] Bernas, S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A
Commentary, 2003 Ed. p. 903.
[46][46]

159 U.S. App. DC. 58, 487 F. 2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

[47][47]

U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)

[48][48]
[49][50]

Supra.
Citing Section 7, Article 3 of the Constitution.

[50][51] Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and
existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public
official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x
( c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. Public officials
and employees shall not use or divulge, confidential or classified information
officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the
public, either:
(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or
(2) To prejudice the public interest.
[51][52] Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer. Any public officer who
shall reveal any secret known to him by reason of his official capacity, or shall
wrongfully deliver papers or copies of papers of which he may have charge and which
should not be published, shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods, perpetual special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 2,000
pesos if the revelation of such secrets or the delivery of such papers shall have caused
serious damage to the public interest; otherwise, the penalties of prision correccional in
its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed.
[52][53] Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or
omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or
by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such
information in advance of its authorized release date.
[53][54]
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communications.
The following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following
case: x x x

(a) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public
interest would suffer by the disclosure.
[54][55] In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra., the Supreme Court recognized
matters which the Court has long considered as confidential such as information on
military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information
on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the
accused. It also stated that presidential conversations, correspondences, or discussions
during close-door cabinet meetings which, like internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court or other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are
recognized as confidential. Such information cannot be pried-open by a co-equal branch
of government.
[55][56] United States v. Reynolds, supra..
[56][57] Unites States v. Article of Drug, 43 F.R.D. at 190.
[57][58]

Senate v. Ermita, supra., p. 63.

[58][59] Id., citing U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L. Ed. 727, 32 A.L.
R. 2d 382 (1953).
[59][61] Trancript of the January 30, 2008 proceedings, p. 29.
[60][63]
Rodriguez v. Judge Bonifacio, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1510, November 6,
2000, 344 SCRA 519.
[61][4]

Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[62][6]

Annex F of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[63][7]

Annex G of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[64][13] Annex D of the petition in G.R. No. 174318.

[65][15]

273 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 319, 71 L. Ed. 580, 50 A.L.R. 1 (1927).

[66][16]

No. L- 3820, 87 Phil. 29 (1950).

[67][18]

Puno, Lecture on Legislative Investigations and the Right to Privacy, at p. 22.

[68][19] Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2003
Ed. at p.737.

[69][20] Bernas S.J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2003
Ed. at p.739.
[70][21]

G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006.

[71][22]

Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), pp. 194-195.

[72][23]

Senate v. Ermita, Id.

[73][24]

De Leon, De Leon, Jr. The Law on Public Officers and Election Law, p. 2.

[74][25]

No. L-77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 558.

[75][26]

193 SCRA 282 (1991).