G.R. No. 193237 - DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner v.

COMMISSION ON ELECT/0]\/S and AGAPITO J.

CARD/NO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 193536- A GAP/TO J. CARD/NO, Petitioner v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS and DOMINADOR G. JALOSJOS,
JR., Respondents.

Promulgated:

)(

-------- ------ -- - - - -----

- -

OCTOBER 09, 2012

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - )(

CONCURRING OPINION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The all-important concern here is the effect of the conviction for
robbery by final judgment of and the probation allegedly granted to
Dominador G. Jalosjos, petitioner in G.R. No. 193237, on,. his candidacy for
the position of Mayor of Dapitan City; and the determination of the rightful
person to assume the contested elective position upon the ineligibility of
Jalosjos.

I easily CONCUR with the insightful opinion delivered for the

Majority by our esteemed colleague, Senior Associate Justice Carpio. As I
see it, these consolidated cases furnish to the Court the appropriate occasion
to look again into the candidacy of a clearly ineligible candidate garnering
the majority of the votes cast in an election and being proclaimed as the
winning candidate to the detriment of the valid candidacy of his rival who
has all the qualifications and suffers rione of the disqualifications. The
ineligible candidate thereby mocks the sanctity of the ballot and reduces the
':

electoral exercise into an expensive joke.

..

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

G.R. No. 193237 is a special civil action for certiorari brought by

Jalosjos to assail the Resolution dated August 11, 2010,1 whereby the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc affirmed the Resolution
dated May 10, 20102 issued by the COMELEC First Division in SPC No.
09-076 (DC). Both Resolutions declared Jalosjos ineligible to run as Mayor
of Dapitan City, Zamboanga Del Norte in the May 10, 2010 national and
local elections pursuant to Section 40(a) of The Local Government Code
(LGC), viz:
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving
moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those
removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
xxx

Additionally, the COMELEC cancelled Jalosjos certificate of candidacy

(CoC) on the ground of material misrepresentation made therein.
Jalosjos charges the COMELEC En Banc with committing grave
abuse of discretion when it ruled that he was disqualified to run as Mayor of
Dapitan City in view of the revocation of his probation; and when it
cancelled his CoC without finding that he had deliberately misrepresented
his qualifications to run as Mayor.
G.R. No. 193536 is a special civil action for certiorari commenced by
Agapito J. Cardino, the only other candidate against Jalosjos, in order to set
aside the COMELEC En Bancs Resolution dated August 11, 2010,3 to the
extent that the Resolution directed the application of the rule of succession
as provided in the LGC. Cardino challenges the COMELEC En Bancs
application of the rule of succession under the LGC, contending that he

1
2
3

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 49-56.

Id. at 40-48.
Id. at 49-56.

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

should be considered elected as Mayor upon the cancellation of Jalosjos

CoC because he had been the only bona fide candidate for the position of
Mayor of Dapitan City.4 Cardino insists that the cancellation of Jalosjos
CoC retroacted to the date of its filing, thereby reducing him into a noncandidate.5
The special civil actions were consolidated on March 29, 2011.6

Antecedents
The antecedents are narrated in the Resolution the Court has
promulgated on February 22, 2011 in G.R. No. 193237, to wit:
On December 6, 2009, private respondent Agapito J. Cardino filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course to and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of
petitioner before respondent Comelec. Petitioner and private respondent
were both candidates for Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga del Norte
during the 2010 Elections. Private respondent alleged that petitioner
misrepresented in his CoC that he was eligible to run for Mayor, when, in
fact, he was not, since he had been convicted by final judgment of
robbery, a crime involving moral turpitude, and he has failed to serve a
single day of his sentence.
The final judgment for robbery stems from the following factual
antecedents:
On April 30, 1970, the then Circuit Criminal Court (now Regional
Trial Court [RTC]) of Cebu City convicted petitioner of the crime of
robbery and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of one (1) year, eight (8)
months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to
four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals
(CA). He later abandoned the appeal, which was thus dismissed on August
9, 1973. Sometime in June 1985, petitioner filed a petition for probation.
On July 9, 1985, Gregorio F. Bacolod (Bacolod), who was then the
Supervising Probation Officer of the Parole and Probation Office,
recommended to the RTC the grant of petitioner's application for
probation. On the same day, the RTC issued an Order granting the
probation for a period of one year subject to the terms and conditions
stated therein.

4
5
6

Rollo, G.R. No. 193536, p. 9.

Id.
Id. at 177.

