Tanzania Civil Aviation Master Plan Pre-Feasibility Study

Republic of Tanzania
Ministry of Infrastructure Development
Civil Aviation Master Plan Pre-feasibility Study
Version 2.3
March 2010
Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADS-B
AFTN
AIS
ANS
ATR
ATS
AVSEC
BADEA
CASSOA
CATC
COM
DAR FIR
DRC
EAC
FDPS
FIR
FY
GA
GNI
GNSS
GoT
GPS
IATA
ICAO
IDA
IFR
JNIA
KADCO
MCC
MoID
NAV
NDB
OPEC
PPP
RGoZ
SADC
TAA
TCAA
TORs
Tsh
TSIP
TSSP
VFR
VHF
VSAT
Automatic Dependent Survey - Broadcast

Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network
Aeronautical Information Services
Air Navigation Services
Avions de Transport Regional
Air Traffic Services
Aviation Security
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
EAC Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency
Civil Aviation Training Center
Communications
Dar es Salaam Flight Information Region
Democratic Republic of Congo
East African Community
Flight Data Processing System
Flight Information Region
Fiscal Year
General Aviation
Gross National Income
Global Navigation Satellite System
Government of Tanzania
Global Positioning System
International Air Transport Association
International Civil Aviation Organization
International Development Agency (part of the World Bank)
Instrument Flight Rules
Julius Nyerere International Airport
Kilimanjaro Airports Development Corporation
Millennium Challenge Corporation
Navigation
Non-Directional Beacon
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
Public-Private Partnership
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar
South African Development Community
Tanzania Airports Authority
Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority
Terms of References
Tanzania Shilling
Transport Sector Improvement Project
Transport Sector Support Project
Visual Flight Rules
Very High Frequency
Very Small Aperture Terminal
Table of Contents
i. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 5
ii. Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................ 7
I. Country Overview .............................................................................................................................. 13
II. Sector Overview ............................................................................................................................... 16
1. Institutions and Agencies ............................................................................................................... 17
a. Ministry of Infrastructure Development ...................................................................................... 17
b. TCAA........................................................................................................................................ 18
c. TAA .......................................................................................................................................... 23
2. Service Providers ........................................................................................................................... 25
Air Tanzania .................................................................................................................................. 25
III. Traffic Overview ............................................................................................................................. 28
1. International Travel ....................................................................................................................... 28
2. Domestic Travel ............................................................................................................................ 34
IV. Investments: An Overview .............................................................................................................. 40
1. Anticipated Needs.......................................................................................................................... 40
2. Summary of Traffic Projections ..................................................................................................... 41
3. Needs for Primary Airports ............................................................................................................ 47
a. Julius Nyerere International Airport ........................................................................................... 47
b. Zanzibar International Airport .................................................................................................... 48
c. Kilimanjaro International Airport ............................................................................................... 50
4. Currently Planned Investments of the TAA .................................................................................... 51
5. Currently Planned Investments of the TCAA ................................................................................. 55
V. Action Plan for the Meeting of Needs for the Air Transport Sector .................................................... 58
VI. Proposed Steps and Outline for Tanzania Civil Aviation Master Plan............................................... 61
Appendix A: A hub in Dar es Salaam - two distinct concepts ................................................................. 63
Appendix B: TAA Financials ................................................................................................................ 66
Appendix C: TCAA Financials .............................................................................................................. 71
Appendix D: Terms of references for the study ...................................................................................... 75
Appendix E: List of persons met for this study ....................................................................................... 85
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i. Introduction
This Aviation Master Plan Pre-feasibility Study has been carried out within the framework of the project
Management Consultancy for Institutional Support to Transport, funded by the EU. The study had several
mandates: Initially conceived as a pre-feasibility study for a full civil aviation master plan, it was also
intended to act in lieu of such a master plan for intermediate term financial planning within the Ministry
of Infrastructure Development (MoID) as in input for the Short Transport Sector Investment Plan for the
three year period between FY 2009/2010 and 2011/2012.
At the onset of this study funding for a full master plan seemed difficult to find, though fortunately
sources for such a plan have been identified as this study neared completion. This implies that many of
the issues identified in this report and perhaps deserving further research can be dealt with more
thoroughly during the actual master plan development.
In addition, funding seems to be on the horizon for the development of a new master plan for Julius
Nyerere International Airport in Dar es Salaam. As will be shown later in this report, the need for a new
terminal for the airport is one of the main findings arriving from traffic projections. Both master plans
were deemed a necessary component for the involvement of the private sector in the development of the
new terminal, and are thus part of part the World Banks Transport Support Project now being prepared
for World Bank Board Approval by end of May 2010.
The TORs for this study can be found in Appendix D. The study is the result of two visits to Tanzania, the
first being between October 16 and October 30, 2009, and the second between February 22 and March 12,
2009. A presentation on the first draft of this study was held on March 4, with representatives from the
MoID, TCAA, and TAA present. This final version of the report reflects the reviews given after the
meeting.
ii. Executive Summary

Tanzania has a total of 368 airports and aerodromes on the mainland, with an additional at least one
additional airport on each of the islands of Pemba and Zanzibar. The country, at 947 km 2, is considered
large, and there are substantial areas of land with low population densities and without much transport
infrastructure. This set a unique environment, as Tanzania has much of a tourist industry from abroad and
has a domestic air transport network in part relying on general aviation type operations.
The sector is at a critical stage, needing much investment. At the same time both domestic and
international air transport has been growing considerably in Tanzania.
The country has three primary institutions, the Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MoID)
responsible for overall policy, investment, and performance monitoring, the Tanzania Civil Aviation
Authority (TCAA) as the main regulator and oversight agency, and the Tanzania Airports Authority as the
main airports authority. In addition, the Kilimanjaro International Airport is managed by the Kilimanjaro
Airports Development Corporation, and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar is responsible for
Zanzibar International Airport and the airport in Pemba.
TCAA
The TCAA had revenues of US$ 13 million for FY 2007/2008, as shown in the Figure a below. The
agency depends on a temporary safety fee that will most likely have to become permanent. As expected,
revenues have dipped for the first time since 2005, in line with what might be expected considering the
changes in the global economy.
Figure a: TCAA revenues
Safety Fee
36%
Air Service Licensing

5%

Landing and Parking Services
Airworthiness Certification
Air Navigation
Personnel Licensing
Services
46%
Flight Operation Fees
AIP Log Book Sales
Student's Fees
Avsec Project Charges
Safety Fee
Administration Fees
Flight Safety Documents
Landing and Parking
Services
Airport Service Certification
9%
TAA
The TAA had operational revenues of US$ 16.2 for FY 2007/2008, from sources as shown in the Figure b
below. Since the actual large capital investments are made by the GoT, the airports under the TAA are de
facto subsidized, with the repayments for capital investments having no significant impact on the TAA.
The TAA has concessioned the ground handling at several airports, including Dar es Salaam and
Mwanza, and has recently allowed airline self-handling at Dar es Salaam.
Figure b: TAA revenues
Airport Parking fees

Advertisement
1%
Charges
4%
Miscellaneous
receipts
1%
Landing & Parking
22%
Landing & Parking

Rental and Concession
Passenger Service Charges
Advertisement Charges
Rental and
Concession
17%
Passenger Service
Charges
55%

Miscellaneous receipts
Service Providers
There has been an increase in airlines based in Tanzania. The two predominant fully scheduled carriers
are the GoT owned Air Tanzania and the privately held Precision Air. In addition, there are numerous
services providers, ranging from pure charter-only operators to airlines flying on schedules, though not
found in the more formal reservation systems and databases. Of particular note is Coastal Aviation, which
operates both as a charter carrier as well as on a full-fledged schedule, using general-aviation type aircraft
such as the Cessna Caravan.
Air Tanzania is a troubled government-owned flag carrier experiencing the same woes as most small flag
carriers. The airline currently operates two Dash-8 turboprop aircraft, and has recently lost the ability to
operate the one Boeing 737-300 it had under lease due to an accident requiring repairs to the aircraft. In
addition, the airline is leasing an Airbus 320 for the sum of over US$ 350,000 a month that does not fit
well into its fleet mix, requires extensive pilot training, and for the last two years has been in repairs. The
airline is in the same cycle that many large and small, non-sustainable government-owned carriers find
themselves in: Efforts to make the airline attractive for privatization result in ever escalating costs and
investments and create distortions in the marketplace that in the end not only end the exercise in failure,
but also potentially hurt other operators. This implies that the only way to cut further losses would be
receivership and liquidation.
8
Traffic
Overall traffic has grown 10.9% between 2001 and 2008, with international having grown 10.6%, and
domestic 11.0%. Tourism is the main driver for international traffic, accounting for 66% of all travel. The
three most important international access points are JNIA, Kilimanjaro International Airport, and
Zanzibar International Airport. The most heavily traveled international corridor is between Tanzania and
Kenya. Figure c below shows the international routes as of 2008, with the thickness of the line showing
the routes proportion of seat capacity compared to all international routes. There are roughly eight major
airlines serving the country.
Figure c: International multi-stop routes for 2008, as measured in seat capacities
Domestic travel has been more difficult to study because of data limitations. Though it is easy to perform
an analysis as to traffic numbers per airport, considerable compromises had to be made to look at the
actual routes being traveled. Figure d shows an estimation of domestic routes for 2008, using seat
capacities from a commercial database. This leaves out many important data point for example, Coastal
Air does not appear in the data. The difficulty in using TAA data lies in the fact that the format of the data
does not allow for easy summation based on origin and destination.
9
Figure d: Domestic multi-stop routes using seat capacities. This chart should be viewed with caution, since it only
shows airlines reporting such data to commercial databases.
The evidence now shows that though traffic has grown significantly, the actual number of domestic nodes
has dropped. In addition, the TAA has roughly 12 airports with absolutely no traffic and 23 airports with
less than 1,000 passengers per year. The reduction of nodes in the north of the country may well be the
result of improved road infrastructure. Figure 13 on page 38 and Table 5 on page 39 of this report show
the airports and the related traffic figures for Tanzania.
Investments
The guiding philosophy when planning investments should not be based on speculating what areas of the
country may be a good idea to place airports for future development, but to rather determine where the
demand can be found today and if it is being met. That fact that facilities exist in the southwest of the
country with no traffic implies not the lack of infrastructure per se, but the lack of demand. Another prime
10
example of this point is a comparison between an airport with an unpaved runway having over 23,000
passengers a year, yet an airport with a paved runway having barely any scheduled services and having
6,000 passengers a year. Bukoba, the unpaved airport, has significant demand. Dodoma, the capital with
the paved runway, does not. In terms of looking at extensive hub development in Dar es Salaam,
Appendix A found on page 63 discusses the feasibility or even desirability of such plans.
Projections with three scenarios, pessimistic, moderate, and high growth, show that overall system traffic
could end being anywhere from 4.5 million passengers to roughly 12 million passengers by 2025, with
JNIAs traffic being anywhere from 2.3 million to over 5.5 million for the same period. These are
conservative estimates, with growth rates being kept low anticipating a slower economic recovery and
some more pessimistic assumptions on the long-term growth of air transport. They highlight the fact that
even with very pessimistic assumptions it is clear that JNIAs current terminal capacity will be exhausted
to the point that expanding the current Terminal 2 will not be enough, and a third terminal needs to go
into the planning stages early on. Therefore, the proposed investments in airports ranked in order of
priority are outlined as found in Table 14 on page 59, with respective phasing from 2010 to 2015, and
2015 and beyond. The same ranking of proposed investments for the TCAA can be found in Table 15 on
page 60.
The World Bank is in the final stages of preparing the Transport Sector Support Project that beyond the
airport investments in Bukoba, Kigoma, and Tabora found in Table 14 also includes financing a
transaction advisor for the expansion of JNIA. As part of this component US$ 600,000 are being set aside
for a civil aviation master plan for Tanzania, as well as an airport master plan for JNIA. The proposed
outline for the civil aviation master plan can be found starting on 61. The board approval date for the loan
is set for late May 2010, which implies that it is therefore timely to begin writing the TORs for such a
master plan now (April 2010), so they are ready to be distributed when the studies are ready to be
procured.
11
12
I. Country Overview
The air transport sector in Tanzania consists of over 360 airports, two larger carriers, many smaller,
usually general aviation (GA) operators, the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA), the Tanzania
Airports Authority (TAA), and the airports authority of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.
Tanzania has a total of 2251 aircraft, helicopters, and balloons on the registry as of December 2008, and a
total of 866 licensed pilots, of which 292 are both commercial and instrument rated. Tanzania is part of
the East African Community, and contributes to the newly established EAC Civil Aviation Safety and
Security Oversight Agency (CASSOA) in Arusha.
Tanzania is a large country, with a surface area of roughly 947 thousand km2, and a population of about
40 million2. It is bordered by Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo DRC, Zambia, Malawi, and
Mozambique. Beyond the mainland, there are three major islands (Pemba, Zanzibar, and Mafia) close to
the shoreline on the Indian Ocean. Large bodies of water include Lake Victoria in the north, Lake
Tanganyika on the very west along the border to Congo DRC, and Lake Nyasa along the border to
Malawi. There are vast areas of thin population in the center and to the west. Dar es Salaam, on the shore
of the Indian Ocean, is the business capital and has the highest population, with several other important
centers including Arusha (the seat of the East African Community), Dodoma (the capital city), and
Mwanza.
Tanzania is a recipient of World Bank IDA loans, and grants and loans from many other donor
organizations. Though ranked as a low-income country by the World Bank, there has been significant
growth in the years leading up to the global recession of 2008, with increased exports in minerals and
tobacco. Tanzania also hosts some of Africas most renowned game parks and natural attractions, with the
Serengeti and other famous parks (such as the Ngorogoro Crater) located in the African Rift Valley to the
boarder of Kenya, and other game parks and potential tourist attractions located throughout the country.
Due to the vastness of the country, and the often lacking infrastructure for other modes, air transport plays
a unique role. Much like Alaska in the United States, the rugged terrain and vast nearly empty-spaces
have made a network of charter and scheduled small or general aviation aircraft indispensible. Beyond
this network, Tanzania is dependent on the same air transport needs as any other larger country a
network for scheduled internal traffic, and international gateways to other countries and continents. Most
airports in Tanzania are more in the order of private airstrips operated by mining and tour operators, while
the TAA only has 58 of the countrys estimated 3703 airports and strips under its management.
Tanzanias air transport sector is at a critical stage. Much of the infrastructure is lacking and in dire need
of investment. By the same token, the prospect for traffic growth in Tanzania is high in healthy global
economic conditions. As shown in the graph below, Tanzania overall has the second highest provision of
air transport services per capita, as measured in estimated seats per capita. For international services this
1
Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania, 2008, TCAA, p. 13

World Bank World Development Indicators
3
The total number of aerodromes on the mainland are 368, with the TAA operating 58 as of March 31, 2010, the
Ministry of Wildlife and Natural Resources owns 71, Tanzania National Park 23, mining sector, private hospitals
and others for special purposes 215, KADCO 1, and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar (not on the
mainland) at least 2.
2
13
may not apply much for the general population; however domestic services have grown considerably
themselves.
Figure 1: Regional comparison of seats per capita. Tanzania is the highest after Kenya.
0.25
0.20
0.15
0.10
Seats per Capita
0.05
0.00
Source: Analysis on data provided by the Seabury SRS data analyzer. Seats per capita is
calculated by dividing the estimated population of a country (gained from the World
Banks World Development Indicators) by the sum of all domestic and international seat
capacity as provided by Seabury SRS, for the same year (2007).
14
Figure 2: Seats per capita and GNI for all countries in sub-Saharan Africa, excluding island nations. The wealthier countries stand out.
Source: Analysis on data provided by the Seabury SRS data analyzer, and World Bank World Development Indicators.
II. Sector Overview

