Database Security

Types of Security

Legal and ethical issues

Policy issues
System-related issues
The need to identify multiple security levels

Threats to databases

Loss of integrity
Loss of availability
Loss of confidentiality

To protect databases against these types of threats, four kinds of

countermeasures can be implemented:

Access control
Inference control
Flow control
Encryption

A DBMS typically includes a database security and authorization subsystem

that is responsible for ensuring the security portions of a database against
unauthorized access.
Two types of database security mechanisms:
Discretionary security mechanisms
Mandatory security mechanisms
The security mechanism of a DBMS must include provisions for restricting
access to the database as a whole
This function is called access control and is handled by creating user
accounts and passwords to control login process by the DBMS.
The security problem associated with databases is that of controlling the
access to a statistical database, which is used to provide statistical
information or summaries of values based on various criteria.

The countermeasure to statistical database security problem is called

inference control measures.

 Another security is that of flow control, which prevents information from

flowing in such a way that it reaches unauthorized users.
Channels that are pathways for information to flow implicitly in ways that
violate the security policy of an organization are called covert channels.
A final security issue is data encryption, which is used to protect sensitive
data (such as credit card numbers) that is being transmitted via some type
communication network.
The data is encoded using some encoding algorithm.
An unauthorized user who access encoded data will have difficulty
deciphering it, but authorized users are given decoding or decrypting
algorithms (or keys) to decipher data.
Database Security and the DBA

The database administrator (DBA) is the central authority for managing a

database system.
The DBAs responsibilities include
granting privileges to users who need to use the system
classifying users and data in accordance with the policy of the
organization
The DBA is responsible for the overall security of the database system.
The DBA has a DBA account in the DBMS
Sometimes these are called a system or superuser account
These accounts provide powerful capabilities such as:
1. Account creation
2. Privilege granting
3. Privilege revocation
4. Security level assignment
Action 1 is access control, whereas 2 and 3 are discretionary and 4 is
used to control mandatory authorization
Access Protection, User Accounts, and Database Audits

Whenever a person or group of person s need to access a database

system, the individual or group must first apply for a user account.
The DBA will then create a new account id and password for the user if
he/she deems there is a legitimate need to access the database

 The user must log in to the DBMS by entering account id and password
whenever database access is needed.
The database system must also keep track of all operations on the
database that are applied by a certain user throughout each login
session.
To keep a record of all updates applied to the database and of the
particular user who applied each update, we can modify system log,
which includes an entry for each operation applied to the database that
may be required for recovery from a transaction failure or system crash.
If any tampering with the database is suspected, a database audit is
performed
A database audit consists of reviewing the log to examine all accesses
and operations applied to the database during a certain time period.
A database log that is used mainly for security purposes is sometimes
called an audit trail.
Discretionary Access Control Based on Granting and Revoking Privileges
The typical method of enforcing discretionary access control in a
database system is based on the granting and revoking privileges.
Types of Discretionary Privileges
The account level:
o At this level, the DBA specifies the particular privileges that each
account holds independently of the relations in the database.
The relation level (or table level):
o At this level, the DBA can control the privilege to access each
individual relation or view in the database.
The privileges at the account level apply to the capabilities provided to
the account itself and can include
o the CREATE SCHEMA or CREATE TABLE privilege, to create a
schema or base relation;
o the CREATE VIEW privilege;
o the ALTER privilege, to apply schema changes such adding or
removing attributes from relations;
o the DROP privilege, to delete relations or views;
o the MODIFY privilege, to insert, delete, or update tuples;
o and the SELECT privilege, to retrieve information from the
database by using a SELECT query
The second level of privileges applies to the relation level
o This includes base relations and virtual (view) relations.

