Options for the Japanese electricity

mix by 2050
Driss Berraho

Disclaimer
This paper and its content only reflect the views of the author

Master of Science Thesis

KTH School of Industrial Engineering and Management
Energy Technology EGI-2012Division of Energy and Climate studies
SE-100 44 STOCKHOLM

Master of Science Thesis EGI 2012

Options for the Japanese electricity mix by

2050

Driss Berraho
Approved

Examiner

Supervisor

EGI-2012-097MSC

Commissioner

Contact person

Abstract
The Great East Japan earthquake and the resulting tsunami struck Japan east coast on March 11th 2011.
All nuclear power plants on the east coast were automatically shut down, and several thermal plants were
damaged: Japan was left with only 19% of its nuclear capacity available (i.e. 9 GW). The FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant underwent major incidents, with a fusion of the nuclear core and radioactivity
leakage, the most important nuclear accident since Chernobyl.
During the summer 2011, the Japanese government undertook emergency measures to offset the expected
20% capacity shortage in Tokyo and Tohoku areas. On the supply side, capacity was recovered by
restarting and restoring fossil-fuelled power generation, and importing power from neighboring areas. On
the demand side, stringent demand restriction measures led to a summer peak demand 10 GW lower in
the Tokyo area and 3.1 GW lower in the Tohoku area, compared to 2010.
In early 2012, only 2 reactors were still in operation, after further nuclear shutdowns. Market-driven
electricity conservation reforms and subsidy-driven supply capacity additions aim to avoid emergency
measures in the summer 2012 similar to those of summer 2011, and offset the expected 9% power deficit
in the country.
For the longer term, Japan government has launched various initiatives to review the 2010 Basic Energy
Plan, which envisaged a nuclear expansion. In this study, a model was developed to assess the economic
and environmental impacts of three contrasted scenarios, reflecting different options for Japans electricity
mix by 2050.
The results show that a nuclear phase-out would induce additional costs of the order of 850bn to the
power system over the period 2010-50, compared to the Basic Energy Plan, while also preventing Japan to
reach its CO2 emissions reduction targets by 2050. A sensitivity analysis shows that a reduced renewables
development would lower the cost of the power system, but put aside climate change mitigation and
energy security of supply. On the other hand, a reduced electricity demand through energy efficiency
measures would have a positive impact on both CO2 emissions and the security of supply.

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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................ 7
Summary ........................................................................................................................................... 8
1

Context .....................................................................................................................................10
1.1
Objectives ................................................................................................................................... 10
1.2
Methodology .............................................................................................................................. 10
1.3
Japan electricity sector in 2010 ........................................................................................... 11
1.3.1
Japan had a well-balanced electricity mix in 2010 ................................................................. 11
1.3.2
Japan electricity network is isolated and weakly connected ............................................ 11
1.4
Japan future energy policy: before Fukushima, the Basic Energy Plan aimed at a
nuclear expansion ................................................................................................................................ 13

How did Japan balance electricity supply and demand during summer 2011?
14
2.1
Reduced nuclear capacity after the Great East Japan Earthquake ............................ 15
2.2
Comprehensive measures to address capacity losses .................................................. 17
2.3
The shift from nuclear to fossil fuels resulted in higher energy prices and CO2
emissions ................................................................................................................................................. 21
2.4
Gloomy prospects for winter 2012 and summer 2012................................................. 23

3 Long term policy implementation: a model to assess the impacts of various

electricity mix options for 2050 in Japan .............................................................................26
3.1
Options for the Japanese electricity mix by 2050 .......................................................... 26
3.2
Model structure and inputs................................................................................................... 28
3.3
Model outputs: a multi-criteria comparison between the three contrasted
scenarios ................................................................................................................................................. 31
3.3.1
Power generation assets ..................................................................................................................... 31
3.3.2
Cost of the power generation system ........................................................................................... 32
3.3.3
Energy security of supply ................................................................................................................... 34
3.3.4
Environmental impact.......................................................................................................................... 36
3.3.5
Multi-criteria comparison conclusions ........................................................................................ 39
3.4
Sensitivity analysis on power supply and demand ........................................................ 41
3.4.1
Rationale and anticipated effects .................................................................................................... 41
3.4.2
A limited development for renewables in the Japanese electricity mix....................... 41
3.4.3
Improved energy efficiency to reduce the electricity demand ......................................... 50

Key conclusions .....................................................................................................................60

Appendix 1: Sensitivity analysis synthesis ..........................................................................61

Appendix 2: Model assumptions .............................................................................................67
References ......................................................................................................................................68

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Table of figures
Figure 1: Japan capacity mix and electricity production mix (resp.) in 2010 ([1]) ................................11
Figure 2: Japan grid network ([2]) .............................................................................................................................12
Figure 3: Japan electric power companies ([2]) .......................................................................................................12
Figure 4: Basic Energy Plan 2030 electricity mix ([3]) ...........................................................................................14
Figure 5: Available nuclear capacity in Japan ([2]) .................................................................................................15
Figure 6: Capacity deficit if no recovery measures were taken, Tokyo area ([4]) ..............................................16
Figure 7: Capacity deficit if no recovery measures were taken, Tohoku area ([5]) ...........................................16
Figure 8: Power generation capacity in Tokyo area ([4]) .......................................................................................17
Figure 9: Power generation capacity in Tohoku area ([5]) ....................................................................................18
Figure 10: Available supply capacity in Tokyo area (weekly average) ([4]).........................................................19
Figure 11: Tokyo area daily peak load for summer 2011 ([4])..............................................................................19
Figure 12: Comparison of 2010 and 2011 summer peak demands ([4]).............................................................20
Figure 13: Summer 2011 daily peak demand vs. daily maximal temperature ([4]) ............................................20
Figure 14: Tohoku area summer 2011 peak day load curve vs. available supply capacity ([5]) ......................21
Figure 15: Japan LNG consumption for power generation ([2]) .........................................................................22
Figure 16: Japan LNG import price ([1]) .................................................................................................................22
Figure 17: Japan CO2 emissions from electricity sector ([2], own analysis) .......................................................23
Figure 18: Japan nuclear power plants status as of February 2012 ([8]) .............................................................24
Figure 19: Anticipated reserve capacity margin winter 2012 ([6]) ....................................................................24
Figure 20: Anticipated reserve capacity margin summer 2012 ([6]) .................................................................25
Figure 21: Japan installed capacity evolution, under the pre-Fukushima Basic Energy Plan ([3]) .................26
Figure 22: 2050 target electricity mix under the three contrasted scenarios ......................................................28
Figure 23: LCOE main technologies in 2030 ([2], [9]) ..........................................................................................30
Figure 24: Strategic Energy Plan electricity demand reference scenario ([3]) ................................................31
Figure 25: Electricity mix in 2030 and 2050, under the three studied scenarios ...............................................31
Figure 26: Installed capacity in 2030 and 2050 under the three scenarios .........................................................32
Figure 27: Investment requirements in power generation assets, under the three scenarios ..........................33
Figure 28: Electricity generation cost evolution under the three scenarios .......................................................33
Figure 29: Total additional cost compared to the Basic Energy Plan .................................................................34
Figure 30: Gas imports for power generation under the three scenarios ...........................................................35
Figure 31: Impact of the energy imports bill on the balance of trades ...............................................................35
Figure 32: Power sector carbon intensity evolution under the three scenarios.................................................36
Figure 33: Power sector overall CO2 emissions evolution, under the three scenarios .....................................37
Figure 34: Number of installed wind turbines in 2050 on Japan territory under the three scenarios ..........38
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Figure 35: Land use for solar panels in 2050 under the three scenarios.............................................................38
Figure 36: Power sector carbon intensity vs. electricity cost in 2050, under the three scenarios ...................40
Figure 37: 2050 target electricity mix with a lower renewables development under the three scenarios ......42
Figure 38: Installed capacity evolution with a reduced renewables development for the three scenarios ....42
Figure 39: Investment requirements in power generation assets, with a lower renewables development,
under the three scenarios ..................................................................................................................................43
Figure 40: Electricity generation cost evolution with a lower renewables development under the three
scenarios...............................................................................................................................................................43
Figure 41: Total additional cost compared to the Basic Energy Plan with a lower renewables development
...............................................................................................................................................................................44
Figure 42: Gas imports for power generation under the three scenarios ...........................................................44
Figure 43: Impact of the energy imports bill on the balance of trades with a lower renewables
development under the three scenarios ..........................................................................................................45
Figure 44: Power sector carbon intensity evolution with a lower renewables development under the three
scenarios...............................................................................................................................................................45
Figure 45: Power sector overall CO2 emissions evolution with a lower renewables development under the
three scenarios ....................................................................................................................................................46
Figure 46: Number of installed wind turbines on Japan territory in 2050 with a lower renewables
development under the three scenarios ..........................................................................................................47
Figure 47: Land use for solar panels in 2050 with a lower renewables development under the three
scenarios...............................................................................................................................................................47
Figure 48: Power sector carbon intensity vs. electricity cost in 2050, with a lower renewables development,
under the three scenarios ..................................................................................................................................48
Figure 49: Electricity demand evolution under the reference scenario and the Advanced Energy Efficiency
scenario ................................................................................................................................................................50
Figure 50: 2050 target electricity mix with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios .............50
Figure 51: Installed capacity evolution with a reduced electricity demand for the three scenarios ...............51
Figure 52: Investment requirements in power generation assets, with a reduced electricity demand,
under the three scenarios ..................................................................................................................................51
Figure 53: Electricity generation cost evolution with a reduced electricity demand under the three
scenarios...............................................................................................................................................................52
Figure 54: Total additional cost compared to the Basic Energy Plan with reduced electricity demand .......53
Figure 55: Gas imports for power generation with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios
...............................................................................................................................................................................53
Figure 56: Impact of the energy imports bill on the balance of trades with a reduced electricity demand
under the three scenarios ..................................................................................................................................54
Figure 57: Power sector carbon intensity evolution with a reduced electricity demand under the three
scenarios...............................................................................................................................................................55
Figure 58: Power sector overall CO2 emissions evolution with a reduced electricity demand under the
three scenarios ....................................................................................................................................................55

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Figure 59: Number of installed wind turbines on Japan territory in 2050 with a reduced electricity demand
under the three scenarios ..................................................................................................................................56
Figure 60: Land use for solar panels in 2050 with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios 56
Figure 61: Energy intensity of GDP ([11]) ..............................................................................................................58
Figure 62: Incremental cost of electricity savings vs. electricity generation costs ([6]) ....................................59
Figure 81: Electricity mix evolution Basic Energy Plan scenario .....................................................................64
Figure 82: Installed capacity evolution Basic Energy Plan scenario ................................................................64
Figure 83: Capacity under construction over 2010-50 Basic Energy Plan scenario ......................................65
Figure 84: Investment requirements Basic Energy Plan scenario ....................................................................65
Figure 85: Fuel imports and energy bill Basic Energy Plan scenario ...............................................................65
Figure 86: Electricity generation cost Basic Energy Plan scenario ..................................................................66
Figure 87: Power sector CO2 emissions and carbon intensity Basic Energy Plan scenario .........................66

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Acknowledgements
The study was carried out as part of an internship at the Strategy Department of AREVA, in Paris, France.
The internship lasted from September 2011 to the end of February 2012, and the study was carried out
during the very same period. Thus, none of the events or political decisions relative to the topic that
happened after this period is reflected in the study, such as:

Official scenarios being considered by the government for Japans future energy mix;
Shut down of all nuclear reactors in May 2012;
Re-start of Ohi 3 & 4 reactors during summer 2012.

I would like to sincerely thank my tutor, Raphael Berger, Vice-President of Economic Studies within the
Strategy Department, who gave me the opportunity to carry out this valuable internship and to tackle this
very interesting topic.
I would like to thank the whole team of the Economic Studies as well, for their help and the time they
devoted to the project.
I would like to thank the Strategy Department, for their friendly welcome and their availability, and the
company, AREVA, as a whole.
Finally, I would like to sincerely thank Prof. Semida Silveira, for teaching me the right tools and the right
approach to tackle such energy policy related matters, and for her availability and valuable comments
throughout the study to reach the current results.