In the Transport Sector Investment Programme the sector is described as having a set of shortcomings.
Specifically mentioned were
Deficiencies in the provision of international air navigation services
Inadequate airport facilities
Low human reserves to adequately manage and operate the air transport industry
Inadequate airport planning and management skills
A Civil Aviation Master Plan that is in place but does not accommodate the changes in the policy
framework that have taken place nationally, regionally and internationally
Lack of knowledge of the emerging economic regulation concept
Inadequate capacity in trained pilots and aircraft maintenance engineers
Lack of a management system that will link the civil aviation headquarters and its centers around
the country
Manual collection and distribution of aviation data.
The TSIP has identified a total of US$ 303 million as investment needs in the five fiscal years between
2007 and 2012. Other shortcomings in the infrastructure where also found by various consultants visiting
the country, which ranged from security installations at major airports such as Mwanza and Zanzibar, to
overall weather reporting and prediction capabilities. By the same token Tanzania has seen significant
growth in air traffic at rates beyond the rest of the continent.
In this study the proposed investments in both the TAA and the TCAA will be reviewed.
1. Institutions and Agencies

a. Ministry of Infrastructure Development
The Ministry of Infrastructure Development (MoID) is responsible for coordinating and financing the
development Tanzanias infrastructure. Sectors in its realm include marine, aviation, roads, and others,
and its responsibilities include working with the National Assembly of Tanzania in creating budgets and
long-term project planning. The ministry is split into divisions and sections. Specific air transport
resources can be found in the following divisions and sections:
Transport Division: A dedicated section for Air Transport has two assistant directors, one for air services
& meteorology, and one for airports and aerodromes
Policy and Planning Division: One dedicated specialist for air transport (a former Air Tanzania flight
captain)
Safety and Environment Division: One dedicated specialist for air transport accidents, who is on loan
from the TCAA.
The role of the ministry, in general, is not technical. Its vital role is to assess policy and budgets. This
implies that in terms of technical resources the MoID relies less on internal resources and more on the
agencies reporting to it the TAA, TCAA, and Air Tanzania. However, the MoID does have the final
authority on many investments and expenditures, and as such does require expertise as to what larger
investments are appropriate for an agency to accomplish its tasks. In this role there is still room for the
agency to develop its capacities.
Safety and Environment Division
A significant exception to the technical needs lies in the Safety and Environment Division. ICAO, in its
recent updating of safety audits standards, is now insisting that the relevant ministries be the final
oversight agency of the regulator. Therefore ICAO recommends that air transport accidents be
investigated outside the regulating agency, in this case the TCAA. The new formation of the Safety and
Environment Division, and its new role in air traffic investigations, is therefore structurally a sound
implementation of the ICAO recommendations.
However, the division has no budget for a permanent investigator. The qualified accident investigator
now reporting to the division is on loan from the TCAA, and being paid out of the TCAAs funds.
Though this arrangement is understandable in current circumstances, long term planning should focus on
giving the division one permanent investigator, who, through building channels with regional and global
resources, is able to implement an investigation team rapidly in the case of an accident.
17
b. TCAA
The Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA) was an executive agency formed 1999, and became a
corporate body in November 2003. In the process of becoming independent, the staffing was optimized,
and the agency has gone from a total of roughly 400 employees to the neighborhood of 140. The agency
has been growing again as it assumes additional functions in oversight, such as economic regulation of
domestic markets.
Figure 3: TCAAs revenue sources, FY 2007/2008.
Safety Fee
36%

5%

Air Navigation Airworthiness Certification
Personnel Licensing
Services
46%
AIP Log Book Sales
Student's Fees
Safety Fee
Administration Fees
Landing and Parking
Services
9%
A bulk of the revenues consists of a per passenger safety fee that is supposed to be temporary.
Data source: TCAA Annual Report, 2007/2008. Total revenues were US$ 13.0 million.
Finances
The agency supports itself through the collection of fees. In FY 2007/2008, 46% percent of the total
income of US$ 13.0 million was derived from air navigation charges. Another 9% of charges are 40% of
the landing and parking fees collected by the Tanzania Airports Authority. Since these sources of
revenues, plus the much more minor standard fees such as licensing and document sales, are not enough
to cover current expenses, a per passenger safety fee has been imposed as a temporary measure. The
revenues gained from this fee comprise 36% of income, to roughly US$ 5 million. This temporary fee has
been in place for over four years. According to the annual report of 2007/2008, the agency had an
operating surplus of US$ 1.0 million, with the total surplus brought forward from previous years being
over US$ 5.0 million. In Figure 4 below the revenues are charted both in Tsh and US$. The decline in
US$ is slightly exaggerated because of different exchange rates applied for the years. The overall
downturn in revenues is expected considering the global decline.
18
Some of the revenue streams at times prompt complaints from some operators who wish to see a cap or
reduction of charges and fees. The surpluses accumulated would indicate that the TCAA could ease
charges on the sector; however new commitments made by the authority are most likely going to require
the safety fees to become permanent, and maybe even be raised.
The TCAA is currently housed mainly in the IPS Building in downtown Dar es Salaam. While the entire
authority is not housed here, the bulk of the TCAA resides in these offices. The authority quoted a figure
of US$ 168,000 rent per annum for 2009. The November 2008 ICAO safety audit findings mention the
current split in the office space as an issue needing corrective action. Combined offices are needed for the
TCAA.
The TCAA has planned ahead and is scheduled to move to new offices by middle of calendar year 2010.
A new office building is being constructed on a site by the airport, with an estimated cost of US$ 12
million. The concrete structure is nearing completion, waiting for interior and exterior finishing.
Since this building is being built by the TCAA, the construction required the TCAA to assume a
commercial loan of US$ 6.5 million, with a five year repayment period and a three year grace period.
With a fixed interest rate of 7.0 %, this would translate to over US$ 118,807 a month. The servicing of the
loan is estimated to cost US$ 1.4 million a year, roughly 8 percent of total operating revenues, and being
in the range of the landing and parking charges allocated to the authority.
Since the authority relies heavily on the Safety Fee mentioned above. The downturn in traffic has made
some of the sources of revenue decline, as seen in Figure 4 below, however particularly strong were
declining receipts from airport charges. The operating surplus for 2008 was in the neighborhood of US$ 1
million, down from US$ 2.9 in the previous year. If traffic continues to decline due to the global financial
crisis, the loan for the office building would absorb any operating surplus, making the removal of
temporary fees such as the safety fee virtually impossible.
Figure 4: TCAA Revenues between 2005 and 2008. The sharpness of the decline in US$ revenues is caused in part
by the exchange rate being adjusted from 1,250 Tsh per US$ to 1,350.
10,000,000,000
9,000,000,000
8,000,000,000
7,000,000,000
6,000,000,000
5,000,000,000
4,000,000,000
3,000,000,000
2,000,000,000
1,000,000,000
-
16,000,000
14,000,000
12,000,000
10,000,000
8,000,000
6,000,000
4,000,000
2,000,000
2005
2006
2007
Data source: Calculated on TCAA annual reports from 2005-2008.
19
2008
Tsh
US$
This in general implies that the TCAA will need to re-assess its overall finances, and will need to do some
additional planning for the next five years. It may be that the property being developed could be sold for
other purposes to the private sector, or that the space inside be allocated in a way that the majority of the
building is rented out and produces revenues.
Services
The TCAA is the countrys service provider in air traffic control. Tanzania has one civilian radar
stationed at JNIA, providing both primary and secondary coverage4 for up to 220 nautical miles. Though
the radar had been purchased in 2001, radar based air traffic control, as opposed to procedural control, is
just starting due to the difficulty of getting enough air traffic controllers to be certified in radar
procedures. Air traffic control over the rest of the country outside the range of the radar is purely
procedural. Tanzania is not unique in this: In Kenya, where radar coverage is above 90% for the country,
radar procedures are in place only in Nairobi, and are used sporadically depending on weather in
Mombasa5.
As part of upgrading and expanding the air traffic control system in Tanzania, one option proposed has
been the implementation of ADS-B, a reporting system that uses GPS receivers within aircraft to pinpoint
the location of the aircraft, and interconnected ground-based transceivers to received aircraft position
reports and transfer these to the air traffic control system. Such a system is far more accurate over longer
distances than radar, and considerably less expensive.
The implementation of ADS-B also has a regional element: Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi are
also considering this technology, and a common platform would allow the regional integration of the
upper airspace. Plans for unifying the upper airspace for the EAC, and also for SADC members, have
recently been openly discussed.
Overflights over Tanzanias airspace (referred to as the Dar-es-Salaam flight information region, or DAR
FIR) number roughly 65 thousand in 2008, and have been increasing because of growth in Qatar and
Kenyan airways flights 6. The overflights represent an important source of revenues. ICAO, however,
insists that overflight charges should not be seen as a cash cow, and that charges should be applied as to
cover the costs of the service being provided. The reality is that with poorer countries this imperative
simply cannot be followed. However, Tanzania could further justify its revenue from these overflights by
increasing the level of air traffic control services being offered. This argument also supports the longerterm notion of implementing ADS-B.
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 below reflect some general statistics for the TCAA. Figure 5 shows the
total number of pilot licenses in Tanzania. The interesting movements are between 2006 and 2007: The
number of commercial pilots without an instrument rating (i.e. only able to fly looking out the window,
4
Primary coverage includes being able to view generally all flying man-made objects within an area, whereas
secondary radar provides much more detail for aircraft equipped with transponders. Secondary radar is generally the
standard used for air traffic control.
5
In clear weather, separation between approaching aircraft could be done visually. In clouds, however, pilots have
to rely solely on the controllers knowledge of nearby traffic, making radar more necessary.
6
Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania 2008, TCAA, p. vii.
20
which is impossible in low visibility or clouds) has dramatically dropped a generally positive sign for
safety. Figure 7 shows the total number of accidents. After a peak of accidents and incidents there has
been a leveling, with fatal accidents showing up sporadically but in general following the same curve. As
noted in the caption of the graph, hull losses overall can overdramatize the accident rate, since the older
an aircraft is, the more likely the hull is written off rather than repaired after damage. Accident statistics
in general are a complicated topic when looking at just one country, because accidents overall are so rare.
The increase in accidents between 2002 and 2005 can somewhat be explained with the growth in traffic.
A true statistical evaluation of the safety of flying in Tanzania would involve indexing the accident rate to
the total amount of flight hours flown.
Figure 5: Pilot licenses registered in Tanzania.

1000
900
800
700
Total Pilot Licences
600
500
Non-Instrument
Commercial
400
300
Instrument
Commerical
200
100
0
Data source: Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania, 2008
21
Figure 6: Total aircraft year-end on the TCAAs aircraft registry.

225
220
215
210
205
Total Aircraft
200
195
190
185
Data source: Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania, 2008
Figure 7: Total Accidents and incidences, fatal accidents, and hull losses. The overall rate has
somewhat stabilized. The hull loss rate is not considered as important statistic in safety
evaluations, since it is dependent on the value (age) of the aircraft. The older the aircraft, the
more likely an accident will lead to a write-off rather than a repair.
20
18
16
14
12
Accidents/Incidents
10
8
Fatal Accidents
Hull Losses
4
2
0
Data source: TCAA

22
c. TAA
Tanzania Airports Authority is semi-autonomous striving towards becoming a fully independent agency.
The authority has 58 airports in its system, with the busiest being Dar es Salaam. Though also having
much tourist travel, the airport in Zanzibar does not fall under the authority, and Kilimanjaro International
Airport is run by a separate joint venture (KADCO).
Finances
Operationally, the TAA is generally carrying itself. Total revenues were US$ 23 million for 2008, of
which US$ 16.2 million were operational income. This is paired with total expenses of roughly US$ 14
million. In addition to operational income was a government infusion of US$ 888,100, which covers the
salary structure of very senior employees who were part of the authority under the previous structural
arrangement with the GoT. Passenger service charges collected were US$ 12.1 million, of which US$ 3.1
million went to the GoT. This roughly 25% remainder to the GoT has been agreed upon to no longer
occur, which means that even if the $888,100 salary subsidy would no longer exist, there would be a net
gain for the authority, and operating surpluses would continue to accumulate, as they have in the past.
Figure 8: TAA Revenue Sources, FY 2007/2008

Advertisement
1%
Charges
4%
Miscellaneous
receipts
1%
Landing & Parking
22%
Landing & Parking

