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8.0 - The First Nuclear Weapons

Version 2.17: 1 August 2002
COPYRIGHT CAREY SUBLETTE
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8.0 - The First Nuclear Weapons

This section describes the first fission and fusion bombs that were developed and tested. The
purpose is 3-fold.
First, these devices are of considerable historical and public interest (i.e., the "first" of anything
garners special attention). Second, these devices serve as archetypal examples of basic designs and
more information is available about these devices than later ones. Third, the effort and technology that
was required to develop these devices provide indications of how easily primitive nuclear weapons can
be developed by others.
8.1 The First Atomic Bombs
8.1.1 The Design of 'Gadget', 'Fat Man', and 'Joe 1' (RDS-1)
8.1.2 TRINITY - The 'Gadget' Test
8.1.3 'Little Boy'
8.1.4 'Fat Man'
8.1.5 Availability of Additional Bombs
8.2 The First Hydrogen Bombs
8.2.1 Early Research on Fusion Weapons
8.2.2 Design and Testing of the First Fusion Weapons

8.1 - The First Atomic Bombs

This subsection describes the three atomic bombs, which were constructed and detonated in 1945.
8.1.1 The Design of 'Gadget', 'Fat Man', and 'Joe 1' (RDS-1)
The design of the Gadget and Fat Man devices are discussed together since they are basically the
same. Gadget was an experimental test version of the implosion system used in Fat Man. A test of the
implosion bomb was considered essential due to the newness of the explosive wave shaping technology
and the complexity of the system.
Although the data given below is based on the U.S. made Gadget/Fat Man, it also applies to the
first Soviet atomic bomb codenamed "RDS-1" (Reaktivnyi Dvigatel Stalina; Stalin's Rocket Engine) by
the Soviet Union and designated Joe-1 by U.S. Intelligence. This is because detailed descriptions of the
design were given to Soviet intelligence by spies who worked at Los Alamos. Lavrenti Beria (who was
the Communist Party official heading the project) insisted that the first bomb copy the proven American
design as closely as possible. The information the Soviets received were not complete specifications of
the final design and -- in particular -- lacked precise measurements. So even an attempt to make an
exact replica would inevitably vary in exact dimensions and other respects.
The 2 key spies at Los Alamos were Theodore ("Ted") Hall and Klaus Fuchs. Hall was involved in
certain aspects of the experimental work involved with the implosion experiments and was the first
source to provide the Soviets with information about the implosion concept (while it was in preliminary
development) in the fall of 1944. The detailed design information about the bomb was provided by
Fuchs who actually had a key role in its development. Significant information about lens manufacture
was also passed on by David Greenglass. But this was mostly or entirely redundant with the Hall and
Fuchs information. In the early 1990s, KGB/RFIS officials disseminated an account of an unidentified
scientist-spy code named "Perseus". But this has since been determined to be a fictional composite.
A fairly complete description of the Gadget's design emerged into the public domain over a span of
45 years (from 1950 to 1995), mostly as an indirect result of Soviet espionage. The Rosenberg trial
resulted in a first description of the implosion process and explosive lens design due to the release of
testimony provided by David Greenglass and Klaus Fuchs. The very detailed information provided by
Klaus Fuchs emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Many additional FBI records relating to the
Fuchs and Rosenberg investigations have recently been released in recent years also.
The intelligence-based descriptions of the Gadget and Fat Man suffered somewhat from the fact
that they actually recounted different stages of design evolution and not the specifications of the actual
devices exploded at Trinity and Nagasaki. Since 1995, more specific information about the actual
Gadget and Fat Man designs has been uncovered and published through the efforts of John CosterMullen who has assembled a great deal of data through interviews, field investigations, archive searches,
and FOIA requests. Coster-Mullen's work is available in the form of his self-published book Atom
Bombs: The Top Secret Inside Story of Little Boy and Fat Man.

Implosion Bomb Cross Section (drawn to scale)

Explosive Sphere
Dimensions
Component
(Outside Diameters)
Pit Assembly
Neutron initiator
2.0 cm (0.79 inches)
Initiator cavity
2.5 cm (0.98 inches)
Plutonium core
9.20 cm (3.62 inches)
Uranium tamper shell
22.225 cm (8.75 inches)
Boron-plastic shell
22.86 cm (9 inches)
Implosion Assembly
Aluminum pusher shell 46.99 cm (18.5 inches)
Inner HE booster shell 92.075 cm (36.25 inches)
Explosive lens
137.8 cm (54.25 inches)
Explosive Sphere Casing
Cork liner
140.3 cm (55.25 inches)
Duraluminum case
145.4 cm (57.25 inches)
Fat Man Bomb Ballistic Case Dimensions
Ballistic case (ID)
152.1 cm (59.875 inches)
Ballistic case (OD)
153.0 cm (60.25 inches)
Scale drawing of 'Fat Man' (click for large
image).

Cut-away view showing the implosion bomb lens block arrangement. Lens and booster blocks are
combined in this diagram. Click for large image.
8.1.1.1 The Pit Assembly
The heart of the pit assembly was the Plutonium core whose fission in its compressed state would
release the explosive energy of the bomb. The core contained 6.2 kg of a delta-phase PlutoniumGallium alloy. The core was a 9.20 cm sphere -- solid except for a 2.5 cm cavity in the center for the
neutron initiator. The solid design was a conservative one suggested by Robert Christy to minimize
3

asymmetry and instability problems during implosion. The sphere had a 2.5 cm hole and Plutonium
plug to allow initiator insertion after assembly of the sphere.
The Plutonium was produced by the nuclear reactors at Hanford, Washington although it is possible
that about 200 g of Plutonium produced by the experimental X-Reactor at Oak Ridge was also used in
the first core. Wartime production meant that the Plutonium had to be separated as quickly as feasible
after being bred in the reactor. Due to the very short irradiation periods used (about 150 days), this was
super-grade weapon Plutonium containing only about 1.2% Pu240.
The Plutonium was stabilized in the low density delta phase (density 15.9) by alloying it with 3%
Gallium (by molar content, 0.8% by weight), but was otherwise of high purity. The weapon design at
the start of 1945 called for the use of pure Plutonium in the alpha phase (its densest phase and the phase
that is stable at room temperature). At that time, knowledge of Plutonium phase behavior and alloys
were slight. And using Plutonium with no diluents and in its densest phase favored the most efficient
explosion possible.
But as increasing quantities of Plutonium came available for metallurgists to work with problems
with making using castings of alpha Plutonium became apparent. Hot pressing 0.9 inch (2.29 cm)
hemispheres weighing 60 g had been successful in April. But attempts to repeat this in May with 2-inch
(5.08 cm) hemispheres weighing 650 g failed. The pressings warped and split due to the phase change
that occurred, much of it after the metal had cooled. Fortunately for the program, a suitable alloy that
stabilized the low density delta phase had already been developed.
The previous summer after the Plutonium crisis had struck Los Alamos, the theoretical division had
calculated the tolerance for diluent atoms in Plutonium (that is, the concentration of non-Plutonium
atoms that would not significantly affect the explosion efficiency). This level was set at 5% (molar). In
February 1945, the metallurgists identified 2 alloying elements that stabilized the metals delta phase -Silicon and Aluminum. Further work found that only Aluminum produced alloys with satisfactory
stability. Suitable ones with an Aluminum content ranging from 1-to-4% were tested.
In early-March, new tolerances for various light element impurities were calculated based on the
production of neutrons from the "alpha,n" reaction. The levels were quite conservative although the
Pu240 had imposed neutron backgrounds some 620 times higher than originally expected. The light
element neutron background was allowed to rise only 62 times so that it would not be a significant
contributor to the neutron emission. It was soon noticed that these limits set the maximum content of
Aluminum at 0.5% (molar), making the only candidate delta-stable alloy unacceptable. Tests were soon
made with Aluminums next heaviest chemically similar neighbor -- Gallium. In April, the 3% Gallium
alloy was developed and tested and thus offered a ready solution to the Plutonium fabrication problem.
Switching to the low density delta phase alloy had other benefits. The higher critical mass of the
lower density metal required the use of more Plutonium. But it also allowed the use of more Plutonium.
The more Plutonium used in the bomb, the bigger the explosion due both to the direct increase in fuel
mass and an increase in efficiency. Serendipitously, the expected drawback of using lower density metal
-- a less efficient reaction -- did not materialize. Even stabilized, the delta phase collapsed quite easily
so that during implosion the Plutonium would compress to the same density as would a pure Plutonium
alpha phase core.
Another advantage of the alloy was that the stabilization eliminated any possibility of phase
transition expansion due to inadvertent overheating of the core after manufacture. A real risk for the
self-heating Plutonium which would distort and ruin it for weapon use. A final advantage was that the
4

