ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO vs.

POTENCIANO ILUSORIO
FACTS:
Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11,
1942.They had six children.
Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensive
properties valued at millions of pesos. He was also
the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club.
In 1972, the spouses were separated from bed and
board for undisclosed reasons.
Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium Manila
and when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio
Country Club.
Erlinda lived in Antipolo city.
On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda at
Antipolo after his arrival from the US.
Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano
an overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead of
the 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by the
latters doctor in New York.
Because of the overdose, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petition for the
guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced aged, frail
health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo
city after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio
city. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati.
On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition
for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondents
prevented her from visiting her husband and from
going home going home to Antipolo.
Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writ
of habeas corpus. However, the CA granted visitation
rights.
The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution
dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have
the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife.
On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano
Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the
Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation
rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the
Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in dismissing
the petition for habeas corpus?
HELD: NO. The essential object of the writ of habeas
corpus is to release a person illegally detained. The
CA did not err in dismissing the petition of Erlinda
because a writ of habeas corpus is only granted
when there is an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.

In the case at bar, it was Potencianos choice not to

return in Antipolo city. He did not request the
administrator of Cleveland Condominium to prevent
his wife from visiting him. Even at 86 years old, he is
still of sound mind which means that he can make
decisions for himself. He should not be the subject of
visitation rights as it will violate his right of privacy.
2. Was the order granting visitorial rights proper?
HELD: NO. The petition of Erlinda did not include the
prayer for visitation rights. The Court of Appeals
missed the fact that the issue involved is between
husband and wife, not between children or minors
and parents. The husband or the wife has the liberty
to refuse to see each other.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife.
Under Article 68 of Family Code
Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/may2000/13978
9_ilusorio.htm
CIRILA ARCABA vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA
FACTS:
Francisco Comille and Zosima Montallana became
the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A at the corner
of Calle Santa Rosa and Rosario in Zamboanga del
Norte on January 1956.
Zosima died on October 3, 1980. Francisco and his
mother-in-law, Juliana Montallana, executed a deed
of extrajudicial partition with waiver of rights.
Juliana waived her share consisting of the property
to Francisco.
Since Francisco had no children, he asked his neice
(Leticia), his neices cousin (Luzviminda) and a
widow (Cirila Arcaba) to take care of his house as
well as the store inside.
When Leticia and Luzminda got married, only Cirila
was left to take good care of Francisco and his
house.
Erlinda Tabancura testified that the source of income
of Francisco solely consisted of rentals from lots.
Francisco did not pay Cirila her wages but her family
received free board and lodging from him.
On January 1991, Francisco executed a Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos wherein he donated 150 sq.
meters lot and his house to Cirila. The latter accepted
such donation.
The deed stated that the donation was being made in
consideration of the faithful services that Cirila had
rendered over the past ten (10) years.
On October 1991, Francisco died.
On 1993, the nephews, nieces and heirs by intestate
succession of Francisco filed a petition for the nullity

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of the deed of donation inter vivos. They alleged that

the donation violated Article 87 of the Family Code
because Cirila was the common law wife of
Francisco.
The court granted the petition in favor of the heirs
based on the testimony of Erlinda Tabancura and the
documents showing that Cirila was the common law
wife of Francisco (Signed documents bearing the
name Cirila Comile).
Cirila filed a motion for reconsideration stating that
the Court of Appeals erred in stating that she was the
common law wife of Francisco based on the
misapprehension of facts. According to her, the
presented evidences were only hearsay.

ISSUE:
1.Whether or not the donation was void.
HELD: YES. The donation made by Francisco to Cirila
was void because it was not in accordance with Article
87 of the Family Code.
Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct
or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage
shall be void, except moderate gifts which the spouses
may give each other on the occasion of any family
rejoicing. The prohibition shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid
marriage.
Respondents having proven by a preponderance of
evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as
husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by
Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the
Family Code.
In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that Cirila
was a common law wife of Francisco based on the
following evidences:

The application for business permit to

operate a real estate business where in Cirila
used the surname Comile instead of Arcaba.
The sanitary permit also showed Cirila
Comile as signatory.
The death certificate of Francisco was signed
by Cirila using the surname Comile.

