G.R. No.

L-68053 May 7, 1990

the other private respondents, Antonio and Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was
survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. 1 It is not clear why the latter is not included as a

LAURA ALVAREZ, FLORA ALVAREZ and RAYMUNDO ALVAREZ, petitioners, vs.

party in this case.

THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APELLATE COURT and JESUS YANES,

ESTELITA YANES, ANTONIO YANES, ROSARIO YANES, and ILUMINADO

Aniceto left his children Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as

YANES, respondents.

she could not attend to the other portions of the two lots which had a total area of around
twenty-four hectares. The record does not show whether the children of Felipe also cultivated

Francisco G. Banzon for petitioner.

some portions of the lots but it is established that Rufino and his children left the province to
settle in other places as a result of the outbreak of World War II. According to Estelita, from the

Renecio R. Espiritu for private respondents.

"Japanese time up to peace time", they did not visit the parcels of land in question but "after
liberation", when her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was
informed that Fortunato Santiago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of
Lot 773. 2

FERNAN, C.J.:
It is on record that on May 19, 1938, Fortunato D. Santiago was issued Transfer Certificate of
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of: (a) the decision of the Fourth

Title No. RF 2694 (29797) covering Lot 773-A with an area of 37,818 square meters. 3 TCT

Civil Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 31, 1983 in AC-G.R.

No. RF 2694 describes Lot 773-A as a portion of Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia and

CV No. 56626 entitled "Jesus Yanes et al. v. Dr. Rodolfo Siason et al." affirming the decision

as originally registered under OCT No. 8804.

dated July 8, 1974 of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental insofar as it ordered the
petitioners to pay jointly and severally the private respondents the sum of P20,000.00

The bigger portion of Lot 773 with an area of 118,831 square meters was also registered in the

representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia,

name of Fortunato D. Santiago on September 6, 1938 Under TCT No. RT-2695 (28192 ). 4 Said

Negros Occidental and reversing the subject decision insofar as it awarded the sums of

transfer certificate of title also contains a certification to the effect that Lot 773-B was

P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and attorney's fees,

originally registered under OCT No. 8804.

respectively and (b) the resolution of said appellate court dated May 30, 1984, denying the
motion for reconsideration of its decision.

On May 30, 1955, Santiago sold Lots 773-A and 773-B to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. in
consideration of the sum of P7,000.00. 5 Consequently, on February 20, 1956, TCT Nos. T-

The real properties involved are two parcels of land identified as Lot 773-A and Lot 773-B

19291 and T-19292 were issued in Fuentebella's name. 6

which were originally known as Lot 773 of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental.
Lot 773, with an area of 156,549 square meters, was registered in the name of the heirs of

After Fuentebella's death and during the settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof

Aniceto Yanes under Original Certificate of Title No. RO-4858 (8804) issued on October 9,

(Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Proceedings No. 4373 in the Court

1917 by the Register of Deeds of Occidental Negros (Exh. A).

of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lots 773-A and
773-B. 7 By virtue of a court order granting said motion, 8 on March 24, 1958, Arsenia Vda. de

Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private
respondents, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while

Fuentebella sold said lots for P6,000.00 to Rosendo Alvarez. 9 Hence, on April 1, 1958 TCT

Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 covering Lots 773-A and 773-B were respectively issued to
Rosendo Alvarez.

10

It will be noted that the above-mentioned manifestation of Jesus Yanes was not mentioned in
the aforesaid decision.

Two years later or on May 26, 1960, Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino,

However, execution of said decision proved unsuccessful with respect to Lot 773. In his return

namely, Estelita, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental

of service dated October 20, 1965, the sheriff stated that he discovered that Lot 773 had been

a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvarez and the Register

subdivided into Lots 773-A and 773-B; that they were "in the name" of Rodolfo Siason who

of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the "return" of the ownership and possession of Lots 773

had purchased them from Alvarez, and that Lot 773 could not be delivered to the plaintiffs as

and 823. They also prayed that an accounting of the produce of the land from 1944 up to the

Siason was "not a party per writ of execution." 17

filing of the complaint be made by the defendants, that after court approval of said accounting,
the share or money equivalent due the plaintiffs be delivered to them, and that defendants be

The execution of the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 having met a hindrance, herein private

ordered to pay plaintiffs P500.00 as damages in the form of attorney's fees. 11

respondents (the Yaneses) filed on July 31, 1965, in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental a petition for the issuance of a new certificate of title and for a declaration of nullity

During the pendency in court of said case or on November 13, 1961, Alvarez sold Lots 773-A,

of TCT Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 issued to Rosendo Alvarez. 18 Thereafter, the court required

773-B and another lot for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siason. 12 Accordingly, TCT Nos. 30919

Rodolfo Siason to produce the certificates of title covering Lots 773 and 823.

and 30920 were issued to Siason,

13

who thereafter, declared the two lots in his name for

assessment purposes. 14

Expectedly, Siason filed a manifestation stating that he purchased Lots 773-A, 773-B and 658,
not Lots 773 and 823, "in good faith and for a valuable consideration without any knowledge

Meanwhile, on November 6, 1962, Jesus Yanes, in his own behalf and in behalf of the other

of any lien or encumbrances against said properties"; that the decision in the cadastral

plaintiffs, and assisted by their counsel, filed a manifestation in Civil Case No. 5022 stating

proceeding 19 could not be enforced against him as he was not a party thereto; and that the

that the therein plaintiffs "renounce, forfeit and quitclaims (sic) any claim, monetary or

decision in Civil Case No. 5022 could neither be enforced against him not only because he was

otherwise, against the defendant Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella in connection with the above-

not a party-litigant therein but also because it had long become final and executory. 20 Finding

entitled case."

15

said manifestation to be well-founded, the cadastral court, in its order of September 4, 1965,
nullified its previous order requiring Siason to surrender the certificates of title mentioned

On October 11, 1963, a decision was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros

therein. 21

Occidental in Civil Case No. 5022, the dispositive portion of which reads:
In 1968, the Yaneses filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution in
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, ordering the defendant Rosendo

Civil Case No. 5022. Siason opposed it. 22 In its order of September 28, 1968 in Civil Case No.

Alvarez to reconvey to the plaintiffs lots Nos. 773 and 823 of the

5022, the lower court, noting that the Yaneses had instituted another action for the recovery of

Cadastral Survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, now covered by

the land in question, ruled that at the judgment therein could not be enforced against Siason as

Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-23165 and T-23166 in the name of

he was not a party in the case. 23

said defendant, and thereafter to deliver the possession of said lots to the
plaintiffs. No special pronouncement as to costs.

The action filed by the Yaneses on February 21, 1968 was for recovery of real property with
damages. 24 Named defendants therein were Dr. Rodolfo Siason, Laura Alvarez, Flora Alvarez,

SO ORDERED. 16

Raymundo Alvarez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. The Yaneses prayed for

the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-19291 and 19292 issued to Siason (sic) for being null and void;

P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B

the issuance of a new certificate of title in the name of the Yaneses "in accordance with the

of Murcia Cadastre, Negros Occidental; the sum of P2,000.00 as actual

sheriffs return of service dated October 20, 1965;" Siason's delivery of possession of Lot 773 to

damages suffered by the plaintiff; the sum of P5,000.00 representing

the Yaneses; and if, delivery thereof could not be effected, or, if the issuance of a new title

moral damages and the sum of P2.000 as attorney's fees, all with legal

could not be made, that the Alvarez and Siason jointly and severally pay the Yaneses the sum

rate of interest from date of the filing of this complaint up to final

of P45,000.00. They also prayed that Siason render an accounting of the fruits of Lot 773 from

payment.

November 13, 1961 until the filing of the complaint; and that the defendants jointly and
severally pay the Yaneses moral damages of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00

C. The cross-claim filed by the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason against the

plus attorney's fees of P4, 000.00. 25

defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez is hereby

dismissed.

In his answer to the complaint, Siason alleged that the validity of his titles to Lots 773-A and
773-B, having been passed upon by the court in its order of September 4, 1965, had
become res judicata and the Yaneses were estopped from questioning said order.

26

D. Defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez are

On their

hereby ordered to pay the costs of this suit.

part, the Alvarez stated in their answer that the Yaneses' cause of action had been "barred
by res judicata, statute of limitation and estoppel." 27

SO ORDERED. 29

In its decision of July 8, 1974, the lower court found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the

The Alvarez appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which in its decision of August

properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico pursuing further medical studies,

31, 1983 30 affirmed the lower court's decision "insofar as it ordered defendants-appellants to

was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. Although the Yaneses were negligent in

pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual

their failure to place a notice of lis pendens"before the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental

value of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros Occidental, and

in order to protect their rights over the property in question" in Civil Case No. 5022, equity

is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00, P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual

demanded that they recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed

damages, moral damages and attorney's fees, respectively."

between Alvarez and Siason was without court approval. 28 The dispositive portion of the

decision reads:

31

The dispositive portion of said

decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed insofar as it
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION, judgment is

ordered defendants-appellants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs-

hereby rendered in the following manner:

appellees the sum of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of Lots

Nos. 773-A and 773-B of the cadastral survey of Murcia, Negros

A. The case against the defendant Dr. Rodolfo Siason and the Register

Occidental, and is reversed insofar as it awarded the sums of P2,000.00,

of Deeds are (sic) hereby dismmissed,

P5,000.00 and P2,000.00 as actual damages, moral damages and

attorney's fees, respectively. No costs.

B. The defendants, Laura, Flora and Raymundo, all surnamed Alvarez

being the legitimate children of the deceased Rosendo Alvarez are
hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the sum of

SO ORDERED. 32

Finding no cogent reason to grant appellants motion for reconsideration, said appellate court

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, it is powerless and for that matter so is the

denied the same.

Supreme Court, to review the decision in Civil Case No. 5022 ordering Alvarez to reconvey the
lots in dispute to herein private respondents. Said decision had long become final and

Hence, the instant petition. ln their memorandum petitioners raised the following issues:

executory and with the possible exception of Dr. Siason, who was not a party to said case, the
decision in Civil Case No. 5022 is the law of the case between the parties thereto. It ended

1. Whethere or not the defense of prescription and estoppel had been

when Alvarez or his heirs failed to appeal the decision against them. 34

timely and properly invoked and raised by the petitioners in the lower
Thus, it is axiomatic that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a

court.

court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains unreversed, it should be conclusive upon

2. Whether or not the cause and/or causes of action of the private

the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 35 As consistently ruled by this Court,

respondents, if ever there are any, as alleged in their complaint dated

every litigation must come to an end. Access to the court is guaranteed. But there must be a

February 21, 1968 which has been docketed in the trial court as Civil

limit to it. Once a litigant's right has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent

Case No. 8474 supra, are forever barred by statute of limitation and/or

court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to return for another try. The prevailing

prescription of action and estoppel.

party should not be harassed by subsequent suits. For, if endless litigation were to be allowed,
unscrupulous litigations will multiply in number to the detriment of the administration of

3. Whether or not the late Rosendo Alvarez, a defendant in Civil Case

justice. 36

No. 5022, supra and father of the petitioners become a privy and/or party
to the waiver (Exhibit 4-defendant Siason) in Civil Case No.

There is no dispute that the rights of the Yaneses to the properties in question have been finally

8474, supra where the private respondents had unqualifiedly and

adjudicated in Civil Case No. 5022. As found by the lower court, from the uncontroverted

absolutely waived, renounced and quitclaimed all their alleged rights

evidence presented, the Yaneses have been illegally deprived of ownership and possession of

and interests, if ever there is any, on Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of

the lots in question. 37 In fact, Civil Case No. 8474 now under review, arose from the failure to

Murcia Cadastre as appearing in their written manifestation dated

execute Civil Case No. 5022, as subject lots can no longer be reconveyed to private

November 6, 1962 (Exhibits "4" Siason) which had not been

respondents Yaneses, the same having been sold during the pendency of the case by the

controverted or even impliedly or indirectly denied by them.

petitioners' father to Dr. Siason who did not know about the controversy, there being no lis
pendens annotated on the titles. Hence, it was also settled beyond question that Dr. Siason is a

4. Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising

purchaser in good faith.

from the sale of Lots Nos. 773-A and 773-B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not annul the sale executed by Alvarez in favor of

transmitted by operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation

Dr. Siason on November 11, 1961 but in fact sustained it. The trial court ordered the heirs of

of law and due process .

33

Rosendo Alvarez who lost in Civil Case No. 5022 to pay the plaintiffs (private respondents
herein) the amount of P20,000.00 representing the actual value of the subdivided lots in

The petition is devoid of merit.

dispute. It did not order defendant Siason to pay said amount. 38

As to the propriety of the present case, it has long been established that the sole remedy of the

Art. 1311. Contract stake effect only between the parties, their assigns

landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is

and heirs except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the

to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property

contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by

has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages.

39

"It is one thing to

protect an innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if

provision of law. The heir is not liable beyond the value of the property
received from the decedent.

deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
decided As clearly revealed by the undeviating line of decisions coming from this Court, such
an undesirable eventuality is precisely sought to be guarded against."

40

As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of
Hemady vs. Luzon Surety Co., Inc. 41

The issue on the right to the properties in litigation having been finally adjudicated in Civil

The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is

Case No. 5022 in favor of private respondents, it cannot now be reopened in the instant case on

not altered by the provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a

the pretext that the defenses of prescription and estoppel have not been properly considered by

deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate before the residue

the lower court. Petitioners could have appealed in the former case but they did not. They have

is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever

therefore foreclosed their rights, if any, and they cannot now be heard to complain in another

payment is thus made from the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs

case in order to defeat the enforcement of a judgment which has longing become final and

or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminishes or

executory.

reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive.

Petitioners further contend that the liability arising from the sale of Lots No. 773-A and 773-B

Under our law, therefore. the general rule is that a party's contractual

made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late

rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors.

Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death.

The rule is a consequence of the progressive "depersonalization" of
Such contention is untenable for it overlooks the doctrine obtaining in this jurisdiction on the

patrimonial rights and duties that, as observed by Victorio Polacco has

general transmissibility of the rights and obligations of the deceased to his legitimate children

characterized the history of these institutions. From the Roman concept

and heirs. Thus, the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code state:

of a relation from person to person, the obligation has evolved into a

relation from patrimony to patrimony with the persons occupying only a

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the

representative position, barring those rare cases where the obligation is

property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the

strictly personal, i.e., is contracted intuitu personae, in consideration of

inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or

its performance by a specific person and by no other.

others either by his will or by operation of law.

xxx xxx xxx
Art. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations
of a person which are not extinguished by his death.

Petitioners being the heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal
consequences of their father's transaction, which gave rise to the present claim for damages.
That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of no moment because by legal

fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father's hereditary

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 20, 1988 decision 1 of the then

estate, and we have ruled that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the

Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) in AC-GR CV No. 69264, entitled Del

payment of the debts of the estate. 42

Monte Development Corporation vs. Enrique Ababa, et al., etc. affirming the decision 2 of the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Misamis Oriental declaring the

It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of

plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot 476 of the Cagayan

their inheritance. With this clarification and considering petitioners' admission that there are

Cadastre, particularly Lot No. 2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an

other properties left by the deceased which are sufficient to cover the amount adjudged in favor

area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy Eight (7,878) square meters more or less.

of private respondents, we see no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals.

As found by the Appellate Court, the facts are as follows:

WHEREFORE, subject to the clarification herein above stated, the assailed decision of the

The parcel of land under litigation is Lot No. 2476 of the Subdivision

Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

Plan Psd-37365 containing an area of 20,119 square meters and situated

at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. Said lot was acquired by purchase from

SO ORDERED.

the late Luis Lancero on September 15, 1964 as per Deed of Absolute
Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Certificate of Title No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for

brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from Ricardo

Bidin J., took no part.

Gevero on February 5, 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo

Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No. 1128 at the back of

G.R. No. 77029 August 30, 1990

Original Certificate of Title No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified
as Lot No. 2476 in the names of Teodorica Babangha 1/2 share and

BIENVENIDO, ESTELITA, MACARIO, LUIS, ADELAIDE, ENRIQUITA and

her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and Ursula, all

CLAUDIO, all surnamed, GEVERO,petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE

surnamed surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area

COURT and DEL MONTE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.

containing 48,122 square meters.

Carlito B. Somido for petitioners.

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II and was survived by
her six children aforementioned. The heirs of Teodorica Babangha on

Benjamin N. Tabios for private respondent.

October 17,1966 executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement and Partition of

the estate of Teodorica Babangha, consisting of two lots, among them
was lot 2476. By virtue of the extra-judicial settlement and partition
executed by the said heirs of Teodorica Babangha, Lot 2476-A to Lot

PARAS, J.:

2476-I, inclusive, under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450 duly

approved by the Land Registration Commission, Lot 2476-D, among
others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who was then alive at the

time of extra-judicial settlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private

Lot No. 2476 E to the defendant spouses Enrique C. Torres and

respondent herein) filed an action with the CFI (now RTC) of Misamis

Francisca Aquino;

Oriental to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of
Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land which it

Lot No. 2476 F to the defendant spouses Eduard Rumohr and Emilia

acquired a portion of lot 2476.