alloy proved relatively corrosion resistant, undergoing corrosion at only 4% the rate of pure Plutonium.
This alloy has remained in use in subsequent nuclear weapons down to the present day.
The bomb cores were formed in 2 hemispheres by hot pressing an ingot of the proper weight in steel
dies. The alloy proved easy to press-form at 400 C and 30,000 psi (200 MPa).
Since Plutonium is a very chemically-reactive metal as well as a significant health hazard, each halfsphere was plated with an inert metal to protect it. The initial technique used was electroplating Silver
to form a layer 0.005 inches (0.13 mm) thick. This protection method was used for the 'Gadget core',
but created a problem. Hasty preparation had left plating solution trapped under the Silver resulting in
blistering that ruined the corrosion protection and the fit. Careful grinding and layering with Gold leaf
restored the necessary smooth surface. However, a thin Gold gasket (about 0.1 mm thick) between the
hemispheres was a necessary feature of the design in any case to prevent premature penetration of shock
wave jets between the hemispheres that could have prematurely activated the initiator.
After Trinity, 2 changes were made in bomb core fabrication. Silver plating was replaced by a new
process that coated the Plutonium with a much tougher and more effective protective layer of Nickel.
The Plutonium was exposed to an atmosphere of a Nickel Carbonyl which reacted with the Plutonium to
deposit a film of Nickel. This coating technique would remain in use at least through the 1950s at
Rocky Flats. Later cores also had a design change that eliminated the need for the Gold gasket. This
possibly involved changing the mating surfaces of the hemispheres from being flat to having some sort
of step or bevel to block shock wave jets.
In the center of core was a 2.5 cm cavity that held the neutron initiator. The initiator used was
called the Urchin (or "screwball") design. It was a sphere consisting of a hollow Beryllium shell with a
solid Beryllium pellet inside, the whole initiator weighing about 7 grams. The outer shell was 2 cm
wide and 0.6 cm thick; the solid inner sphere was 0.8 cm wide.
The Urchin had 15 concentric latitudinal grooves cut into the inner surface of the shell. Each groove
was wedge-shaped and 2.09 mm deep. Like the Plutonium core, the shell was formed in 2 halves by hot
pressing in a Nickel Carbonyl atmosphere. The surfaces of the shell and central sphere were coated by a
layer of Nickel and then plated with 0.1 mm of Gold. 50 curies of Polonium 210 (11 mg) were deposited
on the grooves inside the shell and on the central sphere. The Gold and Nickel layers protected the
beryllium from alpha particles emitted by the Polonium and surrounding Plutonium. The Urchin was
attached to a mounting bracket inside the cores central cavity.
The Urchin was activated by the arrival of the implosion shock wave at the center of the core. When
the shock wave reached the walls of the cavity, they vaporized and the Plutonium gas shock wave then
struck the initiator, collapsing the grooves and creating Munroe-effect jets that rapidly mixed the
Polonium and Beryllium of the inner and outer spheres together. The alpha particles emitted by the Po 210
then struck Beryllium atoms, periodically knocking loose neutrons (perhaps one every 5-10
nanoseconds).
Surrounding the core was a natural-Uranium tamper weighing 108 kg with a diameter of 9 inches
(22.225 cm). The tamper formed a 6.56 cm thick layer around the core. Together, the core and tamper
formed the "pit assembly." The thickness of the tamper layer was determined by neutron conservation
considerations since a few centimeters are sufficient to provide effective inertial confinement. Thicker
natural-Uranium reflectors (exceeding 10 cm) provide significant additional savings to ordinary critical
assemblies. But the "time absorption" effect inherent to fast exponential chain reactions reduced the
benefits of a thicker reflector. About 20% of the bomb yield was from fast fission of this tamper.
5

With the neutron reflection provided by the tamper the Plutonium core was about 78% of a critical
mass before implosion. An additional margin of safety was provided by the use of a Cadmium wire in
the pit before initiator insertion. When compressed by the implosion to over twice its original density,
the pit became an assembly of some 3-to-4 critical masses.
On the outside surface of the tamper was another measure to improve weapon reliability -- a brown
1/8- inch thick (0.32 cm) layer of neutron-absorbing enriched Boron10 bonded with acrylic
thermoplastic. This feature reduced the neutron background in the core. The very fast spontaneous
fission neutrons originating in the pit assembly had a very short residence time. They would quickly
either be captured in the pit assembly or escape from it. But upon doing so, they would encounter the
thick hydrogen-rich explosive layer which would act as an effective moderator and neutron reflector.
The strongly absorbing Boron captured these slow neutrons before they could be scattered back into the
pit assembly where they would then persist for a relatively long time.
8.1.1.2 The Implosion Assembly
The implosion assembly comprised 3 layers: the outermost explosive lens layer which created the
converging implosion shock wave; an inner booster explosive layer that strengthened the converging
wave, and an Aluminum sphere called the "pusher" which further enhanced the implosion wave. Every
aspect of the implosion assembly had to conform to high standards of precision to ensure a highly
symmetric implosion wave. No more than a 5% variation was tolerable.
The entire high-explosive implosion system (made up of the lens and booster layers) was 17.875
inches (45.4 cm) thick. These layers each consisted of 32 explosive blocks (20 hexagonal and 12
pentagonal blocks) which fitted together in the same pattern as a soccer ball (see Figures 3-7 and 3-8 in
Section 3.2.3.1.1 - Implosion Assembly). The complete spherical explosive assembly was 54.25 inches
(137.8 cm) wide and weighed 5,300 lb (2,400 kg).
Each lens block had 2 components. The body made of high velocity explosive and a parabolic low
velocity explosive focusing element on the inner surface. These pieces formed the lens that shaped a
convex, expanding shock wave into a convex converging one (see Figure 3-6). Each lens block was 9
inches (22.9 cm) thick. The hexagonal lens blocks each weighed about 145 lb (66 kg), each pentagonal
block about 95 lb (43 kg). The complete lens layer weighed about 4,000 lb (1,800 kg).
The lenses were made by precision casting which required explosive mixtures that could be safely
melted. The high-velocity explosive was Composition B ("Comp B") -- a mixture of 60% RDX (a very
high velocity but unmeltable explosive); 39% TNT (a good explosive that melts easily --m.p. 80.35 C);
and 1% wax as a binder. The slower explosive was Baratol. It is a mixture of TNT and Barium Nitrate
of variable composition (TNT is typically 25-33% of the mixture) with 1% wax. The high density of
Barium Nitrate gives Baratol a density of at least 2.5.
The inner layer of explosive blocks had a thickness of 8 7/8 inches (22.5 cm) thick. The hexagonal
blocks each weighed 47 lb (19 kg). Each pentagonal one was 31 lb (14 kg) for a total mass of about
1,300 lb (590 kg).
The entire explosive assembly had to be made to very precise tolerances. The composition and
densities of the explosives had to be accurately controlled and extremely uniform. The pieces had to fit
together with an accuracy of 1/32 of an inch (0.8 mm) to prevent irregularities in the shock wave.
Accurate alignment of the lens surfaces was even more important than a close fit. A great deal of tissue
and blotting paper and adhesive tape was also used to make everything fit snugly together with no air
gaps.
6

To achieve the most precise detonation synchronization possible, conventional detonators (which
consisted of an electrically heated wire) and a sequence of primary and secondary explosives were not
used. Instead, newly-invented exploding wire detonators were used. This detonator consists of a thin
wire that is explosively vaporized by a surge of current generated by a powerful capacitor. The shock
wave of the exploding wire initiates the secondary explosive of the detonator (PETN). The discharge of
the capacitor and the generation of initiating shock waves by the exploding wires can be synchronized to
10 nanoseconds.
A disadvantage of this system is that large batteries, a high voltage power supply, and a very
powerful capacitor bank were needed to explode all 32 detonators simultaneously. A cascade of spark
gap switches was used to trigger the discharge of the capacitor bank. Known as the "X-Unit", this
system weighed 400 lb (180 kg) and was one of the most difficult components to qualify in time for the
second atomic attack.
Surrounding the tamper and Boron-plastic layer was a 4 inch (12.0 cm) thick Aluminum sphere
weighing 130 kg, called the "pusher" replacing a similar thickness of high explosive. This layer of inert
higher density material (a density ratio of 1.64) improved the implosion wave in a number of ways.
Upon encountering the higher density layer, the shock wave slows (which tends to reduce the size of
irregularities that have developed) and creates a partial shock reflection of increased pressure that
propagates outward. This strengthens the implosion wave and reduces the drop in pressure than tends
occurs behind the shock front -- both of which contribute to enhancing the compression of the core. At
this smaller radius, the effect of implosion convergence had concentrated the shock wave energy to the
point that the explosive that was replaced no longer contributed significant amounts of energy to it in
any case.
8.1.1.3 The Explosive Sphere Casing
The development of the casing that held the explosive sphere together progressed independently
from the work on the design of the implosion system itself. (It was taken for granted that whatever the
final design it would be high explosive sphere sized to fit the 59 inch case.) A complex early design
designated the "1222" model involved 12 pentagonal sections of the aluminum alloy Duraluminum
(Dural) inside an icosahedral steel shell, the assembly of which required 1,500 bolts.
This was abandoned in the summer of 1944 in favor of a much simpler system -- the "1561" model.
This consisted of a spherical shell made up of 2 polar caps and 5 equatorial segments of machined Dural
castings which required only 90 bolts for assembly. The overall thickness of the Aluminum was 1 inch.
This sphere was enveloped by an ellipsoidal shell of steel attached at the equator with the tail bolted to
the ellipsoid. The electrical detonating and fusing equipment was mounted on the sphere in the space
between the sphere and the outer ellipsoid.
A layer of -inch thick cork lined the inside of the Aluminum sphere and cushioned and compressed
the explosive sphere, holding the whole implosion system together. The outermost steel shell had a
thickness of 3/8 of an inch. It was intended to be heat-treated steel armor plate but warping during the
heat treatment process caused replacement with a case of ordinary steel.
Both the implosion bomb prototype Gadget and the combat Fat Man bomb were assembled on the
site from separate pieces. The explosive sphere was built up from separate explosive blocks; the tamper
and pusher spheres were lowered in by a small crane; and the pieces of the Dural shell was bolted
together. Due to the complexity of the weapon, this was a process that took at least 2 days (including
checkout procedures).
7