In Bitangcor vs. Tan, the Supreme Court ruled that

cohabitation is more than sexual intercourse especially
when the spouses are already old and may no longer
be interested in sex.
Under Article 87 of the Family Code
Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2001/nov2001/146683
.htm

AYALA INVESTMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a loan
amounting to P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment
and Development Corporation (AIDC).
Alfredo Ching, PBMs Exec. Vice President, executed
security agreements (Dec. 1980 and Mar. 1981)
making himself jointly and severally answerable with
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan.
On July 1981, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum
of money against PBM and Alferdo Ching.
The court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and
severally pay AIDC the principal amount
of P50,300,000.00 with interests
While there was an appeal to the decision of the civil
case, the lower court issued a writ of execution
pending appeal. Sr. Deputy Sheriff Magsajo issued a
notice of sheriff sale to the Ching spouses on three of
their conjugal properties.
The Ching spouses filed a case of injunction alleging
that the judgment cannot be enforced against their
conjugal partnership. According to them, the subject
loan did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.
The lower court issued a temporary restraining order
to prevent petitioner Magsajo from proceeding with
the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the
sale of the said properties at public auction.
ISSUE:
1. Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract
entered into by husband in favor of his employer
within the contemplation of debts that redound for the
benefit of family?
HELD: NO. The loan obtained by PBM and Mr.
Ching is a corporate loan, not a personal
one. Signing as a surety is certainly not an exercise
of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
Article 122 of the Family Code is explicit The
payment of personal debts contracted by the
husband or the wife before or during the marriage
shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership
except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the
family.
In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the benefits
the respondent family would reasonably anticipate
were the following:
The employment of co-respondent Alfredo
Ching would be prolonged and he would be
entitled to his monthly salary of P20,000.00
for an extended length of time because of the
loan he guaranteed;

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The shares of stock of the members of his

family would appreciate if the PBM could be
rehabilitated through the loan obtained;
His prestige in the corporation would be
enhanced and his career would be boosted
should PBM survive because of the loan.

However, these are not the benefits

contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code. The
benefits must be one directly resulting from the
loan. It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of
the loan itself.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/feb1998/118305.
htm
ALFREDO CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
On September 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills
Company (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loan
from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC).
Alfredo Ching together with two other persons
executed a continuing guarantee with ABC binding
themselves jointly and severally liable for the PBMCI
obligations.
The extent of their guarantee is up to 38 million
pesos.
PBMCI failed to settle the loans which amounted to
P12,612,972.88 (exclusive of interests, penalties and
other bank charges.)
Together with the writ of preliminary attachment, the
sheriff levied (seized) the 100,000 common shares of
City Corporation stocks registered solely to Alfredo
Ching.
Mrs. Ching filed a petition to set aside the levy of the
100,000 common shares.
According to her, the shares were purchased out of
the conjugal funds.
She also argued that the loan of PBMCI did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership (or
family).
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the argument of Mrs. Ching is
tenable.
HELD: YES. ABC has the burden of proof to show
that the common shares registered solely to the
name of Alfredo Ching were owned by the latter. Just
because Mr. Chings name appeared as the sole
registrant of the shares in the corporate books of
CityCorp doesnt mean that it is his exclusive
property and not to the conjugal partnership.

As held in the case of Ayala Investment and

Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the
court said that signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession. It is not
embarking in a business.
For the conjugal partnership to become liable, it is
important to show that the family received benefits
and advantages from the liability incurred. There is
no presumption that when a husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety,
the conjugal partnership would be benefited.
The benefits must be those directly resulting from the
loan.
Therefore, Mr. Alfredo Chings common shares must
not be levied because he is not the sole owner of
such stocks. The shares belong to the conjugal
partnership.
Under Article 121 of the Family Code
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/apr2000/110844.
htm
CLEODIA and CEAMANTHA FRANCISCO vs. JORGE and
PURIFICATION GONZALES
FACTS:
The petitioners are Cleodia and Ceamantha
Francisco.
They are the children of Cleodualdo and Michele
Francisco.
Mr. and Mrs. Francisco got married on June 12,
1986. Their marriage is governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains (under the Civil Code, before the
Family Code).
In November 2000, the marriage of the spouses was
declared null and void.
They entered into a compromise agreement wherein
one of the provisions is:
Title and ownership of the conjugal property
consisting of a house and lot located in Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shall be
transferred by way of a deed of donation to
Cleodia and Ceamantha, as co-owners, when they
reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) years old,
respectively.
After signing the compromise agreement, Michele
Francisco cohabited with George Matrai at Lanka
Drive, Ayala Alabang Village.
Spouses Jorge and Purification Gonzales filed a case
for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Attachment
against Matria and Michele Franscisco.
The Metropolitan trial court ordered Matrai and M.
Francisco to pay back the rentals, unpaid telephone
bills and attorneys fees.

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A notice of sale by execution was issued by the

