JUGNAUTH PRAVIND KUMAR (HON)

V
THE STATE OF MAURITIUS & ANOR
2015 SCJ 178
Record No. 108728
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MAURITIUS
In the matter of: Hon. Pravind Kumar Jugnauth Plaintiff v. 1. The State of
Mauritius 2. The Registrar, Civil Status 3. The Honourable Prime Minister 4. The
Honourable Minister of Information and Communication Technology 5. The
Honourable Attorney General Defendants ..
JUDGMENT
Introduction: The orders prayed for In the present action entered by way of a
plaint with summons, the plaintiff is seeking redress under section 17 of the
Constitution on the ground that sections 3(a), 3 (b), 3 (c), 7 (1), 9 and 13 of the
Constitution are likely to be contravened in relation to him. He accordingly prays
for such orders, writs and directions as this Court may consider appropriate for
the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of the above-mentioned
provisions of the Constitution. He further prays for: (a) an order declaring and
decreeing that sections 7 (1)(b) and 7 (1A) of the National Identity Card Act 1985
are unconstitutional and violate sections 3(a) and 7 of the Constitution; (b) a
permanent writ of injunction preventing and prohibiting the defendants from
storing his fingerprints and biometric information on a database; 2 (c) an order
holding and decreeing that the National Identity Card (Particulars in Register)
Regulations 2013 (GN No 237 of 2013) made under section 3(2) (b) and 10 of the
National Identity Card Act 1985 violate sections 3(a), 3(c) and 9 of the
Constitution; and (d) any such order as may be just and expedient in the
circumstances of this case and as this Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances. Preliminary Remarks As a result of general elections which took
place after judgment had been reserved in the present case, a new government
with new Ministers took over. As the new Minister of Information and
Communication Technology the defendant No. 4 in the present case - is the
plaintiff himself, the case was fixed for mention in view of ascertaining whether
the stand of the parties was still the same. Counsel for the plaintiff and Counsel
for the defendants informed this Court that the stand of their respective clients
had remained the same both in facts and in law. The essential undisputed facts
The following essential facts, as can be gathered from the common statement of
agreed facts filed by the parties, are not in dispute: (1) The plaintiff is a citizen of
the Republic of Mauritius. (2) The defendant No. 2 is the authority vested by law
for the issue, delivery and replacement of national identity cards and is the Data
Controller for the purposes of the Data Protection Act. (3) The Mauritius National
Identity Scheme (MNIS) project has been set up under the aegis of the
defendant No.3. (4) The defendant No. 4 is a member of a Steering Committee
responsible for the monitoring of the MNIS project. (5) The implementation of the
new biometric identity card project started as from 1 October 2013. 3 (6) The
National Identity Card Act (the NIC Act) provides that every person applying for
the new identity card is under an obligation to, inter alia: (i) allow his fingerprints