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Summary
Before Fukushima, Japan had set up the Basic Energy Plan, meant to drive the energy policy of the
country for the coming decades. The plan aimed for the decarbonisation of the power sector, with an
extension of the low CO2 power generation, mostly nuclear power, and energy efficiency measures to
reduce the power consumption by 3% in 2030. The planned nuclear expansion was to be achieved by a
combination of lifetime extensions on the nuclear installed base, and several new projects to reach 68GW
of nuclear capacity by 2030. The targeted electricity mix was to achieve a 74% low-CO2 power generation,
decreasing CO2 emissions from the power sector by almost 50%, compared to the 2010s level. The
increase in renewable electricity production was to be based on a better use of the installed hydropower
capacity and the development of solar and wind power. But this was before Fukushima
The Great East Japan earthquake and the resulting tsunami struck Japan east coast on March 11 th 2011.
All nuclear power plants on the east coast were automatically shut down, and several thermal plants were
damaged: Japan was left with only 19% of its nuclear capacity available (i.e. 9 GW). The FukushimaDaiichi nuclear power plant underwent major incidents, with a fusion of the nuclear core and radioactivity
leakage, the most important nuclear accident since Chernobyl. In addition, several fossil plants (oil, gas,
coal) located near Fukushima were also shut down following the events. This meant that in the Tokyo and
Tohoku areas, an additional 16.6 GW of fossil generation were unavailable: 13.3 GW in Tokyo area and
3.3 GW in Tohoku area. All in all, Tokyo and Tohoku areas were to face large capacity shortages in the
summer 2011. More exactly, the shortage amounted to 23% in Tokyo and 26% in Tohoku of what was
necessary in relation to the summer 2010 peak demand.
During the summer 2011, short term policy reforms and initiatives were required in order to minimize
power shortages and stabilize power supply and demand. The Japanese government undertook emergency
measures to offset the expected capacity shortage in Tokyo and Tohoku areas. On the supply side,
capacity was recovered by restarting and restoring fossil-fuelled power generation, and importing power
from neighboring areas, securing up to 11% capacity margin in Tokyo area. On the demand side, stringent
demand restriction measures led to a summer peak demand 10 GW lower in the Tokyo area and 3.1 GW
lower in the Tohoku area, compared to 2010: large industries were particularly successful in reducing their
power consumption by up to 20%, with a reduced activity and significant adjustments of operating times
The increase in fossil fuels consumption, as replacement of unavailable nuclear power, and the increase in
oil prices, have had a negative financial impact on the country, with a projected additional cost of $46bn
on the 2011 national energy bill. Assuming a full repercussion of fuel costs on the consumers, the
electricity bill could rise by 18.2% for households and 36 % for industrial consumers by 2012,
corresponding to a 48 $/MWh increase. The shift from nuclear power to fossil-fuelled generation resulted
in a higher consumption of oil, coal and LNG, leading to a significant 11% increase in CO 2 emissions.
In early 2012, only 2 reactors were still in operation, after further nuclear shutdowns. Market-driven
electricity conservation reforms and subsidy-driven supply capacity additions aimed at avoiding emergency
measures in the summer 2012 similar to those of summer 2011, and offset the expected 9% power deficit
in the country. Demand restriction measures for large industries during summer 2011 were unsustainable
arrangements and could not be permanent. Public acceptance and willingness to alter their daily lifestyle
might not last. That is why demand reduction measures scheduled for summer 2012 were more incentives
than restrictions.
For the longer term, Japan government has launched various initiatives to review the 2010 Basic Energy
Plan, which envisaged a nuclear expansion. In this study, a model was developed to assess the economic
and environmental impacts of three contrasted scenarios, reflecting different options for Japans electricity
mix by 2050. Thus, three contrasted scenarios for the 2050 electricity mix were built, reflecting the various
opinions for the long term:

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The Basic Energy Plan (Pre-Fukushima) scenario, as a reference case, reflecting the energy policy
which had been chosen by the Japanese government for 2030, extended to 2050. The 2050 target
electricity mix aimed at 60% nuclear power, 30% renewables and 10% fossil-fuelled power.
The nuclear upholding scenario considers that the share of nuclear power in the electricity mix is
maintained over the period, and stays at 30% by 2050, with 40% renewables and 30% fossilfuelled power.
The nuclear phase-out scenario considers a phase-out of nuclear power from the electricity mix
by 2050, with 50% renewables and 50% fossil-fuelled power.

The results showed that a nuclear phase-out would induce additional costs of the order of 850bn to the
power system over the period 2010-50, compared to the Basic Energy Plan, while also preventing Japan to
reach its CO2 emissions reduction targets by 2050: CO2 emissions would have a 30% reduction compared
to 1990, instead of the 85% reduction under the Basic Energy Plan. The security of supply would be
threatened in case of a nuclear phase-out, as the increased reliance on imported fossil fuels would induce
the energy imports bill to increase by approximately 25bn p.a. Finally, the feasibility of the above
mentioned nuclear phase-out scenario is questionable, as it would require ~ 10% of Japan territory to be
covered by wind farms, which would be challenging in terms of supply chain and public acceptance for
land use competition.
On the other hand, maintaining nuclear would limit costs and significantly decrease CO 2 emissions
compared to a nuclear phase-out. Indeed, compared to the Basic Energy Plan, the additional cost to the
power generation system would be limited to 450bn, 50% less than the nuclear phase-out. The nuclear
upholding scenario would relieve the security of energy supply, with an energy imports bill 12bn lower
compared to the nuclear phase-out, while managing to decrease the CO2 emissions by 60% compared to
1990s level.
A sensitivity analysis was carried out on two parameters: supply and demand. The rationale is that in case
there would be a limited financial capability and/or a lack of accessible resources, renewable energy
projects could be constrained and the targets achieved, lower. For the demand, enhanced energy efficiency
measures could help on climate change mitigation and energy security of supply.
The results of the model showed that a limited renewables development would limit the cost of a nuclear
phase-out but put aside climate change mitigation with higher CO2 emissions. Indeed, the lower share of
renewables in the electricity generation mix would lead to a higher consumption of imported gas (LNG)
and a lower investment in power generation capacity (gas-fired power generation having a higher load
factor than renewables). The additional cost to the power generation system, compared to the Basic
Energy Plan, would be limited to 490bn, while the power sector carbon footprint would be almost as
high as 1990s level. There would be a negative impact on the energy security of supply as well, with an
energy imports bill at ~60bn, 20bn higher than the Basic Energy Plan.
Implementing challenging energy efficiency measures would limit the impact of the nuclear phase-out on
all aspects: cost, security of supply, CO 2 emissions and feasibility. Thus, the nuclear phase-out additional
cost would be limited to ~310bn compared to the Basic Energy Plan (noting that the investment in
energy efficiency measures is not factored in). The energy imports bill would be reduced at 37bn, but still
19bn higher compared to the Basic Energy Plan. Power sector CO 2 emissions would reduce by 40%
compared to 1990s level (still twice higher than the Basic Energy Plan), and the 10GW reduction in
power generation capacity requirements would facilitate the feasibility of a nuclear phase-out. However,
energy conservation measures such as more efficient lighting can be challenging and costly. Replacing
all light bulbs with the most efficient LED bulbs could save up to ~ 9% of Japan annual electricity
consumption, at an estimated cost of 160bn. Nonetheless, depending on the technology already used, the
cost of electricity savings is incremental, and implementing electricity savings measures can be more
expensive than producing that very electricity with existing or new power generation units.

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1 Context
In order to cope with the Kyoto protocol objectives of reducing greenhouse gases emissions drastically
and securing the energy supply of the country, Japan adopted a new Strategic Energy Plan in 2010,
setting the energy policy of the country until 2030. The main objectives were to double the energy selfsufficiency ratio up to 26%, halve the CO2 emissions from the residential sector, and maintain and
enhance energy efficiency in the industrial sector at the highest level in the world. This would lead to 30%
reduction of greenhouse gases emissions by 2030, compared to the levels of 1990. One of the main
measures to achieve these targets was to promote nuclear power generation by building 9 reactors by
2020, and more than 14 by 2030. But this was before Fukushima
The Great East Japan earthquake and the resulting tsunami struck Japan east coast on March 11 th 2011.
Beyond the immense suffering from the disaster, and the human tragedy, significant consequences to the
national infrastructure were recorded, including the power system. All nuclear power plants on the east
coast were automatically shut down, and several thermal plants were damaged. The Fukushima-Daiichi
nuclear power plant underwent major incidents, with a fusion of the nuclear core and radioactivity leakage,
the most important nuclear accident since Chernobyl. The accident raised safety concerns over nuclear
power both locally and globally. Germany, for example, voted for an early nuclear phase-out.
Consequently, expansion of nuclear power in Japan now appears more challenging and uncertain.
Japan is now facing a crossroads: should the country keep pushing for nuclear energy, with more stringent
security standards? Should it completely phase-out nuclear energy and invest massively in renewable
energy? Should it adopt an intermediate solution, with a more moderate introduction of new nuclear
capacity? Finally, in each case, will Japan still be able to afford its set target for greenhouse gases emissions
reduction? At the moment, the country is undergoing a major national debate to address these questions
and redefine its energy policy.

1.1 Objectives
This thesis aims at analysing how Japan should be addressing both short-term and long-term policy
decision-making, power shortage threats, and evaluating the available options for the country in terms of
energy system development.
For short term decision-making, we will analyse how the country dealt with the power crisis following the
Great East Japan Earthquake and the resulting Fukushima accident, the consequences of such emergency
measures and their sustainability on the long term. Assessing the consequences and their sustainability
offers Japanese decision makers an opportunity to validate or not their decisions for the short term, and
assess their reliability for the long term.
For the longer term, we will present and analyse the results of the model we realized, an assessment of the
economic and environmental impacts of various energy mix options for the Japanese 2050 electricity mix.
The model is aimed at providing quantitative tools for comparing various options that are available for
Japan.

1.2 Methodology
The study was carried out following the below described process.
Literature survey and news gathering were first necessary in order to grasp a global overview of the past
and current Japanese energy context, and the previously scheduled energy policy. The information was
mostly recovered from energy databases, news, and reports from relevant administrations and
organizations in Japan and internationally (Institute for Energy Economics of Japan, International Energy
Agency, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, etc.).
Within the context of the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the resulting Fukushima events, balancing
electricity supply and demand during summer 2011 was a major challenge for Japan. Decisions that were
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made at the political level and how they were perceived and applied by the private sector and the
population were reviewed. Press and reports from the relevant local institutions were used in order to get
an overview of the context and decisions that were made. Consequences and sustainability were partly
found in these reports and calculated out of the available data.
Finally, regarding the long term policy aspects, an analytical model was used for analysis. The model will
be presented later in the text (the way it was built and the way the results are drawn). The model was built
in several steps: first a generic model is used aiming at producing the most precise results and information
of interest for decision makers. Secondly, relevant data necessary for the models inputs were gathered.
Finally, the model was tested with the chosen inputs, shared with the rest of the team and people in the
company in Japan who have a good understanding of the local situation, and adjusted properly.

1.3 Japan electricity sector in 2010

1.3.1 Japan had a well-balanced electricity mix in 2010
In 2010, Japan power generation mix was equally balanced between nuclear, gas and coal fired generation,
summing up to over 80% of the mix. This was a result of the diversification policy launched in the 1980s.
Figure 1 shows the evolution since 2000, showing the capacity installed and the energy production in
Japan for each technology available in the country.
GW

TWh

300

1,200

1%

Other renewables

2%

1%

16%

17%

2%
9%

18%

3%
8%

2%
9%

29%

28%

Hydro
Nuclear
Gas

17%

18%

200

800
31%

18%

Oil
Coal

19%
17%

15%

22%

28%

25%
20%

100

19%

400

10%

30%

7%

10%
27%

27%

28%

23%

19%

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

26%

Figure 1: Japan capacity mix and electricity production mix (resp.) in 2010 ([1])

Nuclear power production may appear limited but is an essential share of the Japanese electricity
generation mix, as it provides most of the base load. Japan has indeed historically relied on nuclear power
for its economic development, nuclear power providing stable supply and affordable electricity for energyintensive industries and households.
All fossil fuel needs are imported, as Japan has almost no gas, coal or oil reserves. Japan has no
connection to gas pipelines: all imported gas is Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). The last ten years trend
emphasizes a raising share of gas-fired power generation, instead of coal and oil: gas is getting more and
more affordable, and at the same time, investment for highly flexible gas-fired power plants remains
limited, far below capital-intensive coal or nuclear power.
1.3.2 Japan electricity network is isolated and weakly connected
Japan power grid is isolated from the mainland, and divided in two distinguished areas running at two
different frequencies: the Eastern part of Japan is under a 50Hz frequency, while the Central and Western
part of Japan is under a 60 Hz frequency (see Figure 2). The historical division in two frequency areas
dates back to the 1800s, when Japan electrification began: the eastern regions started to develop their grid
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with German equipment under 50Hz, while rival western regions got equipped by American equipment
under 60 Hz. Since then, exchanging capacities between both regions is limited to the three conversion
stations which can accommodate only up to 1 GW of exchange capacity, compared to the 118GW
capacity in the West grid and 88GW in the East grid.

60 Hz

50 Hz

1 GW
Figure 2: Japan grid network ([2])

This major bottleneck is likely to become a barrier for further integration between the different areas, a
required step towards a renewable energy deployment. Renewable energy resources are scattered around
the country, and so will the renewable electricity production also be. A strong grid integration of the
whole country will be necessary to connect the power production areas to consumption areas: indeed,
most of the wind energy potential is located in the Tohoku and Hokkaido northern areas, while the
biggest consumption areas are located in Central Japan.
Moreover, the electricity sector is dominated by 10 regional privately owned utilities: in each area, the
vertically integrated utility manages generation, transmission and distribution. The largest operator in
terms of capacity installed and power generated is Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Within each
frequency area, the different utilities areas are also weakly connected.

Figure 3: Japan electric power companies ([2])

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Despite the liberalization of more than 60%the electricity market1, which was started in 2000, the market
is still dominated by the 10 power companies. These companies deal mainly under bilateral contracts, and
new entrants could capture only 1-2% of the potential market.

1.4 Japan future energy policy: before Fukushima, the Basic

Energy Plan aimed at a nuclear expansion
In 2003, Japan set up a Basic Energy Plan, meant to drive the energy policy of the country for the coming
decades. The plan was under the responsibility of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI).
The text was set to be reviewed at least every three years, and revised if needed. The last revision occurred
in June 2010.
The Strategic Energy Plan that emerged from the last revision of the Basic Energy Plan was to articulate
the direction of Japans energy policy. According to METI [3], the aim of the plan was to reshape the
energy supply and the demand system by 2030, focusing on three main aspects:

Energy security;

Efficient energy supply;

Environmental protection.