sheriff covering the house and lot property located at
Ayala Alabang.
The grandmother (guardian) of Cleodia and
Ceamantha filed in the RTC an Affidavit of Third
Party Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to Stop Sale
by Execution but this was denied. The motion for
reconsideration was also denied to the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a petition of certiorari with the Court
of Appeals.
The arguments of the petitioners are as follow:
a. They are the rightful owners of the house and lot
as it was donated to them by virtue of the
Compromise Agreement entered into by their
parents.
b. Their parents already waived their rights on the
said property.
c. The obligation of Michele did not redound to the
benefit of the family.
d. Michele Franciscos obligation is a joint obligation
between her and Matrai.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court to
proceed with the execution, levy and sale of the
subject property.
HELD: YES. The Court finds that it was grave error
for the RTC to proceed with the execution, levy and
sale of the subject property.
To begin with, the RTC should not have ignored that
the property in question is in the name of "Cleodualdo
M. Francisco, married to Michele U. Francisco." On
its face, the title shows that the registered owner of
the property is not Matrai and Michele but
Cleodualdo, married to Michele. The liability incurred
by Michele arose from a judgment rendered in an
unlawful detainer case against her and her partner
Matrai.
Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the Notice
of Levy on Execution on November 28, 2001, there
was already annotated on the title the following
inscription: Entry No. 23341-42/T-167907 Nullification of Marriage: Title of ownership of the
conjugal property consisting of the above-described
property shall be transferred by way of a Deed of
Donation to Cleodia Michaela U. Francisco and
Ceamantha Maica U. Francisco, as co-owners when
they reach nineteen (19) and eighteen (18) yrs. old to
the condition that Cleodualdo, shall retain
usufructuary rights over the property until he reaches
the age of 65 yrs. Old.
From the foregoing, it is clear that both Michele and
Cleodualdo have waived their title to and ownership
of the house and lot in Taal St. in favor of petitioners.

The property should not have been levied and sold at

execution sale, for lack of legal basis.
Under Article 124 of the Family Code
Full text:
http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/decisions.php?doctype=Decisio
ns%20/%20Signed%20Resolutions&docid=12227532972067
470223
HEIRS OF CHRISTINA AYUSTE v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Christina Ayuste married Rafael Ayuste on
September 24, 1961.
The couple resided in Manila but they operated a
machine shop in Lucena City. This business was
managed by Rafael Ayuste.
The couple purchased on August 1982 a parcel of
land with an area of 180 square meters on which a
residential house was built situated at Lucena City
for Mr. Ayustes temporary residence.
A deed of sale was executed and signed by the
parties and filed with the Register of Deeds of
Lucena City. The property was purchased from
spouses Pedro and Aida David.
On February 1987, Mr. Ayuste, with the consent of
Mrs. Ayuste sold the said parcel of land for
P40,000 to Malabonga.
Mr. Ayuste died on 1989 and Christina Ayuste
found out that the parcel of land was sold by her
deceased husband without her knowledge or
consent.
In 1990, she filed a petition to for the annulment of
the sale, cancellation of the title issued in the name
of private respondent and for the payment of moral,
exemplary and actual damages. In her complaint
Christina Ayuste alleges that her signature on the
deed of sale was forged.
The RTC granted the petition of Mrs. Ayuste.
Both parties appealed in the Court of Appeals for
the decision rendered by the RTC.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to the
annulment of the contract of sale entered into by
Rafael Ayuste without the consent of Christina
Ayuste?
HELD: The trial court erred in giving due course to
the action for annulment of sale. The Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on February 27, 1987 by and
between defendant-appellant and plaintiff-appellants
husband is declared VALID and BINDING upon the
plaintiff-appellant.
The only issue which remains to be resolved is
whether petitioners are entitled to the annulment of
the contract of sale entered into by Rafael Ayuste
without the consent of Christina Ayuste.

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Under the Civil Code, although the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership, he cannot
alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal
partnership
without
his
wifes
consent, subject only to certain exceptions specified
in the law. The remedy available to the wife in case
her husband should dispose of their conjugal
property without her consent is laid down in Article
173 of the Civil Code which states that:
The wife may, during the marriage, and within ten
years from the transaction questioned, ask the courts
for the annulment of any contract of the husband
entered into without her consent, when such consent
is required, or any act or contract of the husband
which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs, after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
A sale of real property of the conjugal partnership
made by the husband without the consent of his wife
is voidable. The action for annulment must be
brought during the marriage and within ten years
from the questioned transaction by the wife.
In the present case, the deed of sale was executed
on February 27, 1987. Rafael Ayuste died on
October 13, 1989. However, it was only on March 2,
1990 that Christina Ayuste filed her complaint with
the lower court asking for the annulment of the
sale. Although the action was filed within ten years
from the questioned transaction, it was not brought
during the existence of the marriage which was
dissolved upon the death of Rafael Ayuste in 1989.
Clearly, the action for annulment filed by Christina
Ayuste was barred for having been filed out of time.
The fact that Christina Ayuste only learned of the sale
after the death of her husband is not material.
Under Article 173 of the Family Code
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/sept99/118
784.htm
HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR REYES v. CIPRIANO and
FLORENTINA MIJARES
FACTS:
Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but had
been separated de facto since 1974.
In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property
(lot) to spouses Mijares for P40,000 on 1983.
She also found out that Vicente misrepresented her
in the MTC declaring that she died on March 22,
1982 and that the heirs left are him and the 5 minor
children.