and other biometric information about himself to be taken and recorded; and (ii)
allow himself to be photographed. (7) The plaintiff has not yet applied for a new
national identity card. (8) Ten fingerprints are taken and recorded as part of the
registration process and will be stored in the MNIC register. The plaintiffs
biometric photograph, biometric information and fingerprints will be stored in
a database, which is the MNIC register. (9) The biometric national identity card
constitutes a more reliable way of verifying and authenticating the identity of a
person especially as the paper-based laminated identity card which it is meant to
replace can be easily tampered with and lacks adequate security features.
Outstanding issues raised in the plea in limine The following points, which were
raised in the plea in limine at the stage of pleadings, were not pressed at that
stage but are now being raised: (a) The issue of exhaustion of remedies This
issue is raised in the following terms: In the event that there is, or there is likely
to be a breach of plaintiffs constitutional rights (which is denied) the Data
Protection Act provides adequate investigatory and enforcement safeguards
against the misuse of personal data (including biometric information) and as
such plaintiff has adequate alternative remedies under the law and therefore
cannot avail himself of the remedy under section 17 of the Constitution. Section
17(2) of the Constitution, which provides for the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to hear applications for redress where a person alleges that any of sections
3 to 16 has been or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, contains the
following proviso: 4 Provided that the Supreme Court shall not exercise its
powers under this section if it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the
contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under
any other law. In our view, that proviso is not applicable in the present case, as
the defendants cannot invoke the Data Protection Act, the constitutionality of
which is being challenged, as the law under which an alternative means of
redress lies. (b) The contention that defendants Nos. 3 and 4 should be put out of
cause. The plea of the defendants contains a motion by defendants Nos. 3 and 4
that the plaint with summons against them be dismissed outright with costs in as
much as it discloses no cause of action against them. It is true that, as pointed
out in the written submissions of Counsel for the defendants, there have been no
direct allegations of acts or omissions of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 said to be in
breach of any of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. However, it has been averred
in paragraph 6 of the plaint with summons that the MNIS project has been set up
under the aegis of the defendant No. 3, while defendant No. 4 is a member of a
Steering Committee responsible for the monitoring and implementation of the
project. Those averments, which are not in dispute, are sufficient, in our view, to
make of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 interested parties. Furthermore, at paragraph
53 (b) of the plaint with summons, a permanent writ of injunction is sought
preventing the defendants from storing the plaintiffs fingerprints and
biometric information on a database. We are accordingly not prepared to accede
to the motion of defendants Nos. 3 and 4 that they should be put out of cause.
The case for the plaintiff It has been made very clear, at paragraph 11 of the
written submissions of Counsel for the plaintiff, that the latter is not contesting
what he calls the verification functionality, as opposed to the identification
functionality of the new biometric card. The verification function involves a
comparison of the submitted biometric characteristics - a live fingerprint - with
one particular corresponding characteristic, namely the same fingerprint
minutiae. Verification therefore involves a one to one comparison. On the other
hand, the identification function involves the recognition of an individual by

comparing the submitted biometric characteristics of one person with all

previously submitted and stored biometric characteristics in a database through
a search. This search is referred to as a one to many comparison. 5 The plaintiff
does not contest the taking of his fingerprints and the storing of the data within
the biometric card itself. What he contests is the recourse to the identification
functionality which will always need the existence of a database with the
biometric data stored for comparison. At paragraph 13 of the written submissions
of Counsel for the plaintiff, it is contended that the identification system, using
the MNIC register as a database, does affect the plaintiffs constitutional rights
inasmuch as his biometric information and fingerprints will be in the possession
of the defendants Nos. 1 and 2 and will be stored and retained in a database for
which the defendant No. 2 is the Data Controller. It is the plaintiffs case that
his right not to have his fingerprints and other biometric information stored in a
database derives from (a) a general right to privacy under section 3 (a) of the
Constitution; (b) the right to privacy referred to in section 3(c) of the
Constitution; (c) the specific right to privacy provided in section 9 (1) of the
Constitution. It is his further contention that (i) there is no law which has been
enacted to provide for the storage of his fingerprints, and other biometric
information; (ii) although section 9(1) of the Constitution affords a right to
privacy which is more restrictive than Article 8 (1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR), the proportionality test under section 9 (2) of the
Constitution operates in the same manner as that in Article 8(2) of the ECHR. The
defendants case The defendants case is summarized as follows at paragraph 5
of the written submissions of Counsel for the defendants: (a) the right to
private life or a general right to privacy is not afforded by sections 3(a), 3(c) or
9 of the constitution which restrict expressly and unambiguously the right
protected to the protection for the privacy of his home and other property; 6 (b)
the right to private life is instead secured by ordinary enactment, namely Article
22 of the Civil Code headed Du respect de la vie prive, while the right to
protection of personal data is provided for in the Data Protection Act; and (c) in
any event, if the Constitution affords a general right to privacy and that right is
engaged, the retention of fingerprints on the MNIC database is done under the
authority of the law, in the interest of public order as it poses a legitimate aim of
preventing the fraudulent usurpation of identity and cannot be said not to be
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. Does the plaintiff have any right
to invoke under the Constitution? Section 3(a) of the Constitution Section 3 (a) of
the Constitution recognizes and declares that in Mauritius there have existed and
shall continue to exist, without discrimination by reason of race, place of origin,
political opinions, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and for the public interest, the right of the individual to,
inter alia, life... Section 3(c) of the Constitution Section 3 (c) of the
Constitution recognizes in the same terms and subject to the same limitations
the right of the individual to protection for the privacy of his home and other
property and from deprivation of property without compensation. In a judgment
which we delivered earlier to-day in M. Madhewoo v The State of Mauritius and
anor, we have considered the ambit of section 3 of our Constitution and
explained our view that the wording of that section, when construed in the light
of its natural and ordinary meaning, would not afford constitutional protection
against the taking of fingerprints. Section 9(1) of the Constitution However, the
plaintiff can pertinently invoke, in our view, the right conferred under section 9
(1) of the Constitution which reads:- 7 9. Protection for privacy of home and