The final bomb design after Fat Man allowed "trap door" assembly. The entire bomb was
assembled ahead of time except for the pit assembly. To complete the bomb, one of the domed caps was
removed along with one of the explosive lenses and inner explosive blocks. The initiator was inserted
between the Plutonium hemispheres and the assembled pit was inserted in a 40 kg Uranium cylinder that
slid into the tamper to make the complete core. The explosive block and lens were replaced; its
detonator wires attached; and the cap bolted back into place.
Safety was a serious problem for Fat Man though -- in a comparison of worst case accidents -- not
as serious a problem as it was for Little Boy. The critical mass of the Uranium reflected core in the
delta phase was 7.5 kg. But only 5.5 kg in the alpha phase. Any accidental detonation of the high
explosive (in a fire or plane crash for example) would be certain to collapse the 6.2 kg delta phase core
to the supercritical alpha phase state.
The expected yield from the explosion would range from on the order of tens of tons (roughly a
factor of 10 higher than the energy of the high explosive itself) to perhaps as high as hundreds of tons.
The main hazard would be from gamma radiation however, which would be deadly well outside the
main area of blast effects. A 2- ton explosion would produce a lethal 640 cSv prompt gamma radiation
exposure 250 m from the bomb!
8.1.2 TRINITY - The Gadget Test
The test of the first atomic explosion in history was conducted at the Jornada del Muerto trail
(Journey of Death) at the Alamagordo Bombing Range in New Mexico at 33 deg. 40' 31" North
Latitude, 106 deg. 28' 29" West Longitude (33.675 deg. N, 106.475 deg W). The device was called
Gadget; the whole test operation was codenamed TRINITY.
Gadget was a 150 cm sphere consisting of the basic explosive assembly described above with its
Dural shell. The firing electronics and equipment were mounted externally on the test platform which
was atop a 100 foot steel tower, giving Gadget an elevation of 4,624 ft above sea level.
The assembly of 'Gadget' took 5 days and began on July 11, 1945. By July 13, the assembly of
Gadget's explosive lens, Uranium reflector, and Plutonium core were completed at Ground Zero. On
July 14, Gadget was hoisted to the top of the 100 foot test tower and the detonators were connected,
after which final test preparations began.
On July 16, 1945, 5:29:45 a.m. (Mountain War Time), Gadget was detonated. The explosive yield
was 20-22 kt (by latest estimates), vaporizing the steel tower. Since the bomb was exploded above the
ground, it produced only a very shallow crater (mainly created by compression of the soil) -- 2 meters
deep with an 80 m radius. The crater was surrounded by fused (melted) sand dubbed "trinitite" (or
"atomsite"). The exact yield was originally placed at 18.6-kt on the basis of radiochemical tests. Since
the projected yield was only 5-10 kt, many of the experiments were damaged or destroyed by the test
and failed to yield useful (or any) data.
Gadget was exploded close enough to the ground that considerable local fallout was generated
(along with significant induced radioactivity at ground zero from the emitted neutrons). The most
intense induced radiation was in an irregular circle about 10 m in radius around ground zero. The cloud
rose to 11,000 m. The wind was blowing to the northeast. But significant fallout did not descend for
about 20 km downwind.

The heaviest fallout was detected about 20 miles northeast of ground zero. In this area, radiation
levels recorded along U.S. Highway 380 for a distance of 10 miles reached "approximately 50 R total."
Also in this area was a site dubbed "Hot Canyon". The canyon was 5 miles east of the town of
Bingham, 1.1 miles east of a road junction. This is a summary of radiation levels:
15.0 R/hr at 0300 hours after zero
14.0 R/hr at 0330 hours
6.0 R/hr at 0830 hours
0.6 R/hr at 3600 hours
The total exposure as this site was 212-to-230 R.
Some evacuations were conducted the path of the fallout plume out to 30 km. At Bingham, New
Mexico, gamma intensities of 1.5 R/hr were recorded between 2 and 4 hours after the test. South of
Bingham readings reached 15 R/hr but declined to 3.8 R/hr 5 hours after the detonation, and had
decreased to less than 0.032 R/hr one month later.
0.9 miles east of "Hot Canyon" was a house containing the Raitliff family consisting of 2 adults and
a child. Levels at this location were "0.4 R/hr at 3600 hours after zero and after a rain. Accumulated
total dose 57-60 R." Also nearby was another house with a couple named Wilson. None of these people
were evacuated.
Radiation (beta) burns were later observed on cattle in the general vicinity of the test. The main
fallout pattern extended about 160 km from ground zero and was about 50 km wide.
8.1.3 Little Boy
The design of Little Boy was completely different from Gadget/Fat Man. It used the gun assembly
method that had originally been proposed for the Plutonium bomb. The development of the Uranium
gun weapon was somewhat erratic. Early design and experimental work directed towards developing a
gun system for Uranium assembly was conducted during the summer and fall of 1943 after Los Alamos
began operating. It was soon discontinued as attention shifted to the technically more demanding
Plutonium gun. It was felt that once the Plutonium gun was successfully developed, the Uranium gun
would be almost an afterthought since the necessary speed of assembly was much lower.
When the very high neutron emission rate of reactor-produced Plutonium was discovered in AprilJuly 1944, the gun method was abandoned for Plutonium and serious attention returned to the Uranium
gun. The Uranium gun program (the O-1 group of the Ordnance Division) was lead by A. Francis Birch.
He faced an odd combination of considerations in directing the work. The system was straightforward
to develop. Sufficient U235 to build the bomb obviously wouldn't be available until mid-1945, if then.
Birch was nonetheless under a great deal of pressure to complete development as quickly as possible
so that all of the laboratory's assets could be directed to the risky implosion bomb. Furthermore since
the feasibility of the Plutonium bomb was now in doubt, he had to make absolutely sure that the
Uranium bomb would work. Thus although it was a comparatively easy project technically, it still
required extraordinary attention to detail. Thus despite being straightforward technically, the program
still required extraordinary attention to detail. The design arrived at was a very conservative one. The
principle risk was whether the fuzing system with trigger the bomb at the appropriate time.
9

Three 6.5-inch (165 mm) smooth-bore gun tubes with 2-inch (5.08 cm) thick walls and designed for
a maximum pressure of 40,000 psi (2,700 bar) were ordered in March 1944 and received in October.
Proof firings -- consisting of firing a 200 lb (90 kg) projectile at 1,000 ft/sec (300 m/sec) 2-or-3 times
from each tube -- were conducted in December. To hold weight down, the tubes were not designed for
many repeated firings, unlike conventional artillery.
The gun tubes were 6-feet (1.8 m) long and weighed about 1,000 pounds (450 kg) -- little more than
10 percent of the final bomb weight. Far more massive -- weighing in at over 5,000 pounds (2,300 kg)
-- was the high alloy steel case forging that held the target assembly. The target case measuring 28
inches (71 cm) wide and 36 inches (91 cm) long was screwed on to the end of barrel (lest recoil from the
guns firing pull them apart) and had to absorb the full momentum of the projectile and bring it to rest
without cracking or deforming. The target case that was used in Little Boy was the first one ever made.
Which surprisingly had proved also to be the best ever made. It had been used in 4 proof-test firings
without damage before its use in combat.
Inside the target case was a cavity that held the cylindrical Tungsten Carbide tamper -- 13 inches (33
cm) wide and long and weighing 680 pounds (310 kg). The tamper acted as a neutron reflector,
increasing the effective the number of critical masses in the Uranium core. And with a density of 14.8, it
also served as an inertial tamper to hold the core together as long as possible to increase the explosive
yield. When fully assembled, the Uranium core resided in a 6.5-inch wide (16.5 cm) cylindrical cavity
surrounded by a 3.25-inch (8.255 cm) thick layer of Tungsten Carbide.
The choice of Tungsten Carbide as a tamper instead of the natural-Uranium used in Fat Man was
dictated by the need to keep neutrons out of the assembly. U 238 undergoes spontaneous fission 100 times
more frequently than U235. And a piece large enough to be useful as a tamper (200 kg) would generate
3,400 neutrons a second. Too many for gun assembly to be feasible.
The enriched-Uranium core (weighing 64.15 kg fully assembled) was divided 40/60 between the
target insert (25.6 kg) and the hollow core in the projectile (38.53 kg). The hollow core was slightly less
than 6.5 inches wide (16.5 cm) and 7 inches long (17.8 cm). It was fabricated as a stack of 9 rings of
varying thickness with a 4-inch (10.2 cm) inside diameter. The target insert was a cylinder 4 inches
(10.2 cm) wide and 7 inches long (17.8 cm) also made up of a stack of rings. The 6 target insert rings
had a 1-inch inside diameter to accommodate a rod that held the stack together.
With an enrichment of around 80%, the spontaneous fission rate in the 64 kg of Uranium amounted
to 79 fissions/second -- only 1/6th of the limit previously established for Thin Man. The assembly
velocity was reduced to 1/3 of requirement for the Plutonium gun, and even with the larger Uranium
core (which gave a greater assembly distance) the chance of predetonation was still significantly
reduced. Since the mass of a gun varies with the square of its velocity to the 1/3 reduction in velocity
allowed a potential decrease in gun mass to only 1/9th of the original design. In fact, the mass of the
final gun was greater than this, providing an increased margin of reliability.
Both the target insert and uranium projectile were backed by disks of Tungsten Carbide reflector 6.5
inches wide and 3.25 inches thick The projectile consisted of the Uranium core and Carbide reflector
disk packed in a steel sheet can with a wall thickness of 0.0625 inches (1.59 mm) thick along with the 6inch (15.2 cm) long steel projectile body. The projectile body was equipped with brass bands to provide
the gas-tight seal with the smooth-bore barrel. The complete weight of the projectile was 190 pounds
(86 kg).
When the projectile united with insert, the impact drove the assembled core and the Tungsten
Carbide disk backing the target against a malleable steel disk (the anvil) mounted inside the target
10