On September 1983, the court granted guardianship

over the minor children to Vicente and authorized the
latter to sell the estate of Ignacia on October 1983.
On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel,
sent a letter to respondent spouses demanding the
return of her share in the lot.
Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on
June 4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of sale
against respondent spouses.
In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that
they are purchasers in good faith and that the sale
was valid because it was duly approved by the court.
Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that
what he sold to the spouses was only his share.
On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a
decision declaring the sale of lot void with respect to
the share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase price
of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to
return thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent
spouses.
Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision
praying that the sale be declared void in its entirety
and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to
her the rentals they collected on the apartments built
on Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983.
Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses
appealed the decision to the Court
of
Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she
was substituted by her compulsory heirs.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merely
voidable?
HELD: Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the
governing laws at the time the assailed sale was
contracted, provide:
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wifes
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and
within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the
husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the
value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conjugal
property of Ignacia and Vicente. Therefore, the sale

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of said lot to the Mijares spouses, without the

knowledge and consent of Ignacia Reyes, is
voidable. The action to annul the sale made on 1983
was filed on 1986 which is within the prescriptive
period under Article 173.
The Court finds that respondent spouses are not
purchasers in good faith. They already know about
the discrepancies and irregularities in the death
certificate presented by Vicente. The said errors
should have prompted them to question the sale and
pertaining documents.
In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed of
Sale executed by Vicente and respondents was
annulled. The guilty husband is asked to pay
damages to Mijares spouses and to his children
(petitioners).

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising
from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal
partnership.
HELD: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.
Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute
community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the
system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal
partnership of gains has no duty to make advance
payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/aug2003/143826
.htm

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife

arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. The Supreme Court does not
agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.

ROBERTO and VENUS BUADO vs COURT OF APPEALS

and ROMULO NICOL

In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car

which was claimed by the third party complainant to
be conjugal property was being levied upon to
enforce "a judgment for support" filed by a third
person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper
since the obligation which is personal to the husband
is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his
separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate
action by Romulo Nicol was proper.

FACTS:
Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda
Nicol.
On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners.
The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to
pay the damages.
The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of
Erlinda.
An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in
favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado.
After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda,
Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment of
certificate of sale and damages with preliminary
injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff.
He argued that there was no proper publication and
posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the
judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to
P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the
P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of
Romulo Nicol.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act
on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case.
The petitioners filed a petition where they said that
the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of
discretion for reversing the decision given by the
RTC.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/apr2009/gr_145222_2
009.html
DAVID and LORENZA PELAYO vs. MELKI PEREZ
FACTS:
David Pelayo sold two parcels of agricultural land
located in Panabo to Melki Perez on January 1988.
The sale is evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale.
Loreza Pelayo, wife of David, and another one
whose signature is illegible witnessed the execution
of the deed.
Mrs. Pelayo signed only the third space in the space
provided for the witnesses.
Perez asked Loreza to sign on the first and second
pages but the latter refused.
As a result, Mr. Perez instituted an action for specific
performance.
Perez countered that the lots were given to him by
defendant Pelayo in consideration of his services as
his attorney-in-fact to make the necessary
representation and negotiation with the illegal
occupants-defendants in the ejectment suit

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Defendant Pelayo said that the deed was without the

consent of Mrs. Perez and invoked Article166 of the
Civil Code to support his argument.

ISSUE:
1. Did Mrs. Pelayo expressed his consent in the deed
of sale executed by Mr. Pelayo?
HELD: The Supreme Court said that the petitioner
expressed her consent to the Deed of Absolute Sale
when she fixed her signature on the document.
The consent need not be expressed. It can be
implied. In the present case, although it appears on
the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only
as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to
the execution of said document point to the fact that
Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal
property and consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article
166, both of the New Civil Code, which was still in
effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in
question was executed, the lack of marital consent to
the disposition of conjugal property does not make
the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Said
provisions of law provide:
Art. 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non
compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal property without the wifes
consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her
consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same.
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage, and
within ten years from the transaction questioned, ask
the courts for the annulment of any contract of the
husband entered into without her consent, when
such consent is required, or any act or contract of
the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her
interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should
the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand
the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until
the court annuls the same and only upon an action
brought by the wife whose consent was not obtained.
The petition of Mr. and Mrs. Pelayo was denied.

Under Articles 166 and 173 of the New Civil Code.

Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/jun2005/
141323.htm

HEIRS OF DOMINGO HERNANDEZ SR. vs.