 The granting and revoking of privileges generally follow an authorization

model for discretionary privileges known as the access matrix model
where
o The rows of a matrix M represents subjects (users, accounts,
programs)
o The columns represent objects (relations, records, columns,
views, operations).
o Each position M(i,j) in the matrix represents the types of privileges
(read, write, update) that subject i holds on object j.
To control the granting and revoking of relation privileges, each relation R
in a database is assigned and owner account, which is typically the
account that was used when the relation was created in the first place.
o The owner of a relation is given all privileges on that relation.
o In SQL2, the DBA can assign and owner to a whole schema by
creating the schema and associating the appropriate authorization
identifier with that schema, using the CREATE SCHEMA
command.
o The owner account holder can pass privileges on any of the
owned relation to other users by granting privileges to their
accounts.
In SQL the following types of privileges can be granted on each individual
relation R:
o SELECT (retrieval or read) privilege on R:
1. Gives the account retrieval privilege.
2. In SQL this gives the account the privilege to use the
SELECT statement to retrieve tuples from R.
o MODIFY privileges on R:
1. This gives the account the capability to modify tuples of R.
2. In SQL this privilege is further divided into UPDATE,
DELETE, and INSERT privileges to apply the corresponding
SQL command to R.
3. In addition, both the INSERT and UPDATE privileges can
specify that only certain attributes can be updated by the
account.
o REFERENCES privilege on R:
This gives the account the capability to reference relation R
when specifying integrity constraints.
The privilege can also be restricted to specific attributes of R.
Notice that to create a view, the account must have SELECT privilege on all
relations involved in the view definition.
Specifying Privileges Using Views
The mechanism of views is an important discretionary authorization
mechanism in its own right. For example,

o If the owner A of a relation R wants another account B to be able to

retrieve only some fields of R, then A can create a view V of R that
includes only those attributes and then grant SELECT on V to B.
o The same applies to limiting B to retrieving only certain tuples of R;
a view V can be created by defining the view by means of a query
that selects only those tuples from R that A wants to allow B to
access.
Revoking Privileges
In some cases it is desirable to grant a privilege to a user temporarily. For
example,
o The owner of a relation may want to grant the SELECT privilege to
a user for a specific task and then revoke that privilege once the
task is completed.
o Hence, a mechanism for revoking privileges is needed. In SQL, a
REVOKE command is included for the purpose of canceling
privileges.
Propagation of Privileges using the GRANT OPTION
Whenever the owner A of a relation R grants a privilege on R to another
account B, privilege can be given to B with or without the GRANT OPTION.
If the GRANT OPTION is given, this means that B can also grant that
privilege on R to other accounts.
o Suppose that B is given the GRANT OPTION by A and that B then
grants the privilege on R to a third account C, also with GRANT
OPTION. In this way, privileges on R can propagate to other
accounts without the knowledge of the owner of R.
o If the owner account A now revokes the privilege granted to B, all
the privileges that B propagated based on that privilege should
automatically be revoked by the system.
An Example
Suppose that the DBA creates four accounts
A1, A2, A3, A4
and wants only A1 to be able to create base relations. Then the DBA must
issue the following GRANT command in SQL
GRANT CREATETAB TO A1;
In SQL2 the same effect can be accomplished by having the DBA issue a
CREATE SCHEMA command as follows:
CREATE SCHAMA EXAMPLE AUTHORIZATION A1;
User account A1 can create tables under the schema called EXAMPLE.
Suppose that A1 creates the two base relations EMPLOYEE and
DEPARTMENT

