What does studying civil society reveal about the nature and causes of social change in

CEE?

Abstract
This article focuses on the re-emergence of civil society in post-communist states.1
Civil society remains a conceptually fluid concept in contemporary area studies of former
Eastern Bloc countries because much of the literature refers to the World Values Survey and
cites the communist legacies as the primary causes for low levels of civic participation. But
how could this study of post-communist civil society be applied to an updated assessment of
social change in post-communist states? How can studying the development of civil society
benefit the literature on the nature and causes of social change in Central and Eastern
Europe? This enquiry therefore necessitates a broader conceptualization of civil society, by
exploring the implications of a context-specific definition of civil society. After adopting a
multidimensional approach to the measurement of civic activism, this essay looks into
qualitative methodologies to show that civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe are not
weak as commonly perceived, different from pre-1989 social movements, and more effective
in causing social change.

Introduction
1 I am particularly indebted to Anne White, who has offered her thoughts on the
article and taught me the importance of conducting qualitative research in
political science.

The topic of civil society in the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe has been in the
centre of a heated debate since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Policymakers and scholars
envisioned civil society as an arena of action and interaction in post-communist states.
However, quantitative surveys such as the World Values Survey constantly indicate the low
levels of civic activity in the post-communist states. Existing literature often pinpointed the
communist legacies as the main factor behind the relative absence of active civil societies in
post-communist democracies. How can this claim be assessed? What does studying civil
society reveal about the nature and causes of social change in CEE? Answers to such
questions require a more nuanced, updated view into social and political mobilization in
contemporary post-communist states.
In order to explore these issues, this article first briefly discusses the conventional
claim that civil society is weak and ineffective in post-communist states. Second, this article
challenges the claim and suggests for a broader definition of civil society when analysing
post-communist states. Conventional wisdom describes that the roots of civil society in CEE
supposedly lie in the shared communist past and in the specific nature of the revolutions
against communism that broke out between 1989 and 1991 (Ekiert 2014). Third, it provides a
case study of Russia and explores the concept of state-sponsored curtailment and
acknowledges the impoverished environment for Russian civil society. In process, it argues
that while civil society is indeed active in most post-communist democracies of Central and
Eastern Europe, in Russia, state-sponsored means of curbing political mobilisation restricts
the growth of civic participation. Throughout the process of challenging the claim that civil
society is weak and ineffective in post-communist states, one discovers that current civil
societies are structurally different from their 1989 counterparts and are more effective in
bringing about social change.

The article contributes to the literature on civic participation in post-communist states

by carefully examining the popular claim that civil society is weak in post-communist states.
The assertion that civil society remains distinctively weak in post-communist countries due to
the communist legacies is not only empirically, but also theoretically, intriguing, as it has
been nearly 25 years since the breakup of communist regimes throughout the world. Ekiert
and Kubik (2014) aptly summarize the matter at hand with two relevant questions. Firstly, is
civil society necessary to undermine authoritarian rule and bring about regime change? This
question stems from an acknowledgement of positive impacts that civil society has achieved
before the fall of the Soviet Union. Secondly, what impact does civil society have on
government policies and democratic quality, particularly after regime change? (Ekiert and
Kubik 2014). This essay begins by taking the two questions into consideration.

Concept of Civil Society

The concept of a civil society must first be established in order to assess the state of
civic participation in post-communist states. Mudde (2003) describes it as organised
collective activities that are not part of the household, the market, (or more general economic
production), and the state. Mudde (2003) provides a good starting point. Howard (2004)
adds a voluntary aspect to the definition and defines it as a crucial part of the public space
between the state and the family, and embodied in voluntary organizations. With regard to
social change in post-communist states, civil society plays a particularly important role as it
is often regarded as a central element of democratic and market-driven societies in classical
political theory (Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer 2012). The significance of civil society can
also be observed in its application in the European Union, in which civic participation is seen
as a key to solve the democratic deficit resulting from the gulf between citizens and the

ruling bodies of the EU (Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer 2012). However, such definitions
typically characterize the Tocquevillian, Western models of civil society by linking
democratic performance with rich associational life (Valkov 2009).
Implementing an area-specific, nuanced definition which takes the historical legacies
into consideration requires an investigation of the role of civil society in the breakup of
communist regimes. The mass protest movements and social mobilisations which contributed
to the collapse of Soviet Union serve as an excellent example. By acknowledging such
mobilisations, one finds that in post-communist countries, civil societies inherited a different
model of civil society contrary to their Western counterparts. Ekiert and Kubik (2014) agree
with this assertion and point out that whilst CEE countries did not inherit from communism a
civil society properly so called, they did inherit a comprehensive and solidly institutionalized
associational sphere. Bernhard and Karakoc (2007) aptly summarise the current scholarship
and point out that studies of civil society have tended to focus on apolitical aspects of
associational life. Therefore, a direct comparison between the Western model of civil society
and the post-communist model of civic participation may lead to misleading results. Scholars
(Valkov 2009, Ekiert 2014) also warn that the attempts to provide a causal explanation by
solely relying on quantitative data may be invalid.