PLARIDEL and DOLORES MINGOA
FACTS:
The petitioners are the heirs of Domingo Hernandez
namely Sergia Hernandez (surviving spouse),
Domingo, Jr. and Maria Leonora Wilma (children).
Mr. and Mrs. Hernandez were awarded a real
property by the Philippine Homesite and Housing
Corporation (PHCC) by way of salary deduction
(Central Bank.)
The real property was later awarded to Dolores
Camisura who then sold the said property to the
Mingoa spouses.
In April 1983, Mr. Hernandez died intestate.
When Mr. Hernandez died, his heirs found out that
the title of the property was already registered to
the respondents.
On February 1994, the petitioners filed a complaint
against respondents.
They are praying for the annulment and/or
declaration of nullity of the Dead of Absolute Sale of
Real Estate.
The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioners.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the title of the subject property in the
name of respondent Mingoa may still be reconveyed
to the petitioners.
HELD: Article 173 of the Civil Code provides that the
wife may file for annulment of a contract entered into
by the husband without her consent within ten (10)
years from the transaction questioned. Petitioners
filed the action for reconveyance in 1995. Twelve (12)
years have lapsed since such discovery, and they
filed the petition beyond the period allowed by
law. Moreover, when Sergia Hernandez, together
with her children, filed the action for reconveyance,
the conjugal partnership of property with Hernandez,
Sr. had already been terminated by virtue of the
latter's death on April 16, 1983. Clearly, therefore,
petitioners action has prescribed.
In sum, the rights and interests of the spouses
Hernandez over the subject property were validly
transferred to respondent Dolores Camisura. Since
the sale of the conjugal property by Hernandez, Sr.
was without the consent of his wife, Sergia, the same
is voidable; thus, binding unless annulled.
Considering that Sergia failed to exercise her right to
ask for the annulment of the sale within the
prescribed period, she is now barred from
questioning the validity thereof. And more so, she is
precluded from assailing the validity of the
subsequent transfers from Camisura to Plaridel
Mingoa and from the latter to Melanie Mingoa.

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Persons and Family Relations Cases - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic

Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and

within ten years from the transaction questioned,
ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without her consent,
when such consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership
property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right,
she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.

Therefore, title to the subject property cannot

anymore be reconveyed to the petitioners by reason
of prescription and laches. The issues of prescription
and laches having been resolved, it is no longer
necessary to discuss the other issues raised in this
petition.
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/decemb
er2009/146548.htm
ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and GILDA CORPUZ
FACTS:
Judie and Gilda Corpuz were married on December
1968 in Bacolod City before a judge.
Mr. and Mrs. Corpuz purchased a lot in Koronadal,
South Cotabato.
In April 1988, the couple sold one half portion of their
lot to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Guiang.
Gilda Corpuz went to Manila on June 1989 to search
for employment abroad but she became a victim of
an illegal recruiter.
While she was in Manila, Mr. Corpuz (the husband),
sold the other half of their residence to spouses
Guiang (petitioners).
The daughter of Mrs. Guiang sent a letter to Gilda
and the latter replied that she does not consent the
sale.
In March 1990, Gilda went home. She lived in their
residence with their children but the husband
disappeared. The children said that Mr. Corpuz had
a new wife already.
As a result, Mr. and Mrs. Guiang filed a complaint
against respondent for trespassing.
Gilda field for the declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale.
The trial court held that the deed of transfer of rights
and amicable settlement are void. The CA affirmed
the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the deed of transfer of rights was
validly executed, or it not, ratified by the execution of
the amicable settlement.
HELD: The disposition or encumbrance is
voidable. Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the
husband cannot generally alienate or encumber any
real property of the conjugal partnership without the
wifes consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so
made however is not null and void. It is merely
voidable. The offended wife may bring an action to
annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the
provision of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, to wit:

This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)

years during [the] marriage to annul the alienation or
encumbrance was not carried over to the Family
Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or
encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the
Family Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the wife is null and void.
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely
voidable, petitioners aver that it was duly ratified by
the contending parties through the amicable
settlement they executed on March 16, 1990. The
position is not well taken. Doctrinally and clearly, a
void contract cannot be ratified.
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1998/jun1998/125172.
htm
THELMA JADER-MANALO vs.
NORMA and EDILBERTO CAMAISA
FACTS:
Thelma Jader-Manalo saw an advertisement in the
classified ads section of the newspaper Bulletin
Today (April 1992 issue).
The advertisement was about the sale of the ten-door
apartment owned by Mr. and Mrs. Camaisa.
Thelma was interested in the purchase of lot so she
negotiated to purchase the property through a real
estate broker Mr. Ereno.
The parties agreed in a hand-written contract. The
mode of payment agreed was installment.
The following day, both the parties met and signed
the typewritten contract. Manalo issued UCPB
checks.
After one day, Norma called Thelma Manalo and said
that they are cancelling the sale because the
spouses need spot cash and not checks.
Thelma filed a complaint to compel Norma to sign the
contracts to sell.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the husband may dispose of a
conjugal property with the wifes written consent.

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Persons and Family Relations Cases - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic

HELD: The law requires that the disposition of a

conjugal property by the husband as administrator in
appropriate cases requires the written consent of the
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void. Thus, Article
124 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse
to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers
do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
The properties subject of the contracts in this case
was conjugal; hence, for the contracts to sell to be
effective, the consent of both husband and wife must
concur.
The Supreme Court said that being aware of the
transaction is not consent.
Petitioner is correct insofar as she alleges that if the
written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be
brought to court which will give such authority if the
same is warranted by the circumstances. However, it
should be stressed that court authorization under Art.
124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse
who does not give consent is incapacitated.
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that
respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her
consent to the contracts. In the absence of such
showing of the wifes incapacity, court authorization
cannot be sought.
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jan2002/147978.
htm

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK vs.