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

However, on August 8, 1986, Bacolod filed a Motion for

Revocation of the probation on the ground that petitioner failed to report
to him, in violation of the condition of the probation. Accordingly, the
RTC issued an Order dated March 19, 1987, revoking the probation and
ordering the issuance of a warrant of arrest. A warrant of arrest was issued
but remained unserved.
More than 16 years later, or on December 19, 2003, petitioner
secured a Certification from the Central Office of the Parole and Probation
Administration (PPA), which was signed by Bacolod, now Administrator
of the PPA, attesting that petitioner had fulfilled the terms and conditions
of his probation.
At this time, the prosecution also decided to stir the case. It filed a
motion for the issuance of an alias warrant of arrest. The RTC granted the
motion on January 16, 2004 and issued an Order for the Issuance of an
Alias Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.
On January 23, 2004, Bacolod submitted to the RTC a Termination
Report stating that petitioner had fulfilled the terms and conditions of his
probation and, hence, his case should be deemed terminated. On the same
day, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Reconsider its January 16, 2004
Order and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest.
On January 29, 2004, James A. Adasa (Adasa), petitioner's
opponent for the mayoralty position during the 2004 Elections, filed a
Petition for Disqualification against petitioner, based on Section 40(a) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991, on
the ground that the latter has been convicted of robbery and failed to serve
his sentence. Adasa later amended his petition to include Section 40(e) of
the same law, claiming that petitioner is also a fugitive from justice.
Meanwhile, acting on petitioner's urgent motion, the RTC issued
an Order dated February 5, 2004, declaring that petitioner had duly
complied with the order of probation, setting aside its January 16, 2004
Order, and recalling the warrant of arrest.
Thus, in resolving Adasa's petition, the Comelec Investigating
Officer cited the February 5, 2004 RTC Order and recommended that
petitioner be declared qualified to run for Mayor. In the Resolution dated
August 2, 2004, the Comelec-Second Division adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Officer and denied the petition for
disqualification. It held that petitioner has amply proven that he had
complied with the requirements of his probation as shown by the
Certification from the PPA dated December 19, 2003, which was the basis
of the February 5, 2004 RTC Order.
Adasa filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Comelec En
Banc denied on December 13, 2006.
Adasa then filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court
(G.R. No. 176285). In a Resolution dated June 3, 2008, the Court
dismissed the petition for being moot and academic, the three-year term of
office having expired.

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

In a related incident, Bacolod, who issued the Certification dated

December 19, 2003 to petitioner, was charged with violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and falsification of public document under the
Revised Penal Code for issuing said Certification. On September 29, 2008,
the Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding Bacolod guilty as charged.
It held that the Certification he issued was definitely false because
petitioner did not actually fulfill the conditions of his probation as shown
in the RTC Order dated March 19, 1987, which states that the probation
was being revoked. Hence, at the time the Certification was issued, there
was no longer a probation order to be fulfilled by petitioner.
On May 10, 2010, the elections were held, and petitioner won as
Mayor of Dapitan City.
On the same day, the Comelec-First Division issued a resolution
granting the Petition to Deny Due Course and cancelling petitioner's CoC.
The Comelec noted that the dismissal of Adasa's petition for
disqualification hinged on the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
the PPA Certification dated December 19, 2003, declaring that petitioner
had complied with the requirements of his probation. It opined that, with
the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Bacolod, it would now
appear that the December 19, 2003 Certification was fraudulently issued
and that petitioner had not actually served his sentence; thus, the ruling on
Adasas petition is left with no leg to stand on.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. The Comelec En Banc
denied the motion in a resolution dated August 11, 2010. The Comelec
ordered him to cease and desist from occupying and discharging the
functions of the Office of the Mayor of Dapitan City.7

Through the Resolution promulgated on February 22, 2011,8 the Court

dismissed G.R. No. 193237, disposing:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition for
Certiorari is DISMISSED. The assailed Resolution dated May 10, 2010
and Resolution dated August 11, 2010 of the Commission on Elections in
SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) are hereby AFFIRMED.

On March 22, 2011, Jalosjos moved for the reconsideration of the

February 22, 2011 Resolution,9 raising the same issues he had averred in his
petition.
On June 1, 2012, however, Jalosjos filed a manifestation dated May
30, 2012, informing the Court that he had meanwhile tendered his

7
8
9

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 355-358.

Id. at 355-360.
Id. at. 373-391.

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

resignation as Mayor of Dapitan City effective April 30, 2012; that his
resignation had been accepted by Governor Rolando E. Yebes of
Zamboanga del Norte; and that Vice Mayor Patri Bajamunde-Chan had
taken her oath of office as the new Mayor of Dapitan City.