Merida Rumohf ;

Plaintiff now seeks to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the

Lot Nos. 2476-H, 2476-I and 2476 G to defendant spouses

heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the same prejudices the land

Enrique Abada and Lilia Alvarez Abada.

which it acquired, a portion of Lot 2476. Plaintiff proved that before

purchasing Lot 2476-A it first investigated and checked the title of Luis

No adjudication can be made with respect to Lot No. 2476-A

Lancero and found the same to be intact in the office of the Register of

considering that the said lot is the subject of a civil case between the

Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City. The same with the subdivision plan

Heirs of Maria Gevero on one hand and the spouses Daniel Borkingkito

(Exh. "B"), the corresponding technical description (Exh. "P") and the

and Ursula Gevero on the other hand, which case is now pending appeal

Deed of Sale executed by Ricardo Gevero all of which were found to

before the Court of Appeals. No pronouncement as to costs,

be unquestionable. By reason of all these, plaintiff claims to have bought

the land in good faith and for value, occupying the land since the sale

SO ORDERED. (Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 203; Rollo, pp. 21-22)

and taking over from Lancero's possession until May 1969, when the
defendants Abadas forcibly entered the property. (Rollo, p. 23)

From said decision, defendant heirs of Ricardo Gevero (petitioners herein) appealed to the IAC
(now Court of Appeals) which subsequently, on March 20, 1986, affirmed the decision

After trial the court a quo on July 18, 1977 rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which

appealed from.

reads as follows:
Petitioners, on March 31, 1986, filed a motion for reconsideration (Rollo, p. 28) but was denied
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered

on April 21, 1986.

declaring the plaintiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that
portion of Lot No. 2476 of the Cagayan Cadastre, particularly Lot No.

Hence, the present petition.

2476-D of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-80450, containing an area of

SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT (7,878)

This petition is devoid of merit.

square meters, more or less. The other portions of Lot No. 2476 are
hereby adjudicated as follows:

Basically, the issues to be resolved in the instant case are: 1) whether or not the
deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero to Luis Lancero is valid; 2) in the

Lot No. 2476 B to the heirs of Elena Gevero;

affirmative, whether or not the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica Babangha in one of
the litigated lots, lot no. 2476 under OCT No. 7610 is included in the deed of sale;

Lot No. 2476 C to the heirs of Restituto Gevero;

and 3) whether or not the private respondents' action is barred by laches.

Petitioners maintain that the deed of sale is entirely invalid citing alleged flaws thereto, such as

the maxim "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet." Under Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of

that: 1) the signature of Ricardo was forged without his knowledge of such fact; 2) Lancero

Court "where one derives title to property from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the

had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed of sale when he signed the document in 1968

latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property is evidence against the former." It is

entitled "Settlement to Avoid the Litigation"; 3) Ricardo's children remained in the property

however stressed that the admission of the former owner of a property must have been made

notwithstanding the sale to Lancero; 4) the designated Lot No. is 2470 instead of the correct

while he was the owner thereof in order that such admission may be binding upon the present

number being Lot No. 2476; 5) the deed of sale included the share of Eustaquio Gevero

owner (City of Manila v. del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 [1905]; Medel v. Avecilla, 15 Phil. 465

without his authority; 6) T.C.T. No. 1183 of Lancero segregated the area of 20,119 square

[1910]). Hence, Lanceros' declaration or acts of executing the 1968 document have no binding

meters from the bigger area (OCT No. 7616) without the consent of the other co-owners; 7)

effect on DELCOR, the ownership of the land having passed to DELCOR in 1964.

Lancero caused the 1952 Subdivision survey without the consent of the Geveros' to bring about
the segregation of the 20,119 square meters lot from the mother lot 2476 which brought about

Petitioners' claim that they remained in the property, notwithstanding the alleged sale by

the issuance of his title T-1183 and to DELCOR's title T4320, both of which were illegally

Ricardo to Lancero (Rollo, p. 71) involves a question of fact already raised and passed upon by

issued; and 8) the area sold as per document is 20,649 square meters whereas the segregated

both the trial and appellate courts. Said the Court of Appeals:

area covered by TCT No. T-1183 of Lancero turned out to be 20,119 square meters (Petitioners
Memorandum, pp. 62-78).

Contrary to the allegations of the appellants, the trial court found that
Luis Lancero had taken possession of the land upon proper investigation

As to petitioners' claim that the signature of Ricardo in the 1952 deed of sale in favor of

by plaintiff the latter learned that it was indeed Luis Lancero who was

Lancero was forged without Ricardo's knowledge of such fact (Rollo, p. 71) it will be observed

the owner and possessor of Lot 2476 D. . . . (Decision, C.A., p. 6).

that the deed of sale in question was executed with all the legal formalities of a public
document. The 1952 deed was duly acknowledged by both parties before the notary public, yet

As a finding of fact, it is binding upon this Court (De Gola-Sison v. Manalo, 8 SCRA 595

petitioners did not bother to rebut the legal presumption of the regularity of the notarized

[1963]; Gaduco vs. C.A., 14 SCRA 282 [1965]; Ramos v. Pepsi-Cola, 19 SCRA 289 [1967];

document (Dy v. Sacay, 165 SCRA 473 [1988]); Nuguid v. C.A., G.R. No. 77423, March 13,

Tan v. C.A., 20 SCRA 54 [1967]; Ramirez Tel. Co. v. Bank of America, 33 SCRA 737 [1970];

1989). In fact it has long been settled that a public document executed and attested through the

Lucero v. Loot, 25 SCRA 687 [1968]; Guerrero v. C.A., 142 SCRA 130 [1986]).

intervention of the notary public is evidence of the facts in clear, unequivocal manner therein
expressed. It has the presumption of regularity and to contradict all these, evidence must be

Suffice it to say that the other flaws claimed by the petitioners which allegedly invalidated the

clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant (Rebuleda v. I.A.C., 155 SCRA 520-521

1952 deed of sale have not been raised before the trial court nor before the appellate court. It is

[1987]). Forgery cannot be presumed, it must be proven (Siasat v. IAC, No. 67889, October 10,

settled jurisprudence that an issue which was neither averred in the complaint nor raised during

1985). Likewise, petitioners allegation of absence of consideration of the deed was not

the trial in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it would be offensive

substantiated. Under Art. 1354 of the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary

to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. (Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276

is proven.

[1981]; Dela Santa v. C.A., 140 SCRA 44 [1985]; Dihiansan v. C.A., 157 SCRA 434 [1987];
Anchuelo v. IAC, 147 SCRA 434 [1987]; Dulos Realty and Development Corporation v. C.A.,

As to petitioners' contention that Lancero had recognized the fatal defect of the 1952 deed

157 SCRA [1988]; Kamos v. IAC, G.R. No. 78282, July 5, 1989).

when he signed the document in 1968 entitled "Settlement to Avoid Litigation" (Rollo, p. 71), it
is a basic rule of evidence that the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,

Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2476

or omission of another (Sec. 28. Rule 130, Rules of Court). This particular rule is embodied in

under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to

Ricardos' proportionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6)

An instrument notarized by a notary public as in the case at bar is a public instrument (Eacnio

brothers and sisters listed in the Title and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as

v. Baens, 5 Phil. 742). The execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the

inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did not recite that she was deceased at the time it

thing (Art. 1498, 1st Par., Civil Code) and is deemed legal delivery. Hence, its execution was

was executed (Rollo, pp. 67-68).

considered a sufficient delivery of the property (Buencamino v. Viceo, 13 Phil. 97; [1906];
Puato v. Mendoza, 64 Phil. 457 [1937]; Vda. de Sarmiento v. Lesaca, 108 Phil. 900 [1960];

The hereditary share in a decedents' estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the

Phil. Suburban Development Corp. v. Auditor Gen., 63 SCRA 397 (1975]).

moment of the death of the "causante" or predecessor in interest (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity)

Besides, the property sold is a registered land. It is the act of registration that transfers the

disposing of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such

ownership of the land sold. (GSIS v. C.A., G.R. No. 42278, January 20, 1989). If the property

share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de

is a registered land, the purchaser in good, faith has a right to rely on the certificate of title and

Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]).

is under no duty to go behind it to look for flaws (Mallorca v. De Ocampo, No. L-26852,
March 25, 1970; Unchuan v. C.A., 161 SCRA 710 [1988]; Nuguid v. CA-G.R. No. 77427,

Teodorica Babangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were

March 13, 1989).

transmitted from the moment of her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in
1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricardo received his share in the lot as

Under the established principles of land registration law, the person dealing with registered

inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share over lot 2476 that

land may generally rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way

share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the

oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property (Tiongco v.

deed of sale.

de la Merced, L-2446, July 25, 1974; Lopez vs. CA., G.R. No. 49739, January 20, 1989; Davao
Grains Inc. vs. IAC, 171 SCRA 612 [1989]). This notwithstanding, DELCOR did more than

Petitioners contend that Ricardo's share from Teodorica was excluded in the sale considering

that. It did not only rely on the certificate of title. The Court of Appeals found that it had first

that a paragraph of the aforementioned deed refers merely to the shares of Ricardo and

investigated and checked the title (T.C.T. No. T-1183) in the name of Luis Lancero. It likewise

Eustaquio (Rollo, p. 67-68).

inquired into the Subdivision Plan, the corresponding technical description and the deed of sale
executed by Ricardo Gevero in favor of Luis Lancero and found everything in order. It even

It is well settled that laws and contracts shall be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to

went to the premises and found Luis Lancero to be in possession of the land to the exclusion of

the different provisions thereof (Reparations Commission v. Northern Lines, Inc., 34 SCRA

any other person. DELCOR had therefore acted in good faith in purchasing the land in

203 [1970]), to ascertain the meaning of the provisions of a contract, its entirety must be taken

question.

into account (Ruiz v. Sheriff of Manila, 34 SCRA 83 [1970]). The interpretation insisted upon
by the petitioners, by citing only one paragraph of the deed of sale, would not only create

Consequently, DELCOR's action is not barred by laches.

contradictions but also, render meaningless and set at naught the entire provisions thereof.
The main issues having been disposed of, discussion of the other issues appear unnecessary.
Petitioners claim that DELCOR's action is barred by laches considering that the petitioners
have remained in the actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession thereof until at present

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the

(Rollo, p. 17).

Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

and the parties were directed to submit their memorandums. These, together with the evidence,
having been carefully considered, the Court now decides the case.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

First, the facts as the Court sees them in light of the evidence on record:
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all
surnamed Locsin. He owned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces

G.R. No. 89783 February 19, 1992

of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his estate was divided among his three (3) children as
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, JOSE B. LOCSIN, AUREA B. LOCSIN,

follows:

MATILDE L. CORDERO, SALVADOR B. LOCSIN and MANUEL V. DEL

ROSARIO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE JAUCIAN,

(a) the coconut lands of some 700 hectares in Bual, Pilar, Sorsogon, were adjudicated to his

FLORENTINO

daughter, Magdalena Locsin;

JAUCIAN,

MERCEDES

JAUCIAN

ARBOLEDA,

HEIRS

OF

JOSEFINA J. BORJA, HEIRS OF EDUARDO JAUCIAN and HEIRS OF VICENTE

JAUCIAN, respondents.

(b) 106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian,
Mariano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin;

Aytona Law Office and Siquia Law Offices for petitioners.

(c) more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of
Mabella, Sangil & Associates for private respondents.

riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi City went to his
son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina,
for her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from her
parents, Balbino Jaucian and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties

NARVASA, C.J.:

acquired by the spouses in the course of their union, 1 which however was not blessed with
children.

Reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV-11186 affirming with
modification the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Albay in favor of the plaintiffs in

Eventually, the properties of Mariano and Catalina were brought under the Torrens System.

Civil Case No. 7152 entitled "Jose Jaucian, et al. v. Mariano B. Locsin, et al.," an action for

Those that Mariano inherited from his father, Getulio Locsin, were surveyed cadastrally and

recovery of real property with damages is sought. in these proceedings initiated by petition

registered in the name of "Mariano Locsin, married to Catalina Jaucian.'' 2

for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole
The petition was initially denied due course and dismissed by this Court. It was however

and universal heir of all his properties. 3 The will was drawn up by his wife's nephew and

reinstated upon a second motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, and the

trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses

respondents were required to comment thereon. The petition was thereafter given due course

being childless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should
revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin

relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), and those of Catalina to her
"Jaucian relatives."

1-JRL

Apr.

7,

1966

Deed

of

Sale

in

favor

of

430,203

20,000

Jose R. Locsin

Don Mariano Locsin died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness. In due

1-JJL Mar. 22, 1967 Deed of Sale in favor of 5,000 P 1,000 Hostilio Cornello

time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay without any

Julian Locsin (Lot 2020) Helen M. Jaucian

opposition from both sides of the family. As directed in his will, Doa Catalina was appointed
executrix of his estate. Her lawyer in the probate proceeding was Attorney Lorayes. In the
5

Nov.

29,

inventory of her husband's estate which she submitted to the probate court for

favor

approval, 6Catalina declared that "all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private

Matilde

properties of the deceased and form part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the

and Salvador Locsin

1974

Deed

of

Donation

in

26,509

Aurea

Locsin,

L.

Cordero

surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal." 7

2

Feb.

4,

Among her own and Don Mariano's relatives, Doa Catalina was closest to her nephew,

favor

Attorney Salvador Lorayes, her nieces, Elena Jaucian, Maria Lorayes-Cornelio and Maria

Matilde

Olbes-Velasco, and the husbands of the last two: Hostilio Cornelio and Fernando

and Salvador Locsin

1975

Deed

of

Donation

in

34,045

Aurea

Locsin,

L.

Cordero

Velasco. 8 Her trust in Hostilio Cornelio was such that she made him custodian of all the titles
of her properties; and before she disposed of any of them, she unfailingly consulted her lawyer-

nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. It was Atty. Lorayes who prepared the legal documents

favor

and, more often than not, the witnesses to the transactions were her niece Elena Jaucian, Maria

Matilde

Lorayes-Cornelio, Maria Olbes-Velasco, or their husbands. Her niece, Elena Jaucian, was her

and Salvador Locsin

Sept.

9,

1975

Deed

of

Donation

in

(Lot

Aurea

2059)
Locsin,

L.

Cordero

life-long companion in her house.

4
Don Mariano relied on Doa Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9)

July

15,

1974

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

in

1,424

Hostilio

Cornelio

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Fernando Velasco

years after his death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she
was also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or

5 July 15, 1974 Deed of Absolute Sale in 1,456 P 5,750 Hostilio Cornelio

assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and

favor of Aurea B. Locsin Elena Jaucian

nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had received from
her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:

July

15,

1974

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

in

1,237

5,720

ditto

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

in

1,404

4,050

ditto

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE WITNESSES
7
23

Jan.

26,

1957

favor of Mariano Locsin

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

in

962

481

July

15,

1974

favor of Aurea B. Locsin

15

Nov.

26,

1975

Deed

of

Sale

in

favor

of

261

4,930

ditto

Aurea Locsin
16

Oct.

(6,825

sqm.

when

resurveyed)

17, 1975

Deed of

Sale

in

favor

of

533 P 2,000

Delfina Anson

Aurea Locsin M. Acabado

24

Feb.

12,

in

1973

Deed

of

favor

Absolute

of

Sale

100

1,000

Francisco

M.

Maquiniana
17 Nov. 26, 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of 373 P 1,000 Leonor Satuito
Aurea Locsin Mariano B. Locsin

26

July

15,

1973

Deed

of

favor
19

Sept.

1,

1975

Conditional

Donation

in

1,130

3,000

ditto

Absolute

Sale

in

130

of

1,300
Francisco

Maquiniana

favor of Mariano Locsin

27
1-MVRJ Dec. 29, 1972 Deed of Reconveyance 1,5110.66 P 1,000 Delfina Anson
in

favor

of

Manuel

V.

Rosario

del

(Lot

2155)

Antonio

3,

1973

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

in

100

1,000

favor of Ireneo Mamia

Illegible

whose

grandfather

May

maternal

was

Getulio

28

May

3,

1973

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

in

75

750

favor of Zenaida Buiza

Locsin
29
2-MVRJ June 30, 1973 Deed of Reconveyance 319.34 P 500 Antonio Illegible
in

favor

of

Manuel

Rosario

V.

del

(Lot

but

from
2155

Refinery

leased

of
to

3,

1973

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

Deed

of

Absolute

Sale

Deed

of

Absolute

Deed

of

Deed

of

in

150

1,500

in

31

1,000

Sale

in

150

1,500

Absolute

Sale

in

112

1,200

Absolute

Sale

in

250

2,500

favor of Felisa Morjella

Nical
rentals

portion

were

Maria

Salvador

the

bigger

Lot

2155)

May

30

Apr.