case. It was the anvils job to deform, spreading out like a pancake, thus cushioning the impact and
absorbing the bulk of the projectiles kinetic energy. Its momentum was absorbed by the massive target
case. The engineering design of the complete bomb (designated "Model 1850") was complete by
February 1945. Only preparations for field use were required after that. The actual bomb was ready for
combat use by early May 1945 except for the U235 core which waited on deliveries of enriched-Uranium.
The complete weapon was 28 inches in diameter, 126 inches long, and weighed 8900 lb. The target
case and tamper and the gun barrel accounted for nearly all of 'Little Boys length and 3/4 of its weight.
Most of the remaining weight was in the steel plates that stretched back from where they joined the
target case to form the hollow bomb body. A 1-inch (2.54 cm) thick, 27.25 inch wide (69.2 cm) steel
bulkhead disk slid over the rear of the gun barrel to create the aft end of the bomb body. 5 steel plates
were bolted between the bulkhead and target case to form a compartment around the barrel. Inside this
compartment was the fuzing system (the electrical and mechanical components required to detonate the
bomb).
Little Boy used the same air burst detonator system as Fat Man (see below). Essentially all the
enriched-Uranium on hand was used to fabricate the weapon core. Since deliveries had taken place over
about a 7-month period with varying degrees of enrichment, the material varied in quality. It was
important to place the most highly-enriched material in the center of the core where the neutron flux
would be highest. So the target insert was fabricated last using the latest and most highly enriched
shipments. The insert was completed on July 24, the projectile having been cast in pieces from June 15
to July 3. The insert had an enrichment of 86%. The projectile was enriched to 82% for an average
enrichment for the core of 83.5% -- equal to slightly more than 3 critical masses.
At the bottom of the core cavity, one-or-more Beryllium/Polonium "Abner" initiators (different from
the implosion initiators -- simpler in design and with less Polonium) could be mounted. Even if the
neutron initiator failed to work, the bomb would have exploded from spontaneous fission in a fraction of
a second. The decision to include initiators in the final weapon wasnt finalized by Oppenheimer until
March 15, 1945. In the end, 4 initiators out of a batch of 16 shipped to Tinian were used in Little Boy.
These were fastened radially around the target assembly.
Little Boy was a terribly unsafe weapon design. Once the propellant was loaded, anything that
ignited it would cause a full-yield explosion. For this reason, "Deke" Parsons -- acting as weaponeer -decided to place the cordite in the gun after take-off in case a crash and fire occurred. It is possible that
a violent crash (or accidental drop) could have driven the bullet into the target even without the
propellant causing anything from a fizzle (a few tons yield) to a full yield explosion.
Little Boy also presented a hazard if it fell into water. Since it contained nearly 3 critical masses
with only air space separating them, water entering the weapon would have acted as a moderator,
possibly making the weapon critical. A high-yield explosion would not have occurred. But a rapid
melt-down or explosive fizzle and possible violent dispersal of radioactive material could have resulted.
The complete weapon was 126 inches long, 28 inches in diameter, and weighed 8900 lb. Little Boy
used the same air burst detonator system as Fat Man (see below).
No other weapon of this design was ever detonated. Only 5 other Little Boy units were built. But
no others entered the U.S. arsenal. It appears that not even one additional complete set of components
required to assemble a combat-ready weapon were ever procured.
The first U235 projectile component was completed at Los Alamos on June 15, 1945. Casting of the
U235 projectile for Little Boy was completed on July 3. On July 14, Little Boy bomb units accompanied
11

by the U235 projectile were shipped out of San Francisco. They were picked up by the USS Indianapolis
(CA-35) at the U.S. Navy's Hunter's Point shipyard at San Francisco on July 16, bound for Tinian Island
in the Mariana Islands. On July 24, the last component for Little Boy -- the U235 target insert -- was
completed and was tested the next day. The Indianapolis delivered Little Boy bomb units and the U235
projectile to Tinian on July 26. On the same day, the target assembly -- divided into 3 parts -- flew out
of Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque on three C-54 transport planes which arrived July 28 at Tinian.
Bomb unit L11 was selected for combat use. On July 31, the U 235 projectile and target were installed
along with 4 initiators, making Little Boy ready for use the next day. An approaching typhoon required
postponing the planned attack of Hiroshima on Aug. 1. Several days are required for weather to clear
and on Aug. 4, the date was set for 2 days later. On August 5, Tibbets named B-29 No. 82 the Enola
Gay after his mother over the objections of its pilot Robert Lewis. Little Boy was loaded on the plane
the same day.
August 6, 1945 * 0000, final briefing, the target of choice is Hiroshima. Tibbets is pilot, Lewis is copilot.
* 0245, Enola Gay begins takeoff roll.
* 0730, the bomb is armed.
* 0850, Flying at 31,000 ft, Enola Gay crosses Shikoku due east of Hiroshima.
* Bombing conditions are good, the aimpoint is easily visible, no opposition is encountered.
* 0916:02 (8:16:02 Hiroshima time) Little Boy explodes at an altitude of 190050 feet (580
m), 550 feet from the aim point (the Aioi Bridge) with a yield of 12-18 kt (the yield is
uncertain due partly from the absence of any instrumented test with this weapon
design). A state-of-the-art, 6-year study ending in 1987 which used all available
evidence set the yield at 15 kt (20%).
Due partly from the absence of any instrumented test with this weapon design, the yield of this
explosion has been subject to a wide range of estimates over the years, ranging from a low of 12.5 kT up
to 18 kT. The most thorough analyses have typically placed the yield at 15-to-16 kT. Finally a
definitive determination was arrived at in 2002 after nearly 60 years of investigation from a meticulous
study of the radiation field produced by the bomb. The revised burst altitude is 20 meters higher that
previously believed and is now precisely 600 meters. The yield of the explosion is now confirmed at 16
kT.
The yield of Little Boy had been predicted before delivery at 13.4 kt, and the burst height was set at
1,850 ft. Using the 15-kt figure, the actual burst height was optimum for a blast pressure of about 12 psi
(i.e., it maximized the area subjected to a 12 psi or greater overpressure). To inflict damage on a city, a
blast pressure of 5 psi is sufficient. So greater damage would have resulted from an optimum burst
height of 2,700 ft. Due to the uncertainty in predicting yield and the fact that bursting too high causes a
rapid deterioration in effects, the burst height had been set conservatively low in case a low yield
explosion occurred. The 1,900 foot burst height is optimal for a 5-kt weapon. The burst height was
sufficient to prevent any significant fallout over Japan.

12

8.1.4 Fat Man

The combat configuration for the implosion bomb (the Model 1561) basically consisted of the
Gadget device encapsulated in a steel armor egg. The 2 steel half-ellipsoids were bolted to the dural
equatorial band of the explosive assembly with the necessary X-Unit, batteries, and fuzing and firing
electronics located in the front and aft shell. For use in combat, each Fat Man bomb required assembly
almost from scratch -- a demanding and time consuming job. Assembly of a Fat Man bomb was (and
may still be) the most complex field preparation operation for any weapon ever made.
Like Little Boy, Fat Man was fuzed by 4 radar units called "Archies", the antennas for which were
mounted on the tail of the bomb. Developed originally as fighter tail warning systems, these units
measured the bomb's height above the ground and were set to detonate at a pre-calculated altitude (set to
1,850 100 ft). A barometric switch acted as a "fail-safe", preventing detonation until the bomb had
fallen below 7,000'.
Fat Man was 60 inches in diameter, 12 feet long, and weighed 10,300 lb.
The Fat Man Plutonium core and its initiator left Kirtland Air Force Base for Tinian Island on July
26, 1945 in a C-54 transport plane. It arrived on Tinian on July 28. Also on July 28, 3 speciallymodified B-29s flew from Kirtland Field carrying 3 Fat Man bomb assemblies including units F-31 and
F-32, each encased in an outer ballistic shell. These arrived at Tinian on August 2 -- the first Fat Man
units to do so. The bombing date was set for August 11 at this time with Kokura as the target.
Assembly of practice (non-nuclear) weapons began shortly afterward with the first completed bomb
(Fat Man unit F33) ready on Aug. 5. On August 7, a forecast of 5 days of bad weather around the 11 th
moved the bombing date up to August 10, then to August 9. This compressed the bomb assembly
schedule so much that many check-out procedures had to be skipped during assembly. On August 8, the
assembly of Fat Man unit F31 with the Plutonium core was completed in the early morning. At 2200,
'Fat Man' was loaded on the B-29 "Bock's Car".
August 9, 1945 * 0347, Bock's Car takes off from Tinian, the target of choice is Kokura Arsenal. Charles
Sweeney is pilot. Soon after takeoff, he discovers that the fuel system will not pump
from the 600 gallon reserve tank.
* 1044, Bock's Car arrives at Kokura but finds it covered by haze; the aimpoint cannot be
seen. Flak and fighters appear, forcing the plane to stop searching. Sweeney turns
toward Nagasaki -- the only secondary target in range.
* Upon arriving at Nagasaki, Bock's Car has enough fuel for only one pass over the city even
with an emergency landing at Okinawa. Nagasaki is covered with clouds. But one gap
allows a drop several miles from the intended aimpoint.
* 11:02 (Nagasaki time) Fat Man explodes at 1650 33 feet (503 m) near the perimeter of
the city with a yield of 222 kt. Due to the hilly terrain around ground zero, 5 shock
waves were felt in the aircraft (the initial shock and 4 reflections).
Although Fat Man fell on the border of an uninhabited area, the eventual casualties still exceeded
70,000. Also, ground zero turned out to be the Mitsubishi Arms Manufacturing Plant -- the major
military target in Nagasaki. It was utterly destroyed.