Disposition
I vote to affirm the disqualification of Jalosjos as a candidate for
Mayor of Dapitan City; and to sustain the Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc cancelling his CoC.
I agree with the Majority that the rule of succession provided by the
LGC does not apply to determine who should now sit as Mayor of Dapitan
City. Thus, I hold that Cardino, the only other candidate with a valid CoC
for Mayor of Dapitan City in the May 10, 2010 elections, had the legal right
to assume the position of City Mayor.
Let me specify the reasons for this humble concurrence.
1.
Cardinos petition in SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC)
was a petition to deny due course to
or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code
The COMELEC En Banc correctly held that the petition of Cardino in
SPA Case No. 09-076 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due
course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections,10 the Court pointed out that
there are two remedies available to challenge the qualifications of a
candidate, namely:

10

G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447.

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

(1) Before the election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus

Election Code, to wit:
Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material misrepresentation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than
fifteen days before the election.

and
(2) After the election, pursuant to Section 253 oftheOmnibus
Election Code, viz:
Section 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the
election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial,
or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto
with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results
of the election.

The Court has explained that the only difference between the two
remedies is that, under Section 78, the qualifications for elective office are
misrepresented in the CoC, and the proceedings must be initiated prior to the
elections, while under Section 253, a petition for quo warranto may be
brought within ten days after the proclamation of the election results on
either of two grounds, to wit: (a) ineligibility; or (b) disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines. A candidate is ineligible under Section 253 if he
is disqualified to be elected to office; and he is disqualified if he lacks any of
the qualifications for elective office.11
In describing the nature of a Section 78 petition, the Court said in
Fermin v. Commission on Elections:12
Lest it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the
cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a
finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false,
which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she

11
12

Id. at 457.
G.R. No. 179695 & 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782.

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

is running for. It is noted that the candidate states in his/her CoC that
he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory
provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC
that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny
due course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already
likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
Section 78 petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.13

Clearly, the only instance where a petition assailing the qualifications

of a candidate for elective office can be filed prior to the elections is when
the petition is filed under Section 78.14
A Section 78 petition is not to be confused with a Section 12 or
Section 68 petition. The two are different remedies, are based on different
grounds, and can result in different eventualities.15 A person who is
disqualified under either Section 1216 or Section 6817 is prohibited to
continue as a candidate, but a person whose CoC is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not considered a candidate at all because his
status is that of a person who has not filed a CoC.18

13

Id., pp. 792-794; emphases are part of the original text.

Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 192856, March 8, 2011, 644 SCRA 761, 777.
15
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12, p. 794.
16
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for
any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime
involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has
been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualification to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified.
17
Section 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his
election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86
and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless
said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.
18
Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12, at pp. 794-796, to wit:
x x x [A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
[Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local Government Code]. On the other hand, a petition to
14

Concurring Opinion

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

To ascertain whether Cardinos petition against Jaloslos was a petition

under Section 78, on one hand, or under Section 12 or Section 68, on the
other hand, it is necessary to look at its averments and relief prayed for, viz:
1. Petitioner is of legal age, Filipino citizen, married, able to read and
write, a registered voter of Precinct No. 0019A, and is and has been a
resident of Dapitan City, continuously since birth up to the present;
2. Petitioner duly filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of City
Mayor of Dapitan for the election on May 10, 2010, with the Office of
the Commission on Election, Dapitan City, on December 1, 2009,
which accepted and acknowledged the same, a copy of which is hereto
attached as Annex A;
3. Respondent is also of legal age, a resident of Dapitan City, a registered
voter of Precinct No. 0187B, likewise filed his certificate of candidacy
for the same position with the Office of the Comelec, Dapitan City, as
that for which petitioner duly filed a certificate of candidacy, for the
May 10, 2010 national and local elections on December 1, 2009, a
certified true copy of said COC is hereto attached as Annex B;
4. Respondents certificate of candidacy under oath contains
material misrepresentation, when he declared under oath, that
respondent is eligible for the office he seeks to be elected, [par. 16,
COC for Mayor], considering that he is not eligible for the position
for which he filed a certificate of candidacy because respondent
was convicted by final judgment by the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CCC-XIV-140-Cebu for Robbery, an
offense involving moral turpitude and he was sentenced to suffer
the penalty of one [1] year, eight [8] Months and Twenty [20]
Days of prision correctional, as minimum, to Four [4] years, Two
[2] months and One [1] day of prision mayor as maximum, a
certified true [copy] of which decision is hereto attached as Annex
C;
5. Respondent failed to serve even a single day of his sentence. The
position requires that a candidate be eligible and/or qualified to
aspire for the position as required under Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code;
6. This petition is being filed within the reglementary period of within
five days following the last day for the filing of certificate of
candidacy.
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable
Commission:

deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the
said certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled
or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