3,

1973

favor of Inocentes Motocinos

Filoil

assigned

to

Jaucian

Lorayes

31

Feb.

12,

1973

favor of Casimiro Mondevil

Cornelio
32
Of her own properties, Doa Catalina conveyed the following to her own nephews and nieces

Mar.

1,

1973

favor of Juan Saballa

and others:
25
EXHIBIT DATE PARTICULARS AREA/SQ.M. PRICE
2-JJL
Vicente

July

16,

1964

Deed
Jaucian

of

Sale

Dec.

28,

1973

of Rogelio Marticio
in

favor
(lot

5,000

1,000
2020)

Doa Catalina died on July 6, 1977.

Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 affirming and ratifying

subject of this case, in the name of defendants, and derivatives

the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives.

therefrom, and issue new ones to the plaintiffs;

After the reading of her will, all the relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the
court for probate because the properties devised to them under the will had already been

(4) ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to reconvey ownership

conveyed to them by the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the

and possession of all such properties to the plaintiffs, together with all

executor of her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.

muniments of title properly endorsed and delivered, and all the fruits and
incomes received by the defendants from the estate of Catalina, with

In 1989, or six (6) years after Doa Catalina's demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces

legal interest from the filing of this action; and where reconveyance and

who had already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in

delivery cannot be effected for reasons that might have intervened and

the Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City (Branch VIII, Civil Case No. 7152) to recover the

prevent the same, defendants shall pay for the value of such properties,

properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the

fruits and incomes received by them, also with legal interest from the

conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the

filing, of this case

laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina did not join the action.
(5) ordering each of the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the amount of
After the trial, judgment was rendered on July 8, l985 in favor of the plaintiffs (Jaucian), and

P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum of P20,000.00

against the Locsin defendants, the dispositive part of which reads:

each as moral damages; and

WHEREFORE, this Court renders judgment for the plaintiffs and

(6) ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs attorney's fees and

against the defendants:

litigation expenses, in the amount of P30,000.00 without prejudice to

any contract between plaintiffs and counsel.

(1) declaring the, plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and
Eduardo Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the

Costs against the defendants. 9

entire estate, in equal portions, of Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being

the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and

The Locsins appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. CV-11186) which rendered its

Gregorio, both surnamed Jaucian, and full-blood brothers of Catalina;

now appealed judgment on March 14, 1989, affirming the trial court's decision.

(2) declaring the deeds of sale, donations, reconveyance and exchange

The petition has merit and should be granted.

and all other instruments conveying any part of the estate of Catalina J.
Vda. de Locsin including, but not limited to those in the inventory of

The trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews

known properties (Annex B of the complaint) as null and void ab-initio;

and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had
already disposed of more than ten (10) years before her death. For those properties did not

(3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Albay and/or Legazpi City to

form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and

cancel all certificates of title and other transfers of the real properties,

obligations existing at the time of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto
since the opening of the succession." 10 The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from

the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time. 11 Property which Doa

Mariano Locsin II. 13 On April 7, 1966, or 19 years before she passed away, she also sold a 43

Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer formed part

hectare land to another Locsin nephew, Jose R. Locsin. 14 The next year, or on March 22, 1967,

of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate,

she sold a 5,000-sq.m. portion of Lot 2020 to Julian Locsin. 15

only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal
heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under

On March 27, 1967, Lot 2020 16 was partitioned by and among Doa Catalina, Julian Locsin,

certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent's

Vicente Jaucian and Agapito Lorete. 17 At least Vicente Jaucian, among the other respondents in

gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since neither they nor the donees are

this case, is estopped from assailing the genuineness and due execution of the sale of portions

compulsory (or forced) heirs.

12

of Lot 2020 to himself, Julian Locsin, and Agapito Lorete, and the partition agreement that he
(Vicente) concluded with the other co-owners of Lot 2020.

There is thus no basis for assuming an intention on the part of Doa Catalina, in transferring
the properties she had received from her late husband to his nephews and nieces, an intent to

Among Doa, Catalina's last transactions before she died in 1977 were the sales of property

circumvent the law in violation of the private respondents' rights to her succession. Said

which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin and Mariano Locsin in 1975. 18

respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence
there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any transfer of her property

There is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doa Catalina was mentally incompetent

during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise restricted her

when she made those dispositions. Indeed, how can any such suggestion be made in light of the

freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750,

fact that even as she was transferring properties to the Locsins, she was also

Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke:

contemporaneously disposing of her other properties in favor of the Jaucians? She sold to her
nephew, Vicente Jaucian, on July 16, 1964 (21 years before her death) one-half (or 5,000

Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present property of the

sq.m.) of Lot 2020. Three years later, or on March 22, 1967, she sold another 5000 sq.m. of the

donor or part thereof, provided he reserves, in full ownership or in

same lot to Julian Locsin. 19

usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself, and of all relatives
who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to

From 1972 to 1973 she made several other transfers of her properties to her relatives and other

be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall

persons, namely: Francisco Maquiniana, Ireneo Mamia, Zenaida Buiza, Feliza Morjella,

be reduced on petition of any person affected. (634a)

Inocentes Motocinos, Casimiro Mondevil, Juan Saballa and Rogelio Marticio. 20 None of those
transactions was impugned by the private respondents.

The lower court capitalized on the fact that Doa Catalina was already 90 years old when she
died on July 6, 1977. It insinuated that because of her advanced years she may have been

In 1975, or two years before her death, Doa Catalina sold some lots not only to Don

imposed upon, or unduly influenced and morally pressured by her husband's nephews and

Mariano's

nieces (the petitioners) to transfer to them the properties which she had inherited from Don

II, 21 but also to her niece, Mercedes Jaucian Arboleda. 22 If she was competent to make that

Mariano's estate. The records do not support that conjecture.

conveyance to Mercedes, how can there be any doubt that she was equally competent to

niece,

Aurea

Locsin,

and

his

nephew,

Mariano

Locsin

transfer her other pieces of property to Aurea and Mariano II?

For as early as 1957, or twenty-eight (28) years before her death, Doa Catalina had already
begun transferring to her Locsin nephews and nieces the properties which she received from

The trial court's belief that Don Mariano Locsin bequeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a

Don Mariano. She sold a 962-sq.m. lot on January 26, 1957 to his nephew and namesake

"consciousness of its real origin" which carries the implication that said estate consisted of

25

properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doa Catalina's

favor of Matilde Cordero, and (3) still another deed dated September 9, 1975

admission in her inventory of that estate, that "items 1 to 33 are the private properties of the

Salvador Lorayes, were all witnessed by Hostilio Cornelio (who is married to Doa Catalina's

deceased (Don Mariano) and forms (sic) part of his capital at the time of the marriage with the

niece, Maria Lorayes) and Fernando Velasco who is married to another niece, Maria

surviving spouse, while items 34 to 42 are conjugal properties, acquired during the marriage."

Olbes. 26The sales which she made in favor of Aurea Locsin on July 15, 1974

She would have known better than anyone else whether the listing included any of her

by Hostilio Cornelio and Elena Jaucian. Given those circumstances, said transactions could not

paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory was

have been anything but free and voluntary acts on her part.

27

in favor of

were witnessed

signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceeding No.
138 of the Court of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own

Apart from the foregoing considerations, the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not

nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvador Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false

dismissing this action for annulment and reconveyance on the ground of prescription.

inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt's interest and to his own, since he stood

Commenced decades after the transactions had been consummated, and six (6) years after

to inherit from her eventually.

Doa Catalina's death, it prescribed four (4) years after the subject transactions were recorded
in the Registry of Property, 28 whether considered an action based on fraud, or one to redress an

This Court finds no reason to disbelieve Attorney Lorayes' testimony that before Don Mariano

injury to the rights of the plaintiffs. The private respondents may not feign ignorance of said

died, he and his wife (Doa Catalina), being childless, had agreed that their respective

transactions because the registration of the deeds was constructive notice thereof to them and

properties should eventually revert to their respective lineal relatives. As the trusted legal

the whole world. 29

adviser of the spouses and a full-blood nephew of Doa Catalina, he would not have spun a
tale out of thin air that would also prejudice his own interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision dated March 14, 1989 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11186 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private

Little significance, it seems, has been attached to the fact that among Doa Catalina's nephews

respondents' complaint for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of properties in Civil

and nieces, those closest to her: (a) her lawyer-nephew Attorney Salvador Lorayes; (b) her

Case No. 7152 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch VIII of Legazpi City, is DISMISSED, with

niece and companion Elena Jaucian: (c) her nieces Maria Olbes-Velasco and Maria Lorayes-

costs against the private respondents, plaintiffs therein.

Cornelio and their respective husbands, Fernando Velasco and Hostilio Cornelio, did not join
the suit to annul and undo the dispositions of property which she made in favor of the Locsins,

SO ORDERED.

although it would have been to their advantage to do so. Their desistance persuasively
demonstrates that Doa Catalina acted as a completely free agent when she made the
conveyances in favor of the petitioners. In fact, considering their closeness to Doa Catalina it
would have been well-nigh impossible for the petitioners to employ "fraud, undue pressure,
and subtle manipulations" on her to make her sell or donate her properties to them. Doa
Catalina's niece, Elena Jaucian, daughter of her brother, Eduardo Jaucian, lived with her in her
house. Her nephew-in-law, Hostilio Cornelio, was the custodian of the titles of her properties.
The sales and donations which she signed in favor of the petitioners were prepared by her
trusted legal adviser and nephew, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. The (1) deed of donation dated
November

19,

1974 23 in favor of Aurea Locsin, (2) another deed of donation dated February 4, 1975

24

in

Cruz, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 125835 July 30, 1998

alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in

their favor a "CONTRACT TO SELL" Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate,

NATALIA CARPENA OPULENCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALADIN

consisting of 23,766 square meters located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna at

SIMUNDAC and MIGUEL OLIVAN, respondents.

P150.00 per square meter; that plaintiffs paid a downpayment of

P300,000.00 but defendant, despite demands, failed to comply with her
obligations under the contract. [Private respondents] therefore prayed
that [petitioner] be ordered to perform her contractual obligations and to

PANGANIBAN, J.:

further pay damages, attorney's fee and litigation expenses.

Is a contract to sell a real property involved in restate proceedings valid and binding without

In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in

the approval of the probate court?

favor of plaintiffs and receipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment.

However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the
property subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio

Statement of the Case

Carpena (petitioner's father), in respect of which a petition for probate

This is the main question raised in this petition for review before us, assailing the Decision of

was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Bian, Laguna; that

the Court of Appeals2 in CA-GR CV No. 41994 promulgated on February 6, 1996 and its

at the time the contract was executed, the parties were aware of the

pendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not

Resolution dated July 19, 1996. The challenged Decision disposed as follows:

approved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court

[petitioner] had offered to return the downpayment received from

dismissing the complaint is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby

[private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it; that [private

rendered declaring the CONTRACT TO SELL executed by appellee in

respondents] further failed to provide funds for the tenant who

favor of appellants as valid and binding, subject to the result of the

demanded P150,00.00 in payment of his tenancy rights on the land; that

administration proceedings of the testate Estate of Demetrio Carpena.

[petitioner] had chosen to rescind the contract.

SO ORDERED. 4

At the pre-trial conference the parties stipulated on [sic] the following

facts:

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the challenged Resolution.

1. That on February 3, 1989, [private respondents]

and [petitioner] entered into a contract to sell

The Facts

involving a parcel of land situated in Sta. Rosa,

The antecedent facts, as succinctly narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals, are:

Laguna, otherwise known as Lot No. 2125 of the

Sta. Rosa Estate.

In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a

quo [herein private respondents] Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven

2. That the price or consideration of the said sell

It is noteworthy that when the contract to sell was consummated, no

[sic] is P150.00 per square meters;

petition was filed in the Court with notice to the heirs of the time and
place of hearing, to show that the sale is necessary and beneficial. A sale

3. That the amount of P300,000.00 had already

of properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties must

been received by [petitioner];

comply with the requisites provided by law, (Sec. 7, Rule 89, Rules of
Court) which are mandatory, and without them, the authority to sell, the

4. That the parties have knowledge that the

sale itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ab initio.

property subject of the contract to sell is subject

(Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718, Gabriel, et al., vs. Encarnacion, et al.,

of the probate proceedings;

L-6736, May 4, 1954; Bonaga vs. Soler, 2 Phil. 755) Besides, it is

axiomatic that where the estate of a deceased person is already the

5. That [as] of this time, the probate Court has not

subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter

yet issued an order either approving or denying

into any transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate

the said sale. (p. 3, appealed Order of September

Court. (Estate of Obave, vs. Reyes, 123 SCRA 767).

15, 1992, pp. 109-112, record).

As held by the Supreme Court, a decedent's representative
[Private respondents] submitted their evidence in support of the material

(administrator) is not estopped from questioning the validity of his own

allegations of the complaint. In addition to testimonies of witnesses,

void deed purporting to convey land. (Bona vs. Soler, 2 Phil, 755). In the

[private respondents] presented the following documentary evidences:

case at bar, the [petitioner,] realizing the illegality of the transaction[,]

(1) Contract to Sell (Exh A); (2) machine copy of the last will and

has interposed the nullity of the contract as her defense, there being no

testament of Demetrio Carpena (defendant's father) to show that the

approval from the probate Court, and, in good faith offers to return the

property sold by defendant was one of those devised to her in said will

money she received from the [private respondents]. Certainly, the

(Exh B); (3) receipts signed by defendant for the downpayment in the

administratrix is not estop[ped] from doing so and the action to declare

total amount of P300,000.00 (Exhs C, D & E); and (4) demand letters

the inexistence of contracts do not prescribe. This is what precipitated

sent to defendant (Exhs F & G).

the filing of [petitioner's] demurrer to evidence. 6

It appears that [petitioner], instead of submitting her evidence, filed a

The trial court's order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents

Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that the

who alleged:

contract to sell was null and void for want of approval by the probate
court. She further argued that the contract was subject to a suspensive

1. The lower court erred in concluding that the contract to sell is null and

condition, which was the probate of the will of defendant's father

void, there being no approval of the probate court.

Demetrio Carpena. An Opposition was filed by [private respondents]. It

appears further that in an Order dated December 15, 1992 the court a

2. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] in good faith

quo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint. It

offers to return the money to [private respondents].

justified its action in dismissing the complaint in the following manner:

3. The lower court erred in concluding that [petitioner] is not under

it is apropos to refer to the preambular or preliminary portion of the

estoppel to question the validity of the contract to sell.

document, which reads:

4. The lower court erred in not ruling on the consideration of the

WHEREAS, the SELLER is the lawful owner of a

contract to sell which is tantamount to plain unjust enrichment of

certain parcel of land, which is more particularly

[petitioner] at the expense of [private respondents].

Public Respondent's Ruling

Declaring the Contract to Sell valid, subject to the outcome of the testate proceedings on

described as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx

Demetrio Carpena's estate, the appellate court set aside the trial court's dismissal of the
complaint and correctly ruled as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

It is apparent from the appealed order that the lower court treated the

WHEREAS, the SELLER suffers difficulties in

contract to sell executed by appellee as one made by the administratrix

her living and has forced to offer the sale of the

of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena for the benefit of the estate. Hence, its

above-described property, "which property was

main reason for voiding the contract in question was the absence of the

only one among the other properties given to her

probate court's approval. Presumably, what the lower court had in mind

by her late father," to anyone who can wait for

was the sale of the estate or part thereof made by the administrator for

complete clearance of the court on the Last Will

the benefit of the estate, as authorized under Rule 89 of the Revised

Testament of her father.

Rules of Court, which requires the approval of the probate court upon
application therefor with notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees.

WHEREAS, the SELLER in order to meet her

need of cash, has offered for sale the said property

However, as adverted to by appellants in their brief, the contract to sell

at ONE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (150.00)

in question is not covered by Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court

Philippine Currency, per square meter unto the

since it was made by appellee in her capacity as an heir, of a property

BUYERS, and with this offer, the latter has

that was devised to her under the will sought to be probated. Thus, while

accepted to buy and/or purchase the same, less the

the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed the contract in

area for the road and other easements indicated at

her capacity as "executrix and administratrix" of the estate, a cursory

the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2125

reading of the entire text of the contract would unerringly show that

duly confirmed after the survey to be conducted

what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the "other properties

by the BUYER's Licensed Geodetic Engineer, and

given to her by her late father," and more importantly, it was not made

whatever area [is] left. (Emphasis added).

for the benefit of the estate but for her own needs. To illustrate this point,

To emphasize, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contract

yet order appellee to perform her obligations under the contract because

that appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity as executrix of the will or

the result of the administration proceedings of the testate Estate of

administratrix of the estate of her father, but as an heir and more

Demetrio Carpena has to be awaited. Hence, we shall confine our

importantly as owner of said lot which, along with other properties, was

adjudication to merely declaring the validity of the questioned Contract

devised to her under the will sought to be probated. That being so, the

to Sell.

requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court which

refer to a sale made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate do

Hence, this appeal. 8

not apply.
The Issue
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner raises only one issue:
It is noteworthy that in a Manifestation filed with this court by
appellants, which is not controverted by appellee, it is mentioned that the

Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by

last will and testament of Demetrio Carpena was approved in a final

the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate [r]espondent[s] without the requisite

judgment rendered in Special Proceeding No. B-979 by the Regional

probate court approval is valid.