13

The 1987 reassessment of the Japanese bombings placed the yield at 21-kt. At the extreme estimate
ranges for Little Boy and Fat Man (low for Little Boy, high for Fat Man), a ratio of nearly 2-to-1 has
been implied. The 1987 best estimate figures make Fat Man only about 40% larger than Little Boy
(and possibly as little as 15% more).
Using the 21-kt figure, the optimal burst height for Fat Man would have been about 3,100 feet. The
actual burst height was optimal for 15 psi overpressure. The burst height was sufficient to prevent any
fallout over Japan.
8.1.5 Availability of Additional Bombs
The date that a 3rd weapon could have been used against Japan was no later than August 20. The
core was prepared by August 13 and Fat Man assemblies were already on Tinian Island. It would have
required less than a week to ship the core and prepare a bomb for combat.
By mid-1945, the production of atomic weapons was a problem for industrial engineering rather than
scientific research although scientific work continued -- primarily toward improving the bomb designs.
The 3 reactors (B and D which went started up for production in December 1944 and F which started
up February 1945) at Hanford had a combined design thermal output of 750 megawatts and were
theoretically capable of producing 19.4 kg of Plutonium a month (6.5 kg/reactor) -- enough for over 3
'Fat Man' bombs. Monthly or annual production figures are unavailable for 1945 and 1946. But by the
end of FY 1947 (June 30, 1947), 493 kg of Plutonium had been produced. Neglecting the startup month
of each reactor, this indicates an average Plutonium production 5.6 kg/reactor even though they were
operated at reduced power or even shut down intermittently beginning in 1946.
Enriched-Uranium production is more difficult to summarize since there were 3 different enrichment
processes in use that had interconnected production. The Y-12 plant calutrons also had reached
maximum output early in 1945. But the amount of weapon-grade Uranium this translates into varies
depending on the enrichment of the feedstock. Initially, this was natural-Uranium giving a production of
weapon-grade Uranium of some 6 kg/month. But soon, the S-50 thermal diffusion plant began feeding
0.89% enriched-Uranium, followed by 1.1% enriched feed from the K-25 gaseous diffusion plant.
The established production process was then thermal diffusion (to 0.89%) gaseous diffusion (to
1.1%) alpha calutron (to 20%) beta calutron (up to 89%). Of these 3 plants, the K-25 plant had by
far the greatest separation capacity and as it progressively came on line throughout 1945 the importance
of the other plants decreased. When enough stages had been added to K-25 to allow 20% enrichment,
the alpha calutrons were slated to be shut down even if the War continued.
After Japan's surrender in August 1945, S-50 was shut down. The alpha calutrons followed in
September. But K-25 was complete on August 15 and these shutdowns would have occurred in any
case. At this point, gaseous diffusion was incapable of producing weapon-grade Uranium. A planned
"top plant" had been cancelled in favor of more beta calutrons. An expansion of K-25 (called K-27) to
produce a larger flow of 20% enriched feed was under construction and due to go in full operation by
February 1, 1946. In October, production had increased to 32 kg of U235 per month.
In November and December, additional beta tracks went on line and the percentage of downtime for
all beta tracks fell, boosting production further. Between October 1945 and June 1946, these
improvements led to a 117% increase in output at Oak Ridge to about 69 kg of U235 per month.

14

It is very unlikely any more Little Boy-type bombs would have been used even if the War continued.
Little Boy was very inefficient, and it required a large critical mass. If the U 235 were used in a Fat
Man-type bomb, the efficiency would have been increased by more than an order of magnitude. The
smaller critical mass (15 kg) meant more bombs could be built. Oppenheimer suggested to Gen. Groves
on July 19, 1945 (immediately after the Trinity test) that the U 235 from Little Boy be reworked into
Uranium/Plutonium composite cores for making more implosion bombs (4 implosion bombs could be
made from 'Little Boy's pit). Groves rejected the idea since it would delay combat use.
The improved composite core weapon was in full development at Los Alamos when the War ended.
It combined 2 innovations: (a) a composite pit containing both U 235 and Pu239 and (b) core levitation
which allowed the imploding tamper to accelerate across an air gap before striking the pit, creating
shock waves that propagated inward and outward simultaneously for more rapid and even compression.
The composite pit had several advantages over using the materials separately:
A single design could be used employing both of the available weapon materials.
Using U235 with Plutonium reduced the amount of Plutonium and thus the neutron
background while requiring a smaller critical mass than U235 alone.
The levitated pit design achieved greater compression densities. This permitted using 25% less than
fissile material for the same yield (or a doubled yield with the same amount of material).
Production estimates given to Sec. Stimson in July 1945 projected a second Plutonium bomb would
be ready by Aug. 24; that 3 bombs should be available in September and more each month reaching 7or-more in December. Improvements in bomb design being prepared at the end of the War would have
permitted one bomb to be produced for every 5 kg of Plutonium or 12 kg of Uranium in output. These
improvements were apparently taken into account in this estimate. Assuming these bomb improvements
were used, the October capacity would have permitted up to 6 bombs a month. Note that with the peak
monthly Plutonium and HEU production figures (19.4 kg and 69 kg respectively), production of close to
10 bombs a month was possible.
When the War ended on August 15, 1945, there was an abrupt change in priorities so that a wartime
development and production schedule did not continue. Development of the levitated pit/composite core
bomb ground to a halt immediately. It did not enter the U.S. arsenal until the late 1940s. Plans to
increase initiator production to 10 times the July 1945 level were abandoned.
Fissile material production continued unabated after the S-50 and alpha calutron shutdowns though
the fall. But Plutonium shipments from Hanford were halted, and Plutonium nitrate concentrates were
stockpiled there.
In early 1946, K-25 and K-27 were reconfigured to produce weapon-grade Uranium directly. But
the extremely costly Y-12 beta tracks continued to operate until the end of 1946. By that time, Y-12 had
separated about 1,000 kg of weapon-grade Uranium. From this point on, gaseous diffusion enrichedUranium was the mainstay of weapon-grade fissile material production in the U.S., dwarfing Plutonium
production until highly-enriched Uranium production for weapons use was halted in 1964.
The Hanford reactors accumulated unexpected neutron irradiation damage (the Wigner effect). In
1946, they were shut down or operated at reduced power. If war had continued, they both would have
been pushed to continue full production regardless of cost or risk.
15

The effects of these priority changes can be seen in the post war stockpile. Although Los Alamos
had 60 'Fat Man' units (that is, the non-nuclear components to assemble complete Fat Man bombs) on
hand in October 1945, the U.S. arsenal after had only 9 actual Fat Man-type bombs in July 1946 with
initiators for only 7 of them. In July 1947, the arsenal had increased to 13 bombs. There was probably
sufficient fissile material on hand for over 100 bombs, though.

8.2 - The First Hydrogen Bombs

The discovery of fusion reactions arose early in the 20 th Century out of the growing understanding of
atomic physics. By the early 1920s, it was realized that Hydrogen fusion was the source of the Sun's
power output although the details were still obscure. This work culminated in the paper published by
Hans Bethe in Physical Review in 1939 describing the role of fusion reactions in the Sun, for which he
received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1967.
8.2.1 Early Research on Fusion Weapons
The possibility of creating weapons employing fusion reactions was not seriously considered until
the discovery of fission. Almost immediately, physicists around the World realized that fission
explosions generating high temperatures might be possible. But a few years passed before the idea of
using these temperatures to ignite fusion reactions was suggested. Tokutaro Hagiwara at the University
of Kyoto proposed this idea in a speech in May 1941, apparently the first such mention.
While working on atomic bomb research a few months later in September 1941, Enrico Fermi muses
to Edward Teller ("out of the blue") whether a fission explosion could ignite a fusion reaction in
Deuterium. After some study, Teller concluded that it is impossible and although no further work on the
subject followed for a while, this conversation began Teller's eventual obsession with fusion bombs.
[In The Making of the Atomic Bomb (1986), Richard Rhodes reported that Tokutaro Hagiwara at
the University of Kyoto was the first person to conceive of igniting a thermonuclear reaction
based on a single statement translated from a hand-written summary of a speech given by
Hagiwara on May 123, 941. The statement read: "If by any chance U 235 could be
manufactured in a large quantity and of proper concentration, U235 has a great possibility of
becoming useful as the initiating matter for a quantity of Hydrogen."
Hagiwara himself never claimed any credit for conceiving this and in June 1999, a copy
of the original speech was obtained from Hagiwara's daughter. Upon examination, it was
discovered that a kanji character substitution had occurred in hand-copying the original
speech text, changing "super" to "initiating". The actual text stated: "If in some way it
becomes possible to manufacture a fairly large amount of U 235 and mix it with a suitably
concentrated Hydrogen on an appropriate scale, the U 235 is expected to have a high
probability of causing a super explosion." This refers to the incorrect idea that an atomic
explosion requires a moderator, which was held by many early investigators of atomic
weapons.
-- Shuji Fukui, Tetsuji Imanaka, James C. Warf, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56,
No. 4, July/August 2000, p. 5, 65.
Historical footnote: During World War II, the idea occurred in Germany that convergent shock
waves and collapsing shells might focus enough energy to allow conventional high
explosives to ignite limited fusion reactions. This idea was probably inspired by Gudderly's
work in converging shock waves and certainly by the Allied attempts to destroy the heavywater plant at Vemork, Norway. Since German physicists considered fission weapons to be
16