The plan was to include also a reform of the energy industrial structure, to provide the basis for an energybased economic growth.
The plan was setting ambitious targets for 2030, such as:

Doubling the energy self-sufficiency ratio to raise its energy independence ratio2 from 38% to
70%. Japan is indeed highly reliant on fossil fuel imports to cope with its energy needs;

Raising the zero-emission power source ratio from 34% to 70%;

Halving CO2 emissions from the residential sector;

Maintaining and enhancing energy efficiency in the industrial sector at the highest level in the
world;

Maintaining or obtaining top-class shares of global markets for energy-related products and
systems.

Securing stable energy resource supply was at the core of Japan future energy policy, which was to be
achieved by deepening strategic relationships with resource-rich countries or developing new energy
resources. Still the main focus was on the electricity system, as regards the energy supply structure. Indeed,
the power sector was meant to achieve both an independent and environmental-friendly energy supply
structure by:

Expanding the introduction of renewable energy, using the feed-in tariff system for electricity
from renewable energy sources;

Promoting nuclear power generation, by building more than 14 new nuclear power plants by
2030, enhancing the utilization rates, and developing fast-breeder reactors;

Improving the use of fossil fuels, by reducing CO2 emissions from coal and gas-fired power
plants, and progressively introducing Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS);

Eligible customers are customers with a specific consumption over 50kW.

The energy independence ratio is an indicator that combines the self-sufficiency energy with the self-developed
energy supply divided by total primary energy sources. An average energy self-sufficiency rate for OECD
countries is almost 70% ([3]).
2

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Enhancing electricity and gas supply systems, by building an interactive grid network and
enlarging the electricity wholesale market.

Thus, according to the Basic Energy Plan, the power sector was to see a major shift from fossil-fuelled
power generation to low-CO2 power generation, mainly in the form of nuclear power (see Figure 4).
1,200

-3%
1,049

1,000

Renewables
1,020

10%
21%

800

Nuclear
Gas
Oil

28%

Coal

600
28%

53%

400
7%
200
26%

13%
2%
11%

2010

2030

Figure 4: Basic Energy Plan 2030 electricity mix ([3])

The planned nuclear expansion was to be achieved by a combination of lifetime extensions on the nuclear
installed base, and several new projects to reach 68GW of nuclear capacity by 2030. The targeted
electricity mix was to achieve a 74% low-CO2 power generation, decreasing CO2 emissions from the
power sector by almost 50%, compared to the 2010s level.
The increase in renewable electricity production was to be based on a better use of the installed
hydropower capacity, and the development of solar and wind power.
In order to achieve 3% reduction in the national annual electricity demand in 2030, compared to the 2010
level (i.e. getting back to the 2007 level), energy efficiency measures, such as aiming at net-zero-energy
buildings and setting compulsory energy-saving standards for new appliances, were to be implemented.
But this was before Fukushima

2 How did Japan balance electricity supply and demand

during summer 2011?
Following the Great East Japan Earthquake that occurred on March 11 th, and the resulting Fukushima
accident, Japan lost a significant part of its power generation capacity. Besides the reconstruction of the
country, concerns arose as regards the utilities ability to provide enough power in the summer 2011. Due
to high temperatures, this is usually the time of the year when the annual peak demand is reached,
corresponding to air conditioning needs.
This section aims at assessing the impact of the events on generating capacity, presenting the measures
taken by Japan authorities in the two most stricken areas to balance power supply and demand over the
summer. What actually was accomplished is also presented.

-14-

2.1 Reduced nuclear capacity after the Great East Japan

Earthquake
Japans nuclear infrastructure is composed of 54 reactors representing a total installed capacity of
48.5GW. The country was left with only 19% of its nuclear capacity after the Great East Japan
Earthquake. This situation posed large challenges to planners as the summer of 2011 approached
together with the usual peak demand for energy.
Tokyo and Tohoku areas were the regions most impacted by the earthquake and tsunami of March 11th.
Immediately after the events, 11 reactors in these two regions were automatically shut down:

Tokyo area lost 10.1 GW: 6 reactors at Fukushima Daiichi3 (4.6 GW), 4 at Fukushima Daini
(4.4 GW) and 1 at Tokai (1.1 GW);

Tohoku area lost 2.2 GW: 3 reactors at Onagawa.

Fukushima Daiichi reactors are to be indefinitely shut down and it will take years for some of the other
units to resume operation (with the highest uncertainty on Fukushima Daini). Consequently, the Japanese
earthquake and tsunami led to a decrease in 12.3 GW of nuclear capacity, which became
unavailable for the coming years.
In addition of these automatic shutdowns, another 29.7 GW of nuclear capacity was unavailable across the
country:

Reactors at Kashiwazaki are still temporally shutdown after the 2007 earthquake (3.3 GW);

17 reactors were already under maintenance before the events (9.7 GW);

In addition to the automatic shutdowns, 14 other reactors were shut down in the following
months for maintenance, or on request of the government for inspection (14 GW).

GW
50

-81%
49

12

40

3
10

30
14
20

10
9
0

Total installed
capacity

Offline
since 2011
earthquake

Offline
since 2007
earthquake

Previously
Shutdowns
Capacity
under
for inspection
available
maintenance
post-2011
during
earthquake summer 2011

Figure 5: Available nuclear capacity in Japan ([2])

The amount of unavailable nuclear capacity added up to 39.4 GW throughout the summer 2011,
representing 13.7% of Japans total installed generation capacity. 11 reactors out of 54 were still in
operation, accounting for 9.1 GW, i.e. only 19% of Japan total nuclear capacity. Figure 5 summarizes
the multiple cuts that resulted in this situation.

3 reactors were already shut down for maintenance before the earthquake

-15-

Tokyo and Tohoku areas lost an additional 16.6 GW of fossil generation due to the
earthquake and tsunami.
In addition, several fossil plants (oil, gas, coal) located near Fukushima were also shut down following the
events. This means that in the Tokyo and Tohoku areas, additional 16.6 GW of fossil generation were
unavailable: 13.3 GW in Tokyo area and 3.3 GW in Tohoku area.
All in all, Tokyo and Tohoku areas were to face large capacity shortages in the summer 2011. More
exactly, the shortage amounted to 23% in Tokyo and 26% in Tohoku of what was necessary in relation to
the summer of 2010. Figure 6 and Figure 7 summarize the respective capacity losses in relation to demand
in the summer of 2010. The situation of lost installed capacity summed up as follows:

Tokyo region lost 38% of its installed base and was left with 45.9 GW of available
capacity;

Tohoku region lost 34% of its installed base and was left with 11.3 GW of available
capacity.
GW
73.7

75

6.9
66.8

13.3
60.0
7.5

-23%

50

45.9

25

Total installed Unavailable

Available
Lost fossilcapacity
capacity capacitybefore
fuelled
before 11/3/11
11/3/11
capacity

Lost nuclear
capacity

Available Summer 2010

capacityafter peak demand
11/3/11

Figure 6: Capacity deficit if no recovery measures were taken, Tokyo area ([4])
GW
20

16.8

3.3
15.5

15

2.1

-26%
11.3

10

Available
capacitybefore
11/3/11

Lost fossilfuelled capacity

Lost nuclear
capacity

Available
capacity
after 11/3/11

Summer 2010
peak demand

Figure 7: Capacity deficit if no recovery measures were taken, Tohoku area ([5])

-16-

2.2 Comprehensive measures to address capacity losses

The historic context of the division between Eastern (50 Hz) and Western Japan (60 Hz) as regards the
power system frequency has to be kept in mind as we try to understand the measures taken to reduce the
gap between the remaining generation capacity and the expected demand in the summer 2011. The
existing relief connection system can accommodate only up to 1GW (with three frequency conversion
stations: 0.3 GW at Sakuma, 0.6 GW at Shin-Shinano and 0.1 GW at Higashi-Shimizu) i.e. less than 2% of
power demand on both side of the border4. So Tokyo and Tohoku areas faced big challenges as they tried
to overcome the gap. Both supply and demand measures had to be put in place.
Tokyo and Tohoku electric power companies recovered part of the lost capacity by:

Relying on fossil generation

Restoring part of the fossil plants damaged in the earthquake (15,350 MW), and a
hydropower station (680 MW);
Restarting mothballed fossil plants (870 MW);
Installing additional emergency power generation (1,290 MW);
Operating power plants above their nominal capacity.

o
o
o
o

Buying additional power

Power from independent power producers;
Power from in-house generators (1,100 MW);
Power from outside Tokyo area (1,400 MW).

o
o
o

GW
75
16,0

50

0,9

1,1

1,3

1,4

66,6
60,0

+11%

Capacity margin

45,9

25

Available
capacityafter
11/3/11

Restored
fossil-fuelled
and hydro
capacity

Resumption
of mothballed
thermal
power plants

Additional
emergency
capacity

In-house
generation

Available
capacity
from outside
Tokyo area

Maximum
Summer 2010
available
peak demand
capacity by
summer 2011

Figure 8: Power generation capacity in Tokyo area ([4])

Notably, the recovered capacity during the summer had to undergo maintenance and shutdowns, reducing
its availability over the two months. Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 8, after supply measures were put in
place, Tokyo was prepared to deal with a similar peak as that of the summer of 2010. On the contrary, as
shown in figure 9, despite extensive measures to recover capacity, Tohoku area was not prepared to face a
peak load as high as in summer 2010.

See appendix 1

-17-

GW
15,5

16
2,4

12

13,8

-12%

Capacity deficit

11,3

Available
capacity
after 11/3/11

Recovered
capacity

Maximum Summer 2010

available
peak demand
capacity by
summer 2011

Figure 9: Power generation capacity in Tohoku area ([5])

On top of measures to recover capacity, METI5 set targets for a 15% reduction in power demand, in
the Tokyo and Tohoku areas. Two types of measures were set up:

Restrictive measures for large customers (> 500 kW), under the Electricity Business Act
o
o
o

637 companies involved;

Adjustment and shifts of operating times (shifting weekly vacation to weekdays;
night shifts; compulsory holidays during summer months for the entire firm);
15% reduction of their power demand during peak hours.

Voluntary action for small customers (< 500 kW)

o
o
o

Government and utilities provided information and coordination for the

rescheduling of operating hours;
Users were asked to restrain their consumption as much as possible;
An alert system was set up for volunteers, who could get a notification on their
mobile phones when the supply-demand balance became critical.

Despite pessimistic prospects, both Tokyo and Tohoku managed to meet the peak demand during the
summer of 2011. But the situation was somewhat different in the two cases.
Tokyo area
In Tokyo, during the month of July, damaged fossil-fuelled generation was gradually restored, and
emergency capacity installed, leading to an increasing available power supply, from 51 GW to 66 GW. By
mid-August, several of those recently recovered fossil-fuelled plants required maintenance, or had to be
shut down, as summarized on figure 10 below. Together with revision of power exchange with other
companies (both from IPPs and other areas), this lead to 11 GW less available power supply for the rest
of August.

METI: Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

-18-

Fossil-fuelled plants
shutdowns
Revision of power
exchange with other
companies

GW
80

Gradual recovery of
power generation

66.4
60

51.2

53.3

2/7-8/7

9/7-15/7

64.9

66.6

55.8

55.5

55.3

56.1

13/8-19/8

20/8-25/8

27/8-2/9

40

20

Week
16/7-22/7

23/7-29/7

30/7-5/8

6/8-12/8

Figure 10: Available supply capacity in Tokyo area (weekly average) ([4])

Nonetheless, peak demand occurred on August 18th due to especially high temperatures, when demand
peaked at 49.2 GW, which is around 10 GW below the previous years peak demand (59.99 GW).
The available supply capacity in the Tokyo area that day was 54.6 GW, leaving almost a 10% capacity
margin. Following figure 11 confronts daily peak demand during weekdays and weekends, for summer
2011, in Tokyo area.
GW

Supply capacity (weekly average)

70

Daily peak demand (weekday)

Daily peak demand (weekend)

60

+10%

50

40

30

20

10

0
7/2/11

7/9/11

7/16/11

7/23/11

7/30/11

8/6/11

8/13/11

8/20/11

8/27/11

Figure 11: Tokyo area daily peak load for summer 2011 ([4])

Demand restriction measures were particularly successful, reducing significantly the daily peak demand by
an average of 9-10 GW. Large industries managed to decrease their power demand by up to 20%,
compared to business as usual, the most significant demand reduction achieved as shown in Figure 12.

-19-

GW
60

60

49

21

15

Large customers

18

Small customers

18

17

Households

July 23th,
2010

August
18, 2011

40

21
20

Figure 12: Comparison of 2010 and 2011 summer peak demands ([4])

Summer 2011 was on average cooler than summer 2010 (-0.7C in July, -2.3C in August). Surprisingly,
savings from less air conditioning did not contribute as significantly to demand reduction as demand
restrictions in the industry. In the following figure 12, we can see that the correlation between power
consumption and temperature is approximately the same in both summer 2011 and summer 2010, which
highlights the importance of demand restriction measures in the industry in achieving the 9-10 GW
savings on the peak power demand during summer 2011.