Trial Court, Branch 24 Bian, Laguna. But of course such approval does
not terminate the proceeding[s] since the settlement of the estate will

The Court's Ruling

ensue. Such proceedings will consist, among others, in the issuance by

the court of a notice to creditors (Rule 86), hearing of money claims and

The petition has no merit.

payment of taxes and estate debts (Rule 88) and distribution of the
residue to the heirs or persons entitled thereto (Rule 90). In effect, the

Contract to Sell Valid

final execution of the deed of sale itself upon appellants' payment of the
balance of the purchase price will have to wait for the settlement or

In a nutshell, petitioner contends that "where the estate of the deceased person is already the

termination of the administration proceedings of the Estate of Demetrio

subject of a testate or intestate proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any transaction

Carpena. Under the foregoing premises, what the trial court should have

involving it without prior approval of the Probate Court." 9 She maintains that the Contract to

done with the complaint was not to dismiss it but to simply put on hold

Sell is void because it was not approved by the probate court, as required by Section 7, Rule 89

further proceedings until such time that the estate or its residue will be

of the Rules of Court:

distributed in accordance with the approved will.

Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise
The rule is that when a demurrer to the evidence is granted by the trial

encumber estate. The court having jurisdiction of the estate of the

court but reversed on appeal, defendant loses the right to adduce his

deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage,

evidence. In such a case, the appellate court will decide the controversy

or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules and

on the basis of plaintiff's evidence. In the case at bench, while we find

when it appears necessary or beneficial, under the following regulations:

the contract to sell valid and binding between the parties, we cannot as

xxx xxx xxx

coowners of the estate while it remains undivided." . . . And according to

article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage

Insisting that the above rule should apply to this case, petitioner argues that the stipulations in

his part in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or

the Contract to Sell require her to act in her capacity as an executrix or administratrix. She

mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted him in

avers that her obligation to eject tenants pertains to the administratrix or executrix, the estate

the partition upon the dissolution of the community. Hence, where some

Likewise demonstrating that she entered into the

of the heirs, without the concurrence of the others, sold a property left by

contract in her capacity as executor is the stipulation that she must effect the conversion of

their deceased father, this Court, speaking thru its then Chief Justice

subject land from irrigated rice land to residential land and secure the necessary clearances

Cayetano Arellano, said that the sale was valid, but that the effect

from government offices. Petitioner alleges that these obligations can be undertaken only by an

thereof was limited to the share which may be allotted to the vendors

executor or administrator of an estate, and not by an heir. 11

upon the partition of the estate.

being the landlord of the said tenants.

10

The Court is not persuaded. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of

Administration of the Estate Not

the Rules of Court is not applicable, because petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her
capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the estate. In the contract, she
represented herself as the "lawful owner" and seller of the subject parcel of land.

12

She also

explained the reason for the sale to be "difficulties in her living" conditions and consequent
"need of cash."

13

Prejudiced by the Contract to Sell

Petitioner further contends that "[t]o sanction the sale at this stage would bring about a partial

These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the

distribution of the decedent's estate pending the final termination of the testate

estate under probate when she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence

proceedings." 17 This becomes all the more significant in the light of the trial court's finding, as

cited by petitioners has no application to the instant case.

stated in its Order dated August 20, 1997, that "the legitimate of one of the heirs has been
impaired." 18

We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedent's death. 14Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment

Petitioner's contention is not convincing. The Contract to Sell stipulates that petitioner's offer

her father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell,

to sell is contingent on the "complete clearance of the court on the Last Will Testament of her

because the petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the

father." 19 Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and

estate of her late father. 15 Thus, in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 16 the Court resolved an identical issue

private respondents during the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the

under the old Civil Code and held:

sale or the transfer of ownership over the parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to
the full payment of the purchase price and to the termination and outcome of the testate

Art. 440 of the Civil Code provides that "the possession of hereditary

proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner's apprehension that the Contract to Sell

property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption

may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is

from the instant of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance be

settled that "the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending

accepted." And Manresa with reason states that upon the death of a

administration, in no wise stands in the way of such administration." 20

person, each of his heirs "becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be adjudicated
to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the

Estoppel

Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representations in her valid Contract to

the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jacinto Divinagracias withdrawal from

Sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as initial

the partnership.[1] Among the assets to be distributed were five (5) fishing boats, six (6)

payment of the purchase price. Petitioner may not renege on her own acts and representations,

vehicles, two (2) parcels of land located at Sto. Nio and Talisay, Negros Occidental, and cash

to the prejudice of the private respondents who have relied on them.

21

Jurisprudence teaches us

deposits in the local branches of the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Prudential Bank.

that neither the law nor the courts will extricate a party from an unwise or undesirable contract
he or she entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of its
consequences. 22

Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after Vicente Tabanaos untimely
demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanaos heirs any statement of assets and
liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnerships

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of

finances. Petitioner also reneged on his promise to turn over to Tabanaos heirs the deceaseds

Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of
P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment thereof. [2]

SO ORDERED.
Consequently, Tabanaos heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

accounting, payment of shares, division of assets and damages. [3] In their complaint,
respondents prayed as follows:
1. Defendant be ordered to render the proper accounting of all the assets and liabilities of the
partnership at bar; and

[G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001]

2. After due notice and hearing defendant be ordered to pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the

plaintiffs the following:

EMILIO EMNACE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF VICENTE

TABANAO, SHERWIN TABANAO, VICENTE WILLIAM TABANAO,

A. No less than One Third (1/3) of the assets, properties, dividends, cash, land(s), fishing

JANETTE TABANAO DEPOSOY, VICENTA MAY TABANAO VARELA,

vessels, trucks, motor vehicles, and other forms and substance of treasures which belong and/or

ROSELA TABANAO and VINCENT TABANAO, respondents.

should belong, had accrued and/or must accrue to the partnership;

DECISION

B. No less than Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages;

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

C. Attorneys fees equivalent to Thirty Percent (30%) of the entire share/amount/award which
the Honorable Court may resolve the plaintiffs as entitled to plus P1,000.00 for every

Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a

appearance in court.[4]

business concern known as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they
decided to dissolve their partnership and executed an agreement of partition and distribution of

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of improper venue,
lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate of

Tabanao to sue.[5] On August 30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. It held that

II. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave

venue was properly laid because, while realties were involved, the action was directed against

abuse of discretion in insisting to try the case which involve (sic) a parcel of

a particular person on the basis of his personal liability; hence, the action is not only a personal

land situated outside of its territorial jurisdiction;

action but also an action in personam. As regards petitioners argument of lack of jurisdiction
over the action because the prescribed docket fee was not paid considering the huge amount

III. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave

involved in the claim, the trial court noted that a request for accounting was made in order that

abuse of discretion in allowing the estate of the deceased to appear as party

the exact value of the partnership may be ascertained and, thus, the correct docket fee may be

plaintiff, when there is no intestate case and filed by one who was never

paid. Finally, the trial court held that the heirs of Tabanao had a right to sue in their own names,

appointed by the court as administratrix of the estates; and

in view of the provision of Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.[6]

IV. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in not dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.

The following day, respondents filed an amended complaint, [7] incorporating the
additional prayer that petitioner be ordered to sell all (the partnerships) assets and thereafter

On August 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, [12] dismissing

pay/remit/deliver/surrender/yield to the plaintiffs their corresponding share in the proceeds

the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

[8]

thereof. In due time, petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to dismiss, arguing that the

or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial court in issuing the questioned orders

trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case due to the plaintiffs failure to pay the

denying petitioners motions to dismiss.

[9]

proper docket fees. Further, in a supplement to his motion to dismiss, petitioner also raised
prescription as an additional ground warranting the outright dismissal of the complaint.

Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review, raising the same issues
resolved by the Court of Appeals, namely:

On June 15, 1995, the trial court issued an Order,[10] denying the motion to dismiss
inasmuch as the grounds raised therein were basically the same as the earlier motion to dismiss

I. Failure to pay the proper docket fee;

which has been denied.Anent the issue of prescription, the trial court ruled that prescription
begins to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the final accounting is
done. Hence, prescription has not set in the absence of a final accounting. Moreover, an action

II. Parcel of land subject of the case pending before the trial court is outside the
said courts territorial jurisdiction;

based on a written contract prescribes in ten years from the time the right of action accrues.
III. Lack of capacity to sue on the part of plaintiff heirs of Vicente Tabanao; and
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,[11] raising the
following issues:

IV. Prescription of the plaintiff heirs cause of action.

I. Whether or not respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse

It can be readily seen that respondents primary and ultimate objective in instituting the

of discretion in taking cognizance of a case despite the failure to pay the

action below was to recover the decedents 1/3 share in the partnerships assets. While they ask

required docket fee;

for an accounting of the partnerships assets and finances, what they are actually asking is for
the trial court to compel petitioner to pay and turn over their share, or the equivalent value
thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the partnership assets. They also assert that until and

unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the partnerships assets, as well as their

The legal fees shall be a lien on the monetary or property judgment in favor of the pauper-

corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained.Consequently, they feel justified in not

litigant.

having paid the commensurate docket fee as required by the Rules of Court.
Respondents cannot invoke the above provision in their favor because it specifically
We do not agree. The trial court does not have to employ guesswork in ascertaining the
estimated value of the partnerships assets, for respondents themselves voluntarily pegged the

applies to pauper-litigants. Nowhere in the records does it appear that respondents are litigating
as paupers, and as such are exempted from the payment of court fees.[18]

worth thereof at Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00). Hence, this case is one which is really
not beyond pecuniary estimation, but rather partakes of the nature of a simple collection case

The rule applicable to the case at bar is Section 5(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,

where the value of the subject assets or amount demanded is pecuniarily determinable.

which defines the two kinds of claims as: (1) those which are immediately ascertainable; and

[13]

While it is true that the exact value of the partnerships total assets cannot be shown with

(2) those which cannot be immediately ascertained as to the exact amount. This second class of

certainty at the time of filing, respondents can and must ascertain, through informed and

claims, where the exact amount still has to be finally determined by the courts based on

practical estimation, the amount they expect to collect from the partnership, particularly from

evidence presented, falls squarely under the third paragraph of said Section 5(a), which

petitioner, in order to determine the proper amount of docket and other fees.

[14]

It is thus

provides:

imperative for respondents to pay the corresponding docket fees in order that the trial court
may acquire jurisdiction over the action.[15]

In case the value of the property or estate or the sum claimed is less or more in accordance with
the appraisal of the court, the difference of fee shall be refunded or paid as the case may

Nevertheless, unlike in the case of Manchester Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals,

[16]

be. (Underscoring ours)

where there was clearly an effort to defraud the government in avoiding to pay the correct

docket fees, we see no attempt to cheat the courts on the part of respondents. In fact, the lower

In Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Court of Appeals, [19] this Court pronounced

courts have noted their expressed desire to remit to the court any payable balance or lien on

that the above-quoted provision clearly contemplates an initial payment of the filing fees

whatever award which the Honorable Court may grant them in this case should there be any

corresponding to the estimated amount of the claim subject to adjustment as to what later may

deficiency in the payment of the docket fees to be computed by the Clerk of Court. [17] There is

be proved.[20] Moreover, we reiterated therein the principle that the payment of filing fees

evident willingness to pay, and the fact that the docket fee paid so far is inadequate is not an

cannot be made contingent or dependent on the result of the case. Thus, an initial payment of

indication that they are trying to avoid paying the required amount, but may simply be due to

the docket fees based on an estimated amount must be paid simultaneous with the filing of the

an inability to pay at the time of filing. This consideration may have moved the trial court and

complaint. Otherwise, the court would stand to lose the filing fees should the judgment later

the Court of Appeals to declare that the unpaid docket fees shall be considered a lien on the

turn out to be adverse to any claim of the respondent heirs.

judgment award.
The matter of payment of docket fees is not a mere triviality. These fees are necessary to
Petitioner, however, argues that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in

defray court expenses in the handling of cases. Consequently, in order to avoid tremendous

condoning the non-payment of the proper legal fees and in allowing the same to become a lien

losses to the judiciary, and to the government as well, the payment of docket fees cannot be

on the monetary or property judgment that may be rendered in favor of respondents. There is

made dependent on the outcome of the case, except when the claimant is a pauper-litigant.

merit in petitioners assertion. The third paragraph of Section 16, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court states that:

Applied to the instant case, respondents have a specific claim 1/3 of the value of all the
partnership assets but they did not allege a specific amount. They did, however, estimate the

partnerships total assets to be worth Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00), in a

letter

[21]

The court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is

addressed to petitioner. Respondents cannot now say that they are unable to make an

accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the

estimate, for the said letter and the admissions therein form part of the records of this

filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as

case. They cannot avoid paying the initial docket fees by conveniently omitting the said

the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime.

amount in their amended complaint. This estimate can be made the basis for the initial docket
fees that respondents should pay. Even if it were later established that the amount proved was

It does not follow, however, that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint for failure

less or more than the amount alleged or estimated, Rule 141, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court

of private respondent to pay the correct amount of docket fees. Although the payment of the

specifically provides that the court may refund the excess or exact additional fees should the

proper docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court may allow the plaintiff in an

initial payment be insufficient. It is clear that it is only the difference between the amount

action to pay the same within a reasonable time before the expiration of the applicable

finally awarded and the fees paid upon filing of this complaint that is subject to adjustment and

prescriptive or reglementary period. If the plaintiff fails to comply within this requirement, the

which may be subjected to a lien.

defendant should timely raise the issue of jurisdiction or else he would be considered in
estoppel. In the latter case, the balance between the appropriate docket fees and the amount
[22]

In the oft-quoted case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,

this

Court held that when the specific claim has been left for the determination by the court, the

actually paid by the plaintiff will be considered a lien or any award he may obtain in his
favor. (Underscoring ours)

additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment and it shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and

Accordingly, the trial court in the case at bar should determine the proper docket fee

assess and collect the additional fee. Clearly, the rules and jurisprudence contemplate the initial

based on the estimated amount that respondents seek to collect from petitioner, and direct them

payment of filing and docket fees based on the estimated claims of the plaintiff, and it is only

to pay the same within a reasonable time, provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary

when there is a deficiency that a lien may be constituted on the judgment award until such

period has not yet expired. Failure to comply therewith, and upon motion by petitioner, the

additional fee is collected.

immediate dismissal of the complaint shall issue on jurisdictional grounds.

Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint outright

On the matter of improper venue, we find no error on the part of the trial court and the

despite their failure to pay the proper docket fees. Nevertheless, as in other procedural rules, it

Court of Appeals in holding that the case below is a personal action which, under the Rules,

may be liberally construed in certain cases if only to secure a just and speedy disposition of an

may be commenced and tried where the defendant resides or may be found, or where the

action. While the rule is that the payment of the docket fee in the proper amount should be

plaintiffs reside, at the election of the latter.[26]

adhered to, there are certain exceptions which must be strictly construed.

[23]

Petitioner, however, insists that venue was improperly laid since the action is a real
In recent rulings, this Court has relaxed the strict adherence to the Manchester doctrine,

action involving a parcel of land that is located outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court a

allowing the plaintiff to pay the proper docket fees within a reasonable time before the

quo. This contention is not well-taken. The records indubitably show that respondents are

expiration of the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

[24]

asking that the assets of the partnership be accounted for, sold and distributed according to the
agreement of the partners. The fact that two of the assets of the partnership are parcels of land

In the recent case of National Steel Corp. v. Court of Appeals,

[25]

this Court held that:

does not materially change the nature of the action. It is an action in personam because it is an
action against a person, namely, petitioner, on the basis of his personal liability. It is not an
action in rem where the action is against the thing itself instead of against the person.

[27]

Furthermore, there is no showing that the parcels of land involved in this case are being

disputed. In fact, it is only incidental that part of the assets of the partnership under liquidation

value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted. [33] Moreover, respondents became owners
of their respective hereditary shares from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. [34]

happen to be parcels of land.

A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion Tabanao as
The time-tested case of Claridades v. Mercader, et al.,[28] settled this issue thus:

executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to
sue. As successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can

The fact that plaintiff prays for the sale of the assets of the partnership, including the fishpond

commence any action originally pertaining to the decedent. [35] From the moment of his death,

in question, did not change the nature or character of the action, such sale being merely a

his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of petitioners obligations as outlined in their

necessary incident of the liquidation of the partnership, which should precede and/or is part of

dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefore, had the capacity to sue

its process of dissolution.

and seek the courts intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.