beyond reach during the current war, they concluded that the Allied interest in heavy-water
must be due its application in high-explosive weapons. The Germans actually checked
craters left by the British "Grand Slam" (the largest conventional bomb dropped during the
War) to discover whether its unusual power was due to fusion boosting. Polish researchers in
the 1960s and 1970s reported actually generating fusion neutrons through convergent shock
waves. Although the theoretical possibility remains, no one has apparently ever released
significant amounts of energy this way.]
Research into the possibility of fusion weapons took an irregular and halting journey from the time
of Fermi and Teller's conversation until bombs were actually built in the early 1950s. During WW II,
there was an initial surge of interest once fission bomb physics was fairly well understood. After
preliminary theoretical investigation, it was realized that much better experimental data was needed and
a fusion research program was included in the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos.
Continuing theoretical investigations took repeated turns towards optimism then pessimism
and back again. As the difficulty of the enterprise came clear, its priority was steadily downgraded.
Teller on the other hand grew so captivated by the problem that he became unable to fulfill his duties at
Los Alamos. He was relieved of all technical leadership responsibilities and was eventually transferred
to a separate study group to prevent him from interfering in the work of others on the atomic bomb.
During July-September 1942, Oppenheimer's theoretical study group (Oppenheimer, Bethe, Teller,
John Van Vleck, Felix Bloch, Robert Serber, and Emil Konopinski) in Berkeley examined the principles
of atomic bomb design and also considered the feasibility of fusion bombs. Megaton-range fusion
bombs were considered highly likely.
April, 1943 - During the initial organization effort at Los Alamos, Bethe is selected over Teller to
head the Theoretical Division. Teller is soon placed in charge of lower priority research on
fusion weapon design (designated the 'Super') but remains responsible for much theoretical
work on the fission weapon as well.
February, 1944 - The Los Alamos Governing Board reevaluates Deuterium fusion research and
determines that Tritium would be necessary to make an explosive reaction. Priority of fusion
bomb work is further downgraded.
May, 1944 - Teller is removed entirely from the Theoretical Division to prevent his interference with
fission bomb work. He is placed in charge of a small independent group for fusion research.
At the end of the War, most of Los Alamos' scientific and technical talent -- and virtually all of its
leadership -- left for civilian careers. Teller was among those who left. For a period of time, very little
progress on weapon research of any kind occurred. A conference chaired by Teller was held in April
1946 to review the wartime progress on the Super.
The design at that time was for a gun-type Uranium fission bomb to be surrounded by about a cubic
meter of liquid Deuterium with the whole assembly being encased in a heavy tamper. A large-butundetermined amount of Tritium would be required to ignite the reaction. If the amount of Tritium
required was too large, then the bomb would be impractical. Since the fusion of one T atom releases 8%
the energy of the fission of a Pu239 atom with which it competes for neutrons in production reactors, the
energy boost from D+D fusion must be considerably more than a factor of 10 greater than that released
by the Tritium starter fuel before the Super could be worthwhile.

17

The assessment at the time of the conference was that the Super was basically sound, but that more
detailed calculations would be required verify it. Also present at the conference was Klaus Fuchs who
was spying for the Soviet Union. The Soviets thus were well informed about American interest and
optimism about fusion weapons.
In mid-1946, Teller developed an idea he called the Alarm Clock. This involved the use of fusion
fuel (specifically Lithium6 Deuteride) inside a Uranium tamper of an implosion fission bomb. The idea
was that the fission neutrons would breed Tritium form the Lithium. And fission energy would
compress and heat the fusion fuel and ignite a reaction. A fusion-fission chain reaction would then
proceed between the fusion fuel and tamper until the bomb disassembled.
By the end of 1946, Teller thought the Alarm Clock idea unpromising. In his September 1947
memorandum "On the Development of Thermonuclear Bombs", he was pessimistic about Alarm
Clock's potential but felt that it -- like the Super -- were possible and required further study. Due to
limitations in computing devices then available, he proposed delaying further work on both approaches
for 2 years. If work had proceeded on the Alarm Clock design at this time, the U.S. could probably have
tested a device similar to Joe-4 (see below) before the end of 1949.
In the 4 years following the end of the War, about 50% of the Los Alamos Theoretical Division's
effort went into studying the 'Super' although its size and talent were much reduced from wartime levels.
The absence of good calculating machines hampered the massive numerical computations that were
required and greatly slowed progress.
By 1949, the Cold War was in full swing with the Berlin blockade and Communist governments
seizing control throughout Eastern Europe. This included Teller's homeland of Hungary where much of
his family still lived. Early in the summer of 1949, he thus rejoined Los Alamos to pursue the 'Super'.
On August 29, the first Soviet atomic bomb (codenamed "RDS-1" and called Joe-1 by U.S. Intelligence)
was exploded, thus breaking the U.S. nuclear weapon monopoly.
Up to this time, the more detailed work on the classical Super design had showed that it was
marginal at best. The large amounts of Tritium required made it extremely expensive for the yield
produced. And it was not even certain that the design would work at all. Teller remained optimistic,
however. During the next few months, Robert Oppenheimer -- as head of the Atomic Energy
Commission's General Advisory Council (GAC) -- consistently opposed accelerating work on the Super
due to its demonstrated shortcomings.
Despite this, on January 31, 1950 Pres. Truman announced that the U.S. would proceed to develop
Hydrogen bombs. A couple of weeks after Truman's announcement, Teller issued a 72-page update of
"On the Development of Thermonuclear Bombs". In this paper, he again regarded both the Super and
Alarm Clock as viable candidates for weapons development. But he again proposed delaying decision
on full scale development of either for another 2 years.
At this time, Soviet research on the subject was already well underway, focusing on the SakharovGinsberg version of the Alarm Clock concept which they called the Layer Cake. A special department
was set up in March 1950 to proceed with actual Layer Cake weapon development.
By February 1950, immediately after Truman's decision, Stanislaw Ulam had discovered by hand
calculation that even more immense amounts of Tritium than previously believed would be necessary for
the Super to have any chance of success. When Ulam and Cornelius Everett completed more detailed
computations on June 16, the design even these huge amounts of Tritium appeared to be inadequate.
18

Additional analysis by Ulam and Enrico Fermi nailed the coffin shut on the classical Super. When
John Von Neumann's newly-invented ENIAC computer began doing extensive calculations on the
problem later in the year, the negative results were simply piling more dirt on the grave. Until early
1951, real progress on Hydrogen bomb development was impossible because no one knew how to
proceed.
8.2.2 Design and Testing of the First Fusion Weapons
In January 1951, Ulam broke the barrier to progress by inventing the idea of staging -- i.e., using the
energy released by an atomic bomb primary to compress an external fuel capsule. He initially developed
the idea as a means to create improved fission bombs, the second stage being a mass of fissionable
material. By late in the month, he realized that the powerful compression that was possible would
overcome the obstacles to efficient large scale fusion reactions. By multiple staging, bombs of virtually
unlimited size could be created.
This key idea was not sufficient by itself. Before a workable design could be developed, a scheme
was needed for generating efficient compression using this energy flux as was a means for igniting the
fuel once it was compressed. Ulam's idea was to use the neutron flux or the hydrodynamic shock wave
of the expanding bomb core to achieve compression.
Working with Ulam, Teller added additional refinements to this insight during the month of
February. Teller's principal contribution during this period was realizing that the thermal radiation flux
from the primary was a more promising means of generating the necessary implosive forces. On March
9, 1951, Ulam and Teller jointly wrote a report "On Heterocatalytic Detonations I. Hydrodynamic
Lenses and Radiation Mirrors" that summarized these ideas.
From this point on, Teller increasingly began to claim exclusive credit for the breakthrough and
eventually came to deny that Ulam had made any original or significant contribution.
Later in March, Teller added an important additional element to the radiation implosion scheme.
Adapting Ulam's idea to use staged implosion to trigger a fission reaction, Teller suggested placing a
fissile mass in the center of the fusion fuel. The convergent shock wave would compress this to
supercriticality upon arriving at the center, making it act as a "spark plug" to ignite the fusion reaction.
This idea is perhaps not strictly necessary. The convergent shock wave will generate very high
temperatures in the center any way and might suffice to initiate fusion as it does in modern laboratory
inertial confinement fusion experiments.
Since the continuing compression on the fusion fuel would act to confine the fission spark plug, this
final combined design concept was termed the "equilibrium thermonuclear". Teller wrote this idea up in
a report on April 4, 1951.
It was only in April 1951 that the necessary physical principles were in hand to allow the
development and testing of an actual Hydrogen bomb to go forward. More computations were required
to design the device than for any other project in human History up to this point (made possible by the
recent invention of the programmable computer). The elapsed time from this point until the detonation
of the 'Mik' device was less than 19 months. An achievement as remarkable in its own way as the
Manhattan Project.
In April 1951, experiments with fusion reactions and atomic bombs were already being prepared by
the U.S. as part of the Greenhouse test series including a test of the idea of fusion boosting. The
Greenhouse George test in particular provided a valuable opportunity to evaluate the Teller-Ulam ideas
19

by allowing the observation of radiation effects in heating and compressing (although not imploding) an
external mass of fusion fuel.
Since there are several known designs for incorporating fusion reactions into weapons, we come to a
question that is largely a matter of definition: Which design qualifies as a *true* Hydrogen bomb? I
will not try to debate this issue here (see Section 11 - Questions and Answers). Instead, I am including
descriptions of all of the significant tests that lead to the development and deployment of early
thermonuclear weapons.
The tests are listed in chronological order. Each is followed by a brief discussion of its significance
to weapons development.
Greenhouse George
Detonated 5/9/51 at 0930 (local time) on a 200 ft tower on Ebireru/Ruby island at Eniwetok atoll.
Total yield: 225 kt
George was a test of a pure fission bomb and the highest yield bomb tested up to that time. The
bomb was a cylindrical implosion U235 bomb, perhaps based on a design by physicist George
Gamow. [StealthSkater note: Gamow predicted the 3-deg microwave background noise after
the Big Bang. Decades later, his calculations were proved correct by measurements from the
COBE satellite. He also proposed the "quantum tunneling" mechanism by which quantumsized particles can evade large energy barriers by "tunneling" through them. Macroscopic
quantum tunneling may also be possible -- see doc pdf URL . Michio Kaku said that it is
possible that Gamow was never nominated for a Nobel Prize because he liked to write
children's books as a hobby.]
An experiment called the Cylinder device was piggybacked on George to test the ignition of a
thermonuclear reaction. The cylindrical implosion design allowed the fusion experiment to be
heated directly by the pit without the shielding effects of a high explosive layer and avoided
disruption by expanding detonation gases. A Deuterium-Tritium mixture external to the large fission
core was ignited by the thermal flux and produced detectable fusion neutrons. This was the first
ignition of a thermonuclear reaction by an atomic bomb.
Rhodes in Dark Sun estimates the fusion energy yield as 25 kt although the mass of fuel given
("less than an ounce") is at a factor of 12 too small for this. Other sources simply give the fusion
yield as "small". This approach provided no prospect for development into a high-yield
thermonuclear weapon. This test fortuitously provided useful data for evaluating the Teller-Ulam
design which had been devised 2 months prior.
Greenhouse Item
Detonated 5/25/51 at 0617 (local time) on a 300 ft tower on Engebi/Janet island at Eniwetok atoll.
Total yield: 45.5 kt
First test of a boosted fission device. A Deuterium-Tritium mixture in the U 235 bomb core
boosted fission yield by 100% over its expected unboosted yield. This innovation was eventually
incorporated into most or all strategic weapons. But the fusion yield was negligible and overall yield
was still limited by the capabilities of fission designs.