Rental and
Concession
17%
Passenger Service
Charges
55%

Operational income was US$ 16.2 million. However, another US$ 890,000 in government grants are not shown,
which pay for top-level salaries. Data source: TAA Annual Report, 2007-2008.
23
In terms of the capital structure, the Authority is heavily dependent on government and donor infusions
for improvements or heavier-duty maintenance to its airports. Under its current income structure, the
TAA has reported to be capable to raise between US$ 12 million to US$ 22 million with commercial
banks, with this amount having risen as operational surpluses have accumulated. However, these amounts
are marginal if compared to the overall need for infrastructure investment in the airport sector in
Tanzania, demonstrating the need for larger partners to help finance development.
The debt for airport projects does not show in the balance sheets of the authority. Upon further inquiry, it
was determined that the GoT itself carries the debt for airport improvements, and that the TAA makes
payments on this debt from funds received from the GoT. Payments for these debts amounted to roughly
US$ 6 million for 2007/2008. In this sense, the TAA infrastructure is clearly subsidized, and so far capital
investments and their repayments have had no significant impact on the TAAs finances.
Services
The TAA has provided concessions for the handling of passenger and cargo at JNIA and Mwanza. Since
both Kilimanjaro International and Zanzibar International airports are not in the realm of the TAA, these
two airports carry the TAAs highest volume (84% of TAAs system), with the rest being a very distant
16% of volume spread over 57 airports. In general, most services consist of facilities maintenance such as
upkeep of buildings and air-side pavements and other surfaces (in 2008, grass cutting for all airfields
accumulated to an annual expense of US$ 428,000), and airport planning. The TAA is an authority more
focused on the necessary infrastructure upkeep and concessioning of essential terminal services, whereas
the TCAA provides lighter infrastructure (limited to ATC and navigation systems) and more direct
services in terms of oversight, information dissemination, training, navigation, and air traffic control.
24
2. Service Providers
There are three general types of service providers in Tanzania. On the scheduled side, within Tanzania
there is the nationally owned flag carrier, Air Tanzania, and Precision Air, a carrier privately held with
Kenyan Airways as a partial shareholder. A second level of carrier also abounds in Tanzania, with the
prime example being Coastal Air. Operating officially as charter carriers, these carriers actually also
provide scheduled service, and in Coastal's case actually have a broad and expansive network within the
country, essentially flying the same routes as the bigger carriers, but with smaller aircraft and at times
(such as between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar) at much higher frequencies. The third type of carrier is the
pure charter operator, of which there are many. It is important to note that the unscheduled carriers and
the hybrid charter operators provide a larger chunk of the domestic services than one might expect. For
example, Coastal alone has about a 30% market share for all domestic services flying out of Dar es
Salaam, which is significant considering that the biggest route, between Mwanza and Dar es Salaam, is
also served by the Precision Air and Air Tanzania, both of whom fly larger aircraft, though Air
Tanzanias 737-200 had an unfortunate accident in March 2010 and will be in repairs for some time.
Service providers come and go over time, so it is difficult to make long-term projections as to who will be
carrying far into the future. However, the troubles of Air Tanzania play an important role in the overall
role of the service providers.
Air Tanzania
The last iteration of Air Tanzania was 49% owned by South African Airlines, having been launched in
March 2003. The partnership did not end well, and was dissolved by March 2006, after having lost a total
of nearly US$ 20 million, with the airline once again being 100% government owned, as a separate
agency to the Ministry of Infrastructure Development7. What followed was a subsequent decline in the
fleet, and corresponding less frequencies. The overall decline of the airline including even the period
before South African's involvement, coupled with the demand for growth and a more open policy of
allowing other players to provide service, ended up being a boost for Precision Air, which subsequently
became the dominant domestic carrier. Precision Air renewed its turbine fleet with new ATR aircraft from
France, and eventually started jet service between destinations such as Nairobi and Dar es Salaam.
Today the climate in Tanzania towards service providers from the outside for international service may
well yield towards liberalization as stipulated in the Yamoussoukro decision; however there are serious
considerations for economic regulation of domestic services, with the argument that Precision Air is now
monopolizing domestic routes, and a government-owned flag carrier is needed to provide competition and
make sure thin routes do not get dropped out of the network. There is also ample evidence, however, that
private carriers are interested in establishing themselves in Tanzania, as some smaller start-ups are now
showing.
Weak state-owned flag carriers become a significant financial drain for their government. With Air
Tanzania this came to a high point towards the end of 2008: As ICAO performed its audit of the safety
oversight system in Tanzania, the lack of technical documents (manuals) for the aircraft being operated
was discovered. The TCAA had no option but to ground the airline until remedies were in place.
7
See http://www.infrastructure.go.tz/index.php/ministry/category/ministry_departments/
25
However, since the purchase of the technical documentation, in the end, came out of the GoTs pocket,
the TCAA, even though representing the enforcement side of the safety oversight, also had to financially
participate in the remedy. This leads to a troubling conflict of interest: If a regulator is forced to
contribute to the cost of the remedy of a standards violation, it is in the regulator's self interest not to
enforce all applicable safety standards.
The future of Air Tanzania should be more carefully examined. The airline currently operates two Dash8s, purchased with the assistance of Sonangol, and one 737-200 that unfortunately has a mishap in early
2010, and now in need of repairs. In addition, it has now leased an Airbus 320, with monthly lease costs
of over US$ 350,000. This fleet composition presents several problems:
The Airbus is not really economically usable for current routes other than Dar Johannesburg.
The Airbus does not fit in well with the fleet mix. Having many different types of aircraft
increases operating costs and the general logistics of flying, since generally pilots get trained on
and certified on only on type of transport aircraft at a time. On the other hand, having several
aircraft of the same type increases flexibility and serviceability. Another Boeing 737-200 would
have been more suitable.
The Airbus, though lease payments have been made for at least two years, is not flying, since
extensive maintenance is being performed.
Currently, Air Tanzania has transport pilots on its payroll that are not flying, certified for the
Boeing 737. The Airbus will require a resource shift in flying skills, while not taking advantage
of already existing capacity being paid for.
The string of mishaps and financial losses are typical for a small nationally owned flag carrier that should
actually be closed down. Though this is a strongly worded recommendation, there are several reasons for
stating this:
Attempting to find a private sector investor to take over the airline plays into an ever repeating
vicious cycle of trying to make the airline more attractive while investing (and losing) more and
more money. In small African airlines the losses run into the tens of millions US$, in large
carriers such as found in South East Asia losses above US$ 600 million have been experienced in
one year alone for one carrier, all in the efforts to privatize the airlines, with failed outcomes. In
some cases these efforts have lasted over at least a decade.
Keeping the airline as is brings about significant market distortions. For example, it is typical for
small nationally owned carriers not to pay their parking and landing fees, creating large accounts
payable balances at domestic airports that can never be collected, and in effect crowding out those
that do have to pay. In addition, these mechanisms also impeded the efficient setting of fares: The
nationally owned flag carrier actually has an advantage in setting fares because it does not have to
compensate for all of its true economic cost of operating.
Following the previous point, private sector carriers can never trust the government and the
regulator if they are in the same business, competing with them. This may be keeping new
entrants from entering the market.
Government-owned flag carriers can attract substantial governance issues. Not only are there
large risks that some passengers will never fly as revenue passengers, but investment, leasing, and
26
acquisition decisions may not be done on a sound business or

opportunities for governance to go awry.
economic basis, and offer
Text Box: Flag carriersa pattern in attempting privatization8

Not only in Africa but in much of the developing world, the national flag carrier plays a visible role, though one
whose economics are often questionable. In most cases, the state-owned and operated flag carrier was established
decades ago. The carrier grows at first, partly because of market protectioncompetition is prohibited on some or
all of its routes. Over time, service quality declines and losses mount, until a change in government forces a
rethinking of policy. Proponents of maintaining the carrier argue as follows: (i) without it, little-traveled, subsidized
domestic routes would be dropped, creating regional isolation; (ii) the carrier can potentially create revenues for the
government, especially from foreigners traveling within the country; and (iii) a flag carrier must be maintained as a
matter of national pride.
As losses mount, though, advisers recommend the sale of the airline. To attract potential private sector buyers, the
airline must first be restructured and made viable. During that process, the carrier realizes that routes are only
profitable if it remains a state-sanctioned monopoly and that its aircraft in use do not really meet the demands of the
public. In addition, the carrier identifies new potential routes for expansion.
With additional investment from the government, the carrier buys new aircraft and brings new routes into service,
while maintaining its monopoly on current routes. Over time, it becomes apparent that the new aircraft are too
expensive to operate and have a load factor too low to be profitable on the routes for which they were bought
(incurring losses of staggering proportions). The private sector is even less interested in the airline as a result of the
restructuring. Barring liquidation, the process will start all over again.
Generally, the best solution is to completely liquidate the carrier and have a successful outside operator provide
international services. A flag carrier from another country could potentially play this role. Compromises could be
made, such as painting the outside operators aircraft in the flag carriers colors and hiring crew for passenger
services within the country. For domestic routes, it makes sense to let small, local operators develop from the private
sector.
Adapted from Bofinger, Heinrich, An Unsteady Course: Growth and Challenges in Africas Air Transport
Industry, Pre-Release Edition, Africa Infrastructure Diagnostic, the World Bank, p.7
27
III. Traffic Overview

Tanzania's total traffic per airport is summarized in Table 5 at the end of this chapter, using mostly TAA
data. Using TCAA data dating back to 2001, overall traffic has grown 10.9% between 2001 and 2008,
with international having grown 10.6%, and domestic 11.0%. Beyond the airports of the TAA, there are
also Kilimanjaro, Pemba, and Zanzibar. The total system throughput in 2008 was 3.09 million
passengers 9, with an annual geometric growth rate of 11 % between 2004 and 2008, higher than the
industry average globally of 5-6 percent during the same period10. The traffic measured is passenger
traffic as reported by the TAA, and the TCAA with respect to Pemba and Zanzibar. Kilimanjaro, notably,
had grown at rates above 20% between 2004 and 2007, only to have its overall growth rate decline to
16% after registering an actual decline between 2007 and 2008. Also of note are the number of airports in
the system with very little or no passenger traffic at all.
1. International Travel
Tanzania currently has roughly ten major airlines providing international service into three airports, Julius
Nyerere International Airport in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar International Airport on the island of Zanzibar,
and Kilimanjaro International Airport in the Kilimanjaro region. By far the most important airport is the
international airport in Dar es Salaam, though Kilimanjaro has been growing rapidly.
Tourism accounts for a large chunk of passenger traffic arriving internationally, with the game reserves in
the north and Zanzibar being major attractions. An estimated 66.8 of all arrivals are tourism related11. By
far the strongest route is between Kenya and Tanzania, since Nairobi is one of the three import air
transport hubs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Table 2 shows a breakdown of airlines with their respective market
share for 2008, using capacity estimates.
Figure 10 shows the major international routes for all of Tanzania for 2008. The data used for this analysis
is from the Seabury SRS data analyzer, which measures scheduled capacity, not actual passenger flows.
However, an extract of this data for Dar es Salaam has been compared with the actual passenger data
from the TAA for Dar es Salaam, and a remarkable consistency has been found between 2005 and 2008,
as shown in Table 1. The ratio of the estimated scheduled seat capacity to actual passengers should
approximate load factors, and indeed the climb of this ratio from roughly 66% to between 80 and 90%
does somewhat follow the global industry trend in load factors.
There are slight variances in the totals when comparing TCAA and TAAs statistics. The TCAA published a total
system traffic number of 2.90 million, a roughly 6% difference. In most cases, the TCAAs numbers are being used,
however, since the TAA has a published breakdown of all of its airports between 2004 and 2008, for system-wide
traffic the TAAs numbers are used, in conjunction with TCAAs numbers for Zanzibar, Pemba, and Kilimanjaro.
10
The long-term global average is about 10% growth. However, during the period in question Tanzania clearly
outperformed global growth rates.
11
Computed using numbers found in Tourism Statistical Bulletin 2008, Ministry of Natural Resources and
Tourism (Tanzania), Tourism Department, p. 8
28
Table 1: Comparison of Seabury SRS data on international seat capacity for Dar es Salaam and actual
passenger figures provided by the TAA. The ratio of the actual passengers to actual seats approximate
industry load ratios well enough to make reliable route and trend analysis using the Seabury data that could
not be made with TAA data.
SRS International JNIA

TAA International JNIA
Ratio
2005
1,141,327
749,988
66%
2006
1,114,854
975,783
88%
2007
1,331,592
1,115,373
84%
2008
1,370,657
1,220,674
89%
Note: The TCAAs statistics publication of 2008 shows load factors of international flights to be only
56.48% This difference could be caused by the fact that the table above shows only scheduled flights.
Otherwise, it might suggest that the seat capacity in the SRS analyzer is somewhat understated. This should
have no significant effect on trends or the distribution of capacity among routes.
29
Figure 9: International seat capacity in 2001, adjusted for intermediate stops. Total seats where an estimated 1.22 million.
30
Figure 10: International seat capacity in 2008, adjusted for intermediate stops. Total seats where an estimated 2.1 million.
Source: Analysis based on Seabury SRS data. No unscheduled flights are included.
31
Table 2: Airlines providing scheduled international service in Tanzania (including

Zanzibar), with their international seat capacities.
Airline
2001
Precision Air Services Ltd.
2009
2009
Share
6,807
456,248
22%
65,028
268,079
13%
Kenya Airways
173,347
214,041
10%
Emirates
119,716
199,864
10%
129,640
6%
128,943
6%
Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise
Swiss European Air Lines Ltd

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
85,344
South African Airways
48,764
118,200
6%
103,868
5%
58,923
3%
Panair S.p.A.
55,389
3%
African Star Airways (PTY) Ltd.
46,972
2%
Star Air
43,915
2%
Qatar Airways
British Airways
187,675
Egyptair
16,437
40,048
2%
Air Malawi Limited
39,212
39,208
2%
Condor Flugdienst GmbH
37,411
2%
LAM
28,084
1%
1Time Airline
20,749
1%
19,095
1%
Northern Dene Airways Ltd.
18,082
1%
Air Routing International Corp.
17,614
1%
Rwandair Express
12,782
1%
Tavrey Aircompany
10,392
1%
3,940
0%
Air Zimbabwe (PVT) Ltd.
10,686
TUI Airlines Belgium

Air Tanzania Company Ltd.
187,900
Swiss Air UA
122,418
Gulf Air Company G.S.C.
61,313
Air India Limited
43,646
FlyGlobeSpan
22,239
Air Service
16,904
Yemenia
11,682
Eagle Air Ltd.

2,182
Source: Calculated using estimated seat capacities as reported by Seaburys SRS Data
Analyzer.
32
Table 3: Airlines providing scheduled international service in Tanzania, with their

international seat-kilometer capacities.
Airline
2001
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

Swiss European Air Lines Ltd
Emirates
British Airways P.L.C.
Qatar Airways (W.L.L.)
Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise
South African Airways
Condor Flugdienst GmbH
Egyptair
Kenya Airways
1Time Airline
African Star Airways (PTY) Ltd.
Air Malawi Limited
Air Zimbabwe (PVT) Ltd.
Air Routing International Corp.
Tavrey Aircompany
LAM
TUI Airlines Belgium
Northern Dene Airways Ltd.
Star Air
Panair S.p.A.
Rwandair Express
Swiss Air UA
Gulf Air Company G.S.C.
Air India Limited
FlyGlobeSpan
Air Service
Yemenia
Eagle Air Ltd.
610,613,593
311,265,008
825,960,691
77,835,581
118,283,074
2,558,968
46,065,879
108,561,815
35,327,950
24,092,785
497,378,634
248,269,868
240,777,818
116,204,175
76,264,532
24,190,082
20,941,972
611,050
33
2009
916,343,220
870,974,720
791,142,212
440,269,966
394,366,174
380,095,603
286,706,745
253,191,519
233,707,960
167,369,312
139,021,128
51,690,806
40,132,740
37,865,213
28,688,779
26,323,019
25,888,550
21,706,311
21,305,263
18,675,172
16,132,624
14,336,471
10,000,762
2009
Share
18%
17%
15%
8%
8%
7%
6%
5%
5%
3%
3%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
2. Domestic Travel
Tanzania's domestic system will require further study in the proposed civil aviation master plan before
any firm conclusions can be made. Though airport statistics for the airports in the TAA's system are
readily available, the statistics that would analyze the actual routes being flown are much more difficult to
process. Data from the SRS Analyzer is proving to be unreliable due to the fact that only formal,
scheduled, and advertised services could be found. However, much of the domestic network is serviced
by carrier such as Coastal (which now has an estimated 30% of the domestic traffic related to Dar es
Salaam) that are formally classified as charter operators, but act as scheduled carriers. This makes an
analysis of the domestic network dependent on highly granular data for each airport in the system, rather
than a global repository. Though such data is being collected by the TAA, due to its volume the TAA
could not assemble the data into a complete package for this report.
Using the SRS analyzer tool, the domestic system between 2001 and 2008 looks as described in figures
Figure 11 and Figure 12. It would appear that many airports have dropped off the system. However, when
comparing the TAA's airport summaries with the SRS system, the SRS system is clearly understating
service. The dramatic reduction in the route network may well a be function of both overall decline in
service and a shift from formal scheduled services to non-scheduled services acting as scheduled services
as Precision Airways (formal scheduled), Coastal Aviation (informal, i.e. charter, but acting as
scheduled), and others fill the vacuum caused by the severe reduction in Air Tanzania's (formal
scheduled) network. In addition, the route consolidation in the north of the country may also be a result of
a more extensive road networking having developed.
Tanzania's domestic traffic has gone through a significant set of changes in the last ten years. In 2001 a
thin but expansive route network existed, with much higher connectivity than today. Though the traffic
has grown by 11.1 percent, this route network has significantly reduced in terms of the number of nodes.
Especially noticeable is the lack of any destinations in the lower west of the country. This region of
Tanzania has low population densities, but also carries high potential for mining gold and coal, especially
around Iringa, and further development of game parks as tourist attractions. However, mining activities in
general do not increase scheduled passenger services.
An interesting aspect of Tanzania's domestic traffic is the general aviation (GA) component 12. Though the
most important route between Dar es Salaam and Mwanza, is serviced in a fully scheduled manner by Air
Tanzania and Precision Air, Coastal Air, which does not fully fall under the term "scheduled services",
provides an extensive network of scheduled flights, using Cessna Caravans, throughout Tanzania. The
frequency of these flights are a significant addition to the transport network.
The TAA has 58 airports in its current system, however only 13 receive what could be formally called
regularly scheduled services, down from 19 from 200113. There are, in addition to the TAA's airports, a
high number of private strips serving both game parks and hte mining industry. The estimated number of
such strips is 309.
12
General Aviation refers to smaller, propeller aircraft and includes almost all private aircraft. The Cessna Caravan
is a high wing, single-engine, turbine-driven propeller aircraft, and is classified as GA.
13
These figures are from the Seaburys SRS data analyzer tool. As mentioned in other sections of the report, they
omit operators such as Coastal, and should be read with caution.
34
Table 4: Scheduled domestic carriers in Tanzania. This table

must be read with caution - a significant bulk of Tanzania's
domestic travel does not show up in these statistics, as the lack
of Coastal's numbers alone attest. Significant is the loss of Air
Tanzania and the gain of Precision Air. Presented are seat
capacities, not actual passengers.
Airline
2001
2009
121,058
487,441
ZanAir Limited
101,842
229,542
Source: Analysis based on data provided by Seabury's SRS

data analyzer.
35
Figure 11: Estimated domestic seat capacity in 2001, adjusted for intermediate stops. Total seats where an estimated 450,000. Not included are
charter operators with scheduled services, such as Coastal.
Source: Analysis based on Seabury SRS data.
36
Figure 12: Estimated domestic seat capacity in 2008, adjusted for intermediate stops. Total seats where an estimated 840,000. Not included are
charter operators with scheduled services, such as Coastal.
Source: Analysis based on Seabury SRS data.