Concurring Opinion

10

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

1. Declaring respondent, Dominador G. Jalosjos, Jr. ineligible for

the position for which he filed certificate of candidacy and to
deny due course to such filing and to cancel the certificate of
candidacy [Annex B]; x x x19 (Emphasis supplied)

The foregoing make it evident that Cardinos petition contained the

essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a) Jalosjos
made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred
to a material matter that would affect the substantive right of Jalosjos to run
in the elections for which he filed his CoC; and (c) Jalosjos made the false
representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his
qualification for public office or to deliberately attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him ineligible.20
Worthy of noting is that the specific reliefs prayed for by the petition,
supra, were not only for the declaration that Jalosjos was ineligible for the
position for which he filed certificate of candidacy but also for denying
due course to such filing and to cancel the certificate of candidacy.
Thereby, Cardinos petition attacked both Jalosjos qualifications to run as
Mayor of Dapitan City and the validity of Jalosjos CoC based on the latters
assertion of his eligibility despite knowledge of his conviction and despite
his failure to serve his sentence. The petition was properly considered to be
in all respects as a petition to deny due course to or cancel Jalosjos CoC
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

2.
Jalosjos materially misrepresented his eligibility as a
candidate for Mayor of Dapitan City; hence, the
COMELEC properly cancelled his CoC
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a finding not only that a
person lacked the qualifications but also that he made a material

19

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 58-59.

See Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra, note 12; Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra,
note 10.

20

Concurring Opinion

11

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

representation that was false.21 In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,22 the

Court added that there must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus:
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. Given the purpose of the
requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive the electorate
as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere
innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a situation where the intent to
deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results.
The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from
a consideration of the consequences of any material falsity: a candidate
who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, he cannot
serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election
laws.23

A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation of a CoC that

is short of the requirements should not be granted.
Based on the antecedents narrated herein, I consider to be warranted
the COMELEC En Bancs conclusion to the effect that, firstly, his
conviction for robbery absolutely disqualified Jalosjos from running as
Mayor of Dapitan City, and, secondly, Jalosjos deliberately misrepresented
his eligibility when he filed his CoC.
First of all, the records show that the erstwhile Circuit Criminal Court
in Cebu City had convicted Jalosjos of the felony of robbery on April 30,
1970 and had sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of one year,
eight months and 20 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to four
years, two months and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Although he
had appealed, his appeal was turned down on August 9, 1973. In June 1985,

21

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false.
The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election.
22
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744.
23
Id. at 769.

Concurring Opinion

12

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

or more than 15 years after his conviction by the Circuit Criminal Court, he
filed a petition for probation.
Pursuant to Section 40(a) of the LGC,24 his having been sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one year or more of imprisonment rendered Jalosjos ineligible
to run for Mayor of Dapitan City. There is no quibbling about the felony of
robbery being an offense involving moral turpitude. As the Court has
already settled, embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes
which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which
fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude.25
Anent moral turpitude for purposes of the election laws, the Court has
stated in Teves v. Commission on Elections:26
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general.
xxx
Thus, in Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections, the Court clarified
that:
Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It
is for this reason that as to what crime involves moral turpitude,
is for the Supreme Court to determine. In resolving the
foregoing question, the Court is guided by one of the general
rules that crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes
mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was set forth in
Zari v. Flores, to wit:
It (moral turpitude) implies something immoral in
itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or
not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act
itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act
itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes the moral

24

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b)
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
xxx
25
Republic v. Marcos, G.R. Nos. 130371 & 130855, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 43, 63; see also De
Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces, A.C. No. 439, April 12, 1961, 1 SCRA 954, 956.
26
G.R. No. 180363, April 28, 2009, 587 SCRA 1.

Concurring Opinion

13

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include

such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.27

It is relevant to mention at this juncture that the ineligibility of a

candidate based on his conviction by final judgment for a crime involving
moral turpitude is also dealt with in Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which specifically states:
Section 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared
by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified
to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be
deemed removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said
insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to Section 12, Jalosjos remained ineligible to run for a public

office considering that he had not been granted plenary pardon for his
criminal offense. The expiration of the five-year period defined in Section
12 counted from his service of sentence did not affect the ineligibility, it
being indubitable that he had not even served his sentence at all.
It is relevant to clarify, moreover, that the five-year period defined in
Section 12 is deemed superseded by the LGC, whose Section 40(a)
expressly sets two years after serving sentence as the period of
disqualification in relation to local elective positions. To reconcile the
incompatibility between Section 12 and Section 40(a), the Court has
discoursed in Magno v. Commission on Elections:28

27
28

Id. at 12-13.
G.R. No. 147904, October 4, 2002, 390 SCRA 495.