other property. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to
the search of his person.. Our conclusions in Madhewoo (supra) As we have
concluded in Madhewoo (supra), the protection under section 9(1) would clearly
be against any form of undue interference by way of a search of any part of the
body of a person without his consent : and the coercive taking of fingerprints
from the fingers of a person, extracting its minutiae would clearly fall within the
scope of the protection afforded to the integrity and privacy of the person under
section 9 (1) of the Constitution. We however concluded, in that case, that such
coercive taking of fingerprints as provided in section 4 (2) (c) of the NIC Act and
the regulations made thereunder has been shown to have been made in the
interests of public order and to constitute a justifiable interference with the right
of the plaintiff in that case to a search of his person as provided for under section
9(1) of the Constitution. We also concluded that such interference had not been
shown not to be justifiable in a democratic society. However, in Madhewoo
(supra), we took a different view in relation to the issue of storage of personal
biometric data, including fingerprints. For the reasons set out in that judgment,
we held, in that connection, that- (a) the law providing for the storage and
retention of fingerprints and other personal biometric data regarding the identity
of a person constitutes a permissible derogation, in the interests of public order,
under section 9 (2) of the Constitution; (b) the provisions in the National Identity
Card Act and the Data Protection Act for the storage and retention of fingerprints
and other personal biometric data collected for the purpose of the biometric
identity card of a citizen of Mauritius are unconstitutional. Upon a consideration
of the evidence in the present case and in the light of our legal reasoning in
Madhewoo, our findings at (a) and (b) above are the same in the present case
too. The plaintiffs prayers 8 We now have to turn to the prayers of the plaintiff in
paragraph 53 of his plaint with summons. Prayer (a) is for an order declaring
and decreeing that section 7 (1) (b) and 7 (1A) of the NIC Act 1985 are
unconstitutional and violate sections 3 (a) and 7 of the Constitution. And prayer
(c) is for an order holding and decreeing that the National Identity Card
(Particulars in Register) Regulations 2013 (GN No 237) made under Section 3 (2)
(b) and 10 of the NIC Act 1985 violate sections 3 (a) (c) and 9 of the
Constitution. Section 7 (1) (b) and 7 (1A) of the NIC Act deal with the
requirement to produce an identity card when requested. Counsel for the plaintiff
has indicated that the reference in prayer (a) to section 7 of the Constitution is a
mistake and should be read as a reference to section 9 of the Constitution which
we have referred to earlier in this judgment. In the light of our observations and
conclusions in Madhewoo [2015 SCJ 177], we decline to make the order prayed
for in prayer (a) as formulated. In relation to prayer (c), we declare, as we have
done in Madhewoo (supra) that the provisions in the National Identity Card Act
and the Data Protection Act for the storage of personal biometric data, including
fingerprints, collected for the purpose of the biometric identity card of the
plaintiff, are unconstitutional. Furthermore, in response to prayer (b), we grant a
permanent writ of injunction prohibiting the defendants from storing, or causing
to be stored, as the case may be, any fingerprints or biometric information data
obtained on the basis of the provisions in the National Identity Card Act and the
Data Protection Act. With costs against the defendants. E. Balancy Senior Puisne
Judge A. F. Chui Yew Cheong Judge A. A. Caunhye Judge 29th May 2015 Judgment
delivered by Hon. E. Balancy, Senior Puisne Judge 9 For Applicant : Me. Attorney
G Nunkoo Me. I. Collendavelloo, SC Me Y Bhadain, of Counsel For Respondent :

State Attorney State Counsel For Second Respondent : State Attorney State
Counsel