 A1 is then owner of these two relations and hence all the relation privileges
on each of them.
Suppose that A1 wants to grant A2 the privilege to insert and delete tuples in
both of these relations, but A1 does not want A2 to be able to propagate these
privileges to additional accounts:
GRANT INSERT, DELETE ON
EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT TO A2;
Suppose that A1 wants to allow A3 to retrieve information from either of
the two tables and also to be able to propagate the SELECT privilege to
other accounts.
A1 can issue the command:
GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE, DEPARTMENT
TO A3 WITH GRANT OPTION;
A3 can grant the SELECT privilege on the EMPLOYEE relation to A4 by
issuing:
GRANT SELECT ON EMPLOYEE TO A4;
Notice that A4 cant propagate the SELECT privilege because GRANT
OPTION was not given to A4
Suppose that A1 decides to revoke the SELECT privilege on the
EMPLOYEE relation from A3; A1 can issue:
REVOKE SELECT ON EMPLOYEE FROM A3;
The DBMS must now automatically revoke the SELECT privilege on
EMPLOYEE from A4, too, because A3 granted that privilege to A4 and A3
does not have the privilege any more.
Suppose that A1 wants to give back to A3 a limited capability to SELECT
from the EMPLOYEE relation and wants to allow A3 to be able to
propagate the privilege.
The limitation is to retrieve only the NAME, BDATE, and ADDRESS
attributes and only for the tuples with DNO=5.
A1 then create the view:
CREATE VIEW A3EMPLOYEE AS
SELECT NAME, BDATE, ADDRESS
FROM EMPLOYEE
WHERE DNO = 5;
After the view is created, A1 can grant SELECT on the view
A3EMPLOYEE to A3 as follows:
GRANT SELECT ON A3EMPLOYEE TO A3
WITH GRANT OPTION;
Finally, suppose that A1 wants to allow A4 to update only the SALARY
attribute of EMPLOYEE;
A1 can issue:
GRANT UPDATE ON EMPLOYEE (SALARY) TO A4;
o The UPDATE or INSERT privilege can specify particular attributes that
may be updated or inserted in a relation.
o Other privileges (SELECT, DELETE) are not attribute specific.

Specifying Limits on Propagation of Privileges

Techniques to limit the propagation of privileges have been developed,
although they have not yet been implemented in most DBMSs and are not
a part of SQL.
o Limiting horizontal propagation to an integer number i means that
an account B given the GRANT OPTION can grant the privilege to
at most i other accounts.
o Vertical propagation is more complicated; it limits the depth of the
granting of privileges.
Mandatory Access Control and Role-Based Access Control for Multilevel
Security
The discretionary access control techniques of granting and revoking
privileges on relations has traditionally been the main security mechanism
for relational database systems.
This is an all-or-nothing method:
o A user either has or does not have a certain privilege.
In many applications, and additional security policy is needed that
classifies data and users based on security classes.
o This approach as mandatory access control, would typically be
combined with the discretionary access control mechanisms.
Typical security classes are top secret (TS), secret (S), confidential (C),
and unclassified (U), where TS is the highest level and U the lowest: TS
SCU
The commonly used model for multilevel security, known as the BellLaPadula model, classifies each subject (user, account, program) and
object (relation, tuple, column, view, operation) into one of the security
classifications, T, S, C, or U:
o Clearance (classification) of a subject S as class(S) and to the
classification of an object O as class(O).
Two restrictions are enforced on data access based on the subject/object
classifications:
o Simple security property: A subject S is not allowed read access
to an object O unless class(S) class(O).
o A subject S is not allowed to write an object O unless class(S)
class(O). This known as the star property (or * property).
To incorporate multilevel security notions into the relational database
model, it is common to consider attribute values and tuples as data
objects.
Hence, each attribute A is associated with a classification attribute C in
the schema, and each attribute value in a tuple is associated with a
corresponding security classification.
In addition, in some models, a tuple classification attribute TC is added
to the relation attributes to provide a classification for each tuple as a
whole.