The action filed by respondents not only seeks redress against petitioner. It also seeks

Finally, petitioner contends that the trial court should have dismissed the complaint on

the enforcement of, and petitioners compliance with, the contract that the partners executed to

the ground of prescription, arguing that respondents action prescribed four (4) years after it

formalize the partnerships dissolution, as well as to implement the liquidation and partition of

accrued in 1986. The trial court and the Court of Appeals gave scant consideration to

the partnerships assets. Clearly, it is a personal action that, in effect, claims a debt from

petitioners hollow arguments, and rightly so.

petitioner and seeks the performance of a personal duty on his part. [29] In fine, respondents
complaint seeking the liquidation and partition of the assets of the partnership with damages is

The three (3) final stages of a partnership are: (1) dissolution; (2) winding-up; and (3)

a personal action which may be filed in the proper court where any of the parties reside.

termination.[36] The partnership, although dissolved, continues to exist and its legal personality

[30]

Besides, venue has nothing to do with jurisdiction for venue touches more upon the

is retained, at which time it completes the winding up of its affairs, including the partitioning

substance or merits of the case.[31] As it is, venue in this case was properly laid and the trial

and distribution of the net partnership assets to the partners. [37] For as long as the partnership

court correctly ruled so.

exists, any of the partners may demand an accounting of the partnerships business. Prescription
of the said right starts to run only upon the dissolution of the partnership when the final

On the third issue, petitioner asserts that the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no

accounting is done.[38]

legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed as administratrix or executrix of his
estate. Petitioners objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to

Contrary to petitioners protestations that respondents right to inquire into the business

be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and

affairs of the partnership accrued in 1986, prescribing four (4) years thereafter, prescription had

her children are complainants in their own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the

not even begun to run in the absence of a final accounting. Article 1842 of the Civil Code

very moment of Vicente Tabanaos death, his rights insofar as the partnership was concerned

provides:

were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
death of the decedent.[32]

The right to an account of his interest shall accrue to any partner, or his legal representative as
against the winding up partners or the surviving partners or the person or partnership

Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnership and petitioner
were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession, which is
a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the

continuing the business, at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any agreement to the
contrary.

Applied in relation to Articles 1807 and 1809, which also deal with the duty to account,

JOHNNY

RABADILLA,1 petitioner,

S.

the above-cited provision states that the right to demand an accounting accrues at the date of

vs.

dissolution in the absence of any agreement to the contrary. When a final accounting is made, it

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA 2 COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA

is only then that prescription begins to run. In the case at bar, no final accounting has been

VILLACARLOS, respondents.

made, and that is precisely what respondents are seeking in their action before the trial court,
since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnerships business and

DECISION

assets. Hence, the said action is not barred by prescription.

PURISIMA, J.:
In fine, the trial court neither erred nor abused its discretion when it denied petitioners
motions to dismiss. Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, 3 dated December 23, 1993,

upholding the trial courts orders. Precious time has been lost just to settle this preliminary

in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial

issue, with petitioner resurrecting the very same arguments from the trial court all the way up

Court

to the Supreme Court. The litigation of the merits and substantial issues of this controversy is

petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together with

now long overdue and must proceed without further delay.

its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of

in

Bacolod

City,

and

ordered

the

defendants-appellees (including

herein

The antecedent facts are as follows:

merit, and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60,
which is ORDERED to determine the proper docket fee based on the estimated amount that

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge

plaintiffs therein seek to collect, and direct said plaintiffs to pay the same within a reasonable

Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted

time,

yet

as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot No. 1392 of the

expired. Thereafter, the trial court is ORDERED to conduct the appropriate proceedings in

Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special

Civil Case No. 416-C.

Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, contained

provided

the

applicable

prescriptive

or

reglementary period

has

not

the following provisions:

Costs against petitioner.
"FIRST
SO ORDERED.
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:

(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. RT-4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of

G.R. No. 113725

June 29, 2000

the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental.

(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and

give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further

the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged

command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that

by the children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot
negotiate with others than my near descendants and my sister." 4

xxx
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
FOURTH

Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.

(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny

Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod

(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.

Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also at the time
that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge Rabadilla shall have

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,

the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy

docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod

(75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said

City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of

Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.

subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the
Codicil, in that:

FIFTH
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod

Planters Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or

Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall have the

mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.

obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to
Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each year.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred

(100) piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to

SIXTH

plaintiff Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the
filing of the complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for

I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to

compliance.

whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided

HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, on each month of

that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or

December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25) piculs of

mortgagee shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop

Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this

year to herein private respondent.

lot, not have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela
y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter's heirs, and

The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to

shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic) and the latter shall then have the obligation to

reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the cancellation

of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the issuance of a new

For 1986-87, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,

certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza.

payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;

On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28, 1990 the

For 1987-88, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,

Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who filed his

payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and

Answer, accordingly.
For 1988-89, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:

payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92." 5

On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin, son-in-

However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a

law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as attorney-in-fact of

partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988 -1989.

defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a Memorandum of

Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to the following effect:

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the complaint
and disposing as follows:

"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No. 44489 will
be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor of

75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names, Mary

plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated exaction from

Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year, in Azucar

them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title holder/owner of the lot

Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned, and in the same

in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint. The remedy at bar must fall.

manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop years.

Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may
initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to

That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be complied

give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.

in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is as herein agreed
upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during each sugar crop year,

In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is DISMISSED

which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P105,000.00).

without prejudice.

That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash installment,

SO ORDERED."6

payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,

trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:

payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;

"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to receive 100
piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendants-appellee's obligation

under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge Rabadilla, to deliver such

The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the

amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's admitted non-compliance with

substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as "near

said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the

descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near descendants" and

Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392 and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of

therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil Code, the substitution should be

such non-compliance, this Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot

deemed as not written.

No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiffappellant must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the

The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of

appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal heirs in

Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the dismissal of the

order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of

complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no such deviation. The

sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.

Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petitioner.
The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent

Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering

had a legally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which

defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392, together

issue the Court of Appeals ruled in accordance with law.

with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.

It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted from the
SO ORDERED."7

moment of death of the decedent 10 and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of
law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the

Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his way to

widow or widower, are compulsory heirs. 11 Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as

this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the

compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of

reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the basis of paragraph 6 of

law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional rights were transmitted to them

the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla is a modal

from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil Code.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
The petition is not impressed with merit.

obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance with

his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the

Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the sole issue

decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge

raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner maintains that

Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death.

Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testatrix
intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be

In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject

substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the obligation to deliver the fruits to

to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein private respondent

herein private respondent be not complied with. And since the testatrix died single and without

every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succeeded to his rights

issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testamentary provision cannot be given any

and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent's) obligation to deliver the

effect.

fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir

reciprocally corresponds to the right of private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or

preservation of the property and its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to

performance of which is now being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at

preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary

bar. Therefore, private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court

substitution."16 Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The

erred in dismissing the complaint below.

property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation
to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent.

Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not
applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to

Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under

be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be noncompliance with the

Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted must

obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.

not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary substitution is
therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second heir. 17 In the case

Again, the contention is without merit.

under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir
or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under

the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should

subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the New

die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple

Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil Code

12

substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be

provide:

transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. 13 The

Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the two.

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property left by
the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition unless it

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by

appears that such was his intention.

reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.14 In the case under consideration, the

provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to

That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the instituted

predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants would substitute him.

heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator and for the return

What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the

of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and interests, if he or they should

conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to

disregard this obligation.

the testatrix's near descendants.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding article
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a

cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied with in a

fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to

manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.

transmit the same later to the second heir.15 In the case under consideration, the instituted heir
is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the property provided the negotiation is with the

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of

near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a

succession as aninstitucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator

fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the

states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the property left by the

testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. 18 A "mode" imposes an

Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One Hundred

obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the

(100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the

succession.19 On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must

instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they

happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition

sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property involved. The Codicil further provides

suspends but does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. 20 To some extent,

that in the event that the obligation to deliver the sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza

it is similar to a resolutory condition.

21

Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it over to the testatrix's near descendants. The nonperformance of the said obligation is thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix

reversion thereof to the testatrix's near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly

intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded

imposed by the testatrix, not only on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest,

that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest

the sanction imposed by the testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should

to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela

equally apply to the instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.

Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the

Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the

performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not

said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever

complied with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner

obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner is deemed to have

of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because

made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the consummated

it imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such

settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a

institution.

settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the
obligation under the amicable settlement and not the seizure of subject property.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation imposed
upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears from the Will itself

Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person

that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the institution should be considered

disposes of his property, to take effect after his death. 25 Since the Will expresses the manner in

as modal and not conditional.22

which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator
must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the subject of a compromise agreement which

Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private respondent has

would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the instituted heir
because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the

costs

application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from the words
of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made. 23 Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be adopted.

SO ORDERED.

24

Melo,
Vitug,

J.,

(Chairman), concur

in

the

separate

J., see separate

opinion

of

Justice

Vitug.
opinion.

Panganiban,

J., join

the

separate

opinion

of

Justice

Vitug.

Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.

being his "future inheritance" from his parents (Exh. 1). Upon the death of his father Matias,
Lazaro executed an "Affidavit of Conformity" dated February 28, 1980 (Exh. 3) to "re-affirm,
respect, acknowledge and validate the sale I made in 1962." On January 13, 1981, Lazaro

G.R. No. 104482

executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his "undivided

January 22, 1996

ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 . . . " (Exh. 4). He acknowledged
BELINDA TAEDO, for herself and in representation of her brothers and sisters, and

therein his receipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned

TEOFILA

VERNA

that Lazaro sold the same property to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale

TAEDO, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RICARDO M.

dated December 29, 1980 (Exh. E). On June 7, 1982, private respondents recorded the Deed of

TAEDO AND TERESITA BARERA TAEDO,respondents.

Sale (Exh. 4) in their favor in the Registry of Deeds and the corresponding entry was made in

CORPUZ

TAEDO,

representing

her

minor

daughter

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166451 (Exh. 5).

DECISION
Petitioners on July 16, 1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale
executed by Lazaro in favor of private respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro

PANGANIBAN, J.:

from his father.

Is a sale of future inheritance valid? In multiple sales of the same real property, who has
preference in ownership? What is the probative value of the lower court's finding of good faith

Petitioners claimed that their father, Lazaro, executed an "Absolute Deed of Sale" dated

in registration of such sales in the registry of property? These are the main questions raised in

December 29, 1980 (Exit. E). Conveying to his ten children his allotted portion tinder the

this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to set aside and

extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Matias, which deed included the land in

reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV NO. 24987 promulgated on

litigation (Lot 191).

September 26, 1991 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Third
Judicial Region, Tarlac, Tarlac in Civil Case No. 6328, and its Resolution denying

Petitioners also presented in evidence: (1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by

reconsideration thereof, promulgated on May 27, 1992.

Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro
would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro's) children (Exh. A); (2) a typewritten

By the Court's Resolution on October 25, 1995, this case (along with several others) was

document dated March 10, 1979 signed by Lazaro in the presence of two witnesses, wherein he

transferred from the First to the Third Division and after due deliberation, the Court assigned it

confirmed that he would voluntarily abide by the wishes of his father, Matias, to give to his

to the undersigned ponente for the writing of this Decision.

(Lazaro's) children all the property he would inherit from the latter (Exh. B); and (3) a letter
dated January 1, 1980 of Lazaro to his daughter, Carmela, stating that his share in the

The Facts

extrajudicial settlement of the estate of his father was intended for his children, petitioners
herein (Exh. C).

On October 20, 1962, Lazardo Taedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of
his eldest brother, Ricardo Taedo, and the latter's wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents

Private respondents, however presented in evidence a "Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale"

herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of P1,500.00, "one hectare of

dated March 12, 1981 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the

whatever share I shall have over Lot No. 191 of the cadastral survey of Gerona, Province of

reason that it was "simulated or fictitious without any consideration whatsoever".

Tarlac and covered by Title T-13829 of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac", the said property

Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn statement (Exh. G) which

From the foregoing, the issues may be restated as follows:

virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) and the
Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However, Lazaro testified that he sold

1. Is the sale of a future inheritance valid?

the property to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him to execute a deed of sale in
favor of his children after giving him five pesos (P5.00) to buy a "drink" (TSN September 18,

2. Was the subsequent execution on January 13, 1981 (and registration with the

1985, pp. 204-205).

Registry of Property) of a deed of sale covering the same property to the same
buyers valid?

The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that petitioners failed "to
adduce a proponderance of evidence to support (their) claim." On appeal, the Court of Appeals

3. May this Court review the findings of the respondent Court (a) holding that the

affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981

buyers acted in good faith in registering the said subsequent deed of sale and (b) in

(Exh. 9) was valid and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents.

"failing to consider petitioners' evidence"? Are the conclusions of the respondent

Court "illogical and off-tangent"?

The Issues
The Court's Ruling
Petitioners raised the following "errors" in the respondent Court, which they also now allege in
the instant Petition:

At the outset, let it be clear that the "errors" which are reviewable by this Court in this petition
for review oncertiorari are only those allegedly committed by the respondent Court of Appeals

I. The trial court erred in concluding that the Contract of Sale of October 20, 1962

and not directly those of the trial court, which is not a party here. The "assignment of errors" in

(Exhibit 7, Answer) is merely voidable or annulable and not void ab initio pursuant

the petition quoted above are therefore totally misplaced, and for that reason, the petition

to paragraph 2 of Article 1347 of the New Civil Code involving as it does a "future

should be dismissed. But in order to give the parties substantial justice we have decided to

inheritance".

delve into the issues as above re-stated. The errors attributed by petitioners to the latter (trial)
court will be discussed only insofar as they are relevant to the appellate court's assailed

II. The trial court erred in holding that defendants-appellees acted in good faith in

Decision and Resolution.

registering the deed of sale of January 13, 1981 (Exhibit 9) with the Register of
Deeds of Tarlac and therefore ownership of the land in question passed on to

The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the

defendants-appellees.

assailed Decision conceded "it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated
future inheritance is null and void."3

III. The trial court erred in ignoring and failing to consider the testimonial and
documentary evidence of plaintiffs-appellants which clearly established by

But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the

preponderance of evidence that they are indeed the legitimate and lawful owners of

Civil Code, "(n)o contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases

the property in question.

expressly authorized by law."

IV. The decision is contrary to law and the facts of the case and the conclusions

Consequently, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor

drawn from the established facts are illogical and off-tangent.

the creator of any obligation between the parties.

Hence, the "affidavit of conformity" dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate or

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in

ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, "suffers from the

good faith was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who

same infirmity." Even private respondents in their memorandum4 concede this.

presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

However, the documents that are critical to the resolution of this case are: (a) the deed of sale

The property in question is land, an immovable, and following the above-quoted law,

of January 13, 1981 in favor of private respondents covering Lazaro's undivided inheritance of

ownership shall belong to the buyer who in good faith registers it first in the registry of

one-twelfth (1/12) share in Lot No. 191, which was subsequently registered on June 7, 1982;

property. Thus, although the deed of sale in favor of private respondents was later than the one

and (b) the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 in favor of petitioners covering the same

in favor of petitioners, ownership would vest in the former because of the undisputed fact of

property. These two documents were executed after the death of Matias (and his spouse) and

registration. On the other hand, petitioners have not registered the sale to them at all.

after a deed of extra-judicial settlement of his (Matias') estate was executed, thus vesting in
Lazaro actual title over said property. In other words, these dispositions, though conflicting,

Petitioners contend that they were in possession of the property and that private respondents

were no longer infected with the infirmities of the 1962 sale.

never took possession thereof. As between two purchasers, the one who registered the sale in
his favor has a preferred right over the other who has not registered his title, even if the latter is

Petitioners contend that what was sold on January 13, 1981 was only one-half hectare out of

in actual possession of the immovable property.5

Lot No. 191, citing as authority the trial court's decision. As earlier pointed out, what is on
review in these proceedings by this Court is the Court of Appeals' decision which correctly

As to third issue, while petitioners conceded the fact of registration, they nevertheless

identified the subject matter of the January 13, 1981 sale to be the entire undivided 1/12 share

contended that it was done in bad faith. On this issue, the respondent Court ruled;

of Lazaro in Lot No. 191 and which is the same property disposed of on December 29, 1980 in
favor of petitioners.