MIGUELA C. DAILO
FACTS:
Miguela and Marcelino Dailo were married on August
1967.
During the marriage, the spouses purchased a lot
situated in San Pablo City from Dalida.
The Deed of Absolute Sale was executed in favor of
the husband (exclusion of his wife).
On December 1993, Marcelino executed a Special
Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth
Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan
from petitioner Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in
San Pablo City.
Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in
the
amount
ofP300,000.00
from
petitioner
(Homeowners Bank).
As security, Gesmundo executed on the same day a
Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject
property in favor of petitioner.
All the two transactions were made by Marcelino
without the knowledge and consent of Miguela Dailo.
The loan remained outstanding upon maturity. HSLB
instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. The said bank was the highest
bidder.
In December 1995, Marcelino Dailo died. Her wife
found out that the house and lot in San Pablo city
was already mortgaged. As a result, she filed a
petition for the Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and
Certificate of Sale, Deed of Sale and damages
against petitioner.
The petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that the property in question
was the exclusive property of the husband. HSLB
also contended that the loan obtained by Marcelino
redounded to the benefits of the Family.
ISSUE:
1. Was the disposal of the property executed by
Marcelino valid?
HELD: NO. In Guiang v. Court of Appeals, the
Supreme Court held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both the husband
and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code,
this Court declared that the absence of the consent of
one renders the entire sale null and void, including
the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the
husband who contracted the sale.
The same principle in Guiang squarely applies to the
instant case. As shall be discussed next, there is no
legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code
as an exception to Article 124 of the Family Code.

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Respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were

married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relations between respondent and her
late husband. With the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal
Partnership of Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already
established before its effectivity unless vested rights
have already been acquired under the Civil Code or
other laws.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his
wife, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property, which formed part
of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other
spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies
with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. Ei
incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who
asserts, not he who denies, must prove).
On the issue about the loan redounded to
the benefit of the family, the Supreme Court held
that the petitioner did not assert such contention
when they filed their complaint in the lower court.
When a party adopts a certain theory in the court
below, he will not be permitted to change his theory
on appeal, for to permit him to do so would not only
be unfair to the other party but it would also be
offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and
due process.
Full text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2005/mar2005/153802
.htm
PATROCINIA and WILFREDO RAVINO vs. MARY ANN
VILLA ABRILLE

FACTS:
The respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille is married to
Pedro Villa Abrille. The spouses have four children.
In 1982, the spouses purchased a parcel of land in
Juna Subdivision, Matina, Davao city with an area of
555 square meter. The property is registered under
their names.
Adjacent to the said lot is a parcel of land owned and
acquired by Pedro before the marriage.
Mr. and Mrs. Villa Abrille built a house on Lot 7
(owned by both spouses) and Pedros lot. They also

made improvements such as poultry house and

annex.
In 1991, Pedro had illicit relations with another
woman and neglected his family.
As a result, Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage
their movables to support the family.
Pedro sold the property (house and two lots) to
Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravino without the consent of
Mary Ann.
While Mary Ann was out, Pedro and armed members
of the CAFGU transferred the properties of the family
from the house to an apartment.
Respondents Mary Ann and her children filed a
complaint for Annulment of Sale, Specific
Performance, Damages and Attorneys Fees with
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against Pedro and
herein petitioners (the Ravinas) in the RTC of Davao
City.
During the trial, Pedro declared that the house was
built with his own money. Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina
testified that they bought the house and lot from
Pedro, and that her husband, petitioner Wilfredo
Ravina, examined the titles when they bought the
property.
The Trial Court ruled in favor of Mary Ann Villa Abrille
(sale of share is valid, payment for damages).
When the petitioners appealed, the CA modified the
decision.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the property covered by TCT No. T88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or conjugal
property. Whether its sale by Pedro was valid
considering the absence of Mary Anns consent.
HELD: There is no issue with regard to the lot
covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an
exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by
him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the
lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in
1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann.
The house built thereon is conjugal property, having
been constructed through the joint efforts of the
spouses, who had even obtained a loan from DBP to
construct the house.
Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of conjugal
property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124
of the same Code that now treats such a disposition
to be void if done (a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouses
inability, the authority of the court. The particular
provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten
(10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance
was not carried over to the Family Code. It is thus
clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal
partnership property by the husband without the
consent of the wife is null and void.