37
Figure 13: Public airports in Tanzania, categorized by passenger traffic in 2008, using TAA statistics. All airports
except Kilimanjaro, Pemba, and Zanzibar fall under the TAA. Noticeable are existing facilities in the south and
south west of the country with virtually no passenger traffic.
Note: Not shown are Ngarenairobi and Kirondotal. Next version of the report will have updated chart.
Data source: TCAA
38
Table 5: Total Passenger Numbers in Tanzania
Data source: TCAA. The numbers in this table feed into the projections in the next chapter.
39
IV. Investments: An Overview

1. Anticipated Needs
Airport investments are complicated because of (a) their intermodal play and (b) simply the speculative
nature of a new transport node. The notion of "build, and they will come" may work in some
infrastructure arenas, but in the air transport (particularly airports) sector this notion has had very mixed
results, with the example of the Montral-Mirabel airport often cited as the most astounding as the airport
failed as a passenger airport and was relegated to cargo-only operations.
In Tanzania, there are some clear examples of truly needed investments in existing facilities, while the
development of new facilities may be more questionable for future payback. For Tanzania, for example,
the eventual addition of a new international terminal in Dar es Salaam, as well as a new additional
terminal in Zanzibar, are mathematically determined "must-haves". These are existing airports with
determined levels of growth that can be easily projected into the future. Given the nature of Tanzania's
domestic services, however, the true analysis of where future demand lies not in the prediction of where
good anchors, or nodes, may be placed, but by looking at what operators are already doing. The most
informative set of needs for future domestic air transport investment, or even other modal investments
such as roads, may lie in where operators are placing their private airstrips today. At the same time, an
analysis of the current airports in the TAA's system could well demonstrate that there are nodes
worthwhile dropping altogether.
Figure 13 in the previous section helps illustrate the point. There are 37 airports with less than 1,000
passengers in 2008, of which 12 have no passengers at all. If this is compared to the actual traffic charts
showing domestic passenger movements (Figure 12 earlier in this report), it would seem that the lack of
traffic in the lower western portion of the country is not caused by lack or airports or airstrips, but simply
by lack of demand for services at current cost levels.
40
2. Summary of Traffic Projections

Projecting growth in the current climate has become more difficult because of a set of unknowns. The
intermediate-term growth rate of the air transport sector globally has been around 5-6 percent between
2001 and 2007, and very long term rates around 10%. Traditionally growth rates used in projections
follow a smoothed S curve. However, Tanzania is unique in that it has shown a much higher growth
rate, even when compared to Africa. By the same token, new dangers for the air transport industry are
emerging. Between 2007 and 2009 two crises have struck in the forms of the oil price spike and the global
recession. The speed of the recovery is an overall macro-economic element that could easily disrupt
projections, since the airline industry is very dependent on overall economic activity. As a recovery
unfolds, however, the effect on oil prices cannot easily be predicted. In addition, environmental concerns
and even perhaps pending legislation may target the airline industry, especially in Europe. Though overall
economic activity and fuel prices are more cyclical in nature, they could be regarded as events that could
be averaged out over time. However, increased environmental concerns may in fact, for the first time, set
a more permanent cap on air transport's growth.
A history of growth rates, compared to Tanzanias overall GNI, is shown in Figure 14 below. Air
transport growth rates appear as a leading indicator to overall economic growth the peaks in passenger
growth precede the peaks in GNI growth, as do the valleys. This has shown itself also valid in global air
freight statistics.
Figure 14: Growth rates in Tanzanias air travel, as compared to Tanzanias GNI. Passenger growth rates can be
described as a leading indicator.
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
20.0%
Growth Rate All

Growth Rate Domestic
15.0%
Growth Rate International

GNI Growth Rate
10.0%
GNI Per Capita Growth

Population Growth Rate
5.0%
0.0%
g 01-02 g 02-03 g 03-04 g 04-05 g 05-06 g 06-07 g 07-08
-5.0%
Data source: Calculated on data from both the TAA and the TCAA.
41
Figure 15 below shows the historic passenger figures for the overall system, with additional highlights
showing the proportion of JNIAs traffic, Kilimanjaro, Zanzibar, and all remaining airports. JNIA carries
roughly half of all traffic, implying that the remaining categories carry roughly 17% each. Clearly JNIA is
the single most important access point to Tanzania.
Figure 15: System traffic compared to JNIA, Kilimanjaro, Zanzibar, and all other airports
in Tanzania.
3,500,000
3,000,000
2,500,000
Traffic All Facilities
2,000,000
Traffic JNIA
1,500,000
Traffic Kilimanjaro
1,000,000
Traffic Zanzibar
Traffic All Others
500,000
0
Data source: Calculated on data from both the TAA and the TCAA.
The growth projection in report will simply assume estimated year-to-year growth rates, starting with
2008, an estimated figure for 2009, and the continuing to 2025. Since the growth rates of domestic and
international traffic for total traffic within the TAA's airport system are virtually the same (10.5% and
10.2 % respectively), and have historically been following each other tightly, projections are being made
on the overall system, rather than on domestic and international travel separately. In addition, planned
infrastructure improvements may cause a one-time jump in the traffic of at least three domestic airports,
with some estimates as high as 30%, helping offset the dip in domestic travel. 14
It must be noted that a truly regression-based analysis on various specific airports should be considered
in the scope of a full Master Plan, be it for the entire civil aviation sector or for a specific airport.
However, some facts could be drawn from a rough forecast as presented here. As will be shown in the
analysis for Julius Nyerere International Airport below, all scenarios would require investment in new
terminal space. The question centers on the size of the expansion. Since most traffic is scheduled, it is
assumed for this projection that all traffic would be going through either Terminal II or a newer facility.
In fact, less than 10% of the airport's traffic goes through Terminal I today.
14
The three airports selected for near-term rehabilitation by the World Bank are Kigoma, Bukoba, and Taborra.
42
In the charts below, traffic figures from Table 5 in the previous section are shown, with their historic
growth rate, for (a) the entire Tanzanian system traffic, and (b) JNIA. The growth rates are presented with
a "V" curve, reflecting the current economic recession. For the projections, there are three scenarios:
1. Moderate assumption: Assuming a small recovery in 2010 after a 13% drop between 2008 and
2009, and then continued growth, albeit not at the previous rates, but at the African Continent's
rate of slightly above 5%.
2. Optimistic assumption: After the same initial decline, there is a bounce back towards the growth
rate experienced between 2004 and 2008, with a decline in growth only towards the end of the
forecast period, though with growth still above 7.% percent in the end.
3. Pessimistic assumption: After a slower recovery from the 13% drop, growth would remain
sluggish, below 5%.
Figure 16 through Figure 18 show the projections for the entire system, while Figure 19 through Figure 21
show the projections for JNIA.
Figure 16: Projected system growth, with moderate assumptions. After an estimated 13% decline from 2008 to
2009, there would be a slow recovery with a final growth rate being equal that of the continent.
7,000,000
20.00%
6,000,000
15.00%
5,000,000
10.00%
4,000,000
5.00%
3,000,000
0.00%
2,000,000
-5.00%
1,000,000
-10.00%
-15.00%
Projections based on historical data collected by the TAA and TCAA.
43
Overall System
Growth rate
Figure 17: Projected system growth, with optimistic assumptions. After an estimated 13% decline from 2008 to
2009, there would be a quicker recovery with a final growth rate being equal that of between 2004 and 2008. There
may be a decline due to external environmental factors towards the end of the forecast period.
14,000,000
20.00%
12,000,000
15.00%
10,000,000
10.00%
8,000,000
5.00%
6,000,000
0.00%
4,000,000
-5.00%
2,000,000
-10.00%
-15.00%
Overall System
Growth rate
Figure 18: Projected system growth, with pessimistic assumptions. After an estimated 13% decline from 2008 to
2009, there would be a slow recovery ending in a more anemic growth rate below Africa's overall historic average.
20.00%
5,000,000
4,500,000
15.00%
4,000,000
3,500,000
10.00%
3,000,000
5.00%
2,500,000
2,000,000
0.00%
1,500,000
-5.00%
1,000,000
-10.00%
500,000
-15.00%
44
Overall System
Growth rate
Figure 19: Projected growth at JNIA, with moderate assumptions. After an estimated 13% decline from 2008 to
2009, there would be a slow recovery with a final growth rate being equal that of the continent.
3,500,000
20.00%
3,000,000
15.00%
2,500,000
10.00%
2,000,000
5.00%
1,500,000
0.00%
1,000,000
-5.00%
JNIA Passengers
Series2
-10.00%
500,000
-15.00%
Projections based on historical data collected by the TAA.

Figure 20: Projected growth at JNIA, with optimistic assumptions. After an estimated 13% decline from 2008 to
2009, there would be a quicker recovery with a final growth rate being equal that of between 2004 and 2008. There
may be a decline due to external environmental factors towards the end of the forecast period.
6,000,000
20.00%
5,000,000
15.00%
10.00%
4,000,000
5.00%
3,000,000
0.00%
2,000,000
-5.00%
1,000,000
-10.00%
-15.00%
45
JNIA Passengers
Series2
Figure 21: Projected growth at JNIA, with pessimistic assumptions. After an estimated 13% decline from 2008 to
2009, there would be a slow recovery ending in a more anemic growth rate below Africa's overall historic average.
2,500,000
20.00%
15.00%
2,000,000
10.00%
1,500,000
5.00%
1,000,000
0.00%
-5.00%
500,000
-10.00%
-15.00%
46
JNIA Passengers
Series2
3. Needs for Primary Airports

a. Julius Nyerere International Airport
The main airport in Tanzania, JNIA has 50.0 % of total passenger traffic in Tanzania in 2008, and 78.2%
of all traffic in TAAs airport system15, with a total of above 1.4 million passengers. There are two
runways, and extensive rehabilitation by Interbeton with support from the Government of the Netherlands
has brought about, and is currently producing, an improved main runway, a renovated apron area for
Terminal II, a resurfaced secondary runway for general aviation traffic, and (now under construction) a
full length parallel taxiway for the main runway.
The airport has two terminals - the old terminal (Terminal I) now being used for non-scheduled and small
scheduled domestic operations, and Terminal II, which acts as the main gateway. The split in traffic
between the two terminals is of almost no significance in terms of total capacity, as only roughly 100,000
passengers go through the older, much smaller terminal.
However, the airport overall is now already operating beyond its total design capacity of roughly 1.2
million passengers. With an average annual growth rate of 13% between 2001 and 2008, the constraints
for the terminal are becoming more pressing, especially since the passenger flows within the terminal are
not optimal16. The capacity constraints will call for expansion of the current terminal, and the eventual
construction of a new, third terminal. It is often recommended that terminal capacity be expanded through
the re-scheduling of flights. However, in practice airports hold very little bargaining power over airlines.
Though this approach might be attempted, it would not yield a long-term solution.
Table 6: Traffic breakdown for Julius Nyerere International Airport
Service Type
2001
2002
2005
2004
357,320
394,727
459,018
842
878
Dom Scheduled
Dom NonScheduled
192,511
Total
Intl Scheduled
2005
2006
2007
2008
567,907
596,107
658,325
753,315
821,019
823
993
1,764
928
1,177
2,379
182,845
220,254
905,568
345,009
354,045
423,069
435,972
52,393
71,165
76,009
79,376
87,299
135,643
157,987
161,803
903,066
649,615
756,104
953,844
1,030,179
1,148,941
1,335,548
1,421,173
Intl Non-Scheduled
Data source: TCAA. The totals for JNIA differ slightly from those reported by the TAA in Table 5 found
earlier in this report..
Table 7: Growth rates for Julius Nyerere International Airport
Service Type
20012002
International
20022003
20032004
20042005
20052006
20062007
20072008
Geom. g
2001-2008
10.45%
16.24%
23.72%
5.09%
10.27%
14.45%
9.13%
12.63%
Domestic
3.72%
16.63%
29.93%
12.30%
13.27%
18.66%
2.88%
13.60%
Total
7.72%
16.39%
26.15%
8.00%
11.53%
16.24%
6.41%
13.03%
Data source: Computed on TCAA data found in table above.

15
See Table 5 above, which is based on the table found in TAA Traffic Movements Statistics 2008, p.42
Development of Ground Handling Services for Passenger, Aircraft, Cargo and Aviation Fueling Services Report
R06: Technical & Operational Review of Ground Handling Operations, IATA/TCAA, October 31, 2008, p. 55-57.
16
47
The year 2009 may well be a year of actual decline in traffic numbers, due to the global recession.
Overall, the growth rates have been declining since 2007, when growth dropped from 16% from the
previous year to only 6%17. The overall system saw a similar level of decline, falling from 13% to 7% and
having an average growth rate of 13% between 2004 and 2008. The average growth rate for all of Africa,
for all traffic, has been estimated to be 5.8% between 2001 and 2007. Though the years do not exactly
match, it is apparent, by looking at the overall year - to - year system growth rates, that Tanzania has
outperformed the rest of the continent.
Both the cargo terminal and Terminal IIs operations have been concessioned to SwissPort, with the
contract up for rebidding soon. In addition, recently the TAA has allowed air service providers to perform
their own passenger processing if they prefer. The model of having a contractor manage the actual
passenger operations rather than a government-based entity seems to have worked well, though the actual
passenger checking process is still in much need of further computerization.
A recent study by IATA recommends that cargo facilities be improved dramatically, citing significant
shortcomings in the cargo terminal. In addition, the report also highlights some security concerns found in
both the layout of Terminal 1 and the quality of security checks at other entry points to the airside. During
the development of the civil aviation master plan, and any airport master plan for JNIA, the concerns of
this report should be reflected18.
b. Zanzibar International Airport