Concurring Opinion

14

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

It should be noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was
approved on December 3, 1985 while the Local Government Code (RA
7160) took effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in statutory construction
that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative
will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. In enacting the later
law, the legislature is presumed to have knowledge of the older law and
intended to change it. Furthermore, the repealing clause of Section 534 of
RA 7160 or the Local Government Code states that:
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have
repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the other
way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the subject
matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
In David vs. COMELEC, we declared that RA 7160 is a codified
set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section
40 thereof specially and definitively provides for disqualifications of
candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only.
On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of disqualifications of
candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all public
officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature
of a special law which ought to prevail.
The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period
of candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The
cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification
period from five to two years is the manifest intent. (Bold emphases
supplied)29

Regardless of whether the period applicable was five years or two

years, Jalosjos was still ineligible to run for any public office in any election
by virtue of his having been sentenced to suffer prision mayor. That
sentence perpetually disqualified him from running for any elective office
considering that he had not been meanwhile granted any plenary pardon by
the Chief Executive.

29

Id. at 500-501.

Concurring Opinion

15

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

Indeed, in accordance with the express provisions of the Revised

Penal Code, the penalty of prision mayor imposed on Jalosjos for the
robbery conviction carried the accessory penalties of temporary absolute
disqualification and of perpetual special disqualification from the right
of suffrage. The effects of the accessory penalty of temporary absolute
disqualification included the deprivation during the term of the sentence of
the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be
elected to such office.30 The effects of the accessory penalty of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage was to deprive the
convict perpetually of the right to vote in any popular election for any
public office or to be elected to such office; he was further prohibited
from holding any public office perpetually.31 These accessory penalties
would remain even though the convict would be pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the pardon expressly remitted the accessory penalties.32
Secondly, Jalosjos had no legal and factual bases to insist that he
became eligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City because he had been
declared under the RTC order dated February 5, 2004 to have duly complied
with the order of his probation. His insistence has no merit whatsoever.

30

Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code gives the effects of the accessory penalties of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification, to wit:
Article 30. Effects of the penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification. The
penalties of perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification for public office shall produce the following
effects:
1. The deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender may have held even if
conferred by popular election.
2. The deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to
such office.
3. The disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights
mentioned.
In case of temporary disqualification, such disqualification as is comprised in paragraphs 2 and
3 of this article shall last during the term of the sentence.
4. The loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held.
31
Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code expressly declares:
Article 32. Effect of the penalties of perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of
the right of suffrage. The perpetual or temporary special disqualification for the exercise of the right
of suffrage shall deprive the offender perpetually or during the term of the sentence, according to the
nature of said penalty, of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to be elected
to such office. Moreover, the offender shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the
period of his disqualification.
32
Article 42 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
Article 42. Prision mayor; Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prision mayor shall carry with it
that of temporary absolute disqualification and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall
have been expressly remitted in the pardon.

Concurring Opinion

16

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

Probation, by its legal definition, is only a disposition under which a

defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer.33 The
grant of probation cannot by itself remove a persons disqualification to be a
candidate or to hold any office due to its not being included among the
grounds for the removal of the disqualification under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, supra. Although the original text of Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law of 1976) stated that:
xxx [a]n application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with
notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence
of conviction. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the
right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.

the amendment of Presidential Decree No. 968 by Presidential Decree No.

199034 has made more explicit that probation only suspends the execution of
the sentence under certain conditions set by the trial court, viz:
Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this
Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period
for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of
imprisonment or a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed
with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver
of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable.

For sure, probation or its grant has not been intended to relieve the
convict of all the consequences of the sentence imposed on his crime
involving moral turpitude. Upon his final discharge as a probationer, the
convict is restored only to all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his

33
34

Section 3(a), Presidential Decree No. 968.

Approved on October 5, 1985.