 Hence, a multilevel relation schema R with n attributes would be

represented as
R(A1,C1,A2,C2, , An,Cn,TC)
where each Ci represents the classification attribute associated with
attribute Ai.
The value of the TC attribute in each tuple t which is the highest of all
attribute classification values within t provides a general classification for
the tuple itself, whereas each Ci provides a finer security classification for
each attribute value within the tuple.
o The apparent key of a multilevel relation is the set of attributes that
would have formed the primary key in a regular(single-level)
relation.
A multilevel relation will appear to contain different data to subjects (users)
with different clearance levels.
o In some cases, it is possible to store a single tuple in the relation at
a higher classification level and produce the corresponding tuples
at a lower-level classification through a process known as filtering.
o In other cases, it is necessary to store two or more tuples at
different classification levels with the same value for the apparent
key.
This leads to the concept of polyinstantiation where several tuples can
have the same apparent key value but have different attribute values for
users at different classification levels.
In general, the entity integrity rule for multilevel relations states that all
attributes that are members of the apparent key must not be null and must
have the same security classification within each individual tuple.
In addition, all other attribute values in the tuple must have a security
classification greater than or equal to that of the apparent key.
o This constraint ensures that a user can see the key if the user is
permitted to see any part of the tuple at all.
Other integrity rules, called null integrity and interinstance integrity,
informally ensure that if a tuple value at some security level can be filtered
(derived) from a higher-classified tuple, then it is sufficient to store the
higher-classified tuple in the multilevel relation.
Comparing Discretionary Access Control and Mandatory Access Control
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) policies are characterized by a
high degree of flexibility, which makes them suitable for a large variety of
application domains.
o The main drawback of DAC models is their vulnerability to
malicious attacks, such as Trojan horses embedded in application
programs.
By contrast, mandatory policies ensure a high degree of protection in a
way, they prevent any illegal flow of information.
Mandatory policies have the drawback of being too rigid and they are only
applicable in limited environments.

 In many practical situations, discretionary policies are preferred because

they offer a better trade-off between security and applicability.
Role-Based Access Control
Role-based access control (RBAC) emerged rapidly in the 1990s as a
proven technology for managing and enforcing security in large-scale
enterprisewide systems.
Its basic notion is that permissions are associated with roles, and users
are assigned to appropriate roles.
Roles can be created using the CREATE ROLE and DESTROY ROLE
commands.
o The GRANT and REVOKE commands discussed under DAC can
then be used to assign and revoke privileges from roles.
RBAC appears to be a viable alternative to traditional discretionary and
mandatory access controls; it ensures that only authorized users are given
access to certain data or resources.
Many DBMSs have allowed the concept of roles, where privileges can be
assigned to roles.
Role hierarchy in RBAC is a natural way of organizing roles to reflect the
organizations lines of authority and responsibility.
Another important consideration in RBAC systems is the possible
temporal constraints that may exist on roles, such as time and duration of
role activations, and timed triggering of a role by an activation of another
role.
Using an RBAC model is highly desirable goal for addressing the key
security requirements of Web-based applications.
In contrast, discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access
control (MAC) models lack capabilities needed to support the security
requirements emerging enterprises and Web-based applications.
Access Control Policies for E-Commerce and the Web
E-Commerce environments require elaborate policies that go beyond
traditional DBMSs.
o In an e-commerce environment the resources to be protected are
not only traditional data but also knowledge and experience.
o The access control mechanism should be flexible enough to
support a wide spectrum of heterogeneous protection objects.
A related requirement is the support for content-based access-control.
Another requirement is related to the heterogeneity of subjects, which
requires access control policies based on user characteristics and
qualifications.
o A possible solution, to better take into account user profiles in the
formulation of access control policies, is to support the notion of
credentials.
o A credential is a set of properties concerning a user that are
relevant for security purposes

 For example, age, position within an organization

o It is believed that the XML language can play a key role in access
control for e-commerce applications.
Introduction to Statistical Database Security
Statistical databases are used mainly to produce statistics on various
populations.
The database may contain confidential data on individuals, which should
be protected from user access.
Users are permitted to retrieve statistical information on the populations,
such as averages, sums, counts, maximums, minimums, and
standard deviations.
A population is a set of tuples of a relation (table) that satisfy some
selection condition.
Statistical queries involve applying statistical functions to a population
of tuples.
For example, we may want to retrieve the number of individuals in a
population or the average income in the population.
o However, statistical users are not allowed to retrieve individual
data, such as the income of a specific person.
Statistical database security techniques must prohibit the retrieval of
individual data.
This can be achieved by prohibiting queries that retrieve attribute values
and by allowing only queries that involve statistical aggregate functions
such as COUNT, SUM, MIN, MAX, AVERAGE, and STANDARD
DEVIATION.
o Such queries are sometimes called statistical queries.
It is DBMSs responsibility to ensure confidentiality of information about
individuals, while still providing useful statistical summaries of data about
those individuals to users. Provision of privacy protection of users in a
statistical database is paramount.
In some cases it is possible to infer the values of individual tuples from a
sequence statistical queries.
o This is particularly true when the conditions result in a population
consisting of a small number of tuples.
Introduction to Flow Control
Flow control regulates the distribution or flow of information among
accessible objects.
A flow between object X and object Y occurs when a program reads
values from X and writes values into Y.
o Flow controls check that information contained in some objects
does not flow explicitly or implicitly into less protected objects.
A flow policy specifies the channels along which information is allowed to
move.
o The simplest flow policy specifies just two classes of information:

