Philippine Refining Co. v. Jarque

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Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-41506

March 25, 1935

PHILIPPINE REFINING CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
FRANCISCO JARQUE, JOSE COROMINAS, and ABOITIZ & CO., defendants.
JOSE COROMINAS, in his capacity as assignee of the estate of the insolvent Francisco Jarque, appellee.
Thos. G. Ingalls, Vicente Pelaez and DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for appellant.
D.G. McVean and Vicente L. Faelnar for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
First of all the reason why the case has been decided by the court in banc needs explanation. A motion was
presented by counsel for the appellant in which it was asked that the case be heard and determined by the court
sitting in banc because the admiralty jurisdiction of the court was involved, and this motion was granted in regular
course. On further investigation it appears that this was error. The mere mortgage of a ship is a contract entered into
by the parties to it without reference to navigation or perils of the sea, and does not, therefore, confer admiralty
jurisdiction. (Bogart vs. Steamboat John Jay [1854], 17 How., 399.)
Coming now to the merits, it appears that on varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque
executed three mortgages on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. These documents were recorded in the
record of transfers and incumbrances of vessels for the port of Cebu and each was therein denominated a "chattel
mortgage". Neither of the first two mortgages had appended an affidavit of good faith. The third mortgage contained
such an affidavit, but this mortgage was not registered in the customs house until May 17, 1932, or within the period
of thirty days prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Francisco Jarque; also, while the last
mentioned mortgage was subscribed by Francisco Jarque and M. N. Brink, there was nothing to disclose in what
capacity the said M. N. Brink signed. A fourth mortgage was executed by Francisco Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on
the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on May 12, 1932,
or again within the thirty-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings. These proceedings were begun
on June 2, 1932, when a petition was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu in which it was prayed that
Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, which soon thereafter was granted, with the result that an
assignment of all the properties of the insolvent was executed in favor of Jose Corominas.
On these facts, Judge Jose M. Hontiveros declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary
sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages. In so doing we believe that the trial judge
acted advisedly.
Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article 585.) Similarly under the
common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property.
(Reynolds vs. Nielson [1903], 96 Am. Rep., 1000; Atlantic Maritime Co vs. City of Gloucester [1917], 117 N. E.,
924.) Since the term "personal property" includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions
of the Chattel Mortgage Law. (Act No. 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has heretofore been accepted without discussion
that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. (McMicking vs. Banco Espaol-Filipino [1909], 13 Phil.,
429; Arroyo vs. Yu de Sane [1930], 54 Phil., 511.) The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a
chattel mortgage of other personalty is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted n
the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be
entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. (Rubiso and Gelito vs. Rivera [1917], 37 Phil.,
72; Arroyo vs. Yu de Sane, supra.) Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to
its requisites and validity. (58 C.J., 92.)

The Chattell Mortgage Law in its section 5, in describing what shall be deemed sufficient to constitute a good chattel
mortgage, includes the requirement of an affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith.
The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. (Giberson vs.
A. N. Jureidini Bros. [1922], 44 Phil., 216; Benedicto de Tarrosa vs. F. M. Yap Tico & Co. and Provincial Sheriff of
Occidental Negros [1923], 46 Phil., 753.) As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of
good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
In effect appellant asks us to find that the documents appearing in the record do not constitute chattel mortgages or
at least to gloss over the failure to include the affidavit of good faith made a requisite for a good chattel mortgage by
the Chattel Mortgage Law. Counsel would further have us disregard article 585 of the Code of Commerce, but no
reason is shown for holding this article not in force. Counsel would further have us revise doctrines heretofore
announced in a series of cases, which it is not desirable to do since those principles were confirmed after due
liberation and constitute a part of the commercial law of the Philippines. And finally counsel would have us make
rulings on points entirely foreign to the issues of the case. As neither the facts nor the law remains in doubt, the
seven assigned errors will be overruled.
Judgment affirmed, the costs of this instance to be paid by the appellant.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.
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