Concurring Opinion

17

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

conviction. This consequence is according to the second paragraph of

Section 16 of the Probation Law of 1976, which states: The final discharge
of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for
any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. There
is no question that civil rights are distinct and different from political rights,
like the right of suffrage or the right to run for a public office.
Even assuming that Jalosjos had been validly granted probation
despite his having appealed his conviction (considering that the amendment
stating that an appeal barred the application for probation took effect only on
October 5, 1985 but his application for probation was earlier made in June
1985), his disqualification pursuant to Section 40(a) of the LGC would have
still attached simply because the legal effect of a validly-granted probation
was only to suspend the execution of sentence,35 not to obliterate the
consequences of the sentence on his political rights.
In reality, Jalosjos could not even legitimately and sincerely rely on
his supposed final discharge from probation. He was fully aware that he did
not at all satisfy the conditions of his probation,36 contrary to what Section
10 and Section 16 of the Probation Law definitely required, to wit:
Section 10. Conditions of Probation. Every probation order
issued by the court shall contain conditions requiring that the probationer
shall:
(a) present himself to the probation officer designated to undertake
his supervision at such place as may be specified in the order within
seventy-two hours from receipt of said order; .
(b) report to the probation officer at least once a month at such time
and place as specified by said officer. x x x

35

Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968, states:

Section 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend the
execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best.
36
Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 159-160.

Concurring Opinion

18

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

Section 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of

probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the
probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the
probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of
his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated.
The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him
all civil rights lost or suspend as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which
probation was granted.
The probationer and the probation officer shall each be furnished
with a copy of such order.

The records indicate that the RTC revoked the order of probation on
March 19, 1987 upon a motion filed by one Gregorio Bacolod, the
Supervising Probation Officer who had recommended the approval of the
application for probation. The revocation was premised on Jalosjos failure
to report to Bacolod in violation of the conditions of his probation.
Following the revocation, the RTC issued a warrant for the arrest of Jalosjos,
but the warrant has remained unserved until this date. With the revocation of
his probation and in the absence of an order of final discharge, Jalosjos was
still legally bound to serve the sentence for robbery.
I point out for emphasis that the February 5, 2004 order of the RTC
declaring that Jalosjos had duly complied with the order of probation
deserved no consideration for the following reasons, namely: (a) the
certification attesting that Jalosjos had fulfilled the terms and conditions of
his probation was secured by and issued to him only on December 19, 2003,
more than 16 years from the issuance of the RTC order revoking his
probation; (b) the certification was issued by Bacolod, the same Supervising
Probation Officer who had moved for the revocation of the probation; and
(c) the Sandiganbayan later on found the certification to have been falsified
by Bacolod considering that at the time of its issuance there was no longer a
probation order to be fulfilled by Jalosjos.37

37

On that basis, the Sandiganbayan convicted Bacolod of two crimes, one, for a violation of Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, and, two, for falsification of public document under the Revised Penal Code.

Concurring Opinion

19

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

And, thirdly, Jalosjos argues that he acted in good faith in

representing in his CoC that he was qualified to run as Mayor of Dapitan
City,38 having relied on the previous ruling of the COMELEC adjudging
him eligible to run and to be elected as Mayor of Dapitan City;39 and that it
cannot then be said that he deliberately attempted to mislead or to deceive
the electorate as to his eligibility.
The argument is devoid of merit.
The COMELEC Resolution dated August 2, 2004, on which Jalosjos
has anchored his claim of good faith, was rendered on the basis of the RTC
order dated February 5, 2004 that had declared Jalosjos to have sufficiently
complied with the conditions of his probation based on the certification
dated December 19, 2003. As earlier emphasized, however, the issuance of
the certification dated December 19, 2003 that became the basis for the RTC
order dated February 5, 2004 proved to be highly irregular, and culminated
in the Sandiganbayan convicting Bacolod of falsification in relation to his
issuance of the certification.
Clearly, Jalosjos reliance on the COMELEC Resolution dated August
2, 2004 was definitely not in good faith, but was contrary to every juridical
conception of good faith, which, according to Heirs of the Late Joaquin
Limense v. Vda. De Ramos,40 is
xxx an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or
statutory definition; and it encompasses, among other things, an honest
belief, the absence of malice and the absence of a design to defraud or to
seek an unconscionable advantage. An individuals personal good faith is
a concept of his own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be
determined by his protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention,
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry. The essence of good faith lies in an honest belief
in the validity of ones right, ignorance of a superior claim, and

38
39
40

Id. at 28.
Id. at 27-28.
G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009, 604 SCRA 599.