Under the second assignment of error, plaintiffs-appellants contend that defendantsappellees acted in bad faith when they registered the Deed of Sale in their favor as

Critical in determining which of these two deeds should be given effect is the registration of

appellee Ricardo already knew of the execution of the deed of sale in favor of the

the sale in favor of private respondents with the register of deeds on June 7, 1982.

plaintiffs; appellants cite the testimony of plaintiff Belinda Taedo to the effect that
defendant Ricardo Taedo called her up on January 4 or 5, 1981 to tell her that he

Article 1544 of the Civil Code governs the preferential rights of vendees in cases of multiple

was already the owner of the land in question "but the contract of sale between our

sales, as follows:

father and us were (sic) already consumated" (pp. 9-10, tsn, January 6, 1984). This
testimony is obviously self-serving, and because it was a telephone conversation,

Art. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the

the deed of sale dated December 29, 1980 was not shown; Belinda merely told her

ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession

uncle that there was already a document showing that plaintiffs are the owners (p.

thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

80). Ricardo Taedo controverted this and testified that he learned for the first time
of the deed of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of his children "about a month or

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

sometime in February 1981" (p. 111, tsn, Nov. 28, 1984). . . .6

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

The respondent Court, reviewing the trial court's findings, refused to overturn the latter's
assessment of the testimonial evidence, as follows;

We are not prepared to set aside the finding of the lower court upholding Ricardo

which are not proper in this review. It is well-settled that the Supreme Court is not a trier of

Taedo's testimony, as it involves a matter of credibility of witnesses which the trial

facts. In petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, only questions of

judge, who presided at the hearing, was in a better position to resolve. (Court of

law may be raised and passed upon. Absent any whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment,

Appeals' Decision, p. 6.)

and unless the lack of any basis for the conclusions made by the lower courts be amply
demonstrated, the Supreme Court will not disturb their findings. At most, it appears that

In this connection, we note the tenacious allegations made by petitioners, both in their basic

petitioners have shown that their evidence was not believed by both the trial and the appellate

petition and in their memorandum, as follows:

courts, and that the said courts tended to give more credence to the evidence presented by
private respondents. But this in itself is not a reason for setting aside such findings. We are far

1. The respondent Court allegedly ignored the claimed fact that respondent Ricardo

from convinced that both courts gravely abused their respective authorities and judicial

"by fraud and deceit and with foreknowledge" that the property in question had

prerogatives.

already been sold to petitioners, made Lazaro execute the deed of January 13, 1981;
As held in the recent case of Chua Tiong Tay vs. Court of Appeals and Goldrock Construction
2. There is allegedly adequate evidence to show that only 1/2 of the purchase price

and Development Corp.7

of P10,000.00 was paid at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, contrary to
the written acknowledgment, thus showing bad faith;

The Court has consistently held that the factual findings of the trial court, as well as the Court
of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. Among the

3. There is allegedly sufficient evidence showing that the deed of revocation of the

exceptional circumstances where a reassessment of facts found by the lower courts is allowed

sale in favor of petitioners "was tainted with fraud or deceit."

are when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; when there is grave

4. There is allegedly enough evidence to show that private respondents "took undue

abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the judgment is premised on a

advantage over the weakness and unschooled and pitiful situation of Lazaro

misapprehension of facts; when the findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same

Taedo . . ." and that respondent Ricardo Taedo "exercised moral ascendancy over

are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. After a careful study of the case

his younger brother he being the eldest brother and who reached fourth year college

at bench, we find none of the above grounds present to justify the re-evaluation of the findings

of law and at one time a former Vice-Governor of Tarlac, while his younger brother

of fact made by the courts below.

only attained first year high school . . . ;

In the same vein, the ruling in the recent case of South Sea Surety and Insurance Company,
5. The respondent Court erred in not giving credence to petitioners' evidence,

Inc. vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.8 is equally applicable to the present case:

especially Lazaro Taedo'sSinumpaang Salaysay dated July 27, 1982 stating that
Ricardo Taedo deceived the former in executing the deed of sale in favor of private

We see no valid reason to discard the factual conclusions of the appellate court. . . .

respondents.

(I)t is not the function of this Court to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties, particularly where,

To be sure, there are indeed many conflicting documents and testimonies as well as arguments

such as here, the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court on the matter

over their probative value and significance. Suffice it to say, however, that all the above

coincide. (emphasis supplied)

contentions involve questions of fact, appreciation of evidence and credibility of witnesses,

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is

Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the

AFFIRMED. No Costs.

legitimate and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita), who died on 20 October
1985. The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas Santos are the daughters-in-law of

SO ORDERED.

Rita.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the
107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her

G.R. No. 169129

lifetime.

March 28, 2007

SPS. VIRGILIO F. SANTOS & ESPERANZA LATI SANTOS, SPS.VICTORINO F.

The facts of the present case are as follows:

SANTOS, & LAGRIMAS SANTOS, ERNESTO F. SANTOS, and TADEO F.

SANTOS, Petitioners,

vs.

SPS.

JOSE

LUMBAO

and

PROSERFINA

On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the
subject property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc

LUMBAO, Respondents.

(Maria), who died intestate on 19 September 1978. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square
meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through a document denominated as

DECISION

"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 4 Respondents Spouses Lumbao claimed the
execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as shown

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

by their signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
1

Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the

was added to the land as evidenced by a document also denominated as "Bilihan ng Lupa,"
dated 9 January 1981.5

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60450 entitled, Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina
Lumbao v. Spouses Virgilio F. Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and

After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession

Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F. Santos and Tadeo F. Santos, dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July

thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to

2005, respectively, which granted the appeal filed by herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao

the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao

and Proserfina Lumbao (Spouses Lumbao) and ordered herein petitioners Spouses Virgilio F.

made several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein

Santos and Esperanza Lati, Spouses Victorino F. Santos and Lagrimas F. Santos, Ernesto F.

petitioners, for them to execute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate

Santos and Tadeo F. Santos to reconvey to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property

title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the subject property is concerned.

and to pay the latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses, thus, reversing the Decision 3 of the

Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed respondent

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, dated 17 June 1998 which dismissed the Complaint

Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire

for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao for lack of merit.

property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
On 2 May 1986, the Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in
conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, 6 adjudicating and
partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the

subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No.
7

81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.

Considering that [petitioners] have incurred expenses in order to protect their interest,
[respondents spouses Lumbao] are hereby directed to pay [petitioners], to wit: 1) the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and litigation expenses, and 2) costs of the suit. 11

On 15 June 1992, respondents Spouses Lumbao, through counsel, sent a formal demand
letter8 to petitioners but despite receipt of such demand letter, petitioners still failed and refused

Aggrieved, respondents Spouses Lumbao appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 8 June 2005,

to reconvey the subject property to the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Consequently, the latter

the appellate court rendered a Decision, thus:

filed a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages9before the RTC of Pasig City.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed
Petitioners filed their Answer denying the allegations that the subject property had been sold to

Decision dated June 17, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 69 in Civil

the respondents Spouses Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial

Case No. 62175 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered

Settlement had been fraudulently executed because the same was duly published as required by

ordering [petitioners] to reconvey 107 square meters of the subject [property] covered by TCT

law. On the contrary, they prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint for lack of cause of action

No. PT-81729 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City, Metro Manila, and to pay to [respondents

because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised Katarungang

spouses Lumbao] the sum of P30,000.00 for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, which repealed Presidential Decree No. 150810 requiring first resort to barangay

No pronouncement as to costs.12

conciliation.
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision but it was
Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended their Complaint because they

denied in the Resolution of the appellate court dated 29 July 2005 for lack of merit.

discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of P30,000.00. The said Deed

Hence, this Petition.

of Real Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. PT-81729 on 26 April 1991.
Also, in answer to the allegation of the petitioners that they failed to comply with the mandate

The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are the following:

of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law, respondents Spouses Lumbao said that the
Complaint was filed directly in court in order that prescription or the Statute of Limitations

I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REVERSING

may not set in.

THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT, THEREBY CREATING A VARIANCE ON THE

FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TWO COURTS.

During the trial, respondents Spouses Lumbao presented Proserfina Lumbao and Carolina
Morales as their witnesses, while the petitioners presented only the testimony of petitioner

II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN ORDERING

Virgilio.

THE

PETITIONERS

TO

RECONVEY THE

SUBJECT

[PROPERTY]

TO

THE

RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] AND IN NOT RULING THAT THEY ARE

The trial court rendered a Decision on 17 June 1998, the dispositive portion of which reads as

GUILTY OF LACHES, HENCE THEY CANNOT RECOVER THE LOT ALLEGEDLY

follows:

SOLD TO THEM.

Premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby denied for lack of merit.

III. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

Petitioners allege they are in good faith in executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement

HEREIN PETITIONER[S] TO BE IN GOOD FAITH IN EXECUTING THE "DEED OF

because even respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness, Carolina Morales, testified that neither

EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT" DATED [2 MAY 1986].

petitioner Virgilio nor petitioner Tadeo was present during the execution of the "Bilihan ng
Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Petitioners affirm that the Deed of

IV. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

Extrajudicial Settlement was published in a newspaper of general circulation to give notice to

THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT LEGALLY BOUND TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPPOSED

all creditors of the estate subject of partition to contest the same within the period prescribed

BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981] THAT WERE

by law. Since no claimant appeared to interpose a claim within the period allowed by law, a

SUPPOSEDLY EXECUTED BY THE LATE RITA CATOC.

title to the subject property was then issued in favor of the petitioners; hence, they are
considered as holders in good faith and therefore cannot be barred from entering into any

V. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

subsequent transactions involving the subject property.

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAOS] ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE WITH

DAMAGES CANNOT BE SUPPORTED WITH AN UNENFORCEABLE DOCUMENTS,

Petitioners also contend that they are not bound by the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng

SUCH AS THE BILIHAN NG LUPA DATED [17 AUGUST 1979] AND [9 JANUARY 1981].

Lupa" because the same were null and void for the following reasons: 1) for being falsified
documents because one of those documents made it appear that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo

VI. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

were witnesses to its execution and that they appeared personally before the notary public,

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAOS] COMPLAINT FOR RECONVEYANCE IS

when in truth and in fact they did not; 2) the identities of the properties in the "Bilihan ng

DISMISSABLE (SIC) FOR NON COMPLIANCE OF THE MANDATE OF [P.D. NO.] 1508,

Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property in litigation

AS AMENDED BY Republic Act No. 7160.

were not established by the evidence presented by the respondents Spouses Lumbao; 3) the
right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to lay their claim over the subject property had

VII. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING

already been barred through estoppel by laches; and 4) the respondents Spouses Lumbaos

THAT RESPONDENTS [SPOUSES LUMBAO] SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR

claim over the subject property had already prescribed.

PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY[]S FEES.

Finally, petitioners claim that the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by
Petitioners ask this Court to scrutinize the evidence presented in this case, because they claim

respondents Spouses Lumbao was dismissible because they failed to comply with the mandate

that the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate court are conflicting. They allege

of Presidential Decree No. 1508, as amended by Republic Act No. 7160, particularly Section

that the findings of fact by the trial court revealed that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo did not

412 of Republic Act No. 7160.

witness the execution of the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa"; hence, this finding runs
counter to the conclusion made by the appellate court. And even assuming that they were

Given the foregoing, the issues presented by the petitioners may be restated as follows:

witnesses to the aforesaid documents, still, respondents Spouses Lumbao were not entitled to
the reconveyance of the subject property because they were guilty of laches for their failure to

I. Whether or not the Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by

assert their rights for an unreasonable length of time. Since respondents Spouses Lumbao had

respondents spouses Lumbao is dismissible for their failure to comply with the

slept on their rights for a period of more than 12 years reckoned from the date of execution of

mandate of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. No. 7160.

the second "Bilihan ng Lupa," it would be unjust and unfair to the petitioners if the respondents
will be allowed to recover the subject property.

II. Whether or not the documents known as "Bilihan ng Lupa" are valid and

been brought in the city in which the real property, subject matter of the controversy, is located,

enforceable, thus, they can be the bases of the respondents spouses Lumbaos action

which happens to be the same city where the contending parties reside. In the event that

for reconveyance with damages.

respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the said condition precedent, their
Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages can be dismissed. In this case, however,

III. Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the "Bilihan

respondents Spouses Lumbaos non-compliance with the aforesaid condition precedent cannot

ng Lupa" dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the

be considered fatal. Although petitioners alleged in their answer that the Complaint for

subject property to herein respondents spouses Lumbao.

Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents spouses Lumbao should be dismissed for
their failure to comply with the condition precedent, which in effect, made the complaint

It is well-settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the court is not a

prematurely instituted and the trial court acquired no jurisdiction to hear the case, yet, they did

trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by

not file a Motion to Dismiss the said complaint.

the contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Court. 13 But, the rule is not without

Emphasis must be given to the fact that the petitioners could have prevented the trial court

exceptions. There are several recognized exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved

from exercising jurisdiction over the case had they filed a Motion to Dismiss. However, instead

by this Court. One of these exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary

of doing so, they invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer seeking an affirmative

to those of the trial court. This exception is present in the case at bar.

relief from it. Worse, petitioners actively participated in the trial of the case by presenting their

14

own witness and by cross-examining the witnesses presented by the respondents Spouses
Going to the first issue presented in this case, it is the argument of the petitioners that the

Lumbao. It is elementary that the active participation of a party in a case pending against him

Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages filed by respondents Spouses Lumbao should be

before a court is tantamount to recognition of that courts jurisdiction and a willingness to

dismissed for failure to comply with the barangay conciliation proceedings as mandated by the

abide by the resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the

Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under Republic Act No. 7160. This argument cannot

courts jurisdiction.17 It is also well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay

be sustained.

conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be
deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. 18 Hence, herein petitioners can

Section 408 of the aforesaid law and Administrative Circular No. 14-93 15 provide that all

no longer raise the defense of non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings to

disputes between parties actually residing in the same city or municipality are subject to

seek the dismissal of the complaint filed by the respondents Spouses Lumbao, because they

barangay conciliation. A prior recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in

already waived the said defense when they failed to file a Motion to Dismiss.

court or any government offices. Non-compliance with the said condition precedent could
affect the sufficiency of the plaintiffs cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to

As regards the second issue, petitioners maintain that the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August

dismissal on ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same would not prevent a

1979 and 9 January 1981 are null and void for being falsified documents as it is made to appear

court of competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of adjudication over the case before

that petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo were present in the execution of the said documents and that

it, where the defendants failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction.

16

the identities of the properties in those documents in relation to the subject property has not
been established by the evidence of the respondents Spouses Lumbao. Petitioners also claim

While it is true that the present case should first be referred to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation because the parties involved herein actually reside in the same city (Pasig City)
and the dispute between them involves a real property, hence, the said dispute should have

that the enforceability of those documents is barred by prescription of action and laches.

It is the petitioners incessant barking that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August

A. No, sir.

1979 and 9 January 1981 were falsified because it was made to appear that petitioners Virgilio
and Tadeo were present in the executions thereof, and their allegation that even respondents

Q. I am showing to you this document, there is a signature at the left hand margin of this

Spouses Lumbaos witness Carolina Morales proved that said petitioners were not present

document Virgilio Santos, will you please go over the same and tell the court whose signature

during the execution of the aforementioned documents. This is specious.

is this?

Upon examination of the aforesaid documents, this Court finds that in the "Bilihan ng Lupa,"

A. I dont remember, sir, because of the length of time that had passed.

dated 17 August 1979, the signatures of petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo appeared thereon.
Moreover, in petitioners Answer and Amended Answer to the Complaint for Reconveyance

Q. But that is your signature?

with Damages, both petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo made an admission that indeed they acted as
witnesses in the execution of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979. 19However, in order

A. I dont have eyeglasses My signature is different.

to avoid their obligations in the said "Bilihan ng Lupa," petitioner Virgilio, in his crossexamination, denied having knowledge of the sale transaction and claimed that he could not

Q. You never appeared before this notary public Apolinario Mangahas?

remember the same as well as his appearance before the notary public due to the length of time
that had passed. Noticeably, petitioner Virgilio did not categorically deny having signed the

A. I dont remember.20

"Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and in support thereof, his testimony in the crossexamination propounded by the counsel of the respondents Spouses Lumbao is quoted

As a general rule, facts alleged in a partys pleading are deemed admissions of that party and

hereunder:

are binding upon him, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere
statement of fact which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. 21 And in spite

ATTY. CHIU:

of the presence of judicial admissions in a partys pleading, the trial court is still given leeway
to consider other evidence presented. 22 However, in the case at bar, as the Court of Appeals

Q. Now, you said, Mr. WitnessVirgilio Santos, that you dont know about this document

mentioned in its Decision, "[herein petitioners] had not adduced any other evidence to override

which was marked as Exhibit "A" for the [respondents spouses Lumbao]?

the admission made in their [A]nswer that [petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] actually signed the
[Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17 August 1979] except that they were just misled as to the purpose of

ATTY. BUGARING:

the document, x x x."23 Virgilios answers were unsure and quibbled. Hence, the general rule
that the admissions made by a party in a pleading are binding and conclusive upon him applies

The question is misleading, your Honor. Counsel premised the question that he does not have

in this case.

any knowledge but not that he does not know.