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Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of

property, if the husband, without knowledge and
consent of the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale
is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without
the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance
of the wife who is given five (5) years from the date
the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for
annulment of sale within five (5) years from the date
of sale and execution of the deed. However, her
action to annul the sale pertains only to the conjugal
house and lot and does not include the lot covered by
TCT No. T-26471, a property exclusively belonging to
Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without
Mary Anns consent.
The Supreme Court held that the petitioners are not
buyers in good faith. The sale of the conjugal
property was annulled while the sale of Pedros
exclusive property was valid. When a contract is
declared void, there must be a restoration of the
subject of the said contract.
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/oct2009/gr_160708_2
009.html
MANUEL and LETICIA FUENTES vs CONDRADO ROCA
FACTS:
Sabina Tarroza owned a 358-sq. m. lot in
Zamboanga city.
In October 1982, the said lot was sold to Tarciano
Roca (her son) but the latter did not transfer the
registry of title to his name.
In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to Manuel and
Leticia Fuentes.
The parties entered into an agreement to sell
prepared by Atty. Plagata. The said agreement was
to take effects six months after April 29, 1998.
In the agreement, Tarciano required the Fuentes
spouses to pay for a down payment of P60,000 for
the transfer of lot title.
Within six months, Tarciano was to clear the
structures and occupants of the lot. At the same time,
he needs to get the consent of his estranged wife to
agree with the sale. The petitioners agreed to pay the
remaining P140,000 or P160,000 upon Tarcianos
compliance to the agreement.
Atty. Plagata met Rosario (Tarciano) and asked her
to sign the agreement of sale.
The contract of sale was perfected and the Fuentes
spouses became the owner of the said property.
In 1997 (after 8 years), the children of the Roca
spouses filed a complaint against petitioners praying
for the annulment of sale and reconveyance of the
lot.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Rosarios signature on the document
of consent to her husband Tarcianos sale of their
conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged;
Whether or not the Rocas action for the declaration
of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed; and Whether or not only Rosario, the wife
whose consent was not had, could bring the action to
annul that sale.
HELD: The Court of Appeals found out that the
signature of Rosario was forged. The Supreme Court
held the same. There is dissimilarity between the
specimen signature of Rosario and that of seen in the
agreement of sale.
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law
that applies to this case is the Family Code, not the
Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got
married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property
to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August
3, 1988.
When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil code put in
place the system of conjugal partnership of gains on
their property relations. While its Article 165 made
Tarciano the sole administrator of the conjugal
partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling
commonly owned real property without his wifes
consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wifes
consent, the sale is not void but merely voidable.
Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale
annulled during the marriage within ten years from
the date of the sale. Failing in that, she or her heirs
may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only
the value of the property that Tarciano fraudulently
sold.
The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale dated
January 11, 1989 by Tarciano T. Roca, executed in
favor of Manuel O. Fuentes, married to Leticia L.
Fuentes, as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title T90,981 that the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga City
issued in the names of the latter spouses pursuant to
that deed of sale are declared void.
The Fuentes spouses are buyers in good faith.
Therefore, they are not required by law to pay any
amount of damages to the Rocas. However, the
Rocas are indemnified to reimburse the cost of
improvements made by the Fuentes to the property.
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/apr2010/gr_178902_2
010.html

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JOSEFA BAUTISTA FERRER vs. ISMAEL and FLORA

FERRER
FACTS:
Josefa is the widow of Alfredo Ferrer.
Alfredo Ferrer is the half brother of respondents
Manuel and Ismael Ferrer.
Before Alfredo got married, he purchased a piece of
lot and applied for a loan with the Social Security
System (SSS) to build improvements on the property
(residential house and two-door apartment).
The loan was fully paid during the marriage of Alfredo
and Josefa using conjugal funds.
According to the petitioner, spouses Ismael and Flora
Ferrer asked Alfredo to sign his last will and
testament which turned out to be a contract of sale.
The sale involved the property acquired by Alfredo
before the marriage but was fully paid using the
conjugal funds.
Alfredo filed with the RTC a Complaint for the
Annulment of the said sale against respondents. The
RTC dismissed the petition because it found out that
the terms and conditions of the Deed of Sale are not
contrart to law, morals, good customs and public
policy. The Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
affirmed the decision.
Alfredo died on September 1999.
Josefa filed a petition for the reimbursement for the
cost of improvements in Alfedos lot.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Josefa Ferrer must be reimbursed by the
respondents.
HELD:
No. Petitioner failed to show that there is an obligation on the
part of the respondents to respect or not violate her right. The
Supreme Court ruled While we could concede that Civil
Case No. 61327 made a reference to the right of the spouse
as contemplated in Article 120[22] of the Family Code to be
reimbursed for the cost of the improvements, the obligation to
reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the
entire property is vested. There is no obligation on the part of
the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by
the owner-spouse.
Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the
ownership of the improvements that are made on the
separate property of the spouses at the expense of the
partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both
spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any
resulting increase in value are more than the value of the
property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership,
subject to reimbursement of the value of the property of the
owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said
property shall be retained in ownership by the owner-spouse,
likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the