The Weakness of Civil Society

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, civil society in Central and Eastern Europe
remained a mystery. Ekiert and Kubik (2014) went as far as to point out that among all the
changes that have taken place since 1989, those involving civil society are perhaps the least
understood. Although the social movements of the 1980s were seen as evidence of the
reawakening of civil society in Eastern Europe, civil society is generally regarded as weak in

post-communist CEE states (Mudde 2003, Howard 2003, Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer
2012). Wheaton and Kavan (1992) illustrate that the legacies of communism have led citizens
to withdraw from the private sphere and instead, to turn into inner emigration. Howard
(2003) leads the scholarship by explaining the reasons for the alleged weaknesses of the civil
society in post-communist, Central and Eastern European states. Due to the inherent
communist legacies, citizens refrain from group activities as most group meetings were
forced (Howard 2003). Howard primarily refers to the third wave of the World Values Survey
(1995-1997) and shows the low levels of voluntary association across all post-communist
states.2 In order to assess this claim, Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer (2012) examine the
developments in Eastern European civil society by measuring the participation rates in
organisations. While there are little differences between countries that had joined the
European Union between 1995 and 2005 using the World Values Survey, the civic
participation rate in Eastern Europe remains low (Wallace, Pichler, and Haerpfer 2012).
However, one notices an important finding. The World Values Survey indicates that the
membership rates in civic groups are declining throughout United States as well as Western
European states. If membership rates in civil societies are declining throughout the world,
then how can one associate the communist legacies with the relatively low membership rates
in CEE countries?

2 Refer to figure 1.

FIGURE 1: Average Number of Organisational Memberships per Person in Post-Communist

Countries From 1995-1997

Why do we need to adopt a qualitative approach?

The assertion that civil society is feeble throughout post-communist Europe requires
both quantitative and qualitative evidence. The weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe
has been discussed at great length. Suppression of free speech, forced association under
communism, and slow progress in creating organisations after the fall of communism in a
climate of distrust are main reasons posited by the scholarship (Rose 1999, Rose, Mishler and
Haerpfer 1996). Much of the literature has suggested that the legacy of communism has
undermined the development of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, but this
argument is no longer plausible as it has been nearly 25 years since the fall of communist
regimes (Zakaria 2013). Mishler and Rose (1997) cannot find the causal relationships
between the effects of communist legacy and suggest that the declining macroeconomic
conditions of the region served as primary factors contributing to the dearth of civil societies

in the region. Lastly, Putnam (2002) believes that there is a general decline of civic
participation everywhere. Therefore, I adopt Ekiert (2012)s multidimensional approach and
attempt a qualitative analysis.

Gender and LGBT Rights Groups

Groups protesting against gender inequality serve as excellent examples for modern civil
society groups. Fbin (2009) contributes to this literature by illustrating the gender
inequality movements in Hungary. In process, Fbin (2009) offers a qualitative analysis and
illustrates the rise of contemporary womens movements in Hungary which shows that gender
inequality has significantly changed since 1989. In the communist period, the politics,
policies, and parties were dominated by men (Gal and Kligman 2000). Therefore, naturally
since the end of state socialism, differences of interest among genders were the subject of
negotiation (Gal and Kligman 2000). Such gatherings indicate the revival of a civil society
which stands for expressing the opinions of minority groups. Fbin (2009) writes, with the
exception of party-affiliated womens caucuses, until 2007 most womens groups pulled as
far away as possible from the vicinity of electoral politics. Contrary to their pre-1989
counterparts, modern civil societies not only stand up for political causes, but also for
minority rights, which allows for a more divergent sectoral composition of social movements.
LGBT rights groups also exemplify civil societies which depict the concerns of
citizens in post-communist states. Movements which support equality for gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transgenders are also taking place where they have been resisted by local and
national authorities (Holzhacker 2011). Fojtov (2011) explains the emergence of gay rights
activism in Czech Republic. According to Fojtov (2011), whilst the Czech government
legalized registered partnerships in 2006, legal barriers remain which prohibit the same-sex