 confidential (C) and nonconfidential (N)

o and allows all flows except those from class C to class N.
Covert Channels
A covert channel allows a transfer of information that violates the security
or the policy.
A covert channel allows information to pass from a higher classification
level to a lower classification level through improper means.
Covert channels can be classified into two broad categories:
o Storage channels do not require any temporal synchronization, in
that information is conveyed by accessing system information or
what is otherwise inaccessible to the user.
o Timing channel allow the information to be conveyed by the timing
of events or processes.
Some security experts believe that one way to avoid covert channels is for
programmers to not actually gain access to sensitive data that a program
is supposed to process after the program has been put into operation.

Operating System Security Fundamentals

Operating system: collection of programs that allows user to operate
computer hardware
Three layers:
Inner layer
Middle layer
Outer layer

Key functions of an operating system:

Multitasking, multisharing
Computer resource management
Controls the flow of activities
Provides a user interface
Administers user actions and accounts
Runs software utilities and programs
Enforce security measures
Schedules jobs

The Operating System Security Environment

A compromised OS can compromise a database environment
Physically protect the computer running the OS (padlocks, chain
locks, guards, cameras)
Model:
Bank building (operating system)

Safe (database)
Money (data)

Used as access points to the database

Three components:
Memory
Services
Files

Services
Main component of operating system security environment
Operating system core utilities
Used to gain access to the OS and its features
Include
User authentication
Remote access
Administration tasks
Password policies

Files
Common threats:
File permission
File sharing

Files must be protected from unauthorized reading and writing

actions
Data resides in files; protecting files
protects data
Read, write, and execute privileges

File Transfer
FTP (File Transfer Protocol):
Internet service for transferring files from one computer to another
Transmits usernames and passwords in plaintext
Root account cannot be used with FTP
Anonymous FTP: ability to log on to the FTP server without being
authenticated

Best practices:
Use Secure FTP utility if possible

Make two FTP directories:

One for uploads with write permissions only
One for downloads with read permissions only

Use specific accounts with limited permissions

Log and scan FTP activities
Allow only authorized operators

Sharing Files
Naturally leads to security risks and threats
Peer-to-peer programs: allow users to share files over the Internet
Reasons for blocking file sharing:
Malicious code
Adware and spyware
Privacy and confidentiality
Pornography
Copyright issues

Memory
Hardware memory available on the system
Can be corrupted by badly written software
Two options:
Stop using the program
Apply a patch (service pack) to fix it

Can harm data integrity

Can potentially exploit data for illegal use

Authentication Methods
Authentication:
Verifies user identity
Permits access to the operating system

Physical authentication:
Allows physical entrance to company property
Magnetic cards and biometric measures

Digital authentication: verifies user identity by digital means

Digital Authentication Mechanism

Digital certificates: digital passport that identifies and verifies holder

of certificate
Digital token (security token):
Small electronic device
Displays a number unique to the token holder; used with the holders PIN
as a password
Uses a different password each time

Digital card:
Also known as a security card or smart card
Similar to a credit card; uses an electronic circuit instead of a magnetic
strip
Stores user identification information

Kerberos:
Developed by MIT
Uses unique keys a.k.a. tickets for authentication purposes
Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP):
Developed by the University of Michigan
A centralized directory database stores:
Users (user name and user ID)
Passwords
Internal telephone directory
Security keys

Efficient for reading but not suited for frequently changing information
Easy to implement
Uses client/server architecture

NTLM (NT LAN Manager):