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Ivy Mike
Detonated 11/1/52 at 0714:59.4 +/- 0.2 sec (local time) at ground level on Elugelab/Flora island at
Enewetak atoll.
Total yield: 10.4 Megatons.
This was the first test of the Teller-Ulam (or Ulam-Teller) configuration. The Mike device used
liquid Deuterium as the fusion fuel. It was a massive laboratory apparatus installed on Elugelab
Island in the Enewetak Atoll consisting of a cylinder about 20 feet high (more exactly 243.625
inches or 6.19 m), 6 ft 8 in wide, and weighing 164,000 lb (including attached diagnostic
instruments); also said to weigh 140,000 lb without "the cryogenic unit" (this may mean the casing
by itself). It was housed in an open hanger-like structure 88-ft x 46-ft and 61-ft high, where
assembly started in September of 1952.
The Mike device consisted of a massive steel cylinder with rounded ends, a TX-5 implosion bomb at
one end acted as the primary, and a giant stainless steel dewar (thermos) flask holding several hundred
liters of liquid Deuterium surrounded by a massive natural Uranium pusher/tamper constituted the
secondary fusion stage (known as the "Sausage").
The welded steel casing was lined with a layer of Lead. A layer of polyethylene several centimeters
thick was attached to the lead with copper nails. This layer of plastic generated plasma pressure during
the implosion.
The "Sausage" consisted of a triple-walled stainless steel dewar. The inner most wall contained the
liquid Deuterium. Between this wall and the middle wall was a vacuum to prevent heat conduction.
Between the middle wall and the outer wall was another vacuum and a liquid nitrogen-cooled thermal
radiation shield made of copper.
To reduce thermal radiation leakage even further, the Uranium pusher (which was oxidized to a
purple-black color, making it an excellent thermal radiator) was lined with Gold leaf.
Down the axis of the dewar suspended in the liquid Deuterium was a Plutonium rod that acted as the
"spark plug" to ignite the fusion reaction once the compression shock wave arrived at the center. It did
not run the entire length of the dewar but was supported at each end by axial columns. The spark plug
was a boosted fission device. It was hollow and was charged with a few grams of Tritium/Deuterium
gas (which of course liquified once the dewar was charged with liquid Deuterium).
The Mike device had a conservative design. The external casing was made of steel and was
extraordinarily thick (usually described as "a foot thick", but more likely 10 inches to be consistent with
the weight) to maximize the confinement of the radiation induced pressure inside. The interior diameter
was thus about 60 inches. A very wide radiation channel was provided around the secondary stage to
minimize thermal gradients and to make success less dependent on sophisticated analysis. Due to the
low density of liquid Deuterium and the necessity of thermal insulation, the secondary itself was quite
voluminous which -- when combined with the wide channel between the secondary and the casing -- led
to the 80 inch diameter. The massive casing accounted for most of Mike's weight (about 85%).
The TX-5 device was an experimental version of the implosion system that was also deployed as the
Mk-5 fission bomb. It used a 92 point ignition system. That is, 92 detonators and explosive lenses were
used to make the spherical imploding shock wave. This allows the formation of the implosion shock
wave with a thinner layer of explosive than earlier designs.
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The TX-5 was designed to use different fission pits to allow variable yields. The highest reported
yield for a TX-5 test was Greenhouse Easy at 47-kt on 20 April 1951 with a 2,700 lb device. The
smaller mass compared with earlier designs kept the temperature higher and allowed thermal radiation to
escape more quickly from the primary, thus enhancing the radiation implosion process. If the Easy
configuration was used in Mike, then the secondary fusion/primary yield ratio was 50:1. The deployed
Mk-5 had an external diameter of 43.75 inches. The TX-5 would have been substantially smaller since
it lacked the Mk-5 bomb casing.
3 fuels were considered for Mike -- liquid Deuterium, Deuterated Ammonia (ND3), and Lithium
Deuteride. The reason for choosing liquid Deuterium for this test was primarily due to 2 factors. The
physics was simpler to study and analyze and extensive studies had already been conducted over the
previous decade on pure Deuterium fuel. The desirability of Lithium 6 Deuteride as a fuel was known.
But sufficient Li6 could not be produced in time to make the November 1952 target date (in fact,
construction of the first Lithium enrichment plant had just begun at the time of the test).
Liquid Deuterium produces energy through 4 reactions:
(1) D + T He4 + n + 17.588 MeV
(2) D + D He3 + n +

3.268 MeV

(3) D + D T +

4.03 MeV

p+

(4) He3 + D He4 + p + 18.34 MeV

For Mike to function successfully, densities and temperatures in the secondary sufficient to ignite
reactions (2) and (3) were required. This requires densities hundreds of times normal and temperatures
in the tens of millions of degrees K (say, 75 g/cm3 and 3x107 oK).
Since the reaction cross section of (1) is some 100 times higher than the combined value of (2) and
(3), the Tritium is burned as fast as it is produced, contributing most of the energy early in the reaction.
Reaction (4) on the other hand requires temperatures exceeding 200 million oK before its cross-section
becomes large enough to contribute significantly. Whether sufficient temperatures are reached and
quantities of He3 are produced to make (4) a major contributor depends on the combustion efficiency
(percentage of fuel burned).
If only reactions (1)-(3) contribute significantly, corresponding to the combustion of 25% of the
Deuterium fuel or less, then the energy output is 57 kt/kg. If reaction (4) contributes to the maximum
extent, the output is 82.4 kt/kg. The maximum temperature generated by an efficient burn reaches 350
million K.
The fission fraction for Mike was quite high -- 77%. The total fusion yield was thus 2.4 Megatons
which corresponds to the efficient thermonuclear combustion of 29.1 kg of Deuterium (172 liters) or the
inefficient combustion of 41.6 kg (249 liters). The total fission yield was 7.9 Megatons -- the fission of
465 kg of Uranium. All but some 50 kt of this was due to fast fission of the Uranium secondary stage
tamper by fusion neutrons (a 3.3-fold boost).
The amount of Deuterium actually present in Mike was no more than 1,000 liters. Which is the
amount of liquid Deuterium handled by Operation Ivy. In fact, it was probably substantially less than
this since excess LD2 was undoubtedly brought along in case leakage or other losses occurred.
22

Prior to test, Mike's yield was estimated at 1-10 Megatons with a most likely yield of 5 MT but with
a remote possibility of yields in the range of 50-90 MT. The principal uncertainties here would have
been the efficiency of the fusion burn and the efficiency with which the tamper captured neutrons. Both
of these factors are strongly influenced by the success of the compression process. The fusion efficiency
involved novel and complex physics which could not be calculated reliably even if the degree of
compression were known. The physics for determining the efficiency of neutron capture, on the other
hand, were well understood and could be calculated if the conditions could be predicted.
The upper limit estimate provides some insight into the mass of the Uranium fusion tamper.
Presumably the 90 MT figure was calculated by assuming complete fusion and fission of all materials in
the secondary. If 1000 liters of Deuterium were burned with complete efficiency, the yield would be
13.9 MT. Fission must account for 76.1 MT, corresponding to a Uranium tamper mass of 4475 kg.
Lower amounts of Deuterium would lead to higher tamper estimates (a ratio of 0.82 kg of U for each
liter of LD2).
The detonation of Mike completely obliterated Elugelab, leaving an underwater crater a 6240 feet
wide and 164 ft deep in the atoll where an island had once been. Mike created a fireball 3 miles wide.
The "mushroom" cloud rose to 57,000 ft in 90 seconds and topped out in 5 minutes at 135,000 ft (the top
of the stratosphere) with a stem 8 miles across. The cloud eventually spread to 1000 miles wide with a
stem 30 miles across. 80 million tons of soil were lifted into the air by the blast.
TX-16/EC-16
The Mike design was actually converted into a deliverable weapon, demonstrating that Lithium
Deuteride is not essential to making a usable weapon. The weaponized design (designated the TX-16)
went into engineering development in June 1952 (5 months before the Ivy Mike test). The design
eliminated the cryogenic refrigerator, reduced the weight of the tamper, drastically reduced the
dimensions and mass of the casing, used a lighter and less powerful primary, and pared the weight in
other areas.
The expected yield was reduced to 7-MT. The device was about 60 inches in diameter, 25 ft long,
and weighed 30,000 lb. This weapon design would have been filled with liquid Deuterium at a
cryogenic filling station before take-off -- a reservoir in the weapon held sufficient liquid Hydrogen to
replace boil-off losses during flight. Components for about 5 of these bombs were built in late 1953 and
had reached deployment by the time of the Castle tests.
A unit of the TX-16 (codenamed Jughead) was slated for proof test detonation on March 22, 1954
as part of the Castle series prior to its expected deployment as the EC-16 (Emergency Capability)
gravity bomb in May 1954. The excellent results with the solid-fueled Shrimp device in the Castle
Bravo test on March 1(see below) resulted in the cancellation of this test, and then of the entire EC-16
program on 2 April 2 1954.
Soviet Test: Joe-4/RDS-6s
Detonated: August 12, 1953, on a tower at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan
Total yield: 400 kilotons
This was the 5th Soviet test and first Soviet test of a weapon with substantial yield enhancement from
fusion reactions. This bomb (designated RDS-6s) did not employ the Teller-Ulam configuration.
Instead it used the "Sloika" design invented by Andrei Sakharov and Vitalii Ginzburg. A "sloika" is a
layered Russian pastry (rather like a napoleon) and has thus been translated as "Layer Cake". The
23

design was first invented in the United States by Edward Teller (who called it Alarm Clock). But it was
not developed into a weapon there.
This design is based on a combination of what Sakharov has called the "First and Second Ideas".
The First Idea (developed by Sakharov) calls for using a layer of fusion fuel (Deuterium and Tritium in
his original concept) around a fission primary with an outermost layer of U238 acting as a fusion tamper.
The U-238 tamper confines the fusion fuel so that the radiation-driven shock wave from the fission core
can efficiently compress and heat the fusion fuel to the ignition point. While the low conductivity of the
fusion tamper prevents heat loss and at the same time yields addition energy from fast fission by the
fusion-generated neutrons.
The Second Idea (contributed by Ginzburg) used Lithium 6 Deuteride (with some Tritium) as the
fusion fuel. Being a solid, this is a convenient material for designing a bomb. And it also produces
6
additional Tritium from fission neutrons through the Li + n reaction. This establishes a coupled fission
fusion fission chain reaction in the U

