Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE
CATALAN,
Petitioner,

G. R. No. 183622
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

- versus -

Promulgated:
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE,
Respondent.
February 8, 2012
x--------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[1] and Resolution[2] regarding the issuance of letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After
allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United States from his first wife,
Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional

Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of
Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No.
228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent
Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first
marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No.
232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the
ground of litis pendentia, considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the
same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not
considered an interested person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her
contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan,
and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that
petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been
married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.[3] The
trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and
since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the
marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending action with the trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor
against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a
prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of
bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had
never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos,

Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting
when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her
acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial
court held that petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration.[4]
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration,
petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition
for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in
dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by
respondent should have been dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She
also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may have
been filed by an uninterested person, the defect was cured by the appearance
of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a
better right to administer the decedents properties, the RTC should have first
required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First,
it held that petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead
filed a petition for review rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless,
since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA
allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case. Thus,
it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the
case. For litis pendentia to be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there
must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent the same
interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two
cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one
would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in
the other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A
special proceeding is an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to an ordinary civil
action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only

party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant.

Considering its nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration
can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of
the same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In
the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed by the
private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party
to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is
wanting. The contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render
nugatory the provision of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of
administration to be an interested party, inasmuch as any person, for that
matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to
be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files
his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those
specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition
for letters of administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a
marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had
been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting
a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The deduction of
the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case
negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B.
Catalan has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt
from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is
therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an
interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the
dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in
place.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
the
petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5] (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision. [6] She alleged that
the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she
was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still holding that her
marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the
crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed
to appreciate the finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that
petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial
court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows
that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to
take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between
petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an
interested party in the estate of Orlando.
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in
Crim. Case No. 2699-A was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the
principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by
a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as
1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[7] wherein we said:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,[8] to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality
principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In
the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of

Appeals, that once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van
Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by
the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There,
we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have

enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,[9] to wit:
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment
is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven
by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is
the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing
or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested
by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not
kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson
appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court.
However, appearance is not sufficient;compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of
May 18, 1989 was submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected,
not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been registered
in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it
was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed,

petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree

admissible as a written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family
Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine
personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with
the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens,
freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of
their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed
his allegiance to the Philippines and thevinculum juris that had tied him to
Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce
law falls upon petitioner, because she is the party challenging the validity
of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with the
original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of
Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a
long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by
Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in
the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action. In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when
those are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce
new matters. Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent,
the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls
squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other facts, they must be
alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution,
and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the
negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the
validity of Orlandos divorce under the laws of the United States and the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to
remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent
marriage, she has the preferential right to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of administration may be
issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,[10] in which
we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the
present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records
show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country
by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued
by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity
of the divorce to ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises
considered,
the
Petition
is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision dated 18 October 2007 and
the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
Let
this
case
be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos,
Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

AT T E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]

Penned by Associate Justice Amelita G. Tolentino, with Associate Justices Lucenito N. Tagle and Ramon
R. Garcia concurring; rollo, pp. 20-30.
[2]
Id. at 49.
[3]
Id. at 38-45; penned by Judge Jules A. Mejia.
[4]
As narrated by the Court of Appeals on p. 3 of its Decision.
[5]

Rollo, pp. 26-29.

Id. at 31-36.
[7]
223 Phil. 357, 362 (1985).
[8]
399 Phil. 342, 355-356 (2000).
[9]
418 Phil. 723, 723-735 (2001).
[10]
G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, 6 February 2007, 514 SCRA 294, 313-314.
[6]