Zanzibar International Airport does not fall under the TAA, but is still an important facility in Tanzanias
air transport sector, as Zanzibar acts as its own magnet for tourism. From a purely nodal point of view,
having two international airport in the same country only 45 miles apart may seem questionable.
However, not only is Zanzibar an island, but it also has its own draw for tourists, including those coming
from Italy, with an expanding focus to the Middle East, Far East, and Russia19.
The airport has been facing severely deteriorating runway and taxiway conditions. An attempt to extend
and resurface the runway, financed by the World Bank, failed at first because of non-performance by a
contractor. The work has been rebid, and now extensive construction has commenced.
At the same time, both apron and terminal space face severe limitations20. A recently developed master
plan for the airport calls for the construction of a new terminal and related land-side facilities with
investments in the order of US$ 55 million, with a new proposed capacity of 2 million passengers for
meeting needs until 2025, implying an overall annual geometric growth rate of 8%. The terminal would
be constructed in various stages, meeting new passenger capacity requirements by 2015, 2020, and 2025.
17
See Table 5 or Table 7. As mentioned in a previous footnote, there are slight differences in the statistics presented
by the TCAA and the TAA.
18 18
Development of Ground Handling Services for Passenger, Aircraft, Cargo and Aviation Fueling Services
Report R06: Technical & Operational Review of Ground Handling Operations, IATA/TCAA, October 31, 2008, p.
51-72.
19
Airport Master Plan, Zanzibar International Airport, October 2008, p. 9
20
One way to approximate required terminal capacity is to use a figure between 0.007 and 0.01 , multiplied by
annual passenger flow, to obtain the required number of square meters. In the case of Zanzibar, the terminal is 1,850
m2. If one divided this number by the most conservative figure, 0.007 (which really applies more to domestic
operations), the annual capacity of the terminal would be roughly 264,000 passengers. The current flow hovers
around 500,000.
48
The plan carries merit; however, the costs may need to be examined more carefully 21. The overall need
for investment in the airport, according to the master plan, is US$ 108 million. The cost for the terminal
may be overestimated, and the need for high speed turnoffs, estimated at US$ 5.5 million may not be a
necessity even at 2 million passengers.22
Another discussion surfacing in Zanzibar is the need for another, smaller airport. The argument runs as
follows: If a catastrophic event closed the main airport, thousands of tourists might be stranded, well
beyond the current ferry capacity. Hotel owners would not know how to get their visitors off the island.
Since the construction of a full new facility based on a hypothetical event is hard to justify using
probabilities, the question now resides on allowing the private sector to build its own airstrip on its own
land if it felt the need. The concept of permitting the private sector to do may seem essentially sound,
though this airfield might provide competition for Zanzibar International Airport in terms of the smaller,
GA traffic, which is now a large portion of total traffic. Zanzibar International Airport, however, is
currently focusing its investments on larger capacity aircraft. Operators of the GA type services may be
balking at having to share the costs of runway improvements being made solely for the benefit of
operators of larger aircraft.
As shown in Table 9 below, the geometric growth between 2001 and 2008 for domestic traffic has been
18% annually a very large number. International traffic has grown too, but only at 9%, with the overall
share of domestic traffic having overtaken international traffic in 2003 (see Table 8 below). The lower
growth in international traffic could be directly related to both the air side (runway and taxiways) and
land side (terminal capacity) infrastructure at the airport, including the apron limitations. It could well be
argued that since historically international traffic in Zanzibar had indeed the higher proportion of traffic in
2001 and 2002, the redevelopment of the airport would shift the current ratio of international versus
domestic traffic back towards international traffic. Another, more abstract, speculative, and politically
difficult to defend notion could be that having two international airports in a developing country within
75 kilometers of another is difficult to justify, and that instead Dar es Salaam develop as the sole
transcontinental gateway, with domestic flights and improved ferry services between JNIA and Zanzibar
acting as the links to Zanzibar.
21
Currently estimated cost per square meter of terminal space is US$ 1,500. Using even the highest factor for
estimating required terminal space, which is 0.01, and multiplying this with the passenger number of 2 million,
yields required space of 20,000 m2. This would end up costing around US$ 30 million vs the US$ 55 million
proposed. One could explain some of the higher cost as part of inflation and the addition of US$ 7 million in land
side access improvements.
22
At 2 million passengers, with the airport operating 360 days a year for eight hours a day, using an average
capacity of 150 passengers per flight, there would be 4.6 flights per hour, with a runway movement every 13
minutes. Rapid exists become justifiable when aircraft have to leave the runway quickly to allow other aircraft to
land.
49
Table 8: Traffic breakdown for Zanzibar International Airport

Service Type
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Intl Scheduled
68,342
76,346
65,873
78,980
89,043
95,688
90,071
88,629
Intl Non-Scheduled
42,633
58,403
44,743
73,492
94,244
101,876
131,296
117,705
Dom Scheduled
13,686
22,070
65,873
100,566
111,914
136,795
136,540
140,543
Dom Non-Scheduled
77,224
102,367
62,718
107,246
122,314
152,909
163,929
149,053
201,885
259,186
239,207
360,284
417,515
487,268
521,836
495,930
Total
Data source: TCAA
Table 9: Growth according to traffic type for Zanzibar International Airport
Service Type
20012002
20022003
20032004
20042005
20052006
20062007
20072008
Geom. g
2001-2008
International
21.42%
-17.91%
37.84%
20.21%
7.79%
12.05%
-6.79%
9.26%
Domestic
36.88%
3.34%
61.61%
12.71%
23.68%
3.72%
-3.62%
18.00%
Total
28.38%
-7.71%
50.62%
15.88%
16.71%
7.09%
-4.96%
13.70%
c. Kilimanjaro International Airport

Kilimanjaro International Airport is roughly 448 km North-Northwest of Dar es Salaam, acting as another
intercontinental gateway. The airport lies essentially within the North-South flight corridor that
predominates in East Africa, and is situated near some of Tanzanias most important tourist attractions.
As such, many of the international flights that land in Kilimanjaro do so en-route to Dar es Salaam, which
is highly efficient: If Kilimanjaro were not there, passengers would overfly the area on the way to JNIA,
and then board local aircraft to fly back towards Kilimanjaro or the game reserves around Serengeti. The
facility is relatively modern.
Kilimanjaro is also an example about a private sector participation deal that at first seemed acceptable but
has since proven to be flawed. The Tanzanian Government signed 25-year concession for the airport,
lasting from 1998 to 2023, effectively placing the airport under a company held by Mott McDonald
(majority shareholder), the South African Infrastructure Fund, the Tanzanian firm Inter-Consult Ltd., and
the Tanzanian Government (24% share)23. It is not clear if maintenance and investment participation by
the partnership (called Kilimanjaro Airport Development Corporation, or KADCO) were stipulated in
the concession, but the net effect is that no re-investment took place. Though the airport is an excellent
facility, with a runway resurfaced in 2000 with financing by the World Bank, apron and taxiway surface
areas are showing signs of aging and may soon need to be addressed.
23
United Republic of Tanzania: Air Transport Infrastructure Review, Schlumberger & Bofinger, The World Bank,
2005, p.26
50
In 2009 the KADCO concession essentially fell apart, with Mott McDonalds share being purchased back
by the Tanzanian Government. It is not clear if a competitive approach was taken to find a new owner for
the shares, rather than simply repurchasing them, and if the true best interests of the Tanzanian
Government were represented.
Traffic growth at the airport, however, has been an average of near 16% between 2001 and 2008 a very
high rate, though there has been a dip since 2007. Domestic scheduled traffic grew at over 16%. One
operator expressed the opinion that Kilimanjaro is the best run airport in Tanzania as a reason for the
growth. The decline in domestic traffic between 2007 and 2008, however, may be attributed to the revival
of Arusha airport, which is much closer to the city of Arusha.
In terms of larger investment, needs seen as immediate are the rehabilitation of the apron and taxiway
(US$ 12 million), as well as the 10-year recurring maintenance on the main runway surface (US$ 2
million)
Table 10: Traffic breakdown for Kilimanjaro International Airport

Service Type
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
Intl Scheduled
80,082
91,915
106,017
137,722
157,244
201,623
237,519
237,103
Intl Non-Scheduled
17,365
15,491
5,159
6951
5,159
6,505
5,859
10,910
Dom Scheduled
43,240
52,372
29,783
83,154
119,209
147,018
171,878
165,847
Dom Non-Scheduled
13,726
13,167
8,184
10,425
9,403
14,746
28,604
15,481
154,413
172,945
149,143
238,252
291,015
369,892
443,860
429,341
Total
Data source: TCAA.
Table 11: Growth according to traffic type for Kilimanjaro International Airport
Service Type
20012002
20022003
20032004
20042005
20052006
20062007
20072008
Geom. g
2001-2008
International
10.22%
3.51%
30.13%
12.26%
28.16%
16.94%
1.90%
14.28%
Domestic
15.05%
-42.07%
146.47%
37.44%
25.78%
23.93%
-9.55%
17.99%
Total
12.00%
-13.76%
59.75%
22.15%
27.10%
20.00%
-3.27%
15.73%
4. Currently Planned Investments of the TAA

Table 12 presents the currently planned major airport investments by the TAA. The following is
recommended:
1. JNIA is already operating beyond capacity and will continue to grow in passenger traffic. The
airport will eventually become a hindrance for passengers entering the country, so planning ahead
for a new terminal is appropriate. However, the timing of construction is difficult to gauge
51
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
because donor funding must be sought. It is the process of negotiating the financing needs with
donors that has been holding up immediate action on the airport that could involve private sector
participation. When looking at financing options it is important to consider that the contracting of
construction should be independent of the financing, i.e. contracts should be bid competitively.
The recent proposal by an outside party to build a new terminal, operate the airport in a joint
venture with the TAA, and collect and then allocate all revenues amongst the partners contained
no method of validating the outside participant's overall investment, since the outside party also
proposed being the contractor for construction. The alternative, now supported by the World
Bank, is to buy time by implementing a stopgap measure: Along with the private sector, an office
building is to be constructed attached to the current terminal, with all non-operational space being
moved into this building, broadening the overall space available for passenger operations. The
estimated cost of such a building is US$ 20 million, and locally drawn blueprints for this
alternative have already been created. Though this would not be a permanent solution, it would
buy time until a proper source of financing for a new terminal could be found.
New airports: The need for new airports in Tanzania is questionable, even in Dodoma. The drive
for a new airport at the capital may be the result of the type of aircraft that is being used for
flights into the city. New airports should be regarded as speculative at best, and have the lowest
priority ranking. In terms of costs, it is economically considerably more reasonable to rehabilitate
or upgrade an existing facility rather than build a new one.
The proposed rehabilitation of Arusha has been controversial. However, there are arguments for
keeping an airport open, even if a newer, much more advanced facility is close by. The
combination of Nairobi's international airport and the close by Wilson Airport is often cited, with
the intent of allowing Arusha to become a general aviation airport.
Often airports that are called unnecessary are subsequently neglected, because somehow the
political will cannot be harnessed to entirely close the facility. As a result, the airport, which still
faces some demand, stays open, but becomes more and more unsafe. In Arusha's case, the
demand for the airport can be clearly seen in the traffic figures, even with close by Kilimanjaro.
Therefore, rehabilitating the airport, though not a priority, could be deemed appropriate.
Bukoba, Tabora, and Kigoma: These three airports have been selected for World Bank
investments, in part because they are regionally important yet are not likely to find other donor
funding. All three airports have their own role in their local economy, and two (Bukoba and
Kigoma) may become international entryways due to their location. However, the Bank's
involvement shows that the proposed projects in themselves have components that are being
economized: The Bank, for example, has decided to finance the entire redevelopment of Bukoba,
while only addressing the general runway conditions, and therefore safety, of the two others.
Mafia Island: Mafia is an attractive tourist destination with its own unique flavor and isolation.
The airport, once a military field with a substantial runway, has deteriorated to the point that
scheduled services had to stop. The draw of Mafia is visible to whoever has visited, so outside
development financing was available, this time through the MCC. However, here again the
investment needs lie in the components: The Sir Frederic Snow reports reflect a project
containing a control tower, new terminal, and other installations, whereas the MCC's
involvement, just as the Bank's involvement in Kigoma and Tabora, is limited to the runway.
Mwanza: The most important domestic airline route in Tanzania is between Mwanza and Dar es
Salaam, with Mwanza also being Tanzania's fourth international entryway. The area of Mwanza
52
is also important for non-traditional exports, experimenting with cut flowers, and having been an
export center for West Nile Perch. The TAA has successfully implemented a PPP arrangement
with the cargo operations of the airport, only to have witnessed the cargo exports of fresh fish to
stop completely after both the obsolescence of current runway and apron infrastructure, and new
surcharges on air cargo exports.
The above points highlight that (a) in the TAA's investment list almost all airports merit at least some
investment, though they might only get the most important aspects financed by donors, and (b) some
projects, particularly new airports such as Msalato and Songwe, should be approached with caution.
Furthermore, the current reaction of donors suggests that though Sumbawanga may be a tough sell,
Shinyanga, which is economically more robust than the World Bank financed Tabora project, could
perhaps be a project of interest for aid donors.
Moshi represents an example where private sector participation may be appropriate. The airport, only 30
kilometers from Kilimanjaro, has very low traffic. The airfield sports a flying club with very well
maintained, almost collectible piston aircraft. Being geographically close to a major airport, and having a
base of aircraft perhaps betraying local wealth, and with a decaying runway, the airport is a prime
example of what perhaps should be dropped out of the TAA's system and passed on to private investors.
53
Table 12: Projects in Airports as Planned by the TAA
Airport
Type of Project
US$ (mil)
Dar es Salaam
Terminal III
Mwanza
Rehabilitation
and terminals
59.3
Songwe
New airport finalizing
23.7
Arusha
Bukoba
Kigoma
Mafia
247.0
Financed by
Amount
Financed
US$ mil
Financing
Gap US$
mil
To be determined
247.0
12.0
2.0
7.0
4.6
12.1
16.8
22.2
6.6
36.5
0.1
39.2
15.1
Competing with Kilimanjaro, 50 km away

Proposed WB involvement
69.3
Long-term proposal
15.9
0
0
1.6
7.7
108.5
14.0
24.7
21.1
Snow Ltd. projects slightly more growth in Tabora
Snow Ltd. found lowest return on investment
36.5
16.9
61.4
21.7
World Bank
World Bank
MCC
69.3
To be determined
Tabora
Shinyanga
Sumbawanga
29.9
24.7
21.1
World Bank
Mpanda
Rehabilitation
9.3
Totals
Fix Terminal II for perhaps US$ 20 mil.24, then plan for Terminal
III, with private sector participation.
BADEA/OPEC
GoT
BADEA
OPEC
GoT
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
New Airport in
Dodoma
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation
Msalato
Comments
UNHCR
GoT
620.8
45.3
0
Detailed design ongoing

Project implementation ongoing
Contract signed, contractor mobilized
512.3
Source: World Bank Mission, Spring 2009, and updates by the TAA/
24
New proposal is that World Bank will be financing a transaction advisor for finding capital for expanding the current terminal as a stop-gap and part of the
other rehabilitation efforts.
54
5. Currently Planned Investments of the TCAA

The TCAA in a recent World Bank mission has identified a set of comprehensive needs, ranging from
infrastructure enhancements to capacity building and the establishment of an aviation culture by the
development of training opportunities for the next generation of pilots and technicians. The specific items
identified are categorized into the five project elements below:
I.
Institutional Development and Capacity Building

1. Flight operations inspectors training: Tanzania identified the need to have flight inspectors
trained for every type of aircraft on the registry. Since this would be rather costly, and is a
common finding in the other countries, a regional solution with shared inspectors would be
most likely a more cost-effective solution. The issue of inspector capacity is an ICAO
USOAP audit finding.
2. Upgrading of the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC): The TCAA estimates a needed
US$ 5.7 million investment, including a building and other education infrastructure, and
human capacity building for the center.
3. Training needs: A strong training program for personnel licensing, including medical
examiners and an aviation medical assessor, would require recurrent funding of US$ 100,000
per annum. In addition, training for most technical services, such as air traffic management,
aviation meteorology, aerodrome inspectors, and others would run annual recurring costs of
US$ 200,000.
4. Accident Investigation Unit: The TCAA places the cost of setting up a fully staffed,
independent accident investigation unit, excluding salaries, at US$ 600,200.
5. Search and Rescue: The TCAA estimates a total cost ff US$ 600,000 for a search and rescue
service unit, including US$ 200,000 for software with Search and Rescue calculation
capability, US$ 120,000 for survival gear and droppable supplies, US$ 250,000 for training
(including search and rescue pilots), and US$ 30,000 for plotting equipment.
II.
Enhancement of Flight Safety Inspection Services

1. Training for Flight Safety and Airworthiness Inspectors: The TCAA estimates that when
instituting and aggressive and pro-active training program, annual training needs for flight
operations and airworthiness inspectors cost US$ 800,000.
III.
Upgrading of Aviation Infrastructure