238

tamper with the fusion fuel acting in effect as a neutron

6

accelerator. Larger bombs can be created by placing additional successive layers of Li D and U around
the bomb. The device tested in 1953 probably had 2 layers.
A small U235 fission bomb acted as the trigger (about 40 kt). The total yield was 400 kt. 15-20% of
the energy was released by fusion, and 90% due directly or indirectly to the fusion reaction.
A few weeks before the test, it was belatedly realized that despite the sparse population of the area
around Semipalatinsk, a serious fallout hazard nonetheless existed for tens of thousands of people. The
options were to carry out a mass evacuation or delay the test until an air-dropped system could be
arranged which would take at least 6 months.
Rather than delay the test, a hasty evacuation was conducted. [Note: This implies that the 'Layer
Cake' was not available as a usable weapon until after Feb. 1954 -- a time at which the U.S. had actually
deployed the EC-14, a Megaton-range Lithium Deuteride fueled Teller-Ulam design. See the Castle
Union test below.]
Castle Bravo
Detonated: March 1, 1954 (0645 local time) on reef 2,950 ft off of Nam/Charlie island, Bikini Atoll
Total yield: 15 Megatons
The Shrimp device detonated in the Bravo test was the first test of a Teller-Ulam configuration
bomb fueled with Lithium Deuteride. This became the standard design for all subsequent Hydrogen
bombs (including Soviet designs). Shrimp was a cylinder 179.5 in long and 53.9 in wide, weighing
23,500 lb. The Lithium in Shrimp was enriched to a level of 40% Li6.
The predicted yield of this device was only 6 MT (range 4-6 MT). But the production of
unexpectedly large amounts of Tritium through the fast neutron fission of Li 7 boosted the yield to 250%
of the predicted value, making it the largest bomb ever tested by the U.S. (and destroying much of the
measuring equipment). The fission yield was 10 MT, the fusion yield was 5 MT for a fusion fraction of
33%.
The explosion created a 6,000 ft crater 240 ft deep in the atoll reef. The cloud top rose to 114,000 ft.

24

The Bravo test created the worst radiological disaster in U.S. history. Due to failure to postpone
the test following unfavorable changes in the weather, combined with the unexpectedly high yield, the
Marshallese Islanders on Rongerik, Rongelap, Ailinginae, and Utirik atolls were blanketed with the
fallout plume. They were evacuated on March 3. But 64 Marshallese received doses of 175 R. In
addition, the Japanese fishing vessel Daigo Fukuryu Maru (Fifth Lucky Dragon) was also heavily
contaminated with the 23 crewmen received exposures of 300 R (one later died from complications).
The entire Bikini Atoll was contaminated to varying degrees and many operation Castle personnel were
subsequently over-exposed as a result. After this test, the exclusion zone around the Castle tests was
increased to 570,000 square miles -- a circle 850 miles across (for comparison, this is equal to about 1%
of the entire Earth's land area).
The 2-stage device Shrimp design was used as the basis for the Mk-21 bomb. The weaponization
effort began on 26 March -- only 3 weeks after Bravo. By mid-April, the military characteristics were
defined. On July 1, an expedited schedule for deployment was approved. The use of the final fast
fission stage was apparently eliminated.
After a number of efforts to reduce the weight, the design seems to have stabilized in mid-July 1955
with a projected yield of 4 Megatons (subsequently tested at 4.5 Megatons in Redwing Navajo, 95%
fusion, July 11, 1956). Quantity production began in December 1955 and ended in July 1956 with 275
units being produced. The Mk 21 weighed about 15,000 lb. It was 12.5 ft long, and 56 in. in diameter.
During June-November 1957, it was converted to the Mk 36 design.
Castle Romeo
Detonated 27 March 1954 on barge in Bikini atoll lagoon near Bravo test site at 0630:00.4 (local time).
Total yield: 11 Megatons
The Runt I device (the second in the Castle series) was another solid fueled 2-stage design. This
device was 224.9 in. long, 61.4 in. in diameter, and weighed 39,600 lb. The fuel for Runt was natural
Lithium Deuteride -- a major advantage considering the high cost of Lithium 6 enrichment. It exceeded
its predicted yield by an even larger margin than Bravo with a most probable yield of 4 MT out of a 1.57 MT range. This is consistent with the higher proportion of Li 7 compared to Bravo. The fission yield
was 7 MT for a fusion fraction of 36%.
The Runt I and Runt II devices (seen Castle Yankee below) were design tests for the EC-17 and
EC-24 bombs, respectively. These 2 weapons were very similar (externally identical, similar internal
configurations, but with different primaries). They were the most powerful weapons ever built by the
U.S. with predicted yields of 15-20 Megatons, and were also the largest and heaviest bombs ever
deployed by the U.S. The Mk 17/24 (as the deployed versions were eventually designated) was 24 ft. 8
in. long with a 61.4 in. diameter and a weight of 41,400-42,000 lb (30,000 lb of this was the 3.5 in. steel
casing).
Although the initial work on these weapons dates at least to Feb. 1953, they went into development
engineering in Oct. 1953. The EC-17 and EC-24 became the second and third models of Hydrogen
bomb to enter the U.S. arsenal. From April to September in 1954, EC-17 and EC-24 bombs were
stockpiled (5 EC-17 and 10 EC-24). These bombs were removed in October, modified for better safety
features and with drogue parachutes for slower fall, and returned to duty as the Mk 17 Mod 0 and Mk
24 Mod 0 in November 1954. These weapons went through 2 subsequent modifications and stockpiles
reached 200 Mk 17s and 105 Mk 24s during the October 1954 - November 1955 production run. The
Mk 24s were retired in Sept-Oct 1956. The Mk 17s were retired between Nov. 1956 and Aug. 1957.
25

Castle Union
Detonated 26 March 1954 (0610:00.7 local time) on barge in Bikini atoll lagoon off Yurochi Island.
Total yield: 6.9 Megatons
This was actually the 4th test in the Bravo series (the 3rd test - Koon - failed when the fusion stage did
not ignite). This was the test of the EC-14 Alarm Clock bomb (unrelated to Teller's earlier Alarm
Clock concept) which was the first Hydrogen bomb actually to enter the U.S. arsenal and the first TellerUlam bomb ever to be deployed anywhere. This was a solid fueled 2-stage device using 95% enriched
Lithium6. It also exceeded expectations. The predicted yield was 3-4 MT (range 1-6 MT). The fission
yield was 5 MT for a fusion fraction of 28%. The tested device had a length of 151 in., a diameter of
61.4 in, and weighed 27,700 lb.
The TX-14 Alarm Clock went into development engineering in August 1952 and procurement was
approved in mid-September (some 6 weeks before 'Mike' had even been tested). The first EC-14
weapons were produced in Feb. 1954 -- 2 months prior to test of the design. The design was simple but
had very poor safety features. A total of 5 were deployed. This low figure can probably be attributed to
scarcity of Li6 at the time. Safety could presumably have been improved through retrofitting. But the
high cost of these weapons probably led to their rapid retirement. They were removed from the arsenal
in October with the deployment of the EC-17. The Mk 14 (its final deployed designation) had a
diameter of 61.4 in., a length of 18 ft. 6 in., and weighed 28,954 lbs. After refitting with a drogue
parachute, its weight increased to 29,851 lbs.
Castle Yankee
Detonated May 5, 1954 (0610:00.1 local time) on barge in Bikini atoll lagoon above the Union
crater.
Total yield: 13.5 Megatons
The Runt II device was very similar to Runt I, mostly differing in the design of the primaries. The
fuel for Runt II was also natural Lithium Deuteride. It also exceeded its predicted yield with a most
probable yield of 8 MT out of a 6-10 MT range. See "Castle Union" for a discussion of weapons
derived from this test. This device was 225 in. long, 61 in. in diameter, and weighed 39,600 lb. The
fission yield was 7 MT for a fusion fraction of 48%.
Soviet Test No. 19 Test 11/22/55 (No common name)
Detonated 11/22/55
Total yield: 1.6 Megatons
The first Soviet test of a Teller-Ulam/Sakharov 'Third Idea' bomb. It used radiation implosion to
detonate a Lithium Deuteride-fueled capsule. This was the World's first air-dropped fusion bomb test.
After this test, the Soviet Union used radiation implosion bombs as the basis for their strategic arsenal.
Exploded underneath an inversion layer, the refracted shock did unexpected collateral damage, killing 3
people.

26

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