Lindsey v. Mississippi State Parole Board, Et Al - Document No. 11
Lindsey v. Mississippi State Parole Board, Et Al - Document No. 11
Lindsey v. Mississippi State Parole Board, Et Al - Document No. 11
11
Case 4:06-cv-00022-WAP-JAD Document 11 Filed 02/27/2006 Page 1 of 2
V. NO. 4:O6CV22-P-D
OPINION
This matter is before the court, sua sponte, for consideration of dismissal. Plaintiff, an
inmate currently incarcerated at the Mississippi State Penitentiary, files this complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff contends that he is not being credited with 1163 days which he
completed while on supervised parole, resulting in him having to serve excessive time.
After carefully considering the contents of the pro se complaint and giving it the liberal
construction required by Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), this court has come to the following
conclusion.
The United States Supreme Court has held that § 1983 is an inappropriate vehicle for an
inmate to seek recovery of lost time credits. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 36
L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), and it is likewise improper for an inmate to sue for damages under § 1983
where success on the merits of the claim would "necessarily imply" the invalidity of confinement.
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed.2d 383 (1994). In both cases, the
inmate's available remedy is to petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Heck also applies to inmates
challenging the loss of earned time credits through prison disciplinary proceedings resulting in a
change to the length of their sentences. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 137 L.
The rule which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit follows in determining whether a
prisoner must first obtain habeas corpus relief before bringing a § 1983 action is simple: "if a
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Case 4:06-cv-00022-WAP-JAD Document 11 Filed 02/27/2006 Page 2 of 2
favorable determination would not automatically entitle the prisoner to accelerated release, the
proper vehicle for suit is § 1983. If it would so entitle him, he must first get a habeas corpus
judgment." Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222, 226 (5th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied, 133 F.3d 940 (1997)
(citing Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 31 (5th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 736, 133 L. Ed. 2d
686 (1996)).
Therefore, he must obtain habeas corpus relief before bringing suit pursuant to § 1983,1 and this case
1
It appears that plaintiff may have filed a motion for
post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Sunflower County
concerning this issue. However, there is no indication that he
has been granted habeas corpus relief or has pursued the matter
further. It is well-settled that a state prisoner seeking habeas
corpus relief in federal court is first required to exhaust
available state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); see also
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982). More specifically, a
petitioner must present his claims to the state courts in such a
fashion as to afford those courts a fair opportunity to rule on
the merits. Picard v. Conner, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Dispensa v.
Lynaugh, 847 F.2d 211, 217 (5th Cir. 1988). A habeas corpus
petitioner must provide the state's highest court with a fair
opportunity to pass upon the issues raised in the petition for
federal habeas corpus relief. Dupuy v. Butler, 837 F.2d 699, 702
(5th Cir. 1988) (citing Carter v. Estelle, 677 F.2d 427, 443-44
(5th Cir. 1982)). Clearly, plaintiff has not done so.