1. GNSS Approaches to replace conventional ones using NDBs for Arusha, Mwanza, Zanzibar,
Pemba, Bukoba, Kigoma, Tabora, and Mafia airports (2005 estimated total cost: US$ 1
million)
2. For surveillance, ADS-B (2006 estimated cost: US$ 10 million) to cover the whole of
Tanzania
3. A VHF Extended Range System Vsat Link: In order to provide communications coverage six
relay stations need to be added, namely Lilungu, Lolkisale, Gairo, Nyanshana, Kaluwe, and
Kazeh Hill. In addition, the existing installations are aged and require and expensive and
underlying telecommunications link which needs to be replaced with VSAT technology.
(Estimated cost: US$ 2.5 million)
4. An integrated automated AIS/ATS Data Processing System: This is a multi-faceted system
consisting of a message handling system with an AFTN gateway (US$ 962,000), an
automated AIS system (US$935,000), an FDPS system for giving the air traffic controller
trajectory predictions (US$ 415,000), and an overall billing system (US$ 91,200). (Total
estimated cost: US$ 2.4 million)
55
5. Building and equipment for an EAC upper airspace flight information region center: This
building would house the area control center for the Unified Upper Flight Information Center
within the EAC. (Estimated cost: US$ 1.2 million)
6. Provision of ANS at the Musoma, Bukoba, Mafia, and Lake Manyara aerodromes (cost to be
determined).
IV.
Enhancement of Security at Key Airports

1. Training of aviation security specialists: The TCAA estimates that training for five human
resources is needed per annum, for an annual recurring cost of US$ 117,000.
V.
Liberalization of Air Transport Services

1. Tanzania recommended a study on the implementation of the Yamoussoukro decision in East
Africa for a cost of US$ 500,000. However, an extensive study for all of Africa already
exists. A component often recommended is a monitoring body within the EAC that keeps
track of progress towards liberalization within the EAC by, in part, keeping a registry of air
service agreements.
The list is long, and financial realities will require some prioritization. The question is what is required for
providing essential oversight services now versus what is needed for the further development of the
sector.
Education centers, for example, are usually not self-sustainable, and need to be looked at in a regional
context, perhaps by developing curricula at already established academic institutions. Four institutions
exist in some shape or form in East Africa 25, all in need and all being proposed to become a regional
center. The wisest long-term approach would be to coordinate their programs.
At the same time, most of the infrastructure requirements are pressing, as is the lack of capacity in flight
safety inspectors. In addition, US$ 1.6 million of the list above consists of annual recurring costs.
Finding aid for infrastructure such as air traffic control systems is considerably easier than funding for
recurring expenses.
25
Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania have existing training facilities in various areas. Burundi has a training school
building that in recent years had been used by other agencies, and wishes to rededicated this to its original purpose.
56
Table 13: TCAAs list of needed investments as of Spring 2009.
Item
Licensing Training
Technical Services Training
Accident Investigation Unit
Search and rescue equipment
Inspector Training Program
GNSS Approaches
ADS-B
VSAT and VHF extended range link
Integrated AIS/ATS data system
EAC Upper Flight Information Region

Center
CATC
AVSEC specialist training
Regional Study on Liberalization
Total
Est. Cost
in US$
mil.
0.10
0.20
0.60
1.20
0.80
1.00
10.00
2.50
2.40
1.23
5.70
0.50
0.50
26.73
Notes
Recurring Annually
Recurring Annually
Regional solution may be appropriate
May find donor (WB considering)
Recurring Annually
May find WB financing
May find WB financing
May find donor (WB considering)
System needed - cost should be re-assessed
Politically complicated issue. Bring about common ATC
infrastructure first (ADS-B in all countries), then see
what is doable in terms of consolidated airspace and
central air traffic control.
Existing space from the new Aviation House should be
allocated. Donor would be needed for simulator.
Recurring Annually
May not be needed
Source: World Bank Mission, Spring 2009
57
V. Action Plan for the Meeting of Needs for the Air Transport Sector
Most of the investment plans currently on the table are to some extent justifiable, however with some
proposals needing refinements. Specifically, it is easy to fall into the trap of believing that new facilities
will attract new traffic. The TAA, for example, has many airports and strips in the system that are
essentially non-performing and could be dropped. Airports with 1,000 passengers and virtually no cargo
average 3 passengers per day - i.e. they have virtually no scheduled traffic, and are not really sustainable.
In terms of new airports, the investments proposed for Dodoma should be carefully evaluated in light of
politics, actual runway needs, and costs. Though the airport currently cannot service jets due to the
condition of the existing pavement, the condition of the airport is far superior to ones currently receiving
much higher passenger numbers, such as Bukoba. And with complete reconditioning, the airport could
handle smaller jet aircraft. The cost of such rehabilitation would be far below the cost of a new airport.
Some suggestions have been made for turning JNIA into a regional hub. The justification for this
suggestion lies in the distance between the other major airports in the region, Johannesburg, Nairobi, and
Addis Ababa. However, overall air traffic in Africa is not very dense, and the region in need of a more
centralized hub lies in the Western portion of the continent. In addition, regional hubs in Africa have a
dominant flag carrier anchored in their hub, such as South African Airways in Johannesburg, Kenyan
Airways in Nairobi, and Ethiopian Airlines in Addis Ababa. These carriers have existed for a long time,
and are indeed the dominant carriers throughout all of sub-Saharan Africa. Tanzania would either have to
develop Air Tanzania into such a carrier, which is virtually impossible given the current market
conditions, or attract one of those carriers to use JNIA as a hub, which is unlikely26.
Tanzania, however, does have the advantage of being highly attractive to tourism, and being an enddestination in travel. Therefore, all planning should be focused on meeting the needs of arriving
passengers, including their domestic travel needs.
A study by IATA dated October 31, 2008 on the ground handling operations at Mwanza, Zanzibar,
Kilimanjaro, and JNIA found several crucial shortcomings that could be categorized as being both
procedural and infrastructure related27. Though Kilimanjaro was an exception, shortcomings were found
in the actual terminals, security procedures and infrastructure (particularly in Mwanza), and the overall
adherence to safety procedures. In terms of infrastructure development, these shortcomings should be
addressed in the airport investments outlined below. New terminals are being planned for all three
airports, and changes planned at Terminal II at JNIA should consider the findings in the report. In
addition, the budgets of the TAA and RGoZ should included training elements to address some of the
shortcomings in the report.
26
Further discussion on hubs can be found in Appendix A: A hub in Dar es Salaam - two distinct concepts
See Development of Ground Handling Services for Passenger, Aircraft, Cargo and Aviation Fueling Services
Report R06: Technical & Operational Review of Ground Handling Operations, IATA/TCAA, October 31, 2008.
The report needs to be read with caution. Though many of the findings and recommendations are compelling, some
of the security shortcomings, such as the incident mentioned in Zanzibar where the IATA consultant noticed the
screeners wand not being turned on during screening, are proposed to be remedied through training. The fault of
such lapse, however, is less likely due to lack of training but rather may lie in bad on-the-ground supervision and
management.
27
58
Table 14: Airport Investments
Priority
Subpriority
Item
JNIA Terminal II
JNIA Terminal III
Zanzibar
Kilimanjaro
Kilimanjaro
Ia
Kilimanjaro
Kilimanjaro
Kilimanjaro
Dodoma
Ib
II
III
Songwe
Subtotal TAA
Subtotal Zanzibar
Subtotal KADCO
1
Bukoba
2
Kigoma
3
Mafia
4
Tabora
5
Shinyanga
Subtotal TAA
1
Arusha
2
Mafia
Subtotal TAA
Msalato
Sumbawanga
Subtotal TAA
Total TAA
TOTAL Zanzibar, TAA, and KADCO
Phase A (2010 until 2015)

Expand Operational Area
Start construction
Est.
Cost
(US%$
mil)
7.0
120.0
Rehabilitate completely
Rehabilitate runway
Rehabilitate runway, fencing
Rehabilitate runway
Rehabilitation of runway, fencing
Expand
88.0
12.0
2.0
Rehabilitate Apron and taxiway

Runway 10 year extended life
maintenance
Terminal
capacity
upgrade,
security, baggage screening
Replacement of fire tenders
New cargo terminal
Rehabilitate (estimate)
Finish Construction
Phase B (2015-)
127.0
23.4
Comment
Immediate concern
May require PPP, World Bank to
finance transaction advisor. Cost
seems high. Also need to look at
cargo terminal.
As per airport master plan
6.6
3.0
3.0
17.0
12.1
156.1
88.0
20.6
20.8
26.7
17.7
19.1
18.0
102.3
16.1
Capital city airport needs to be

more accessible.
127.0
23.4
6.0
Expand runway, complete
Complete Rehabilitation
16.1
New construction
Est.
Cost
(US$
mil)
13.0
13.0
287.5
396.1
59
New Airport
40.9
12.1
6.7
59.7
20.4
15.1
35.5
69.3
8.1
77.4
299.6
329.0
If traffic in Dodoma justifies
Table 15: Anticipated TCAA needs
Priority
Subpriority
Ia
Item
Phase A (2010 until 2015)
GNSS Approaches
ADS-B
Design & Implement

Deploy
VSAT and VHF

extended
range
link
Deploy
Est.
Cost
(US%$
mil)
1.0
10.0
2.5
Subtotal
13.5
5.0
Various training
programs
Ib
Search and Rescue

Equipment
Subtotal
1
2
III
3
4
Accident
Investigation Unit
Create Unit
1.2
0.6
Integrated
AIS/ATS
data
system
EAC Upper Flight
Information
Region Center
Deploy
2.4
CATC
Subtotal
Total TCAA
Total ALL (Airports + TCAA)
5.0
5.0
1.2
Subtotal
II
Est.
Cost
(US$
mil)
Phase B (2015-)
Funding will be needed somehow regional solution may also be

developed.
and
1.23
Question of likelihood - other

countries have to agree...
Cost could be cut if housing would
be found in new office complex.
5.70
60
Assuming annual recurring cost of

US$ 1 million, needs to be
reassessed.
Funding will be needed somehow regional solution may also be
developed.
Construction
development of
8.7
23.4
419.5
Comment
1.2
6.2
335.2
VI. Proposed Steps and Outline for Tanzania Civil Aviation Master Plan
In many cases master plans successfully provide a blueprint for the development of a sector; however,
often they also are overtaken by events not predicted, or become victims of political shifts in priorities. If
a new master plan for Tanzania were to be drafted, there would have to be a consensus on findings of
such a plan, and then an adherence to the fundamentals laid out in the plan. Two particular dangers occur:
A donor government comes up with a project in exchange for rights not related to the aviation sector, rearranging priorities in such a way that other, important priorities are stalled. Or political necessities create
make-work projects whose economic value is questionable. A master plan not only lays the foundation for
planning for the sector, but also serves as a tool for identifying if proposed projects fall into a predetermined framework towards meeting the overall goals of the sector.
The World Bank is preparing the Transport Sector Support Project (TSSP) for Tanzania, which includes
an air transport component. Beyond financing the rehabilitation of Bukoba, Kigoma, and Tabora airports,
the project contains a component for finding a transaction advisor for the development of terminal
capacity at JNIA. As part of this component, it has been established that a master plan for the civil
aviation sector, as well as a separate master plan for JNIA, would be helpful. The amount of US$ 600,000
has been set aside in the TSSP to finance these two master plans. The project is due for approval by the
World Bank Board of Directors in late May 2010, with disbursements most likely commencing within
three to four months thereafter. It is therefore timely to begin writing the TORs for such a master plan
now (April 2010), so they are ready to be distributed when the studies are ready to be procured.
Below is a proposed table of contents, with main and applicable sub-topics. This structure is similar to
recent, successful civil aviation master plan projects.
1. Infrastructure
a. Airports
b. Air Carriers (overall)
c. Regulatory System
i. TCAA
ii. Regional options for oversight
d. Ownership and organization
i. Role and capacities in civil aviation within the Ministry of Infrastructure
Development
ii. TCAA
1. Structure and functions
a. Safety Oversight
b. Economic oversight
c. ANS
2. Relationship to regional oversight
iii. TAA (airports)
iv. Air Tanzania and other carriers
e. Current and projected requirements for the overall infrastructure (using forecasts made in
section 5 below)
61
2.
3.
4.
5.
i. Airport improvements
1. Major Airports (JNIA, Zanzibar, Kilimanjaro)
2. Intermediate (Mwanza)
3. Auxiliary
ii. Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance (ADS-B)
iii. Meteorology
iv. Emergency response
Overall and Economic Policy for the Civil Aviation Sector
a. Overall long-term guidelines for aviation policy
b. International competition regulation (movement towards Yamoussoukro)
c. Domestic competition regulation (keep domestic services open)
d. Aviation charges, with regional and global benchmarks
e. Competitive procurement policy for infrastructure (competitive bidding for all
procurement, including the development of new terminals)
f. Competitive concessioning of services
g. Towards an aviation culture in Tanzania: Planning domestic and regional aviation
education programs
Scheduled service providers and flag carriers
a. History of Air Tanzania
b. History of other major carriers in Tanzania
c. Contrast and comparison: Government operated airlines vs the private sector
i. Could another carrier replace Air Tanzania as the flag carrier?
d. Long-term policy towards sustainable and competitive domestic services in Tanzania
Domestic Aviation
a. Airplane operations
i. IFR infrastructure
ii. IFR operations
iii. VFR Operations
b. Helicopter operations
c. Communications infrastructure solutions for domestic aviation
d. Summary of NAV, COM, and Surveillance, including vision towards ADS-B
Forecasts
a. Impact of global environmental concerns on international air traffic growth
b. Impact of regional road network development on the need for aviation travel
c. Business International
d. Business Domestic
e. Tourism International (i.e. gateways)
f. Tourism Domestic (i.e. after arrival)
g. Potential for hub development at JNIA
62
Appendix A: A hub in Dar es Salaam - two distinct concepts

Much attention has been given to the creation of a hub in Dar es Salaam. The discussion needs to be
delineated around two separate concepts:
1. A transport hub in Dar es Salaam, with the airport being a component
2. An airline hub at Julius Nyerere International Airport
Though the two concepts may be interlinked, they need to be discussed separately as to their feasibility
and approaches. In both cases the significant challenge is competition in already established centers, in
particular in Nairobi, for air transport, and in Mombasa for maritime transport.
Potential for a holistic transport hub (port plus airport)
The linkages between air and maritime transport, in an efficient system, would not be as strong as one
might expect. In terms of cargo, sea transport is applicable for heavy items, or items not requiring high
speed delivery, while air transport seeks the opposite: high value per kilogram goods that need fast
transport. The value to weight ratio is of essence. In complex supply chains one can see an interaction
between the two (e.g. manufacturing centers shipping first rush-to-market merchandise by air, then
following with larger shipments by sea), but beyond those cases the modal interlink is very small. The
Tanzania Ports Mater Plan, recently authored, discusses rail and roads, not air transport, in its multimodal assessments, already implying that very little linkage exists between air transport and port
operations.
Current projections state that beyond 2015, if growth rates and increases in efficiency allow, the current
port in Dar es Salaam will be at capacity, requiring a new port. In a report co-authored by Ecorys and the
Maritime Economics and Logistics center at Erasmus University in Rotterdam, the ideal future locations
are all away from Dar es Salaam28, meaning that JNIA would not be in the ports proximity.
In addition, seeing perhaps a cohesive development of the port in Dar es Salaam in conjunction with the
airport, one may gain an underlying notion that as shipments increase, more business travel would occur
as businessmen would come to the port in Dar es Salaam to inspect their arriving goods, help them
through customs, and then would return further inland or their neighboring land-locked countries to await
land delivery.
However, the assumption of increased air travel into Dar es Salaam as port traffic may increase inherently
implies an inefficiency in port operations or in land-based transport: If the port truly grew and was
operated efficiently, and goods could make it from the port to their final destinations unhindered by a
failing rail and road network and inefficient borders, then there would be no need for the recipient to
come to the port prior to receiving his or her goods further inland. In developed economies such travel
barely exists. If such travel exists in developing countries, it would point to inefficiencies in trade
facilitation rather than structural increase in air transport demand caused by economic growth.
As a final note, the key shared intermodal connection for both air transport and maritime transport is the
road network. Neither an airport nor a port can survive without good road connections, though for ports
28
Identifying Economic Conditions for a Regional Logistics Hub in Northern Tanzania - Final Report, Erasmus
University and ECORYS, Rotterdam 2009, p. 69
63
rail links may be even more important. Nairobi has been successful in exporting flowers through Kenyas
main airport (not located by a port) because of excellent road access between the growing areas by Lake
Naivasha and the city. In Ethiopia, spoilage of flowers can reach 40% to 50% while in transit to the
airport in Addis Ababa, because of poor road conditions. Whatever growth the airport may experience,
the ability to get from the airport into the centers of business, and the ability to get goods to the airport,
depend heavily on road access with minimal risks and delays.
Potential for JNIA becoming an airline hub