Figure 13: Summer 2011 daily peak demand vs. daily maximal temperature ([4])

In any case, overall summer electricity consumption was 14% lower than in the summer of 2010,
confirming the impact of emergency demand restriction measures.

July

August

Total

Large customers

-12.8%

-15.4%

-14.1%

Small customers

-12.9%

-18.2%

-15.7%

Households

-5.8%

-17.0%

-11.8%

Total electricity
sold

-11.0%

-16.8%

-14.0%

Table 1: Volume of electricity sales compared to summer 2010 ([4])

-20-

Tohoku area
In Tohoku area, power demand in the summer of 2011 peaked on August 10th at 12.4 GW. Thanks to
demand restrictions and a lowered economic activity in the most stricken area, peak demand set at a
level of 3.1 GW, below the 2010 level. Neighboring areas relieved Tohoku tight supply capacity margin,
especially Tokyo, which benefited from more than 10% capacity margin as explained above. The following
figure 14 confronts the available supply capacity to the summer 2011 peak day load curve.
GW
15
Available supply
+12%

10
Load

Time (h)
0

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24

Figure 14: Tohoku area summer 2011 peak day load curve vs. available supply capacity ([5])

Tohoku area suffered from additional capacity shutdowns:

24 hydro stations, accounting for almost 1 GW, because of heavy rains;

Series of problems on other fossil-fuelled and hydro generation.

Nonetheless, Tohoku managed to keep the balance, thanks to efficient demand restriction measures.
June

-14%

July

-13.4%

August

-17.6%

Table 1: Saving rates at peak period in Tohoku area ([6])

2.3 The shift from nuclear to fossil fuels resulted in higher

energy prices and CO2 emissions
LNG consumption for power generation increased on average by 24% over May-August 2011,
compared to 2010 figures ([2]). If the resumption of operations for nuclear plants on inspection or
maintenance was postponed until an undetermined period, total Japanese LNG imports could increase by
15 Mt in 2011 and 20 Mt by 2012, from a level of 70 Mt in 2010. ([6]). Figure 15 shows the increase in
LNG consumption for power generation during May-August 2011, compared to 2010.

-21-

Mt
20

+24%
16,9

15

4,8

August

4,5

July

4,0

June

2,8

3,6

May

2010

2011

13,7
4,2

10
3,6
5

3,1

Figure 15: Japan LNG consumption for power generation ([2])

There had been a 20% increase in LNG imports prices since the end of March 2011. To be noted that
this trend had started by the beginning of 2011, suggesting that the massive nuclear shutdowns and
corresponding increase in LNG consumption may not be the only reason for the price increase. Figure 16
illustrates the LNG import price-increasing trend.

$/MMBtu
15

+20%

10

1/9/11

1/3/11

1/5/11

1/1/11

1/9/10

1/5/10

1/1/10

1/9/09

Figure 16: Japan LNG import price ([1])

LNG import capacities were to cope with the demand surge. On the one hand, IEEJ estimated that LNG
suppliers seemed to have enough supply capacity, but raised concerns over the global LNG transport
capacity. On the other hand, as regards Japans gas network, the current system had at least a 50% margin,
with 28 LNG terminals and 5 underground storage facilities, enabling a 180 Mt/years import capacity
([7]).
However, the load on gas-fired plants could become critical on the long term, as this increasing use of
LNG in the Japanese generating mix could raise the load factor for gas-fired plants from 65% to 75% ([1],
[2], own analysis): further nuclear shut downs could raise load factors to unsustainable levels, raising issues
over investment in generation capacity.
The increase in fossil fuels consumption, as replacement of unavailable nuclear power, and the increase in
oil prices, have had a negative financial impact on the country, with, according to IEEJ, a projected
additional cost of $46bn on the 2011 national energy bill. Thus, additional costs on the energy bill

-22-

along with reduced exports due to the global economic downturn resulted for instance in a $10bn loss on
the balance of trade in August 2011 alone. This was the worst monthly loss recorded since 1979.
All power utilities increased electricity prices in the second quarter of 2011, retroactive to higher fuel
imports costs over December 2010-February 2011. Following the same pattern, a potential electricity price
surge, due to the earthquake and the resulting Fukushima accident, would not appear before 2012.
Assuming a full repercussion of fuel costs on the consumers, IEEJ expects that the electricity bill
would rise by 18.2% for households and 36 % for industrial consumers by 2012, corresponding to a
48 $/MWh increase.
The shift from nuclear power to fossil-fuelled generation resulted in a higher consumption of oil, coal and
LNG, leading to a significant 11% increase in CO 2 emissions. Figure 17 illustrates the increase in CO2
emissions over April-August 2011, compared to 2010.
Mt CO2
+11%

150

132
120

119

22

April

23

May

25

June

27

30

July

31

33

August

2010

2011

20
90

19
22

60

30

Figure 17: Japan CO2 emissions from electricity sector ([2], own analysis)

This extreme situation raises concern over Japans ability to meet greenhouse gases emissions
requirements under the Kyoto protocol. With TEPCO being unable to reach its target of 20% GHG
emissions reduction by 2020, the increased burden over the other electric power companies might not be
bearable.

2.4 Gloomy prospects for winter 2012 and summer 2012

Additional nuclear power plants were shut down for scheduled maintenance, so that in early 2012,
only 2 reactors (~2 GW), i.e. 4% of Japan nuclear capacity, were still in operation. The last reactor
was shut down in 02/20/2012, in the area of Kansai. Under the current schedule, there would be no
nuclear power production from late spring 2012 if none of the reactors currently shutdown resume
operation. Severe power shortages are to be expected in summer 2012 if no proactive measures are
undertaken.

-23-

Figure 18: Japan nuclear power plants status as of February 2012 ([8])

A structural decrease in power consumption should ensure limited capacity shortage: 2010 winter peak
demand was 15% lower than summer peak demand in Tokyo area. Utilities were to expect capacity
deficits in some areas, such as Tohoku, stricken by the earthquake, or Kansai and Kyushu, highly reliant
on nuclear power.
- 10

-5

10

15

%
Eastern Japan

Tohoku

-3
6

Tokyo

12

Hokkaido
1

Western Japan
Kansai

-7

Chubu

Hokuriku

6
7

Chugoku
5

Shikoku
Kyushu

-2
2

Japan

Figure 19: Anticipated reserve capacity margin winter 2012 ([6])

On the supply side, efforts were undertaken to secure more available capacity and use maximum electricity
interchange.
On the demand side, less restrictive measures than for summer 2011 were required, with a focus on
Kansai and Kyushu regions: electricity conservation was voluntary, under the recommendation that
maximum electricity use during specified periods was not to exceed 90-95% of last years level in these
regions.

-24-

Should 2012 demand reach its summer 2010 level, 9% (17 GW) supply deficit is expected. On the other
hand, if 2010 demand reach its summer 2011 level (when extensive conservation measures were applied), a
4% capacity margin is expected.
- 30

- 20

- 10

10

20

%
Eastern Japan

-10

Tohoku

19

-13

Tokyo
Hokkaido

-6 -2

Western Japan
Kansai

-8 2
-19

-9

Chubu

Hokuriku

-2 6

Chugoku

Shikoku

14

-3

-11

Kyushu

-12 -1

Japan

-9

based on 2010 peak demand

based on 2011 peak demand

Figure 20: Anticipated reserve capacity margin summer 2012 ([6])

Demand restriction measures for large industries during summer 2011 were emergency measures. Shifting
operating hours, working at night or taking compulsory holidays were unsustainable
arrangements and cannot be permanent. Public acceptance and willingness to alter their daily lifestyle
might not last. That is why demand reduction measures scheduled for summer 2012 are more
incentives than restrictions:
On the supply side, beside the improvements undertaken for the power companies supply
capacity, the introduction of private (co)generation and renewables is promoted with subsidies;
On the demand side, budget and institutional reforms are implemented to save up to 10 GW:
Market pricing information and market mechanisms;
Subsidy-driven promotion of energy conservation equipment, electricity storage and
energy management systems.

-25-

3 Long term policy implementation: a model to assess

the impacts of various electricity mix options for 2050
in Japan
Beyond the immeasurable human tragedy induced by the terrible Great East Japan Earthquake and
tsunami, and the resulting Fukushima events, the impact on Japans future energy development plan was
considerable. Indeed, nuclear power came under public scrutiny, for safety concerns. Most political
actions are now going towards a significant curtailment of nuclear share in the Japanese electricity mix,
challenging the 2010 Basic Energy Plan, which favored a nuclear expansion both for energy security and
climate change mitigation matters.
Under these exceptional circumstances, while taking emergency measures to avoid power shortages on the
short term, Japan launched a review of its energy policy through a variety of initiatives:

The Energy and Environment Council is to articulate a basic philosophy for the future energy
system and come up with a national consensus. On the short term, policy and reforms are
proposed to minimize power shortages and stabilize power supply/demand. On the longer term,
the council is trying to set up the new best mix of energy resources and a new energy system;

The Cost Estimation and Review Committee was set up to provide objective data supporting
the assessment of potential strategies, as regards the current and future power generation costs
and the introducible amounts of renewable energies;

The METIs Advisory Committee for Natural Resources launched a series of meetings,
gathering experts from various fields related to the power sector, and with different opinions
regarding nuclear power, to review the Basic Energy Plan, and the organization of the power
industry. The debates are focusing on lowering dependency on nuclear generation, increasing the
share of renewable energy in the electricity mix and energy efficiency;

Since January 2012, the government is considering a legal restriction on nuclear power plants
lifetime to 40 years;

An Innovative Strategy for Energy and the Environment, including findings from the
ongoing work, is to be posted for national debate in 2012.

The aim of the following section is to provide comparable data to the ongoing debate over the options for
nuclear power in the 2050 electricity mix, and assess the economic and environmental impacts of the
various exposed scenarios.

3.1 Options for the Japanese electricity mix by 2050

Before Fukushima events, the Basic Energy Plan planned a nuclear power generation increase in the mix,
with a significant expansion of the nuclear installed capacity as shown in Figure 21.
GW
80
68
60
49

52
6

17

47

43

New Build
Installed Base

60
42

40

20

49

26
0
2010

2015

2020

2030

Figure 21: Japan installed capacity evolution, under the pre-Fukushima Basic Energy Plan ([3])

-26-

However, following the natural disaster, and the resulting incidents on Fukushima nuclear power plants, a
nuclear expansion does not seem feasible any longer, regarding the resenting public opinion to the
technology and the industry. Two distinctive scenarios were developed, in order to illustrate two
differentiated evolutions for the nuclear base in Japan:
A nuclear bounce-back scenario, where nuclear capacity is to reach its 2010 level by 2020,
with lifetime extensions granted to some existing nuclear power plants, and new builds
allowed;
A nuclear low scenario, where the installed nuclear capacity decreases by 2020, allowing
for a long-term nuclear phase-out, with no lifetime extensions and no new builds.

Following these three nuclear scenarios for the short term, and due to the uncertainty regarding the future
electricity mix for 2050, three contrasted scenarios for the 2050 electricity mix were built, reflecting
the various opinions for the long term. The energy mix for each scenario is illustrated in Figure
22.

The Basic Energy Plan (Pre-Fukushima) scenario, as a reference case, reflecting the energy
policy which had been chosen by the Japanese government for 2030, extended to 2050:
o Short-term nuclear evolution is the one that had been decided for the Basic Energy Plan,
with a nuclear expansion by 2030.
o Under the Basic Energy Plan, nuclear power was to represent 53% of the electricity mix
by 2030, while renewables were to represent 21% of the mix. The 2050 target electricity
mix is constructed as an interpolation of that previous distribution:
60% nuclear power;
30% renewables;
10% fossil-fuelled power.

The nuclear upholding scenario considers that the share of nuclear power in the electricity mix
is maintained over the period, and stays at 30% by 2050
o Regarding the nuclear evolution, the nuclear bounce-back scenario is considered;
o The 2050 targeted electricity is distributed as follows:
30% nuclear power;
40% renewables;
30% fossil-fuelled power.

The nuclear phase-out scenario considers a phase-out of nuclear power from the electricity
mix by 2050
o Regarding the nuclear evolution, the nuclear low scenario is considered for the short
term, with no new nuclear plants commissioning allowed over the period;
o The 2050 targeted electricity mix is distributed as such:
50% renewables (the target is constrained by the available renewable energy
resources for the country, as explained later);
50% fossil-fuelled power

-27-

30%

40%

50%

30%

60%

50%
30%
10%
Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear upholding
Renewables

Nuclear

Nuclear phase-out
Fossil

Figure 22: 2050 target electricity mix under the three contrasted scenarios

Each scenario has been then assessed under a series of criteria:

Power generation system
o Electricity mix reached in 2030 and in 2050;
o Installed capacity of various technologies in 2030 and 2050;
Cost
o Investment needs for power generation assets;
o Electricity generation cost;
o Additional cost of the power generation system compared to the Basic Energy Plan;
Energy security of supply
o Impact of the energy imports bill for power generation on the trade balance;
Environmental impact
o CO2 emissions from the power sector, compared to 1990s level;
o Cost of avoided CO2 emissions;
o Land use.
In order to assess these several criteria, a spreadsheet model has been built. The aim of the following
section is to present the structure and the inputs model, which enables a quantitative comparison of the
presented options for the future Japanese electricity mix.

