Ty (Impartiality) and GARCIA (Propriety) Cases

IMPARTIALITY
Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,

G.R. No. 149797-98, February 13, 2004
TOPIC: BIAS
FACTS:
Tala, et al. filed a motion for the voluntary inhibition and/or
disqualification of respondent judge Tac-an on the grounds of
manifest prejudgment and partiality.
Respondent judge denied the motion for inhibition and ruled
that all the Orders of the court were based on facts and
applicable law and jurisprudence.
Nancy Ty and Tala, et al. filed separate petitions for certiorari
and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
Appellate court dismissed the two petitions and affirmed the
assailed Orders by respondent judge.
DOCTRINE:
The role of the trial judge in the conduct of judicial proceedings
should only be confined to promote the expeditious resolution
of controversies and prevent unnecessary waste of time or to
clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference

where the judges participation in the conduct of the trial tends
to build or bolster a case for one of the parties. This is
enjoined by the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 3.06 which
provides:
While a judge may, to promote justice, prevent waste of time
or clear up some obscurity, properly intervene in the
presentation of evidence during the trial, it should always be
borne in mind that undue interference may prevent the proper
presentation of the cause or the ascertainment of truth.
There is undue interference if the judge, as in the instant case,
orders the presentation of specific documentary evidence
without a corresponding motion from any party, or directs a
party when and who to present as a witness and what matters
such witness will testify on. To our mind, respondent judge
transgressed the boundaries of impartiality when he suggested
to Banco Filipino what evidence to present to prove its case.
While the trial court may interfere in the manner of presenting
evidence in order to promote the orderly conduct of the trial,
the final determination of what evidence to adduce is the sole
prerogative of the contending parties. Courts, while not
unmindful of their primary duty to administer justice, without
fear or favor, and to dispose of cases speedily and in as
inexpensive a manner as is possible for the court and the
parties, should refrain from showing any semblance of bias or
more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false

impression in the minds of the litigants. For obvious reasons, it
is the bounden duty of all to strive for the preservation of the
peoples faith in our courts.
There is no rule of procedure that requires a judge to
conclude, out of necessity, the existence of a prima facie case
on the basis alone of the evidence presented by the plaintiff.
As correctly pointed out by petitioner, it is only when the
plaintiff demurs to evidence that the trial court may rule on the
case before the defense presents its evidence. Moreover, the
assailed Order, being interlocutory in nature, is not the final
decision. As such, it is inappropriate for respondent judge to
rule, in an interlocutory order, on the principal issue that
effectively disposes of the merits of the case. In the interest of
substantial justice, the issue of whether or not there is a trust
relationship between the parties must be threshed out in a fulldress hearing and not merely in an interlocutory Order.
It is of utmost importance that a judge must preserve the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the parties as an
impartial, unbiased and dispassionate dispenser of justice.
When he conducts himself in a manner that gives rise, fairly or
unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and confidence are
eroded. His decisions, whether right or wrong, will always be
under suspicion of irregularity. In the case of Bautista v.
Rebueno, we stated:
... The Judge must maintain and preserve the trust and
faith of the parties litigants. He must hold himself above
reproach and suspicion. At the very first sign of lack of faith
and trust to his actions, whether well grounded or not, the
Judge has no other alternative but inhibit himself from the
case. A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a
litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce
doubt to his honest actuations and probity in favor of either
party, or incite such state of mind, he should conduct a careful
self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way
that the people's faith in the Courts of Justice is not impaired.
The better course for the Judge under such circumstances is
to disqualify himself. That way, he avoids being
misunderstood, his reputation for probity and objectivity is
preserved. What is more important, the ideal of impartial
administration of justice is lived up to.
In the case at bar, the consistency and regularity with which
respondent judge issued the assailed directives gives rise, not
to a fanciful suggestion or to a superficial impression of
partiality, but to a clear and convincing proof of bias and
prejudice. While we are not unmindful of this Courts previous
pronouncements that to warrant the judges inhibition from the
case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from
an extra-judicial or extrinsic source, this rule does not apply
where the judge, as in the instant case, displays an inordinate
predisposition to deviate from established procedural precepts
that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is

also true that the Supreme Court, on several occasions, ruled
that the issuance of the complained orders and decision that
pertain to the judges judicial functions may not be proper
considerations to charge a judge of bias though these acts
may be erroneous. However, where said complained orders,
taken not singly but collectively, ineluctably show that the
judge has lost the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate,
due process dictates that he voluntarily inhibits himself from
the case.
PROPRIETY
A.M. No. MTJ-92-687 February 9, 1994
ENGINEER EDGARDO C. GARCIA, complainant, vs.JUDGE
MELJOHN DE LA PEA, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Caibiran-Culaba, Leyte [Acting Judge, Municipal Trial
Court, Naval, Leyte], respondent.
FACTS:
A criminal case for grave oral defamation was filed by Dr.
Melencio de la Pea against Ignacia G. Garcia, petitioners
wife, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2577. Judge Meljohn de
la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of Municipal Trial Court

of Naval, Leyte took cognizance of the criminal case. He
issued a warrant of arrest to petitioners wife and June 8, 1992
and was detained for twenty hours since they cannot process
the posting of bail due to respondent judges absence as well
as of the Release Order which was unknowingly left with his
wife. On June 15, 1992, they received a copy of the criminal
complaint, affidavit of the witnesses and respondent judge's
inhibition order dated June 15, 1992. Outraged, petitioner filed
an administrative case against Judge de la Pea for partiality,
abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion in connection
with Criminal Case No. 2577 which was filed by the Judges
brother against his wife.
Judge de la Pea committed grave abuse of authority.
DOCTRINE
Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides in part that
no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or
his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee,
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party
within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to
counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the
rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has
presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the
subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in

interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
In this case, respondent judge took cognizance of the criminal
case, notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the
second degree of consanguinity to private complainant. With
such situation, it is compulsory that the respondent judge
should have inhibited from sitting in the case. Hence, Judge de
la Pea, in committing grave abuse of authority, was hereby
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and
with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public

office, including government-owned or controlled corporations.

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IMPARTIALITY

Ty v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,

clear up some obscurity. There is, however, undue interference

more or less partial attitude in order not to create any false

that demonstrate obvious partiality in favor of one party. It is

la Pea in his capacity as acting judge of Municipal Trial Court

subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in

with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public

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