Developed and used by Microsoft
Employs a challenge/response authentication protocol
No longer used

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):

User keeps a private key
Authentication firm holds a public key
Encrypt and decrypt data using both keys
RADIUS:
Remote authentication dial-in user services
used by network devices to provide a centralized authentication mechanism

Secure Socket Layer (SSL): authentication information is transmitted over the

network in an encrypted form
Secure Remote Password (SRP):
Password is not stored locally
Invulnerable to brute force or dictionary attacks

Authorization

Process that decides whether users are permitted to perform the

functions they request
Authorization is not performed until the user is authenticated
Deals with privileges and rights

User Administration
Create user accounts
Set password policies
Grant privileges to users
Best practices:
Use a consistent naming convention
Always provide a password to an account and force the user to change it
at the first logon
Protect passwords
Do not use default passwords
Create a specific file system for users
Educate users on how to select a password
Lock non-used accounts
Grant privileges on a per host basis
Do not grant privileges to all machines
Use ssh, scp, and Secure FTP
Isolate a system after a compromise
Perform random auditing procedures

Password Policies
First line of defense
Dictionary attack: permutation of words in dictionary
Make hard for hackers entering your systems
Best password policy:
Matches your company missions
Enforced at all level of the organization

Best practices:
Password aging
Password reuse
Password history
Password encryption

Best practices (continued):

Password storage and protection
Password complexity

Logon retries
Single sign-on

Vulnerabilities of Operating Systems

Top vulnerabilities to Windows systems:
Internet Information Services (IIS)
Microsoft SQL Server (MSSQL)
Windows Authentication
Internet Explorer (IE)
Windows Remote Access Services

Top vulnerabilities to Windows (continued):

Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC)
Windows Scripting Host (WSH)
Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express
Windows Peer-to-Peer File Sharing (P2P)
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)

Top vulnerabilities to UNIX systems:

BIND Domain Name System
Remote Procedure Calls (RPC)
Apache Web Server
General UNIX authentication accounts with no passwords or weak
passwords
Clear text services

Top vulnerabilities to UNIX systems (continued):

Sendmail
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
Secure Shell (SSH)
Misconfiguration of Enterprise Services NIS/NFS
Open Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)

Designing Trusted Operating Systems

What makes an operating system secure? Or

trustworthy?
How are trusted systems designed, and which of those
design principles carry over naturally to other program
development tasks?

How do we develop assurance of the correctness of a

trusted operating systems?

Primitive security services

Memory protection
File protection
General object access control
User authentication

OS is trusted if we have confidence that it provides

these four services in a consistent and effective way.

What is a trusted system?

Trusted process process that can affect system security
Trusted product evaluated and approved product
Trusted software- software portion of system that can be relied upon
to enforce security policy
Trusted computing base set of all protection mechanisms within a
computing system that enforce a nified security policy
Trusted system system that employs sufficient hardware and
software integrity measures to allow its use for processing sensitive
information

Security Policies
security policy statement of security we expect
the system to enforce
Military Security Policy

based on protecting classified information

Information access is limited by need-to-know rule
Each piece of classified info is associated with a
compartment

Military Security Policy

Class (classification) - <rank; compartment>
Clearance - indication that person is trusted to access info up to a
certain level of sensitivity
Dominance

s <= O iff ranks <= ranko

and compartmentss <= compartmentso

Clearance level of subject is at least as high as that of the information

Subject has a need to know about all compartments for

which the information is classified.

Commercial Security Policies

Data items at any level may have different degrees
of sensitivity (public, proprietary, internal)
No formalized notion of clearances
No dominance function for most commercial
information access

Well-formed transactions perform steps in order,

exactly as listed & authenticating the individuals who perform the
steps

Goal maintain consistency between internal data

and external expectations of the data
Process constrained data items by
transformation procedures

<userID, TPi, {CDIj, CDIk, }>

Separation of duty division of responsibilities

(manual system)
Chinese Wall Security Policy

Confidentiality Policy
Objects (e.g. files)
Company Groups (all objects concerning a particular
company)
Conflict classes (cluster competing companies)