3.2 Model structure and inputs

The spreadsheet model was developed under Excel. The main objective of the model is to balance every
year electricity supply and demand, by constructing the necessary power generation assets in order to:

Offset the decommissioning of the current installed base;

Cope with the electricity demand evolution;
Reach the 2050 electricity mix target set by each scenario.

Balancing electricity supply and demand

In order to balance every year the electricity supply and demand, the model takes into account the
installed capacity every year:

The nuclear installed base evolution is exogenous, set by the chosen electricity mix scenario, as
long as the nuclear power plants lifetime;
Other power plants lifetime is exogenous, and identical for all scenarios.

Exogenous load factors, identical to all scenarios, are applied to each technology, in order to determine
the annual electricity supply.
The electricity demand scenario determines the final electricity consumption every year: once transmission
and distribution losses are taken into account (proportional to demand with an exogenous coefficient), the
-28-

annual primary electricity demand is set. Load factors for fossil-fuelled power plants are then adjusted
to optimize their use, and try and cope with the electricity demand. The remaining difference is to be
offset by new capacity construction.
Capacity requirements for construction are determined every year by:

The unserved electricity demand, determined previously after adjustment of fossil-fuelled power
generation load factors;
The 2050 electricity mix target, exogenous and set by the chosen scenario. It results in a yearly
electricity mix target by linear interpolation.

The resulting outputs are every year:

The installed capacity for each technology considered;

The investment required to build these power generation assets;
The land used by the various power generation technologies.

Gas-fired power generation load factors are finally adjusted, in order to offset the difference between the
construction requirements for power generation capacity, and the actual power generation capacity built
every year: indeed, capacity construction is constrained by the standard size of units, so that the capacity
built is most of the time smaller than the capacity required.
After adjustments, the yearly electricity production and the resulting yearly electricity mix are
obtained, as long as fuel requirements for fossil-fuelled power and nuclear power, setting the energy
imports, and CO2 emissions from the power sector, resulting from fossil-fuelled power plants.
Finally, regarding the renewables mix, it is distributed between the selected technologies, i.e hydropower,
onshore and offshore wind, solar power, geothermal power and biomass. As the hydropower installed
base is already significant in Japan, the target share is adjusted from one scenario to the other in order to
fit the current installed base. The rest of the renewable technologies is distributed following the same
pattern for each scenario, with onshore wind and solar power representing each time the biggest
contributions.
Balancing supply capacity and peak load
Balancing electricity supply and demand is not enough to build a self-sufficient power system. Indeed, in
order to size a power system properly, we need to make sure that power supply and demand match at
every moment, all the more at instants when power demand is maximal (this concept corresponds to the
power peak load). That is why to size the power system properly, we need to make sure that the installed
capacity can provide enough power to meet the peak load.
The available supply capacity at peak load is exogenous, and depends on the power generation
technology. A capacity credit is attributed to each technology, reflecting its availability at peak hours 6.
The peak demand is supposed to increase at the same pace as the electricity demand: confronting the
peak demand with the summed capacity credits of the installed power generation capacity determines the
requirement for back-up capacity: back-up capacity, in the form of oil-fired peaking plants, is to offset
mainly low variable renewables capacity credits, and make sure that the system can provide the required
power to meet the peak load. The main assumption over the back-up capacity is that, considering the very
few load hours imposed to back up capacity, the resulting electricity production is negligible, and not
included in the annual electricity production.
Balancing supply capacity and peak load provides additional outputs to the model:

Back-up capacity;

The availability of a technology at peak hours is determined by technical constraints for conventional power generation, and by
technical and meteorological constraints for renewable energy technologies.
6

-29-

Investment required for back-up capacity;

Land used for back-up capacity.

The cost criteria reflects an economic view of the generation cost

The Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) is an instrument that enables to determine the minimum
required power market price to trigger the investment in a power generation asset. A simple form of a
technology LCOE could be calculated as:
LCOE=
Regarding the model we developed, the LCOE of each technology is calculated every year, in order to
take into account the evolution of fuels costs, of CO2 costs, and the evolution of the investment required
for each technology (CAPEX): indeed, a learning curve is applied to each technology to reflect the
decrease in CAPEX required over time, thanks to technology improvements. The following figure 23
illustrates the LCOE reached in 2030 by the main technologies under consideration in the model.
350

2010/MWh

300
250
200
150
100
50
0
Nuclear

Gas

Coal

Hydro

Onshore
wind

Offshore
wind

Solar PV

Biomass Geothermal

Figure 23: LCOE main technologies in 2030 ([2], [9])

Once the electricity production mix is determined, the electricity generation cost is calculated every year
as the weighted average LCOEs of the various technologies. The yearly electricity generation bill is
obtained by combining the electricity generation cost and the electricity production.
Finally, according to each assessed scenario, the total cost of the power generation system over 2010-50 is
determined as the cumulated yearly electricity generation bill over 2010-50. The additional cost
compared to the Basic Energy Plan is basically the difference between the total cost of the analyzed
scenario, and the total cost of the Basic Energy Plan scenario. The cost of avoided CO2 emissions was
calculated as the average ratio between:

the yearly avoided CO2 emissions compared to the 2010 level;

the additional yearly electricity bill compared to the 2010 level.

-30-

3.3 Model outputs: a multi-criteria comparison between the

three contrasted scenarios
Each of the described scenarios was assessed, under the Strategic Energy Plan demand reference
scenario: the electricity demand for 2030 was to be the electricity demand planned under the preFukushima energy policy. Beyond 2030, we considered that the combination of energy efficiency
measures and new electricity use in the primary energy demand would result in a stabilization of
the electricity demand at 2030 level.

Figure 24: Strategic Energy Plan electricity demand reference scenario ([3])

3.3.1 Power generation assets

The targeted electricity mix is reached progressively by 2050 for each scenario as shown in Figure 25. The
2030 electricity mix reflects both the future electricity mix and the historical installed base.
Basic Energy Plan

11%

22%

Nuclear upholding

30%

26%

28%

40%

50%

30%

60%
61%
44%

31%

33%
11%

30%

47%

Nuclear phase-out

56%

50%

2030

2050

30%

10%
2010

2030

2050
Renewables

2030
Nuclear

2050
Fossil

Figure 25: Electricity mix in 2030 and 2050, under the three studied scenarios

We notice that a nuclear phase-out would require an additional 107 GW of installed capacity by 2050.
Indeed, by relying on renewables for power generation, the scenario suffers from low load factors and low
-31-

capacity credits from variable renewables, requiring a significant amount of thermal back-up power plants
to balance renewables intermittency. The amount of installed capacity per type of technology required in
each scenario is shown in Figure 26.
Basic Energy Plan

125
75

68
2030

179

240

151

31
2050

44

94

69

2030

2050

Renewables

191

19

48

91

Nuclear phase-out

Nuclear upholding

Nuclear

303

118

105

2030

2050

Fossil

Figure 26: Installed capacity in 2030 and 2050 under the three scenarios

3.3.2 Cost of the power generation system

The power generation system cost is a key criterion for stakeholders and decision-makers who will be
shaping the new energy policy. Indeed, cost of energy for industries and households is the main driver for
decision-making, as it impacts significantly the countrys competitiveness and economic growth.
To address this issue, the model focuses on three aspects of the systems cost:

Investment requirements for power generation assets, which determine the economic feasibility
of the system, as regards the access to capital and the cost of financing. Investments on the
electricity network is not included in the analysis;
Electricity generation cost, which set the price per MWh that the consumer will have to pay to get
electricity;
Total cost of the power generation system over the studied period, which is basically the
cumulated annual electricity generation bill it takes into account both the cost of generating
electricity and the way it is consumed.

According to these three criteria, the main conclusions that could be highlighted are:

Investment requirements

As summed up in figure 27, the least capital-intensive scenario is the Basic Energy Plan, requiring
1,000bn investment over 2010-50 in power generation assets. A nuclear phase-out would require an
additional 320bn investment in power generation assets, compared to the Basic Energy Plan, whereas
maintaining a 30% share of nuclear power in the electricity mix would save 165bn investment,
compared to the nuclear phase-out. One can infer that the higher the share of renewables in the mix, the
more capital-intensive is the scenario: indeed, most of renewables technologies are fuel-free technologies,
but require significant investment upfront, which are higher that nuclear power investment requirements,
in terms of /MW.

-32-

Figure 27: Investment requirements in power generation assets, under the three scenarios

Electricity generation cost

Figure 28 shows that whatever is the scenario, electricity cost is to increase over 2010-50, reflecting the
expected increase in fossil fuels. The Basic Energy Plan offers the lowest electricity cost in 2050, at
101/MWh. A nuclear phase-out would induce a 70% increase in electricity costs over 2010-50, so that
electricity costs would be 30% higher in case of a nuclear phase-out compared to the Basic Energy Plan.
Maintaining nuclear power in the mix would lead to electricity costs only 15% higher compared the Basic
Energy Plan. A high share of nuclear power is the main driver for lower electricity costs in the Basic
Energy Plan.

Figure 28: Electricity generation cost evolution under the three scenarios

Total cost of the power system

The Basic Energy Plan would induce a total cost for the power generation system over 2010-50 of
4036bn. Compared to the Basic Energy Plan, a nuclear phase-out would induce an additional 850bn
to the total cost of the power system over 2010-50, while maintaining nuclear power in the electricity mix
would cost an additional 410bn, 440bn less than a nuclear phase-out. Following figure 29 illustrates
the additional cost of the nuclear phase-out and nuclear upholding scenarios: this additional cost comes
mainly from the assumption that nuclear power is to remain cheaper than available renewable energy
technologies, and that fossil fuel prices, as long as the cost for emitting CO 2, is to keep increasing over the
period.
It is to be noted that the cost for integrating variable renewables in the grid network is not included in the
analysis: a gross estimation sets the additional cost for grid integration of renewables at 160bn over
-33-

2010-50 in case of a nuclear phase-out, and 80bn in case of a nuclear upholding, compared to the Basic
Energy Plan.

Figure 29: Total additional cost compared to the Basic Energy Plan

A major shift in terms of energy policy, deciding to gradually phase-out nuclear power from the Japanese
electricity mix, would have a significant cost. The main question that arises is then: would the country be
ready to pay such a tribute in order to get rid of nuclear power? Are there any other benefits if alternative
paths are chosen?
3.3.3 Energy security of supply
The energy security of supply is at the core of any energy policy: making sure that the country is selfsufficient in terms of energy resources, or at least limiting its reliance on imported energy resources is a
key issue. Indeed, energy independence comes with a limited exposure to both risk from political turmoil
in energy (i.e fossil fuels) rich areas of the world and energy prices volatility. Regarding the case of
uranium, Japan has indeed no indigenous resources to cope with their demand for power generation.
However, uranium is widely considered as a fuel with low political risk and low price volatility, as the
resource is scattered amongst a lot of countries, and held by countries with low political risk (Australia,
Canada, South Africa, Niger ).
In order to illustrate the evolution of Japan energy security of supply, we chose to present two outcomes:

Gas imports for power generation: Japan has no connection to mainland Asia, so the country
ships all of its gas needs in the form of Liquefied Natural Gas;
The resulting energy imports bill, and more specifically its impact on the countrys balance of
trade: energy imports include coal, gas, oil, uranium for nuclear power, and the price paid by
fossil-fuelled power generation for CO2 emissions.7

Following these two criteria, decision makers can have an idea of the energy security of supply that can
provide each of the studied scenarios:

Gas imports for power generation

Under the Basic Energy Plan, the nuclear expansion and the strong development of renewables would
allow for a 70% reduction in gas imports for power generation compared to 2010s level. If maintaining
7

Adding CO2 emissions cost to the annual energy bill is a way of estimating the cost of climate change mitigation, under the
chosen CO2 price evolution.

-34-

nuclear power in the mix would bring back the imports in 2050 to their 2010s level, a nuclear phase-out
would induce a 60% increase compared to 2010s level. All in all, a nuclear phase-out would result in gas
imports 5 times higher in 2050, compared to the Basic Energy Plan: indeed, the phase-out from nuclear
power would result in an increasing reliance on gas-fired power generation. Figure 30 summarizes the
evolution of yearly gas imports for power generation, under the three considered scenarios.
100

80

60
Gm3

Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear upholding
40

Nuclear phase-out

20

0
2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Figure 30: Gas imports for power generation under the three scenarios

Impact of the energy imports bill for power generation on the balance of trade

The reliance on imported fossil fuels has a cost that is directly transferred to the balance of trade, as a
significant negative impact. The Basic Energy Plan would allow for a 50% reduction in the energy
imports bill over 2010-50, with a significant share of nuclear power (which fuel consumption has only a
low impact on the cost of power generation) and renewables, which basically benefit from free fuel. For
the same reasons, maintaining nuclear power in the mix would contain the energy imports bill, reducing it
by 15%. However, phasing-out nuclear power would cause energy imports bill to be 25bn compared
to the Basic Energy Plan, because of the increasing reliance on gas-fired power generation, as shown in
figure 31.

Figure 31: Impact of the energy imports bill on the balance of trades

-35-

3.3.4 Environmental impact

Finally, as the energy sector is one of the sectors with highest CO2 emissions in the Japanese economy,
redefining a new energy policy cannot go without taking climate change mitigation into account.
In order to address the climate change mitigation concern, we chose to include the evolution of CO 2
emissions from the Japanese power sector under the three scenarios. Moreover, to address feasibility
concerns regarding other environmental impacts, the land use of the two main renewable energy
technologies, wind and solar power, is also assessed.