couples from adopting children. In the article, Fojtov (2011) illustrates the steady growth of
Czech lesbian activism which demands legal parental rights for registered lesbian and gay
couples. Her findings heavily rely on qualitative methods in the form of personal interviews.
Contrary to conventional scholarship which establishes a causal relationship between the low
membership rates and lack of social capital in post-communist CEE states, Fojtov (2011)s
qualitative findings show that lesbian activists during the 1990s were marginalized within the
national gay and lesbian movement. In sum, such cause and effect relationship which depends
on the context cannot be obtained by solely relying on quantitative research.
Workers Movements
The Balkan states witnessed new social movements in forms of grass-root, left-wing
activism. The social movements started in the former Yugoslavia. Musi (2013), in his
assessment of labour strikes in the Balkans, illustrates the emergence of public
demonstrations and social upheavals due to high unemployment rates and low economic
growth. Musi (2013) argues that the slow and painful process of integration into Western
Europe created points of social conflict in the Balkan post-communist societies. Therefore,
Musi (2013) requests the scholarship to consider new forms of civic participation in the
Balkans. Spontaneous protests and social gatherings have awakened the bureaucratized trade
union structures out of their slumber (Musi 2013). In November 2012, organised group of
Slovenian workers called for a European Day of Action and Solidarity. This resulted in a
successful one-day general strike in the public sector, which involved nearly 100,000
workers. According to Music (2009),Musi (2013) and Horvat (2012), and S, spontaneous
street mobilisations provided an opportunity for direct engagement and political praxis for a
large number of discontent workers. This is especially relevant for the younger group of
activists who are technology-savvy and have good grasps of modern social networking
services.communication tools. The rudimentary nature of mass protests soon became a venue

for exchanging social networking groups and active online social networks allowallowed the
younger generation of activists to mobilise themselves in a coherent manner.. In this regard,
one finds that social protests serve as aan initial breeding ground for organised forms of civil
society, which is and

Russia
Nature- democratic nature
Causes- policy

Russian civil society remains ineffective due to state policies. In order to assess this
claim, one must first look into the legacy effect of the Soviet Union. It is indeed true that
Soviet civil society was composed of institutional elements (Crotty 2009). Howard (2002)
points out that the institutionalised civil space resulted in the growth of network of friends,
family, and individual connections inside the home. After more than 15 years, despite
kernels of civic activism (Gellner 1994) that were present at the time of the collapse of the
Soviet Union, Russian civil society remains weak and ineffective in the face of an ever
strengthening state. Notwithstanding this assessment, however, there are a number of
emerging Russian NGOs which flourished in spite of state sponsored policies (Henry 2006).
One can identify a number of Grass Roots Organisations in Russia. Such GROs actively
campaign for a variety of local issues, such as veterans affairs, as well ecological causes.
This movement soon came to an abrupt end as state-sponsored policies actively
curbed the political and social mobilisation of the Russian people (Crotty 2009). Perhaps the
best example of such policies can be observed in the early days of Yeltsins administration.

The law On Public Associations required all public organisations who had registered the
previous act to re-register, which significantly increased administrative procedures for the
fledgling civil society groups (Squier 1999, Crotty 2009). Such administrative requirements
resulted in more paperwork, and allowed the Russian government to exploit the mobile
weaknesses of the civil society. Such state policies continued into Putins era. Putins
initiation of civic forum was met with mixed results. While it encouraged NGOs as well as
social movements to participate in forums with the federal government, the government
actively drove the agenda and the associated outcomes (Crotty 2009). Another legislation
which curtailed the growth of civil society is the NGO Law, which was also initiated during
Putins administration. The law placed restrictions on donations from foreign capital by
claiming that such donations could potentially threaten the sovereignty of Russia and its
national independence (Machdeler 2006). Such active state policies continue to restrict the
emergence of Russian civil societies for both apolitical and political civic participation.

Conclusion and Discussion

This essay focused on the post-communist experience at hand and challenged the two
dominating myths of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe. The experiences of postcommunist countries shed light on both accounts and allow us to contribute to the literature
on civic participation and reassess the matter at hand. There are three important findings of
this paper. Two findings relate to the nature and change of civic activism in post-communist
CEE states. As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, I started out with an assessment of
the perceived weakness and ineffectiveness of CEE civil societies in order to determine the
nature and causes of social change in post-communist states.

The first myth is that civil societies remain weak in Central and Eastern Europe due to
communist legacies. By studying the nature of civil society in CEE, we find that civic
participation achieves its purpose by voicing the concerns of minority groups and
campaigning for causes in various sectors. While the numbers of organisations may not be as
large as those of their Western counterparts, CEE states provide grounds for an arena of
active civic participation. However, the nature of the civil society is different. The raisons
d'tre of modern civil societies in CEE are different in nature compared to their pre-1989
counterparts and are becoming more divergent from one another and stand for a variety of
causes. This is observed in the case of rising LGBT activism in Hungary and Czech Republic.
The second myth is that the civil societies are ineffective in CEE states. By
challenging this myth, one learns that the different structure of post-1989 civil society enables
bringing about more effective social change. This is exemplified in the case of student
protests and spontaneous social gatherings which ultimately become coherent civil societies
through the means of modern technology.
Studying civil society trends of post-communist states also offers two methodological
findings as they pertain to the nature and causes of social change in Central and Eastern
Europe. Conducting area studies in post-communist states requires one to immerse oneself
into both quantitative and qualitative datasets. A simple analysis on quantitative data can lead
to misleading results, as it does not take into the historical legacies into account and
marginalise ongoing changes. Additionally, the term post-communist may not be suitable in
an assessment of civil society in Central and Eastern Europe, as evidenced by the case of
Russia.