For an airport to become a hub, it must have an airline to choose it to be one. Considering its health, Air
Tanzania, the nationally owned flag carrier, as discussed previously in this study, is not an option. This
would indicate that the development of a hub would involve a hands-off, gradual approach. This is highly
conditional: If an airline develops a sophisticated network requiring spokes into other countries, e.g.
Precision Airs development into a more extensive international carrier, then and only then the airport
may begin to seem like a hub. Or, if an outside carrier takes advantage of extremely liberalized air
services agreements, it may consider starting hub operations in Dar es Salaam if the infrastructure and
services at the airport are of high enough standard. This suggests that the best policy consists of not
planning for a hub per se, but running the airport efficiently in its current function as Tanzanias main
global access point. The National Transportation Policy of 2003 explicitly refers to the development of
the airport as Tanzanias main gateway29.
In addition, when looking at the future of hubs, there are some important and sobering facts to keep in
mind:
1. The notion of intentionally developing a hub in Dar es Salaam is highly risky. At one point South
African Airways was interested in expanding further into East Africa, and the airlines failed
participation in Air Tanzania was based on this strategy. There are many reasons why the
partnership with South African and Air Tanzania may have failed, but it seems clear that for
South African the notion of having a hub in Dar es Salaam was not economically attractive
enough to remain in partnership with Air Tanzania. It may be that South African had
overestimated the economic viability of developing such a hub.
2. Strategically, it may be that hubs are actually on their way to decline.
a. Star distributive systems, which a hub implies, though good for achieving higher load
factors, may in the end not be as fuel efficient per passenger, as the actual distance being
flown per passenger is often more than with a direct flight.
b. The recognition of (a) above has some significant strategic implications and
consequences. The direct effect of the inherent inefficiency of hubs was the driving factor
behind Boeings development of the 787, as an answer to the Airbus 380. The Airbus 380
was build on the anticipation that hubs would be growing and would need more feeder
aircraft, whereas Boeing, for all intents and purposes, bet its entire future on that direct
29
National Transport Policy 2003, Ministry of Communications and Transport, p 49. The policy does not mention
development of a hub in Dar es Salaam. The general tone of the policy is focused on bringing infrastructure and
services up to international standards such as defined by ICAO, liberalization of the bilateral air services
agreements, and privatization of services.
64
flights are the coming wave, and the hub system would decline. Boeing has therefore put
the emphasis on smaller, much more fuel efficient aircraft.
c. Within Africa, Ethiopian Airlines has placed its bet with Boeing, by aggressively
adopting the Boeing 787. The author of this report was informed in March 2010 that in
discussions with the airline it had become clear that Ethiopian was going to decentralize
away from Addis Ababa, i.e. the hub in Addis would go into a decline. This would be in
line with the increased use of higher freedom (5th and above) flights as liberalization
takes hold. Instead of seeing hub and spokes, there might be a much higher number of
ring patterned flights, such as Kenyans rings routes in East Africa. The hub model may
already be in decline.
Though much can be said about the direct contribution of airports and hubs to local economies, one must
analyze the transport infrastructure in terms of the overall contribution it provides to economic efficiency
and growth, not the direct benefits of a facility to a locale. Developing a hub for local growth while
adopting a less efficient route topology in the end would bring a displacement of resources, rather than
true economic growth brought about by increased efficiencies.
Todays function of JNIA is to present an important and vital access way to the world. The airports
significant importance, beyond letting Tanzanians travel abroad, is bringing visitors, now mainly tourists,
into the country. Therefore the main policy emphasis should be on making sure that the airport is able to
serve this vital function in an efficient manner, as the National Transportation Policy of 2003 states.
In terms of further study, the outline for the master plan now includes a sub-section on potential for hub
development in the forecasts section, since this section is the main driver to much else in the master plan.
65
Appendix B: TAA Financials

TAA Income Statement
Item
Operating Income
Other Income
Capital Income
Total Income
2008
16,221,105
888,083
5,935,933
23,045,121
18,961,616
Staff Emoluments
Maintenance of Building
Maintenance of Pavements
Airfield Maintenance
Maintenance of Property, Plant, and Equipment
Financial and Legal Charges
Motor Vehicle Expenses
Administrative Expenses
General Expenses
Fire Fighting and Rescue Expenses
Workers Counsel Expenses
Total Expenditure
3,545,328
1,712,782
341,710
428,566
620,858
353,027
650,213
4,172,415
1,567,473
497,631
119,055
14,009,059
2,707,695
1,535,250
328,884
244,235
748,349
377,095
699,784
3,843,508
1,341,912
436,840
154,392
12,417,944
9,036,062
3,023,743
3,351,729
9,364,048
6,543,672
2,780,395
68,490
3,831,767
1,275
1,275
Operating Surplus before Depr. And Amort.

Depreciation and Amortization
Prior Year Adjustment
Operating Surplus for the Year
Exchange rate
66
2007
17,941,807
1,019,809
TAA Balance Sheet

Item
Assets Employed
Non Current Assets (Net)
Intangible Assets
Jun-08
Jun-07
50,805,681
43,833
44,820,844
54,792
116,813
3,386,837
52,209
743,004
4,298,863
109,849
5,089,752
17,436
1,820,214
7,037,251
Current Liabilities:
Less Liabilities
Sundry Creditors
Net Current Assets
Total net Assets
331,958
3,966,905
54,816,420
488,883
6,548,368
51,424,004
Financed by:
Accumulated Fund
Development Fund
Operating Surplus
Long-term Loan
Total Financed by
1,310,874
9,166,175
37,216,152
7,123,219
54,816,420
1,310,874
15,136,124
27,853,787
7,123,219
51,424,004
1,275
1,275
Current Assets:
Stocks
Trade Debtors
Staff Debtors
Cash & Bank Balances
Total Current Assets
Exchange rate
67
TAA Statement of Cash Flows

Item
Cash flow from Operating Activities
Surplus for the year
Adjustment for :
Operating Surplus before working Capital Changes
Working Capital Changes
(Increase)/Decrease in Stocks
(Increase)/Decrease in Debtors
(Increase)/Decrease in Loans & Advances
(Decrease)Increase in Creditors
Net Cash flow from operating activities (A)
Cash flow from Investing Activities
Purchasing of Fixed Assets
Net Cash used in investing Activities (B)
Cash flow Financing Activities
Increase (Decrease) in Long-term Loan
Increase (Decrease) in Capital Fund.
Net Cash from financing activities (C)
Net Change in Cash and Cash equivalents (A+B+C)
Cash and Cash equivalents as a 1 July
Cash and Cash Equivalent
Exchange Rate
68
Jun-08
Jun-07
9,362,365
3,822,981
3,025,491
12,387,855
2,781,843
6,604,824
-6,964
1,702,914
-34,772
-156,925
13,892,108
0
-2,928,026
83,689
178,069
3,938,556
-8,999,370
-8,999,370
-8,927,129
-8,927,129
0
-5,969,949
-5,969,949
-1,077,210
1,820,214
743,004
-225409.8039
5,969,949
5,744,539
907,561
912,653
1,820,214
1,275
1,275
TAA Sources of Revenues

Item
Operating Revenue
Landing & Parking
Total
Other Revenue
Disposal of Fixed Assets
Gain from exchange rate
Government Subventions
Total
Capital Income
Grants from Government
Total Income
Jun-08
Jun-07
3,639,337
2,696,824
8,949,935
574,380
172,553
191,593
16,224,622
3,640,342
2,931,242
10,784,494
388,304
75,592
121,833
17,941,807
17,412
41,433
829,238
888,083
0
154,277
865,532
1,019,809
5,935,933
5,935,933
23,048,639
0
18,961,616
1,275
1,275
Exchange Rate
69
TAA Expenses
Item
STAFF EMOLUMENTS
Personal Emoluments
Gratuity Expenses
Acting Allowance
NSSF - Employer Contribution
PSPF _Employer Contribution
NHIF - Employer Contribution
Jun-08
3,545,328
3,170,510
42,270
22,904
25,195
209,587
74,862
Jun-07
2,707,695
2,336,292
145,992
12,066
24,174
129,242
59,929
MAINTENANCE OF BUILDING
Maintenance of Buildings
Maintenance of Building - Residential
Fumigation
Upkeep of Garden
1,712,782
1,573,811
1,495
83,914
53,562
1,535,250
1,404,537
1,365
52,191
77,157
MAINTENANCE OF PAVEMENTS
Maintenance of Pavement
341,710
341,710
328,884
328,884
AIRFIELD MAINTENANCE
Grass Cutting
428,566
428,566
244,235
244,235
MAINTENANCE OF PLANT AND

EQUIPMENT
Maintenance of Equipments
Maintenance of Air Conditioners
Maintenance of Computers
620,858
748,349
505,835
47,052
67,971
689,927
31,276
27,146
FINANCIAL & LEGAL CHARGES

Interest Charges
Bank Charges Account
Insurance premium
353,027
23,742
35,952
293,333
377,095
20,822
54,312
301,961
MOTOR VEHICLE EXPENSES - NORMAL

Motor Vehicles - Licenses & Parking
Motor Vehicles - Fuel & Lubricants
Maintenance of Motor Vehicles
650,213
1,756
429,511
218,946
699,784
2,184
388,957
308,644
4,174,098
221,588
12,655
33,682
288,503
264,153
293,067
331,218
253,981
24,799
615,315
177,128
3,811,059
227,548
14,376
32,213
283,195
305,907
412,000
244,393
476,162
11,204
236,970
224,286
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
Telephone & Fax Expenses
Postage Charges
Newspapers and Periodicals
Stationery Expenses
Office Sundries
Travelling - Local
Staff & Passenger Transport
Travelling - Overseas
Water Expenses
Electricity Expenses
Consultancy fees
70
Appendix C: TCAA Financials

TCAA Income Statement
Item
INCOME
Revenue
Other Income
LESS - OPERATING EXPENDITURE

Staff Costs
Operating Expenses
Repairs and Maintenance
Financial Charges
Other Administrative Expenses
Board Expenses
Audit Fees and Expenses
2008
2007
$
$
$
12,650,107 $
372,297 $
13,022,404 $
13,684,304
489,590
14,173,894
$
$
3,917,133 $
6,513,994 $
$
322,093 $
3,951,040
4,328,547
870,690
878,929
$
$
$
$
$
87,713
1,158,353
11,862
12,011,149
$
$
$
$
138,061
1,096,112
8,000
11,271,379
SURPLUS FOR THE YEAR
1,011,256
2,902,515
SURPLUS/(DEFICIT) BROUGHT FORWARD
4,065,779
1,488,526
SURPLUS/(DEFICIT) CARRIED FORWARD
5,077,034
4,391,041
Exchange rate
1,350
71
1,250
TCAA Balance Sheet

Item
ASSETS
Non-current assets (net)
Property, plant and equipment
Investment in shares
Intangible assets
Subtotal
2008
$
$
$
$
6,919,514
7,703
142,876
7,070,093
Current Assets
Inventory
Trade and other receivables
Short term investments
Cash at bank and in hand
Subtotal
$
$
$
$
$
288,941
1,749,979
5,903,021
4,570,376
12,512,316
$
211,833
$
2,090,082
$
2,855,582
$
5,582,254
$ 10,739,751
TOTAL ASSETS
19,582,410
$ 17,980,282
EQUITY
Capital fund
Accumulated surplus
Revaluation reserve
Assets held for sale
Subtotal
$
$
$
$
$
4,958,688
9,390,986
5,310
14,354,984
$
$
$
LIABILITIES
Borrowings
Funds held for special project
Trade and other payables
Current portion of borrowings
Subtotal
$
$
$
$
$
3,237,836
244,529
1,364,172
380,889
5,227,426
$
$
$
$
$
TOTAL EQUITIES AND LIABILITIES
19,582,410
Exchange Rate
1,350
72
2007
$
$
$
$
7,018,588
2,585
219,358
7,240,531
5,355,383
7,691,546
10,686
$ 13,057,615
2,957,823
264,091
1,365,674
335,078
4,922,667
$ 17,980,282
1,250
TCAA Statement of Cash Flows

Item
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
Surplus for the year
Gain on disposalal of fixed assets
Gain from revaluation of assets
Prior year adjustments
2008
2007
2,269,184
3,386,757
(15,569)
(9,895)
2,597,674
ADJUSTMENTS FOR:
Depreciation
Amortization
Operating Surplus Before Working Capital Changes
(Increase)/Decrease in inventories
Decrease in trade and other receivables
(Decrease)/Increase in trade creditors and other payables
CASH FLOWS FROM OPERATING ACTIVITIES
1,031,193
127,161
1,096,112
128,995
3,417,644
7,064,974
(92,800)
185,282
99,659
3,609,784
CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES

Proceeds from disposal of property, plant, and euqipment
Acquisition of property, plant, and equipment
Purchase of shares
Acquisition of intangible assets
NET CASH FLOWS FROM INVESTING ACTIVITIES
CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
(increase)/Decrease in term loan
Increase in other grants
NET CASH FLOWS FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES
(1,452,014)
(66,928)
(1,518,942)
569,742
569,742
NET INCREASE/(DECREASE) IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS

CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR
CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS AT THE END OF THE YEAR
Exchange Rate
63,434
375,101
542,829
8,046,338
31,897
(2,168,965)
2,585
9,826
2,149,479
(2,181,962)
264,091
(1,917,871)
2,660,584
7,812,812
10,473,396
3,978,987
4,458,850
8,437,837
1,350
1,250
Note: Italicized numbers are forced totals because the subcategories do not sum to the same number.
73
TCAA Sources of Revenue

REVENUE
Airworthiness Certification
Personnel Licensing
AIP Log Book Sales
Student's Fees
Safety Fee
Administration Fees
TOTAL
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
OTHER INCOME
Interest Iincome
Civil Aviation Weeek contribution
Sales of Tender Documents
Sale of Dollar
Foreign Student's Deposit
Miscellaneous Revenue
Disposal of Fixed Assets
Realized Exchange gain (loss)
National Transport Week contribution
TCAA Consumer Council Subsiidy
TOTAL
Exchange Rate
2008
6,265,181
1,223,681
681,936
207,769
83,118
69,052
8,080
78,858
4,957,273
38,359
9,894
119,942
13,743,143
$
5,138,788
$
69,849
$
8,106
$
97,382
$ 14,949,510
265,393 $
149,089
53,587 $
54,358
$
$
25,836 $
372,297 $
211,362
435,210
1250
74
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
2007
7,173,474
1,374,643
660,154
197,202
82,396
76,522
9,721
61,274
1250
Appendix D: Terms of references for the study