Concurring Opinion

20

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

absence of intention to overreach another.41

In contrast, Jalosjos had knowledge of the circumstances surrounding

the finality of his conviction and the revocation of his probation. He never
denied and cannot now dispute his failure to comply with the conditions of
his probation, for he fully knew that he had never duly reported to Bacolod
during the period of his probation. The following findings rendered by the
Sandiganbayan in its Decision dated September 29, 2008 convicting
Bacolod of falsification of a public document and violation of Republic Act
No. 3019 sustained the fact that Jalosjos had been unable to fulfil the terms
of his probation:
xxx [T]he subject Certification of the accused [Bacolod] attesting
that as per records Mr. Jalosjos has fulfilled the terms and conditions
of his probation and his case is deemed terminated, is nevertheless false
because the PPA Central Office had no records of an order of final
discharge issued by the court to support the facts narrated in the
subject certification that Mr. Jalosjos has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation and that his case is deemed terminated.
Besides, the accused failed to submit any oral or documentary
evidence to establish that at the time he issued the subject Certification on
December 19, 2003, Mr. Jalosjos has already fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation. His belated submission on January 23, 2004
of a termination report dated January 12, 2004 does not cure or remedy the
falsity of the facts narrated in the subject certification. Rather, it
strengthens the theory of the prosecution that at the time the accused
issued the subject Certification on December 19, 2003, probationer
Jalosjos had not yet fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation
because, if it were so, his submission of the said termination report
would no longer be necessary. Since the PPA Central Office had no
record of a court order of final discharge of the probationer from
probation, then he should have been truthful and certified to that effect.42

Nor could Jalosjos even feign a lack of awareness of the issuance of

the warrant for his arrest following the revocation of his probation by the
RTC on March 19, 1987. This is because he filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of Arrest in the RTC upon obtaining the
falsified certification issued by Bacolod.43 The absurdity of his claim of good

41
42
43

Id. at 612; emphasis is supplied.

Rollo, G.R. No. 193237, pp. 159-160.
Id. at 153.

Concurring Opinion

21

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

faith was well-known even to him because of his possession at the time he
filed his CoC of all the information material to his conviction and invalid
probation. Being presumed to know the law, he knew that his conviction for
robbery and his failure to serve his sentence rendered him ineligible to run as
Mayor of Dapitan City. As a result, his affirmation of his eligibility in his
CoC was truly nothing but an act tainted with bad faith.
3.
Jalosjos did not file a valid CoC for the May 10,
2010 elections; not being an official candidate,
votes cast in his favor are considered stray
The filing of a CoC within the period provided by law is a mandatory
requirement for any person to be considered a candidate in a national or
local election. This is clear from Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code,
to wit:
Section 73. Certificate of candidacy No person shall be eligible
for any elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of
candidacy within the period fixed herein.

In turn, Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code specifies the

contents of a CoC, viz:
Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his
candidacy for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said
office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including
its component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his
date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes;
his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees promulgated
by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion;
and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to the best
of his knowledge. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

Concurring Opinion

22

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

A CoC, according to Sinaca v. Mula,44 is in the nature of a formal

manifestation to the whole world of the candidates political creed or lack of
political creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office
certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that
he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he
belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election
purposes being as well stated.
Accordingly, a persons declaration of his intention to run for public
office and his declaration that he possesses the eligibility for the position he
seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute
a valid CoC that render the declarant an official candidate.
In Bautista v. Commission on Elections,45 the Court stated that a
cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy. A person without a
valid CoC cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any CoC cannot at all be a candidate.46 Hence, the
cancellation of Jalosjos CoC rendered him a non-candidate in the May 10,
2010 elections.
But, even without the cancellation of his CoC, Jalosjos undeniably
possessed a disqualification to run as Mayor of Dapitan City. The fact of his
ineligibility was by itself adequate to invalidate his CoC without the
necessity of its express cancellation or denial of due course by the
COMELEC. Under no circumstance could he have filed a valid CoC. The
accessory penalties that inhered to his penalty of prision mayor perpetually
disqualified him from the right of suffrage as well as the right to be voted for
in any election for public office. The disqualification was by operation of a
mandatory penal law. For him to be allowed to ignore the perpetual
disqualification would be to sanction his lawlessness, and would permit him

44
45
46

G.R. No. 135691, September 27, 1999, 315 SCRA 266, 276.
G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998, 298 SCRA 480, 493.
Miranda v. Abaya, G.R. No. 136351, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 617, 624.