CO2 emissions from the Japanese power sector

Regarding the carbon footprint of the power sector, two criteria have been analyzed:
o
o

Power sector carbon intensity (gCO2/kWh);

Overall power sector CO2 emissions.

The power sector carbon intensity stands as the average CO2 emissions from the Japanese electricity mix
per MWh produced. It is calculated as the weighted average CO 2 emissions per MWh of each of the
technologies represented in the electricity mix, and which evolution is represented in figure 32. It reflects
then the share of the various technologies, and there specific CO2 emissions.
The overall power sector CO2 emissions stand for the total emissions of the power sector over the year,
that is to say the product of the power sector carbon intensity by the yearly electricity consumption. It
reflects both the power sector carbon intensity (i.e the share of clean technologies in the electricity mix)
and the electricity consumption of the country (reducing the electricity consumption participates in
reducing the carbon footprint of the system), and is represented on figure 33 for the three scenarios. In
both figures, as the electricity consumption is set at the same level for all scenarios, the decrease in CO 2
emissions reflects a decrease in the electricity mix of the share of power generation with high specific
emissions.
Following the criteria cited above, we could assess that even with a strong development of renewables, a
nuclear phase-out would keep the power sector CO2-intensive: indeed, in case of a nuclear phase-out, the
carbon intensity would be 5 times higher compared to the Basic Energy Plan, at 200 gCO2/kWh, but
still a 50% reduction compared to 2010 level. Moreover, Japan would not be able to meet its greenhouse
gases emissions reduction target by 2050: indeed, according to the Basic Energy Plan, power sector
emissions were to decrease by 85% compared to 1990 level, while a nuclear phase-out would only allow
for a 30% reduction compared to 1990s level: replacing coal and oil by gas-fired power generation brings
significant emissions reduction, but not enough to achieve the targets that Japan had set.

Figure 32: Power sector carbon intensity evolution under the three scenarios

-36-

Figure 33: Power sector overall CO2 emissions evolution, under the three scenarios

Cost of avoided CO2 emissions

As explained previously, avoided CO2 emissions are priced by the difference between what would have
cost the power generation system in 2010, and what it costs in the reference year. Only the average cost
over the period 2010-50 is considered, as the pace for emissions reduction is different from one scenario
to the other. Results are summarized in the following table 2.
Scenario under consideration

Average cost of avoided CO2 emissions (/tCO2)

Basic Energy Plan

112

Nuclear upholding

226

Nuclear phase-out

459

Table 2: Average cost of avoided CO2 emissions under the three scenarios

This calculated cost should not be confused with the actual CO2 price paid by fossil-fuelled power
generation for its emissions, which is already taken into account, but rather gives a relative idea of the cost
of decarbonizing the Japanese power sector. The Basic Energy Plan achieves the lowest cost thanks to the
highest emissions reduction, at the lowest systems cost. On the other hand, under the nuclear phase-out
scenario, low emissions reduction and high systems cost, because of the increase in fossil fuel prices,
result in such a high cost of the few emissions reductions.

Land use for wind and solar power

Land scarcity is a major issue in Japan that cannot be excluded from the decision-making process while
reshaping the countrys energy policy. Wind power and solar power under these circumstances, the main
conclusions regarding the land use for power generation are:
o

A nuclear phase-out would require nearly 10% of Japans territory 8 (i.e. 36,000 km2) to be
covered with onshore wind farms by 2050, raising serious concerns over social
acceptance and industrial feasibility;
Solar panels9 would cover an additional 1,400 km2 in case of a nuclear phase-out,
compared to the Basic Energy Plan;

The three studied scenarios consider a significant development for solar and wind power, having a strong
impact over landscape anyway. Even under the Basic Energy Plan, wind farms would cover 5% of the
territory, as represented on the following figures 34 and 35. This is mainly a consequence of the fact that
renewable energy resources are inherently scattered, compared to conventional resources.
8Land

use for onshore wind turbines: 3.2 W/m2 (an average of various wind farms around the world).
Land use for solar panels: 40W/m2 (an average of various solar farms around the world).

-37-

Figure 34: Number of installed wind turbines in 2050 on Japan territory under the three scenarios10

Figure 35: Land use for solar panels in 2050 under the three scenarios

10Wind

turbines capacity : onshore 2 MW, offshore 5 MW

-38-

3.3.5 Multi-criteria comparison conclusions

The multi-criteria analysis confirms the value of developing nuclear in the electricity mix, as in the Basic
Energy Plan. Indeed, a nuclear phase-out would have significant negative impacts on Japans economy and
environment. The following table summarizes the main conclusions regarding the nuclear phase-out
scenario, as compared to the Basic Energy Plan.

~320bn additional investment in power generation capacity

compared to the Basic Energy Plan (BEP). (Investment in the
electricity network not included)

Electricity generation costs 70% higher by 2050 compared to

2010

Energy imports bill more than ~25bn higher by 2050

compared to BEP, significantly affecting the balance of trades

Power sector carbon intensity at ~200gCO2/kWh, i.e. 5 times

higher compared to BEP

Japan not able to meet its -85% CO2 emissions reduction

target

Generation capacity up to ~110 GW larger by 2050 compared

to BEP

Up to ~60,000 wind turbines, covering ~10% of Japan

territory, raising concerns over land scarcity, land use
competition and public acceptance

~850bn
Cost

additional to the power

generation system cost
+~25bn p.a.

Security of supply

On the energy imports

bill caused by increased
reliance on imported
fossil fuels
- ~30%

Climate change
mitigation

in CO2 emissions
compared to 1990, a
failure to mitigate
climate change
~ 10%

Feasibility

of Japan territory
covered by wind farms
would be challenging in
terms of supply chain
and public acceptance

Table 3: Main conclusions for the nuclear phase-out scenario compared to the Basic Energy Plan

-39-

On the other hand, maintaining would limit costs and significantly decrease CO 2 emissions compared to a
nuclear phase-out. Following table 4 summarizes the main differences between the nuclear upholding
scenario and the nuclear phase-out.

Additional cost compared to BEP limited to ~410bn,

~440bn less compared to the nuclear phase-out

~150bn additional investment in power generation capacity

compared to BEP, but still 50% less than the nuclear phaseout

~30bn energy imports bill, 13bn more than BEP, but still
12bn less than the nuclear phase-out

Power sector emissions ~40% lower compared to the nuclear

phase-out

~60% reduction in Japan CO2 emissions compared to 1990s

level

~55 GW less generating capacity compared to the nuclear

phase-out

~25% less installed wind turbines and ~25% less land used for
power generation purposes

~410bn
Cost

additional to the power

generation system cost

- ~12bn p.a.
Security of supply

in energy imports bill,

compared to a nuclear
phase-out
- ~60%

Climate change
mitigation

in CO2 emissions
compared to 1990, twice
as much as a nuclear
phase-out
~7%

Feasibility

of Japan territory
covered by wind farms,
still challenging in terms
of supply chain and
public acceptance

Table 4: Main conclusions for the nuclear upholding scenario, compared to the nuclear phase-out.

It appears then that keeping nuclear power in the mix is the only option to contain the cost of climate
change mitigation, as the following figure 36 illustrates the increasing cost of electricity and the increasing
CO2 emissions from the Basic Energy Plan scenario to the nuclear phase-out scenario.

Figure 36: Power sector carbon intensity vs. electricity cost in 2050, under the three scenarios

Following these conclusions, we imagined actions on supply and demand that could be undertaken in
order to curb the economic and environmental impacts of the scenarios, compared to the Basic Energy

-40-

Plan. The aim is to reach the best option mix and the best option for the power generation system
construction. These options are to be exposed in the next section.

3.4 Sensitivity analysis on power supply and demand

3.4.1 Rationale and anticipated effects
The following sensitivity analysis aims at exposing the consequences of actions on supply and demand
over the conclusions regarding the three studied scenarios.

Supply-side measures

The action considered on the supply-side would be a limited development of renewables. Indeed,
renewables projects could be constrained by a limited financial capability, as they are highly capitalintensive, or a lack of accessible resources. Indeed, the potential for renewables has voluntarily not been
considered as a constraint to our analysis, as the currently available figures are contradictory from one
assessment to the other: they did not seem reliable enough, and that is why an extensive review of the
renewable energy resources is being undertaken in Japan11. Taking them into account might cap the share
of renewables below we aimed at in each of the scenarios
The anticipated effects of a limited renewables development are mainly:
o

o
o

A decrease in the cost of the power system: it would require less investment for power
generation assets, and less investment for grid integration of variable renewables, as
under our assumptions, renewables are the most capital-intensive technologies.;
An increase in CO2 emissions from the power sector, as the renewable electricity would
be replaced by fossil-fuelled power generation;
A deteriorated energy security of supply, as the decrease in renewable electricity
production would transfer into a higher reliance on imported fossil fuels.

Demand-side measures

The action considered on the demand-side would be an increased effort on energy efficiency measures. It
would help reduce the carbon footprint of the power sector by producing less electricity, while enhancing
the energy security of supply.
The anticipated effects of enhanced energy efficiency are mainly:
o
o
o

A decrease in electricity demand;

A decrease in CO2 emissions from the power sector;
A decrease in the cost of the power system.

However, it is to be noted that energy efficiency measures will have a significant cost, not taken into
account in the following analysis. The topic is to be discussed in a further section.
3.4.2 A limited development for renewables in the Japanese electricity
mix
According to the assumption that renewables would not be able to develop as expected, due to financial
and/or resource availability constraints, we assessed the nuclear upholding scenario and the nuclear phaseout scenario under a reduced share of renewables in the 2050 mix. Figure 37 illustrates the 2050 target
electricity mix in the reference scenarios and the scenarios with a lower renewables development.

11

A summary of the various estimates for renewable energy resources in Japan will be provided at the end of the following
section, to give an idea of the discrepancies between the various assessments.

-41-

20%

30%

30%

40%

50%
30%

30%

60%

70%

50%

50%

30%
10%
Basic Energy Plan Nuclear upholding Nuclear upholding Nuclear phase-out Nuclear phase-out
- lower renewables
- lower renewables
Renewables

Nuclear

Fossil

Figure 37: 2050 target electricity mix with a lower renewables development under the three scenarios

Impact on the power generation system

A limited renewable energy development would not change the way the 2050 electricity mix target is
reached. However, it will significantly affect the capacity installed under the various scenarios.
Thus, a limited renewables development could save up to 100 GW capacity by 2050, in both a
nuclear upholding and a nuclear phase-out. The main reason is that less renewable capacity means fewer
requirements for fossil-fuelled back-up capacity. Besides, conventional power generation has a much
higher availability, resulting in higher load factors, so those capacity requirements are much less important.
The following figure 38 illustrates the installed capacity in 2030 and 2050 under the three scenarios, with a
lower renewables development. The top square with a dashed line represents the decrease in capacity
requirements compared to the reference scenarios, i.e with a higher share of renewables.

Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear upholding

Nuclear phase-out

97
98

43
125
75
68
2030

179

88

117

48
91

44

114

94

2030

2050

31
2050
Capacity savings

Renewables

Nuclear

46
125
19

180
-

138

131

2030

2050

Fossil

Figure 38: Installed capacity evolution with a reduced renewables development for the three scenarios

Impact on the power generation system cost

Investment requirements
A lower share of renewables in the electricity mix results into a higher reliance on low-capital intensive
gas-fired power generation, which limits the investments, so that a nuclear phase-out with a reduced share
of renewables in the mix, would require 175bn less investment, compared to the Basic Energy Plan,
saving around 490bn compared to the nuclear phase-out reference scenario. For the same reasons, the
-42-

nuclear upholding would require now only 680bn, 40% less compared to the reference scenario. Figure
39 illustrates the investment requirements under the three scenarios with a lower renewables development:
the dashed lines represent the level of investments required under the reference scenarios, i.e if renewables
were at a higher share.

Figure 39: Investment requirements in power generation assets, with a lower renewables development,
under the three scenarios

Electricity generation cost

A limited renewables development would contain electricity generation costs increase, as a lower reliance
on more expensive renewable electricity lowers the systems generation cost. Thus a nuclear phase-out
would induce a 55% increase in electricity costs over 2010-50, so that electricity costs would be 15%
higher in case of a nuclear phase-out compared to the Basic Energy Plan. Maintaining nuclear power in
the mix would lead to electricity costs only 2% higher, compared the Basic Energy Plan. Following figure
40 illustrates the evolution of electricity generation cost with a lower renewables development.

Figure 40: Electricity generation cost evolution with a lower renewables development under the three
scenarios

Total cost of the power system

Compared to the Basic Energy Plan, a nuclear phase-out would induce an additional 490bn
over 2010-50;
A lower renewables development would save up to 350bn to the power generation system cost
in case of a nuclear phase-out;
Maintaining nuclear power in the electricity mix would cost an additional 75bn, 415bn less
than a nuclear phase-out.
-43-

As expected earlier, and illustrated in following figure 41, a lower share of renewables decreases the overall
cost of the power generation system, thanks to lower investment requirements.