TERMS OF REFERENCE
for
Aviation Master Plan Pre-feasibility Study

1.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
1.1
Beneficiary country
The beneficiary country is the United Republic of Tanzania.
1.2
Contracting Arrangements
The Aviation Master Plan Pre-feasibility Study will be carried out within the framework of
the project Management Consultancy for Institutional Support to Transport and hence
no separate contract is required. However, approval of staff proposed will be required by
Director of Policy and Planning (DPP) in the Ministry of Infrastructure Development.
1.3
Current State of Affairs in the Aviation sub-sector
Air transport has a major role to play in enabling aspired rapid economic growth.
There are three major areas of demand for transport that require development
of an efficient and affordable or lower cost aviation system: (a) catering for the
hitherto grossly under-exploited horticulture with a large interregional or
international trade potential in especially cut flowers/floriculture, vegetables,
fruit, meat, fish and other related chilled and frozen products; (b) access to the
many remote areas with under-exploited or even untapped tourism potential;
and (c) facilitating time sensitive business and social travel, especially given the
size of the country and the grossly inadequate and poor surface transport
infrastructure.
The governance of the aviation sector is currently achieved through three sets of
institutions: the Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority (TCAA), responsible for safety
and economic regulation, the Tanzania Airports Authority (TAA), responsible for
development and management of airports, and the airlines or air transport
operators, providing passenger and freight flights. The Ministry of Infrastructure
Development has the responsibility of setting sub-sector policy and development
75
strategies, as well as guidance and monitoring for the implementation of the

strategies.
All airports are currently managed and operated by TAA, with the exception of
Kilimanjaro airport, which was leased to Kilimanjaro Airport Development
Company (KADCO), a private company with majority shares. Airport handling
services at international or major airports are also provided by a private
company, Swissport. There are plans to involve the private sector as much as
possible, in investment in and operating airports. Air operations or flight services
are provided by a state owned designated national flag carrier, Air Tanzania
Company Ltd (ATCL), and Precision Air, the biggest locally based airline, as well
as several other smaller companies. International flights are mainly provided by
other international airlines, based on Bilateral Air Services agreements (BASAs).
However a liberalization process is underway, under the auspices of
implementing the Yamoussoukro Decision by African Heads of State and
Government, signed in 2000.
Currently air transport industry in Tanzania is characterized by unavailability in
some remote areas, low frequency, high cost and unreliability at times. An
acknowledged suitable strategy to develop the aviation industry is for the
Government to develop airports, where possible in partnership with the private
sector in PPPs. The airports network should be supported by adequate safety
provisions, thereby satisfying the international requirements for various
categories of airports. A good airport network will, in turn, attract an increased
number of air transport operators/airlines and thereby pave the way for an
improved level of service to travelers and freighters. Currently, there are about
180,000 aircraft movements per year in Tanzania as shown in the chart below.
Aircraft Movements from year 2001 to 2007
Aircraft Movements from Year 2001 to 2007
180,000
160,000
140,000
120,000
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
2001
2002
2003
2004
OVERALL
76
TAA
2005
2006
2007
1.4
Related Programmes and other Donor Activities

The major donor currently involved in the aviation sector is primarily the World Bank,
which has recently financed a feasibility study and preliminary design of seven airports.
The study was completed by the end of 2008.
1.5
Reference Documents
Transport Sector Investment Programme (TSIP), April 2008
Short TSIP (2009/10-11/12), August 2009
Status of Air Transport Sub Sector and Investment Opportunities in Airports,
June 2008
Joint Infrastructure Sector Review, October 2008, Aviation Performance Review
2.
DESCRIPTION OF THE ASSIGNMENT
2.1
Overall objectives
The overall objective of this assignment is to support TSIP, and thereby facilitate
expansion to foster domestic and international trade and tourism. This is to be achieved
through providing conducive environments for private sector participation in managing
and, where feasible, development of airports and incentives to strategic investors.
2.2
Specific objectives
This study would basically prepare a long term strategic plan for the aviation
industry. Various projects will be identified for further study and implementation
over the next 10 years.
The specific objective of the study shall be to identify the framework and key
elements in a master plan for developing an efficient and economically viable
airport network to cater for the future development needs of the country.
The study will not include design of individual airports but shall be limited to
elaboration of size and categories of airports, facilities to be incorporated and
estimates of investment projects, prioritisation of the projects and possible
timing.
77
2.3
Tasks to be carried out

A summary of the tasks to be carried out include:
Assess the status and performance of the Tanzania aviation sector
Review of the status and performance of the aviation industry, especially

airports, air navigation and safety and airline operations, as well as sector
development plans;
Result and activities

Result 1: Overview the status and performance of the Tanzania aviation sector - will
achieved by carrying out the following activities
Assessing the current inventory and status of air transport infrastructure and
services, in particular with regards to airports, civil aviation safety and
economics, and airline operations as well as institutional gaps;
Review the performance of the aviation sub-sector especially in relation to
servicing key market segments or specific major demand areas, (including origins
and destinations, or city pairs, tourism, business and leisure/social) travel and
freight. Performance should be assessed based on identified key indicators to be
proposed by the consultant and agreed upon by MoID;
Comparing the performance of the Tanzania aviation sector with other
developing and developed countries for benchmarking; and
Assess the general or broad impact, economic and others, for the current state
of the aviation sector.
Assessment. The study will review existing information, including available master
plans or similar, to determine the current and future demand for air transport, both for
passenger and freight. Rough estimates should be made for the medium and long term

Result 2: Assessment of future demand for air transport
Review existing data to determine relevant market segments (routes, services,
key commodities);
Determine future demand for air travel and airports, especially to access
or open up the underutilized economic potential, cater for projected
78
tourism growth and provide for business and social travel throughout the
country, at both regional and international level; and
Analyse the overall role of air transport within the overall transport system
(how does air transport complement road networks, railways systems, and
waterways). The demand/supply analysis may need to show analyze and
the
modal
split
Air/Road/Railways/Ports
in
terms
of
domestic/regional/foreign traffic (passenger and cargo), before going to
the details of air transport analysis.
Assess the status or trend of transport in the region taking advantage of
geographical location of Tanzania in relation to landlocked countries of
Malawi, Zambia, DRC, Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. With likely hood of
attracting transit traffic through planned Tanzanian airports.
Defining a strategy and action plan for aviation sector development
A strategy for developing an aviation transport, especially a network of airports, to

maximize economic gains/benefits, will be developed. The strategy should also
include an action plan, listing priorities, a realistic time frame for the actions and
investments, depending on demand development. The action plan will also identify
the relevant stakeholders, a division of responsibilities for all different actions and
mechanisms to initiate and sustain the actions.

Result 3: Defining a strategy and action plan for aviation sector development
Establish the strategy for development of the aviation sector (or outline the
main elements of an aviation sector master plan) comprising general
description of prioritized investment projects and action plan for
implementation to cater for identified demand. Prioritization should be based
on criteria to be proposed and agreed upon by MoID/stakeholders. The
strategy will in particular pay attention to developing an airports network,
supported by safety requirements, that addresses the identified needs. This
includes expansion of Dar es Salaam and Kilimanjaro international airports to
attract an increased number of passenger flights and freighters, upgrading
strategic airports to international status for tourism and other economic
79
imperatives, and improving other domestic airports to establish an efficient

network. The strategy should also include development of aviation related
meteorology services and institutional capacity building;
Indicate existing and other possible sources of finance, especially by
identifying potential PPP opportunities;
Elaborate a strategy for attracting an increased number of competing airline
operators, and number of international flights to/from the countrys
international airports;
Identify which airports require more detailed planning in terms of
a. Only 63 airports owned by TAA/Government (+KADCO)?
b. Only selected, say 20 major out of 63 airports owned by TAA/Government
(+KADCO)?
c. All
368
airports;
national
TAA/TANAPA/MINING/HOSPITALS etc
wide
owned
by
Where necessary recognize the interaction of the selected group against the
rest as they complement one another as spokes/feeders, or smallhubs/distributors of the same traffic.
Clearly show the integrated plan for development of ATC and NAVAIDS to
support the airports under study. This means that airports infrastructures
demand projections and ATC and NAVAIDS development need to be
planned linearly.
Prepare a result based and time bound action plan for strategy
implementation, including allocation of responsibilities for the identified
actions.
3.
EXPERTS PROFILE
3.1
Number of requested experts per category
The assignment will be carried out by one Transport Economist/Aviation Specialist
3.2
Profile required (education, experience, references and input as appropriate)
The following experts will be required:

80
Transport Economist/Aviation Specialist (8 weeks)
Qualification and skills - the Transport Economist/Aviation Specialist should have a good
knowledge of transport economics skills and an in-depth knowledge of the aviation
sector. He/she must have not less than 10 years of relevant experience. He/she must
have proven skills in consultancy in aviation sector aspects. International work
experience, especially in Africa and, in particular Tanzania, is an advantage.
General professional experience - Must have a management or consultancy background

related to transport economics and, in particular aviation assessment of air transport
planning, development and operations.
Education Masters degree in transport economics/aviation economics.
4. LOCATION AND DURATION

4.1
Starting period and duration

The project work will be carried out within 10 weeks of the commencement date. This
period shall cover examination of relevant documentation and interviews with relevant
officers, preparation of reports detailed in Section 5 and facilitation of a stakeholders
workshop.
4.2
Planning
A kick-off meeting will be organised by the Department of Policy and Planning of the
Ministry of Infrastructure Development for the team of experts upon their arrival.
During this meeting, the final scope of the assignment (i.e. the list of documents to be
reviewed, as well as persons to be interviewed by experts, format of reports to be
produced) and practical arrangements will be decided (eg. time schedule for visits in
airports). Minutes of the kick-off meeting, to be prepared by the experts, together with
these Terms of Reference will then provide guidelines for conducting project work to be
presented in the Inception Report.
A liaison office will be provided by MoID who will operate as part of the team. The
consultant will organise a workshop to gain acceptance and commitment from all key
stakeholders for the draft final report as workshop document.
81
4.3
Location(s) of assignment
The main base for the project work will be in Dar es Salaam. Project work including
inspections of a small representative sample of air facilities as needed.
5. REPORTING
5.1
Content
The following reports should be provided: Inception Report, Draft Final Report and Final
Report.
The Inception report will outline the detailed working schedule for the project.
The Draft Final Report will have three main sections, based on the three
results/outputs defined in section 2.3 above.
The Draft Final Report be subject to comments from DPP and a stakeholders
workshop. These comments shall be addressed and taken into consideration in
the Final Report.
5.2
Language
All reports will be drafted in English.
5.3
Submission/comments timing
The reports will be submitted according to the timetable below having commencement
date N (kick-off meeting) as a reference:
Milestone
5.4
Time
Inception Report
N+1 week
Draft Final Report
N+7 weeks
Workshop
N+9 weeks
Comments of DFR
N+9 weeks
Final Report
N+10 weeks
Number of report(s) copies

All reports will be provided in 6 hard copies and in an electronic form.
82
Annex: STSIP Projected Expenditure
TAA Projects
2009/10
Approved
2010/11
2011/12
Total
J.Nyerere International Airport
56,738
10,080
0.00
66,818
Songwe Airport
32,700
0.00
0.00
32,700
Mwanza Airport
14,582
19,000
19,000
52,582
1,214
6,000
6,000
13,214
Arusha Airport
560
18,000
18,000
36,560
Kigoma Airport
255
10,300
10,300
20855
Msalato Airport
1,560
22,000
22,000
45,560
Singida Airport
350
150
150
750
Bukoba Airport
2,560
8,470
8,470
19,500
Tabora Airport
370
8,900
8,900
18170
110889
102900
92820
Mafia Island Airport
TAA - Total
306709
TCAA Projects
TShs Billion
2008/9
2009/10 2010/11 2011/12
Total
Procurement of Air Navigation Aids
0.65
0.65
0.00
0.00
1.29
Construction of the Civil Aviation House
2.56
3.16
0.68
0.68
7.08
Establishement of Training Fund
0.77
0.77
0.77
0.77
3.07
Enhanced Capacity of the Civil Aviation
0.00
0.00
83
0.64
Centre
0.64
0.00
Management Information system
0.00
0.00
0.51
0.00
0.51
Civil Aviation Master Plan
0.00
0.00
0.38
0.00
0.38
Building Economic Regulation Capacity
0.00
0.00
0.09
0.08
0.17
Civil Aviation Statistics Database
0.00
0.00
0.32
0.00
0.32
TCAA - Total
3.97
4.58
3.39
1.52
13.47
84
Appendix E: List of persons met for this study

The list below does not include the large number of attendees at the meeting held March 4, 2010 in Dar es
Salaam, when the initial draft of this report was being reviewed. In addition, there were telephone
interviews with other relevant parties.
Project coordination and management:
Aunyisa Boniface Meena
Senior Transport Economist
Elirehema Obed Mollel
Economist
Department of Policy and Planning
Air Transport:
Eng. Edwin H.T. Mujwahuzi
Assistant Director - Airports and Aerodromes
Kirenga R. Ndemino
Assistant Director Air Transport and Meteorolgy
Dr. Bwire Barth Rufunjo
Transport Expert
Thomas Ngulika
Air Transport Expert
Safety and Environment:

Mademi Kipande
Director, Safety and Environment
Tanzania Airports Authority

Prosper Tesha
Director General
S.S. Suleiman
Director of Engineering and Technical Services
George Smabali
Manager Planning, Design, and Evaluation
85
Moshongi I. Moshongi
Assistant Statistician
Neema Joseph
Project Coordinator (World Bank airports project)
Tanzania Civil Aviation Authority
Margaret Muyage
Director General
Fadhili Monongi
Director Economic Regulation
Said A. K. Sumry
Civil Aviation Manager, Zanzibar
Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar Ministry of Communications & Transport
Dr. Vuai I. Lila
Principal Secretary
Mr. Abdullah H. Kombo
Project Coordinator, Zanzibar Transport Master Plan Project
Abdulhalym Mohamed Sururu
Chief Civil Aviation Security & Safety, Department of Aviation
Yussuf-Mohammed Ali
Planning & Policy Officer, Department of Aviation
Kilimanjaro Airports Development Company (by telephone):

Marco van der Kreeke
Managing Director
86
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Republic of Tanzania

Ministry of Infrastructure Development

Civil Aviation Master Plan Pre-feasibility Study

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Automatic Dependent Survey - Broadcast

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ii. Executive Summary

Air Service Licensing

Air Navigation Services

Airport Parking fees

Landing & Parking

Airport Parking fees

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Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania, 2008, TCAA, p. 13

Seats per Capita

II. Sector Overview

1. Institutions and Agencies

Air Service Licensing

Air Navigation Services

Data source: Calculated on TCAA annual reports from 2005-2008.

Figure 5: Pilot licenses registered in Tanzania.

Total Pilot Licences

Data source: Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania, 2008

Figure 6: Total aircraft year-end on the TCAAs aircraft registry.

Data source: Civil Aviation Statistics of Tanzania, 2008

Data source: TCAA

Figure 8: TAA Revenue Sources, FY 2007/2008

Airport Parking fees

Landing & Parking

Airport Parking fees

acquisition decisions may not be done on a sound business or

economic basis, and offer

Text Box: Flag carriersa pattern in attempting privatization8

III. Traffic Overview

SRS International JNIA

Table 2: Airlines providing scheduled international service in Tanzania (including

Precision Air Services Ltd.

Ethiopian Airlines Enterprise

Swiss European Air Lines Ltd

South African Airways

African Star Airways (PTY) Ltd.

Air Malawi Limited

Condor Flugdienst GmbH

Northern Dene Airways Ltd.

Air Routing International Corp.

Air Zimbabwe (PVT) Ltd.

TUI Airlines Belgium

Gulf Air Company G.S.C.

Air India Limited

Eagle Air Ltd.

Table 3: Airlines providing scheduled international service in Tanzania, with their

KLM Royal Dutch Airlines

Table 4: Scheduled domestic carriers in Tanzania. This table

Precision Air Services Ltd.

Source: Analysis based on data provided by Seabury's SRS

charter operators with scheduled services, such as Coastal.

Source: Analysis based on Seabury SRS data.