Concurring Opinion

23

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

to make a mockery of the electoral process that has been so vital to our
democracy. He was not entitled to be voted for, leaving all the votes cast for
him stray and legally non-existent.
In contrast, Cardino, the only remaining candidate, was duly elected
and should legally assume the position of Mayor of Dapitan City. According
to the Court in Santos v. Commission on Elections:47
Anent petitioners contention that his disqualification does not ipso
facto warrant the proclamation of private respondent, We find the same
untenable and without legal basis since votes cast for a disqualified
candidate fall within the category of invalid non-existent votes because a
disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law. Section
155 of the Election Code provides
Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been
disqualified shall be considered as stray and shall not be counted
but it shall not invalidate the ballot. (Italics supplied)
Considering that all the votes garnered by the petitioner are stray
votes and therefore should not be counted, We find no error, much less
any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec, in proclaiming
private respondent Ricardo J. Rufino the duly elected Mayor of Taytay,
Rizal, he having obtained the highest number of votes as appearing and
certified in the canvass of votes submitted by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers petitioner having been legally disqualified. Such a
proclamation finds legal support from the case of Ticzon vs. Comelec 103
SCRA 671, wherein disqualified candidate Ticzon likewise questioned the
legality of the Resolution of the Comelec which not only disqualified him
but further proclaimed Dizon, the only candidate left for the disputed
position, and this Court upheld the proclamation of Cesar Dizon as Mayor
of San Pablo City.48

Although the doctrine of the sovereign will has prevailed several

times in the past to prevent the nullification of an election victory of a
disqualified candidate, or of one whose CoC was cancelled, the Court should
not now be thwarted from enforcing the law in its letter and spirit by any
desire to respect the will of the people expressed in an election. The
objective of prescribing disqualifications in the election laws as well as in
the penal laws is obviously to prevent the convicted criminals and the
undeserving from running and being voted for. Unless the Court leads the

47
48

G.R. No. L-58512, July 23, 1985, 137 SCRA 740.

Id. at 749.

Concurring Opinion

24

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

way to see to the implementation of the unquestionable national policy

behind the prescription of disqualifications, there would inevitably come the
time when many communities of the country would be electing convicts and
misfits. When that time should come, the public trust would be trivialized
and the public office degraded. This is now the appropriate occasion,
therefore, to apply the law in all its majesty in order to enforce its clear letter
and underlying spirit. Thereby, we will prevent the electoral exercise from
being subjected to mockery and from being rendered a travesty.
In closing, I consider to be appropriate and fitting the Courts
following pronouncement in Velasco v. Commission on Elections:49
x x x [W]e have ruled in the past that a candidates victory in the
election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in favor of the
candidate sought to be disqualified if the main issue involves defects in the
candidates certificate of candidacy. We said that while provisions relating
to certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established
rule of interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC.
The present case perhaps presents the proper time and opportunity
to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with the realization that a
blanket and unqualified reading and application of this ruling can be
fraught with dangerous significance for the rule of law and the integrity of
our elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may provide a
way around the law that effectively negates election requirements aimed at
providing the electorate with the basic information to make an informed
choice about a candidates eligibility and fitness for office.
The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified reading is
made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies the basic qualifications of
local government officials. Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless
is Section 74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a COC.
Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere delay in the resolution of
the petition to cancel or deny due course to a COC can render a Section 78
petition useless if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the
obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC qualifications if they
know that an election victory will cure any defect that their COCs may
have. Election victory then becomes a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements.
In the process, the rule of law suffers; the clear and unequivocal
legal command, framed by a Congress representing the national will, is

49

G.R. No. 180051, December 24, 2008, 575 SCRA 590.

Concurring Opinion

25

G.R. Nos. 193237 & 193536

rendered inutile because the people of a given locality has decided to vote
a candidate into office despite his or her lack of the qualifications
Congress has determined to be necessary.
In the present case, Velasco is not only going around the law by his
claim that he is registered voter when he is not, as has been determined by
a court in a final judgment. Equally important is that he has made a
material misrepresentation under oath in his COC regarding his
qualification. For these violations, he must pay the ultimate price - the
nullification of his election victory. He may also harve to account in a
criminal court for making a false statement under oath, but this is a matter
for the proper authorities to decide upon.
We distinguish our ruling in this case from others that we have
made in the past by the clarification that COC defects beyond matters of
form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the
benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections
are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A
mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the
will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC
misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election
and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the
people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between
provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand,
and the will ofthe electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe
and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. The balance must
always tilt in favor of upholding and enforcing the law. To rule otherwise
is to slowly gnaw at the rule oflaw. 50

ACCORDINGLY, I JOIN the Majority in granting the petition in

G.R. No. 193536; in dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 193237 for lack of
merit; and in affirming the COMELEC En Bane Resolution dated February
22, 2011 subject to the modification that Agapito J. Cardino be proclaimed
as the duly elected Mayor of Dapitan City, Zamboanga during the May 10,
2010 national and local elections, and thus entitled to assume the office of
Mayor ofDapitan City.

50

Id. at 614-615.