On the testimony of respondents Spouses Lumbaos witness Carolina Morales, this Court
ATTY. CHIU:

adopts the findings made by the appellate court. Thus -

Q. Being you are one of the witnesses of this document? [I]s it not?

[T]he trial court gave singular focus on her reply to a question during cross-examination if the
[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] were not with her and the vendor [Rita] during the transaction.

WITNESS:

It must be pointed out that earlier in the direct examination of said witness, she confirmed that

[respondents spouses Lumbao] actually bought the lot from [Rita] ("nagkabilihan"). Said

categorically held that even while an estate remains undivided, co-owners have each full

witness positively identified and confirmed the two (2) documents evidencing the sale in favor

ownership of their respective aliquots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or

of [respondents spouse Lumbao]. Thus, her subsequent statement that the [petitioners Virgilio

mortgage them.28 The co-owner, however, has no right to sell or alienate a specific or

and Tadeo] were not with them during the transaction does not automatically imply that

determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the thing is

[petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo] did not at any time sign as witnesses as to the deed of sale

represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere

attesting to their mothers voluntary act of selling a portion of her share in her deceased

fact that the deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void.

mothers property. The rule is that testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in

The sale is valid, but only with respect to the aliquot share of the selling co-owner.

its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.

24

Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition upon the termination of the coownership.29

Furthermore, both "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981
were duly notarized before a notary public. It is well-settled that a document acknowledged

In the case at bar, when the estate left by Maria had been partitioned on 2 May 1986 by virtue

before a notary public is a public document 25 that enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a

of a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, the 107- square meter lot sold by the mother of the

prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein and a conclusive presumption of its

petitioners to respondents Spouses Lumbao should be deducted from the total lot, inherited by

existence and due execution.26 To overcome this presumption, there must be presented

them in representation of their deceased mother, which in this case measures 467 square

evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be

meters. The 107-square meter lot already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao can no longer

upheld.27 In addition, one who denies the due execution of a deed where ones signature

be inherited by the petitioners because the same was no longer part of their inheritance as it

appears has the burden of proving that contrary to the recital in the jurat, one never appeared

was already sold during the lifetime of their mother.

before the notary public and acknowledged the deed to be a voluntary act. Nonetheless, in the
present case petitioners denials without clear and convincing evidence to support their claim

Likewise, the fact that the property mentioned in the two "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents was

of fraud and falsity were not sufficient to overthrow the above-mentioned presumption; hence,

described as "a portion of a parcel of land covered in Tax Declarations No. A-018-01674,"

the authenticity, due execution and the truth of the facts stated in the aforesaid "Bilihan ng

while the subject matter of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement was the property described in

Lupa" are upheld.

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 3216 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Rizal
in the name of Maria is of no moment because in the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979

The defense of petitioners that the identities of the properties described in the "Bilihan ng

and 9 January 1981, it is clear that there was only one estate left by Maria upon her death. And

Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981 in relation to the subject property were not

this fact was not refuted by the petitioners. Besides, the property described in Tax Declaration

established by respondents Spouses Lumbaos evidence is likewise not acceptable.

No. A-018-01674 and the property mentioned in TCT No. 3216 are both located in Barrio
Rosario, Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, and almost have the same boundaries. It is,

It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as "Bilihan ng

thus, safe to state that the property mentioned in Tax Declaration No. A-018-01674 and in TCT

Lupa," the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her

No. 3216 are one and the same.

and her co-heirs and so the description of the entire estate is the only description that can be
placed in the "Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981" because the exact

The defense of prescription of action and laches is likewise unjustifiable. In an action for

metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao could not be

reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead

possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale between

is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in

Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have

another persons name to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. It is,

indeed, true that the right to seek reconveyance of registered property is not absolute because it

from the said provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the

is subject to extinctive prescription. However, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to

property were transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property,

be reconveyed, prescription cannot set in. Such an exception is based on the theory that

rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the

registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the

heirs.33 Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by

30

expense of another.

their predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability
affecting their common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their

In the case at bar, the right of the respondents Spouses Lumbao to seek reconveyance does not

deceased mother. They only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and

prescribe because the latter have been and are still in actual possession and occupation as

binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The death of a party does not

owners of the property sought to be reconveyed, which fact has not been refuted nor denied by

excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and

the petitioners. Furthermore, respondents Spouses Lumbao cannot be held guilty of laches

obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly,

because from the very start that they bought the 107-square meter lot from the mother of the

nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has a property

petitioners, they have constantly asked for the transfer of the certificate of title into their names

interest in the subject matter of the contract.34

but Rita, during her lifetime, and the petitioners, after the death of Rita, failed to do so on the
flimsy excuse that the lot had not been partitioned yet. Inexplicably, after the partition of the

In the end, despite the death of the petitioners mother, they are still bound to comply with the

entire estate of Maria, petitioners still included the 107-square meter lot in their inheritance

provisions of the "Bilihan ng Lupa," dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently,

which they divided among themselves despite their knowledge of the contracts of sale between

they must reconvey to herein respondents Spouses Lumbao the 107-square meter lot which

their mother and the respondents Spouses Lumbao.

they bought from Rita, petitioners mother. And as correctly ruled by the appellate court,
petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorneys fees and litigation expenses for

Under the above premises, this Court holds that the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17

having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest. 35 On this matter,

August 1979 and 9 January 1981 are valid and enforceable and can be made the basis of the

we do not find reasons to reverse the said findings.

respondents Spouses Lumbaos action for reconveyance. The failure of respondents Spouses
Lumbao to have the said documents registered does not affect its validity and enforceability. It

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision and

must be remembered that registration is not a requirement for validity of the contract as

Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 8 June 2005 and 29 July 2005, respectively, are

between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. The

hereby AFFIRMED. Herein petitioners are ordered to reconvey to respondents Spouses

principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract that a

Lumbao the subject property and to pay the latter attorneys fees and litigation expenses. Costs

transaction involving the property had been entered into. Where the party has knowledge of a

against petitioners.

prior existing interest which is unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his
knowledge of that prior unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him. 31 Hence,

SO ORDERED.

the "Bilihan ng Lupa" documents dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981, being valid and
enforceable, herein petitioners are bound to comply with their provisions. In short, such

MINITA

documents are absolutely valid between and among the parties thereto.

Associate Justice

Finally, the general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-

G.R. No. 162784

interest applies in the present case. Article 1311 32 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear

V.

June 22, 2007

CHICO-NAZARIO

NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs.SEGUNDA ALMEIDA, COURT OF

SA SINO MAN KINAUUKULAN;

APPEALS, and RTC of SAN PEDRO, LAGUNA, BR. 31, respondents.

Akong si MARGARITA HERRERA, Filipina, may 83 taong gulang, balo,
DECISION

kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San

Pedro Laguna, sa ilalim ng panunumpa ay malaya at kusang loob kong isinasaysay

PUNO, C.J.:

at pinagtitibay itong mga sumusunod:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the National Housing

1. Na ako ay may tinatangkilik na isang lagay na lupang tirikan (SOLAR), tumatayo

Authority (NHA) against the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro Laguna,

sa Nayon ng San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, mayroong PITONG DAAN AT

Branch 31, and private respondent Segunda Almeida.

PITUMPU'T ISANG (771) METRONG PARISUKAT ang laki, humigit kumulang,

at makikilala sa tawag na Lote 17, Bloke 55, at pag-aari ng Land Tenure

On June 28, 1959, the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) awarded to Margarita Herrera several

Administration;

portions of land which are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is
evidenced by an Agreement to Sell No. 3787. 1 By virtue of Republic Act No. 3488, the LTA

2. Na ang nasabing lote ay aking binibile, sa pamamagitan ng paghuhulog sa Land

was succeeded by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On July 31, 1975, the DAR was

Tenure Administration, at noong ika 30 ng Julio, 1959, ang Kasunduang sa

succeeded by the NHA by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 757.2 NHA as the successor agency

Pagbibile (AGREEMENT TO SELL No. 3787) ay ginawa at pinagtibay sa Lungsod

of LTA is the petitioner in this case.

ng Maynila, sa harap ng Notario Publico na si G. Jose C. Tolosa, at lumalabas sa

kaniyang Libro Notarial bilang Documento No. 13, Pagina No. 4; Libro No. IV,

The records show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the

Serie ng 1959;

mother of private respondent) and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her
3. Na dahilan sa ako'y matanda na at walang ano mang hanap buhay, ako ay

mother and left heirs.

nakatira at pinagsisilbihan nang aking anak na si Francisca Herrera, at ang

Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.

tinitirikan o solar na nasasabi sa unahan ay binabayaran ng kaniyang sariling cuarta

sa Land Tenure Administration;

On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera
executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative, being

4. Na alang-alang sa nasasaysay sa unahan nito, sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios

the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of

ng aking buhay, ang lupang nasasabi sa unahan ay aking ipinagkakaloob sa nasabi

the late Margarita Herrera.

kong anak na FRANCISCA HERRERA, Filipina, nasa katamtamang gulang, kasal

kay Macario Berroya, kasalukuyang naninirahan at tumatanggap ng sulat sa Nayong

The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960,

ng San Vicente, San Pedro Laguna, o sa kaniyang mga tagapagmana at;

allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The pertinent portions of which are as follows:
5. Na HINIHILING KO sa sino man kinauukulan, na sakaling ako nga ay bawian
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY

na ng Dios ng aking buhay ay KILALANIN, IGALANG at PAGTIBAYIN ang

nilalaman sa pangalan ng aking anak na si Francisca Herrera ang loteng nasasabi sa

47, 48 and 49, Block 50; one of the lots transferred to Beatriz, e.g. Lot 47, with an

unahan.

area of 148 square meters is in the name of the protestant; protestant occupied the
lots in question with the permission of the protestee; protestee is a resident of the

SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT, ako ay nag-didiit ng hinlalaki ng kanan kong

Tunasan Homesite since birth; protestee was born on the lots in question; protestee

kamay sa ibaba nito at sa kaliwang gilid ng unang dahon, dito sa Lungsod ng

left the place only after marriage but resided in a lot situated in the same Tunasan

Maynila, ngayong ika 7 ng Octubre, 1960.

Homesite; her (protestee) son Roberto Herrera has been occupying the lots in

question; he has been there even before the death of the late Margarita Herrera; on
The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The witnesses signed at the

October 7, 1960, Margarita Herrera executed a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" whereby

left-hand side of both pages of the document with the said document having 2 pages in total.

she waived or transferred all her rights and interest over the lots in question in

Margarita Herrera placed her thumbmark above her name in the second page and at the left-

favor of the protestee; and protestee had paid the lots in question in full on March

hand margin of the first page of the document.

8, 1966 with the defunct Land Tenure Administration.

The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-

This Office finds that protestee has a better preferential right to purchase the lots in question. 9

Adjudication before the then Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch 1 in Binan, Laguna
(now, Regional Trial Court Branch 25). The case for annulment was docketed as Civil Case
No. B-1263.

Private respondent Almeida appealed to the Office of the President.10 The NHA Resolution was
affirmed by the Office of the President in a Decision dated January 23, 1987.11

On December 29, 1980, a Decision in Civil Case No. B-1263 (questioning the Deed of SelfAdjudication) was rendered and the deed was declared null and void.

On February 1, 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of
her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the
NHA.12 The NHA executed several deeds of sale in favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and

During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca

titles were issued in their favor.13 Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda

Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots submitting therewith a

Mercado-Almeida to leave the premises that she was occupying.

copy of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as
heir of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, protested the application.

Feeling aggrieved by the decision of the Office of the President and the resolution of the NHA,
private respondent Segunda Mercado-Almeida sought the cancellation of the titles issued in

In a Resolution dated February 5, 1986, the NHA granted the application made by Francisca

favor of the heirs of Francisca. She filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for "Nullification

Herrera, holding that:

of Government Lot's Award," with the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch

31.
From the evidence of the parties and the records of the lots in question, we gathered
the following facts: the lots in question are portions of the lot awarded and sold to

In her complaint, private respondent Almeida invoked her forty-year occupation of the disputed

the late Margarita Herrera on July 28, 1959 by the defunct Land Tenure

properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera's declaration of self-adjudication has

Administration; protestant is the daughter of the late Beatriz Herrera Mercado who

been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The defendant heirs of

was the sister of the protestee; protestee and Beatriz are children of the late

Francisca Herrera alleged that the complaint was barred by laches and that the decision of the

Margarita Herrera; Beatriz was the transferee from Margarita of Lot Nos. 45, 46,

Office of the President was already final and executory.14 They also contended that the transfer

of purchase of the subject lots is perfectly valid as the same was supported by a consideration
15

"Sinumpaang Salaysay" on October 7, 1960. Defendant NHA claims that the

and that Francisca Herrera paid for the property with the use of her own money. Further, they

"Sinumpaang Salaysay" is, in effect, a waiver or transfer of rights and interest over

argued that plaintiff's occupation of the property was by mere tolerance and that they had been

the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. This Court is disposed to believe

paying taxes thereon.

16

otherwise. After a perusal of the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" of Margarita Herrera, it

can be ascertained from its wordings taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense

The Regional Trial Court issued an Order dated June 14, 1988 dismissing the case for lack of

that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effect after her death.

jurisdiction.17 The Court of Appeals in a Decision dated June 26, 1989 reversed and held that

Clearly the Court finds that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" is a will of Margarita

the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction to hear and decide the case involving "title and

Herrera. Evidently, if the intention of Margarita Herrera was to merely assign her

possession to real property within its jurisdiction." 18The case was then remanded for further

right over the lots to her daughter Francisca Herrera, she should have given her

proceedings on the merits.

"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to the defendant NHA or to Francisca Herrera for

submission to the defendant NHA after the full payment of the purchase price of the

A pre-trial was set after which trial ensued.

lots or even prior thereto but she did not. Hence it is apparent that she intended the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" to be her last will and not an assignment of rights as what

On March 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of

the NHA in its resolution would want to make it appear. The intention of Margarita

the NHA and the decision of the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of

Herrera was shared no less by Francisca Herrera who after the former's demise

Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs

executed on August 22, 1974 a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is her

null and void. The Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba Branch was ordered to cancel the

sole and legal heir. It was only when said deed was questioned in court by the

Transfer Certificate of Title issued. Attorney's fees were also awarded to private respondent.

surviving heirs of Margarita Herrera's other daughter, Beatriz Mercado, that

Francisca Herrera filed an application to purchase the subject lots and presented the

The Regional Trial Court ruled that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of

"Sinumpaang Salaysay" stating that it is a deed of assignment of rights. 19

rights but a disposition of property which shall take effect upon death. It then held that the said
document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer property.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the NHA acted arbitrarily in awarding the lots to the heirs of
Francisca Herrera. It upheld the trial court ruling that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an

Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for

assignment of rights but one that involved disposition of property which shall take effect upon

reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed

death. The issue of whether it was a valid will must first be determined by probate.

to the Court of Appeals. The brief for the heirs of Francisca Herrera was denied admission by
the appellate court in a Resolution dated June 14, 2002 for being a "carbon copy" of the brief

Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.

submitted by the NHA and for being filed seventy-nine (79) days late.
Petitioner NHA raised the following issues:
On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESOLUTION OF THE NHA AND THE

viz:

DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT HAVE ATTAINED

There is no dispute that the right to repurchase the subject lots was awarded to

FINALITY, AND IF SO, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRINCIPLE OF

Margarita Herrera in 1959. There is also no dispute that Margarita executed a

ADMINISTRATIVE RES JUDICATA BARS THE COURT FROM FURTHER

DETERMINING WHO BETWEEN THE PARTIES HAS PREFERENTIAL

and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of

RIGHTS FOR AWARD OVER THE SUBJECT LOTS;

a judicial nature.23 However, administrative agencies are not considered courts, in their strict
sense. The doctrine of separation of powers reposes the three great powers into its three (3)

B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO MAKE THE

branchesthe legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. Each department is co-equal and

AWARD ON THE SUBJECT LOTS; AND

coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the executive department may not, by
its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the

C. WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF THE SUBJECT LOTS BY THE NHA

expanded jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, it is empowered to "determine whether or not

IS ARBITRARY.

there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 24 Courts have an expanded role under the
1987 Constitution in the resolution of societal conflicts under the grave abuse clause of Article

We rule for the respondents.