Figure 41: Total additional cost compared to the Basic Energy Plan with a lower renewables development

Impact on the energy security of supply

Gas imports for power generation
A reduced share of renewables in the 2050 electricity mix would result in a higher gas-fired power
generation, and thus, reliance on imported fossil fuels. Thus, if maintaining nuclear power in the mix
could contain the gas imports in 2050 to their 2010 level, a lower renewables development would induce
now a 60% increase compared to 2010. A nuclear phase-out would result in gas imports 7 times higher in
2050, compared to the Basic Energy Plan. This highlights the fact a lack of access to financial resources,
or a renewables potential that would prevent a development as one would expect, would result in a
significantly deteriorated energy independence, as illustrated in figure 42 (dashed lines represent the
reference cases, with a higher share of renewables).
140

120
Basic Energy Plan
100
Nuclear upholding
Gm3

80
Nuclear phase-out
60

40

Nuclear upholding - lower

renewables

20

Nuclear phase-out - lower

renewables

0
2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Figure 42: Gas imports for power generation under the three scenarios

-44-

Impact of the energy imports bill for power generation on the balance of trades
The impact on gas imports is transferred to the energy imports bill, with a trend even more amplified
because of the increase in fossil fuel prices which goes along the increase in fossil fuels imports:

Increasing the share of gas-fired power generation from 50% to 70% in the 2050 electricity mix
would result in a 40% increase in the energy imports bill, in case of a nuclear phase-out;
Phasing-out nuclear power would cause energy imports bill to be 42bn higher compared to the
Basic Energy Plan;
Even maintaining nuclear power in the mix would lead to a 30% increase in the energy bill.

Figure 43: Impact of the energy imports bill on the balance of trades with a lower renewables development
under the three scenarios

Impact on CO2 emissions and on land use

CO2 emissions from the Japanese power sector
Increasing the reliance on fossil-fuelled power generation goes against climate change mitigation:

A reduced share of renewable electricity in the 2050 electricity mix would lead to a 40% increase
in the power sector carbon intensity, setting it at 280 gCO 2/kWh, 7 times higher than the Basic
Energy Plan;
A nuclear phase-out would bring the power sector CO2 emissions back to their 1990s level,
completely putting aside the countrys greenhouse gases emissions reduction objective.

Figure 44: Power sector carbon intensity evolution with a lower renewables development under the three
scenarios

-45-

Figure 45: Power sector overall CO2 emissions evolution with a lower renewables development under the
three scenarios

Cost of avoided CO2 emissions

Compared to the reference cases, reducing the share of renewables reduces at the same time the amount
of saved CO2 emissions (as renewable electricity is systematically replaced by fossil-fuelled power
generation) and the systems additional cost compared to 2010 level (as fossil-fuelled power generation is
much less expensive than renewable electricity under the considered assumptions). The following table 5
summarizes the results, with the values for the reference case (higher share of renewables) in brackets.
Scenario under consideration

Average cost of avoided CO2 emissions (/tCO2)

Basic Energy Plan

112

Nuclear upholding

237 (226)

Nuclear phase-out

697 (459)

Table 5: Average cost of avoided CO2 emissions under the three scenarios, with a lower renewables
development

It appears that in both nuclear upholding and nuclear phase-out scenarios, the decrease achieved in the
cost of the power generation system is greater than the decrease in avoided CO 2 emissions, as the cost of
avoided CO2 increases in both cases. The increase for the nuclear upholding scenario is slowed down by
the remaining nuclear power which drives the emissions down and maintains the cost of the system at a
lower level, compared to the nuclear phase-out.
Land use for wind and solar power
A lower penetration of renewables in the electricity mix translates into lower capacity requirements, and
so, in a lower land use for wind farms and solar panels:
A nuclear phase-out would require nearly 5% of Japans territory 12 (i.e. 18,000 km2) to be covered
with onshore wind farms by 2050, 48% less compared to the reference scenario;
Less renewables would reduce the land required for solar panels13 by 48%, so that solar panels
would cover almost the same area in case of a nuclear phase-out, compared to the Basic Energy
Plan.
The following figures 46 and 47 illustrate the land use for both wind farms and solar panels under the
three scenarios, with a lower renewables development. The dashed lines stand for the reduction in land
use compared to the base case (i.e. the same scenarios with a higher share of renewables).

12Land

13

use for onshore wind turbines: 3.2 W/m2 (an average of various wind farms around the world).
Land use for solar panels: 40W/m2 (an average of various solar farms around the world).

-46-

Figure 46: Number of installed wind turbines on Japan territory in 2050 with a lower renewables
development under the three scenarios

Figure 47: Land use for solar panels in 2050 with a lower renewables development under the three scenarios

-47-

Main conclusions regarding the impacts of a reduced penetration

of renewables in the 2050 electricity mix
A limited renewables development would reduce the cost of a nuclear phase-out, but put aside climate
change mitigation with higher CO2 emissions. The following table 6 summarizes the impacts on the
nuclear phase-out scenario of a reduced renewables development, in comparison to the Basic Energy Plan.
Impact of the measure on
the nuclear phase-out

Cost

Security of supply

Climate change
mitigation

Feasibility

Key differences compared to the Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear phase-out additional cost limited to ~490bn

compared to BEP

~175bn less investment in power generation capacity

Electricity generation costs ~55% higher by 2050 compared to

2010, i.e. ~16% higher than BEP

Energy imports bill at ~60bn, vs. ~20bn in the BEP

Power sector carbon intensity at ~300gCO2/kWh,

7 times higher compared to BEP

Japan CO2 emissions almost back to their 1990s level

Only 10 GW additional generating capacity compared to BEP

~50% less land used for power generation purposes compared

to the nuclear phase-out reference case

i.e.

Table 6: Main conclusions regarding a lower renewables development for the nuclear phase-out scenario,
in comparison to the Basic Energy Plan.

Keeping nuclear power in the mix remains the best option to reduce the power sector carbon intensity, at
lower cost, even with a limited renewables development.

Figure 48: Power sector carbon intensity vs. electricity cost in 2050, with a lower renewables development,
under the three scenarios

-48-

The renewable energy potential issue

Assessing the renewable energy potential of Japan is a key issue in order to define a long-term renewable
electricity development. The scale of the opportunity appears significant, but complex, and current
estimates are still contradictory, or at least, do not converge to widely adopted figures.
The Ministry of Environment, and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) had done most
of the work, but the studies do not agree yet on the introducible potential for the various renewable
energy technologies. That is why, under the current policy review that the country is going through, the
Cost Estimation and Review Committee has been appointed to carry out an extensive study
regarding the potential for renewable energy.
Yet, under the Ministry of the Environment estimates, the renewable energy potential seem significant
enough for a large-scale renewable electricity development, but several constraints, beside the
intermittency of variable renewables, are likely to prevent the power sector to rely exclusively, or too
significantly, on renewable electricity to balance the supply and demand at the countrys level. The
following table summarizes estimates published by the Ministry of Environment, yet under dispute
compared to estimates from other authorities, such as the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

Installed
capacity (GW)

Introducible
potential

Feasible
potential
under the
current
FiT14
scheme

Feasible
potential under
the current FiT
Key issues
scheme
+Technological
innovation

Solar PV

150

0.2 - 72

Onshore wind

280

24-140

270

Offshore wind

1,600

0-3

140

Small-middle
scale
hydropower

Geothermal

14

14

1.1 - 3

The rather low capacity factor of the technology

under the Japanese conditions would limit the
actual electricity production.

Land scarcity and public acceptance will

Deep water is reached very rapidly off the coast,

requiring floating turbines, a technology yet to be
developed.

99% of the remaining untapped capacity is

estimated to offer less than 3 MW per site and
could prove expensive given unfavorable sites
and hydrological conditions.

Substantial portions of that potential are located

within protected national and regional park areas,
raising concerns over social and political
acceptance.

4.3

1.1-4.8

5.2

Table 7: Introducible potential for renewable energies, Japan ([10])

Finally, beside renewable energy resources constraints, a further development would have to take into
account the ability of the current grid infrastructure to handle the introduction of a significant
amount of variable renewables.
For example, Japanese expert Yasushiro Hayashi, Director of the Research Institute of Advanced
Network Technology, Waseda University and head of METIs smart meter advisory panel, estimates that
the current grid network can accommodate for only 10 GW of additional wind and solar PV:
aiming at the pre-earthquake Basic Energy Plan target of 120 GW of wind, solar and geothermal capacity
by 2030 would have required significant grid investment. Any further development would cost even more.
14

Feed-in-Tariff

-49-

Strengthening the current grid infrastructure would require to build additional transmission lines to
connect the dispersed renewables, and address the frequency conversion bottleneck by increasing the
converting facilities. If some experts suggest enhancing the grid conversion capacity up to 10 GW, the
measure might be inadequate, depending on the magnitude and location of the renewables deployment.
For example, a 1 GW frequency conversion station would cost approx. 1.5-2bn, with a construction
time of 18-24 months: ramping up the conversion capacity up to 10 GW would cost $13.5-$20bn,
additional to investments in the power generation system.
3.4.3 Improved energy efficiency to reduce the electricity demand
Improving energy efficiency by implementing proactive measures at the countrys level could save up to
13% on the 2050 electricity demand, compared to the Strategic Energy Plan reference demand scenario.
The Advanced Energy Efficiency scenario considers an annual 0.2% reduction in electricity demand:

Demand reduction efforts undertaken during summer 2011 become permanent behavior changes,
or are captured by technological improvements;
Beyond 2030, electricity demand remains constant as a result of a raising use of electricity
in primary energy demand.

Figure 49: Electricity demand evolution under the reference scenario and the Advanced Energy Efficiency
scenario

Following the assumption of a reduced electricity demand, the three scenarios are assessed, under the
same 2050 electricity mix target as in the reference cases, as presented in the following figure 50.
30%

40%

50%

30%

60%

50%
30%
10%
Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear upholding
Renewables

Nuclear

Nuclear phase-out
Fossil

Figure 50: 2050 target electricity mix with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios

-50-

Impact on the power generation system

Decreasing electricity demand will reduce the requirements in terms of power generation, and thus,
installed capacity.
Decreasing electricity demand could save up to 10 GW of installed capacity by 2050, under the
nuclear phase-out scenario. Following figure 51 summarizes the capacity requirements in each of the three
scenarios. The dashed lines represent the difference compared to the base case scenario, i.e. with a higher
electricity demand (and lower energy efficiency). A decreasing electricity demand naturally leads to a
decreased capacity requirement, thanks to both a reduced energy consumption and lower peak load.
Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear upholding

Nuclear phase-out

10
5

22

13
125
75
68
2030

162

41

38

19

107

102

125

134

2030

2050

2030

2050

91
31
2050

264

208

132

179

Capacity savings

Renewables

Nuclear

Fossil

Figure 51: Installed capacity evolution with a reduced electricity demand for the three scenarios

Impact on the power generation system cost

Investment requirements
Electricity savings would allow for a minimized investment in low-CO2 generating capacity in all scenarios.
A nuclear phase-out would still require an additional 120bn investment in power generation assets, while
maintaining nuclear power in the electricity mix and saving electricity would require as much investment
as the Basic Energy Plan. No matter how low is the electricity consumption, phasing-out nuclear still
represents a significantly higher need in investment, due to more capital-intensive renewable energy
electricity production, under the considered assumptions, as illustrated in the following figure 52.

Figure 52: Investment requirements in power generation assets, with a reduced electricity demand,
under the three scenarios

-51-

Electricity generation cost

A nuclear phase-out would still induce a 70% increase in electricity costs over 2010-50, so that electricity
costs would be 28% higher in case of a nuclear phase-out compared to the Basic Energy Plan.
Maintaining nuclear power in the mix would lead to electricity costs 15% higher, compared the Basic
Energy Plan.
Decreasing electricity demand would not change significantly the cost of electricity generation, as the
distribution within the mix between fossil, nuclear, and renewables remains the same. However, in case of
a nuclear phase-out, we can notice a slight decrease compared to the base case: the significant
hydroelectric installed base sees its relative share within the renewables basket increase, leading to the
slight decrease in electricity costs, as illustrated in the following figure 53.

Figure 53: Electricity generation cost evolution with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios

Total cost of the power system

Compared to the Basic Energy Plan, a nuclear phase-out would induce an additional 310bn over 201050. But thanks to a lower electricity demand, it could save up to 540bn to the power generation system
cost in case of a nuclear phase-out. Maintaining nuclear power in the electricity mix and improving energy
efficiency would cost 65bn less than the Basic Energy Plan.
Indeed, reducing the electricity demand would result in lower requirements in capacity investments, while
at the same time reducing the demand for fuel, for power generation.
However, the cost of energy efficiency measures is not taken into account in the analysis: if they were
factored in, it might significantly change the conclusions, resulting in the Basic Energy Plan still being the
cheaper option.
The following figure 54 illustrates the cost difference between the 4,042bn of the system cost over 201050 under the Basic Energy Plan, and the other scenarios, under a reduced electricity demand. The dashed
lines represent the difference with the reference scenarios (i.e. with a higher electricity demand.

-52-

Figure 54: Total additional cost compared to the Basic Energy Plan with reduced electricity demand

Impact on the energy security of supply

Gas imports for power generation
Improving energy efficiency would decrease the need for fossil-fuelled power generation, and the resulting
gas imports:

On the overall, decreasing the electricity demand by 13% would reduce gas imports by 12-13%;
Maintaining nuclear power and undertaking energy efficiency efforts would reduce the
dependency on imported gas by 14%;
A nuclear phase-out would result in gas imports 4 times higher in 2050, compared to the Basic
Energy Plan.