improvement. The subject property was precisely declared

as the exclusive property of Alfredo on the basis of Article
120 of the Family Code.
What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite the
allegations contained in the Complaint that they are the
buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse
nor can they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon
whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs
rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership or the spouse who
expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect
petitioners right to be reimbursed.
In the case at bar, the respondents has not obligation to pay
any cost of improvements to Josefa Ferrer. Therefore, the
petition is denied.
Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2006/november2006/1
66496.htm
ELENA MURRER vs HELMUT MERRER
FACTS:
Petitioner
Elena
Buenaventura
Muller
and
respondent Helmut Muller were married in Germany
on September 1989.
The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
the parents of respondent.
In 1992, the spouses decided to move and reside
permanently in the Philippines.
During that time, Helmut Muller inherited the house of
his parents which he sold. The proceeds of the sale
were used to purchase a parcel of land in Antipolo,
Rizal and the construction of the house (P528,000
and P2,300,000 respectively).
The Antipolo property was registered under the name
of Elena Murrer.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged
womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses
eventually separated.
On September 1994,Helmut Muller filed for a
separation of property before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon city.
On August 1996, the trial court rendered a decision
which terminated the regime of absolute community
of property between the spouses Muller.
The court also decreed the separation of properties
between the spouses and ordered the equal partition
of personal properties located within the country
excluding those acquired by gratuitous title.
Helmut Muller said that he is not praying for the
transfer of ownership of the property but of the
reimbursement of his personal funds.

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ISSUE:
1. Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled
to the reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property?

HELD: NO. Mr. Muller is not entitled to the

reimbursement of the funds used to purchase the
Antipolo property.
The Constitution prohibits alien from acquiring private
lands in the Philippines for the conservation of the
national patrimony.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied
trust was created and resulted by operation of law in
view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for
the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, respondents disqualification from
owning lands in the Philippines is absolute. Not even
an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the
purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can
result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise
on
respondents
part.
To
allow
reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed
to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
The Supreme Court held that the respondent cannot
seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it
is clear that he purchased the property despite
constitutional prohibition.

Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/gr_149615_2
006.html
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs DITA MAQUILAN
FACTS:
Virgilio and Dita Maquilan are spouses who once had
a blissful married life.
They were blessed to have one son.
Their marriage turned bitter when petitioner Virgilio
discovered that private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour.
The petitioner filed a case of adultery against private
respondent Dita Maquilan and the paramour.
Dita Maquilan and her paramour were convicted of
the crime charged and were sentenced to suffer
imprisonment.
Private respondent, Dita, filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Damages on 2001.

During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and

respondent entered into a Compromise Agreement.
Partial settlements are as follows:
- P500,000.00 of the money deposited in the
bank jointly in the name of the spouses shall be
withdrawn and deposited in favor and in trust of
their common child, Neil Maquilan, with the
deposit in the joint account of the parties. The
balance of such deposit, which presently stands
at P1,318,043.36, shall be withdrawn and
divided equally by the parties;
- The store that is now being occupied by the
plaintiff shall be allotted to her while the bodega
shall be for te defendant. The defendant shall
be paid the sum of P50,000.00 as his share in
the stocks of the store in full settlement thereof.
- The motorcycles shall be divided between
them such that the Kawasaki shall be owned by
the plaintiff while the Honda Dream shall be for
the defendant;
- The passenger jeep shall be for the plaintiff
who shall pay the defendant the sum of
P75,000.00 as his share thereon and in full
settlement thereof;
- The house and lot shall be to the common
child.
The petitioner filed for Omnibus Motion praying for
the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement on the
grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently
and judiciously apprise him of the consequential
effects of the said agreement.
The RTC and CA dismissed the petition of Mr.
Maquilan.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the partial voluntary separation of
property made by the spouses pending the petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage is valid.
HELD: YES. The petitioner contends that the
Compromise Agreement is void because it
circumvents the law that prohibits the guilty spouse,
who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage,
from sharing in the conjugal property. Since the
respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner
said that her share should be forfeited in favor of the
common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the
Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to
disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from
sharing in the conjugal property; and because the
Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final
and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article
2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since adultery
is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise
Agreement is therefore void. These arguments are
specious.

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Moreover, the contention that the Compromise

Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the
law prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the
conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
The conviction of adultery does not carry the
accessory of civil interdiction.
Neither could it be said that the petitioner was not
intelligently and judiciously informed of the
consequential effects of the compromise agreement,
and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement.
The argument of the
petitioner that he was not duly informed by his
previous counsel about the legal effects of the
voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or
vitiation of consent, as now claimed by the petitioner
as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could
hardly be said to be evident.
Full Text:
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2007/june2007/15540
9.htm

Case digest prepared The Law Chic. Facts and rulings were
taken from the full text of the case.

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Persons and Family Relations Cases - Case Digest Prepared by The Law Chic