VIII which includes that duty to check whether the other branches of government committed
Res judicata is a concept applied in review of lower court decisions in accordance with the

an act that falls under the category of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

hierarchy of courts. But jurisprudence has also recognized the rule of administrative res

jurisdiction.25

judicata: "the rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by
competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial facts of public, executive

Next, petitioner cites Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of

or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of

198026 where it is therein provided that the Intermediate Appellate Court (now, Court of

courts having general judicial powers . . . It has been declared that whenever final adjudication

Appeals) shall exercise the "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

of persons invested with power to decide on the property and rights of the citizen is examinable

resolutions, orders or awards, of the Regional Trial Courts and Quasi-Judicial agencies,

by the Supreme Court, upon a writ of error or a certiorari, such final adjudication may be

instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling within the jurisdiction of the

pleaded as res judicata."20 To be sure, early jurisprudence were already mindful that the

Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution" 27 and contends that the Regional Trial

doctrine of res judicata cannot be said to apply exclusively to decisions rendered by what are

Court has no jurisdiction to rule over awards made by the NHA.

usually understood as courts without unreasonably circumscribing the scope thereof and that
the more equitable attitude is to allow extension of the defense to decisions of bodies upon

Well-within its jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, in its decision of August 28, 2003, already

whom judicial powers have been conferred.

ruled that the issue of the trial court's authority to hear and decide the instant case has already
been settled in the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 26, 1989 (which has become

In Ipekdjian Merchandising Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, the Court held that the rule

final and executory on August 20, 1989 as per entry of judgment dated October 10, 1989). 28 We

prescribing that "administrative orders cannot be enforced in the courts in the absence of an

find no reason to disturb this ruling. Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. The

express statutory provision for that purpose" was relaxed in favor of quasi-judicial agencies.

system of judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of a final

21

and executory judgment.29 The appellate court's decision becomes the law of the case which
In fine, it should be remembered that quasi-judicial powers will always be subject to true

must be adhered to by the parties by reason of policy.30

judicial powerthat which is held by the courts. Quasi-judicial power is defined as that power
of adjudication of an administrative agency for the "formulation of a final order." 22 This

Next, petitioner NHA contends that its resolution was grounded on meritorious grounds when

function applies to the actions, discretion and similar acts of public administrative officers or

it considered the application for the purchase of lots. Petitioner argues that it was the daughter

bodies who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,

Francisca Herrera who filed her application on the subject lot; that it considered the respective

application and inquired whether she had all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications

demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an

of a possible awardee. It is the position of the petitioner that private respondent possessed all

obligation

the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for lot award and hence the award was not

transmissible.37 Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her

done arbitrarily.

death either by will or by operation of law.

The petitioner further argues that assuming that the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was a will, it could

If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the

not bind the NHA.31 That, "insofar as [the] NHA is concerned, it is an evidence that the subject

decedent should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by

lots were indeed transferred by Margarita Herrera, the original awardee, to Francisca Herrera

the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a

was then applying to purchase the same before it." 32

property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on

on

both

partiesMargarita

Herrera

and

NHA.

Obligations

are

succession and the law on sales and obligations.38

We are not impressed. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have
noted that the effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of

When the original buyer died, the NHA should have considered the estate of the decedent as

the instrument; in her words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay" Hence, in

the next "person"39likely to stand in to fulfill the obligation to pay the rest of the purchase

such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession

price. The opposition of other heirs to the repurchase by Francisca Herrera should have put the

of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code

NHA on guard as to the award of the lots. Further, the Decision in the said Civil Case No. B-

which provides that:

1263 (questioning the Deed of Self-Adjudication) which rendered the deed therein null and
void40 should have alerted the NHA that there are other heirs to the interests and properties of

Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property,

the decedent who may claim the property after a testate or intestate proceeding is concluded.

rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are

The NHA therefore acted arbitrarily in the award of the lots.

transmitted through his death to another or others either by his will or by

operation of law.33

We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the probate court to determine.
We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an element

By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has
34

already passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued

of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of
which shall transpire upon the death of the instrument maker.41

its resolution35 on February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by
Francisca Herrera without considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of the National Housing Authority is DENIED. The

property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatever interest she has or may have

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 68370 dated August 28, 2003, affirming the

had over the disputed properties. To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over

decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna in Civil Case No. B-2780 dated

the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property

March 9, 1998, is hereby AFFIRMED.

and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute
them later to her heirsin accordance with a will or by operation of law.

No cost.

The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita

SO ORDERED.

Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's

Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna, Garcia, JJ., concur.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused Gloria Umali guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Art. 1 (sic) of RA 6425 as amended,

G.R. No. 84450

otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, and is hereby sentenced to

February 4, 1991

suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused being a detention prisoner is

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GLORIA UMALI y AMADO

entitled to enjoy the privileges of her preventive imprisonment. The case against

AND SUZETH UMALI y AMADO, defendants-appellants.

Suzeth Umali, her co-accused in this case is hereby ordered ARCHIVED to be

revived until the arrest of said accused is effected. The warrant of arrest issued

The

Solicitor

General

for

plaintiff-appellee.

against her is hereby ordered reiterated.

Public Attorney's Office for defendants-appellants.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30)
Hence, this appeal from the lower court's decision with the following assignment of errors:
I
MEDIALDEA, J.:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND
In Criminal Case No. 85-473 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Lucena City, Gloria

CREDENCE TO THE BIASED TESTIMONY OF FRANCISCO MANALO

Umali and Suzeth Umali were charged for violation of Section 4, Article 1 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 under an information which reads:
That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1985, at Recto Street, Poblacion,
Municipality of Tiaong, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,

II
THE

COURT A

QUO GRAVELY

ERRED

IN

ADMITTING

THE

PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE WHICH WERE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF

ACCUSED'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE

unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give marijuana or Indian Hemp, a
prohibited drug to one Francisco Manalo y Arellano, without authority of law.
Contrary to law. (Rollo, pp. 7-8)

III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED
NEVER DISPUTED THE CLAIM THAT SHE WAS THE SOURCE OF

Upon arraignment, Gloria Umali entered a plea of "not, guilty" as accused Suzeth Umali
remained at large. After trial, the lower court rendered a decision on September 9, 1987, the
dispositive portion thereof states:

MARIJUANA LEAVES FOUND IN THE POSSESSION OF FRANCISCO

MANALO ON APRIL 5, 1985 AND THAT WHICH WAS USED BY PIERRE
PANGAN RESULTING TO THE LATTER'S DRUG DEPENDENCY
IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED GLORIA 1,

With the consent of Francisco Manalo, Pfc. Sarmiento, Chief of the Investigation Division

GUILTY OF VIOLATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 1972 ON THE

gave him four (4) marked P5.00 bills to buy marijuana from sources known to him. The serial

BASIS

numbers of the money was entered in the police blotter. The instruction was (sic) for Manalo to

OF

MERE

CONJECTURES

AND

NOT

ON

FACTS

AND

CIRCUMSTANCES PROVEN

bring back the prohibited drug purchased by him to the police headquarters. Few minutes there
after (sic), Manalo returned with two (2) foils of dried marijuana which lie allegedly bought

from the accused Gloria Umali. Thereafter, he was asked by the police investigators to give a
statement on the manner and circumstances of how he was able to purchase two (2) marijuana

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE GUILT

foils from accused Gloria Umali. With the affidavit of Francisco Manalo, supported by the two

OF THE ACCUSED DID NOT PASS THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY.

(2) foils of marijuana. the Chief of the Investigation Division petitioned the Court for the

(Rollo, p. 49)

issuance of a search warrant as a justification for them to search the house of Gloria Umali
located at Rector (sic) Street. Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon. After securing the same, the police

The antecedent facts of this case as recounted by the trial court are as follows:

operatives, went to the house of Gloria Umali and served the search warrant on her.
Confiscated from the person of Gloria Umali were the four P5.00 bills with serial numbers

On April 27, 1985 Pierre Pangan a minor was investigated by Pat. Felino Noguerra for drug

BA26943, DT388005, CC582000 and EW69873, respectively as reflected in the police blotter.

dependency and for an alleged crime of robbery. In the course of the investigation, the

Likewise, present in the four (4) P5.00 bills were the letters T which were placed by the police

policemen discovered that Pierre Pangan was capable of committing crime against property,

investigators to further identify the marked four (4) P5.00 bills. The searched (sic) in the house

only if under the influence of drug (sic). As Pierre Pangan is a minor, the police investigators

was made in the presence of Brgy. Capt. Punzalan. The search resulted in the confiscation of a

sought the presence of his parents. Leopoldo Pangan, father of the minor was invited to the

can of milo, containing sixteen (16) foils of dried marijuana leaves which were placed in a

police headquarters and was informed about the problem of his son. Mr. Pangan asked the

tupperware and kept in the kitchen where rice was being stored. The return of the search

police investigators if something could be done to determine the source of the marijuana which

warrant reads as follows:

has not only socially affected his son, but other minors in the community. Previous to the case
of Pierre Pangan was the case of Francisco Manalo, who was likewise investigated by

DATE: 22 April 1985

operatives of the Tiaong, Quezon Police Department and for which a case for violation of the
Dangerous Drug Act was filed against him, covered by Criminal Case No. 85-516 before

WHAT: "RAID"

Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City. Aside from said case, accused Francisco
Manalo was likewise facing other charges such as concealment of deadly weapon and other

WHERE:

crimes against property. Pat. Felino Noguerra went to the Tiaong Municipal Jail, and sought the

Poblacion, Tiaong, Quezon

Residence

of

Dr.

Emiliano

AT

SAID

Umali

help of Francisco Manalo and told him the social and pernicious effect of prohibited drugs like
marijuana being peddled to minors of Tiaong, Quezon. Manalo although a detention prisoner

WHO: MBRS. OF TIAONG INP

was touched by the appeal made to him by the policeman and agreed to help in the
identification of the source of the marijuana. In return he asked the policeman to help him in

TIME

some cases pending against him. He did not negotiate his case for violating the dangerous drug

221410H Apr '85

act, as he has entered a plea of guilty to the charged (sic) before the sala of Judge Eriberto
Rosario.

STARTED/ARRIVED

PLACE:

SERVED

TO:

MRS.

GLORIA

UMALI

MR. EMILIANO UMALI

In view of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal possession of "Indian
Hemp" penalized under Sec. 8 of Article 6425 (sic); as amended

PERSON APPREHENDED/PROPERTY SEIZED/RECOVERED

otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and the Court
hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of two (2) years and

Mrs. Gloria Umali 16 Aluminum Foils of

four (4) months of prision correccional to six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayor and to pay a fine of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00).

Mr. Emiliano Umali Suspected Marijuana leaves

TIME/DATE LEFT SAID PLACE: 221450H Apr '85

Let the period of detention of the accused be credited to his sentence.

Accused never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo that the marijuana found in
his possession on April 5, 1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to

WITNESSES (sic) BY:

him by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did not dispute the claim of the
prosecution that in the investigation of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator came

1. (Sgd) Reynaldo S. Pasumbal

to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana leaves which he used
and smoked resulting in his present drug dependency. (Rollo, pp. 22-27)

2. (Sgd) Luisabel P. Punzalan

The appellant vehemently denied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court
3. (Sgd) Arnulfo C. Veneracion

committed reversible errors in convicting her. She alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should not be taken on its face value.

4. (Sgd) Isidro C. Capino

Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because of his
desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood.

Samples of the marijuana leaves confiscated were submitted to the PC Came

Laboratory for examination. Capt. Rosalinda Royales of the PC crime Laboratory

However, the plaintiff-appellee through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco

took the witness stand, testified and identified the marijuana submitted to her and in

Manalo was then facing several criminal charges when he testified, such fact did not in any

a written report which was marked as Exhibit "G" she gave the following findings:

way disqualify him as a witness. "His testimony is not only reasonable and probable but more
so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the other prosecution witnesses,

Qualitative examination conducted on the specimen mentioned above

especially the police officers." (Rollo, pp. 83-84)

gave POSITIVE result to the tests fur marijuana.

The appellant also claimed that the marked money as well as the marijuana were confiscated
In Criminal Case No. 85-516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his

for no other purpose than using them as evidence against the accused in the proceeding for

possession Indian Hemp on April 5, 1985, in violation of Section 8, Article 11 of

violation of Dangerous Drugs Act and therefore the search warrant issued is illegal from the

Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The

very beginning. She stressed that there can be no other plausible explanation other than that she

Court in rendering against him disposed the case as follows:

was a victim of a frame-up.

In relation to this contention, the Solicitor General noted that it is not true that the evidences

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

submitted by the prosecution were obtained in violation of her constitutional right against

crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

illegal search and seizure.

The phrase "conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law" takes into account Article
Furthermore, the appellant contended that the essential elements of the crime of which she was

821 of the Civil Code which states that persons 91 convicted of falsification of a document,

charged were never established by clear and convincing evidence to warrant the findings of the

perjury or false testimony" are disqualified from being witnesses to a will." (Paras, RULES OF

court a quo. She also stressed that the court's verdict of conviction is merely based on surmises

COURT ANNOTATED, Vol. IV First Ed., p. 44)

and conjectures.
Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the above-mentioned crimes to
However, the Solicitor General noted that the positive and categorical testimonies of the

disqualify him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the

prosecution witnesses who had personal knowledge of the happening together with the

fact that said witness is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way

physical evidence submitted clearly prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of accused-

disqualify him as a witness.

appellant for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

The testimony of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that
Time and again, it is stressed that this Court is enjoined from casually modifying or rejecting

he was actuated by improper motive (People v. Melgar, G.R. No. 75268,29 January 1988, 157

the trial court's factual findings. Such factual findings, particularly the trial judge's assessment

SCRA 718). Hence, in the absence of any evidence that witness Francisco Manalo was

of the credibility of the testimony of the witnesses are accorded with great respect on appeal

actuated by improper motive, his testimony must be accorded full credence.

for the trial judge enjoys the advantage of directly and at first hand observing and examining
the testimonial and other proofs as they are presented at the trial and is therefore better situated

Appellant's

to form accurate impressions and conclusions on the basis thereof (See People v. Bravo, G.R.

merit.1wphi1 "Courts must be vigilant. A handy defense in such cases is that it is a frame-up

No. 68422, 29 December, 1989,180 SCRA 694,699). The findings of the trial court are entitled

and that the police attempted to extort from the accused. Extreme caution must be exercised in

to great weight, and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had

appreciating such defense. It is just as easy to concoct as a frame-up. At all times the police, the

overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below,

prosecution and the Courts must be always on guard against these hazards in the administration

having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their

of criminal justice." (People v. Rojo, G.R. No. 82737, 5 July 1989, 175 SCRA 119)

contention

that

she

was

victim

of

"frame-up"

is

devoid

of

testimonies (People v. Alverez y Soriano, G.R. No. 70831, 29 July 1988, 163 SCRA 745, 249;
People v. Dorado, G.R. No. L-23464, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53; People v. Espejo, G.R.

The appellant's allegation that the search warrant is illegal cannot also be given any merit.

No. L-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400). Hence, in the absence of any showing that

"Where marked peso bills were seized by the police as a result of the search made on the

the trial court had overlooked certain substantial facts, said factual findings are entitled to great

appellant, the admissibility of these marked peso bills hinges on the legality of the arrest and

weight, and indeed are binding even on this Court.

search on the person of the appellant" (People v. Paco, G.R. No. 76893, 27 February 1989, 170
SCRA 681). Since the search is predicated on a valid search warrant, absent any showing that

Rule 130, Section 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:

such was procured maliciously the things seized are admissible in evidence.

Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive,

Appellant argues that the lower court's verdict is based on surmises and conjectures, hence the

and perceiving can make known their perception to others may be witnesses.

essential elements of the crime were never established by clear and convincing evidence.

Conviction cannot be predicated on a presumption or speculation. A conviction for a criminal

Pursuant to recent jurisprudence and law, the case is covered by Section 4 of Republic Act No.

offense must be based on clear and positive evidence and not on mere presumptions (Gaerlan v.

6425 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, effective February 17, 1980, which raised

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 57876, 6 November 1989, 179 SCRA 20). The prosecution's

the penalty for selling prohibited drugs from life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging

evidence consisted of the testimony of witness Manalo and the law enforcers as well as the

from twenty to thirty thousand pesos (People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 65349, October 31, 1984,

physical evidence consisting of the seized marked peso bills, the two (2) foils of marijuana

133 SCRA 132) Thus, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment but

purchased and the can containing sixteen (16) aluminum foils of dried marijuana.

failed to impose a fine.

Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence more so as it consisted mainly of

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the modification that a fine of

testimonies of policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty

twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) be imposed, as it is hereby imposed, on the accused-

in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, 21 February 1989,

appellant.

170 SCRA 497). Hence, in the absence of proof to the contrary, full credence should be
accorded to the prosecution's evidence. The evidence on record sufficiently established that

SO ORDERED.

Umali gave two (2) foils of marijuana to witness Manalo for which she was given and received
four (4) marked five peso (P5.00) bills, and fully supports conviction for drug pushing in
violation of Section 4 Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Thus, the Court has no option but to declare that the trial court did not err in finding, on the
basis of the evidence on record, that the accused-appellant Gloria Umali violated Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.