The following figure 55 illustrates the evolution for gas imports to Japan, under the three considered
scenarios. The dashed lines represent the reference cases (i.e. with a higher electricity demand, and so,
with a higher gas consumption).
100

80
Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear upholding

Gm3

60

Nuclear phase-out
40
Nuclear upholding - lower
demand
Nuclear phase-out - lower
demand

20

0
2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

2035

2040

2045

2050

Figure 55: Gas imports for power generation with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios

Impact of the energy imports bill for power generation on the balance of trades
The impact on gas imports is transferred to the energy imports bill. Thus, decreasing the electricity
demand reduces the fuel consumption, and CO2 emissions, and reduces the impact on the balance of
trades:

-53-

Decreasing electricity demand by 13% would allow for a 14% decrease (i.e. 6bn) in the yearly
energy imports bill in 2050;
Phasing-out nuclear power would cause energy imports bill to be back to their 2010s level;
Maintaining nuclear power in the mix would lead to a 30% decrease in the energy bill.

Figure 56 illustrates the reduction in energy imports bill for each scenario, compared to the reference cases
(dashed lines).

Figure 56: Impact of the energy imports bill on the balance of trades with a reduced electricity demand
under the three scenarios

Impact on CO2 emissions and on land use

CO2 emissions from the Japanese power sector
Energy conservation by implementing energy efficiency measures would contain the environmental
impact of a nuclear phase-out:
Electricity savings would slightly reduce the carbon footprint of the power sector, reducing also CO2
emissions by 13 MtCO2 in 2050, as less fossil fuels would be burned for power generation purposes, in the
period.
A nuclear phase-out would result in a 40% decrease in the power sectors CO 2 emissions compared to
their 1990s level. The lower electricity demand enables a higher CO 2 emissions decrease compared to the
reference case, as illustrated in figure 58 (the dashed line represent the emissions in reference cases, with a
higher electricity demand).
However, saving electricity would not impact the power sector carbon intensity: the electricity mix
remains the same, and so do specific CO2 emissions for that very mix. Indeed, even if less CO2 is emitted
on the overall, emissions per kWh produced remain the same, as the share of fossil-fuelled power
generation in the electricity mix is at the exact same level. The effect is illustrated in figure 57, while figure
58 represents overall CO2 emissions over the period.

-54-

Figure 57: Power sector carbon intensity evolution with a reduced electricity demand under the three
scenarios

Figure 58: Power sector overall CO2 emissions evolution with a reduced electricity demand under the three
scenarios (dashed line representing the emissions in reference cases, with a higher electricity demand).

Cost of avoided CO2 emissions

As explained previously, avoided CO2 emissions are priced by the difference between what would have
cost the power generation system in 2010, and what it costs in the reference year. Only the average cost
over the period 2010-50 is considered, as the pace for emissions reduction is different from one scenario
to the other. Results are summarized in the following table 8 (values for the reference cases are in
brackets).
Scenario under consideration

Average cost of avoided CO2 emissions (/tCO2)

Basic Energy Plan

112

Nuclear upholding

132 (226)

Nuclear phase-out

257 (459)

Table 8: Cost of avoided CO2 emissions, under a reduced electricity demand, for the three scenarios

Out of the previously stated results, we can draw that reducing electricity demand significantly lowers the
cost of reducing CO2 emissions. Indeed, reducing electricity demand reduces at the same time the cost of
the overall system over the period 2010-50, and the CO2 emissions. It seems that the systems cost is
reduced to a much greater extent than the CO2 emissions, resulting in a much lower cost for the avoided
CO2 emissions. However, this outcome would be tempered if the cost for energy efficiency measures were
to be factored in: they would result in a higher cost for the system and higher cost for avoided CO2
emissions consequently.
-55-

Land use for wind and solar power

A reduced electricity demand translates in lower capacity requirements, and so, in a lower land use for
wind farms and solar panels. A nuclear phase-out would require nearly 7% of Japans territory to be
covered with onshore wind farms by 2050, 65% more than the Basic Energy Plan, but still lower than the
reference case with a higher electricity demand (~10%). Enhanced energy efficiency would reduce the
land required for solar panels by 15%, so that solar panels would cover 63% more land in case of a nuclear
phase-out, compared to the Basic Energy Plan.
Following figure 59 and 60 illustrates the reduction in the landscape footprint of wind and solar power,
with a reduced electricity demand, compared to the reference cases (dashed lines).

Figure 59: Number of installed wind turbines on Japan territory in 2050 with a reduced electricity demand
under the three scenarios

Figure 60: Land use for solar panels in 2050 with a reduced electricity demand under the three scenarios

-56-

Main conclusions regarding the impacts of a reduced electricity

demand in Japan by 2050
Saving electricity would limit the impact of a nuclear phase-out, while reducing the cost on the power
generation system for climate change mitigation.
Impact of the measure on
the nuclear phase-out

Cost

Security of supply

+
+

Climate change
mitigation

Feasibility

Key differences compared to the Basic Energy Plan

Nuclear phase-out additional cost limited to ~310bn

compared to BEP

~125bn additional investment in power generation capacity

(Investment for energy efficiency measures not factored in)

Energy imports bill reduced at 37bn thanks to reduced

electricity demand, but still 19bn higher compared to BEP

40% reduction in power sector emissions compared to the

nuclear phase-out reference case, but still 4 times higher
compared to BEP

40% reduction in Japan CO2 emissions compared to 1990s

level

~10 GW generating capacity saved through reduced electricity

demand, still ~100GW higher compared to BEP

Table 9: Impacts of reduced electricity demand in Japan by 2050, compared to the reference case and the Basic Energy
Plan.

Implementing energy efficiency measures is challenging and

costly
Japan has already one of the worlds lowest electricity intensity
The high reliance of Japan on foreign-sourced fuels forced the country to undertake significant energy
efficiency within its industry sector, since the 1970s oil crises. Today, Japans energy intensity
(primary energy consumption/GDP) is already one of the worlds lowest, 64% below the world
average, 49% below the USA and 46% below the European average. However, based on the IEA
energy consumption date for the 1990-2000 period, residential demand has been expanding by more than
35%, thus resulting in the increase of residential energy intensity. Following figure 61 illustrates the energy
intensity of GDP for various OECD and non-OECD countries: the energy intensity is represented as the
energy consumption in tons of oil equivalent (toe) for each unit of currency produced and summing up to
the total GDP of the country.

-57-

Toe/Currency

1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0

Figure 61: Energy intensity of GDP ([11])

Under the current situation, the energy transition that Japan might need to go through might trigger the
necessary energy efficiency efforts to rationalize energy use in Japanese households and tertiary sector.
However, two key issues are to challenge the implementation of these very measures:

The significant behavioral changes that will be required from the citizens, as much as their
willingness to upgrade their appliances and house infrastructures will be key to improve their
energy use;
Energy efficiency measures may have a significant cost, and the challenge will be either to
promote efficiency efforts that are intrinsically cost-effective, or to incentivize others that are not
for the single consumer, but that would be beneficial to the society.

Residential use is dominated by lighting

In order to identify the potential for rationalizing the energy use in Japanese households, we first need to
get an insight of how typical Japanese homes consume electricity. In table 10 below, which describes the
energy consumption of a typical Japanese household in 2004, Lighting and Other includes the various
entertainment and computing electrical devices in the home, many of which utilize some degree of energy
wasting standby power generation.
Residential function

1965 segmentation

2004 segmentation

Lighting and Other

19%

38%

Hot water

34%

28%

Heating

31%

25%

Kitchen

15%

7%

Cooling

0.4%

2%

18,100

42,680

Total MJ/household/year

Table 10: Japan residential electricity use (2004) ([3], [6])

Lighting appears to present the most significant potential for load reduction, specifically with switching
current light bulbs with more efficient LED lighting.
More efficient lighting could save up to 9% of the current electricity demand for 160bn
In Japan, there are approximately 1.6 billion light bulbs that consume every year 151 TWh of electricity
(i.e. 13.5% of the national annual electricity demand). Replacing all light bulbs with more efficient LED
bulbs could save up to 92 TWh/year, reducing the annual electricity demand by 9-12%.

-58-

However, switching to more efficient lighting has a significant cost, and is not always cost-effective. Thus,
if replacing all light bulbs would cost 160bn, with an average payback of 10 years, that cost is
incremental: the more electricity is saved, the more it becomes expensive to save it, depending on the
technology already used.
Figure 62 gives an illustration of the described phenomenon: if changing incandescent light bulbs is always
cost-effective, compared to producing electricity through nuclear power or any other technology, cost can
be challenging for other more efficient technologies, and implementing electricity saving measures
can end up more expensive than producing that very electricity.

Figure 62: Incremental cost of electricity savings vs. electricity generation costs ([6])

-59-

4 Key conclusions
During the summer 2011, emergency measures undertaken by the Japanese government and the
populations responsiveness to these measures were highly efficient. Indeed, despite the expected 20%
capacity shortage in Tokyo and Tohoku areas, there was no power outage. On the supply side, capacity
was recovered by restarting and restoring fossil-fuelled power generation, and importing power from
neighboring areas. On the demand side, stringent demand restriction measures led to a summer peak
demand 10 GW lower in the Tokyo area and 3.1 GW lower in the Tohoku area, compared to 2010.
However, these measures had indirect significant impacts on the Japanese economy and daily life, and
appear unsustainable on the long term. Thus Japan saw a 20% increase in LNG import prices, a $46bn
additional cost to the national energy bill in 2011, and an 11% increase in CO 2 emissions. Moreover,
demand restriction measures for large industries during summer 2011 were emergency measures and
cannot be permanent. Public acceptance and willingness to alter their daily lifestyle might not last.
Market-driven electricity conservation reforms and subsidy-driven supply capacity additions aim to avoid
emergency measures in the summer 2012 similar to those of summer 2011, and in that sense, lessons from
the past seem to have been perfectly integrated by the Japanese government.
For the longer term, the results of the developed model, under the chosen inputs, show that a nuclear
phase-out would induce additional costs of the order of 850bn to the power system over the period
2010-50, compared to the Basic Energy Plan, while also preventing Japan to reach its CO2 emissions
reduction targets by 2050. A sensitivity analysis shows that in case the renewable energy potential is lower
than expected, a reduced renewables development would lower the cost of the power system, but put
aside climate change mitigation and energy security of supply. On the other hand, a reduced electricity
demand through energy efficiency measures would have a positive impact on both CO 2 emissions and the
security of supply. In terms of cost, in the context of our analysis which focuses on the power generation
system, energy efficiency measure will translate into a reduced systems cost. However, the cost of these
very energy efficiency measures might end up costlier than producing this very saved electricity.
All in all, assessing economic and environmental impacts of the 2050 energy mix in Japan gives means of
comparison to decision makers for driving the future energy policy, However, focusing on the power
generation system alone seems insufficient, as indirect consequences to the countrys economy, such as
the cost of energy efficiency measures or the benefits of creating an industry around dedicated
technologies, are not factored in, and could change the outcomes of certain decisions. To that extent, we
see that energy policy should not be driven solely by energy-related considerations, but should include
larger considerations, as it impacts the society as a whole.

-60-

Appendix 1: Sensitivity analysis synthesis

-61-

-62-

-63-

Appendix 2: Model outputs evolution

Basic Energy Plan scenario

Figure 63: Electricity mix evolution Basic Energy Plan scenario

Figure 64: Installed capacity evolution Basic Energy Plan scenario

-64-

Figure 65: Capacity under construction over 2010-50 Basic Energy Plan scenario

Figure 66: Investment requirements Basic Energy Plan scenario

Figure 67: Fuel imports and energy bill Basic Energy Plan scenario

-65-

Figure 68: Electricity generation cost Basic Energy Plan scenario

Figure 69: Power sector CO2 emissions and carbon intensity Basic Energy Plan scenario

-66-

Appendix 2: Model assumptions

Macroeconomic assumptions and fossil fuels prices
Exchange rates
Economic
assumptions
Inflation

1.30

/Yen

98.6

1.5 %

2010

2020

2030

2050

11

12.9

13.9

14.3

Coal $2010/t

99.2

106.3

109.3

110

CO2 2010/t

23

31

31

14

14

14

14

Gas

Fuel prices

/$

$2010/MBtu

Nuclear
2010/MWh
fuel

-67-

References
[1] www.enerdata.net, Enerdata (energy related database)
[2] http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/index.html , Federation of Electric Power Companies, Japan
[3] http://www.meti.go.jp/english/ , Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)
[4] http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/index-e.html , Tokyo Electric Power Company
[5] http://www.tohoku-epco.co.jp/index-e.htm , Tohoku Electric Power Company
[6] http://eneken.ieej.or.jp/en/ , Institute for Energy Economics (IEEJ), Japan
[7] http://energy.gov/ , US Department of Energy; http://www.iea.org/, International Energy Agency
[8] http://www.jaif.or.jp/english/ , Japan Atomic Industrial Forum
[9] Cost Estimation and Review Committee, within the National Policy Unit
[10] http://www.env.go.jp/en/ , Ministry of the Environment, Japan
[11] Energy Intensity of GDP as an Index of Energy Conservation Problems in international comparison of energy
intensity of GDP and estimate using sector-based approach , Shigeru Suehiro, Institute for Energy Economics
(2007)

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